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International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice

39 (2011) 204e214
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijlcj

Fraud and recessions: Views from fraudsters

and fraud managers
Martin Gill
Perpetuity Group, Leicester, UK

Abstract

While a link is often made between the economy and crime levels, the evidence suggests that char-
acteristics of an adverse economic climate can lead to either an increase or a decrease in crime. In this
paper the impact of the recession on fraud is examined. This work is based on work undertaken by the
author with fraud managers (via three group discussions), and interviews with sixteen fraudsters in prison.
The findings underline the need for caution in making a link between increased levels of fraud and an
adverse economic climate. More research is needed in this area to examine what types of offences, or what
characteristics of them are most likely to be affected by poor economic conditions.
Ó 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Fraud and recession; Crime levels; Fraudsters; Fraud managers

1. Introduction

Developing exhaustive explanations for the ‘causes’ of crime, on both the macro country
wide level, as well as in individual cases, remains something of the holy grail of criminology.
Developing effective theories of why crime occurs leads to good theories of crime prevention,
since every theory of what makes a crime happen leads to a theory of how to prevent it or at
least reduce it. And of course there are a lot of theories which variously explain, for example,
the mal adjustment and development issues within the individual; societal inequalities;
criminogenic cultures; divisive social policies; inappropriate policing; easy opportunities;
inadequate penal responses, to name but a few (for a discussion of theories see Hopkins Burke,
2009; Maguire et al., 2007; Newburn, 2007).

E-mail address: m.gill@perpetuitygroup.com

1756-0616/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2011.05.008
 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214 205

In the current economic climate, there is a major concern about the impact of the recession
on levels of crime. For some the adverse economic climate will clearly lead to crime increases,
and especially in acquisitive crime. For example, the Association of British Insurers (ABI,
2009) has warned that ‘fraud thrives in a recession’, while the Chief Executive of CIFAS,
warned: ‘With Britain now in recession, a significant rise in fraud is inevitable’ (CIFAS, 2009).
Indeed, for many this is something of a commonsense view; if people are short of money some
will turn to crime so that they can make ends meet. However, as (Weatherburn, 1992; 8) notes
about a slightly different but parallel context:
‘Chronically high levels of unemployment in certain sectors of the economy, and the
existence of a marginalised under-class of individuals and families living in poverty are all
conditions which can just as easily be found in booming as in contracting economies’.
This paper begins by discussing some of the issues that connect the economy to crime.
Specifically, it will explore two potential influences of a recession, facilitating both and increase
and a decrease in crime. It will then focus specifically on fraud and report on some work
undertaken with fraud managers on the one hand, and fraudsters on the other, about their views
on the impact of the recession. Three focus group discussions were held with fraud managers
and 16 people with convictions for fraud were interviewed in three prisons to determine what
impact they felt the recession would have on fraud levels.

2. The economy and crime levels

It is important to understand that although ‘recessions’ are often referred to as if they were
a single thing, what causes them varies. Knoop (2004) assesses various causes, notably,
government policy, the money supply, labour productivity and wages and concludes that despite
a wealth of knowledge about their causes and patterns economists have not been good at predicting
them. Sherman (2010) believes recessions are an inherent part of capitalism, but this does not
make them predictable (Dow, 1998). Part of the difficulty is that recessions are often in part due to
the way economic circumstances were dealt with, or were not dealt with. Moreover, events that
cause a recession in one place or at one point in time will not necessarily have the same conse-
quence in another (Vogel, 2010). What is clear, is that recessions are caused by a combination of
factors which have different characteristics which impact in different ways.
It perhaps should not be surprising then that there is nothing axiomatic between an adverse
economic climate and an increase in acquisitive crime. Indeed, reviews of a range of studies
reveal that there are supporting arguments that it will result in both higher and lower crime (e.g.
Diez-Ticio, 2000; Weatherburn, 1992). At least part of the explanation for these different results
rests with the different methodologies used. And a range of researchers have used different
units of measurement, including unemployment, relative income, relative deprivation, and the
average expenditure per person per annum (see, Field, 1999; Weatherburn, 1992). From these
though come some important explanations about the impact of the economy.
A number of researchers have noted that while adverse economic conditions results in less
money being available to individuals (a push towards crime), it can also mean that people spend
more time at home and so there is more guardianship (a pull away from crime) (see, Witt et al.,
1999). And guardianship is seen as a key crime preventer (Felson, 2001). Deadman and Pyle
(2000) discuss these in terms of motivational theories (people have a reason to commit crime)
and opportunity theories (there are less opportunities because people with less disposable
income venture out less often and in staying at home more they help protect their residences
from crime).
206 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214

