PART1

GENERAL PROVISION
Rule 72: SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES

Civil action – is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. [sec. 3,
R1(a)]

1. Ordinary Civil Action is one by which one party sues another, based on a cause of action, to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or
redress a wrong, whereby the defendant has performed an act or omitted to do an act in violation of the rights of the plaintiff. The
purpose is primarily compensatory.

2. Special Civil Action is also one by which one party sues another to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong.
However, such action, although governed by rules for ordinary civil actions, is subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special
civil action.

Examples:
 Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
 Ejectment (forcible entry and unlawful detainer)
 Expropriation
 Review of decision of COA and COMELEC
 Partition
 Foreclosure
 Contempt

 A SPECIAL PROCEEDING is an application to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, or any remedy other than an
ordinary suit in a court of justice. It is generally commenced by application, petition or special form of pleading as may be provided for by
the particular rule or law.

Differences Special Proceeding Civil Action

As to nature Non-adversarial (not brought by 1 party against another) Adversarial (a suit by 1 party against another)
Binding effect Proceeding in rem (binding upon the whole world. All persons having Not in rem proceeding
interest in the subject matter involved, whether notified or not, are equally
bound.
Cause of action No cause of action (does not pray for affirmative relief for injury) Must have cause of action (exp. Some special
civil actions)
Commenced by application, petition or special form of pleading

Acquire Publication Based on allegations (complainant),

jurisdiction summons/voluntary appearance (defendant)

Proceeding in rem- is directed on the thing or the res itself and which asks the court to make a declaration of or to dispose of or deal with the res.
Examples
 Application for original registration of a parcel of land
 Petition for declaration of insolvency
 Escheat proceedings
 Petition for change of name

Action in personam – directed against particular person and seeks a relief which would be binding only upon such particular persons. Ex: specific
performance, action for a sum of money

Action quasi in rem – one which is directed against particular persons but seeks to reach and dispose of or deal with their property located in the
Philippines.
Example
 Judicial foreclosure of mortgage
 Action for partition and accounting
 Action to quiet title and to remove cloud.

List of Special Proceedings under Rule 72, S1, not exclusive

1) Settlement of estate
2) Escheat
3) Guardianship and custody of minors
4) Trustees
5) Adoption
 6) Rescission and revocation of adoption
7) Hospitalization of insane persons
8) Habeas corpus
9) Change of name
10) Voluntary dissolution of corporations
11) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children
12) Constitution of family home
13) Declaration of absence and death
14) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry

Habeas Corpus
 It is a writ that extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto (Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of Court).

WRIT OF KALIKASAN 
 the writ is a remedy available “on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.”
 is aimed to provide a stronger protection of environmental rights in order to accord an effective and speedy remedy where the constitutional
right to a healthful and balance ecology is violated and address any possible large-scale ecological threats. 

WRIT OF AMPARO
 a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
 The difference between these two writs is that habeas corpus is designed to enforce the right to freedom of the person, whereas amparo is
designed to protect those other fundamental human rights enshrined in the Constitution but not covered by the writ of habeas corpus.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

 A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
 to protect citizens from the improper use of collected personal data held by the government and private agencies.

Testate and Intestate Proceedings

 Cruz v. Cruz, Feb. 28, 2018; Excluded heirs

Facts:
The parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering a parcel of land from which they inherited their late parents, on
the agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion of the subject property. In 1998, when the subject property was being
subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was shown to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two lots. Respondents
alleged that their siblings Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion – who was illiterate – to sign the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, which was written in the English language, without previously reading and explaining the
contents thereof to the latter.RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.CA reversed the RTC’s decision, CA found that the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz is null and void.

Issue:
Whether the subject extrajudicial settlement of estate was valid.

Ruling:
No. This is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where coheirs were effectively deprived of their rightful share to the estate of
their parents - who died without a will - by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to
one of the heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its contents.

Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares." In
this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-
heirs, in equal shares as well.

While the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion and setting aside the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred in
appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud - thus applying the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have simply held that
the action for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe, under the circumstances, given
that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion was effectively deprived of her true
inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.Wherefore, Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate is hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID.

 What are the five requirements for a valid extra-judicial partition of estate?
According to Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, for an extrajudicial settlement to take place, the following criteria must be met:
a. The decedent died intestate, i.e., without a valid will;
b. The estate has no outstanding debts at the time of the extrajudicial settlement;
c. The heir/s are all of age, or the minor heirs are represented by their judicial guardians or legal representatives;
d. The extrajudicial settlement is made in a public instrument, stipulation or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds;
e. The fact of such extrajudicial settlement must be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks; and 
f. The parties to the extrajudicial settlement shall file a bond with the Register of Deeds in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved. 

 What are the remedies of an excluded heir?

NULLITY and RECONVEYANCE. RECONVEYANCE She can demand that her share be fully satisfied. She can even demand that it
be satisfied from the testamentary dispositions that infringed on or diminished her legitime.

Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied.

Article 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

 BINATIRO vs. CUYOS 

Doctrines:
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was
never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement
was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged
agreement afterwards.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of judgment. — The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.
An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.

Facts:
Spouses EvaristoCuyos and AgatonaArroganteCuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator, and after filing an opposition thereto, Gloria
&Fransisco, assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria appointed as administratrix of the estate & letters of
administration of the estate of the late EvaristoCuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria CuyosTalian after posting a nominal bond of
P1,000.00.

The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition. In his Commissioner’s report dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all
the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to
attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the
sum of P40,000.00 & divide the proceeds equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate based on Gloria’s absence & change of residence. The Court ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of
sale after the payment of the sum ofP36,000 which shall remain in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment of necessary
taxes.

Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Original Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter. In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique &Salud filed with the
CA a petition for annulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFI’s order was null and void and of no effect, the same
being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process
in claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property. The CA
granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void,
hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annul the CFI’s order.

HELD:
The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process. Section 2 of Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of judgment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.

The veracity of Atty. Taneo’s report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the
 alleged meeting. The Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged
attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto. It was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard
to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of
all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due
process.

The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in
annulling the assailed order. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has
no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed
of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the
subsequent transfers are void ab initio. The petition was denied

 Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Prudencio September 7, 2016

Doctrines:
All the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the settlement of his/her estate.
Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-Judicial Partition, the same is a total nullity.
It is not binding upon them.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.
Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into
and it cannot be validated either by time or ratification.

Facts:
Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio (Elena), he begot five (5) children, namely:
Valentina, Eusebio, Paula, Florentina, and Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad (Teodora), he had two (2) children namely: Felipe
Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio, Jr.) and Leonora. During the first of marriage of Felipe, they acquired a 13.0476 hectares parcel of land located
at Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot). When Elena died, Felipe and their children became the co-owners of the property. Felipe died intestate
during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition of the Estate of
late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora. The partition stated that Felipe and Elena did not have any children who could
inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children are the only living heirs by operation of law. Thus, the title to theCagayan lot was
transferred to Teodora’s name. Subsequently, Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda.

In turn, Spouses Cepeda sold the same lot to petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao. The respondent filed a complaint for
Partition with Reconveyance against petitioner. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage.
They assert that upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of the Elena’s conjugal share in the Cagayan lot, while the other half
remained with Felipe. Upon the death of Felipe, the respondent also became owners of Felipe’s conjugal share together with Teodora,
Prudencio Jr. and Leonora. Respondent assert that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful share in the estate of Felipe and Elena.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that it was an innocent purchaser for value. It asserted that it had no knowledge that other persons had
interest on the Cagayan lot.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that it was impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had
children/grandchildren by his first marriage. Therefor, the Extra-Judicial Partition was done in bad faith. The RTC ruled that Teodora can
only sell her share in the property. Upon petition to the CA, it affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the partition validly passed ownership of the Cagayan lot to Teodora so that she had the right to sell the entire lot.

Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled in the negative. Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) state that all the children
of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even
if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.

Thus, the children of Felipe in his two (2) marriages should be included in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition. It is undisputed that
respondents-appellees were children of Felipe by his first marriage. Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora did not deny respondents-
appellees' relation with Felipe. Despite this, however, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora declared in the Extra-Judicial Partition that they
are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of law. They claimed that Felipe had no child with his first wife Elena, in effect depriving
respondents-appellees of their rightful shares in the estate of their parents. Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge
nor participation in the Extra-Judicial Partition, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them.

The nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of the sale between (1) Teodora and Spouses Cepeda,
and that of (2) Spouses Cepeda and petitioner. Teodora may therefore sell her undivided interest in the Cagayan lot, and such disposition
 shall affect only her pro indiviso share. When she sold the entire property to Spouses Cepeda, the latter legally and validly purchased only
the part belonging to Teodora. Petitioner is ordered to reconvey to respondents an area of 74,557.72 square meters as their pro indiviso
share in the Cagayan lot.

In the present case, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora acted in bad faith when they declared that they are the only living heirs of Felipe,
despite knowing that Felipe had children in his first marriage. It is well-settled that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.[49]
Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into
and it cannot be validated either by time or ratification.

 Marcos vs. Bangi October 15, 2014.

Doctrines:
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may
be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition
may be presumed.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed.
it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.
It has been ruled that oral partition is effective when the parties have consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership of the respective portions set off to each.

Facts:
In their complaint, the respondents averred that the land in issue was originally owned by AlipioBangi (Alipio). After the death of Alipio,
his children Eusebio, Jose, EspeditaBangi, entered into an oral partition of the land and as such, Eusebio inherited one third of the land. In
1943, the respondent’s parents, Isidro and Genoveva, bought the one-third portion from Eusebio, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the latter.
In 1998, respondents learned that the title to the subject property, including the portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred to
herein petitioner Dominador, Primo, Ceasaria’s husband, Jose, and Emilio through a (First) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995,
supposedly executed by Alipio with the consent of his wife Ramona. Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT
No. 47829 was issued. On November 21, 1995, Primo, Jose and Emilio executed another (Second) deed of absolute sale over the same
property in favor of herein petitioners (SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS), TCT No. T-47829 was then
cancelled and TCT No. T-48446 was issued in the names of herein petitioners.

The respondents claimed that the first deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died in 1918 while Ramona passed away on 1957.
Likewise, the second deed of absolute Sale is also a forgery since Primo could not have signed the same on the said date since he died on
January 29, 1972.
On the other hand, the petitioners maintain that the said sale of the one-third portion of the subject property was not valid. They insinuate
that the subject property, at the time of the sale, was still owned in common by the heirs of Alipio; that Eusebio could not validly sell the
one-third portion of the subject property as there was no partition yet among the heirs of Alipio.

The petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that there was already a partition of the estate of Alipio prior to the sale of the one-third
portion of the subject property by Eusebio to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva. They insist that “there was no deed of extrajudicial partition
by and among Eusebio, Jose and Espedita [Bangi], wherein Eusebio [was assigned the subject property].”[15] Accordingly, the petitioners
aver, the sale in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943 is a nullity and, consequently, the respondents do not have
any right over the subject property.

They further claimed that Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third portion of the subject property to Isidro and Genoveva. They
explained that Eusebio supposedly acquired the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 22361 by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his
father Alipio when he married IldefonsaCompay (Ildefonsa) in 1928. They claimed that the donation propter nuptias in favor of Eusebio
was fictitious since Alipio died in 1918 and that, in any case, the said donation, even if not fictitious, is void since the same was not
registered.

ISSUE:
Is the oral partition between the heirs of Alipio valid?

RULING:
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
presumed.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed.
 Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol
partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the
respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held
or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or
otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance
with the possession in severalty.

That there was no written memorandum of the partition among AlipioBangi’s heirs cannot detract from appellee’s cause. It has been ruled
that oral partition is effective when the parties have consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership
of the respective portions set off to each. Here, it is obvious that Eusebio took possession of his share and exercised ownership over it.
Thus, the preponderant evidence points to the validity of the sale executed between Eusebio Bangi and Isidro Bangi on November 5, 1943
over the one-third portion of the property.

The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the death of Alipio, his heirs – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – had
orally partitioned his estate, including the subject property, which was assigned to Eusebio.
Even so, We are of the considered view that in 1943, when Eusebio Bangi executed the deed of sale in favor of Isidro Bangi, Eusebio
already had acquired interest in the property covered by OCT No. 22361 through succession from his father, AlipioBangi, who died in
1918. Further, it appears that such interest extends to the entire property embraced by OCT No. 22361. This much can be gleaned from the
testimony of appellant Gloria Marcos herself, who said that her father Eusebio owned the entire lot because his siblings Espedita and Jose
already had their share from other properties.

It is obvious that Eusebio took possession of his share and exercised ownership over it. Thus, the preponderant evidence points to the
validity of the sale executed between Eusebio Bangi and Isidro Bangi on November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the property
covered by OCT No. 22361
As pointed out by the CA, the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim is but a ruse to defeat the rights of the
respondents over the one-third portion of the subject property. If at all, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed by
Espedita and Jose Bangi merely confirms the partition of Alipio’s estate that was earlier had, albeit orally, in which the subject property
was assigned to Eusebio.

Accordingly, considering that Eusebio already owned the subject property at the time he sold the one-third portion thereof to the spouses
Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943, having been assigned the same pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of Alipio effected by
his heirs, the lower courts correctly nullified the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 and November 21, 1995, as well as TCT
No. T-47829 and T-48446.

 What if the heirs cannot agree on a partition?

According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they
disagree as to the exact division of the estate, and only "[i]f the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose."

The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The reason is
that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate
for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.

 Boot vs Duhali October 2, 2017, Section 1 Rule 74. Administration proceedings.

Doctrines:
Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire
estate may be considered valid, do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several
exceptions.
If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial
administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of
disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for
choosing not to file an action for partition.
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals[30] we had the opportunity to explain what the "good reason exception" means. What constitutes good
reason depends on the circumstances of each case.
questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings,
especially where such property is in the hands of one heir."
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the
heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an
action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration.

FACTS:
Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). Buot alleged that she
was a surviving heir of Gregorio who died intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death, there had been no effort to settle his
 estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further
alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed
to preserve Gregorio’s estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered
distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings
is allowed only when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court) is possible, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.
Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an
ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1)
the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks
to challenge Buot’ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly
ConstanciaDujali and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.

ISSUE: Won Petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted

HELD:
No, The Supreme Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration do not
suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings.
Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio’s entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to
order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial
settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid, do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the
administration of the estate
As to Buot’s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3) that
other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of
these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition.

An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not only would it
allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive
their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if partition is
proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several
exceptions. If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without
judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case
of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for
choosing not to file an action for partition. In the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, the court held that said section is not
mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. In Pereira v. Court of Appeals[30] we had the
opportunity to explain what the "good reason exception" means. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case.
We said:
"Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner
of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the
respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir."

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the
heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an
action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. In still another case, We did not find so powerful a
reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is
necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just
adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of the latter.

 What are compelling reasons for filing of administration proceedings?

In the case of Buot v Duhali, the Supreme Court held that what constitutes “good” or compelling reasons for filing an
administration proceeding instead of filing an action for partition depends on the circumstances of each case. The following reasons
proffered by the petitioner in this case do not constitute good or compelling reasons: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not
cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) there is a challenge as to one’s status as an heir; (4)
other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate. 

In another case, the Court also held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator (hence, resort to administration
proceedings) is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain
transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. In still another case, the Court did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the
intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of
the latter.
 Morales vs. Agustin June 6, 2018 Rule 69

Doctrine:
While the Court could not hold the bonds of familial relationships together through force, it could hope to deter any further degradation of
this sacred tie through law.

Facts:
Jayme Morales (Jayme), registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, died intestate leaving as heirs his four (4) children, all of
whom were survived by their respective children. The respondent, a grandchild of Jayme, initiated the instant complaint, with one of her
cousins, for the partition of Jayme's property, alleging that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme. On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, one of Jayme’s children, filed
an Answer, arguing that an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is a condition that has to be met before
any partition of the estate and any distribution thereof to the heirs could be effected. Further, he alleged that herein respondent has no more
right of participation over the subject property because the same has long been conveyed to him (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the
respondent's parents.
After a protracted hearing on motions and other incidents of the case, the RTC rendered its decision via a summary judgment in favor of
herein respondent. The CA thereafter dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision. Despite the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, the CA affirmed its decision, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the partition of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the settlement of the estate of the deceased registered
owner thereof.

