9th Cir. Reply To Response

Case: 22-35794, 04/17/2023, ID: 12696795, DktEntry: 21-1, Page 1 of 16
Case 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ Document 275-1 Filed 04/17/23 Page 1 of 16
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN, No. 22-35794
Appellant - Plaintiff, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ

U.S. District Court for Western
v. Washington, Seattle (WAWD)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPLY TO RESPONSE TO

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG), MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INJUNCTION
VETERANS AFFAIRS, [DOE’S 1-155],
ET AL,
Appellees - Defendants.
I. REPLY TO RESPONSE
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Appellant-CSX raises objections to the response presented by appellees.
II. JURISDICTION
28 U.S.C. § 1331, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,”
28 U.S.C. 1346(b) for Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
this Court has jurisdiction. In the district court, the magistrate judge overlooked the
timely filed drug violations against Dept of Veterans. (1-ER 2-10, 1-ER 15-20).
In WAWD, The Honorable Judge Jones has a Motion for Reconsideration in
his Court since October 21, 2022. (1-ER 1-20, 1-ER 35-40, 1-ER 23-34. Dkt. #258
series).
1
III. BACKGROUND
Appellant-CSX claims arise from the Department of Veterans 2018-1996, to
include into 2023, with timely filed drug violations against appellees, Part-1.
Part-2 and Part-3 are regarding the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling applies
for the numerous Constitutional and civil rights depravations and violations. Part-1
is clear on timeliness. Appellees are either misleading the Court again, or are
themselves confused. The record clearly states “Plaintiff, at this time, has removed
Title VII violations, Bivens claims, as well as the eleventh cause of action...” (Dkt.
#30 p. 45 @ lines 6-8). The opening brief was filed January 26, 2023, with a
motion for preliminary injunction March 31, 2023. Appellees filed an extension of
time to file their response to May 22. Appellant supported a time extension to April
28, opposed May 22. (DktEntry 18, 17-1).
Relief was requested in the trial court. (1-ER 168-206). In the district court,
the magistrate judge, respectfully, failed to properly consider the timeliness of the
Federal and State drug violations against Dept of Veterans. Therefore, the district
court erred in adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Federal and State
drug violations against the Dept of Veterans are timely, Therefore, appellant-CSX
respectfully requested the Court give serious consideration to remand the case back
to U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle matter,
2:21-cv-01276-RAJ.
2
IIII. ARGUMENT
These are not new claims, the evidence clearly indicates a continuation of
substandard care for the veteran to include data manipulation, intentional delays,
refusal of needed and recommended medical/dental care. Fraudulent charges. False
statements in the medical record. Libel for the blatant lies and misleading
statements of which equates to Defamation of Character. This continues to come at
the expense of the veteran’s health, quality of life, good reputation, that then
becomes an irrevocable financial devastation. At the expense of my good name.
A. A Continuation of Claims, Not New for Review
The appellees argue that the appellant-CSX “has never presented these
claims to the district court.” In Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1997),
the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff could add new claims to a preliminary
injunction motion if they were closely related to the claims already before the
Court, and therefore should be allowed at this stage. (1-ER 200-204). "Irreparable
harm is likely to result where the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the
merits and where denial of preliminary relief would result in the plaintiff's
suffering an injury that cannot be remedied if the court ultimately denies relief."
Appellant-CSX has been a victim of a 20+ yearlong of appellees fraud (to
include manipulation of pharma data records), manipulating data, breach of the
3
standard of care that caused appellant-CSXs injuries and damages, Aphasia,
Tardive Dyskinesia, exponential delays to include refusal for recommended and
needed medical and dental treatments. Falsification of records, and criminal
mistreatment in the state of Washington. (1-ER 147-153, 1-ER 134-146, DktEntry
6-3 p. 11, pp. 143-159, pp. 194-197). “The energetic pattern represented is one
seen in stroke ... is a component of vascular and brain involvement.” Id. p.198.
The continued conduct of appellees fraud (see the False Claims Act (31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733)), falsification of records, breach of the standard of care that
caused appellant-CSXs injuries and damages, refusal of needed medical/dental
treatment, and Defamation of Character are a continued persistent chronic pattern
of the failings of the Dept of Veterans that includes Phoenix, Arizona. See United
States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir. 1986), United States v. Hernandez-
Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 2013). (DktEntry 19-1).
In furtherance, Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) in the state of
Washington entered "Multiple Myeloma" cancer in my record (800 weeks ago),
over 15 years prior to being informed for the first time March 2, 2023, by the
Phoenix Veterans Dental Clinic of this blood cancer diagnosis that I have not been
tested or treated for this cancer diagnosis. Dept of Veterans in Phoenix refused to
even provide an appointment for their recommended dental treatment of extraction
for my painful two-molars due to this diagnosis.
