ANNOTATION

LEGAL DOCTRINES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE

By
ALICIA GONZALEZ-DECANO*
___________________
 
§ 1.        Introduction, p. 637
§ 2.        Form of Search Warrant, p. 638
§ 3.        Doctrines on Search and Seizure, p. 639
___________________
§ 1. Introduction
The law in search is found in Rule 126, Sections 1 to 14.
Before an exhaustive revisit of the legal doctrines, a
definition of Search Warrant, an enumeration of the
requisites for issuing search warrant, duties of the judge,
and other important provisions are in order.
Search Warrant defined. Rule 126, Section 1, defines
search warrant. “A Search Warrant is an order in writing
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property described therein and bring
it before the court.

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*  Retired Judge, Professorial Lecturer IV and Consultant (Law and

Political Science Cluster, UST Graduate School) and Dean, College of Law
& Law Professor, Pan Pacific University North Philippines (PUNP),
Urdaneta City.

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Section 4 enumerates the requisites for the issuance of a

search warrant. It provides: “A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after exanimation under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.”
Section 5 “The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answer, in writing and under oath, the complaint and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statement,
together with the affidavits submitted.”
Section 6 “If the judge is satisfied of the existence of the
facts upon which the application is based or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules.”
§ 2. Form of Search Warrant
The search warrant must be in writing and must contain
such particulars as the name of the person against whom it
is directed, the offense for which it is issued, the place to be
searched and the specific things to be seized. It must
contain a directive to law enforcement officers to search the
place therein, unequivocally identified, and to seize the
person and things therein specifically described, and to
bring them to the court. The warrant must bear the
signature of the judge issuing it, (Pamaran, The 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended, Annotated, Rules 110-
127, Rules of Court, Central Professional Book Inc., Q.C.,
2001, p. 563)
Section 9 “x x x   The warrant must direct that it be
served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the
property
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is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched that

it be served at anytime of the day or night.”
Section 10 “x x x A search warrant shall be valued for
ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.”
§ 3. Doctrines on Search and Seizure
In the case of People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 133917,
February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 174, the Supreme Court
held:

“x x x The fundamental law of the land mandates that search

and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion that is by
virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. x  x  x. Complementary to the
foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus,
any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. x x x”

The Supreme Court continued:

“x x x Search and seizures may be made without a warrant and

the evidence obtained therefrom maybe admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving vehicles; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) search of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) x x x”

The Highest Tribunal further decreed:

“x x x The first exception (search indicated to a lawful arrest)

includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search.
In this instance, the land requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be
reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate of effected
with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however,
recognizes permissible

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warrantless arrested. Thus, a peace officer or a private person

may, without warrant, arrest a person (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
(arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. (arrest
of escaped prisoners)

The Highest Court of the land articulated on the

meaning of Probable cause in this wise:
 “x x x In People vs. Chua Ho San1 the Court held that in cases
of in flagrante delicto arrest, a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested his committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit   an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent
case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.”

As discussed in People vs. Doria2 probable cause means

an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e. supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create a
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause guilt of the person to be arrested, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest x x x.”

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1 People vs. Chua, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)

2 People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999)

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In People vs. Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001, 354
SCRA 338, the Supreme Court expounded on the Plain
View Doctrines and Search Incident to Arrest.
The Supreme Court made the final pronouncement,
thus:

“x x x Where the gun tucked in a person’s waist is plainly

visible to the police, no search warrant is necessary, and in the
absence of any license for said firearm, he may be arrested at once
as he is in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers.”

The highest Court further articulated:

“x x x as a consequence of appellant”s valid warrantless arrest,

he may be lawfully searched for dangers weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense
without a search warrant, as provided on Rule 126, Section 12.
This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The
subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substances which, was later identified as shabu,
though in a distinct place from wherein the illegal possession of
firearms was committed, cannot be said to have been made during
an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the
exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in
violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used
for purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the
poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the
crime, such as the firearms, the shabu and the drug
paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant.
Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a
consented search is admissible in evidence. x x x.”

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January

15, 2002, 373 SCRA 221 reiterated the doctrines
enunciated in People vs. Molina (supra) although this case
added a number 7 as one of these exceptions provided for
by the constitution against warrantless searches and
seizures. No. 7 is exigent and emergency circumstances.
The Supreme Court decreed:
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“x x x We might add that a warrantless search of a moving

vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Searchers without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration
laws, provided such searches are made at borders or constructive
orders like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the state. x x x”

The Supreme Court further postulated:

“x x x One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop

and search” without warrant at military or police checkpoints
which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists. Routine inspections are not
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance
is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a
light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5)
where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or
visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted on
a fixed area. None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in
the case at bar. The public officers did not merely conduct a visual
search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle. They had
to reach inside the vehicle, left the kakawati leaves and look
inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It
can not be considered a simple routine checks. x x x”

The Highest Tribunal further pronounced:

“x x x We hold that the vehicle looked suspicious simply

because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the
conduct of a search without warrant. x x x”

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The plain view doctrine was exhaustively explained in

this case by the Supreme Court.

“x x x Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain

view of the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not a
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.
In other words, if the package is such that an experience observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. It is clear from the records of this case that the
cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in
sacks and covered with leaves. The articles were neither
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities.
They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves
and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what
was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the
object is not in plain view which could justify mere seizure of the
articles without further search. x x x.”

