HAMDARD INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES AND

RESEARCH
JAMIA HAMDARD,
DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY,
HAMDARD NAGAR 110062

SUBJECT- CRIMINOLOGY CASE

COMMENT ON -
MAHMOD FAROOQI JUDGEMENT OF DELHI HIGH COURT.

Collectively submitted by
NAME - MOHAMAD GUFRAN
ENROLLEMENT NO. 2019-342-058,
NAME – MIRZA SHAQUIB
ENROLLMENT NO. 2019-342-057

SUBMITTED TO -
DR ABHISHEK GUPTA

“ɪꜰ ʏᴏᴜ ᴅᴏɴ’ᴛ ɢᴏ ᴀꜰᴛᴇʀ ᴡʜᴀᴛ ʏᴏᴜ ᴡᴀɴᴛ, ʏᴏᴜ’ʟʟ ɴᴇᴠᴇʀ ʜᴀᴠᴇ ɪᴛ. ɪꜰ ʏᴏᴜ
ᴅᴏɴ’ᴛ ᴀꜱᴋ, ᴛʜᴇ ᴀɴꜱᴡᴇʀ ɪꜱ ᴀʟᴡᴀʏꜱ ɴᴏ. ɪꜰ ʏᴏᴜ ᴅᴏɴ’ᴛ ꜱᴛᴇᴘ ꜰᴏʀᴡᴀʀᴅ,
ʏᴏᴜ’ʀᴇ ᴀʟᴡᴀʏꜱ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ꜱᴀᴍᴇ ᴘʟᴀᴄᴇ.” – ɴᴏʀᴀ ʀᴏʙᴇʀᴛꜱ

