1. GR No. 100113Cayetano v. Monsod –
5 SCRA 661 Gutierrez – Moral
practice of law; key: a practice which
requires application of legal knowledge
is a practice of law.
Cayetano was appointed as a COMELEC
Chairperson but his appointment was
challenged on the ground that he was not
engaged in the practice of law for more than 10
years. The court ruled that the Petition for
certiorari were not meritorious and that
Monsod was qualified with the said position.
The Court explained that Practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Atty.
Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor–verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement–that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
2. 540 SCRA 424 Dacanay Case – Resume
practice of law; key: no automatic right
to resume law practice accrues, a
Filipino who has reacquired his
citizenship must seek authorization
from the Court.
Dacanay was admitted to the PH bar sometime
in 1960 but he migrated to Canada to seek
medical attention where he subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
Canada’s free medical program. In 2006, he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship and returned
to PH and now intends to resume his practice.
The Court held that although he [Dacanay] is
also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice
accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to
practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship
pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice. This is further qualified
by the Constitution which provides that practice
of profession in the PH is limited to Filipinos
save in cases prescribed by law. Thus, loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
3.
Turpitude; key: Under section 5 of Rule
127, a member of the bar may be
removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by
reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is,
without doubt, such a crime. The term
"moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals.
Gutierrez is a member of PH bar who has been
convicted of murder. The victim’s widow prayed
that respondent be disbarred in accordance
with Rule 127 Sec 5. Respondent relies on
Lontok case which held that pardon from the
president bars the proceeding of his
disbarment. However, in this case, Lontok case
is inapplicable because only conditional pardon
was given. The court, pursuant to the above
rules ordered Gutierrez disbarred.
4. 49 SCRA 22 In Re: IBP Integration; key:
requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua
non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine
Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was
passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within
two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.” The
Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar
Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all
comments on the proposed integration. The
Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the
exercise of its power “to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar. Integration is not
violative of freedom of association because it
does not compel a lawyer to become a member
of any group of which he is not already a
member. All that it does is “to provide an
official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is already a member.”
The lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only
compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a
lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the
court held that “such compulsion is justified as
an exercise of the police power of the state”
Integration is also not violative of the freedom
of speech just because dues paid by the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which
the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would
make every government exaction a “free speech
issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice
out his objections to positions taken by the
integrated bar. The dues exacted from lawyers
is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.
5. AC 4749 Santos v. Llamas; key: Limited
practice of law does not relieve a
member of the bar from payment of IBP
dues.
Atty. Llamas was complained of not paying his
IBP dues as well as his PTR. That complainant
capitalizes on the fact that respondent had
been delinquent in his dues. Respondent being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income
taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from
a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. The Court held that respondent was
guilty of violating CPR and was suspended from
practice of law for 1 year or until payment of
IBP dues.
6. 132 SCRA 453 Beltran vs. Abad –
Essential Requisites for the practice of
law; key: Lawyers oath administered by
[this] Court and Signature with RoA.
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of
the 1978 bar examinations. His subsequent
practice of law was questioned and complained
by the President of Philippine Trial Lawyers’
Association, Inc. Respondent explained that: (1)
He had already paid for the Bar Admission Fee;
(2) He was notified of the oath-taking by the
Supreme Court and signed the Lawyer’s Oath by
one clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidante; (3)
He participated Annual General Meeting of IBP
Quezon City, and paid his statement dues and
was included as a voting member for officers
and directors – also conferred to him a
certificate of Membership in Good Standing
from IBP QC Chapter; and (4) The Supreme
Court never issued any order in the striking of
his name in the roll of attorneys, and paid his
dues and PTR. The Court in ruling held that
Respondent Abad should know that the
circumstances which he has narrated do not
constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar
and the right to practise law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of
Court.
7. 222 SCRA 378 ULEP v. Legal Clinic;
advertisements
Petitioner contends that the advertisement
produced by the respondent are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession and
destructive of community in the integrity of the
bar and to a member of the legal profession. In
respondent’s answer, they admit such
publication but claims that it is not engaged in
practice of law but of rendering legal profession
through paralegal with the use of computer and
electronic machines. The court held that the
respondent’s publication falls within the
definition of practice of law as defined in
Cayetano v. Monsod. Further, CPE before the
adoption of CPR had also warned lawyers that
they should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer have been engaged of concerning
the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance the of
the lawyer’s position and all other like self-
laudation.