4
B. Entitlement to a Preliminary Injunction Favors Appellant-CSX
Appellant respectfully did request relief in the district court. It is true that the
appellant-CSX did not file a motion for preliminary injunction in the trial court.
(See 1-ER 168-206, DktEntry 19-2 p. 2). Pursuant to FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a),
and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the prerequisites have been met. Thus, fulfilling the
administrative and exhausting the requirements. The U.S. Dept of Justice Civil
Division Torts Branch Federal Tort Claims Act Staff confirmed receipt of
appellant-CSXs tort claim on December 31, 2020. (Dkt. #106).
See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007),
"Although a plaintiff generally must make a motion for preliminary injunctive
relief in the district court before seeking such relief on appeal, we have recognized
that irreparable harm may be presumed from a district court's decision, and that a
plaintiff may therefore seek injunctive relief on appeal even if he did not make
such a motion in the district court." In Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n v. City and
County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008), "A plaintiff who does
not move for a preliminary injunction in the district court may nevertheless seek
injunctive relief on appeal if the plaintiff can show that he is threatened with
irreparable harm and has demonstrated either a likelihood of success on the merits
or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
5
litigation, and that the balance of hardships tips in his favor." See United States v.
City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002), "Although ordinarily a plaintiff
must move for preliminary injunctive relief in the district court before seeking such
relief on appeal, we have recognized an exception where the district court's
decision has caused irreparable harm to the plaintiff."
Appellant-CSX is entitled to such relief even if she has not yet proven her
case on the merits. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7 (2008), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must show that they are likely to succeed on the merits, that they will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, that the balance of
hardships tips in their favor, and that the injunction is in the public interest. "The
movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an
injunction. . . The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief
will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily
against a claim of irreparable harm," at Winter, 555 U.S. at 22-23. CSX has met
these criteria and is therefore entitled to a preliminary injunction. "An irreparable
injury is one for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation,
because it cannot remedy the loss suffered by the plaintiff." See Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). (1-ER 168, 200-204).
6
Appellant-CSX's loss cannot be remedied by a monetary award alone. It
encompasses being maimed, loss of reproductive rights, losing 20+ years of life in
my prime, dismantling of the entire family, Aphasia, Tardive Dyskinesia, and
being thrown into an asylum like a subhuman due to appellees' substandard and
neglectful medical care. Appellees committed perjury with premeditation solidified
three times in the record, resulting in constitutional deprivations and civil rights
violations. Paying out-of-pocket to recover from being maimed from an active-
duty injury that was exacerbated by appellees to include DOE-1, and to recover
from the enormous drug damage that caused great harm, economic losses, and
missed opportunities in business and life. All of this, while also seeking restoration
of my good name. (1-ER 200-204, 1-ER 168-199).
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006), where the
Supreme Court held that the availability of monetary damages alone did not
preclude a finding of irreparable harm. The court emphasized that a plaintiff
seeking injunctive relief did not have to demonstrate that monetary damages were
inadequate to compensate for the harm. Rather, the court must consider the
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief, which includes irreparable harm,
balance of equities, public interest, and likelihood of success on the merits. "[T]he
decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable
discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised
7
consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in
other cases governed by such standards."
The record demonstrates that appellant-CSX requested the same relief in the
district court that is presented now. (1-ER 204 @ lines 11-14, 18, pp. 200-204).
C. The District Court is the Proper Venue for CSX’s Continued Claims
Substantial Evidence: Over 60 Notices of Filing Paper or Physical Materials
with the Clerk at the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, at
Seattle. (WAWD).
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), See Reddick v.
Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff is allowed to bring claims in a different venue if they have a good
reason to do so. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's choice of forum should be given substantial
weight unless there are strong reasons for transferring the case. "Unless the balance
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed." In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), held that "the
forum-selection clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
8
aside." The Court also noted that a plaintiff's choice of forum is "entitled to great
weight" and should not be disturbed "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant."
Great Weight Standard defined:

