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JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT, 2016
VOL. 32, NOS. 13–14, 1333–1358

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0267257X.2016.1177578
Exploring commitment in peer-to-peer exchanges: the case

of timebanks
Eleni Papaoikonomoua and Carmen Valor b
a
Rovira and Virgili University, Tarragona, Spain; bUniversidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, Spain
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Despite the growing trend of peer-to-peer (P2P) exchanges, there Received 23 June 2014
is a lack of studies that examine the determinants of the relation- Accepted 26 March 2016
ship between exchanging partners and the role of commitment in KEYWORDS
particular. This is especially necessary as P2P exchanges enact a Peer-to-peer exchanges;
different type of reciprocity from that of ‘business-to-consumers’. generalised reciprocity;
Thus, exploring P2P exchanges allows a better understanding of timebanks; commitment;
the drivers of commitment and the relationship of commitment reciprocity; foci of
with reciprocity. This qualitative and exploratory study examines commitment
the case of timebanks (TBs). Drawing from 40 in-depth interviews
with TB managers and users along with participant observation,
this study finds that commitment is a complex and multidimen-
sional construct that may vary drastically depending on the dis-
tinct foci of commitment, the dual roles that users perform (as
providers or as recipients), the type of exchange system and the
notion of reciprocity underlying the exchange system.
Introduction
Commitment has been defined as ‘the implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity
between exchange partners’ (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987, p. 19). As a construct, it has
been examined in different types of marketing relationships and domains (Arnett,
German, & Hunt, 2003; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). As Murphy, Laczniak, and Wood (2007)
argue, the study of relational exchanges and commitment could involve any stakeholder
relationship. However, most empirical research on commitment has focused on
exchanges between organisations, or between organisations and individuals. To the
best of our knowledge, no study has explored the structure and nature of commitment
in peer-to-peer (P2P) exchanges. P2P systems enable ‘two or more peers to collaborate
spontaneously in a network of equals (peers)’ (Schoder & Fischbach, 2003, p. 27).
We claim that P2P exchanges are a new domain that demands revisiting the
antecedents and mediators of the relationship between the exchange parties. This
domain presents the following differential characteristics: the exchange is conducted
between peers, although the organisation acts as facilitator; skills and time are the
object of exchange; the benefits accruing from such exchanges are economic, but also
CONTACT Eleni Papaoikonomou eleni.papaoikonomou@urv.cat