8. Petition for Authority to Continue se the
Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez, & Castillo”; nom de plume
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners
who had passed away. They contend that the
continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. The Court ruled in
negative. In view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards
demanded in the canons of professional ethics,
no practice should be allowed, which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility
of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased
partners from their firm name. Thus, it has been
stated that “the use of a nom de plume”,
assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
9. Garcia vs. Atty. Balauitan; key: Rule
7.03
Atty B. sold to the petitioner a portion of his
land and upon payment thereof, he learned
that respondent mortgaged said land which
prompted him to demand to the respondent a
copy of the TCT of the land he purchased.
Respondent failed to produce the same and
demanded the return the money paid to him
instead, however, respondent failed to do so.
Petitioner filed for disbarment case against Atty
B. The Court held, siting Rule 7.03 of the Code,
provides that a lawyer should not engaged in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law. Respondent, through his dealing
with the petitioner involving a tiny parcel of
land, shows a want of professional honesty.
Such misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which
he is made of. His fitness to continue in the
advocacy of tlaw and manage the legal affairs of
others are thus put in serious doubt. Guilty of
misconduct and dishonesty.
CASE LAW ON MORAL TURPITUDE
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general,[a] contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[b] Not every
criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude.
It is for this reason that the Court has to
determine as to what crime involves moral
turpitude."[c]
In the concurring opinion of Justice Arturo Brion
in one case (April 28, 2009. . Edgar Y. Teves v.
COMELEC. 604 Phil. 717), he explained that the
term "moral turpitude" first took root under the
United States (U.S.) immigration laws.[1] Its
history can be traced back as far as the 17th
century when the States of Virginia and
Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration
resolutions excluding criminals from America, in
response to the British government's policy of
sending convicts to the colonies. State
legislators at that time strongly suspected that
Europe was deliberately exporting its human
liabilities.[2]
In the U.S., the term "moral turpitude" first
appeared in the Immigration Act of March 3,
1891, which directed the exclusion of persons
who have been convicted of a felony or other
infamous crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude; this marked the first time the
U.S. Congress used the term "moral turpitude"
in immigration laws.[3] Since then, the presence
of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a
variety of situations, including legislation
governing the disbarment of attorneys and the
revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude
also has been judicially used as a criterion in
disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in
determining the measure of contribution
between joint tortfeasors, and in deciding
whether a certain language is slanderous.[4]
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of the term "moral turpitude"
in Jordan v. De George.[5] The case presented
only one question: whether conspiracy to
defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a
crime involving moral turpitude within the
meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration
Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam De George,
an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of
conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government of
taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the
Board of Immigration Appeals ordered De
George's deportation on the basis of the
Immigration Act provision that allows the
deportation of aliens who commit multiple
crimes involving moral turpitude. De George
argued that he should not be deported because
his tax evasion crimes did not involve moral
turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Vinzon, disagreed, finding that
"under an unbroken course of judicial decisions,
the crime of conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a
crime involving moral turpitude."[6] Notably,
the Court determined that fraudulent conduct
involved moral turpitude without exception:
Whatever the phrase "involving moral
turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the
decided cases make it plain that crimes in which
fraud was an ingredient have always been
regarded as involving moral turpitude.xxx Fraud
is the touchstone by which this case should be
judged.xxx We therefore decide that Congress
sufficiently forewarned respondent that the
statutory consequence of twice conspiring to
defraud the United States is deportation. [7]
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never
exactly defined what amounts to a "crime
involving moral turpitude." The legislative
history of statutes containing the moral
turpitude standard indicates that Congress left
the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and
administrative agencies.[8] In the absence of
legislative history as interpretative aid,
American courts have resorted to the dictionary
definition - "the last resort of the baffled
judge."[9] The most common definition of
moral turpitude is similar to one found in the
early editions of Black's Law Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity
in private and social duties which man owes to
his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man. xxx Act or
behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment
or accepted moral standards of community and
is a morally culpable quality held to be present
in some criminal offenses as distinguished from
others. xxx The quality of a crime involving
grave infringement of the moral sentiment of
the community as distinguished from statutory
mala prohibita.[10]
In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was
first introduced in 1901 in Act No. 190,
otherwise known as the Code of Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings.[11] The Act provided
that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as lawyer by the
Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude.[12] Subsequently,
the term "moral turpitude" has been employed
in statutes governing disqualifications of
notaries public,[13] priests and ministers in
solemnizing marriages,[14] registration to
military service,[15] exclusion[16] and
naturalization of aliens,[17] discharge of the
accused to be a state witness,[18] admission to
the bar,[19] suspension and removal of elective
local officials,[20] and disqualification of
persons from running for any elective local
position.[21]
In Re Basa,[22] a 1920 case, provided the first
instance for the Court to define the term moral
turpitude in the context of Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a
lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was
convicted of the crime of abduction with
consent. The sole question presented was
whether the crime of abduction with consent,
as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of
1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court,
finding no exact definition in the statutes,
turned to Bouvier's Law Dictionary for guidance
and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes
everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.)