COURT- DELHI HIGH COURT

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION-

In this particular case, Mahmood Farooqui, the appellant here was accused of Rape
under section 376 of IPC. The prosecutrix in this case is a student from Columbia
University in New York. She met with the accused through a common friend and
Mahmood invited her to a wedding. The charge against the accused was that on
March 28, 2015, he undertook forcible oral sex on the prosecutrix in his flat
without her consent, and the offender’s defence at the trial court stage was that
such a case hadn’t ever occurred; however, after being convicted at the trial court
stage, the accused
proposed a different argument (that was acknowledged by the court) that, if the act
of oral sex had taken place, it was with the consent of the prosecutrix.
Facts of the case-
FIR No.273/15 dated 19.06.2015 was registered for investigation under Section
376 of the IPC.
The police after investigation submitted charge sheet whereupon cognizance was
taken and the case was committed to the court of sessions for trial.
The plaintiff in the Farooqui case was an American PhD student who, as part of her
study, had met with media star Farooqui many times. The incident happened at his
home after the complainant had been invited to accompany him and his wife to a
local wedding. The accused was drunk when the defendant entered, and the wife
was not in the house. He performed oral sex on her, forcefully. She claimed she
didn't want to indulge in oral sex and that she kept pulling it up because "the
defendant attempted to take down her panties." She refused, but was held down
violently because soon as it was done she wanted to leave the room. The
complainant, in her email to the accused, is quoted as having said “I told you
many times I didn’t want to. But you did become forceful. I went along,
because I did not want things to escalate… I was just afraid that something
bad would happen if I didn’t, it was because of pressure and your own force
physically on me.”
The prosecutrix, in her FIR has stated that She had come to Delhi in June, 2014
and was in search of some contact at Gorakhpur for the purposes of getting
information regarding Nath Sampraday. It was in this connection that she was
introduced to the appellant through a friend, Danish Hussaini, who has been
examined as PW10 in the trial. On the day of the occurrence i.e. on 28.03.2015,
she had called the appellant requesting him to arrange for tickets of his
performance which was to be staged a day after. The appellant invited her over to
his house for dinner. Later, at 4 o‟clock in the afternoon, the appellant informed
her that he would be going to a wedding. The prosecutrix thought that perhaps the
appellant and his wife would be going to the wedding. She thereafter arrived
around 9 p.m. at the house of the appellant and saw two students leaving the house.
After exchanging brief courtesies with them, the prosecutrix went upstairs and the
door was opened by Ashish Singh, a friend of the appellant who has been
examined as PW12. The prosecutrix found the appellant to be in an intoxicated and
lachrymose state. The prosecutrix was asked to go to the office room of the
appellant. After waiting there for about 20 minutes, the prosecutrix came out of the
office room for a smoke on the porch when she was asked by the appellant to sit
down near him. The prosecutrix hugged the appellant, enquired from him as to
whether there was a need for a group hug and also asked him about the reason for
his sadness. At that point of time, the appellant is said to have told Ashish (PW12)
to leave the room and also informed that one Darrain (DW3) would be coming.
After Ashish left the company of the prosecutrix and the appellant, the appellant
called Darrain and also put him on speaker phone. The prosecutrix heard Darrain
saying that he would not come. The prosecutrix then called Darrain when the
appellant had left the room. Darrain was informed by the prosecutrix that the
appellant was drunk and that Darrain needed to come to his house. Darrain
expressed his inability and promised to talk to her the next day. Thereafter, the
appellant came back and he and the prosecutrix had a talk for a while. It has been
alleged by the prosecutrix that thereafter the appellant kissed her, to which she
responded by saying that she did not think that it was what he needed. The
appellant kept on kissing the prosecutrix and telling her about her being a great
woman. He also disclosed his intention of sucking her to which she promptly
denied. The appellant and the prosecutrix were seated on the couch. The
prosecutrix has then alleged that the appellant tried to pull down her underwear and
she kept on pulling it up. The prosecutrix was thereafter immobilized by the
appellant who forced oral sex upon her.
The prosecutrix has stated that in the first instance, she was scared because of the
strength of the appellant but because she did not want to get hurt, she pretended an
orgasm. The appellant tried to repeat what he had done but in the meantime the
door bell rang and the two friends of the appellant returned. Thereafter, the
prosecutrix wanted to leave and so she booked a MERU cab and simultaneously
texted her friend Danish Hussaini (PW10). She also told Ashish (PW12) that she
wanted to go but was asked by Ashish to stay back for a while as in case the wife
of the appellant, Anusha (not examined) did not return, she will have to feed the
appellant. The prosecutrix, in the event of the driver of the MERU cab not locating
the house of the appellant, wanted to get a rickshaw but she was dissuaded and was
told that it was dangerous for her in the night to take a rickshaw ride. The wife of
the appellant in the meantime returned and the appellant asked her to go. Taxi was
fetched by Ashish. When the prosecutrix got into the car, she immediately called
Danish Hussaini (PW10) and told him about what had happened between her and
the appellant. She has stated in her complaint that she wanted to take legal action
against the appellant for his act and that she did not want to go through the medical
examination.
Charge was framed against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of the
IPC to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
On 30.03.2015, the prosecutrix is said to have sent an e-mail (Ex.PW 3/C-9) to the
appellant. For the sake of completeness, the e- mail referred to above is being
extracted below:
"I tried calling you, but was unable to get through, I want to talk with you about
what happened the other night. I like you a lot. You know that I consider you a
good friend and I respect you, but what happened the other night wasn't right. I
know you were in a very difficult space and you are having some issues right now,
but Saturday you really went too far. You kept asking me if you could suck me and
I knew you were drunk and sad and things were going awful. I knew that this
wasn't going to help things and I told you many times I didn't want to. But you did
become forceful. I went along, because I did not want things to escalate, but it was
not what I wanted. I was just afraid that something bad would happen if I didn't.
This is new for me. I completely own my sexually and I consider you a good
friend. I like you. I am attracted to you, but it really made me feel bad when this
happened. I haven't known what to say to you since then, I wasn't sure if I would
say anything. In the end I consented, but it was because of pressure and your own
force physically on me. I did not want things to go bad. I have only decided to tell
you how I feel for your own well being. I am afraid that if you don't realize that
this is unacceptable, you may try this on another woman when you are drunk and
she will not be so understanding.
I do love you and wish you well. I want the best for you, whatever that is, but I
also need you to know doing what you did the other night is unacceptable. I hope
this doesn't affect our friendship, but am willing to deal with the repercussions if it
does."
The prosecutrix has deposed that on the receipt of the e-mail referred to above, the
appellant expressed his sincerest apologies ["My deepest apologies"]. The
prosecutrix has deposed that she wanted to ignore this fact but she could not. On
01.04.2015, she wrote to her Academic Advisor, Allison Busch, at Columbia
University through e- mail (Ex.PW5/D) that she was sexually assaulted and wanted
to come home. There was no response of the Academic Advisor till 08.04.2015.
During this period she was in contact with her mother and sisters who wanted her
to come home but she waited for the response of her Academic Advisor. On
08.04.2015, she received an e-mail (Ex.PW3/C-15) from the Academic Advisor.
By this time the prosecutrix had made up her mind to go back home. On
12.04.2015, the prosecutrix again sent an e-mail (Ex.PW3/C-10) to the appellant
telling him as to how he had afflicted her life and the life of her family members.
On the same day i.e. on 12.04.2015 she received an e-mail (Ex.PW3/C-11) from
the wife of the appellant namely Anusha...
The wife of the appellant had apologized for what had happened to the prosecutrix.
The prosecutrix also replied to the e-mail (Ex.PW3/C-12), telling the wife of the
appellant not to blame the bipolar disorder of her husband for the sexual assault on
her and that rape and sexual assault is executed with power.
The prosecutrix thereafter left India on 14.04.2015. On 15.04.2015 she again
received an e-mail from the wife of the appellant which is as hereunder:
"Hi ....Prosecutrix I am glad to know that you will be among your friends and
family for the moment. I hope that you will be able to overcome this horrible
incident. As I said before, his brothers and I will completely support you in
whatever you wish to do about it.
I understand how angry you must be and therefore misread my categorical position
on such matters. The reason I mentioned Bi-polar is because that is the reason why
I don't have access to Mahmood and therefore I am unable to confront him at
present
The prosecutrix thereafter went to New York and saw a counsellor at Columbia
University because she was very traumatized. By late April, she had decided to file
a report about it in the Department of Gender Based Misconduct at Columbia
University. It was at that point of time that she decided to return to India to file a
complaint against the appellant and also to continue with her research. She wrote
to the Head of Fulbright Fellowship intimating him about the sexual assault on her
and her desire to go back to India to pursue the case against the appellant but she
was advised to stay in America because her research visa was to expire on
11.05.2015. The research visa could not be extended and the prosecutrix had to
come to India on a 30 days‟ tourist visa only for the purposes of filing a complaint
against the appellant.
The prosecutrix came to India on 06.06.2015. Because of her being unaware of the
procedure in India and for fear, she visited the police station of New Friends
Colony only on 19.06.2015 and gave her complaint (Ex.PW5/A) to a lady police
officer. Since the prosecutrix was not in a proper shape of mind, she could not
actually state in the complaint as to what had happened to her and therefore she
added that the appellant had forced oral sex on her, in her complaint and appended
her initials. She was given a copy of the FIR (Ex.PW1/A) and was taken to AIIMS
for her medical examination. However she refused to undergo any gynecological
examination. Her statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.PW5/B) at
Saket Courts.
Judgements:
In the judgement dated September 25, a Single Judge of the High Court set aside
the conviction on the basis that,
“it remains in doubt as to whether such an incident, as has been narrated by the
prosecutrix, took place and if at all it had taken place, it was without the
consent/will of the prosecutrix and if it was without the consent of the prosecutrix,
whether the appellant could discern/understand the same.”
The Court therefore, required three ingredients to be proved for the purpose of
constituting an offence under Section 375:
• That the event took place, in that there was the actus reus, i.e., any of the
four actions that are enumerated in subsections (a) to (d) of Section 375 were
committed.
• That any of circumstances enumerated in Section 375 were present. In the
present case, the circumstance invoked was that there was ‘lack of consent’.
• That there was mens rea, being the specific knowledge of the accused that he
was performing the act without the consent of the prosecutrix, i.e., the
accused could discern that there was lack of consent.