© 2016 Westburn Publishers Ltd.
1334 E. PAPAOIKONOMOU AND C. VALOR
social, which could suggest hybridised modes of exchange; members perform a dual but
asynchronous role as providers and receivers.
Furthermore, studying P2P relational exchanges will allow us to explore the role of
reciprocity in relational exchanges, and more specifically, the role of reciprocity in regard
to commitment (Palmatier, Dant, Grewal, & Evans, 2006) because those roles have never
been examined. One plausible reason why scholarship on relationship marketing has not
examined reciprocity or has taken it for granted is that it has focused on relationships
where reciprocity is direct and explicit (Arnett et al., 2003; Bagozzi, 1975; Hoppner &
Griffith, 2011; Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal, 2007; Palmatier, Jarvis, Bechkoff, & Kardes,
2009). However, the rich tradition on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Ekeh, 1974;
Levi-Strauss, 1969; Sahlins, 1972) explains that reciprocity varies among different types
of exchanges (Molm, 2010): from dyadic to network exchanges, and from exchanges
built on balanced reciprocity to those built on generalised reciprocity. Also, reciprocity
varies in relation to the reasons of an individual to reciprocate: from reciprocity based on
calculations of benefit to those based on obligation or duty (Göbel, Vogel, & Weber,
2013). Although P2P exchanges may vary, they often work within broader networks
characterised by mutuality or generalised reciprocity (Arnould & Rose, 2015; Giesler,
2006; Skågeby, 2010) unlike the commonly studied dyadic exchanges between brands
and their customers (Plouffe, 2008) based on balanced reciprocity.
Hence, this article studies P2P exchanges as we claim this will help us to gain further
insights into the notion of reciprocity and commitment, and the relationship between
these constructs (Palmatier et al., 2006). Studying commitment on a different domain
follows the suggestions for more context specific qualitative studies (Vincent & Webster,
2013) and non-traditional exchanges (Palmatier et al., 2006).
The research question guiding this research echoes that of Bagozzi (1975): ‘Why do
some P2P exchange networks persist in ongoing relationships while others fall apart?’
Thus, our research aim is to explore and understand the nature and type of commitment
displayed in P2P exchange systems, its relation to reciprocity and the interplay between
the two to maintain the relationship.
Timebanking is chosen as the empirical case, as a domain that may help ‘uncover and
test our taken-for-granted assumptions’ (Arnould, Price, & Moisio, 2006, p. 113).
Timebanks (TBs hereafter) are built as networks of peers that exchange time among
themselves which leads to services being performed. The method of function is simple: a
user provides services to another user and earns credit from the service that can later be
used to obtain a service in return. In turn, the user who benefited from the original
service owes a debt in time credits and needs to ‘repay’ the debt by offering a service to
another member of the TB. In this way, time is ‘banked’ and may be used when the
volunteer needs it. In TBs, time is used as an alternative type of currency for the
exchange of services, i.e. an hour’s work for an hour’s work (Peacock, 2006). Unlike
other prominent P2P systems such as music file sharing (López Sintas, Zerva, & Garcia-
Alvarez, 2012; Plouffe, 2008), timebanking exchanges include a variety of services from
gardening to child care (Pacione, 1997; Seyfang, 2006) depending on the skill set of the
members and what they choose to offer and demand. TBs have been studied from the
social policy perspective (e.g. North, 2003; Seyfang, 2003), but have received very little
attention as a space of exchange in the marketing and consumer behaviour literature
(for notable exceptions, see Dubois, Schor, & Carfagna, 2014; Laamanen, Wahlen, &
JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT 1335
Campana, 2015; Ozanne & Ozanne, 2011). Further discussion of timebanking is provided
in a following section.
The article is structured as follows. First, the concept of commitment is introduced
and its antecedents revisited. Second, reciprocity is briefly presented drawing from the
rich anthropological and sociological tradition. Third, we provide a more detailed
discussion of timebanking to show its specificities as a research context. Fourth, the
methodological design is described. Finally, the results are presented and discussed.
Commitment
Commitment is a central construct in relationship marketing (Bansal, Irving, & Taylor,
2004). It has been proven as a key mediating factor in relational exchanges whether they
be economic, social (e.g. Fullerton, 2005; Naskrent & Siebelt, 2011; Palmatier, Houston,
Dant, & Grewal, 2013; Vincent & Webster, 2013) or political (Henneberg &
O’Shaughnessy, 2009). Commitment is multi-faceted; it has multiple components,
antecedents and consequences, and is dynamic (Bansal et al., 2004; Palmatier et al.,
2013). The literature on commitment is vast; for this summary we draw fundamentally
from marketing literature and B2C relationships from both for profit and non-profit
organisations. The literature review also revealed that to the best of our knowledge, no
study has examined commitment in P2P exchanges. The review of the literature on
commitment led to three main observations.
First, confusion has arisen as commitment is defined at times as an attitudinal
construct and at times as a behavioural concept (Bansal et al., 2004; Meyer & Allen,
1991). As a behavioural concept, commitment is usually implicitly used to refer to the
overt manifestations of relationship continuation, such as loyalty (Gundlach, Achrol, &
Mentzer, 1995). However, many suggest that these are better thought of as
consequences, commitment being the mediating variable (Bansal et al., 2004; Gruen,
Summers, & Acito, 2000). In other words, at the attitudinal level, commitment is
conceptualised as the reason why a user maintains a provider, and the behaviour is
the consequence/outcome of commitment.
In the literature about commitment in B2C relationships, the most common outcomes
of commitment are retention, word of mouth and increased purchases (Garbarino &
Johnson, 1999; Gruen et al., 2000; Palmatier et al., 2006). In behavioural terms,
commitment is expressed with different terms of intensity and we may define the
range between more passive and more active patterns of commitment as a
continuum (Bar-Hayim & Berman, 1992); the difference is established on the basis of
the effort made for the relationship. Consumers or employees with an active
commitment make a greater effort than those with passive commitment, although still
bound to the organisation. The reason for this difference was later called ‘diligence’ by
Murphy et al. (2007) and defined as ‘steady, earnest and energetic application and effort’
(p. 46), similar to the very definition of commitment given by Dwyer et al. (1987), or the
definition of ‘involvement’ (e.g. Bar-Hayim & Berman, 1992; Steers, 1977).
Similar conclusions are reached by studies in non-profit organisations where passive
or silent members participate through monetary donations, whereas the active or core
members take on committee roles or other responsibilities for a long period of time
(Holmes & Slater, 2012; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002). Pearce (1993) calls those who
participate sporadically or for a finite period, ‘peripheral members’. In other words, at the
behavioural level, commitment translates into engaging in more or less active
behaviours.
At the attitudinal level, the reason for maintaining the relationship unveils the three
dimensions of commitment (Bansal et al., 2004; Gruen et al., 2000; Meyer & Allen, 1991)
that other authors call types (Fullerton, 2005; Naskrent & Siebelt, 2011) or components
of commitment (Frow, 2007; Gundlach et al., 1995). These are the normative (I stay
because I ought to, I have the moral obligation), continuance or calculative commitment
(I stay because I need to, after a rational cost/benefit analysis, or because the cost of
switching is too high, or there are no alternatives), and the affective (I stay because I
want to maintain the relationship).
These three dimensions are not orthogonal. Bansal et al. (2004) found that affective
commitment leads to normative commitment. Also, the relationship among them varies
over time, as users may go from continuance to normative commitment (Vincent &
Webster, 2013). Individuals will remain engaged in a relationship if they ‘are or feel
better off than before’ (Grönroos, 2008, p. 303) assessing the value created for them in a
longitudinal and experiential manner (Grönroos & Voima, 2013). The affective
component of commitment becomes even more important in the context of non-
profit marketing where non-economic benefits such as identification with non-profit
values, learning and the expression of gratitude to the volunteers all play an important
part of commitment (Arnett et al., 2003; MacMillan, Money, Money, & Downing, 2005;
Ryan, Kaplan, & Grese, 2001; Sargeant, 1999; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2005).
Second, the antecedents of commitment have been the object of much research in
the management and non-profit literatures, but there is no consensus in their treatment.
The two most researched antecedents are trust and satisfaction (Morgan & Hunt, 1994;
Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2005). Actually, users often cannot differentiate between trust and
commitment and they allude to the construct of trust to define commitment (Papista &
Dimitriadis, 2012). Some authors (e.g. Vincent & Webster, 2013) suggest blending
commitment, trust and satisfaction into a second-order construct called Relationship
Quality. Other antecedents found are communication, shared values, and attractiveness
of alternatives (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Theron, Terblanche, & Boshoff, 2008) as well as
involvement (defined as personal relevancy or perceived importance) and identification
with the organisation (Papista & Dimitriadis, 2012).
In the non-profit literature, non-economic benefits, defined as the understanding that
the non-profit is using the funds correctly, were a direct precursor of commitment, while
non-material benefits were a mediating variable between trust and commitment
(MacMillan et al., 2005). In the meta-analysis by Palmatier et al. (2006), it is found that
relationship benefits, similarity in culture, values, and customer dependency on seller are
effective in building commitment.
Third, the foci of commitment is an area that deserves further attention. Frow (2007),
drawing from Becker, Billings, Eveleth, and Gilbert (1996), introduces another facet of the
commitment construct: the focus or ‘entity to which a person is psychologically
committed’ (p. 245). Sääksjärvi, Hellén, Gummerus, and Grönroos (2007) characterise
the foci as hierarchical gestalts and find that consumers may be committed to the
product, brand and organisation, and that these three are sequential evolving from
commitment to the product to commitment to the organisation. However, contrary to
this view of foci as gestalts, in the organisational management literature, it has been
suggested that foci could be understood as attributes of the organisation (Becker et al.,
1996).
This discussion goes to show that commitment is an intricate and multidimensional
concept. A more nuanced understanding of commitment involves considering its foci,
components and antecedents in order to understand why individuals commit to a
relationship at the attitudinal level. But also, the exploration of the behavioural
outcomes reveals whether attitude has indeed translated into behaviour and whether
individuals adopt active or passive patterns of commitment. Exploring the
multidimensional construct of commitment is of interest in the case of TBs and other
P2P exchanges systems due to their distinct exchange structure and potentially varied
reciprocity expectations.
Reciprocity and the types of exchange