Ruling:
While the Court does not agree with the assertion of the petitioners, the Court, nonetheless, agrees that the trial court should have collated
Jayme's other properties, if any, prior to the promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on
Succession.Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues: first, there is the issue of whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first
issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what portion should go to
which co-owner.

The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the difference between (1) an action of partition based
on the successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and (2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes
interchanged with one another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from two different sets of legal
provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).
To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. As such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees'
successional rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance left by the decedent.

Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary
action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the
testator. A reading of this enumeration would reveal instances when the appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed with. One
is through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which is the focal point of
this case, is through the ordinary action of partition.

The ordinary action for partition, under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on the settlement
of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession
to which they are immediately entitled. Notwithstanding, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform
to the law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary partition.
In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-
ownership. While both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that would govern the manner of partition, the foregoing
disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different—one
speaks of the partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees, whereas the other speaks of partition of
any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-owners thereof.

In the case at hand, the partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme. As such, when the
petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually
invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code—
the provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of
disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.

In sum, the factual milieu of this case presents questions of facts which are crucial in the complete resolution of the controversy. The Court
finds error in the trial court's refusal to delve into the genuine issue concerning the partition of the subject property—as submitted by the
petitioners. In the end, only a full-blown trial on the merits of each of the parties' claims—and not a mere summary judgment—could write
finis on this family drama.

 Instances where appointment of administrator or executor are dispensed with

 One is through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which is the focal
point of this case, is through the ordinary action of partition.

Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate
by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months
from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay

 Section 4, Rule 74, Sudden appearance of creditor;

In case unpaid debts are discovered within the said period of two years, the procedure is not to cancel the partition, nor to appoint an
administrator to re-assemble the assets, as was allowed under the old Code, but the court, after hearing, shall fix the amount of such debts
or lawful participation in proportion to or to the extent of the assets they have respectively received and, if circumstances require, it may
issue execution against the real estate belonging to the decedent, or both. The present procedure is more expedient and less expensive in
that it dispenses with the appointment of an administrator and does not disturb the possession enjoyed by the distributes

Remedies of Creditor
1. The creditor may ask for administration of enough property of the estate sufficient to paythe debt, but the heirs cannot prevent
such administration by paying the obligation.
2. Where the estate has been summarily settled, the unpaid creditor may within 2 yearsperiod file a motion in the court wherein
summary settlement was had for the payment ofhis credit. After the lapse of 2 year period an ordinary action may be instituted
againstthe distributees within the statute of limitation but not against the bond.
3. The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud should befiled within 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud.

Remedies of creditor: (mortgage)

1. To waive the security mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate as an ordinary action
2. Foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim
3. Extrajudicial foreclosure - To rely solely upon the mortgage and foreclose the same at any time before it is barred by prescription w/o right
to claim for any deficiency.

2 year lien on the property

Upon inheriting property in the Philippines, an annotation of a 2-year lien on the new title to be issued to the heirs is required. The purpose of this
encumbrance is to give a prejudiced heir or creditor a chance to contest the partition. It is only upon the expiration of the 2-year period that the lien
can be removed.

PD 1529 section 86
Section 86. Extrajudicial settlement of estate.
When a deed of extrajudicial settlement has been duly registered, the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the proper title the two-year lien mentioned
in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

Upon the expiration of the two-year period and presentation of a verified petition by the registered heirs, devisees or legatees or any other party in
interest that no claim or claims of any creditor, heir or other person exist, the Register of Deeds shall cancel the two-year lien noted on the title
without the necessity of a court order. The verified petition shall be entered in the Primary Entry Book and a memorandum thereof made on the title.

No deed of extrajudicial settlement or affidavit of adjudication shall be registered unless the fact of extrajudicial settlement or adjudication is
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and proof thereof is filed with the Register
of Deeds. The proof may consist of the certification of the publisher, printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising
manager of the newspaper concerned, or a copy of each week's issue of the newspaper wherein the publication appeared.

PD 1529 Section 86 how to cancel lien versus Section 4 Rule 7

PD 1529 Section 86 states that Upon the expiration of the two-year period and presentation of a verified petition by the registered heirs, devisees or
legatees or any other party in interest that no claim or claims of any creditor, heir or other person exist, the Register of Deeds shall cancel the two-
year lien noted on the title without the necessity of a court order.

You need to file a petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with the Register of Deeds where the
property is located. Note that it is important that the two years have lapsed before the petition must be filed, or else it will be denied.

How to cancel lien vs. section 4 rule 7

Lien can be removed for as long as the two-year period provided in said Section 4, Rule 74 for the filing of claims against the estate of the deceased
has already elapsed, without any claim having been filed. Such claims include claim for the rightful share of the other heirs, and claim for the
payment of the deceased’s debts to his/her creditors.
need to file a petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with the Register of Deeds where the property
is located. Note that it is important that the two years have lapsed before the petition must be filed, or else it will be denied.

 Venue, Jurisdiction and residency

The exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, is exercised either by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) or
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), depending on the gross value of the estate.

1. The residence of the decedent at the time of his death is determinative of the venue of the proceeding. If he was resident of the philippines, venue
is laid exclusively in the province of his residence, the jurisdiction being vested in the RTC thereof. Residence means his personal, actual or physical
habitation, his actual residence or place of abode

2. It is only where the decedent was a nonresident of the philippines at the time of his death that venue lies in any province in which he had estate and
then CFI thereof first taking cognizance of the proceeding for settlement acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. The question of
residence is determinative only of the venue and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the institution of the proceeding in the province
wherein the decedent neither had residence nor estate does not vitiate the action of the probate court.
3. Where the proceedings were instituted in two courts and the question of venue is seasonably raised the court in which the proceeding first filed has
eclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue.

Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 provides that jurisdiction over a probate proceeding is conferred to the appropriate court
depending on the gross value of the estate and such value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. 

 Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.
 Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

Settlement of Estate (Rule 73)

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

 Freanila vs. Banayad July 30, 2009

General Rule: Issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Reason: The principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government.
Exception: Delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court
(Tijam Ruling).

b) How jurisdiction is determined

- Jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereto.
- Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petitionSpecial Proceedings

a) Jurisdiction in Probate Procceedings

RTC - gross value of the estate exceeds ₱400,000.00
MTC - demand does not exceed ₱400,000.00

b) Amount of the estate of the decedent must be stated in petition

- Jurisdiction over probate proceedings depends on the gross value of the estate. Hence the gross value of the estate of the decedent must be
stated in the petition in order to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

FACTS:
Petitioner Frianela was named as devisee in the will after the death of her uncle testator Banayad. Frianela filed before the RTC for the
allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the decedent. Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and
counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent dated September 27, 1989 and another dated September
28, 1989. RTC rendered its Decision declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will.
CA ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary
disposition of Moises’s real property was concerned. Frianela’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence she filed this instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing Decision of the CA. But SC noted that RTC and CA focused all of its
 attention on the merits of the case without first determining whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decide such
probate proceedings.

ISSUE:WON RTC could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decide the probate estate, such as the determination of the status
of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

HELD:
From the foregoing, this Court holds that the general rule on the limited jurisdiction of the RTC as intestate court is applicable. As this
Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and for all if there is co-ownership and to partition the
subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming
ownership over the properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any right of inheritance.

 Cuenco vs. CA October 26, 1973

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of
the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last
will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings

HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this
were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

 Palaganes vs. PalaganesJan. 26, 2011

Principles:
· Wills that are executed abroad can be probated here in the Philippines even if it has not yet been probated and allowed in the country
it was executed
- Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
· Probate of a will that is presented for the first time before a competent court is different from Reprobate of a will already probated
abroad
- Reprobate is governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.
- In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can
be established.

FACTS:
Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in
California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Private respondent Ernesto filed with the RTC a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for the former’s appointment as special
administrator of her estate. Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta (the nephews), opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. The RTC allowed the will to be probated in the Philippines. This
was affirmed by CA. Hence petitioners files this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this
Court.

ISSUE:
 WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in
the country where it was executed.

HELD:
YES. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Moreover, our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value
and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered
to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the
time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. Hence
our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in
the countries of their execution.

 Issues on ownership of property owned by the deceased.

(1) Status of a woman who claims to be the lawful wife of the decedent; 
(2) Whether the property in Inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of deceased spouse; 
(3) Status of each heir 
(4) Matters Incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate 
(5) Validity of a Waiver of hereditary rights 
(6) Who the Heirs of the decedent are 
(7) Validity of Disinheritance effected by the testator 
(8) Recognition of a natural child 

 Can a probate court rule on issue of ownership?

No. The probate court is only authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from
the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs
of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal
or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. (Aranas v. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014)

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."33

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of
the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal
or exclusive property of the deceased spouse

 Ignacio vs. Reyes July 12, 2017

Doctrine:
"In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality"

Facts:
Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then CFI of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City, intestate court) a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Sr. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate. Teresa
executed several lease contracts over properties in Baguio City. Herein respondents filed before the RTC three complaints for partition,
annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the
lessees of the subject Baguio properties. They alleged in their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the
Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties.

They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other
parties without their conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different from the Heirs of
Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud. They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the
properties aforementioned. RTC – manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution
of the subject properties. Intestate Court – denied respondent’s motion CA – annulled order of intestate court. Granted respondent’s
petition for partition.

Issue:
Whether or not intestate court can determine the ownership of the subject properties and to partition as co-owners.
 Held:
Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally
pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the

Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu, a son of Remedios, also filed his Opposition, dated June 13, 2008.

In its January 14, 2009 Order, the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator of
the Estate. On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence
in RTC-Br. 9 Judge Sescon to dispense justice. RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January
14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be
referred to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.

Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City,
assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.

The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property claimed by another based on adverse title; and that
questions like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.

SIDE NOTE:
A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of cases, the
Court had defined the parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was an extraneous
matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or
should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate
court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of
the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.

 Mayor vs. Chu November 23, 2016

FACTS:
Testator left a holographic will, naming her sister Remedios Tiu and niece Manuela Mayor as executors. They filed a petition for the
probate of the will.

Respondent, Damiana, claiming to be the adopted daughter of testator, filed an opposition. Praying: to: 1) order an immediate inventory of
all the properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the Primrose Development Corporation, namely, Mercury Drug and
Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court.

Petitioners countered that probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly by Primrose, having a
separate and distinct personality from decedent’s estate.

ISSUE: WON probate court has jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly Primrose.

RULING: NO. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate
entity applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available
to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they
should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

 Powers of probate court

 a. [1] issue warrants and processes to compel attendance of a witness and to carry into effect their orders and judgments, [2] issue
warrant for apprehension and imprisonment of a person who refuses to perform an order or judgment, and  [3] all other powers
granted to them by law. (Section 3 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court) ;
b. order the probate of the will of the decedent (Sec. 3, Rule 77, Id.);
c. grant letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Sec. 5, Rule 79, Id.);
d. supervise and control all acts of administration;
e. hear and approve claims against the estate of the deceased (Sec. 11, Rule 86, Id);
f. order the payment of lawful debts (Sec. 11, Rule 88, Id.);
g. authorize the sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Sec. 2, Rule 89, Id.); and
h. direct the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Sec. 1, Rule 90, Id.).

 Reyes vs. Ysip

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan to permit and allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she
is a natural daughter of the deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio. Probate of the last will and testament of decedent was filed in the CFI. Leonor P.
Reyes, herein petitioner filed an opposition. The special administratix, who had presented the will for probate, object to the personality and
right of the petitioner herein to contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing thereon. The
Honorable Judge held that only the probate of the will was at issue and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of
the oppositor, petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the court reconsider its order but the court
refused to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the will.

HELD:
In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a person who can have no interest in the succession cannot be
allowed to intervene and oppose such probate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be required to show interest in the will or the
property affected thereby. For such purpose, it is sufficient that he shows or produces prima facie evidence of his or her relationship to the
testator. The court did not amount to a prohibition to take part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was motivated by desire to
avoid multiplicity of the issues and the limitation thereof to the execution of the will. The court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of
any right which she is entitled to under the rules of law.

 Gaas vs. Fortich

Facts: January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and testament in which, subject to certain devises, he bequeathed
all of his property to Pilar Fortich, his then wife. Later, upon his death, this will was admitted to probate as his last will and testament.
Herein petitioner Isidra Gaas is the wife of the deceased Federico Arquiza, illegitimate son of Francisco Arquiza and Anatolia Asilo, and
together bore three children, one of which died at the age of 2. Wherefore, the petitioner as natural guardian of the minors, Felicísimo and
Soledad Arquiza, prayed to declare said minors to be legal heirs as they are acknowledged natural children of the deceased Francisco
Arquiza.
The lower court sustained the petition and found that all of the legal rights of Federico Arquiza was vested in the petitioners, who were his
legitimate children, and that, as such, they were entitled to one- third of the estate left by Francisco Arquiza.

Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to inherit a share of the estate of Francisco Arquiza by right of representation

Ruling:
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. This is a proceeding to obtain a declaration of the rights of the petitioners as the
legitimate children of Federico Arquiza to inherit in representation of their father from their grandfather. It further ruled that it was no
longer necessary for Federico Arquiza to bring an action for recognition because he had acquired the status of a recognized natural child by
the tacit recognition of his father Francisco. His vested rights were transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no need to bring an
action against Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their father, Federico Arquiza, as the natural son of Francisco
Arquiza.

 Torres vs. Javier

Facts:
The case is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic where two women are claiming to
be his legal wife namely: Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. The trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres, who
claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed a certain Juan L. Javier as administrator. The appeal is taken by
Marta Torres from that order of appointment.

Issue:
WON the trial court is correct in appointing Juan L. Javier as administrator Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the probate court.
 Basis: Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or
wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable,
the administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. The court considered the facts and
circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as
administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the
Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic.
It further held that the probate court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as
administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.

 Romero vs. CA April 18, 2012

Facts:
This case is a petition filed under Rule 45 for the reversal of the decision of the CA wherein it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioners Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero, which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the resolutions issued by Judge
Maria Baua. The resolutions likewise dismissed petitioners’ complaint for annulment of sale, nullification of title and conveyance of title
against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
The petitioners alleged that their brother Vittorio, through fraud, misrepresentation and duress, registered the purportedly conjugal
properties of their parents under his name through Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and the petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA which likewise dismissed. CA ruled
that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of
an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI).
Petitioners argue that the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to the settlement of the estate but cannot determine questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
WON the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case

Ruling:
Affirmative. In Coca v. Borromeo, this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the
only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the proceeding
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
Therefore, the petition is denied.

 Tan vs Rodriguez January 31, 2018

Facts:
Respondent siblings Rodriguez are the children left with several properties by their late parents Reynaldo and Ester Rodriguez and
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. On the other hand, Anita Ong Tan is a co-depositor in a BPI Joint account with Reynaldo.
She claimed that the funds deposited in the joint account were owned by her. Thus, Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the
settlement of intestate estate of the late Reynaldo and issuance of letter of administration to any competent neutral willing person, other
than the heirs of Reynaldo.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita. The RTC held that Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the presumption that the funds deposited
under the BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo were owned by them in common as evidenced by a Debit Memo from East West Bank,
which was used for the issuance of a Manager's Check in the amount of One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty Eight and
30/100 Pesos (P 1,021,868.30), which exact amount was deposited to the BPI joint account.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated May 25, 2015.
Undaunted, respondents filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA then reversed the ruling of the RTC. It maintained that the presumption of co-ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts was
not sufficiently overturned, as Anita failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the funds therein. Anita filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.Hence, the petition.

Issue:
WON Anita and Reynaldo are co-owners of the subject bank deposits

Ruling:
Negative. The Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita sufficiently proved that she owns the funds in the BPI joint
account exclusively. In the absence of a survivorship agreement, the Court submits that it is only rightful to determine their respective
shares based on evidence presented during trial.
The exact amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account, i.e., One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-
Eight Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P1,021,868.30), was the exact amount used to open the BPI joint account. With all these, it is apparent
that Anita owned the funds exclusively as she sufficiently overturned the presumption under the law. In this case, the Court notes that the
parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the intestate court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed
a Motion to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative relief from
the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the
exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate estate
of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate
 court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not
jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.