The first two rape conditions were met: oral sex was against her will, and without
her consent. The plaintiff said no, attempted to hold the accused off her clothes and
tried to drive him further. Her relinquishing resistance in fear is a consent gained
by fear of harm. Instead of enforcing the consent law as it was adopted in 2013, the
court added an extra requirement for "intellectually / academically qualified"
women "with letters." The court ruled that a well educated women needed to make
clear to the accused her "unwillingness." The court held that the accused failed to
understand the 'no' repeatedly issued, and the resistance.It further held that in cases
where “physical contacts” have existed between the parties in the past “it would be
really difficult to decipher whether little or no resistance and a feeble ‘no’, was
actually a denial of consent.” The use of the term “feeble” is concerning as at no
point in any of the complaint’s cross-examination or evidence given was this
suggested. Further to place an additional burden upon the complainant -ensuring
the perpetrator understands her lack of consent- goes against the legal provisions in
force for prosecuting rape, and undermines the definition of sexual consent. The
Delhi High Court, for crimes related to sexual harassment, including the current
consent clause, did not follow the values and the enforcement of the law as adopted
in 2013. Rather, the court was more confident applying section 90 of the Indian
Penal Code, the 'consent considered to be given under fear or suspicion' clause for
all criminal offences.
Decision in Mahmood Farooqui v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) provides a clear
example of the law’s aversion to change. The persistence of law inside dominant
social, cultural, and sexual norms frequently violates the logic and goal of legal
changes, leaving us with more law but little freedom or justice. Noteworthy
amendments were implemented to the rape law provisions in the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 in 2013, which included the insertion of a definition of consent in rape
cases. However, the high court’s anti-feminist interpretation in the said case has
utterly nullified the definition of sexual consent’s goal and intent. The supreme
court has once again proven the rigidity and fixity of the conservative legal
framework by overturning a trial court judgement which dramatically recognised
rape as loss of control over one’s sexuality. The preconceptions of an ideal rape
victim is plain and simple as per the court, genuine rape, real resistance, and
authentic consent are all that remains. In 2013 the amendments had defined
consent as “an unequivocal voluntary agreement when a woman signals intent to
participate in a specific sexual act through words, gestures, or any other form of
verbal or nonverbal communication.” This definition is used in conjunction with
the broader definition of rape. In addition, the 2013 changes included a seventh
section to Section 375, which stipulates that a male is guilty of rape if the woman
“is unable to communicate consent.” In its most limited sense, this could relate to
instances in which someone is unable to communicate owing to a physical or
mental impairment. However, this can also refer to instances in which a woman is
denied the opportunity to speak and be heard, leaving her unable to communicate.
Mahmood Farooqui, the appellant, has been convicted under Section 376(1) of the
IPC vide judgment dated 30.07.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge -
Special Fast Track Court, Saket Courts, New Delhi in Sessions Case No.118/15
(New SC No.1590/2016), arising out of FIR No.273/2015 dated 19.06.2015 (P.S.
New Friends Colony) registered under Section 376 of the IPC. He has been
sentenced by order dated 04.08.2016 to undergo RI for 7 years, and to pay a fine of
Rs.50,000/-.
A reference has been made to the case of Tameezuddin @ Tammu vs State Of
(Nct) Of Delhi : (2009) 15 SCC 566, where the Supreme Court has held as here
under:
"It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given
predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if
the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very
principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter."