Scholarship on relationship marketing has not examined the role of reciprocity with a
few exceptions where reciprocity is examined as a norm (e.g. Chan & Li, 2010; Pervan,
Bove, & Johnson, 2009). These studies define reciprocity as direct (there is an
expectation that good is received for good given, or as it is often termed, quid pro
quo). Yet the structure of reciprocity is complex (Kolm, 2006; Molm, 2010) and the
relationship marketing literature has not explicitly reflected this complexity.
Ekeh (1974), for instance, identifies the types of restricted and generalised exchanges
where restricted exchange involves a dyadic exchange between two parties and their
resources and results in structures of direct reciprocity (Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2007).
Generalised exchange is carried out at the group or network level; it is an ‘inherently
group-driven phenomenon’ (Willer, Flynn, & Zak, 2012, p. 125) and it may involve
different subtypes, notably two. For Ekeh, the definition of a ‘group-generalised’
exchange is when group members pool their resources and either collectively receive
the benefits generated (group-focused), or specific individuals enjoy the collectively
produced benefits (individual-focused). The second subtype, the chain generalised
(Ekeh, 1974) or network generalised exchange (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993), is defined as
a network where an individual provides a service and/or material good to a member of
the network and receives the return service and/or material good from a different
member of the network.
More recently, Arnould and Rose (2015, p. 15) coined the term ‘mutuality’ to refer to
the classic term of generalised exchange emphasising ‘the inscription of all in a common
sociality’. Here, reciprocity is indirect (Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007) and that would
principally constitute the case of the TBs of this study as it will be further explained in
the following section. Furthermore, a stream of research in social exchange theory has
examined the link between the exchange structure and the emergence of solidarity and
cohesion (Molm et al., 2007; Willer et al., 2012). It has been suggested that greater
solidarity is observed in generalised exchange structures (Molm et al., 2007), but for
Willer et al. (2012), this largely depends on the exchange benefits and the productivity of
the exchange structure.
Other dimensions of exchanges that define reciprocity relate to the time frame of the
reciprocal exchange and type of return. Sahlins (1972) offers a clear typology of
reciprocity in the form of a continuum that varies in terms of the expectation of returns
and the immediacy and equivalence of returns. At one end, he defines ‘generalised
reciprocity’ as altruistic exchanges where material and/or immaterial objects are given
and if possible and necessary returned. Here the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite
because the return is not defined by strict rules in terms of time, quality or quantity.
Most importantly, if there is no return, the relationship between the giver and taker does
not terminate. For Sahlins (1972), an ideal example of this type of reciprocity would be
the ‘pure gift’ that Malinowski (1922) describes in his anthropological study. On the
other end of the reciprocity continuum, we find negative reciprocity where exploitative
exchange occurs. Participants act on the basis of their own self-interest; therefore, more
formal mechanisms of control may be employed to ensure fairness in the transaction
(Phan, Blumer, & Demaiter, 2009).
At the midpoint, Sahlins discusses ‘balanced reciprocity’, an exchange where returns
are stipulated in terms of time, amount and type. What is considered as a balanced give
and take depends on prevailing social norms and kinship distance (Phan et al., 2009;
Sahlins, 1972). For example, Amato (1993) finds that in urban contexts, the time frame
for reciprocity is much shorter than in rural contexts since rural contexts are based on
stronger social ties and relationships. However, imbalances and one-way flows are not
tolerated. As Sahlins puts it, in generalised reciprocity, ‘material flow is sustained by
prevailing social relations’, whereas in balanced reciprocity, ‘social relations hinge on the
material flow’ (1972, p. 195).
This discussion shows that reciprocity takes on different meanings depending on
the type of exchange system and the established norms of reciprocity. Indeed,
previous research on P2P exchange systems considers the expectations of
reciprocation in order to understand and classify the different types of social
exchange going on (Feldman & Chuang, 2005; Giesler, 2006; López Sintas et al.,
2012). For instance, López Sintas et al. (2012) find that music sharing systems are
generalised exchange systems characterised by univocal reciprocity, implying a type
of generalised reciprocity on the network level. The compliance or incompliance with
the established norms of reciprocity may directly affect the continuity of the
relationship, the displayed commitment, the stability of the exchange structure and
the established ‘social contract’ (Maxwell, Nye, & Maxwell, 2003).
Timebanking and the co-production principle

One of the main tenets of timebanking is co-production (Cahn, 2001). Cahn proposed
that co-production is a political principle against neoliberalism. For Cahn, co-production
is an all-inclusive construct, or as he calls it, a ‘passion for social justice’ (p. 28). It implies
the active collaboration of all participating actors for the creation of social and economic
value. As Boyle (2007) explains, this differentiates TBs from traditional kinds of
philanthropy since the traditional roles of the charity giver and recipient cease to
exist. Boyle emphasises the importance of the reciprocal relationship that turns
‘dependent supplicants [in] to equal partners’ (2007, p. 8). But according to
Humphreys and Grayson (2008), co-production in the management literature has
conflated two types of co-production: company–consumer production to produce
exchange value, and collective production to produce use value for the community. The
latter would fit better with how Cahn theorised co-production in timebanking.
Timebanking may also agree with the Service Dominant (S-D) logic and the actor-to-
actor perspective (Gummesson, 2008; Vargo & Lusch, 2011) where a ‘complex and
dynamic system of actors relationally co-create value and at the same time, jointly
provide the context through which value gains its collective and individual
assessment’ (p. 182).
Beyond the dyadic level, in TBs, value is created for the community/network and may
be assessed by the community/network, thus following relationship scholars’ view of
value generation (Gummesson, 2008; Gummesson & Polese, 2009). TB users are not
supposed to ascribe to one specific role; they are supposed to alternate between
producers and consumers. They are actors that should perform different roles at
different moments and create value independently of their role. But, although the S-D
logic removes the labels of producer and consumer and views exchanges from an ‘actor-
to-actor’ perspective (Vargo & Akaka, 2012), timebanking clearly acknowledges who
performs each role, even when tender money is not exchanged, by using devices such
as accounts, credit, cheques, etc. TB users adopt different roles in each exchange
because co-production here implies the asynchronous enactment of both roles. As
such, TB users are not supposed to be either producers or consumers exclusively, but
rather they are supposed to adopt specific roles in each individual exchange. Here, the
producer–consumer divide fades away at the network level, but it is more evident at the
moment of the exchange. These distinctive characteristics of TBs make it an interesting
domain in which to explore the notion of commitment.
Method
Given that it remains to be explored if existing relationship models may apply or
whether studied variables are relevant, Grounded Theory (GT hereafter), an inductive
methodology aimed at theory generation, was used for this study. GT is appropriate
when research is attempting to shed new light or offer a novel perspective on an
already-examined issue (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This is precisely the case for P2P
transactions, so an inductive methodology is more appropriate for unveiling new
variables or new relationships among them.
GT principles were carefully applied, particularly the principles of bracketing out and
constant comparison. The main distinctive feature of GT is ‘its commitment to ’discovery‘
through direct contact with the social world studied coupled with a rejection of a priori
theorising’ (Locke, 2001, p. 34). This rejection requires that researchers’ preconceived
ideas be ‘bracketed out’ (2001, p. 46). However, the authors adopt the position of GT
theorists such as Bryant and Charmaz (2007) and Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 326) who
claim that ‘no researcher enters into the process with a completely blank and empty
mind’ and that a general theoretical knowledge of the area under study forearms the
researcher with theoretical sensitivity to recognise categories and concepts.
This article reports the results of a two-year-long data collection process that includes 40
in-depth interviews and participant observation. During the first year, 27 semi-structured
interviews were conducted with time bank managers of different Spanish TBs either by
phone or in-person. Most of them were members of the TB and were paid for their work as
Table 1. Description of participating TBs.