 Generally, Probate Court cannot issue a writ of execution. When can they issue a writ of execution? (Rule 88. PAYMENT OF THE
DEBTS OF THE ESTATE)

A writ of execution is not the proper procedure to satisfy debts.The court must order the SALE OR MORTGAGE OR THE PROPERTIES
OF DECEDENT, the proceeds of which will satisfy the debts and expenses Reason why execution is NOT a proper remedy to satisfy an
approved claim
(1) Payment approving a claim does not create a lien upon a property of the estate, and
(2) Special procedure is for the court to order the sale to satisfy the claim.

EXCEPTION:
(1) To satisfy the distributive shares of devisees, legatees, and heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets (2) To enforce payment of the
expenses of partition, and (3) To satisfy costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings

Requisites before the EXECAD may pay the money claims against the estate. (HAS) 
(1) A Hearing is conducted 
(2) The Amounts of such claims are ascertained, and
(3) There are Sufficient assets to pay the debts

PART 2

WILL = an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after
his death.

NOTARIAL WILL = which must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting witness and is governed by Arts 804-809 of
NCC.

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL = one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. Interpretation of Wills =The testator’s intention is to
be ascertained from the WORDS of the will, taking into consideration the CIRCUMSTANCES under w/c it was made.

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. The wishes and desires
of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement w/c would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a will
Allowance of Will is Conclusive as to its Due Execution WILL = an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death.

A PROBATE OF A WILL IS REQUIRED BEFORE ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

PROBATE = a judicial act whereby an instrument is adjudged valid and is ordered to be recorded; it is the statutory method of establishing the
proper execution of an instrument and giving notice of its contents.

PURPOSE: To finally and definitively settle all questions concerning the capacity of the testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
The ALLOWANCE OF A WILL is only conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION, because the authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance w/ the formalities prescribed by law.

When the court determines the due execution of wills, it means that:
(1) the formalities of the law have been complied with,
(2) (2) the capacity of the testator has been established,
(3) (3) and the will is genuine, all of w/c refer to the extrinsic validity of a will.

As a consequence of the allowance of a will, it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings.

Probate of Will is Mandatory

A petition for probate may be filed ANYTIME and the action to admit the decedent’s will to probate DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.
Wills are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent’s ownership and right of disposition w/in legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to
allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of ESTOPPEL.

When the decedent leaves a will, the law enjoins its probate. The heirs may validly partition the estate only after the will has been probated. To
dispose of them in any way w/o the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it w/ jurisdiction w/c the court cannot allow.
The requirement of probate is not limited to instruments designated as wills. For as long as the instrument or document involves the disposition of
estate that takes effect upon death, it should be presented to the court for probate.
EFFECT OF PROBATE: For a will to take effect, it has to be probated, approved, or allowed in the proper testamentary proceedings. Once allowed,
the principle of res judicata applies.
Nature of Probate Proceedings
IN REM =Binding on the whole world. It cannot be dispensed w/ and substituted by another proceeding judicial or extrajudicial w/o offending
public policy
MANDATORY= No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court Partitioning the estate w/o
probating the will is improper
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE= it is required by public policy and the state could not have intended to defeat the same by applying thereto the statute of
limitation of action.

DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL does not apply; During probate the court does not look into intrinsic validity; exception

General Rule: the probate court’s authority is limited only to the EXTRINSIC VALIDITY of the will, the DUE EXECUTION thereof, the
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY and the compliance with the REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly executed. Any inquiry into the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Exception: when a will is VOID ON FACE VALUE, the probate court may disregard passing on the extrinsic validity of the will for practical
considerations.

32. What is a will? Two kinds, Holographic and Notarial

Article 783 of the Civil Code of the Philippines defines will as “an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.”

Every will, regardless of type, must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

A. Notarial Will

The following are the requisites for the execution of a notarial will:
1. The will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator personally or by the testator's name written by some other person in his/her presence,
and by his/her express direction;
2. The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another;
3. The testator or the person requested by him/her to write his/her name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin;
4. All the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page;
5. The attestation shall state the following:
a. the number of pages used upon which the will is written;
b. the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his/her name, under his/her express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses; and
c. the fact that the instrumental witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another;
6. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them;
7. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses;
8. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he/she must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he/she shall designate two persons to read it
and communicate to him/her, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof; and
9. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him/her twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged.
It bears stressing that compliance as to form and substance are required for the will to be valid.

A holographic will is one entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator.
1. The testator must personally know the language of the will;
2. The will must be entirely handwritten by the testator personally; and
3. The will must be dated.
It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

33. Gallanoza vs. Archangel 83 SCRA 676

FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate
to his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa
was Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo
Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted the will to probate.
The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands
and praying that they be declared owners thereof.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will”
alleging fraud and deceit.
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated
under that will to the petitioners.

HELD:
NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case
and the first civil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That means that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal
of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the
Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410
of NCC (the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment
is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

34. Probate of will. Precedence over intestate proceedings

Probate of wills is a special proceeding to establish the validity of a will. It decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of
the testator (sumilang v ramagosa)
Probate of will is mandatory as no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance w/ the ROC (art 838
CC). even if only one heir has been instituted, there must still be the judicial order of adjudication. It is a proceeding in rem and therefore, it cannot
be dispensed with or substituted by any other proceeding, judicial, extrajudicial without offending public policy.

TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — Testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a
court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected
or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. (URIARTE v. CFI of Negros Occidental)

35. Morales vs. Olandrez, Feb. 3, 2016

Facts:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children, collectively referred to as
the respondent heirs.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition for the partition of the decedent’s estate and the appointment of a
special administrator. RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for
her appointment as special administratrix. But the said will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
Despite this, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 (partition) and moved to suspend the intestate proceedings in order to
give way to the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069. The respondent heirs opposed Morales’ motion for suspension and her
petition for allowance of the will.

The RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 with Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069. respondent heirs then moved to dismiss the probate
proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will. Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of
preterition. Hence, the RTC, suspended the intestate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate, on the ground that
probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings. RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued to
Alfonso Jr. Hence, the respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of Administration. The RTC noted that
while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might
become an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void. RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria
Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings,
Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied. Morales then filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC, but was
dismissed by the CA. The CA reasoned that while probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate succession.4 Thus, the continuation of the
probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed
intestate because of preterition.

Ruling: affirmative, on both issues.

1. General rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the
probate court will only determine the will’s formal validity and due execution.8 However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not beyond
the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
Decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution of heirs.The annulment effectively
caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.12 The decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error – much less grave abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.

NOTE: Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father,
son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In
other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express
disinheritance.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and
advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present
evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

36. Cuenco vs. CA, Oct. 26, 1973

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first
marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife (widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said
court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred
to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate
proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings.

HELD:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon
City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to
take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at least equal and coordinate
jurisdiction over the estate.

NOTE (additional info):

● Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal: Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
● When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue: the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings
only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It
would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time,
money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate
court.

37. Oriarte vs. CFI May 29, 1970

FACTS
November 6, 1961 – Vicente filed with CFI Negros a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a
natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son

CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
published in accordance with law.

The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually qualified as special administrator.

December 19, 1961 – HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed
a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to the court upon receipt and
further questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.

August 28, 1962 – Juan UriarteZamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of
the deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:
· As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the intestate proceedings
· Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent.

Vicente opposed the MTD contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the same.

CFI Negros granted Juan UriarteZamacona’s MTD and dismissed the proceeding before it. MR denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of the record on appeal. Whilethis was pending, Vicente
Uriarte filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, CFI Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give way to the certiorari.

Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to intervene therein, for the dismissal of the petition and for the annulment
of the proceedings had in the special proceeding therein. Motion was denied.

It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi Negros during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment forhis compulsory
acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the petition for
settlement of estate, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator
(who failed to qualify).
On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it, as thelast will of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not
to have been contested.

ISSUE: Whether Juan UriarteZamacona should have filed the petition for probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to
commenced the corresponding separate proceedings in CFI Manila

REASONING

Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of
first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of
any province in which he had estate.

The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in provinces where he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the settlement of his estate.

Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special proceeding.

It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law
on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement ofthe estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had alreadybeen appointed, the latter being required to render final account and
turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.

These facts support the view that Juan UriarteZamacona should have submitted the will for probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion in the already pending special proceeding:
1. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially
if several courts would be involved.
2. When HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the issuance of letters of sdministration, he had already informed the
Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested forsubmission to CFI Negros. When Juan
UriarteZamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred
that he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in CFi negros for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person.

It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case,Vicente has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since1961 when HiginioUrirate
opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the alleged will and of the filing of petition for its probate when Juan
UriarteZamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By then, The Manila
Court had already appointed an administrator and had admitted the will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings therein would put a premium on his negligence.

SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to
have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.

DISPOITIVE petition dismissed

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER "ALL MATTERS OF
PROBATE." — Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph (e), Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all
matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate.

2. ID.; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; VENUE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PROVINCE WHERE
DECEDENT INHABITANT OF PHILIPPINES RESIDED AT TIME OF HIS DEATH OR WHERE INHABITANT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY
HAD ESTATE. — The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province of which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of
a non-resident alien — like the decedent in the instant case — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

3. ID.; ID.; TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — Testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over
the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will
enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; PROBATE OF WILL SHOULD BE FILED IN SAME COURT WHERE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN COMMENCED.
— Where intestate proceedings had already been commenced before a court of first instance, as in the case at bar, the probate of the will of the
decedent should be submitted to the same court, either in a separate proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose in the intestate
proceedings. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation,
especially if several courts would be involved. Furthermore, the party seeking the probate of the will in the instant case knew before filing the
petition for probate with another court of first instance of the pendency of the intestate proceedings .

5. ID.; ID.; VENUE; WRONG VENUE WAIVABLE; WAIVER BY LACHES; INSTANT CASE. — It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong
venue is merely a waivable procedural defect. Petitioner, in the instant case, has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT NOT INCLINED TO ANNUL PROCEEDINGS REGULARLY HAD IN LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF
IMPROPER VENUE. — This Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower Court even if the latter was not the proper venue
therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of the same jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.

7. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; NATURAL CHILD: QUESTION OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT MAY BE PRESENTED IN
INDEPENDENT ACTION FOR COMPULSORY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OR IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. — A party claiming to be an
acknowledged natural child of testator is entitled to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as a natural child of said deceased
testator in the proceeding instituted precisely for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural child, or intervene in proceedings for the probate of
will of testator if it is still open, or to ask for its re-opening, if it has already been closed, the probate having jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

8. ID.; PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; DISMISSAL AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC; INSTANT CASE. — The supplemental petition for
mandamus, in the case at bar, has become moot and academic for if the said petition is successful it will only result in compelling the Negros Court
to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
being the order of the said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner’s motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said order being, as a result of what has been said heretofore, beyond petitioner’s power to contest, the
conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our
ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.

38. Baluyot vs. Pano, May 7, 1976

FACTS
SoteroBaluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration.
He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the
decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime
as special administrator.

The lower court in its order appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition alleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the
allegation as to her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator be set aside.

The lower court in its order cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator. In that same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs.
Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. Acting on that motion, the lower court in its order of March 31, 1975 appointed
Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.

Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of September 2, 1975 asked that Espino, former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged
acknowledged natural child of SoteroBaluyut, be appointed administrator should she not be named administratrix.
The probate court in its order terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as
regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth
as heir of the deceased. The lower court said it was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her "sufficient understanding" justified her
appointment.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix is valid?

RULING:
NO.We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of
administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing
on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not
automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might
have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the
opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106, January 31,
1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not
give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that
Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the decedent's alleged will.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620; Rodriguez vs. De
Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).

39. Casiano vs. Maluto, Sept. 30, 1977, Intestate proceedings already terminated

Facts:

AldinaMalotoCasiano, ConstancioMaloto, Panfilo Maloto, and FelinoMaloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that
decedent died intestate, commenced an intestate proceeding. In the course of said intestate proceeding, AldinaMalotoCasiano, ConstancioMaloto,
Panfilo Maloto and FelinoMaloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto, where they adjudicated said estate unto
themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each.

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art
of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that AldinaMalotoCasiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and FelinoMaloto are named as heirs but
MalotoCasiano and ConstancioMaloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in
the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo,
the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and PurificacionMiraflor.

On May 24, 1967, AldinaMalotoCasiano and ConstancioMaloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment
of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and PurificacionMiraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. Panfilo Maloto
and FelinoMaloto opposed the motion of AldinaMalotoCasiano and ConstancioMaloto.

The Court of First Instance of iloilo, issued an order denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed
out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and
FelinoMaloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was
denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition
on the groud that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged will in question. 7
Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last
will and testament of Adriana Maloto. The probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the finding of said court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained
the oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate proceeding, Special
Proceeding No. 1736.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for probate was barred by the judgment of an earlier intestate proceeding.

Ruling:
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736.
Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate
proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of
November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May
14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged with in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the
alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and
the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the
respondents.

40. Advincula vs. Teodoro, May 31, 1956, Letters of Administration

Facts:
Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular administrator of his deceased wife’s estate. After he qualified as
administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceased's will. Emilio opposed the probate of the will on the ground
that the signature was not his wife’s and even if it was, the same was procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he
(Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to
act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate”. The court ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was
denied so he instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the lower court’s order.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Lacson’s motion.

Held:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson was named executor of the deceased's
will. This provision, however, cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted to probate. The discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso
facto nullify letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is “proved and allowed by the
court”.
Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to the deceased’s estate, is
incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger may be competent,
capable and fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. Besides,
Emilio as the surviving spouse is a forced heir of the deceased. He is entitled to 1⁄2 of all property apart from his share of the other half thereof as
heir of the deceased since “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership”.

1. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; EXECUTOR NAMED IN THE WILL WHEN MAY HE BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. — The
provision of section 4 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provides that "when a will has been proved and allowed, the Court shall issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules, cannot
be enforced, until after said document has been allowed to probate.

2. ID.; DISCOVERY OF WILL AFTER APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR EFFECT OF. — The discovery of a document purporting to be
the last will and testament of a deceased, after the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the latter upon the assumption that he or she had
died intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will has
been proved and allowed by the court." (Rule 83, section 1 of the Rules of Court.)

3. ID.; APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR; SURVIVING SPOUSE NOT STRANGER TO THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED. — It is
untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience, because a stranger to deceased may be competent, capable, and fit to administer his estate in
much the same as a member of her immediate family could be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any rate A is not a stranger either to her
or to her estate, he being her surviving spouse and as such, one of her forced heirs, (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897 to 900 and 995 to 1001, Civil
Code of the Philippines), whether she died testate or intestate. What is more he is prima facie entitled to one-half of all property subject to the
authority of the administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the other half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership" — of which he is its administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the Philippines) — "unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife" (See Arts. 160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

41. Due execution of will. Articles 805-806 of the Civil Code

Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

42. Dorotheo vs. CA Dec. 8, 1999, Lawyer executed deed of partition.

Facts:
Private respondents (PRs) were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died then Alejandro died thereafter. After
Alejandro’s death, Lourdes Dorotheo (petitioner) - the concubine of Mr. Alejandro filed a special proceeding for the probate of the will and
testament. The Court then issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. The children did not appeal but instead filed a "Motion To Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void." The Trial Court granted the motion because Lourdes is not the wife of the decedent, hence intrinsically void. Lourdes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death but it was
denied. She then appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed and the dismissal became final and executory.
A writ of execution was released. But Lourdes refused to surrender the TCTs. The children filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion. · Then RTC Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the final and executory Order of
the CA and the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character. The children filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Thus, they filed a petition before the CA, which nullified the two
assailed Orders. Hence, this petition of Lourdes for review.

Issue:
Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be
given effect?

Held:
NO it will not.

A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
1986 Order that has attained finality, the TC in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the CA. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It
has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

It should be noted that probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
● whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
● compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
● the testamentary capacity of the testator;
● and the due execution of the last will and testament.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does
not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession,
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will
no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is
deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end
to litigation. Interes rei publicaeutfinis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill
this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a
party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.