Continuing its pronouncements, the Supreme Court

stated:
 “x x x The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) age of the defendant;
(2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he
objected to the search or passively looked in; (4) education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given. x x x”

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It was likewise ruled that there are three requisites of a

consented search or warrant of the constitutional
guarantee against intrusive search. It must first appear
that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, or the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
Finally, it was decreed that “a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto
but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law.
People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 129035, August 22, 2002,
387 SCRA 569, expounded the requisites for the issuance of
search warrant. Said the Supreme Court:

“x x x Absence of any of these requisites will cause downright

nullification of the search warrants. These requisites are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined
personally by the judge; (3) complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge; in writing
and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.”

People vs. Asis, G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002, 391
SCRA 108, dwells on warrantless seizures, waiver and
consent. The Supreme Court decreed:

“x x x Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable

searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is
expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present
case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at
the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, appellant
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being
the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have
given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could
not have come from any other person.”

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The Supreme Court went further by stating that, “to

constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the
right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and
third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. How could appellant Formento have consented to a
warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not
understood what was happening at that moment? The
prosecution witnesses themselves testified that there was
no interpreter to assist him—a deaf-mute—during the
arrest, search and seizure. Naturally, it would seem that
he indeed consented to the warrantless search, as the
prosecution would want this court to believe. x x x”
People vs. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002,
394 SCRA 478, speaks of the meaning of reasonable or
unreasonable searches and exceptions thereto.

“x x x The Constitution bars state intrusions to a person’s body,

personally effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
outlined in the constitution and reiterated in the Rues of Court;
Interdictions against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence
are enumerated in People vs. Molina, supra, and Caballes
vs.Court of Appeals and reiterated in this case, to wit: (1) search
of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches,
waiver or consented searches; (4) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search) and (5) search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x.”

The Supreme Court further articulated:

 “x x x The search conducted on Susan resulted in the discovery
and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline
substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Such warrantless
arrest and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that
Susan was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and
police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. x x x.”

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People vs. Lozada, G.R. No. 141121, July 17, 2003, 406
SCRA 494, expounded on searches and seizures,
warrantless arrests, hot pursuits and the meaning of
personal knowledge of a peace officer.
The Highest Tribunal issued the following
pronouncements:

“x x x The applicable rule at the time of the arrest of appellants

is Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that “a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x (b) when an offense has
in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
“Personal knowledge” the court has explained should be based on
“probable cause,” which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion in the probable guilt of the person to be
arrested is based on facts or circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create a probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested.”

The Supreme Court further decreed:

“x x x But even on the assumption that the police erred in not

securing warrants for the capture of appellants, the latter could
no longer impugn the validity of their arrest. Any objection
against an arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused should be made at or
before the arraignment, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
Appellants entered their plea to the crime of robbery with
homicide and thereafter participated in the trial without
questioning the legality of their arrest. The Search conducted on
appellant Lozada, being an incident of the arrest, should also be
upheld. Belleza on the other hand, waived his right against a
warrantless search when he himself voluntarily disclosed where
he hid the keys and the bag of Rosita Sy and where, true enough,
the items were recovered. x x x.”

People vs. Simbahon, G.R. No. 132371, April 9, 2003,

401 SCRA 94, showed that search warrant no. 95-100 was
issued for more than one offense. In addition, there was an
absence
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of a particular description of subject matter in the search

warrant which rendered it void.
Said the Highest Court of the Land:

“x x x The caption and the body of the search warrant no. 95-
100 show that it was issued for more than one offense—violation
of R.A. 6425 and violation of P.D. 1866.

In Tambasen vs. People (246 SCRA 184 [1995]), it was

held:

“x x x On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule

123 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of
a search warrant for more than one offense. The system of search
warrant no. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D.
1866 for illegal possession of fire arms, ammunitions and
explosives; and R.A. 1700, the Anti-Subversive Law. Search
warrant no. 365 was therefore “scatter-shot” warrant and totally
null and void. x x x.”

The Supreme Court continued:

“x x x Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be

searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended. x x x In the case at bar, only the
application for search warrant contained the address of the place
to be searched. The search warrant issued by the court merely
referred to appellant’s residence as “premises” without specifying
its address. The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the
place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. The
absence of a particular description in the search warrant renders
the same void. x x x.”

Finally, the Supreme Court ruled: “The seized

marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant. x x x.
 The seizure by the police officer conducting the search of
articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the
perimeter of their authority under the search warrant,
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that
a search warrant should particularly described the thing to
be seized. x x x x
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Neither can the admissibility of such seized item be

justified under the plain view doctrine, for the bricks of
marijuana in this case were not found inadvertently or in
plain view, rather they were found after a meticulous
search under the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and insed a
plastic bag. In People vs. Masa (G.R. No. 96177, 27 January
1997, 217 SCRA 597), the marijuana recovered by
NARCOM agents was declared inadmissible because the
said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which bore no
indication of its contents. x x x.”
In the case of Tenorio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
1160604, October 10, 2003, 413 SCRA 234, the Supreme
Court held:

“x x x Case law has it that the court which issued the search
warrant acquires jurisdiction over the items seized under the said
warrant.” Goods seized lawfully on the basis of said warrant or its
accepted exceptions are in custodia legis. Only that court which
issued the warrant may order the release or disposition thereof. x
x x The release and description of the goods seized were for the
court. The criminal case to delve into and resolve. Until the
institution of the appropriate criminal action with the proper
court, the court which issued the search retained custody and
content of the goods seized. x x x.”
——o0o—— 

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