Time Year of Number of users/
bank City foundation exchangesa Founders
TB1 Tenerife/ 2010 240/1500 Neighbours
urban
TB2 Barcelona/ 2011 57/15 Town council and Salud y Familia Foundation
urban
TB3 Barcelona/ 2011 59/NA Neighbour association and Salud y Familia Foundation
urban
TB4 Valencia/ 2012 20/NA Group of friends/15M. It has closed
rural
TB5 Barcelona/ 2006 200/65 Town council, Salud y Familia Corporation and ‘Women
urban and Community’ Association
TB6 Barcelona/ 2011 152/NA Neighbour association and Salud y Familia Foundation
urban
TB7 Valencia/ 2012 50/NA Town council and Women association (Casa de la dona)
rural
TB8 Menorca/ 2009 250/NA Grass-roots initiative, Salud y Familia Foundation and help
urban from another time bank
TB9 Mallorca/ 2012 70/ NA 15M
rural
TB10 Barcelona/ 2003 200/ NA Neighbour association
urban
TB11 Barcelona/ 2007 83/700 Barcelona Activa
urban
TB12 Barcelona/ 2012 30/10 Neighbour Association and Salud y Familia Foundation
urban
TB13 Girona/ 2010 564/1262 Neighbour association and Salud y Familia Foundation
urban
TB14 Barcelona/ 1999 300/NA Neighbour association
urban
TB15 Madrid/ 2009 80/NA Association Ida y Vuelta
urban
TB16 Valladolid/ 2005 510/1183 Town council, TB brokers not members
urban
TB17 Madrid/ 2005 260/NA Neighbours
urban
TB18 Valencia/ 2010 105/600 Neighbour association
urban
TB19 Madrid/ 2011 105/25 15M
urban
TB20 Online 2012 4000/600 Entrepreneurs
TB21 Huesca/ 2011 10/25 Neighbours
rural
TB22 Valencia/ 2005 250/200 Town council, TB brokers not members
urban
TB23 Madrid/ 2006 56/32 NGO Red Cross
urban
TB24 Madrid/ 2011 30/NA (very few) 15M
urban
TB25 Madrid/ 2011 200/100 15M
urban
TB26 Madrid/ 2012 76/31 Neighbours and 15M
urban
TB27 Madrid/ 2005 1031/2353 Town council, TB brokers not members
urban
a
2013–2015, at the time of the interview. NA means that the TB was unable to provide the information.
TB managers in time credits (see the exceptions in Table 1). TB managers (gestores in
Spanish), an ‘emic’ term, are those users forming part of the management team. They differ
from TB broker, present mostly in municipal TBs in that the latter are usually externally
hired and paid. We have clarified in Table 1 where there are TB brokers.
However, beyond managers’ own experiences as TB users, due to their position, they
could offer information about the experiences of other users, such as how the TBs
function, incidents and anecdotes, etc. Hence, they were considered to be TB users with
privileged information that could explain TB experiences and patterns of commitment
from an individual and organisational perspective. Sometimes we observed that these
informants’ narratives related more with their organisational role as managers/brokers
than as simple users. In addition, the authors engaged more broadly with Spanish TBs by
attending meetings and by joining the Spanish Development Association of TBs (http://
adbdt.org) where through observation and informal chats with various members, more
information was gathered. TBs were identified online either on specialised sites about
Spanish TBs (e.g. http://adbdt.org and http://www.bdtonline.org/) or on Facebook which
proved to be a valuable source to make contact with TBs. Also, in some cases, the
authors requested permission and joined the Facebook groups of some of the most
active TBs such as TB13 and TB10. The objective was to get a potentially diverse set of
experiences, thus heterogeneous sampling was employed and different characteristics
were identified to construct the sample (Patton, 2015): rural/urban, size, founders and
‘age’ of TBs (see Table 1).
During the second year, 13 in-depth interviews with TB users were carried out. Our
objective was to complement our data by getting information from TB non-managers users
focusing only on their own first-hand experiences. They were recruited via postings to
different online TB platforms asking members to take part in an interview to explain their
experiences in the TB. All the interviewees that replied to the posts were interviewed.
Table 2. Description of participating TB users.

No. Pseudonym Gender Age Location Participation
1 Pedro Male 36 Valencia Two exchanges, provider. Member for the last 2 years. No
exchange in the last 10 months
2 Jasmine Female 50ish Tenerife Member (founding) for the last 5 years. Four exchanges,
provider and recipient
3 María Female 35 Valencia Member for 3 years. No longer a member (currently user of
another community currency). Two exchanges, provider
4 José Male 62 Oviedo Member (founding) for 3 years. Several exchanges, provider
and recipient
5 Martina Female 50 Tenerife Member for 4 years. Several exchanges, provider and
recipient
6 Paco Male 59 Valladolid Member for the last 3 years. Several exchanges, provider
7 Ricardo Male 40 Valladolid Member for the last 10 years. Several exchanges, provider
and recipient
8 Ana Female 31 Valencia Member during 2years (currently user of another
community currency). No exchange
9 Marta Female 55 Madrid Member for the last 2 years. No exchange
10 Cristina Female 37 Madrid Member for the last 3 years. Two exchanges, provider
11 Rosalia Female Self-employed Barcelona Participation in an online and (member for 3 years) an
in her offline TB (member for 4 years). Various exchanges in the
thirties online TB as provider and recipient. Two exchanges in the
offline TB as recipient
12 Arnau Male Retired in his Barcelona Member for the last 7 years. Several exchanges, provider
sixties and recipient
13 Marcos Male Public servant, Tenerife Member (founding) for the last 6 years. Several exchanges,
54 years old provider and recipient
Although this might usually lead to a selection bias of the most active TB users, in this case
there is a diversity in terms of activity (see Table 2). Interviews were conducted either by
phone or in-person. Again, the sample is diverse with informants of different ages, genders
and professions. Also, they vary in terms of their degrees and types of participation (active,
passive, providers, recipients or both). Table 2 presents a brief description of these
informants. We have used pseudonyms to protect the identity of the participants.
To carry out the interviews, a topic guide was developed to cover a list of topics to
explore (Krueger, 1998). A looser structure of the interviews was initially required as it
was more conversational and allowed for more spontaneity and flexibility in information
gathering. However, as the fieldwork continued, certain themes were emerging
repeatedly so the interviewers developed a ‘questioning route’ (Krueger, 1998, p. 11).
This was also necessary in order to ensure consistency as interviews were carried out
simultaneously by two different researchers. The questions were mainly focused on: how
the TBs functioned; the participants’ broader experiences; their motivations for joining,
carrying out exchanges or not being active; the meanings attached to timebanking; their
TB, etc. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Given the potential of multiple
interpretations and for the triangulation of emerging themes, both researchers went
over notes and transcriptions of the interviews (Patton, 2015). In a similar manner to
Bishop and Hoel (2008), we initially created multiple codes/themes followed by the
further refinement of these codes as the data analysis proceeded. The interpretations of
the data are outlined in the themes in the following section.
Findings
Before further exploring the notion of commitment in TBs, it is important to note the
following issues. First, similar to previous research on TBs (Collom, Lasker, & Kyriacou,
2012), we found that TBs are fluid and multifaceted exchange systems which aim to
accomplish many goals and are articulated as multidimensional projects. In most
interviews with TB managers and TB brokers and on the TB websites/Facebook pages,
TBs are defined as (1) political projects that put into practice a countercultural view of
the world based on equality and solidarity social projects that want to create
neighbouring ties and foster social capital; (2) a social welfare project where TBs are
seen as an arena for helping neighbours, a non-traditional form of volunteering and (3)
economic projects and markets where services can be obtained and skills acquired using
time credits. These three dimensions represent different foci of commitment and users
may be committed to the political dimension, but not to the economic dimension of the
project. Our findings are explained in detail in the following sections while we provide
an overview of commitment and its structure of foci in Table 3.
Second, as previously explained, all users are expected to perform a dual role in the
network as a provider and recipient of services. As we discuss in the literature review,
the notion of commitment has been commonly studied from only the individual
perspective of the consumer, donor or employee. Here, we explore two dimensions
simultaneously: the commitment of the TB users to their provider/producer role and to
their recipient/consumer role.
According to our findings, TB users exhibit different levels of commitment to these
two roles. This is largely related to the foci of commitment to the TB (as a political
Table 3. Overview of commitment in this study.