43. Tanchangco vs. Santos June 8, 2020

Facts:

Consuelo died. Her daughter, (respondent) and her grandson, (petitioner) brought suit for the court to determine which among them will be
designated as special administrator of her estate. The daughter alleges that Consuelo left a will, and for this, she presented lawyers as witnesses to the
due execution of the will. The respondent daughter sought for testacy. On the other hand, petitioner grandson insists that there was no will, that
Consuelo was too weak and unstable to write one. He sought for intestacy.

RTC appointed the petitioner grandson as special administrator. The RTC found the purported will replete with aberrations. It noted that two attesting
witnesses to the will and the notary public were all associates of a Makati-based law firm which is the counsel of Natividad in the instant case.
Nobody among Consuelo's relatives witnessed the execution of the alleged will. Except for Natividad and her lawyers, no one knew that Consuelo
ever executed a will during her lifetime. RTC gave credence to Ronaldo's testimony that Consuelo declared that she had no will and that her
properties would be equally divided between her two children.

CA reversed RTC’s decision and appointed respondent daughter in place of petitioner. Article 960 of the Civil Code preferred testacy over
intestacy. The positive testimonies of the witnesses established the due execution and authenticity of the will especially when the Tanchancos could
not present proof that the said witnesses are not credible or competent. It added that the witnesses are all lawyers who are not disqualified from being
witnesses under the law except in cases relating to privileged communication arising from attorney-client relationship. It noted that in the probate of
the will, the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will in that the testator, of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It found nothing extraordinary in Natividad's act of submitting the will for probate 10 years
from its execution and after Consuelo's death especially since there is no law which obliges a testator to file a petition for probate of his or her will
during his or her lifetime. Thus, the daughter is hereby appointed executor of the estate pursuant to the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya of the decedent.

Issue:
Whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

Held:
Yes. The CA decision is affirmed. It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of

his property may be rendered nugatory." In a similar way, "testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose."The will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law.

An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it complied with the formalities required by the law, except that the attestation clause failed to indicate
the total number of pages upon which the will was written. To address this concern, Natividad enumerated the following attributes of the attestation
clause and the will itself, which the Court affirms.

In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment
portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5)
nadahon, kasama ang dahongkinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoongito. " Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of
the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually
five pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation clause.

The lawyers are NOT disqualified from being witnesses to a will.

Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, "[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and
able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code."

Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not
disqualified from being witnesses under Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time.

44. Disallowance of a will Section 9 Rule 76 ROC; Article 839 of the Civil Code

Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

In other words, the grounds under Section 9 may fall under the following categories:

A. Legal Formalities
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
B. Testamentary Capacity
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
C. Due Execution
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.

45. Conclusive nature of a will. Appeal under Rule 109.

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order
or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Periods to appeal - In special Proceedings deadline to file an appeal would be

(15) days from notice of the order or judgment appealed from.
(30) days from notice of the order or judgment appealed from if the case involves multi appeals

When to Appeal? - Appeal may be taken from one aspect of the case while the court proceeds to hear another aspect of the case. It may be taken from
an order admitting the will to probate, while the court proceeds to resolve its intrinsic validity.

Rationale for multiple appeals - are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings.
The probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal but retains
jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of.

When record on appeal is required - in addition to the notice of appeal is required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the
trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.

46. Morales vs. Olondrez

Facts:
Alfonso Juan Olondriz Sr. died and was survived by his widow and children. Believing that the decedent died intestate, the heirs filed a petition to
partition the estate. However, Iris Moralesfiled a separate petition alleging that the decedent left a will. Morales prayed for the probate of the
will.Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.Morales moved to suspend the intestate proceeding to
give way to the probate however, heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings due to preterition. After postponements, at the instance of Morales,
reception of evidence for the evidentiary hearing was scheduled but she failed to appear, effectively waving her right to present evidence on the issue
of preterition.Case Observed facts:(1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Olondriz is an heir of the decedent;(2) that Francisco was
clearly omitted from the will; and(3) that based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited.

Hence, the court ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.

Issue:

(1) Was there preterition ?

(2) whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to
proceed intestate because of preterition.

Ruling:

(1) Yes.

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc.,
he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.5
Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.6

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express
disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
(emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.7
In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of
his preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on
his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the
issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
We will not entertain the petitioner’s factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited because this Court is not a trier of facts.1âwphi1
Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC’s conclusion. We see no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.

(2) Yes. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the
will; the probate court will only determine the will’s formal validity and due execution.8However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not
beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the
issue.

The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution of heirs.1avvphi1 The
annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.12 The decedent’s will, no matter how
valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error – much less grave abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed
intestate.
The will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the
direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition. During the
proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime
from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waving her right to present evidence on the issue.We
cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc.,
he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited
— tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. (Article 854, Civil Code)

47. Nepomuceno vs. CA, Oct. 9, 1985

Facts:
Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that
he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper
and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of
Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein
petitioner.

Ruling: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between
the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a
separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the
donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

48. Can a person in custody of the will be compelled by mandamus to bring the will to the court?

NO.

A. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15 The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.21
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.

Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature
of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.24 The writ of mandamus
lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to
the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.25 To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private
wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.26

B. Writ of Mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy
of mandamus being invoked.

. Rule 76, Section 1 and Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the adequate remedy that respondent Lee can avail. Rule 76, Section 1 provides that
petition for allowance of will can still proceed regardless of whether or not petitioner has the will in his possession. Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides
the remedy for the production of the original holographic.

49. Uy KIAO ENG vs. Lee

FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus against his mother, petitioner UyKiaoEng, before the RTC to compel petitioner to
produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested
his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason. In her answer, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings.

After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her
custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Respondent appealed to CA who initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the
motion, issued the writ of mandamus, and ordered the production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Petitioner then filed this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to SC contending in the main that the petition for
mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE/S: WON mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD:
NO.

C. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15 The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.17
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or
station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.21
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will
not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public
duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution
of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is
called a prerogative writ.25 To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating
to the public.26

D. Writ of Mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy
of mandamus being invoked.

In the instant case, mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the production of the subject will. Rule 76, Section 1 and Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the adequate remedy that respondent
Lee can avail. Rule 76, Section 1 provides that petition for allowance of will can still proceed regardless of whether or not petitioner has the will in
his possession. Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the remedy for the production of the original holographic.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic
will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks
the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for
the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus—
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the
death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the
testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period,
signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections
without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable
cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the
will.30
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot
be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

50. Rule 76 Section 1. Persons who have a claim against the estate.

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

51. Can a testator during his lifetime have his will probated in court?

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court for the allowance of his will.

52. San Luis vs. San Luis Feb. 6, 2007

FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.

Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce against

Felicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.

Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo
died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Felicidad San Luis
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death;; Felicisimo being then the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent
Felicidad San Luis has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly
went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

ISSUES:

• Whether venue was properly laid

• Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code
• Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

HELD:

• YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of
election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

• YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the affirmative.

Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

• YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co- owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co- owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry.

Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

53. Pee Ing Chong vs. Herrera March 25, 1976

• Spouses Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat were ordered to pay, "jointly and severally", to petitioner PyEng Chong
• the trial court issued a First Alias Writ of Execution but returned unsatisfied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
• the trial court issued a Second Alias Writ of Execution directing the Sheriff of Negros Occidental to levy on the properties of Eduardo Uy
Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat, jointly and severally, especially their participation in the general partnership of the respondent Julia So De Chiat &
Sons.
• respondent partnership Julia So De Chiat & Sons filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Levy on Execution alleging, inter alia, that the properties
levied upon belong exclusively to said respondent and that judgment debtors Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat have ceased to be members
of the partnership, having sold all their rights and participation therein to Julia So De Chiat, mother of judgment debtor Eduardo Uy
• petitioner filed his opposition to said urgent motion, alleging, among others, that the deed of sale dated June 25, 1966 adverted to in the
urgent motion and allegedly executed by the judgment debtors in favor of the mother of Eduardo Uy Chiat, Julia So De Chiat, is a simulated sale "
• On August 20, 1969, respondent partnership filed a motion and manifestation stating that since the judgment is only a money claim and the
debtor, Eduardo Uy Chiat, died "before final judgment has been rendered" in the case, the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution
against said deceased defendant.
• This motion was opposed by petitioner who invited the attention of respondent Judge to the fact that the judgment in the case had long
become final and executory before Eduardo Uy Chiat died on March 30, 1968, and that the judgment debt which is sought to be enforced by the
Second Alias Writ of Execution can still be executed against the successors-in-interest of Eduardo Uy Chiat.
• On September 1, 1969, respondent Judge, after hearing, issued an Order granting the motion to lift the levy on execution filed by the
respondent partnership by ordering the recall of the Second Alias Writ of Execution,

Issue:
Was the order to lift the levy on execution by ordering the recall of the Second Alias Writ of Execution was proper.

Ruling:
Yes! The basic reason of the respondent court in recalling the writ of execution was that the judgment being for money and the judgment debtor
having died prior to the levy, the judgment creditor should file his claim in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased pursuant
to Section 5 of Rule 86.

The respondent court was correct in recalling the Second Alias Writ of Execution. Defendant Eduardo Uy Chiat having died on March 30, 1968,
prior to the levy which was made by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental on June 23, 1969, the judgment in favor of petitioner, being one for
a sum of money, may no longer be enforced by means of the said writ of execution, but must be filed in the proper estate proceedings."
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. - All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. ... .(Emphasis supplied.
See also Agnes v. Lemas, 5 SCRA 959 where the court held that judgments for money are abated by the debtor's death.)
The above-quoted provision is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
5 The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. "The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue."

Had the levy been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on execution could have been carried to completion in accordance with
Section 7 (c) of Rule 39 which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same
may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment. However, as observed by respondent court, such is not the case here.

Petitioner, however, contends that he could not present his claim in the proper estate proceedings because no such proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Eduardo Uy Chiat have been instituted. The infirmity of this argument is evident from the fact that the Rules of Court
amply provides remedy for petitioner. He may initiate proceedings under Section 1 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court 7 if Eduardo Uy Chiat died
testate, or under Section 6 (b) of Rule 78 8 if he died intestate.

In Sikat v. Vda. De Villanueva, 9 this court stated that if a creditor, having knowledge, of the death of his debtor and the fact that no administrator
has been appointed, permits more than three (3) years to elapse without asking for the appointment of an administrator or instituting the intestate
proceedings in the competent court for the settlement of the latter's estate, he is guilty of laches and his claim prescribes. 10 "To hold otherwise
would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of the debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either estate
or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and legatees."

With respect to the claim of petitioner that the respondent court arbitrarily amended or modified a final and executory judgment, We note that the
statement in the order Of September 1, 1969 that the judgment "is really a judgment against the conjugal partnership ... " is merely an expression of
opinion which cannot in any way amend or modify the final judgment in Civil Case No. 65733. It cannot be construed otherwise, as it is well-settled
that a final judgment or order can no longer be altered or amended, and the court loses jurisdiction over it, save to order its execution.

Finally, on petitioner's contention that the private respondent has not availed of the remedies provided for in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, it must be noted that the aforecited rule does not require that the title of ownership of the claimant be produced, an affidavit of his title
thereto being all that is necessary to be presented with his claim. Respondent's motion was under oath, supported by two public instruments - the
Deed of Sale of June 25, 1966 executed by Eduardo S. Uy Chiat as vendor, and Julio So de Chiat & Sons as vendee, duly acknowledged before
Notary Public Raymundo M. Lozada, Jr., and the Amended Articles of Partnership of Julia So de Chiat & Sons, dated June 25, 1966 - stating the
factual basis of private respondent's claim of title over the real properties that were being levied upon. Such requirement was undoubtedly
substantially complied with by the submission of said pleading with the attached documents. In any event, as stated previously, the recall of the writ
of execution was based on the fact of death of the judgment debtor before the actual levy was made. Under such circumstances, the judgment cannot
be executed, the remedy being, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, for the judgment creditor to resort to the intestate or testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor.

54. Palaganes vs. Palaganes

Facts:
Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.On October 15, 2003, however,
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta's will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it.

The RTC issued an order admitting to probate Ruperta's last will, appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC. The CA pointed out that Section 2,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines.

The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures.Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed
in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves
that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the
probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same,
and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

Issues:
W/N the will executed abroad may be probated in the PH?

Ruling:
YES, Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Moreover, our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the
person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. Hence our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.

55. Jurisdictional facts of exhibits

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
a. Death of the testator
b. His residence at the time of his death;
c. If non-resident, the province where the estate was left; and
d. The fact that the will has been delivered to the court (Regalado, 2008);

56. Rodriguez vs. De Borja 17 SCRA 418

FACTS: On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament
of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will; but before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CFI of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

Petitioners CONTENTION: In a motion to dismiss, petitioners contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M.
on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition for probate.
CFI Bulacan: DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the
other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan,
since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent
this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N CFI BULACAN HAS JURISDICTION?

RULING: Petition Denied.

RATIO: The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of
Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will
is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the
testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court
may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is
made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez
was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

There are two other reasons:

1. BAD FAITH: One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of
Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of
priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
2. INTESTATE SUCCESSION IS ONLY SUBORDINATE TO THE TESTATE, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative
will. "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre established action".
The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

Other Doctrines:
• Jurisdiction vs Venue
Petitioners CONTENTION: Section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the
case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province.
SC: Even if we consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply
that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of
first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither party denies that the late Fr.
Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan. That is sufficient in the case before us.

Jurisprudence Cited: Section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last
resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction
over the subject matter is another. The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new
Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.)

• First Court to Acquire Jurisdiction

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court,
Rules of Court: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of
proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.

57. Probate of will is a proceeding in rem.

"proceedings in rem" is applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them or of some
interest therein. It is a proceeding brought to determine the status of a particular thing itself.
A probate of a will being a proceeding in rem directed against the whole world it can be said that there is similarity of parties in a subsequent action
involving the same will, and where said will had been previously probated in a final judgment of the court it constitutes res judicata in said
subsequent action.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem (40 Cyc. p. 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested
through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against
all of them." (Manalo v. Paredes, 41 Phil. 938. 942)
"The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will is
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State."
(Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215).

ACTION IN PERSONAM VS IN REM VS IN QUASI REM

[1] An action in rem is one instituted and enforced against the whole world.
[2] An action in personam is one filed against a definite defendant. It is intended to subject the interest of defendant on a property to an obligation or
lien.

In actions in personam, jurisdiction over the person (defendant) is required. It is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person, and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose is to impose through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. No other than the defendant is liable, not the whole
world, as in an action for a sum of money or an action for damages.

[3] An action quasi in rem, also brought against the whole world, is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the
discharge of the claims assailed. An individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. It deals with status, ownership or liability or a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
Examples of actions quasi in rem are action for partition, action for accounting, attachment, foreclosure of mortgage.
[4] An action in personam is not necessarily a personal action. Nor is a real action necessarily an action in rem. An in personam or an in rem action is
a classification of actions according to foundation. For instance, an action to recover title to or possession of real property is a real action, but it is an
action in personam, not brought against the whole world but against the person upon whom the claim is made.
[5] The distinction is important to determine whether or not jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required and consequently to determine
the type of summons to be employed. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide a case against
said defendant where the action is one in personam but not where the action is in rem or quasi in rem.

[6] An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while and an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person‘s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the ―thing‖ itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem

[7] An action for injunction is in personam since it can be enforced only against the defendant therein

58. De Aranz vs. Galiog May 28, 1988

Facts:
Respondent Joaquin Infante filed a petition for the probate and allowance of the will of Montserrat Infante. He attached the addresses of the
other legatees & devisees to the petition. The petition was set for hearing but none of the oppositors (other legatees & devisees; herein petitioners)
was able to attend because they weren’t sent personal notices for the said hearing. SC remanded the case because the law is clear that
personal notice to other legatees and devisees is required if their addresses are known.
The RTC (probate court) issued an order setting the petition for hearing on May 5, 1986 at 8:30AM. The order was published in the Nueva
era (a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila) once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. On May 5, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was
reset to May 12, 1986. On May 12, it can be presumed that no oppositor appeared yet again because the RTC issued an order stating:“There being no
opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Commissioner to receive evidence ex-parte of
the petitioner.” On the same day, Joaquin presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo (one of his testamentary witnesses) on the witness
stand. During the proceedings, Joaquin was appointed as executor. Then 2 days later, herein petitioners (Joaquin’s relatives whose names are listed in
the Other Notes) filed an MR of the order on May 12, 1986 (Fact #5;stating that Joaquin can present evidence ex-parte)
Alleged that no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76.Prayed to be given 10 days to file their opposition to the probate of the will.
MR denied.
They filed a pet. for certiorari and prohibition w/ the SC (w/c referred it to the CA).The CA dismissed their petition.

