Course Outline (LAW 207 Administrative Law)1 PART II

Rizal Memorial Colleges-School of Law, SY 2022-2023

Ombudsman Prosecutor Ferdinand C. Tugas, Ch.E.

FISCAL AUTONOMY - entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other
than those provided by law; a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize
their resources. It recognizes the power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
compensation rates not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law; formulate and
implement their organizational structure and compensation of their personnel.

Concept of Independence of Constitutional Bodies - the independence enjoyed

by OMB and the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics – they
do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; they also all enjoy fiscal autonomy. These bodies are intended
by framers to be insulated from political pressure and independent from
executive control or supervision or any form of political influence ( EMILIO A.
GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 196231,
SEPTEMBER 4, 2012 [JANUARY 28, 2014]; WENDELL BARRERAS-
SULIT V. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, G.R. NO. 196232).

While the agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structure of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute
and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System (UPCCS) under RA 6758.

Upgrading and creation of FMO and PAO in CHR. CHR is not in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant and not a tag obtainable by membership. CHR
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Credits to the Lectures and Notes of Atty. Rodolfo M. Elman
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cannot lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of positions without
the approval of the DBM because the latter has sole power to administer the
UPCCS (CHREA VS. CHR, G.R. NO. 155336, NOVEMBER 25, 2004).

CHR has the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released
automatically and regularly, but not fiscal autonomy in its extensive or broad
sense (CHREA vs. CHR).

DBM is without authority to downgrade SC positions and salary grades of Chief

Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23). DBM
encroached upon SC’s fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel. The
DBM authority to review SC plantilla and compensation extends only to “calling
SC attention” on alleged erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules. Only
then may SC amend or modify its resolution as its discretion may dictate (Re:
CLARIFYING & STRENGTHENING OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE & ADMIN SET-UP OF PHILJA, A.M. NO. 01-1-04-SC-
PHILJA: January 31, 2006).

POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENA - Administrative agencies have no inherent power

to require attendance of witnesses.

It has been essayed that the lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations
are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule-making, adjudication,
and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no
more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should
be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations,
not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings
whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct

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general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

Sec. 13 & 37, Ch. 3, Bk. Vll, EO 292: Administrative bodies have power in any
contested case to require attendance of witnesses, or take or receive evidence
xxx. Authority to take testimony includes power to administer oaths, summon
witnesses and require production of documents by a subpoena duces tecum.
Disobedience to subpoena or refusal to be sworn in may be punished as
contempt.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AND A

JUDICIAL SUBPOENA? The strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of
Court, namely, that a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or
trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the
court’s judicial or adjudicatory functions, cannot apply to a non-judicial
subpoena issued by an administrative agency. An administrative subpoena
differs in essence from a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by
a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena.

WHEN MAY A SUBPOENA BE ENFORCED?

- An administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but to
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigation and
accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable
violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of
the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant. (EVANGELISTA VS. JARENCIO, G.R. No. L-
29274. November 27, 1975)
- The purpose of an administrative subpoena is to discover evidence, not to
prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of
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 testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to
have information that might shed some helpful light.

POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT - should be clearly defined and granted by law

and its penalty determined. In the absence of law, the admin agency may invoke
aid of RTC. It is limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony and it
cannot be exercised in furtherance of administrative functions; this limitation
derives from its nature being inherently judicial and need for preservation of
order in judicial proceedings.

Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no
merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot
be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative,
rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As
petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a
case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
(LASTIMOSA VS. VASQUEZ, G.R. NO. 116801, APRIL 6, 1995).

IMPLEMENTING RULES OR INTERPRETATIVE POLICIES

Administrative bodies have authority to interpret the meaning of the law. It is
not binding upon courts but has force and effect of law and entitled to great
respect.

Reasons for sustaining decisions of administrative bodies: On basis of

separation of powers as well as their knowledge, ability and expertise.

REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS

1. must be issued under authority of law;
2. must be within the scope and purview of the law;
3. must be reasonable;

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 4. must be published. Art. 2, Civil Code (as amended by EO 200)2

What needs to be PUBLISHED?

*issuances of general applicability as their purpose is to enforce existing laws.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if

their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. IRR of RA 93353 (Attrition Act – rewards xxx for BIR and BOC) were
published on May 30, 2006 in a newspaper of general circulation and became
effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are
presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS.
PURISIMA, 562 SCRA 260).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and

interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and
are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.
As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court.