Foci of TB as a social
commitment TB as a political project welfare project TB as a market
Type of Attitudinal commitment but potential Behavioural Behavioural commitment
commitment lack of behavioural commitment commitment,
emphasis on
provider role
Motivation to Idealistic Altruistic Instrumental
join
Perceived Reciprocity may vary from generalised Generalised Balanced reciprocity
dominant to balanced; when lack of reciprocity
notion of behavioural commitment, reciprocity
reciprocity is not considered because no
exchanges are carried out
Main issue for Motivational saturation, lack of Reluctance to ask Erosion of functional value (use value
the network engagement to the reality of the for services of services offered, quality of
project services, convenience and efficiency
of TB, lack of trust)
project, as a social welfare project or as markets) and the established reciprocity

norms.
TBs as political spaces

Similar to previous research on TBs (Blanc & Fare, 2013; Miller, 2008; Seyfang, 2003),
community building is the prominent motivation for setting up and participating in a TB.
Most TB managers and many participants report the creation of bonding social capital
(Putnam, 2001) as one of the main goals and also on of the main outcomes of their TBs.
They claim that TBs ‘improve the social fabric’, ‘tighten ties among neighbours’,
encourage ‘community development’, ‘increase trust among neighbours’ and allow
users to ‘get to know each other’.
For many, the decision to participate in a TB holds a further significance. TB
managers and members express their wish to contribute to the creation of an
alternative space for market exchanges where money loses its significance and
value is measured in time. The intention is symbolic: they want to ‘devalue the
importance of money’ (TB24) and create an exchange system where anyone can
participate and everyone is equal.
The TB is putting into practice an idea, a desire of change because we want to change the
way we live and relate to each other, and TBs go toward this direction. Building a society
where we can relate with one another without money. (Martina)
I joined because the concept was attractive. I liked the idea of doing exchanges, interac-
tions, among people, outside the economic sphere (. . .) It´s like a bubble in the system.
(Pedro)
The findings are similar in other P2P exchange system studies (Lamberton & Rose, 2012)
that emphasise the ‘anti-industry utility’ of these systems and the rejection of the
traditional marketplace. Yet in this context, the rejection revolves around the money-
mediated relationships and the widely diverse exchange values of services in the
traditional marketplace; in the traditional marketplace unpaid work goes unrecognised
and economic relationships may often be unjust. That is why many TB members
appreciate the basic tenet that the time of all members, regardless of their education or
profession, is assigned a uniform value.
I like the idea that all hours have equal worth. I used my time to read, to learn, but should I
charge for this? I enjoyed that! Why should I charge more? (Martina)
Members drawn to this political dimension do not join to seek personal gains, but aim to
help others build ‘neighbourly relations’ or contribute to the creation of a ‘parallel’,
‘alternative’, ‘more human’ economy.
I think that timebanks could help recreate the relations I had with my neighbours in the
small village where I was born. (José)
Thus, participation is driven principally by moral reasons. The nature of commitment in

this focus is normative and affective: members join out of a moral obligation and an
attraction to the meanings associated with the project. As other authors have put it
(Laamanen et al., 2015), participation in TBs is a form of lifestyle movement that aims to
foster social change by adopting a different identity and way of life. TBs are political in a
broader sense (similarly to the original meaning of the word politikon): TBs are about
exercising citizenship and taking a stand on issues. These issues may involve a
renegotiation of how work is valued, how economic relations are organised or how
social relations are established in modern societies. TBs, together with other locally
organised actions, fit well with the changing modern protest tactics that Forno and
Graziano (2014) identify. Yet, this focus of commitment may at times lead to unintended
outcomes. As one of the TB managers explains,
Well, at first everyone joins and registers. Everyone thinks it is a really cool thing to do. And
everything is great until people have to carry out a transaction. Then the problems
start. (TB9)
These problems relate to both the roles of TB users as providers and recipients of
services. The initial enthusiasm of what TBs represent (a novelty, an alternative, even a
form of activism) is replaced by a lack of commitment to engage with the TB either as
providers or recipients of services.
Maybe someone comes with so much enthusiasm! Oh the TB is fantastic! I offer to do tons
of things like teaching English, accompanying older people, bricolage, fifty thousand things.
People are enthusiastic at first and offer fifteen-twenty different things, but they only like
doing three. So when other people call them, they don’t feel like doing them. ‘Bricolage? So
boring, no, no I cannot . . .’. This demotivates those calling, because when they call users and
the first one, second one, third one, all say no! They think: TBs don’t work and then they
stop calling and become inactive. (Arnau)
According to different TB managers and brokers, members may reach a point of

motivational saturation after joining that is also found in volunteers that drop out
immediately after joining (Yanay & Yanay, 2008). In the case of TBs, many members do
not actually leave the TB, but registering is the height of their participation. This also
implies that they may be committed only to the ideal, but not to the reality of
timebanking. Members relate more easily to the idea of TBs as spaces to reconnect
with neighbours, but many fail to see them as a feasible and efficient exchange system
or as an alternative market. The act of joining proves their commitment to the symbolic
project that TBs represent as they show their support to the meanings attached to TBs
(‘It is a wonderful initiative, it is worthwhile being a member, we have to support this’,
Jasmine). However, their commitment does not translate into actual behaviour in the
long term. Moreover, Arnau’s quote shows that some members’ lack of commitment to
their role as providers may gradually affect other members’ commitment to their role as
recipients.
TBs as a social welfare project