"When an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is at issue, the
agency's interpretation is entitled to great weight, particularly when the agency has
expertise in the subject matter. The degree of deference to be accorded an agency's
interpretation depends upon the thoroughness of its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." See
Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th
Cir. 1981). See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008).
Your Honor, I implore the Court to understand the extent of the appellants'
suffering and mistreatment from appellees, that bleeds throughout numerous other
veterans’ lives across America the Beautiful.
Due to the Dept of Veterans' failure to treat my physical injury, the
appellants' four lower molar’s mountainous structures were filed flat, with two of
them internally cracked. These same two molars (#31, #18) had root canals in
attempts to save these molars prior to the internal cracking (1-ER 149). These
continued claims, and molars, are sufficiently related to the claims in the district
court. Two root canals were paid for by the appellant-CSX due to the Dept of
Veterans-WA failed to treat these two-molars even after room temperature water
was not tolerated, months later, in 2018.
9
Appellees are the direct causation that could have been prevented had the
defendants (Puget Sound Veterans Hospital–WA) treated my physical injury
instead of dismissing it as a mental illness. The active-duty physical injury was
well documented, then ignored. Failure to treat this initial injury led to maiming
appellant-CSX. (1-ER 154-167), (2-ER 370-478).
Despite being diagnosed with a "mild" case of post-traumatic stress, the
appellant was left to walk around with her well-documented physical injury for
over six years without any appropriate medical treatment. No pain medication until
2005. Dept of Veterans used Paxil and other psychotic drugs to treat my physical
injury. This is how appellant-CSX filed down the mountainous parts of my lower
molars flat then cracking two internally. This is far below the standard of care and
is an inhumane experience that no one should have to endure.
The substandard level of care provided by the Dept of Veterans is not an
isolated incident, but rather a chronic and persistent problem that continues to
plague Veterans Hospitals across our beloved country. Veterans across this county
deserve at the basic standard of care. Manipulating data is a chronic persistent
continuing problem with the Dept of Veterans causing ongoing harm to veterans.
(Opening Brief pp. 19-22). Whether it’s Puget Sound in the state of Washington,
and/or Phoenix, Arizona, or any other state in America the Beautiful, this is a
nationwide systemic crisis with appellees, Dept of Veterans.
10
There is 20+ years of medical providers in the state of Washington verses
two too few employees in Phoenix, Arizona. Online services are able and easy to
connect Phoenix, Arizona to the Court in Washington State. It is also important to
note the appellant-CSXs main support system is in Washington State. There are
many good reasons for appellant-CSX claims to be heard in the district court in the
state of Washington. Evidence. Support. Washington State is the proper venue.
While the appellees may not be bound by the American Disabilities Act
(ADA) in all circumstances, it still has obligations to ensure that its programs and
services are accessible to individuals with disabilities under other federal laws and
its own internal policies and regulations, to include its Code of Conduct, and
Patient Rights. (6-ER 1570-1576), (1-ER 147-153). It is important to note that the
veterans' benefits exception is not absolute and the Dept of Veterans is still
required to comply with other federal laws and regulations that protect the rights of
individuals with disabilities. Appellees must comply with Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability
in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. In addition, Dept
of Veterans has its own internal policies and regulations that govern its obligations
to provide reasonable accommodations and other disability-related services to
11
veterans. Appellant-CSX is recovering from a brain that is seen in “stroke”
patients, in 2021. Id. p. 198.
Appellees have a duty to provide reasonable accommodations to veterans
with disabilities in its programs and services under 38 U.S.C. § 501, and has issued
regulations implementing this duty at 38 C.F.R. § 17.105.
The Military (USCG) also failed the appellant by being completely incompetent
in treating my physical injury, with gross negligence. Instead of providing the
necessary care, the USCG acted in a retaliatory manner towards me, provided a
hostile work environment, provided a hostile medical environment, despising me
as a female.
Yet, the USCG states their “Core Values” as:
“Integrity is our standard. We demonstrate uncompromising ethical conduct