Case for the Defence

The case for the defence throughout the trial was that while the prosecutrix visited
the house of Farooqui on March 28, the incident is totally false and he did not
perform oral sex on her. Rather, the prosecutrix was angered by his rebuffs and
filed this false complaint.
On appeal, the defence raised a new plea (see para 42) in the nature of an
alternative argument that, if at all, such an occurrence had taken place, it was with
the consent of the prosecutrix.
It must be noted that taking a false plea at trial is itself an incriminating
circumstance against the accused and the Supreme Court has specifically
disregarded contradictory stands in the context of rape cases. The Single Judge,
however, does not consider this as a basis for drawing any negative inference.
The defence argued that “it is not unknown that during sexual acts, one of the
partners may be a little less willing or, it can be said unwilling but when there is an
assumed consent, it matters not if one of the partners to the act is a bit hesitant...”
The defence lists (at para 45) the circumstances which demonstrate that the
prosecutrix communicated willingness. These include that the prosecutrix had
exchanged kisses and hugs with Farooqui in the past, that she had been cracking
jokes and indulged in playful banter immediately prior to the occurrence, that she
feigned an orgasm and that prior to the act, when asked for sexual favours by the
accused, she did not stoutly resent or deny. All of these factors, it was submitted,
give rise to a situation of ‘assumed consent.’
The defence further argued that the previous statement of the prosecutrix in her
email dated March 30 to Farooqui clearly reveals that she consented in that it states
that he went really too far and that it was not right, but she ‘went along’ and
‘consented.’

Did she refuse (properly)?