According to most TB managers, it emerges that users attached to this dimension of TBs
are willing to give, but unwilling to ask for anything. Thus, they are committed to their
role as providers, but not as recipients of services. This phenomenon has been named
credit hoarding in TB research (Gregory, 2012).
In contrast to the type of networks examined in the marketing or reciprocity
literature, in the analysed TBs, participants are forced to demand services to comply
with their dual role. This entails a form of balanced reciprocity as users are encouraged
to have zero account balances meaning that they have contributed as much as they
have received. However, most users have surpluses in their accounts or remain inactive
as they are reluctant to utilise timebank offerings (‘Nobody asked for the services, maybe
this shows that there was not a need for the TB’, TB21).
For the members to learn to ask for things. This is our biggest problem [. . .] It is the way we
are used to doing things. We are vain. You offer your time to others even though it costs
you. But when you have to ask for things, it seems like a bigger sacrifice. It is really difficult.
It is strange, but it is like this. (TB10)
This barrier has not been fully explored, although it has been identified in previous
studies of timebanking (Dubois et al., 2014; Gregory, 2012; Ozanne & Ozanne, 2011) and
other alternative spaces of exchange (Albinsson & Perera, 2012). Many members are
more comfortable with offering their time and skills than they are with asking for
something. Simply put, the main problem is that many members only enact their role
as ‘providers’: they only provide services but do not ask for anything in return.
Several reasons can be offered to explain this reluctance to ask for services.
Following Sahlins (1972) typology, members often view exchanges as generalised
reciprocity and offer their time without having concrete expectations of receiving.
However, TBs are neither a pure type of generalised reciprocity nor a balanced type
of reciprocity. On one hand, reciprocity is indirect and returns are not expected within
specific periods of time which resembles more of the generalised reciprocity type. On
the other hand, TBs use devices such as accounts and debit/credit thresholds:
exchanges are registered and ‘monetised’ in time credits and there are limits
especially with regard to the accumulation of negative time credit. Therefore, the
accumulation of positive and negative time points does not go unnoticed, and at
times, TB managers may block the members ‘in debt’ unless they increase their
commitment as providers. In this way, the flow of exchanges is controlled and
reciprocation is ensured. Also, there is an explicit demand for members to perform
their roles as both providers and recipients, and to reach a balanced account.
Therefore, their reluctance leads to unbalanced commitment patterns since users
act principally as providers. In other words, the TBs in our sample are structured in
such a way that there cannot be a group of only-providers and a group of only-
recipients, otherwise activity may be blocked or discouraged by the organisation.
Therefore, there is a clash of how reciprocity norms are understood and practiced
within the TB that leads to unbalanced commitment patterns. Some members
understand TBs as a space to give akin to volunteering spaces but not as a market,
and this constitutes a problem in the medium and long run. It also has to do with TBs’
symbolic representation and users’ prior consumer socialisation in the traditional
marketplace. As TBs do not fit with traditional conceptualisations of market
exchanges, members categorise them as volunteering, a familiar type of reciprocal
exchange (Eckstein, 2001) in line with previous findings on TBs (Gregory, 2012).
Other reasons related to the above are people’s pride or identity-related issues. If TBs
are represented as a social welfare project, asking for help would be similar to
representing oneself as a person in need. Thus, different stereotypes and identities
may be associated with the two roles.
They don’t understand that time is a currency, they think they are asking for a favour. They
see it as assistance, but it is not. (TB16)
The above quote equates exchanges with favours, which reinforces the idea that some
members do not see timebanks as a market for fair exchanges of skills and services.
Behind this emotion of pride or shame may be the reluctance to depend on others.
Asking for a service can be seen as being in need, awarding power to the person able to
satisfy this need (Cook & Rice, 2003). Members do not want to relinquish this power and
hence they do not demand services. Blau (1964) referred to it as a process of
differentiation, where the failure to reciprocate serves to establish a status hierarchy
validating one’s superiority. Likewise, studies involving rural societies found that sharing
excess is used as a device to construct oneself as a generous person (Nolin, 2012). Or as
explained by José, a TB member with a disability, people are very individualistic,
independent and not used to relying on others. He shares that his condition has
made him ask for help in the past and that is why he has no trouble asking for
services, presenting high levels of commitment to both roles. Credit hoarding could
work here as a device for identity realisation: having a surplus of hours reinforces the
image of ‘helpful’ and ‘altruistic’. The following quotes illustrate how members express
this reluctance to ask for services.
I have a lot of surplus hours. I don’t need anything . . . It’d be like abuse . . . I have my needs
solved, I’d rather offer a helping hand than ask for help. (Paco)
I’d rather have more time given than received. I feel less absorbing, less imposing. (Pedro)
TBs try to deal with this in various manners: they encourage members with high time
credit to spend it and discuss any possible needs they may have; they put limits on the
credits being offered; they allow members to give away some of their time credits to the
TB’s account and emphasise the TB’s purpose. For example, the TB manager of TB17
stresses to all members: ‘Let others experience the joy of giving that you’ve already
experienced; let others feel good about themselves’. Changing members’ mindsets is a
process (Albinsson & Perera, 2012) and the figure of the TB manager is key in that sense.
Users that actively participate as both providers and recipients seem to understand this
(‘I don’t feel bad. I have my tempus [the name of the time-currency] and I can spend it as
I see fit’, Martina).
TBs as markets
TBs are established as alternative marketplaces where services of uniform value are
exchanged (one hour of labour for one hour of labour). As previously mentioned, not all
members understand them as such and this can limit their long-term commitment both
as providers and as recipients of services. The motivation to exchange is more
instrumental since the TB is seen as a space where utilitarian benefits can be
obtained. Because of this, members are active both as providers and as receivers. As
providers, they can accumulate credits which can later be spent on needed services, or
they can exercise and improve their skills, so they can later be sold in the traditional
marketplace. As recipients, they can access services they need.
Look, for me it’s perfect because they can take care of my dog when I am travelling. I live
alone and there are many offering this service. (Arnau)
I am a linguist, but I started something new some time ago. About natural nutrition. I got a
diploma in it and I offered it for the first time in the TB. Consulting about nutrition and diets.
And now I feel confident in this field because I have already been asked by other users and
have offered it a lot. I have put my knowledge in practice. (Rosalia)
In Rosalia’s case, she now offers her services both in the conventional market and in the
TB. Rosalia is a member of an online and an offline TB. She explains that although both
models are attractive and offer a wide diversity of services, she has carried out more
transactions (as a provider and recipient) in the online TB because it is more efficient,
professional and provides services that she needed for her new profession. In the online
TB, members can see each other’s record and experience, contact one another and keep
track of the time credits, all online.
In the offline TB, lists of services are sent by e-mail periodically, while time is credited
and debited in paper time accounts. Here, lack of commitment relates to the erosion of
functional value in TBs due to, inter alia, a lack of convenience, efficiency and trust; the
limited number of services being offered; and quality issues.
Like Rosalia, other participants report lack of convenience. Trying to ‘get something
done’ may sometimes be a time-consuming, ‘inefficient’ experience. Rosalia chooses the
efficient online TB, while others prefer the conventional markets for ‘urgent’ things. The
following quote (TB8) evidences this problem.
For example my mum. She has time credit of 5 hours because she has done things. And she
needs to repair her trousers. But instead of doing this within the TB, she will go to the store
and for 5 or 6 euros, she has it done. You know sometimes you prefer to pay and have
things ready right now. You cannot wait. And this is one of our problems. This fast food
society. (TB8)
Lack of convenience does not refer to the specific transactions, but instead refers to how
TBs are organised to facilitate and register transactions. Lack of termination costs
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994) only aggravates this: TB members are not bound by any
contractual agreement, nor are they dependent on the TB to obtain services as they
can always seek needed services in the commercial marketplace (‘I have my needs
covered, I have some savings. I don´t need to go to the bank’, Paco). Similarly, Dubois
et al. (2014) found that TB users will not completely substitute the conventional market
as users keep looking to the conventional market for professional services. Furthermore,
again it is found that members’ prior consumer socialisation seems to affect how they
evaluate services within the TB (Ozanne & Ozanne, 2011).
Additionally, the limited number of services offered is acknowledged by some TB
managers/brokers and users as one of the main factors that limit higher levels of
commitment. The records of different TBs principally reveal hedonic-oriented
consumption, such as crafts, massages, or coaching and personal development
therapies (e.g. Reiki). This brings the attention to the use value of the services
exchanged. For example, the manager of TB8 acknowledges that some people
may join to cover some of their consumer needs, but the TB is not a survival
solution:
As an alternative to survival, that would be a really small minority of users. People look for
this in other places. You can find someone to teach you English, give you a massage, but if
you are looking for bread, this is not the right place.
The manager of TB4 explains that their TB failed after a year because members saw it
as a complement to the consumerist society we live in, not as a real alternative.
Likewise, users comment that they sought to solve their needs by looking to TB
providers, but were not able to find what they were looking for (‘I had neck pain and
tried to find someone to help me, but could not find anyone’, José). Alternatively,
they refer to the limited selection to justify why they do not ask for services: they do
not need the ones on offer. Of course, bigger TBs have more services to offer than
smaller ones.
The main reason advanced in the literature (Dittmer, 2013; Seyfang, 2006) to explain
this problem of limited services is that the equal valuation of work, one of the basic
principles of TBs, causes users to only offer skills and services to the TB which are not
valued in the conventional market; skilled providers go to the conventional market since
they feel their skills are undervalued and underpriced in the TB (Dittmer, 2013).
Furthermore, exchanges tend to only involve services because goods are not easily
traded with time credits (Dittmer, 2013; Lee et al., 2004; North, 2003). For that reason,
TB1 has considered creating a parallel local currency network to involve the trade of
goods and the participation of local businesses.
The issue of low perceived quality of service is also raised. The limited presence of
skilled labour creates uncertainty towards the quality of the provided service. Martina
explains that she needed massages, but there were no certified physiotherapists and she
did not trust alternative therapists. As a result, she ended up going to the conventional
market. Other TB managers and users express similar concerns that they attribute to our
enculturation in market capitalism (‘We believe that only if we pay will we get a quality
service’, TB25). Likewise, Dubois et al. (2014) also explain low perceived quality as a
consequence of the market mentality we are wired with; as these are cash-free
exchanges, they are perceived to be of poorer quality. In market transactions, price is
an indicator of the expected quality and exchange value. But, TBs predefine an equal
exchange value for all services valuing everyone’s time in the same way. Furthermore, TB
members do not usually provide their evaluation of the service received. In that sense,
there is generally a lack of indicators traditionally used in the marketplace that