ISSUE
W/N PERSONAL NOTICE of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a
will?

RULING:
YES
CA: The requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of
procedural convenience to better satisfy the requirements of due process.

PETITIONERS: Under Sec. 4, Rule 76, the personal notice requirement is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error as grave
abuse of discretion.

SC: Petitioners are correct. It’s clear from Sec. 4, Rule 76 that notice of the time and place of hearing for the allowance of a will shall be
forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines if their residence be known.
Residences of petitioners were known to the probate court (RTC Pasig).
The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees & devisees of the testator.
But still the RTC didn’t cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners.
The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for 3 weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Joson vs. Noble-not applicable cos in that case, the petition included the residence of the other legatees/devisees but it was the WRONG address.
So, it’s as good as their (correct) residence is NOT known to the court. Thus, there’s no need for personal service w/c is only required if the address
of the legatees/devisees is known.
In Re: Estate of Suntay-It’s a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made.

59. Lerio vs. Lunga Oct. 8, 2018

Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Leriou assailing the Decision of CA affirming the Orders of the RTC of Muntinlupa City Branch 276 which
denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion to remove respondent Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix and to appoint petitioner Eleptherios or his
nominee as administrator of the estate of deceased Enrique Longa.
Respondent-minors YohannaFrenesi S. Longa[4] (Yohanna) and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa[5] (Victoria), represented by their mother, Mary Jane B.
Sta. Cruz, instituted a special proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Enrique T. Longa Petition for Letters of Administration with
the RTC in Muntinlupa City
Respondents alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen and respondents Yohanna and Victoria, his
legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively; and that Enrique left several properties with no creditors.
respondents were deemed as pauper litigants and exempt from paying the filing fee, subject to the payment thereof once a final judgment is rendered
in their favor.[8]
RTC issued the Letters of Administrator... on 2007
2008... respondent-administratrix submitted a Report of the Inventory and Appraisal... of the real and personal properties of the decedent, which was
duly noted by the RTC in its Order... petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion 1. To Remove Jane Sta. Cruz as Administratrix; and 2. Appoint
Eleptherios L. Longa or His Nominee as Administrator (Omnibus Motion).
alleged that they were denied due process of law because they did not receive any notice about respondents' Petition for Letters Administration.

Petitioners assert that each of them, being the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Enrique, has a preferential right over respondents to act as
administrator of the estate, or to designate somebody else to administer the estate in their behalf, pursuant to the order of preference under Rule 78,
Section 6.
2008, respondent-administratrix filed her Opposition... alleging that she mailed the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC
Order dated July 4, 2007 to petitioners in the addresses that the latter gave her... nd that she coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) for the service of the Petition for Letters of Administration to petitioners as evidenced by the RTC Order bearing the stamp[15] "RECEIVED"
by the DFA Records Division on July 27, 2007... respondent-administratrix averred that petitioners are disqualified to act as administrators because
petitioner Iona, a Greek national, is already divorced from Enrique and has already remarried as shown by her name Iona LeriouRegala in the
Omnibus Motion, and petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen are non-residents of the Philippines.

Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds by which an administrator may be removed by the court: Section 2. Court may
remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. - If an executor or administrator neglects
to render his account and settle the estate according to law, to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules,
or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. x xx.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement,
have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT
IT DISPENSED WITH THE MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3, RULE 79, IN RELATION TO
SECTIONS 3 & 4, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AND THE COURT A QUO'S OWN ORDER DATED 04 JULY 2007, WHEN IT
CONSIDERED THE MERE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE ORDER DATED 04 JULY 2007 ON THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMPLIANT WITH THE SAID LEGAL REQURIEMENTS.

WHETHER OR NOT
IT CONSIDERED THE EXCHANGE OF ELECTRONIC MAILS BETWEEN RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ AND PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS
AS A POSITIVE INDICATION THAT PETITIONERS HEIRS LONGA WERE ALLEGEDLY OFFICIALLY SERVED AND HAD PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID ELECTRONIC MAILS WERE ONLY BETWEEN RESPONDENT STA.
CRUZ AND PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS.

WHETHER OR NOT IT
DISREGARDED THE PREFERENTIAL AND SUPERIOR RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN OVER THE ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN OF THE DECEDENT.

WETHER OR NOT
IT DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIATED GROUNDS RAISED BY PETITIONERS HEIRS LONGA, SHOWING THE UNFITNESS OF
RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ TO DISCHARGE HER DUTIES AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT
DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIATED GROUNDS RAISED BY PETITIONERS HEIRS LONGA, SHOWING THE UNFITNESS OF
RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ TO DISCHARGE HER DUTIES AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT

Ruling:
It was not petitioners but Atty. Joseph Lemuel B. Baquiran (Baquiran) of Sianghio Lozada and Cabantac Law Offices who signed the certification
against forum shopping despite the absence of any showing that petitioners executed an SPA authorizing Atty. Baquiran to sign in their behalf.

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification
is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action." "Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the filing of a
petition in that case." Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must
execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. "[A] certification which had been signed by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition."

In the instant case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for three consecutive weeks in Balita, a newspaper of general circulation, on the
following dates: July 27, 2007, August 3, 2007, and August 10, 2007.[30] By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world,
petitioners are deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate.
The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones[32] where some of the heirs did not receive any personal notice about the
intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed notified through publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem.
petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their choice of administrator should be preferred because they are the
nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not absolute, and
that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.

It is worth emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not absolute, and that the appointment of an
administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify them from administering the decedent's estate pursuant to Rule
78, Section 1[35] of the Rules of Court. We are mindful that respondents are also disqualified by reason of their minority. In view of the evident
disqualification of petitioners and respondents and the lack of any known creditors, the parties have no choice but to have somebody else administer
the estate for them. Petitioners nominated Juan Manuel Elizalde (Elizalde) but failed to give adequate justification as to why Letters of
Administration should be issued in Elizalde's favor.[36] We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts in choosing respondent-
administratrix over Elizalde. Compared to Elizalde whose interest over the decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-administratrix's interest is to
protect the estate for the benefit of her children with Enrique.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court
which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie
on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate.

PART 3

- What are the grounds for disallowance of a will? Section 9 Rule 76 and Article 839 of the Civil Code

Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n)

Perez vs. Tolete June 2, 1994. Foreigners’ will probated abroad

DOCTRINE:
With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time and accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and devisees,
and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.

FACTS:
1. Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan became American citizens. They lived in the US with their children Jocelyn,
Jacqueline and Josephine.
2. Dr. Jose Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the remainder” of his real and personal property at the
time of his death “wheresoever situated.” In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren
with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
substitute executor.

“If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of
our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with
such presumption” (Rollo, p. 41).

3. Four days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her
husband.
4. Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
5. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof
with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. These two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his
favor.
6. Subsequently, SaludTeodroro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn filed with the RTC a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to
the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting
primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. Letters of administration were issued in her favor.
7. Perez filed motions praying for certain life insurance companies(Philippine Life Insurance Company and Philippine American Life
Insurance Company) be directed to deliver the proceeds of the life insurance policy taken by the deceased Cunanan spouses.
8. In another motion, Perez asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook savings
deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates
9. Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.,
Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that
before receiving petitioner’s motion his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, “in the interest of simple fair play,”
they should be notified of the proceedings.

Note: I just took the allegations of both parties that relate to Specpro

10. Perez then filed a counter manifestation basically alleging that the Cunanan collaterals had not legal or proprietary interests to protect and
no right to intervene. Probate court granted Perez’s motion.
11. Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special
administratrix of the estates. They alleged that that being the “brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs” of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had
been “deliberately excluded” in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to
believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such “misrepresentation” deprived them of their right to “due process in violation of
Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court.
12. In her opposition, Perez asserted:
a. that she was the “sole and only heir” of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the “Cunanan collaterals;” hence they
were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice;
b. that she could not have “concealed” the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not
only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court;
c. that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and
that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the
necessary ancillary proceedings in this country;
13. In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States “to settle
and divide equally the estates,” and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the “court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance”
a. They further asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the
requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with.
14. A lot of motions and exchanges happened between the parties and along the line the original Perez petitioner was substituted by her
daughter because she was ailing.

ISSUE:

W/N the Cunanan heirs should have been notified. ( This is the specpro issue but the main issue was regarding the effectivity of the will here in the
Philippines and the requisites it needed to comply with for it to take effect Also if both wills should be jointly probated. It dealt more with Conflicts
of laws). YES.

HELD:
YES.
1. Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
2. The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance” means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time.
3. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
4. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the
wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator”

 WHETHER OR NOT THE REPROBATE OF THE TWO WILLS IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING IS PROCEDURAL
 WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO WILLS PROBATED OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES MAY BE REPROBATED IN THE PHILIPPINES

RULING:
Requirements for allowance of foreign wills for probate in the Philippines
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by law of the place in which
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the
will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and law requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which
the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.

The separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the
Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate
proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case
at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two will contains essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in
all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

On the requirement of notice

Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance” means that with regards to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented
for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally
to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills.
Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, …”

Palaganes vs. Palaganes January 26, 2011.

Facts:
Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S.

Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganes, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition
on the ground that Ruperta's will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it.

The RTC issued an order admitting to probate Ruperta's last will, appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC. The CA pointed out that Section 2,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines.

The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures.
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution
before it can be probated here. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over
the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for
the valid execution of a will.

Issues:
W/N the will executed abroad may be probated in the PH?

Ruling:
YES, Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Moreover, our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the
person having custody of it.

Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.

The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. Hence our laws do not
prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution.

- Domiciliary administration and Ancillary administration

Domiciliary administration – Estate situated in the state of deceased's permanent residence is the domiciliary estate. Domiciliary administration is the
settlement and distribution of a decedent's domiciliary estate.

Ancillary administration- A probate court proceeding that is supplementary to the administration at the place of the decedent's domicile. Generally,
ancillary administration is necessary in cases where a deceased person owns property in another state.

An "ancillary administrator" is chosen by the executor or administrator of an estate to handle the property (primarily real estate) of the deceased's
estate in a state other than the one in which the estate is probated.

Ancillary administration is the performance of ancillary probate which is a proceeding for estate assets located in another state than where the
deceased lived. Each state has its own property laws, so administrators of estates must have a probate proceeding in each state that assets are located
in a will.

- Rule 78, Administrator and executor. What are their qualifications?

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person incompetent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity,
or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. — The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator.

Section 3. Married women may serve. — A married woman may serve as executrix or administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not
affect her authority so to serve under a previous appointment.

Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. — When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary
thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as required by these rules.

Section 5. Where some coexecutors disqualified others may act. — When all of the executors named in a will can not act because of incompetency,
refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are competent,
accept and give bond, and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust required by the will.

Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

- Who may be appointed? Differentiate an Executor and Adminsitrator?

The Executor is the person appointed in the Will. He shall take charge in executing the provisions of the Will, thus, carrying out the wishes of the
testator.

While an Administrator is a person appointed when there is no will. Hence, it may follow that, in the settlement of the estate of the deceased without
a Will, there can be no executor. However, an administrator will be appointed if it is really required. Such an administrator will be given letters of
administration.
Incidentally, there can likewise be a situation, wherein there is a will and yet no appointed executor therein. In this instance, if there is a need to
administer the estate, an administrator shall be appointed by the Court. He is called an Administrator with a Will Annexed.

- Can the court appoint two or more executors or administrators?

YES.

RULE 81
Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators. — When two or more persons are appointed executors or administrators the court may take a
separate bond from each, or a joint bond from all.

RULE 85
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court according to the services
actually rendered by them respectively.

- Uy vs. CA Gr No. 167979

DOCTRINE
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. The practice of appointing co- administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. Under both Philippine and American
jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.
FACTS
Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy,
Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia, Lilen S. Uy and Wilson
S. Uy (Petitioner).

On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was instituted and Lilia Hofileña was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the
deceased. On June 9, 1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña's appointment as special administrator and denied her petition to be
appointed as regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of administration were granted to petitioner (Wilson uy), who took his oath of office as
administrator on June 23, 1998.

Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) in his motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the decedent
but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter's properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed private
respondent as co-administrator of the estate.

Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to
re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; that private respondent is not only alien to
the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that the trial court's appointment of private respondent as
co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co- administrator to the estate of the deceased.
RULING
NO. The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of
administration. In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private respondent as co-administrator.
Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as follows:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set
aside the order of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another
person. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a
creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not
submit any report regarding the estate under his administration. In its March 16, 2000 Order, the trial court found thus:

Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been set relative thereto, this Court has observed that indeed the judicial administrator
had not submitted to the Court any report about the Estate under his administration except those involving the cases he filed and/or intervened in
other branches. This may be due to his being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him from the administration of the
Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However, considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to
have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial
to the Estate if he be appointed co- administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if
only to shed more light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent's Estate pending before this Court.

A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. The practice of appointing co- administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, this Court
reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-administrators under certain circumstances, to wit:

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co- administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the
benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.

Thus, petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent
administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own orders as long as
the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested
parties. In the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.

- Tanchangco vs. Santos June 8, 2020

Facts:

Consuelo died. Her daughter, (respondent) and her grandson, (petitioner) brought suit for the court to determine which among them will be
designated as special administrator of her estate. The daughter alleges that Consuelo left a will, and for this, she presented lawyers as witnesses to the
due execution of the will. The respondent daughter sought for testacy. On the other hand, petitioner grandson insists that there was no will, that
Consuelo was too weak and unstable to write one. He sought for intestacy.

RTC appointed the petitioner grandson as special administrator. The RTC found the purported will replete with aberrations. It noted that two attesting
witnesses to the will and the notary public were all associates of a Makati-based law firm which is the counsel of Natividad in the instant case.
Nobody among Consuelo's relatives witnessed the execution of the alleged will. Except for Natividad and her lawyers, no one knew that Consuelo
ever executed a will during her lifetime. RTC gave credence to Ronaldo's testimony that Consuelo declared that she had no will and that her
properties would be equally divided between her two children.

CA reversed RTC’s decision and appointed respondent daughter in place of petitioner. Article 960 of the Civil Code preferred testacy over
intestacy. The positive testimonies of the witnesses established the due execution and authenticity of the will especially when the Tanchancos could
not present proof that the said witnesses are not credible or competent. It added that the witnesses are all lawyers who are not disqualified from being
witnesses under the law except in cases relating to privileged communication arising from attorney-client relationship. It noted that in the probate of
the will, the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will in that the testator, of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It found nothing extraordinary in Natividad's act of submitting the will for probate 10 years
from its execution and after Consuelo's death especially since there is no law which obliges a testator to file a petition for probate of his or her will
during his or her lifetime. Thus, the daughter is hereby appointed executor of the estate pursuant to the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya of the decedent.

Issue:

Whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

Held:

Yes. The CA decision is affirmed.

It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory." In a similar way, "testate proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose."

The will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law.

An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it complied with the formalities required by the law, except that the attestation clause failed to indicate
the total number of pages upon which the will was written. To address this concern, Natividad enumerated the following attributes of the attestation
clause and the will itself, which the Court affirms.
In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment
portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5)
nadahon, kasama ang dahongkinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoongito. " Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of
the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually
five pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation clause.

The lawyers are NOT disqualified from being witnesses to a will.

Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, "[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and
able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code."

Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not
disqualified from being witnesses under Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time.