Yet, as other researchers have noted, less opportunities needs to be balanced by other
influences. Cook and Zarkin (1985) note some implications of people having more time. One
the one hand, if people are not in work then the opportunity cost of involvement in crime (and
being caught) is much less, on the other, victims have more time on their hand and are therefore
more willing and able to report offences and provide witness statements (because there are
fewer other things they could be doing with their time) making arrests more likely. Moreover,
recessions may result in less money being spent on containing crime (or the money having to be
spent more thinly as crime increases).
But what about fraud levels? Yeager (2007) has summarised evidence that points both ways.
In assessing the various influences on corporate misconduct he concludes, ‘In the aggregate the
research shows little support for the hypothesis that profit strain produces significantly higher
rates of offending by US Companies’ (p31). Yet, there are reasons to be concerned that fraud
will increase in the recession (See, Snider, 1993; Slapper and Tombs, 1999), although, once
again, there are arguments that it may decrease too.1 Much depends on the type of fraud in
question although more research is needed. Recent work on counterfeiting suggests different
influences are at work:
Criminals dealing in counterfeit goods face similar problems to legitimate retail businesses
during a recession e people have less disposable income to spend on non-essential items.
However, this illegal market e ‘the shadow economy’ e offers customers a way of getting
goods cheaply (Leslie and Hood, 2009; 10).
Certainly there is a need to look behind fraud patterns for explanations that are more prominent
than attribution to the recession. For example, at one point in the recession the UK Card Payments
Association (formerly APACS) produced figures which also showed an increase in some frauds,
but the report made no link with the recession and in many cases were able to offer alternative
explanations.2 A case in point relates to counterfeiting: ‘Counterfeit fraud losses increased by
18 per cent in 2008, but the growth is markedly down on last year’s 46 per cent rise’; and that
online fraud losses rose 132 per cent, but that: ‘From 2001 to 2008 card-not-present fraud losses
rose by 243 per cent; over the same time period, the total value of online shopping transactions
alone increased by 524 per cent (up from £6.6 billion in 2001 to £41.2 billion in 2008).’
A variation on this theme is the belief that in a recession organisations will look more closely
at anything that impacts on the ‘bottom line’ and look for more fraud. So while more may be
discovered it does not mean that fraud has increased (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2009). Indeed, it
may take several years for frauds to be noticed.3 And there are many different types of fraud,4
about which there is typically little research, and so determining patterns and understanding the
ways in which fraudsters may behave takes place in something of a knowledge vacuum. Yet,
not only does fraud costs billions (Levi et al., 2007; Gee et al., 2010), it can often have
a significant impact on victims (Button et al, 2009a,b; Spalek, 2001, 2007; see also Sentencing
Guidelines Council, 2009).

1
For a discussion on why identity theft could decrease in a recession, see at <http://arstechnica.com/security/news/
2009/02/recession-could-diminish-not-boost-identity-fraud.ars>.
2
APACS, fraud figures for 2008. At <http://www.apacs.org.uk/09_03_19.htm>. Accessed 21 April 2009. See also
SPSS (2010) which reports business leaders’ views that perceptions of fraud levels increases in the recessionary period
vary by sector.
3
See at www.yhff.co.uk/Fraud%2520Barometer%2520-%2520Feb%25202009%2520_2_.pdf.
4
The Fraud Act of 2006 clarified that false representation, failure to disclose information, and abuse of position signify
fraud.
 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214 207

In terms of managing fraud though, and if company surveys are to be believed, there are
reasons to be concerned. The KPMG (2009) Integrity Survey, which focussed on US
employees, assessed employees’ perceptions of the factors that lead to misconduct. It reported
that fifty-nine per cent stated that they felt ‘pressure to do “whatever it takes” to meet business
targets’, which was the highest response. Very close to a half (49 per cent) mentioned fear of
‘losing their jobs if they do not meet targets’. A quite separate survey by an insurance group5
found that the number of Britons who thought that committing insurance fraud was acceptable
rose from 3.6 million in March 2008 to 4.7 million in January 2009.
To better understand the impact of the recession, fraud managers and fraudsters were
consulted for their views. The aim was to explore how an adverse economic climate might
impact on fraud levels identifying the sorts of influences that could either directly or indirectly
influence fraud, or in some ways stifle it.