communicate levels of quality and encourage the choice of certain producers over
others.
People in general say ‘very good, I enjoyed it’, but very few times will they say ‘I did not like
it, I evaluate you negatively’. They may comment on their experience to those they trust the
most, not in public. Because in the end, this is like a small village. No one wants to talk bad
about others, that they were cheated or whatever. So they simply say nothing and just stop
using that particular service. You learn it from rumours that go around. (TB8)
Rosalia mentions that there might be issues of trust because exchanges are often
between strangers. For that reason, she prefers the online system where comments
and feedback are encouraged when exchanges are completed. Lack of trust does not
appear to be towards the organisation, but towards other members, because at the end
of day the transaction takes place between members.
The organisation plays a key role in building the ‘community of trust’, as TBs are often
defined. They do so by employing a number of techniques to incentivise members;
among them, they give away free time credit and they organise events where TB
members meet to facilitate future exchanges and create a sense of community. Also,
TB managers act as trust creators by recommending specific service providers to users or
by bringing members together.
Once per month we meet, like 20 or 30 people, we split up and at each table we speak in
different languages [. . .] Another example, on March 9th we will organise our second
conference, we want to organise 50 seminars. We are looking for people and proposals.
(TB13)
Other TBs encourage the adoption of an online system to facilitate transactions, permit
members to provide public feedback, and increase the transparency and trust among
members. These strategies reveal that the intent of TBs is to build trust among members
through increased frequency of communication and interaction among members, as this
is the key antecedent of trust (Palmatier et al., 2006). Furthermore, various TB managers
mentioned that collective workshops and group classes are the most successful activities
and they incite further person-to-person exchanges. These collective exchanges allow
for initial trust to be built, especially since many person-to-person exchanges are carried
out in people’s homes. As TB10 argues, ‘It is difficult to open your door’. Such findings
concur with the argument that there is a clear need for initial trust to establish a stable
generalised exchange system (Takahashi, 2000; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). For Molm et al.
(2007), this is especially challenging in groups of strangers with no knowledge of each
other and no initial basis of trust.
All these conditions surrounding the exchanges in TBs erode the utilitarian value for
members and limit the transactions. Many of these issues explicitly limit users’
commitment as recipients of services. However, this will either lead to unbalanced
commitment patterns and reluctance to ask for services (users acting as providers but
not as recipients) or will gradually limit commitment overall.
In addition to the limited use value of available services, two more barriers for
behavioural commitment are advanced: lack of involvement or personal relevance and
the limited buying capacity.
Lack of personal involvement or personal relevancy, one of the antecedents of

commitment (Papista & Dimitriadis, 2012), is evidenced when users are incapable of
naming or explaining what their personal outcome was as a result of being involved
with a TB. When asked to evaluate the outcomes of TBs, they emphasise the symbolism
of the project and its potential to bring about change (‘It is the materialisation of a way
of living I’ve always wanted’, Jasmine; ‘It has the potential to help people in need’, Paco;
‘If it disappears it will distress me because of what this initiative means’, Martina). At
most, they refer to having met like-minded people, experiencing the satisfaction of
being in an initiative ‘steering the world in the right direction’ and ‘rehumanis[ing] my
life’, as a product of reinstating people at the centre of relations and by being part of a
community. However, they are not able to name any utilitarian benefit they received.
The final reason offered to explain limited exchanges is the lack of currency.
Participation in TBs and other P2P networks demands time; participants may
experience more shortage of this currency than conventional money.
I’d like to be more active. I wanted to learn English and sewing, if only I had the time; also
because I am not that into it, I don’t actually need it. (Pedro)
I joined because I thought it was a good idea, but I don’t have time, so . . . [she has not
participated in any transaction]. (María)
To sum up, our findings suggest that the TB’s use value and the evaluation of personal
gains are either material (e.g. have access to services that otherwise they cannot afford),
or non-material (e.g. an acquisition of skills or development of the relational network),
and can affect members’ commitment. To make such evaluations, users compare
between TBs and the traditional marketplace which comes up as the prominent
mainstream choice.
Discussion and conclusions

This study sheds light on the conceptualisation of commitment in a type of market
space that has received little attention. Our study contributes to both the literature on
commitment and P2P networks in various manners.
First of all, the nature of exchange is such that all TB members adopt a dual role as
providers and as receivers of services. This duality is a necessary condition for
participation in TBs. Our findings show that this distinction is necessary to fully
understand commitment since, for instance, there are users that display commitment
only to their role as providers, but not to their role as recipients. This finding may also be
relevant for the co-creation literature, and in practice, for companies that co-create with
consumers asking them to produce and consume at the same time (Humphreys &
Grayson, 2008). Considering both roles when studying commitment may explain in-
depth whether prosumers are equally committed to their role both as consumers and as
producers of value, and why. Furthermore, TBs may be an interesting context to study
value co-creation in communal contexts and to further explore the social nature of value
(Laamanen & Skålen, 2015).
Our findings highlight the difficulties users have in assuming this dual role and the
asynchronous adoption of two personas, that of producer and that of consumer.
Apparently it is easier to adopt the producer role, as it is frequently understood as
‘volunteering’ and/or to systems of generalised reciprocity. Our findings reveal a