Since the will in this case is contested, Section 11, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:

SEC. 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. - If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the
notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in
the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. x x x

The lawyer-witnesses unanimously confirmed that the will was duly executed by Consuelo who was of sound mind and body at the time of signing.
£a⩊phi£ The Tanchancos failed to dispute the competency and credibility of these witnesses; thus, the Court is disposed to give credence to their
testimonies that Consuelo executed the will in accordance with the formalities of the law and with full mental faculties and willingness to do so.

- Who may be appointed administrator? Rule on preference Section 6 Rule 78

Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

- PCIB vs Escolin 56 SCRA 266

Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo
City for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband
Charles. Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the
brothers and sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place.

When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to
continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary
transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name included.

As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on
August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the
question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
―None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of
deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will
when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.‖

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime
employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was
appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by
one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a
modus operandi to settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)— which, however, went awry, with more and more heirs
from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Much much
later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon
Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her
capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate,
to which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties.

PCIB’s Claims
Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic
validity of its testamentary provisions.
• Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
• Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the
"national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables, and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) as regards
immovables.
• Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
• Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles,
not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
• The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate, cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. ―All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
• Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of
right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can
legally and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of
legitime. (Article 886)
• Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of
the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
• In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate, Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been
operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal
assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
• As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s estate at the time of
Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to ―all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate‖ which would go to her siblings in
the event of Charles death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
• There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857- 870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and
(2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four
of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first
heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar or
simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator;
or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and,
therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void. Manresa even said, ―when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in
case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator.‖
• The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to ¼ of the conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the
estate of Charles.
• It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely in continuation of the Hodges’ businesses, and which
corresponding deeds of sale were confirmed by the probate court, are null and void and should be subject to reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant
of the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.)
• Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the
same estate, to her relatives.

• After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations
and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
• Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no
such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’ repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of rents,
emoluments and income.

Issue:
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void? – NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? – REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s testamentary substitution, when viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is
correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnie’s will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the
testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or
(3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to
jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a
will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default is
contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence
of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.

Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles
during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction
whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to
this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering
that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)

Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of Linnie’s estate. While he may
have used language like ―herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated… there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, ‖ he would’ve
known that doing so
would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even moved to include Roy’s
name included in the probate court’s order, lest Roy’s heirs think that they had been omitted.

Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wife’s estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his
death, more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so
much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in thePhilippines on the basis of his
being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs.

The Court thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be
considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death,
and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal
revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles’ intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes
abroad, though they have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the parties.

It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in settling Linnie’s estate, and his sole administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs
interests, making it difficult to properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be
just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.

2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch
as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no
more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she
could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the
Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and
contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code,
the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnie’s brothers and
sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further
maintained that, in any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co- heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching
on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.

The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an
intelligent comprehensive and just resolution.
No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of foreign
laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all
other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and
adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.

Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the
laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the
laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.

The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by
Charles after Linnie’s death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his
intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after
the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:

(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be
considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27
and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which
include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part
of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;

(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such
exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes
Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers
and sisters;

(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically
ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon
the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these constructions of Linnie’s will
should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.

Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles’ alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnie’s will.

Avelina remains to be the administrator of Linnie’s estate. The said estate consists of ¼ of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the
time of Linnie’s death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date
until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently
from each other, as administrators.

Gabriel vs. CA August 7, 1992

FACTS:
9 months after Domingo Gabriel died, his son Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for letters of administration

The court directed the publication of the order in the newspaper "Mabuhay," once a week for 3 consecutive weeks

No opposition having been filed, Roberto was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order appointing
Roberto as administrator

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate was published in the "Metropolitan News."

Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto, filed a claim alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that
she thereby had an interest in said estate

The oppositors herein, including the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition claiming that (I) they were not duly informed by personal notice of
the petition for administration; (2) Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over Roberto Gabriel; (3) Roberto Gabriel has a
conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent
have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to the oppositors herein and should not be included in the value of the estate sought
to be administered by private respondent.
• The probate court denied the opposition since no proof was adduced to show that Roberto Gabriel is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to
perform the trust

The oppositors filed a certiorari before the CA claiming that the order of preference stated in the Rules of Court provides that the surviving spouse,
who in this case is Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator
o Also, as between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred
over Roberto Gabriel, who is an illegitimate son
o Roberto Gabriel contends that the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters
of administration for 30 days after the decedent's death. In this case, the oppositors failed to do so.

Issue/s:
1. WON the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded by the court to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of
her husband- NO

2. WON there is sufficient ground to revoke the appointment of Roberto as an administrator – NO

3. WON both the widow and the illegitimate son should be appointed as a co-administrator -- YES

Held/Ratio: Petition GRANTED. Both the widow, Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, and the illegitimate son, Roberto Gabriel, must be appointed as co-
administrators

1) NO. While it is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply
for letters of administration for 30 days after the decedent's death, such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the
estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration
• • In the case at bar, there is no such compelling reason
• • Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived since
the rule merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors”.

2. NO. Administrators can only be removed for just cause

o • Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator
o • A mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate
ratiocination for the removal of private respondent.

3. 3) YES. It is equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate in this case.
The purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate

Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction
and supervision of the probate court
The appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to
have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.

- Marcelo Investment Corp vs. Marcelo November 26, 2014

FACTS: On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and
(4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters
of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC. Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as
special administrators. However, Edward was the one appointed as regular administrator.
A project of partition was submitted, Edward manifested that oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. had already expressed his conformity to the Liquidation
of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by his signature therein. He therefore prays that the said
document which bears the conformity of all four (4) compulsory heirs of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be approved. RTC approved the proposed partition.
However, the distribution was deferred pending submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At this stage, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose,
Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his father’s estate, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448, and moved for his appointment as new regular
administrator thereof, which was approved by the RTC. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and now moved for the
appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate

ISSUE 1: Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution stage of the intestate
proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.

RULING: Yes. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Rule
90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate. The rule provides in pertinent part: SECTION 1. When order for
distribution of residue made. – x xx No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs. x xx The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs.
ISSUE 2: Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate bars his present appointment as such even in lieu
of Edward who is now dead.

RULING: Yes. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and unsuitable to administer his father’s estate. Section 1, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator: Who are incompetent to serve as executors
or administrators.— No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and (c)
Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or
by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is George the eldest son of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his most
immediate kin, he has, moreover, been chosen by the rest of the heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an administrator. In this regard, in
addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen executed an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the appointment of
George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to the [Court of Appeals.] we thus issue Letters of Administration to George to
facilitate and close the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate.

- San Luis vs. San Luis February 6, 2007

FACTS:

Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.

Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce againstFelicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.

Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo
died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Felicidad San Luis
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death;; Felicisimo being then the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent
Felicidad San Luis has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly
went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

ISSUES:

• Whether venue was properly laid

• Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code
• Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

HELD:

• YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of
election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
• YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the affirmative.

Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

• YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co- owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co- owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry.

Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

- Rule 79 Contents of letters of administration

Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

- Who may file a petition for letters of administration?

RULE 78
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

- What happens if there is a delay in the appointment of executor or administrator? Section 1 Rule 80.

Section 1. Appointment of special administrator. — When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of
the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

- Fernandez vs. Maravilla March 31, 1964

Facts:
Maravilla sought the probate of his late wife’s will. The siblings sought denial of probate on the ground that it wasnât signed on each and every page
by the decedent. They likewise prayed for the appointment of their brother as special administrator in lieu of the husband to protect their interest and
also due to failure to file an inventory. The probate of the will in the meantime was denied and to this, the husband appealed. Consequently, the
brother was appointed as administrator.

The husband filed a petition for certiorari and for preliminary injunction, praying therein the annulment of the brother as co- aadministrator and the
prohibition of the probate court from proceeding in his removal as administrator. The petitioners moved for the certification of the same to the SC as
the amount involved exceeds the jurisdiction of the CA. Nevertheless, the CA decided in favor of the husband.

Issue: Whether or not the ruling of the CA is correct.

Held:
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that
even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased.

In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or
value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate, considering that
the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. Note also that the present proceedings under review
were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co- administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent
as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole
estate is the value in controversy. It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had
no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note
that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is
merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also
impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon
whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is
allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)

- Powers and duties of administrator Rule 84

General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators

Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and property. How right enforced. — The executor or administrator of the
estate of a deceased partner shall at all times have access to, and may examine and take copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership
business, and make examine and make invoices of the property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving partner or partners, on request, shall
exhibit to him all such books, papers, and property in their hands or control. On the written application of such executor or administrator, the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may order any such surviving partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and to exhibit the books,
papers, and property, as in this section provided, and may punish any partner failing to do so for contempt.

Section 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. — An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenanble repair the houses and
other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.

Section 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and the expenses of administration.

PART 4

Claims against the estate Rule 86

- Section 1 of Rule 86. What is the role of the Office of the Clerk of Court?

Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. — Immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court.

- Notice to creditors, how issued?

Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. — Immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court.

Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of
claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice.
However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
Section 3. Publication of notice to creditors. — Every executor or administrator shall, immediately after the notice to creditors is issued, cause the
same to be published three (3) weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and to be posted for the same period in four
public places in the province and in two public places in the municipality where the decedent last resided.

Section 4. Filing of copy of printed notice. — Within ten (10) days after the notice has been published and posted in accordance with the preceding
section, the executor or administrator shall file or cause to be filed in the court a printed copy of the notice accompanied with an affidavit setting forth
the dates of the first and last publication thereof and the name of the newspaper in which the same is printed.

- 2 kinds of claims against the estate, money claims and non-money claims, where to file and who to file?

1. Rule 86 (Money Claims)

Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. — Immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court.

Where to file: COC of the court who issued/ granted the letters testamentary or of administration (PROBATE COURT)
Who to file: all persons having money claims against the decedent

2. Rule 87 (Non-money Claims)

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money
or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.

Where to file: courts; may be prosecuted independent of testate or intestate proceeding against the executor or administrator;
Who to file: interested persons who have a claim for the recovery of real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal

Section 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned — When an executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the
title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.

- Rule 86 vs. Rule 87

RULE 86 speaks of the Claims Against Estate. It discusses how to file money claims against the decedent. all persons having money claims against
the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court.

On the other hand, RULE 87 illustrates how Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators are filed. Non-money claims such as the recovery
of real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or the enforcement of a lien thereon, and recovery of damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or administrator.

- What money claims that may be filed before the Probate Court?

Rule 86
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent,
1. arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
2. all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent,
3. and judgment for money against the decent

A "contingent claim" is one which has not accrued, and which is dependent on the happening of some future event. A "contingent claim," within the
rule that claims against an estate which are not contingent are barred if not presented within a certain time, is one depending upon something
thereafter to happen.

- Government vs. Pamintuan 55 Phil 13

Facts:
Florentino Pamintuan filed an income tax return for the year 1919 and paid an amount on the basis of said return. When Florentino died in 1925,
intestate proceedings were instituted where the court appointed commissioners for the appraisal of the value of the property left by Florentino.

The court then ordered the delivery to the heirs of their respective shares of the inheritance after paying the corresponding inheritance taxes which
were duly paid. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, the administrator Jose Ramirez filed income tax returns for the estate of the
deceased corresponding to the years 1925 and 1926. The intestate proceedings were then closed in 1926.
In 1927, subsequent to the distribution of Florentino’s estate, the government discovered that Florentino had not paid P462 as additional income for
1919 on account of the sale of his house, from which he realized an income of P11,000.00 which was not included in his income tax return filed in
1919.

The government demanded payment of the income tax but the heirs refused to pay. The lower court ruled that the government was barred from
collecting the income tax due to its failure to file its claim with the committee on claims and appraisals.

Issue: W/n the gov can still collect the income tax despite its failure to file its claim with the committee on claims and appraisals

Ruling:
The administration proceedings of the late Florentino Pamintuan having been closed, and his estate distributed among his heirs, the defendants
herein, the latter are responsible for the payment of the income tax here in question in proportion to the share of each in said estate, in accordance
with section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

ESTATE; LIABILITY OF HEIRS AND DISTRIBUTEES. — Heirs are not required to respond with their own property for the debts of their
deceased ancestors. But even after the partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding
claims against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the property they have respectively received from the estate. The hereditary property
consists only of that part which remains after the settlement of all lawful claims against the estate, for the settlement of which the entire estate is first
liable. The heirs cannot, by any act of their own or by agreement among themselves, reduce the creditors' security for the payment of their claims.

RULE 88- but the assets so distributed may still be applied to the payment of the claim when established, and the creditor may maintain an action
against the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and their estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have
respectively received from the property of the deceased.

For the reasons stated, we are of opinion and so hold that claims for income taxes need not be filed with the committee on claims and
appraisals appointed in the course of testate proceedings and may be collected even after the distribution of the decedent's estate among his heirs,
who shall be liable therefor in proportion to their share in the inheritance.

- Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibanez 452 SCRA 228

FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of
P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim
entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed
a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.

Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2)
tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum
of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but
the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to
the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to
Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the
Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said
document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus
the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an
existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE:
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was
pending.

W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved
by the probate court.

W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.

HELD:
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed
its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased
and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-
maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty

Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left
a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
o (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.

May a creditor of a deceased for a money claim collect directly from the heir on the ground that obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs
from the moment of death of the decedent?
HELD – NO.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the
late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. At most, Unionbank may go after Edmund, but it may not go after Florence.

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may
be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.

ADDITIONAL information re Capacity of UNION BANK

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines…"34
However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and
the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation therein
as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank
is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of fs, 107 SCRA 504).36

- Gutamco vs. Chan Sing 46 Phil 542

Facts:

Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000 among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan
Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three adopted sons, Tan
Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should
be required.

Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were appointed and qualified as commissioners, and later they
published the usual notice to creditors to present their claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena, of Manila. The
commissioners presented their report to the court in which, among others, they reported the allowance of the claim here in question. At the time all of
the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the deceased.

When such report has been filed, the executor filed a motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his own choice as curador ad litem for the
minor heirs which, among other things, that the heirs who are interested in the estate of the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco,
age 20; Tan Kim Hong, age 12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China, and the day of their
return to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the estate which court ignored but appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment
as only formality such that he did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved.

In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for
the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey ordered an
investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem
of all the minor heirs, including the claimant, who made a written report to the court.

The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan
Kim Hong. After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his
order of removal, among other things, said that commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the
report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear in the
report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed.

After such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the present administrator applied to the court for authority, among
other things, to pay the claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the application of the present guardian to the
claimant to require the administrator to pay the claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong appeals,
contending that the lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the
administrator for authority to pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and
contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the
Code, and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became final.

Held:
NO. The court found as a fact that in the De los Santos vs. Reyes case, supra, there was a substantial compliance with all of the statutory
requirements, and the decision in that case was based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and those in the instant
case. Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is conclusive that at the time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was
only twelve years of age, and that all of the other parties were minors.

There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to
represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that
the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that the
claim in question in any manner, shape or form was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. For aught that appears in the record, the claim
was allowed by the commissioners on their own motion and of their own volition.

It also appears that the entries which were made in the books of the deceased were made by his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show that they
were made by the authority of the deceased. It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the entries were made, and
that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in question.

A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of
the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by
the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is pronounced
between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .

In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a
judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.

Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon
justice. It appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in question
their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were not res judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the
claim was a fraud upon the appellee.
Affirmed.

- What remedy is available if the probate court denies one’s money claim?

Section 13. Judgment appealable. — The judgment of the court approving or disapproving a claim, shall be filed with the record of the administration
proceedings with notice to both parties, and is appealable as in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay,
in due course of administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the
judgment creditor any priority of payment.

- Suppose the estate is the creditor? Will you follow Rule 86

General Rule: file an ordinary action against a third person (debtor) in favor of the creditor estate.

Exception:
Counter-claim

Rule 86
Section 10. Answer of executor or administrator. Offsets —Within fifteen (15) days after service of a copy of the claim on the executor or
administrator, he shall file his answer admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting forth the admission or denial. If he has no knowledge
sufficient to enable him to admit or deny specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The executor or administrator in his answer shall allege
in offset any claim which the decedent before death had against the claimant, and his failure to do so shall bar the claim forever. A copy of the
answer shall be served by the executor or administrator on the claimant. The court in its discretion may extend the time for filing such answer.