and moral behavior in all of our personal and organizational actions. We are loyal
and accountable to the public trust. We value our diverse workforce. We treat each
other and those we serve with fairness, dignity, respect, and compassion. We
encourage individual opportunity and growth. We encourage creativity through
empowerment. We work as a team. We are professionals, military and civilian,
who seek responsibility, accept accountability, and are committed to the successful
achievement of our organizational goals. We exist to serve. We serve with pride.”
Do you believe their core values? I did. What is ethical, professional
respectful, fair, accountable, loyal, or even “a part of military service” about
intentionally honorably discharging a female physically injured splitting at the
hind-end seams? How can one endure retaliation in a hostile medical environment
12
while being physically injured, and forced to walk around with a lower extremity
injury for 22 months? With an injured cervical spine. Reprimanded for seeking to
speak to a doctor outside of a medical appointment. It was a difficult period for me,
to the extent that I couldn't even stand up to smoke a cigarette.
Menaced with a screwdriver while the second in command yells in a rage
over the appellant seeking another crew members help to install a pull-up bar.
During the qualifications as a contender for the American Gladiators, pull-ups is
where most individuals were eliminated. The USCG would not allow me to
participate after I qualified as a contender. I was intentionally trapped in the void
of a boat, denied a respirator while using the toxic solvent Toluene, and then
ordered to paint with a type of paint called "lead death paint," which is highly toxic
and can cause death. Adding to that, my supervisor physically blocked the exit,
preventing me from leaving to come up for air to breathe while I was suffocating.
What part of this conduct is represented in their Core Values, Code of Conduct??
Where does maiming fit? (5-ER), (2-ER 370-478), (1-ER 154-167).
Vicarious liability: See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 1956, "It is
well settled that the Government is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act... for
the torts of its agents acting within the scope of their employment."
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I urge the Court to consider the gravity of this situation and hold the
defendants accountable for their gross negligence and heinous mistreatment of the
appellant-CSX.
D. Objection to Delaying the Briefing Schedule
There is no justifiable reason for the appellees to continue delaying the case
other than to gain a tactical advantage. It is imperative that the schedule be kept in
the best interest of both the case and the Court.
Any delay could result in unfair advantages, unnecessary disruptions, undue
harm, and inconvenience to all parties involved. As such, the legal process must
remain fair, impartial, and without bias to all parties involved. Every individual has
the right to a timely and efficient legal process, particularly when urgent situations
or emergency motions are involved. The slightest delay in the briefing schedule
could set a dangerous precedent for future cases and make it significantly more
difficult for parties to receive the timely resolution they need. Therefore, it is
essential that the schedule be kept, and all parties should respect this requirement.
The U.S. Dept of Justice Civil Division Torts Branch Federal Tort Claims
Act Staff confirmed receipt of appellant-CSXs tort claim on December 31, 2020.
///
///
///
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V. CONCLUSION
The appellant-CSX respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and remand the case to WAWD for further proceedings.
Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that the equities tip in favor of the
appellant-CSX, and that granting the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is in the
public interest. Moreover, the district court erred by adopting the magistrate judge's
recommendations without giving proper consideration to the timeliness of the
Federal and State drug violations against the Dept of Veterans.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing statement is made under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington and Arizona foregoing
is true and correct, and I am competent to testify to the matters set forth herein.
RESPECTFULLY and sincerely submitted this 17th day of April 2023.
s/ Carolyn Sioux Green/ candidCarolyn®