great reluctance of users to switch to a consumer mode in the exchanges. Yet if
all users offer services and no one demands, little value is created at the network
level.
Second, another important contribution is to unveil the importance of reciprocity as a
key relational construct. Whereas previous literature on commitment has largely
assumed that reciprocity is direct and balanced, TBs and other P2P systems are built
as network exchange systems where reciprocity is indirect and generalised. However,
users may understand it as balanced which may impinge on their behavioural
commitment, as users are reluctant to ask for services. This is one of the most
saturated themes of this study and a major obstacle for behavioural commitment.
Nevertheless, this concept has received limited attention in previous relationship
marketing literature or in social exchange theory (e.g. Cook & Rice, 2003; Molm et al.,
2007, 2007; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). Our findings suggest different
interpretations for this phenomenon: feelings of shame, reluctance to create a
dependency relationship, prior consumer socialisation and limited use value of
services offered. Following Sahlins’ typology, there is a conflict of understandings of
reciprocity norms. In the long run, this can jeopardise the continuance of the project
because it leads to unbalanced patterns of commitment (i.e. highly debited or highly
credited time accounts) which are discouraged as TBs promote co-production (Cahn,
2001) or balanced provider/recipient roles. If users are willing to give but not to receive,
this may be due not only to lack of understanding about the nature of exchange in TBs,
but also lack of acceptance of the equality principle among all users. The equality
principle is challenging and greatly differentiates the timebank as an exchange space
from the mainstream market where social differences and inequalities are often a given.
Gregory (2012) suggests that the giver may attain superiority status for helping those in
need (the receivers). However, it may also create an inherent inequality by categorising
givers as ‘caring’ and receivers as ‘needy’. Furthermore, reluctance to ask for services
implies that some of the users have limited access to the cultural and social capital that
TBs could create as they only enact the receiver role in exchanges. Further research on
the notion of reciprocity in other P2P exchange schemes is of interest as it can explain
commitment patterns and intensity in these schemes.
Third, our study also places emphasis on the foci of commitment. Whereas previous
papers have conceptualised foci as hierarchal gestalts and found that consumers display
commitment in a sequential manner, first to the product (as a whole), then to the brand,
and finally the organisation, we define foci as layers of meaning or dimensions of
meaning. We claim that consumers’ commitment does not necessarily evolve
sequentially, from one focus to another; rather they may show commitment to one
focus but not to another and this will also impinge on users’ behavioural commitment.
In the previous sections we have identified and discussed three foci: TBs as political
projects, as social welfare and as markets. We observed that when members are
attracted to the political symbol that the TBs represent, but are not committed to it as
a market and a real space for exchanges, they will not exhibit behavioural commitment
either as providers or as recipients of services. We have advanced various reasons for
this. Members may reach a point of motivational saturation after joining similar to
volunteers that abandon after initial training (Yanay & Yanay, 2008). Passive members
emphasise the symbolism of the action of registering for the TB without further active
involvement. In other words, they join a project with whose values they agree with and
consider this to be a sufficient personal contribution to bring about social change even
though they do not carry out any transactions. In this way, they may build their identity
through the act of registering for the TBs instead of participating in them. Therefore,
shared values and the desire for collective gains are an important condition for joining,
but are not enough to effectuate active participation in the TB over time.
Still, participants enacting the role as receivers seek utilitarian features such as quality
and speed of service. If the TBs cannot offer them, they might turn to other more
efficient TBs (e.g. the example of the online, professionalised TB) or the traditional
marketplace. Previously, Jones and Taylor (2012) found that consumers are
predominantly rational, prioritising the utilitarian value of services over relational
variables. Even though shared values (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) are important when
joining the group, they do not ensure active commitment when not accompanied by
a further utilitarian value of the project. This challenges TBs that function under terms
that are completely different than those of the traditional marketplace.
Furthermore, TBs seem to place much attention on the exchange value of services
rendering it equal for all, but not on the use value of services. In the long run, these
barriers may result in unbalanced patterns of commitment or lack of commitment
altogether. In other words, active and ongoing commitment is curtailed unless
members have at minimum, a dual foci of commitment to timebanking as a social
welfare and/or political project and to timebanking as an alternative but real market.
Also, TBs are often composed of communities of strangers. Trust appears to be relevant
to active commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) and TB managers play a key role in building
this trust. The repertoire of actions for this purpose is different in offline and online
brokerages (e.g. organising meetings and social events vs. demanding online ‘post-
consumption’ feedback). Also, the trust needed in order for the network to work depends
on whether the exchange is conducted face-to-face or online. In the former case, the
amount of ‘working trust’ that needs to be created is greater, and the role of TB managers
is consequently more important. For example, some TB managers recommend who should
exchange with whom based on their knowledge of the community, thus acting as trust
creators and ‘guarantors’. This finding should be further studied in other P2P networks that
demand parties to meet in-person versus P2P networks where all activity takes place online.
It is important to understand what affects active commitment in TBs as these results are
potentially relevant to other types of P2P exchange systems presented as alternatives to
traditional consumption. The positive social impact of these initiatives being egalitarian,
social strengthening and ecological has been previously suggested (Dubois et al., 2014).
However, although these initiatives are attractive, our findings indicate that initial
enthusiasm may decrease because there is a lack of real understanding of these projects
and their reciprocity norms. We also need to keep in mind that most TB members have
been socialised as consumers in the traditional marketplace, so this affects how they
understand exchanges, reciprocity and how they evaluate services.
In this study, we acknowledge that commitment is a complex and multidimensional
construct that may drastically differ depending on the type of exchange system and the
notion of reciprocity underlying the market system.
This study opens new avenues for future work. An interesting future line of research
would be how both givers and receivers craft their identities in TB exchanges and how
reciprocity understandings can mediate this process. Previously, Gneezy, Imas, Brown,
Nelson, and Norton (2012) found that costly prosocial behaviours affirm prosocial
identities more strongly than costless prosocial behaviours. Therefore, if some users only
offer their services seeing TBs as a ‘space of sacrifice’ allowing them to construct caring and
giving identities (Sargeant, 1999), they might not be interested in receiving any type of
reward that would alter their formation of identity, thus accumulating time credits. This
research line would be interesting for the broader P2P literature and potentially for the non-
profit literature. Also, future research should explore how consumer socialisation may
influence participation and commitment in P2P exchange networks of different types. Our
study implies that consumers need ‘training’ in the relational modes of exchange in order to
be better equipped to participate in such networks. This is also of interest for public and
private organisations that put such systems in practice to ensure their success and
sustainability.
In conclusion, understanding foci of commitment as layers of meaning or dimensions
opens new avenues of research in both for-profit and not-for-profit domains.
Organisations/brands could be broken down into layers of meaning to understand
whether their determinants and users’ commitments vary across layers. This exercise
could be especially interesting in the case of organisations emphasising multiple logics
such as Ben and Jerry’s or Body Shop.
Furthermore, an emic view of the meanings attached to time as a currency should be
further explored and compared with money along with the bearings that time as a
currency has on the relationship and the exchange system. Cross-cultural research
would also be interesting as well as comparisons with long established TBs. Finally,
more studies should be conducted on other P2P schemes to explore the structure of
commitment, the notion of reciprocity and how that notion relates to commitment.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Eleni Papaoikonomou is Lecturer of Marketing in Rovira and Virgili University (Spain). Her work has
been published in the Journal of Consumer Culture, Journal of Business Ethics and International
Journal of Consumer Studies among others.
Carmen Valor is Lecturer at Universidad Pontificia Comillas (Spain); her work focuses on respon-
sible consumption. Previous research has been published in Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of
Consumer Policy and Journal of Marketing Management, inter alia.
ORCID
Carmen Valor http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4864-1048
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JOURNAL OF MARKETING MANAGEMENT, 2016

VOL. 32, NOS. 13–14, 1333–1358

Exploring commitment in peer-to-peer exchanges: the case

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

CONTACT Eleni Papaoikonomou eleni.papaoikonomou@urv.cat

Reciprocity and the types of exchange

Timebanking and the co-production principle

Table 1. Description of participating TBs.

Table 2. Description of participating TB users.

Table 3. Overview of commitment in this study.

project, as a social welfare project or as markets) and the established reciprocity

TBs as political spaces

Thus, participation is driven principally by moral reasons. The nature of commitment in

According to diﬀerent TB managers and brokers, members may reach a point of

TBs as a social welfare project

there is generally a lack of indicators traditionally used in the marketplace that

Lack of personal involvement or personal relevancy, one of the antecedents of

Discussion and conclusions

‘volunteering’ and/or to systems of generalised reciprocity. Our ﬁndings reveal a

Takahashi, N. N. (2000). The emergence of generalized exchange. American Journal of Sociology,

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