- Sicat vs. De Villanueva November 10, 1932

FACTS: Ricardo Sikat is the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva. QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva is the judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva. Sikat filed a complaint against Vda de Villanueva praying that the decision of the
committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P.
Villanueva be confirmed by the court. Vda. de Villanueva denied each and every allegation, and set up a special defense of prescription. Evidence
was adduced acknowledging indebtedness, the document dated September 22, 1909, executed by the late Pedro Villanueva in favor of his father, the
late Mariano P. Villanueva.

Issue: WON the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate against Pedro Villanueva estate has already prescribed.

HELD: YES
This court has so held in Santos vs. Manarang, in treating of the period of prescription established in section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
follows:
It cannot be questioned that this section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in
its application, to claims against the estates of deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United
States. It is commonly termed the statute of non-claims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be
delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute
of limitations, have not yet prescribed.

Now then, with reference to the extraordinary prescription established for claims against deceased persons, has the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate against Pedro Villanueva's estate prescribed?

In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang, this court laid down the following doctrine:
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased person and the early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy
after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

SC had seen that under section 689 of the Code, the maximum period for the presentation of claims against the estate of a deceased person is 18
months from the time fixed by the committee on claims and appraisal in its notice, and this period may be extended one month if a creditor applies
for it within six months after the first term, according to section 690.

The SC held that whenever a creditor's claim presented in the intestate proceedings of the estate of his debtor is not allowed because the court has no
jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three years to elapse before instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the claim is
barred by laches, applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.

- Notice to creditors issued by court and the creditors fail to file their money claim, what will be its effects?

Rule 86.
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.

- Section 2 Rule 86. Tardy Claim

Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of
claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice.
However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.

- Barrido vs. CA Nov 28, 1962

Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6
months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of
Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest
and attorney’s fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of
McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed
of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 86 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after
the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing
late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period.

Section 2, Rule 86 provides:

SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against
the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time
before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court
may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month.

Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed.

Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the
court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the
claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of
claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution
presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse
for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground
insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage
embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no
authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.

- Pauline vs Aquino

Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958, wherein the controverted one month period was clarified as follows:

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the
claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of
claims. (Emphasis supplied)

In Paulin vs. Aquino, supra, the Supreme Court held that the late filing was justified by the fraudulent omission of certain assets in the inventory; in
Gallinero vs. Torres, L-2329, June 30, 1950, on the ground of inducement of fraud upon claimant; and in Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. 573, it was held
that negotiations with an heir is not a sufficient cause in allowing a tardy claim. Upon the other hand, in Nebraska Wesleyan University vs. Bowen,
103 N.W. 275, it was ruled that a court ought not to permit a claim delayed more than 8 months in the absence of diligence and of unavoidable
mistake or accident or of a fraud of a nature analogous to that which warrants interposition of a court of equity to grant new trial.

- PNB vs CA March 20, 1958

Doctrines:
• To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds,
together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed
by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:

Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate – The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided
by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
xxx
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated,
a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the
deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

• Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively
pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any
deficiency.

• Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor
waives any further deficiency claim.

Facts:
The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in
their names. Upon Antonio’s death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonio’s
intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand (P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner
Philippine National Bank to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the above- mentioned parcel of land.

On June 29, 1989, Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note, payable on June 29, 1990. To secure
the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.

On December 27, 1990, for failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through theEx-Officio Sheriff,
who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the
auction, PNB was the highest bidder with a bid price P306,360.00. Since PNB’s total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the
loan had a payable balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua
and Allan Chua in his capacity as special administrator of his father’s intestate estate. The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of
PNB’s complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNB’s appeal for lack of merit.

Petitioner contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to
recover the deficiency from the debtor.

Private respondents argue that having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the deceased, petitioner is
precluded from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio M. Chua. This they say is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, which states that:

Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate;
or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there
is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize
upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other
security alone and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a
creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or
administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by payingthe debt for which it is hold as security, under the direction of the court if
the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.

Issue:
May the petitioner still avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the
property securing the mortgage in its favor?

Ruling:
No.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a
foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into
play decisively.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds,
together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed
by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89.Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate – The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided
by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
xxx

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated,
a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the
deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of
Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.

Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively
pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any
deficiency.[9]

In Perez v. Philippine National Bank,[10] reversing Pasno vs. Ravina,[11] we held:

The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation
have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7,
Rule 87 (now Rule 86), the majority opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out the third alternative conceded
by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative.

The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. Following the
Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further
deficiency claim.

The dissent in Pasno, as adopted in Perez, supports this conclusion, thus:

When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial sale waives all right to recover against the estate of
the deceased debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen that the decision in this case (referring to the majority
opinion) will impose a burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property for the security of debts, without any
compensatory advantage.

Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor’s option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas.
This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the
complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its
favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chua’s estate.

- What if it is the executor and administrator has a claim over the estate?

Rule 86
- Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. — If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he
represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of
such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The
court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim.

Rule 87 Non-money claims

- Where or whom to file non-money claims?

Against the executor or administrator of the estate (may be filed independently of the testate or intestate proceeding). In ordinary courts

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money
or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.

- Examples of non-money claims against the estate?

1. recovery real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,

2. enforcement of a lien thereon
3. actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal
- What are Sections 6 to 9 of Rule 87?

Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. — If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor or
other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has
knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of or tends or discloses the right, title, interest, or claim
of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if
the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for
contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put any such person, and his answers thereto,
shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office.

Section 7. Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account. — The court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, may cite a person
entrusted by an executor or administrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person to render a full
account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, account, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust for such
executor or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish
him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.

Section 8. Embezzlement before letters issued — If a person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of administration on the estate of the
deceased, embezzles or alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of such deceased, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the
executor or administrator of the estate for double the value of the property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of such
estate.

Section 9. Property fraudulently conveyed by deceased may be recovered. When executor or administrator must bring action. — When there is a
deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts and expenses of administration, and the deceased in his
lifetime had conveyed real or personal property, or a right or interest therein, or an debt or credit, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid any
right, debt, or duty; or had so conveyed such property, right, interest, debt or credit that by law the conveyance would be void as against his creditors,
and the subject of the attempted conveyance would be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor or administrator may
commence and prosecute to final judgment an action for the recovery of such property, right, interest, debt, or credit for the benefit of the creditors;
but he shall not be bound to commence the action unless on application of the creditors of the deceased, not unless the creditors making the
application pay such part of the costs and expenses, or give security therefor to the executor or administrator, as the court deems equitable.

- Who has authority to file recovery of property belonging to the estate?

Rule 87
Section 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. — For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of deceased, actions for causes which survive.

- Rioferio vs. CA January 13, 2004

FACTS:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada,
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora
Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered
that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties
of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.

Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator.

HELD:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.Even if administration proceedings
have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the
total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.

- Yaptinchay vs del Rosario March 2, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638
and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Carmona, Cavite. On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all,
of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (“Golden Bay”) under TCT
225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of
Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as
RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.

Upon learning that “Golden Bay” sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the “RTC” an Amended Complaint to implead
new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the RTC in an Order dated July 7, 1995,
which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, which they promptly did. On August 12, 1995, the private
respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of
action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs’
claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, holding that
petitioners “have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays
- that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.”

Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC. Undaunted, petitioners have come before
this Court to seek relief from respondent court’s Orders under attack. Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners’ submission that the
respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court can make a declaration of heirship in the civil action filed by the petitioners considering that the petitioners are the legal
heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay

HELD: No, the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as “one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong” while a special proceeding is “a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

The plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except
the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance.

"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera,
the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations
(that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.’

- Treyes vs Larlar September 8, 2020

DR. NIXON L. TREYES, PETITIONER, V. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:
Rosie LarlarTreyes died intestate and without a child. Rosie’s siblings sent a letter to Dr. Nixon Treyes, the husband of Rosie, inviting him for a
conference for the settlement of estate of Rosie. Treyes ignored the letter and executed two affidavits of self-adjudication which he registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental, transferring unto himself 14 properties, as sole heir of his decedent-
spouse. After sending a second letter, it was found out by the siblings that the properties of Rosie were already transferred to Treyes.

The siblings Larlar filed an action for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession, partition, and
damages, before the RTC of Negros Occidental.

A first service of summons was served on Treyes, which he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. A re-service of summons was served to Treyes which then he filed another Motion to Dismiss arguing that the private respondents’
Complaint should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and, corollarily, lack of real parties in
interest, arguing that the petitioners have not established their right to succession and thus lacking the personality to file the complaint; prescription
on the ground that the action for recovery of properties of the heirs has prescribed, and improper venue for the complaint was filed before the RTC of
San Carlos, Negros Occidental.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting Treyes to file before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA,
however, denied the same.

ISSUE and HOLDING:

1) Whether the action should be dismissed for improper venue
No, the action cannot be dismissed for improper venue. Invoking rule 73 to allege improper venue is entirely inconsistent with Treyes’ assertion that
the complaint filed is not a special proceeding but an ordinary civil action. Rule 9, Section 1 of the rules provides that all defenses and objections not
pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in an answer shall be deemed as a waiver with exception to the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, prescription, res judicata, litis pendentia. Likewise under Rule 15, Section 8, it provides that a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment
shall include all objections available, else such objection not raised shall be deemed waived (exception: the 4 grounds of motion to dismiss).

In this case, in the first motion to dismiss, Treyes only raised lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner. The defense for improper venue was very much
available at the time of filing. Thus, raising the defense of improper venue although would not have been prejudicial to the petitioner, there is no
valid justification for the failure to invoke such defense.

2) Whether the action has prescribed

No, the defense of prescription of the complaint has no merit. Treyes invoked prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is inconsistent with his main theory
that the complaint is an ordinary civil action and not a special proceeding. The provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is applicable only:
1. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and
2. when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

The court held that both requirements are absent in this case; thus, the prescriptive period on constructive trust under the Civil Code, particularly
under implied constructive trust, applies, and not the prescription on Special Proceedings.

The Civil Code identifies 2 kinds of Trusts:

1. Implied – by operation of law
2. Express – by intention of the parties

Under Implied Trust, there are two more categories:

1. Resulting Trust
– disposition of property which raises an inference that he does not intent the person holding the property to have any beneficial interest

2. Constructive Trust
– subject to equitable duty to convey to another, on ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it

– The duty to acquire property arises because of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, wrongful disposition, breach of fiduciary duty.

In an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust, the law provides a prescription of 10 years from issuance of the torrens title over
the property, which is based in article 1144 of the civil code. This issuance of title operates as a contructive notice to the whole world, which the
discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of such issuance.

3) Whether there is a need for prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding prior to filing an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of property

No. Treyes contends that the petitioners have not established their right as legal heirs and is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit; hence, their action for
reconveyance should be dismissed.

The court held that the establishment of right of the heirs is conferred by law and there is no need for judicial confirmation to establish petitioners as
heirs. It was already established by the petitioners that they are heirs ipso facto jure, thus there is no need for any judicial confirmation. The
complaint alleges that their rights over the properties is by virtue of their being siblings of the decedent.
In Article 777 of the Civil Code, it substantially provides that rights of succession is transmitted upon the moment of death of the decedent. This
much to say that the title or rights is immediately passed to the heirs upon death. Thus, the heirs have legally been deemed to have acquired
ownership over the estate of the decedent, without need of any declaration.

In partition, even before a property is judicially partitioned, heirs are already deemed owners and without need for prior separate judicial declaration
of their heirship.

In a summary settlement of estates, heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of estate of decedent amongst themselves through execution of a
public instrument without prior declaration in separate judicial proceeding that they are heirs of the decedent.

Article 1001 likewise provides that brothers and sisters or their children who survive with the widow or widower are entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, the other half to the surviving spouse.

Here, the petitioners have already established their filiation with the decedent and therefore there is no need for a declaration of heirship through
special proceedings. The need to instittue a sperate special proceeding for determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicaility as when parties in a civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented evidence regarding the issue of
heirship. Further, in this case, the plaintiffs do not really seek to establish their right as an heir but seek the enforcement of their rights brought about
them being heirs by operation of law, as provided under Article 777, in relation to Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the petition is denied.

PART 5

Rule 88
- When may debts against the estate be paid?
If the estate is sufficient, debts shall be paid in full. If, after hearing all the money claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such
claims, it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or administrator pay the same within the time limit for that purpose.
(Section 1, Rule 88)

- What is the Statute of non-claims?

The statute of non-claims is a rule requiring certain creditors of a deceased person to present their claims for examination and allowance within a
specified period; otherwise, they are barred forever (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 86, RoC).

Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of
claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice.
However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.

Purpose of the rule in fixing the period

The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.The purpose of the rule is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch so that the
residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims which, under the
ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed.

The purpose of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims against an estate of the deceased person must be presented is to insure a speedy
settlement of the estate and the early distribution of the estate of deceased persons should not be unnecessarily delayed by the lethargy and negligence
of those who have a direct interest in the same (Rio y Compania v. Maslog, GR L-12302. Apr. 13, 1959, 105 Phil. 452).

- Where to get the payments from?

Section 1. Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. — If, after hearing all the money claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such
claims, it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or administrator pay the same within the time limited for that purpose.

Section 2. Part of estate from which debt paid when provision made by will. — If the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to
be appropriated for the payment of his debts, the expenses of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according to the provisions of
the will; but if the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated, is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real or
personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any shall be appropriated for that purpose.

Section 3. Personalty first chargeable for debts, then realty. — The personal estate of the deceased not disposed of by will shall be first chargeable
with the payment of debts and expenses; and if said personal estate is not sufficient for tat purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment of the
participants for the estate, the whole of the real estate not dispose of by will, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after obtaining the authority of the court therefor. Any deficiency shall be met by
contributions in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of this rule.

Section 4. Estate to be retained to meet contingent claims. — If the court is satisfied that a contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the
executor or administrator to retain in his hands sufficient estate to pay such contingent claim when the same becomes absolute, or if the estate is
insolvent, sufficient to pay a portion equal to the dividend of the other creditors.

Section 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have been possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have
entered into possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become liable to contribute for
the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of
their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.

Section 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent — If the assets which can be appropriated for the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose,
the executor or administrator shall pay the debts against the estate, observing the provisions of Articles 1059 and 2239 to 2251 of the Civil Code.
Article 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be applied to the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the provisions
of articles 2239 to 2251 on Preference of Credits shall be observed, provided that the expenses referred to in article 2244, No. 8, shall be those
involved in the administration of the decedent's estate. (n)

Article 2239. If there is property, other than that mentioned in the preceding article, owned by two or more persons, one of whom is the insolvent
debtor, his undivided share or interest therein shall be among the assets to be taken possession of by the assignee for the payment of the insolvent
debtor's obligations. (n)

Article 2251. Those credits which do not enjoy any preference with respect to specific property, and those which enjoy preference, as to the amount
not paid, shall be satisfied according to the following rules:
(1) In the order established in article 2244;
(2) Common credits referred to in article 2245 shall be paid pro rata regardless of dates. (1929a)
Article 2244. With reference to other property, real and personal, of the debtor, the following claims or credits shall be preferred in the order named:
(1) Proper funeral expenses for the debtor, or children under his or her parental authority who have no property of their own, when approved by the
court;
(2) Credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees, laborers, or household helpers for one year preceding the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency;
(3) Expenses during the last illness of the debtor or of his or her spouse and children under his or her parental authority, if they have no property of
their own;
(4) Compensation due the laborers or their dependents under laws providing for indemnity for damages in cases of labor accident, or illness resulting
from the nature of the employment;
(5) Credits and advancements made to the debtor for support of himself or herself, and family, during the last year preceding the insolvency;
(6) Support during the insolvency proceedings, and for three months thereafter;
(7) Fines and civil indemnification arising from a criminal offense;
(8) Legal expenses, and expenses incurred in the administration of the insolvent's estate for the common interest of the creditors, when properly
authorized and approved by the court;
(9) Taxes and assessments due the national government, other than those mentioned in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;
(10) Taxes and assessments due any province, other than those referred to in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;
(11) Taxes and assessments due any city or municipality, other than those indicated in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;
(12) Damages for death or personal injuries caused by a quasi-delict;
(13) Gifts due to public and private institutions of charity or beneficence;
(14) Credits which, without special privilege, appear in (a) a public instrument; or (b) in a final judgment, if they have been the subject of litigation.
These credits shall have preference among themselves in the order of priority of the dates of the instruments and of the judgments, respectively.