The SEC violated due process when it denied the public prior knowledge of SEC
1990 Circular removing the filing fee ceilings provided for in SEC 1986 Circular.
The 1990 SEC Circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its
request in 2002 to extend its corporate existence as the SEC filed said Circular
with the UP Law Center only in 2004. The Office of the President and the CA
were correct in declaring that the applicable filing fee payable by PICOP is P100T
as computed under the 1986 Circular, instead of P12M SEC assessment under

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PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY.
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AN ACT TO IMPROVE THE REVENUE COLLECTION PERFORMANCE OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) AND
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) THROUGH THE CREATION OF A REWARDS AND INCENTIVES FUND AND OF A
REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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the 1990 Circular (SEC vs. PICOP, G.R. NO. 164314, September 26,
2008) .

In Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication

Corporation, the Court laid the guidelines in resolving disputes concerning the
interpretation by an agency of its own rules and regulations, to wit: (1) Whether
the delegation of power was valid; (2) Whether the regulation was within that
delegation; (3) Whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process
test.

In the case under review, there is an evident violation of the due process
requirement. It is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for
promulgation when it filed the required copies of the said regulation at the UP
Law Center only fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have taken effect.

The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied the public prior
notice of the regulations that were supposed to govern them. The SEC cannot
wield the provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its outright
compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its
request to extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only discovered
in 2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC filed its second motion for
reconsideration.

GSIS VS. COA, G.R. NO. 125982, JANUARY 22, 1999:

E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette, or on January 07, 1987. 4 At that time, the late General Asuncion was a
reserve officer who had rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active
duty service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a
member of the GSIS on the date he died on November 15, 1987, in line of duty in
a helicopter crash. Consequently, his heirs are entitled to payment of death
benefits.

Next, according to auditor Gaborne, the optional insurance policy issued to the
late General Asuncion had lapsed on April 30, 1984, due to non-payment of
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premiums. The optional insurance policy referred to, however, is distinct from
the compulsory coverage membership in the GSIS. The optional insurance policy
was issued on the basis of a voluntary application under existing regulations and
lapsed in April, 1984, due to non-payment of premiums. On the other hand,
qualified reserve officers were covered by compulsory membership in the GSIS
under Executive Order No. 79 effective on January 07, 1987, regardless of
whether or not the premiums were paid. Of course, the unpaid premiums, if any,
may be deducted from the proceeds of the policy.

DBM Circular disallowing payment of allowances and other compensation to

government officers is of no force and effect due to absence of publication in OG
or newspaper xxx. That it was reissued and submitted for publication in OG does
not cure the defect and retroact to date of disallowance. Publication is a
condition precedent.

PHIL. INTERNATIONAL TRADING VS. COA, G.R. NO. 152688, 19

NOV. 2003: There is no merit in the claim of PITC that R.A. No. 6758,
particularly Section 12 thereof is void because DBM-Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10, its implementing rules, was nullified in the case of De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit, for lack of publication. The basis of COA in disallowing the
grant of SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 and not DBM-CCC No. 10. Moreover,
the nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10, will not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758. It is a
cardinal rule in statutory construction that statutory provisions control the rules
and regulations which may be issued pursuant thereto. Such rules and
regulations must be consistent with and must not defeat the purpose of the
statute. The validity of R.A. No. 6758 should not be made to depend on the
validity of its implementing rules.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
ARROYO VS. DOJ, G.R. NO. 199082, SEPTEMBER 18, 2012: The
COMELEC and DOJ created a Joint Committee and a Fact-Finding Team to
investigate election fraud during the 2004 and 2007 elections. The said Joint
Committee conducted a Preliminary Investigation against Arroyo, GMA and
Abalos. They argued that the PI was not valid because the Rules of Procedure
were not published.

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RULING: In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the DOJ is governed by the
Rules of Court, while the Comelec is governed by the 1993 Comelec Rules of
Procedure. There is, therefore, no need to promulgate new Rules as may be
complementary to the DOJ and Comelec Rules. Xxx

The publication requirement covers not only statutes but administrative

regulations and issuances, as clearly outlined in Tanada v. Tuvera: effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Xxx

Publication is a necessary component of procedural due process to give as

wide publicity as possible so that all persons having an interest in the
proceedings may be notified thereof. The requirement of publication is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. It is imperative for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgressions of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever.

Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure is ineffective for

lack of publication, the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee are not
rendered null and void for that reason, because the preliminary investigation
was conducted by the Joint Committee pursuant to the procedures laid down in
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules of
Procedure.

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PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICES CORP. VS.
LABOR SECRETARY, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001: POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared
ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.

POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount
which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00.
The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of
Article 32 of the Labor Code 

It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of

those issuances which should be published for its effectivity. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been
published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely
private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from
the ambit of our ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of
Service Exporters v. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies
engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be
enforced or implemented.

Our pronouncement in Tañada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative

rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
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duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall
under any of these exceptions.

Rules imposing a penalty as authorized by the law itself must be filed &
registered with the UP Law Center (Secs. 3 and 4, Bk. Vll, EO 292).

REPUBLIC VS. EXTELCOM AND BAYANTEL, G.R. No. 147096,

January 15, 2002; BAYANTEL Vs. EXTELCOM, G.R. No. 147210,
January 15, 2002: The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin
of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress,
all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the
Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs. Xxx

Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a

condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This
is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil
Code, and which states that: “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.”

What need not be published?

a. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e
regulating only the personnel of the agency and not the public.
b. Letter of Instructions (LOIs) issued by administrative superiors concerning
rules to be followed by subordinates

SEC VS. GMA NETWORK, G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008:
The questioned SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, it should be
emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This
administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531
and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be

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considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law,
but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as
interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SEC’s assessment amounting
to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A
filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a
document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the
service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the examination and
verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its
corporate term.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES (GSIS) VS. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 170463, FEBRUARY 2, 2011:
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed
with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to
be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and
publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
Administrative agency and not the public," need not be filed with the UP Law
Center.
Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306
was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No.
197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed
resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of
the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions
with the UP Law Center.

REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

1. Impartial tribunal
2. Due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard
3. Procedure consistent with essentials of fair play
4. Proceedings conducted to give opportunity for the court to determine
whether the applicable rule of law and procedure were observed.

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EMIN VS. DE LEON, G.R. NO. 139794, FEBRUARY 27, 2002:
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent
CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of
estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSCs
jurisdiction over his case.
But we must stress that nothing herein should be deemed as overriding the
provision in the Magna Carta for Teachers on the jurisdiction of the Committee
to investigate public school teachers as such, and the observance of due process
in administrative proceedings involving them, nor modifying prior decided cases
of teachers on the observance of the said Magna Carta such as Fabella vs. Court
of Appeals.

Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had
afforded petitioners sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself
against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibility of certain
teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional
Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him to the
extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its proceedings was
willful and voluntary.

ALCALA VS. VILLAR, G.R. NO. 156063, NOVEMBER 18, 2003: As

held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them. In the case at bar,
petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his amended
petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his Motion to
Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he was "open
to further investigation by the CSC to bright light to the matter" and by further
praying for "any remedy or judgment which under the premises are just and
equitable." It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the judgment
only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

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In the case at bar, respondent was amply afforded due process in an
administrative proceeding, the essence of which is an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Not only did the respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion
for reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman and was given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. Verily, participation in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional
infirmities.

OMBUDSMAN VS. MEDRANO, G.R. NO.177580, OCTOBER 17,

2008: Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of
some "proper disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating committee of
the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the
petitioner "may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative 
proceedings against erring public officers or employees." In light of this, the
Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman
over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with
the proper committee of the DepEd.

NATURE OF SEC. 9, RA 4670

OMBUDSMAN VS. MASING, G.R. NO. 165416, JANUARY 22,
2008: The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and
action center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no
less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith,
Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all
administrative complaints, viz:

Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints

relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
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 (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations

conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules
of procedure and consistent with due process.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers
an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving
them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the
1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A.
No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987
Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier
enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in
conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public
officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. 

DUE PROCESS IN ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

It includes: 1) right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings; 2) real opportunity to be heard personally or with counsel and to
present evidence; 3) impartial tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction; and
4) finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence xx known
to parties affected.