3. The perspective of fraud managers

Three focus groups were organised with fraud managers which involved a total of 37
attendees from both the public and private sector.6 Fraud managers have a proximity to fraud
patterns and management which has the potential to provide important insights.
It was clear that participants had little evidence that changes in fraud patterns (where these
were identifiable) were the result of the recession at the time of the interviews in March 2009,
but discussion focussed on ways in which an adverse economic climate could impact on fraud.
They identified a range of frauds that might increase, including benefit frauds, insurance frauds,
and tax evasion, and some felt old frauds may resurface, and cheque fraud was a case in point.
They felt that some professionals will be involved in fraud, including valuers, estate agents as
well as accountants and solicitors. Participants found it difficult to put a number on the scale of
the threat here, one commented that ‘there aren’t huge numbers’, another noted, ‘There are
more than a few e they’re on the fringes and hard to prosecute as they’re in a powerful
position.’
Participants highlighted a range of influences that they felt were contributing to fraud. They
noted that technology had had an impact in at least two different ways. First, the emphasis on
technology to identify fraud may have resulted in staff being less diligent in their own fraud
prevention efforts. Second, while technology has enabled larger and quicker transactions, it has
also facilitated crime, including the mass compromise of data, and in the process enabled
fraudsters to commit crimes on a much larger scale than before. The fact that it was perceived
as a relatively easy crime to commit worried some managers that more would seek out these
opportunities as their need for money became greater. In a different way fraudsters have used
technology to collate detailed information on companies, one participant remarked:

5
See at http://www.rsagroup.com/rsa/pages/media/ukpressreleases?type¼press&ref¼489&;view¼true.
6
I am grateful to the help of Wendy Caulfield, then of the NFA for help in organising the workshops. Attendees were
selected from a list of stakeholders and other key experts held by the NFA at the time. The aim was to include key
agencies, and to examine some of the fundamental issues that may impact on the recession. I am also grateful to D
Janice Goldstraw-White for her help in writing up the output from the group discussions and in identifying and
reviewing previous papers.
208 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214

It’s amazing the knowledge that organised criminals have of your business. They know
when [computer] runs are, what security controls you have . dates . times etc. They
place Trojans7 on machines to get this.
Alongside this, many felt that law enforcement had not progressed at the same pace, with
fraudsters hiding behind a fragmented international judicial regime and variable international
commitment to tackling fraud.
A major threat was perceived to be staff who either lose their jobs or fear they will as a result of
economic cut backs. The risk of collusion with outsiders to commit offences was viewed as serious
not least where disgruntled staff are approached by disgruntled ex staff, often with inside
knowledge of their own. Some respondents noted that they feared organised criminals had planted
staff in companies and the distraction caused by the recession increased the chances for them to
operate more easily and effectively. One respondent noted, those who are made redundant ‘will
come back at you’, and there were fears that organisations would not manage this well (for
a discussion of employee crime see, Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010; Hollinger and Adams,
2006). Moreover, policies of working from home and off site, and sub contracting services
sometimes overseas complicated effective oversight, and this, it was felt, created opportunities for
fraudsters and increased risks of data compromise. Comments from participants included:
The increasing number of telemarketing and call centres has taken data and business
away from our own organisations, even into the hands of individuals in foreign countries,
where security measures may not be as stringent as our own and cultures may view crime
and fraud differently.
We need to secure data better but it’s hard because call centres have gone global.
Others noted that those involved in sales driven environments may find it harder to reach their
targets, and the risk of them resorting to fraud needs to be checked. Some respondents were
worried some employers may use the recession to pay staff less, or reduce benefits leading to
anxiety at work which then becomes a breeding ground for discontent and upon which fraudster
can prey.
Alongside this there were concerns that companies would place less emphasis on fraud
prevention and so controls would be weaker: ‘This is when employees can take advantage .
while their vigilance is down.’ Indeed, that vigilance is down may provide an incentive for
fraudsters. In the some context it was noted that keeping staff abreast of trends and keeping
them alert on what to look out for was all the more important in times of austerity, and that this
should be a priority. Not all thought that this would be the case, indeed, it was noted that one
way of showing that the level of frauds is low is not to look for them in the first place. ‘The
costs of assessing fraud risks is high and is a significant spend. This is hard to sell to the Board.’
And as another discussant said, ‘a recession is a bad time to find a Madoff’.
The interviews with fraud managers took place in the early stages of the recession and at the
time of the interviews there were no noticeable trends in fraud patterns that anyone wished to
link to the economic climate. Few thought that an increase in fraud was unlikely, but not all felt
that it was inevitable. It was noted that a lack of credit meant some types of fraud that
dependent on the availability of credit would reduce, other might increase but that depended on