Section 8. Dividends to be paid in proportion to claims. — If there are no assets sufficient to pay the credits of any once class of creditors after
paying the credits entitled to preference over it, each creditor within such class shall be paid a dividend in proportion to his claim. No creditor of any
one class shall receive any payment until those of the preceding class are paid.

Section 9. Estate of insolvent non-resident, how disposed of. — In case administration is taken in the Philippine of the estate of a person who was at
the time of his death an inhabitant of another country, and who died insolvent, hi estate found in the Philippines shall, as far as practicable, be so
disposed of that his creditors here and elsewhere may receive each an equal share, in proportion to their respective credits.

Section 10. When and how claim proved outside the Philippines against insolvent resident's estate paid. — If it appears to the court having
jurisdiction that claims have been duly proven in another country against the estate of an insolvent who was at the time of his death an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and that the executor or administrator in the Philippines had knowledge of the presentation of such claims in such country and an
opportunity to contest their allowance, the court shall receive a certified list of such claims, when perfected in such country, and add the same to the
list of claims proved against the deceased person in the Philippines so that a just distribution of the whole estate may be made equally among all its
creditors according to their respective claims; but the benefit of this and the preceding sections shall not be extended to the creditors in another
country if the property of such deceased person there found is not equally apportioned to the creditors residing in the Philippines and the other
creditor, according to their respective claims.

Section 11. Order for payment of debts. — Before the expiration of the time limited for the payment of the debts, the court shall order the payment
thereof, and the distribution of the assets received by the executor or administrator for that purpose among the creditors, as the circumstances of the
estate require and in accordance with the provisions of this rule.

Section 12. Orders relating to payment of debts where appeal is taken. — If an appeal has been taken from a decision of the court concerning a claim,
the court may suspend the order for the payment of the debts or may order the distributions among the creditors whose claims are definitely allowed,
leaving in the hands of the executor or administrator sufficient assets to pay the claim disputed and appealed. When a disputed claim is finally settled
the court having jurisdiction of the estate shall order the same to be paid out of the assets retained to the same extent and in the same proportion with
the claims of other creditors.

Section 13. When subsequent distribution of assets ordered. — If the whole of the debts are not paid on the first distribution, and if the whole assets
are not distributed, or other assets afterwards come to the hands of the executor or administrator, the court may from time to time make further orders
for the distributions of assets.

Section 14. Creditors to be paid in accordance with terms of order. — When an order is made for the distribution of assets among the creditors, the
executor or administration shall, as soon as the time of payment arrives, pay the creditors the amounts of their claims, or the dividend thereon, in
accordance with the terms of such order.
Section 15. Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice, within what periods. — On granting letters testamentary or
administration the court shall allow to the executor or administrator a time for disposing of the estate and paying the debts and legacies of the
deceased, which shall not, in the first instance, exceed one (1) year; but the court may, on application of the executor or administrator and after
hearing on such notice of the time and place therefor given to all persons interested as it shall direct, extend the time as the circumstances of the
estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a single extension not so that the whole period allowed to the original executor or administrator shall
exceed two (2) years.

Section 16. Successor of dead executor or administrator may have time extended on notice within certain period. — When an executor or
administrator dies, and a new administrator of the same estate is appointed, the court may extend the time allowed for the payment of the debts or
legacies beyond the time allowed to the original executor or administrator, not exceeding six (6) months at a time and not exceeding six (6) months
beyond the time which the court might have allowed to such original executor or administrator; and notice shall be given of the time and place for
hearing such application, as required in the last preceding section.

Rule 89

Sections 1,2,4 and 5 of Rule 89

Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent

Section 1. Order of sale of personalty. — Upon the application of the executor or administrator, and on written notice to the heirs and other persons
interested, the court may order the whole or a part of the personal estate to be sold, if it appears necessary for the purpose of paying debts, expenses
of administration, or legacies, or for the preservation of the property.

Section 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through personalty not exhausted. —
When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such
personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient
provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on written notice of
the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so
much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly
appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of
such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the circumstances.

Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. — No such authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or
personal estate shall be granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned to pay the debts,
expenses of administration, and legacies within such time as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the security of the creditors, as well as of the
executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of either.

Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. — When it appears that the sale of the
whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon
application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned
to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.

Section 5. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of estate to pay debts and legacies in other countries. — When the sale of
personal estate, or the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real estate is not necessary to pay the debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in
the Philippines, but it appears from records and proceedings of a probate court in another country that the estate of the deceased in such other country
is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies there, the court here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the
personal estate or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the payment of debts or legacies in the other country, in same manner as
for the payment of debts or legacies in the Philippines.

- How and when can the Executor or Administrator sell, mortgage or subject the estate of the decedent to encumbrance?

HOW

● Section 7. Regulation for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. — The court having jurisdiction of the estate
of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases
provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations.

(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the
legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that
the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial.

(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reasons for the
same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by
publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor
or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;

(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and
in case of sale the court may authorize it to be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The executor or administrator
shall be furnished with a certified copy of such order;

(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning
notice of execution sale;

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgage, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a
certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be as valid as if the
deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

WHEN
Section 1. Order of sale of personalty. — Upon the application of the executor or administrator, and on written notice to the heirs and other persons
interested, the court may order the whole or a part of the personal estate to be sold, if it appears necessary for the purpose of paying debts, expenses
of administration, or legacies, or for the preservation of the property.
Section 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through personalty not exhausted. —
When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such
personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient
provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on written notice of
the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so
much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly
appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of
such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the circumstances.

Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. — When it appears that the sale of the
whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon
application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned
to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
Section 5. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of estate to pay debts and legacies in other countries. — When the sale of
personal estate, or the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real estate is not necessary to pay the debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in
the Philippines, but it appears from records and proceedings of a probate court in another country that the estate of the deceased in such other country
is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies there, the court here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the
personal estate or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the payment of debts or legacies in the other country, in same manner as
for the payment of debts or legacies in the Philippines.
Section 6. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty acquired on execution or foreclosure. — The court may
authorize an executor or administrator to sell mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate acquired by him on execution or foreclosure sale, under the
same cicumstances and under the same regulations as prescribed in this rule for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of other real estate.

Rule 90

Distribution and Partition of the Estate

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. — Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

Section 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. — If at the time of distribution the executor or administrator has retained sufficient effects in his
hands which may lawfully be applied for the expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such
executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by
the parties in proportion to their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if
any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the executor or
administrator against the party not paying the sum assessed.
Section 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. — Certified copies of final orders and judgments of the court relating to the real estate or the
partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where the property is situated.

- How and when can the estate of the decedent be distributed?

HOW
WHEN
RULE 90
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs

● There are two ways to settle an estate in the Philippines:

1. Judicial - In a judicial partition, the matter is taken to court. This happens if the deceased property owner has left a valid will or if there are
disagreements or conflict among the heirs.

2. Extrajudicial - If there is no will, the heirs must execute an Extra-Judicial Settlement of estate (EJS), a notarized legal document signed by
all the heirs listing the properties comprising the estate of the decedent and the agreed manner of distribution of the estate among the legal heirs.

CASE: Project of Partition. Reyes Vs. Ilano Oct. 28, 1936

Facts:
Andres Reyes and Luciana Farlin were married in 1893 and had six children, three of whom died without heirs before their parents' death and two of
whom died after their mother's death. Upon their death, their son Andres Reyes succeeded them in the lease and purchased said leased lands as friar
lands from the Spanish government in the years 1909, 1910 and 1921. After the death of Luciana Farilin, Andres Reyes, contracted a second
marriage with Felisa Camia and had a son named Bibiano Reyes. Andres Reyes died on April 20, 1932, leaving a will (Exhibit A) which was duly
probated on June 21, 1933. SeveroAbellara and Luis Gaerlan were appointed commissioners on claims and appraisal and, after having qualified on
June 25, 1932, became executrix of the estate left by Andres Reyes.

The appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano filed her opposition to this account in her pleadings of June 3 and 12, 1933, claiming that some of the items of
expenses stated therein are unnecessary and inaccurate. On October 13, 1933, the executrix-appellant presented the second account of her
administration, which was also opposed by the oppositor-appellee. On October 16, 1933, Felisa Camia de Reyes filed a project of partition with an
appraisal of the properties therein enumerated, which appraisal is different from that made by the commissioners on claims and appraisal. This
counterproject of partition was admitted and approved by the court.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in accepting the counterproject of partition presented by the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano.

Ruling:
There is nothing in the law imposing upon the executor or administrator the obligation to present a project of partition for the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person. Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to assign ". . . the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled . . ." (See also article 1052,
Civil Code.) It is referred from these legal provisions that it is the Court of First Instance of Cavite alone that may make the distribution of his estate
and determine the persons entitled, and it may require the executrix to present a project of partition to better inform itself of the condition of the estate
to be distributed and so facilitate the prompt distribution thereof. The project of partition that the executor or administrator might have presented
would not be conclusive and the interested parties could oppose the approval thereof and enter their counterproject of partition which the court might
accept and approve, as it did in this case. In adopting the project of partition of the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano, said court acted within
its discretionary power and committed no error of law.

In view of the foregoing considerations, and with the sole modification that the estate of the deceased Andres Reyes reimburse the executrix-
appellant in the sum of P690.57, plus the sum of P81.94 as commission, the resolution appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

- Deborja Vs. Deborja April 27,1949

Facts:
The case of Juliana de Borja and Crisanta de Borja has been pending in court for more than twenty years. In 1927, Marcelo de Borja, the richest man
in Pateros, Rizal, died intestate and the estate has remained unliquidated and undivided. The two of the four heirs died during the most crucial stage
of the trial and the other two are now passed the age of seventy. The heirs were unable to agree on one particular project or plan of partition until
finally the court was constrained to appoint commissioners to partition the considerable mass of property of the present intestate among the four heirs
in this case. The two commissioners were appointed to draw up a project of partition and then to submit it to the court for its approval.

The Court, then, appointed Mr. Saturnino David, the Provincial Treasurer, and ex-oficio Assessor of Rizal and Mr. SeveroAbellera, the Clerk of
Court. Their appointment was highly approved by the parties because they were men of proven merit. On February 8, 1944, the commissioners
submitted a project of partition which was approved by the court. Juliana de Borja interjected her appeal and argued that she had not been afforded an
opportunity to be heard by the commissioners when they were proceeding to the division of the properties among the heirs. She filed a detailed
opposition against the project, supported by exhaustive arguments, none of which were found to be meritorious by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in finding the oppositions of Juliana de Borja unmeritorious?

Ruling:
Yes, the court is correct in finding appellants' arguments unmeritorious. In the project of partition, she was given properties valued at P80,595.05,
more than the value of the properties awarded to each of the other heirs with the exception of Crisanta de Borja who received the same value as that
of appellant. It is not necessary to show what specific property is given to one heir in exchange of the share that is not given him in another property,
as the result of the partition shows that all the heirs have received substantially equal shares.

The most important details in this text are that the policy and purpose of administration proceedings is to close up and not to continue an estate, and
that the machinery furnished by the State for the division and distribution of the property of the decedent is so cumbersome, unwieldy and expensive
that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division. The court's policy on this matter is embodied in Rule 89, section
15, which reads as follows:

"The court shall allow to the executor or administrator a time for disposing of the estate and paying the debts and legacies of the deceased, which
shall not exceed one year; but the court may, on application of the executor of administrator and after hearing on such notice of the time and place
therefore given to all persons interested as it shall direct, extend the time as the circumstances of the estate require not exceeding six months for a
single extension nor so that the whole period allowed to the original executor and administrator shall exceed two years." The order appealed from is
affirmed with costs against appellant.

- What is the concept of Advance inheritance?

● Gifts during the lifetime of the owner are advances from the inheritance. The law considers all property given during the lifetime of the
decedent as advances from his/her estate. (Thus, any property which the deceased gave or donated to other persons before death must be returned to
his/her estate - known as collation.)

● Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. — Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

● (Rule 109 Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to
settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate
may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90
of this rules.)

- What is the remedy of an heir omitted in the partition?

● The better practice to secure relief is reopening of the proceeding case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed
and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.

- Jerez vs. Nietes Dec 27, 1969

Doctrine: We do so now and definitely hold that rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a
testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved. Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality
as to pleas for intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court.

Facts:
After Nicolas Jalandoni died, a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent Judge, petitioner Lucrecia
Jerez, his widow, being appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted and the same was approved. Lucilo
(alleged acknowledged natural child) and Victoria (alleged illegitimate daughter), sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
preterited in the project of partition. Judge Nietes allowed intervention and the proceedings were reopened. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied, the matter was elevated to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.CA
denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Nietes validly caused the reopening of the proceedings.

Ruling:
Negative. Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of
respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the
absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned by Justice Sanchez:
"No one may quibble over the existence of the court’s discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."

Respondent Judge is directed to require LuciloJalandoni and Victoria to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special Proceeding. In
the event that they could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed conformably to law.

- Suppose the 30 day period lapsed from the approval of the Project of Partition, what is the remedy of an excluded heir?

Action for reconveyance against co heirs

In your understanding of probate proceedings what could be the case flow settling the estate of a decedent?

1. Petition
Rule 76.
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

2. Issuance of Letters
Rule 78:
Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. — When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue
letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as
required by these rules.

3. Claims
Rule 86 for Monetary Claims
Rule 87 of Non-Monetary Claims

4. Payment
RULE 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate

5. Distribution
RULE 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate

Rule 91
- What is the concept of an Escheat Proceedings?
● Section 1. When an by whom petition filed. — When a person dies intestate, seized of real property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or
person by law entitled to the same, the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth
the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.

- Republic vs. CA Jan 31, 2002

● Facts:
In recognition of Amada Solano's faithful and dedicated service as her personal domestic helper, Ms. Elizabeth Hankins donated two parcels of land
to Solano. But the deeds of donation evidencing the above however were alleged to be missing and nowhere to be found.

The Republic then initiated escheat proceedings concerning the parcels of land in which Solano filed a motion to intervene. Said motion was denied.
Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the
estate of the decedent in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings, Solano claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation and, filed a petition
before the CA for the annulment of the lower court’s decision, alleging, among others, that: Having been donated to her, the properties in dispute did
not and could not form part of Ms. Hankins estate. Hence, could not be validly escheated

Republic, in its answer, invoked (a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, that (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations, being filed beyond the 5-yr limitation provided under Sec. 4 Rule 91 ROC.

The CA ruled in favor of Solano ruling that she is not claiming anything from the estate within the purview of Sec 91 Sec 4, but rather she is claiming
ownership over the disputed properties and reconveyance thereof. As such, her claim was properly filed within the 10-yr prescriptive period under
the Civil Code, not under the ROC. Hence, this appeal.

● Issue:
(1) Whether Solano is barred by prescription.
(2) Whether Solano is a claimant within Sec 91.
(3) Whether the allegedly donated properties may be validly escheated in favor of the Republic.

● Ruling:
(1) Yes. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such
person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting
the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant;
on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose
them forever in a final judgment.xxx

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more
or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent’s belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
(2) Yes. (case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc) Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in
the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
(3) Yes. In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being
conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had
been previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to
the properties in question." 9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to
the property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating
that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any
clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at
least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore
cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent’s estate at the time the lower court handed down its
decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a
close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being
diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.

- Suppose the Escheat proceeding was concluded, when may an heir file his claim over the estate of the decedent?

Section 4. When and by whom claim to estate filed. — If a devisee, legatee, heir, widow, widower, or other person entitled to such estate appears and
files a claim thereto with the court within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same,
or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds after deducting reasonable charges for the care of the estate; but a
claim not made within the said time shall be forever barred.

● Devisees, legatees, widows, widowers or other persons entitled to such estate who appear and file claim thereto within 5 years from date of
judgment (Note: 5-year period is prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose
them forever in a final judgment.)
● A claim not made shall be barred forever