CASES ON ADMIN DUE PROCESS

CRUZ VS. CSC, G.R. NO. 144464, NOVEMBER 27, 2001
There is no question that petitioner Zenaida Paitim, masquerading herself as
petitioner Gilda Cruz, took the civil service examinations on her behalf. Gilda
Cruz passed the examinations. On the basis of a tip-off that the two public
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employees were involved in an anomalous act, the CSC conducted an
investigation and verified that the two employees were indeed guilty of
dishonesty. Thus, in accordance with the CSC law, the petitioners merited the
penalty of dismissal. Xxx

The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it
could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was
based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.

It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding
that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly
informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that
there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the CSC to take cognizance of the case. 

Distinction between Sec. 12 and Sec. 47 of EO 292

CSC VS. ALBAO, G.R. NO. 155784 OCTOBER 13, 2005
SEC. 12 refers to CSC authority to institute directly and motu proprio
administrative cases of dishonesty and falsification, intended to administer the
Civil Service system and protect its integrity by removing from the list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications; SEC. 47 refers to the ordinary disciplinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system.

PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law itself – not merely
the procedures by which the law is enforced – is fair, reasonable and just.

LACSON VS. PAGC, G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475, May 30, 2011
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both
procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that
the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing. On the
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other hand, substantive due process requires, among others, that the dismissal
be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the administration of the
office of which the concerned employee is a member of and must be restricted
to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of
the public.

CSC vs. LUCAS, G.R. No. 127838 January 21, 1999

As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC
distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil
Service Commission, we held that "in grave misconduct as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest, which is obviously
lacking in the respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged
with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by
convicting him of grave misconduct. We sustain the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person cannot be
convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental

procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
administrative proceedings.

RUIVIVAR VS. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 165012, September 16,

2008: The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for
reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for the private respondent's failure
to furnish her copies of the affidavits of witnesses) and on questions relating to
the appreciation of the evidence on record. The Ombudsman acted on this
motion by issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly furnishing her with
copies of the private respondent's witnesses, together with the "directive to file,
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may
deem fit under the circumstances."

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Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner
simply chose to file a "Manifestation" where she took the position that "The
order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003 supplying her with the
affidavits of the complainant does not cure the 04 November 2002 order," and on
this basis prayed that the Ombudsman's decision "be reconsidered and the
complaint dismissed for lack of merit"

Petitioner was not denied due process when on her filing an MR from the
decision reprimanding her, she was given opportunity to be heard on the
witnesses’ affidavits belatedly furnished her – by directing her to file any
pleading. “The law can no longer help one who had been given
ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage
of the proffered chance.”

DR. ZENAIDA PIA VS. MARGARITO GERVACIO, G.R. No. 172334,

June 05, 2013: Pia’s argument that she was not properly charged with the
offense for which she was found guilty of committing still does not warrant her
exoneration from the offense. In Avenido, we emphasized that the designation
of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative
case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense where
the substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves
one’s guilt.24 Citing the case of Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, we held
in Avenido that the charge against the respondent in an administrative case need
not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is
sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is
controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.

Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have been committed by
Pia amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and that
she has been afforded a full opportunity to present her side and refute the act
imputed against her, the Court finds no cogent reason to nullify the ruling made
by the CA on Pia’s guilt.
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GAOIRAN VS. ALCALA AND CASTILLEJO, G.R. No. 150178,
November 26, 2004: In any case, contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the
letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo is not a "complaint" within the purview
of the provisions mentioned above. In the fairly recent case of Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the "complaint" under E.O.
No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases "both refer to the actual charge to
which the person complained of is required to answer and indicate whether or
not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be deemed not
satisfactory." xxx
Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal Affairs Service
and Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a fact-finding investigation
on the incident. The said letter-complaint did not, by itself, commence the
administrative proceedings against the petitioner, requiring an answer from him,
but, as already mentioned, merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the
CHED.

The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioner’s contention that respondent
Castillejo’s letter-complaint was "inexistent" and could not be acted upon by the
CHED for to do so, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation of E.O.
No. 292 and effectively deprive the Government of its disciplining power over
people who hold a public trust. xxx

Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied procedural
due process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity
to be heard. The petitioner was undoubtedly afforded the opportunity to
present his side as he was directed to file his written answer to the formal
charge against him. He opted not to do so. He cannot now feign denial of due
process.

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings

similar to those in courts ( UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA, G.R. NO.

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134625, August 31, 1999). So long as a party is afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity, the requirement of due process is complied with.

DAR RD LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA, G.R. No. 117565 November

18, 1997: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging
the services of counsel or not. Xxx Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident
of his capacity and so opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.

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