7
A ‘Trojan’ or ‘Trojan horse’ is a computer virus that can be placed on machines without the user knowing. Often it
may appear as a useful piece of software and can trick the recipient into opening and activating it. Trojans can be merely
annoying or malicious, or can create a way for outsiders to access the system and thus compromising the data on it.
 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214 209

a variety of circumstances, not least the commitment of companies to keep fraud under control
and the effectiveness of measures they had in place. For an alternative view, a sample of
fraudsters were interviewed.

4. Offenders

Although offenders can be a good source of information about crime, still the process of
incorporating offenders’ perspectives has remained a fairly marginal interest within the world
of criminology (see Bernasco, 2010). There have been studies of fraudsters (for example, see,
Copes, and Vieraitis, 2008; Dodge, 2007; Finch, forthcoming; Goldstraw-White, forthcoming;
Jesilow et al., 2004; Hessing et al., 1993; Levi, 1998, 2003, 2008; Sainsbury, 2003; Sakurai and
Smith, 2003) which have provided important insights into why and how they have committed
certain types of offences (see also Gobert and Punch, 2007). There have also been reviews of
why people commit fraud (see, Doig, 2006; Smith et al, 2010). One of the most commonly
referred to is Cressey’s (1973) contention that people commit crime because they have
a problem they cannot share with others including an inability to pay debts, and concerns about
status in the organisation. Gill (2005, 2007) reports on interviews with convicted fraudsters, the
majority of whom had stolen from their employer. He found that they explained their moti-
vations in terms of unmanageable debts; blackmail; a search for status; boredom; a lack of life
structure; temporary loss of balance or sanity; an organisational culture facilitating dishonesty;
and the availability of opportunities. Arguably all these explanations might be seen as more
likely to occur in an adverse economic climate.
For the purposes of this study 16 incarcerated fraudsters were interviewed about their
motivations for committing offences and their views on the links between fraud and the
recession.8 The fraudsters were located in three prisons, chosen because they were open prisons
and therefore more likely to be a good recruiting ground for fraudsters. In each case the
research process was slightly different. In the first prison 34 offenders with a fraud related
conviction were identified.9 The prison circulated a letter from the author outlining the study
and seven responded and all were interviewed. In the second institution, the prison authorities
placed notices at strategic places around the prison and invited those with a fraud conviction to
respond to a nominated person if they were prepared to help. Eight inmates responded and all
were interviewed. In the final prison, 17 inmates were approached but only one was
interviewed.10
In order to check the accuracy of fraudsters’ accounts, information they reported in the
interview was checked against data held on prison records, specifically, the number and type of
previous convictions; the number of prison sentences served; details of the current sentence;
previous occupation; and brief details about the offence they were currently serving a sentence
for. It is somewhat ironic that official files, so often criticised for their factual inaccuracy
become the means of checking offenders’ honesty in interview (see, Farrington, 2001).
However, there was a very close correlation in 15 of the 16 cases (one case could not be
checked) between what was said in interview and what could be gleaned from official records.