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN aka (3-ER, Dkt. #54)
CANDIDCAROLYN®
PO Box 38097, Phoenix, Arizona 85069
(253) 588-8100, candidCarolyn@gmail.com
Appellant-Plaintiff self-represented
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-2.6(c) the appellant-CSX notes related cases.

This related case on appeal is from WAWD matter 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ, where
drug violations against the United States Dept of Veterans timely filed. DOE-1 is
Providence St. Peter Hospital (“Providence”) named in the above case with a
Motion to Joinder unchallenged, unopposed. (1-ER 72-77. Dkt. #48). In the Court
of Appeals Division-II No. 57429-2-II – Providence, is a related case that involves
different parties as this matter.
Providence is the catalyst in the related case that is now eligible for filing in
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT; Carolyn Sioux Green v. State of
Washington, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Western
State Asylum, et al., of which DOE-1 is the direct causation.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this brief complies with all applicable rules. Cir. R. 32-1. It was
produced in 14-point type and consists of a total of 3235 words.
DATED: April 17, 2023,
s/ Carolyn Sioux Green/ candidCarolyn®

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN
CANDIDCAROLYN®
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Case: 22-35794, 04/10/2023, ID: 12692270, DktEntry: 20, Page 1 of 15
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN,

C.A. No. 22-35794
Appellant,
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-1276-RAJ
v.
Western District of
Washington, Seattle
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD, et al.,
Appellees.
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION
Carolyn Sioux Green has moved under Ninth Circuit Rule 27-3 for
an emergency preliminary injunction asking the Court to: (1) direct the
Department of Veterans Affairs’ Phoenix, Arizona Medical Center
(VAMC) to amend her health records; (2) order the VA to reimburse her
for out-of-pocket dental expenses; and (3) remand this matter back to the
district court for further consideration of these new claims. Dkt. 19-2 at 1.
This Court should deny Green’s emergency motion because she has
never presented these claims to the district court. Alternatively, the
Court should deny the emergency motion because Green cannot show
that she is entitled to this extraordinary relief. Finally, the emergency
motion should be denied because the district court is not the proper venue
to hear these new claims on remand because the alleged acts supporting
them occurred in Phoenix, Arizona. The Court should deny the
emergency motion because it lacks merit.
JURISDICTION AND TIMELINESS
The district court had jurisdiction under the Federal Torts Claim
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation that Green’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice
because her claims were untimely and equitable tolling did not excuse
their tardiness. 1 ER-21-22, 45-55. Green timely appealed this decision.
Appendix-2.
2
BACKGROUND
I. Proceedings at the District Court.
Green’s claims arise from her 1994-1995 service in the Coast Guard
and subsequent medical treatment at the VA in 2001. 1 ER-46. On
September 20, 2021, Green filed a complaint alleging violations of the
FTCA, Bivens, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Constitution. Id.
The United States moved to dismiss on the grounds that these
claims were barred under the relevant statutes of limitation and that
equitable tolling did not apply because Green had not been pursuing her
rights diligently in the previous two decades and no extraordinary
circumstances prohibited her from timely filing suit. Id. at 47-49.
The magistrate judge agreed, recommending that Green’s
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it was untimely and she
was not entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at 55. Following objections from
Green, the district court adopted the report and recommendation and
dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. 1 ER-21-22. This appeal
followed.
3
II. Proceedings at the Ninth Circuit.
Green appealed the dismissal of her Complaint, submitted an
opening brief challenging the district court’s dismissal, and filed over
seventeen hundred pages of record excerpts. Dkts. 7, 9. The United
States’ response brief is due on May 22, 2023. Dkt. 18.
A few weeks after she filed her opening brief, Green filed a motion
for emergency relief from this Court concerning interactions with
personnel at the Phoenix VAMC that occurred in March 2023. Dkt. 19-1.
Green wants the Court to enter an emergency injunction requiring the
VA to remove the diagnosis “multiple myeloma” from her medical record,
reimburse her for out-of-pocket dental procedures, and give “serious
consideration” to remanding this matter to the district court. Dkt. 19-2
at 1.
ARGUMENT
This Court is “‘a court of review, not of first view.’” Stewart v. City
& Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16018, 2023 WL 2064162, at *1 (9th Cir.
Feb. 17, 2023) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851
(2018), Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)). “In general, an
appellate court does not decide issues that the trial court did not decide.”
4
CoreCivic, Inc. v. Candide Grp., LLC, 46 F.4th 1136, 1145 (9th Cir.
2022) (citation omitted).
Green never sought a preliminary injunction from the district court;
the relief she seeks arises out of events that postdate the district court’s
judgment on appeal. Her motion should be denied for that reason alone.
Denial of Green’s emergency motion is also appropriate for two
other reasons. First, Green has not shown she is entitled to a preliminary
injunction because she is not likely to succeed on the merits, she will not
suffer irreparable harm absent an emergency injunction, and the balance
of equities or public interest do not tip in her favor. Second, Green has
not explained how the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington would be an appropriate venue to consider her
new claims, all of which are based on factual allegations about events in
Phoenix, Arizona.
I. Green failed to present these new claims to the district