Although no decision can be found which has
decided the exact question, it cannot admit of
doubt that crimes of this character involve
moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act
is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct.
Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the
American lead and adopted a general dictionary
definition, opening the way for a case-to-case
approach in determining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude.
Through the years, the Court has never
significantly deviated from the Black's Law
Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."[23] This definition is more specific than
that used in In re Vinzon[24] where the term
moral turpitude was considered as
encompassing "everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals."[25]
In the U.S., these same definitions have been
highly criticized for their vagueness and
ambiguity.[26] In Jordan, Justice Jackson noted
that "except for the Court's [majority opinion],
there appears to be a universal recognition that
we have here an undefined and undefinable
standard."[27] Thus, the phrase "crimes
involving moral turpitude" has been described
as "vague," "nebulous," "most unfortunate,"
and even "bewildering." [28]
Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly
defined concept are not unwarranted. First, the
current definition of the term is broad. It can be
stretched to include most kinds of wrongs in
society -- a result that the Legislature could not
have intended. This Court itself concluded in
IRRI v. NLRC[29] that moral turpitude "is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the
meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached" - once again confirming, as late as
1993 in IRRI, our case-by-case approach in
determining the crimes involving moral
turpitude.
Second, the definition also assumes the
existence of a universally recognized code for
socially acceptable behavior -- the "private and
social duties which man owes to his fellow man,
or to society in general"; moral turpitude is an
act violating these duties. The problem is that
the definition does not state what these duties
are, or provide examples of acts which violate
them. Instead, it provides terms such as
"baseness," "vileness," and "depravity," which
better describe moral reactions to an act than
the act itself. In essence, they are "conclusory
but non-descriptive."[30] To be sure, the use of
morality as a norm cannot be avoided, as the
term "moral turpitude" contains the word
"moral" and its direct connotation of right and
wrong. "Turpitude," on the other hand, directly
means "depravity" which cannot be appreciated
without considering an act's degree of being
right or wrong. Thus, the law, in adopting the
term "moral turpitude," necessarily adopted a
concept involving notions of morality -
standards that involve a good measure of
subjective consideration and, in terms of
certainty and fixity, are far from the usual
measures used in law.[31]
Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails
to inform anyone of what it requires.[32] It has
been said that the loose terminology of moral
turpitude hampers uniformity since ... [i]t is
hardly to be expected that a word which baffle
judges will be more easily interpreted by
laymen.[33] This led Justice Jackson to conclude
in Jordan that "moral turpitude offered judges
no clearer guideline than their own consciences,
inviting them to condemn all that we personally
disapprove and for no better reason than that
we disapprove it."[34] This trait, however,
cannot be taken lightly, given that the
consequences of committing a crime involving
moral turpitude can be severe.
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude[35]
Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,[36] the
Court has maintained its case-by-case
categorization of crimes on the basis of moral
turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as
necessarily involving moral turpitude. The
following is a list, not necessarily complete, of
the crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:
(a) Abduction with consent[37]
(b) Bigamy[38]
(c) Concubinage[39]
(d) Smuggling[40]
(e) Rape[41]
(f) Estafa through falsification of a
document[42]
(g) Attempted Bribery[43]
(h) Profiteering[44]
(i) Robbery[45]
(j) Murder, whether consummated or
attempted[46]
(k) Estafa[47]
(l) Theft[48]
(m) Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow
Worker[49]
(n) Violation of BP Bldg. 22[50]
(o) Falsification of Document[51]
(p) Intriguing against Honor[52]
(q) Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[53]
(r) Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Drug-pushing)[54]
(s) Perjury[55]
(t) Forgery[56]
(u) Direct Bribery[57]
(v) Frustrated Homicide[58]
Zari v. Flores[59] is one case that has provided
jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving
moral turpitude, namely: adultery,
concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income
tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery,
criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making
fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract,
murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication
of evidence, offenses against pension laws,
perjury, seduction under the promise of
marriage, estafa, falsification of public
document, and estafa thru falsification of public
document.[60]