8
I would like to thank the National Research Committee for permitting access to prisons and all those who helped
facilitate and took part in interviews.
9
The remit was to focus on those serving over 12 months but of these 34 two were serving less than this time and the
prison was unable to specify how long another five, whose offence category was ‘other fraud’, were serving.
10
The research took place at a time of staff turnover which may have impacted on the response.
210 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214

However, it should be noted that this is a small sample of fraudsters, and clearly in no way
representative of all fraudsters and this should be borne in mind when assessing the findings
(for a good discussion of methodological issues in researching offenders’ accounts see Ber-
nasco, 2010).
All interviewees were male and serving a variety of fraud related offences including advising
clients to commit carousel fraud, there were two long firm fraudsters although most were
convicted for different types of conspiracy to defraud, sometimes against their employers,
sometimes other organisations and sometimes parts of the Government such as tax authorities.
Of the sample six did not have previous convictions. Of the ten who had, six of them had
previously been to prison, one of them five times, the longest sentence anyone was serving was
six years.
Of the 16 fraudsters, only two did not think that fraud would increase as a result of the
recession. One fraudster opined that as there was less credit available in a recession, and many
frauds had been committed just because of the availability of money, these types would
decrease. The other interviewee also noted that in adverse times workers and individuals
scrutinise accounts more closely and are more diligent in the care of information:
Money is tighter. To obtain credit is harder, and credit reference agencies will tighten
their belts. They are not underwriting as much business any more. There will need to be
more personal guarantees. The climate will create more want for fraud but not supply.
I don’t think there will be more fraud because small men are being hurt and the money is
not there anymore to get away with. Fraud is a better criminal option when there is plenty
of cash in the system not when everyone is short of money checking their accounts all the
time. And because they are checking their accounts this makes fraud harder to get away
with, people are more likely to notice it.
One other interviewee felt that the effects of the recession could be different for different
types of fraud
I don’t think it creates any opportunities. I think things such as benefit fraud will increase,
because people are taking more drastic measures. In that respect, maybe, but I think
people will clamp down on credit, so it is harder to get money, or things with money.
Most interviewees felt that fraud was likely to increase as people find things hard in
a recession and fraud represents, one way, and some felt an easy way of making money:
I think it will get a damn site worse, that is for sure. It was normally a young man’s game
but the more mature will face problems and the people will turn . Some have said to me
in here, I tried everything but I needed money for my family, it goes against the grain but
they were desperate. I really think this will get worse.
Fraud in general will increase because people suffer
There will be more frauds because they will be more desperate for money.
In a big way. People all have survival instincts. They need a minimum and whenever this
is threatened a survival instinct comes out. Crime generally as well as fraud.
Few of the fraudsters though felt that the economic climate would have had an impact on
their own offending and none were planning to commit more offences in the future. The reasons
interviewees gave for the frauds they were serving a sentence for at the time of the interview do
 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214 211