court
This Court should deny Green’s emergency motion because she
failed to seek a preliminary injunction on these claims or otherwise
present them to the district court in the first instance. As explained, this
Court does not generally consider claims that were not first raised at the
5
district court. See Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1007
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th
Cir. 2002). That rule has special force in the context of a request for
injunctive relief because a court “‘does not have authority to issue an
injunction’ ‘based on claims not pled in the complaint.’” LA All. for
Human Rights v. County of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d
631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015)).
Here, the allegations underlying Green’s emergency motion
postdate her complaint (and the district court’s judgment). They concern
interactions she had at the Phoenix, Arizona VAMC in March of 2023.
Dkt. 19-4, 5. Green alleges that she was informed about a 2007 medical
diagnosis for the first time on March 2, 2023, during a medical
appointment at the Phoenix VAMC to schedule a tooth extraction.
Dkt. 19-1 at 8. Green apparently disputed this diagnosis directly with her
Phoenix VAMC providers at that March 2, 2023 appointment and
recorded that conversation. Id. at 11-14. Green alleges that the VA
providers declined to perform the tooth extraction until the records issue
was resolved. Id. at 10, 14-15.
6
Green then sought treatment outside the VA for her tooth aliments.
Dkt. 19-4. On March 10, 2023, Green obtained a third-party estimate for
her tooth extraction. Id.at 8. On March 31, 2023, the same day she filed
this emergency motion, Green filed a complaint with the Phoenix VAMC
about the care she received. Dkt. 19-5 at 1-3. Green also submitted a
request with the VA to amend her medical records to correct the apparent
misdiagnosis. Id. at 4.
These events were never raised at the district court. See Haskell v.
Harris, 745 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that if plaintiff
wanted a preliminary injunction for different relief then what was
presented at the district court, “they are free to seek it from the district
court” in the first instance and that the appellate court “will review it if
and when it is presented”).
Here, the Complaint at the center of this appeal focused on Green’s
1994-1995 service in the Coast Guard, and subsequent medical treatment
she received in 2001 at the VA. 1 ER-45. The new issues Green raises in
the emergency motion, which occurred a month ago, have never been
considered by the district court. The Court should deny Green’s
emergency motion on this basis.
7
II. Green cannot establish that she is entitled to a preliminary