While evaluating this argument, the Single Judge begins by observing,
“It is a matter of common knowledge that different persons have different
inclinations for sexual activity and immediately preceding the act, there are
different ways of people of responding to the advances, entreaties or request (at
para 77).”
After considering the conduct of the prosecutrix, the Judge holds that even though
she said no and pushed him, thereafter, she went along and that there was no
communication of the fear in the mind of the prosecutrix to the accused. Rather,
“…by making a mental move of feigning orgasm so as to end the ordeal, what the
appellant has been communicated is, even though wrongly and mistakenly, that the
prosecutrix is okay with it and has participated in the act (para 82).”
Once the prosecution has proved that a woman said no and pushed someone, the
fact that she then ceased resisting does not transform her verbal expression of ‘no’
into a non-verbal expression of consent. It is the evidence of the prosecutrix that
she did feign an orgasm, however, this was after some moments had passed so as to
end the ordeal. Thus, at best, this expression could only be invoked to justify his
actions post this moment and cannot be relied on to justify all his actions prior
thereto.
The Judge also relies on the email, to find that “she went along” and so there was
no communication of lack of consent. However, the email when read as a whole
says a very different story:
“..I told you many times I didn’t want to. But you became forceful. I went along,
because I did not want things to escalate but it was not what I wanted…
In the end I consented but it was because of pressure and your own force
physically on me. I did not want things to go bad.”
The prosecutrix is clear that the force of the accused preceded her going along.
Moreover, in light of her testimony, there is nothing in this previous statement to
indicate that this going along was anything more than passive resistance in that she
lay down without physically or verbally resisting, after having said no. This is not
sufficient in law to constitute an unequivocal expression of willingness. The
proviso in Section 375 explicitly prohibits the Court from reaching such a
conclusion.
Role of Judges and Criminal Law
The Court, like any of us, can only make a determination based on a Judge’s own
understanding of human psychology. Is he right when he says that there are grades
of ‘no’ and that not all refusals are actual denials of consent? Did Farooqui only do
what most people do by coaxing a partner into sex? Should he be in prison for this?
Apart from outlawing those actions that are already morally abhorrent to society,
Criminal Law is also a tool to reorient human behaviour so as to avoid larger social
harm. It is deployed to ensure that regardless of how we presently behave or feel
about our behaviour, we have to modify our actions to fall within the standards of
law.
The law as it stands after the Criminal Law Amendment, 2013 does not leave us
free, either as regular people, or as judges, to simply apply our own standards and
assume consent in sexual relationships, whether because of a past sexual
relationship or because of how educated the parties are. It requires that men receive
affirmative expressions of consent, regardless of whether this is a normal practice
in our sexual encounters or not.
This standard follows a long history of mostly male judges using their own limited
understanding of the world to repeatedly disbelieve women who say there was no
consent. The reluctance of this Court to apply this hard standard raises serious
challenges to the very ability of Criminal Law to serve as an effective recourse to
those women who experience very real trauma from the actions of people,
including intimate partners, who are not yet socialised into respecting boundaries.
The judgement holds up a mirror to us to ask whether consent between known
persons is too murky a ground for us to adjudicate via the vehicle of the adversarial
criminal trial? Even as the Judge reaffirms that the prosecutrix is a ‘sterling
witness,’ the judgement is very transparent about his struggle to understand how to
pin responsibility in this case.

So, the question here is, Did the accused understand her lack of consent?