not offer optimism that things will not get worse in a recession. The most common reason
offered, unsurprisingly, was that they needed the money, some admitted specifically to be bad at
managing finances and had accrued debts which they did not feel they could meet by other
means, and one interviewee viewed fraud as a way of meeting normal life expenses. One
interviewee claimed that he became involved fraud when he was offered the chance by
a woman he knew to become a part of a long firm fraud. He said that this happened just at the
point when he was going through a divorce and was desperate for money.
Others also pointed to chance occurrences. Another long firm fraudster claimed to have
thought of the possibility of building up credit and making off without payment in the course of
his normal business duties. Indeed, the most common explanation offered by interviewees was
that fraud resulted from their normal business activities. One self employed business advisor,
with a previous fraud conviction, admitted he ‘sailed close to the wind,’ but claimed a corrupt
client resulted in his conviction. Similarly, a solicitor admitted that he had been negligent in his
work but denied being aware that he knew his client had set out to commit fraud. And an
accountant, serving a second sentence for fraud claimed that he was adept at helping clients
avoid tax, and disagreed with the prosecution that his work amounted to tax evasion.
Two interviewees linked their offences to a changing economic climate and in similar ways.
They had overstated the value of assets to take out loans, but when business started to go wrong
the banks investigated and claimed the value of the assets had been purposively exaggerated.
One of the interviewees ran a company with three partners and claims it was ignorance and
naivety rather than criminal intent that led to him being prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud
money from a bank.
Two interviewees became involved in fraud because they wanted to form friendships. For
one of these the money from fraud enabled him to appear generous, for the other engaging in
fraud was a way of meeting people and making friends, although he was later let down by his
co-fraudsters. Interestingly, some of the interviewees noted that fraud was exciting and
provided a ‘buzz’, typically not a main reason but often a contributory one (see also, Copes and
Vieraitis, 2008).
Fraudsters like fraud managers offered a range of suggestions on areas where fraud might
increase as a result of an adverse economic climate. This includes tax fraud, employee fraud
including more fiddling of expenses claims, insurance fraud as well as frauds involving State
benefits:
I think there will be more social security fraud. I am on about working and claiming and
doing fiddles between partners, saying they have left. I did that myself and I got caught
and had to pay the money back. That is a major thing.
Also we have a lot of people in here for fiddling benefits, I am not sure whether that is
a clamp down, but there are more.
During the interviews the fraudsters were asked for their thoughts on the impact of the
recession on fraud. There were a variety of reasons offered for why they thought fraud might
flourish. Many pointed to the wide availability of people with money on the one hand, and the
many short of finances on the other as both an opportunity and an incentive. Others pointed to
the culture within business which some saw as corrupt, one felt that the focus on commission
and incentives bred dishonesty amongst employees that was likely to be accentuated in
a recession. Others pointed to what they saw as the general lack of awareness about how best to
tackle fraud (fuelled by the belief that committing offences was easy); and the wide availability
212 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214

of information, not least on the internet, but also amongst fellow prison inmates about how to
commit fraud and avoid being caught.
One final point noted by two fraudsters and echoing points raised in the literature review
mentioned above, and in the discussions with fraud managers e was that although fraud levels
may go up this was as likely to be as a result of more frauds being discovered as it was more
being committed:
In advance of this meeting I have been thinking. Frauds are just as often perpetrated in
good times as bad. But frauds will lay undiscovered until bad times arrive. Investments
get made and only bad ones are discovered in bad times. In contrast, when times are
hard, people will be more motivated to commit fraud, because they simply need the
money. You will probably have more crime out of desperation, in good times it could be
greed.
A friend of mine here is serving a long sentence. He was going under and so he got
involved in drug smuggling. He funded it and lost the money and was sent to prison for
a long time. It is inevitable there will be more and it is so easy with the internet to commit
fraud. So I think the nature of person committing fraud is different in bad times.
I think we will find a huge amount more coming to light. Especially bank loans granted
on false information which are called in. In 2 or 3 years we will see a lot more
people for fraud related crimes. In here you find out about so many frauds. Stuff to do
with companies that fail will show more frauds because when things go wrong you see
more.

5. Summary

In short, the evidence from previous work on fraud, from interviews with fraud managers
and also fraudsters in prison would suggest that caution is needed when predicting that an
adverse economic climate will lead to increases in financial offences. All three sources
acknowledge that this could happen, for certain types of offences, and hence the need for close
monitoring of fraud patterns, but it is not a given. Even fraudsters, who generally thought that
fraud would increase because of the recession, generally did not feel that it would have affected
their own circumstances.
Attributing cause to crime is fraught with difficulties. This study has highlighted a range of
reasons why offences may take place, some which may occur as a direct result of the recession
(people having less money) and some more indirect reasons (cut backs in resources to manage
or investigate fraud). Yet it seems clear that in adverse periods companies will look more
critically at what impacts on the bottom line and more offences may be discovered. There is
a likelihood that a recession will create opportunities for fraud, and a possibility that these will
be off-set, totally or to some extent, by constraints (such as the unavailability of credit). For
each area of fraudulent activity, or potential such activity, patterns need to be tracked. There is
nothing new in cautioning about simplistic links between changes in crime levels and putative
causes of crime (economic or otherwise), but against a background where, in the case of fraud,
such links are being made, we need to exercise advocate careful assessment of the data. Indeed,
to do otherwise is to ignore the wisdom of previous research and the views of both fraud
managers and fraudsters.
 M. Gill / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39 (2011) 204e214 213

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Martin Gill is a Director of Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International.