injunction
The Court should also deny the emergency motion because Green
has not shown she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims, that
she would suffer irreparable harm absent an emergency injunction, that
the balance of equities tip in her favor, or that the public interest is
furthered by the Court providing extraordinary injunctive relief.
First, Green has not shown how she is likely to succeed on the
merits of her claim that the VA’s actions in March 2023 prevented her
from providing informed consent for her tooth extractions, which caused
her to suffer monetary damages because she had to seek medical care
outside of the VA. Dkt. 19-1 at 8. At bottom, Green seems to be claiming
that the VA providers in Phoenix fell below the applicable standard of
care and were negligent in their treatment, resulting in harm.
The Court likely lacks jurisdiction because Green has not yet
administratively exhausted these potential FTCA claims prior to raising
them in the emergency motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (setting forth the
FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement). On that basis, the
Court should deny Green’s emergency motion.
8
Even assuming she had exhausted any potential FTCA claim, based
on the scant record before it, the Court cannot conclude that the actions
of the VA providers in Phoenix fell below the applicable standard of care,
or that this breach caused Green harm. Accordingly, Green cannot show
success on the merits of her potential FTCA claim.
Additionally, Green has failed to show how an emergency
preliminary injunction is the only way she can avoid irreparable harm.
As to the out-of-pocket expenses, a preliminary injunction is an
inappropriate remedy when money damages are available. “To show
irreparable harm, a plaintiff must demonstrate that other legal remedies
like money damages cannot cure that harm.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal,
13 F.3d 1313 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, Green’s claim that she
may have to declare bankruptcy as a result of out-of-pocket medical costs
is also speculative and cannot support injunctive relief in this instance.
As to the contention that she will suffer irreparable harm if her VA
medical records are not amended, the Court should deny the emergency
motion because this harm is too speculative to support extraordinary
relief. See Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir
9
2016) (holding that “[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable
injury” sufficient to support a preliminary injunction).
Here, Green has submitted an amendment request directly to the
VA on March 31, 2023. See Dkt. 19-5 at 4. According to the VA’s website,
she will receive a response indicating whether her request has been
granted or denied. https://www.oprm.va.gov/privacy/privacy_howTo.aspx
If Green disputes that decision, she can seek relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act or another federal statute.
Finally, Green has not shown that the equities tip in her favor or
that the public interest would be further served through entry of her
proposed preliminary injunction. Balancing Green’s concerns about her
medical records and out-of-pocket expenses against the VA’s interest in
providing veterans and others an orderly process to seek amendment to
those records and the agency’s ability to administratively consider any
claims for monetary damages, the Court should also find that the equities
and public interest tip in the VA’s favor and deny the emergency motion.
Considering the relevant factors, the Court should deny the
emergency motion because Green has not demonstrated that she is
entitled to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
10
III. The district court is not the proper venue for Green’s new
claims
This court should also deny Green’s request for a remand because
the district court would not be a proper venue to consider Green’s new
claims. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1391(b), the federal venue statute,
provides that civil actions may be brought in,
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be

brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Here, Green requests that the Court give “serious consideration” to
remanding this matter back to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, presumably so she can purse her new
claims before the district court. Id. at 19-2 at 1. But the Western District
of Washington would not be a proper venue for these new claims, which
all arise out of factual allegations in Phoenix, Arizona. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(2). Accordingly, remand to the Western District of Washington is
11
unwarranted. That is especially true because—while there may be some
overlap between the defendants to this action and the defendants to
Green’s new claims, and both claims concern her medical care as a
general matter—nothing in her motion shows that the new claims are
sufficiently related to the old ones that it would make sense to permit her
to amend the current complaint to add her new claims.
IV. This Court should stay the briefing schedule
The United States’ answering brief is currently due on May 22,
2023. Dkt. 18. Under the rules of this Court, certain types of motions
automatically stay the briefing schedule when filed. See 9th Cir. R. 27-
11. These include motions for full remand. Id. Here, because Rule 27-11
provides for an automatic stay of the briefing schedule for a motion for
full remand, the Court should enter an order staying this matter while it
considers Green’s emergency motion.
//
//
//
12
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny Green’s Motion for an Emergency
Preliminary Injunction.
April 10, 2023

