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Kant's Theory of Freedom - by Henry E. Allison (Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, Issue 4) (1992)
Kant's Theory of Freedom - by Henry E. Allison (Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, Issue 4) (1992)
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RALF MEERBOTE
ofRochester
University
For some twentyyears Henry Allison has been working with Kant's
doctrine of transcendentalidealism. No one knows better than he how
manywould consider thisa waste of time,arguing thatKant's theoryis so
incoherentas not to deserve serious consideration.But Allison has criti-
cally examined such attacks in numerous articlesand three books: first,
TheKant-Eberhard Controversy( 1975), thenKant'sTranscendental
Idealism:An
Interpretation and Defense(1983), and now, Kant's Theoryof Freedom.His
judgment now is thatKant's theoryof freedomis "the mostprofoundand
sustained attempt to deal with this problem in the historyof Western
philosophy."
Allison does not hold thateverydetail of Kant's idealismis defensibleor
thatKant is completelyconsistentin all his discussionsof the topic. None-
theless,he has found reason to remain appreciativeof Kant's main episte-
mic theme, and his argumentsare characterizedby lucidityand by sensi-
tivityto exceptionallydifficultand frequentlyambiguous texts.Given the
obscurityof manyof Kant's arguments,however,the depth and subtletyof
Allison's interpretationsmay require some of his readers to read various
passages several times to be sure theyhave understood them.
Allison has argued for the viabilityof Kant's transcendentalidealism in
his book of that title. Put briefly,he contends that Kant's noumenal-
phenomenal distinctionis a "two-aspect"claim, based on what Allison
refersto as the "epistemicconditions"of human knowledge,namely,those
conditionsnecessaryforus to have experienceof objects.These, of course,
are the sensible formsof space and time and the pure categories of the
understanding.They also may be considered to be "objectifyingcondi-
tions,"since theyboth constituteour knowledgeof objects and determine
the limitsof our possible knowledge of such objects. Kant's "transcenden-
tal idealism," then, claims that all the objects we experience are "mere
865
866
ROGER J. SULLIVAN
ofSouthCarolina
University
867