Talking about effective communication where both parties understand what they
mean, the court had an interesting opinion which was the basis of ruling in this
particular case. The sexual partners are equally responsible for obtaining a
“unequivocal voluntary agreement” under this concept. In addition to the woman’s
willingness to participate, the male must be accountable and sincere in his
understanding and appreciation of what is being expressed. Far from grasping this
significant shift in understanding of consenting sexuality, the Farooqui decision
falls short of conceiving sexual freedom for women. Instead, the feminist shift in
the concept of consent is being undone in a variety of ways. The ruling replaces the
woman and reinstitutes the male as the subject of law, rejecting feminist reforms.
The court’s conclusion was based on what the man understood, not what the lady
said: “even though the act was not done with her consent, she actually transmitted
something that the appellant took as consent.” As a result, the woman’s voice in
questions of sexuality was effectively silenced. Also the court’s questions were
framed from the man’s perspective: “whether the appellant mistakenly accepted the
prosecutrix’s moves as consent; whether the prosecutrix’s feelings could be
effectively communicated to the appellant; and whether mistaking all of this for
genuine consent by the appellant.” Moreover, the court stated that “the
prosecutrix’s unwillingness was only in her own mind and heart, but she
communicated something different to the appellant. It is unclear at when point
during the act she did not grant her consent, and it is safe to assume that the
appellant was completely unaware of the prosecutrix’s unwillingness. It is not
uncommon for one of the parties to be less willing or even unwilling during sexual
actions, but when there is assumed permission, it makes no difference whether one
of the couples is hesitant. Such faint hesitancy may never be interpreted as a
positive rejection of the other partner’s advances.”
The court attempted to read stereotypes into consent by stating that a ‘feeble no’
from a woman can be taken into account as a ‘yes’ in some circumstances, and by
distinguishing between the ‘no’ of a learned woman versus a more orthodox
woman, and when the victim knows the accused versus when they are strangers. In
this concept, women (especially “intellectually/academically capable” women) are
expected to be loud (not feeble), aggressive (not timid), and show “genuine
opposition” (not feeble disinclination).
The court’s explanation of section 375 requires a ‘unequivocal willingness
from the victim to the sexual act,’ which implies that “men should receive
affirmative expressions of consent, regardless of whether this is a common
practise in our sexual encounters or not,” but nowhere are these kinds of
subtleties added to meet the criteria of consent from a female.
In such cases, it would be really difficult to decipher whether little or no resistance
and a feeble “no”, was actually a denial of consent.”
Thus, the crux of the judgement is that the Court sets out a separate standard for
educated (liberated) women who claim rape by people with whom they have had
prior sexual relationships/by known persons. This is a classic reproduction of
stereotypes around ‘good’ women versus ‘bad’ women – while the former is to be
believed, that latter is to be assumed to be consenting, even if a bit hesitant.

“In my opinion, the judgement here is flawed reason being the High
Court entirely dismissed important aspects in the facts of the case. The
prosecutrix did say no, she denied accused’s advancements on her body
but the court only considered the point where in her no was timid and
feeble. In the trial court, the accused denied the entire situation in one
god, what does that say about the accused? Later on he said that it did
happen with her consent, then what was the reason of lying in the trial
court hearing? How is it possible that the high court dismissed several
important aspects of this case and just blamed it on the prosecutrix that
you should’ve been clearer with your
disagreement. How was the man not expected to understand that she
said no, not once but twice. Verbally as well as through her body
language when he pulled her underwear down and she pulled it back up.
How is it that the man in this case was not expected to ask id she wanted
oral sex or not?
This judgement had a chance to write history with respect to the
amendment in rape laws but has set a really negative precedent for the
coming future.”
Hence, the legal accuracy of the judgment boiled down to whether the
court believed that the incident took place at all. While addressing this
issue, the court questioned whether the incident could have taken place
in a short time span as suggested by the survivor’s testimony. However,
it also noted that the aspects regarding the timing “pale into
insignificance” if the accused did not know that the sexual act was
without the survivor’s consent. It is not clear whether the court
determines that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
incident took place or not. If on the basis of the evidence adduced, the
court laboured a doubt about the timeline of the survivor’s testimony, it
should have acquitted Farooqui straightaway. That could have been said
to be based on a sound legal basis, although one may disagree on the
interpretation of facts. However, by articulating irrelevant “standards of
consent” and ruling that the perception of the accused on the survivor’s
consent is relevant in rape adjudication, the judgment causes immense
damage to rape law, and to the advances made—both in law and public
discourse—after the 2012 Delhi gang rape.
The reliance on stereotypes and rape myths has a detrimental impact on
rape adjudication, where, for their testimony to be treated as credible
and sufficient for a conviction, a specific type of behaviour is expected of
rape survivors before, during, and after the act. The stereotypes and
behaviours that have been considered relevant during rape law
adjudication in India have included: the past sexual conduct of the
survivor; the relationship between the accused and the survivor;
whether she screamed during the incident; whether she physically
resisted; the time gap between the incident and registering of the FIR;
and whether the survivor informed her family, friends, or even passers-
by right after the incident. Only an “ideal” rape survivor—as
determined by myths about how women do (or should) act during sexual
assault—was given the protection of the law.

The Supreme Court in Mukesh vs. State of Chhattisgarh: (2014) 10 SCC 327, which
was a case of rape, has held that the state of mind of the prosecutrix cannot be precisely
analyzed on the basis of speculation because each person reacts differently to a
particular stressful situation.