Respectfully submitted,
NICHOLAS W. BROWN
United States Attorney
Western District of Washington
/s/ Matt Waldrop

MATT WALDROP
United States Attorney
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: (206) 553-4311
13
Appendix
Case 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ Document 255 Filed 10/12/22 Page 1 of 1

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Appendix-2

9th Cir. Reply To Response

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9th Cir. Reply To Response

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Case: 22-35794, 04/17/2023, ID: 12696795, DktEntry: 21-1, Page 1 of 16

Case 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ Document 275-1 Filed 04/17/23 Page 1 of 16

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN, No. 22-35794

Appellant - Plaintiff, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPLY TO RESPONSE TO

Appellant-CSX raises objections to the response presented by appellees.

In WAWD, The Honorable Judge Jones has a Motion for Reconsideration in

Appellant-CSX claims arise from the Department of Veterans 2018-1996, to

28, opposed May 22. (DktEntry 18, 17-1).

refusal of needed and recommended medical/dental care. Fraudulent charges. False

statements of which equates to Defamation of Character. This continues to come at

becomes an irrevocable financial devastation. At the expense of my good name.

A. A Continuation of Claims, Not New for Review

Appellant-CSX has been a victim of a 20+ yearlong of appellees fraud (to

include manipulation of pharma data records), manipulating data, breach of the

standard of care that caused appellant-CSXs injuries and damages, Aphasia,

Tardive Dyskinesia, exponential delays to include refusal for recommended and

needed medical and dental treatments. Falsification of records, and criminal

mistreatment in the state of Washington. (1-ER 147-153, 1-ER 134-146, DktEntry

U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733)), falsification of records, breach of the standard of care that

caused appellant-CSXs injuries and damages, refusal of needed medical/dental

treatment, and Defamation of Character are a continued persistent chronic pattern

In furtherance, Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) in the state of

Washington entered "Multiple Myeloma" cancer in my record (800 weeks ago),

even provide an appointment for their recommended dental treatment of extraction

for my painful two-molars due to this diagnosis.

B. Entitlement to a Preliminary Injunction Favors Appellant-CSX

appellant-CSXs tort claim on December 31, 2020. (Dkt. #106).

"Although a plaintiff generally must make a motion for preliminary injunctive

relief on appeal, we have recognized an exception where the district court's

decision has caused irreparable harm to the plaintiff."

movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an

injunction. . . The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief

these criteria and is therefore entitled to a preliminary injunction. "An irreparable

injury is one for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation,

Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). (1-ER 168, 200-204).

Appellant-CSX's loss cannot be remedied by a monetary award alone. It

my prime, dismantling of the entire family, Aphasia, Tardive Dyskinesia, and

neglectful medical care. Appellees committed perjury with premeditation solidified

violations. Paying out-of-pocket to recover from being maimed from an active-

of my good name. (1-ER 200-204, 1-ER 168-199).

preclude a finding of irreparable harm. The court emphasized that a plaintiff

consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in

other cases governed by such standards."

Substantial Evidence: Over 60 Notices of Filing Paper or Physical Materials

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff is allowed to bring claims in a different venue if they have a good

Great Weight Standard defined:

veterans’ lives across America the Beautiful.

Due to the Dept of Veterans' failure to treat my physical injury, the

was not tolerated, months later, in 2018.

defendants (Puget Sound Veterans Hospital–WA) treated my physical injury

instead of dismissing it as a mental illness. The active-duty physical injury was

appellant-CSX. (1-ER 154-167), (2-ER 370-478).

Despite being diagnosed with a "mild" case of post-traumatic stress, the

is an inhumane experience that no one should have to endure.

The substandard level of care provided by the Dept of Veterans is not an

deserve at the basic standard of care. Manipulating data is a chronic persistent

nationwide systemic crisis with appellees, Dept of Veterans.

There is 20+ years of medical providers in the state of Washington verses