Decentralization of Natural Resource Governance Regimes

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Decentralization
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Anne M. Larson1 and Fernanda Soto2
1
Center for International Forestry Research, Managua, Nicaragua;
email: alarson@alfanumeric.com.ni
2
Department of Anthropology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712;
email: sotojoya@gmail.com
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2008. 33:213–39 Key Words

First published online as a Review in Advance on democracy, devolution, forest management, local government,
July 1, 2008
participation, property rights
The Annual Review of Environment and Resources
is online at environ.annualreviews.org Abstract
This article’s doi: This chapter reviews the literature on natural resource decentralization
10.1146/annurev.environ.33.020607.095522
with an emphasis on forests in developing countries. This literature can
Copyright c 2008 by Annual Reviews. be located at the intersection between discussions of good governance
All rights reserved
and democracy, development, and poverty alleviation, on the one hand,
1543-5938/08/1121-0213$20.00 and common property resources, community-based resource manage-
ment, and local resource rights, on the other. Policies implemented in
the name of decentralization, however, are often not applied in ways
compatible with the democratic potential with which decentralization
is conceived, and only rarely have they resulted in pro-poor outcomes or
challenged underlying structures of inequity. Greater attention to who
receives decentralized powers, the role of property rights, the notion
of “the local,” and the meeting of expert and local knowledge provides
insights into key issues and contradictions. Fundamental differences in
conceptions of democracy, participation, and development lie behind
these contradictions and shape strategies for the redistribution of access
to political power and resources, which is implied by decentralization.
213
that management and controls are more

Contents effective when local populations play a role in
making the rules (3).
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Literature on decentralization and natu-
DEFINING
ral resource management can be located at
DECENTRALIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 216
the intersection between discussions of good
DECENTRALIZATION
governance and democracy, development and
IN PRACTICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
poverty alleviation, on the one hand, and stud-
Why Decentralize? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
ies of common property resources, community-
What Is Decentralized: Design
based natural resource management, local
and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
rights, and access to resources, on the other.
Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
The common property literature, in particular,
Outcomes of Current Policy
has made it clear that local governance struc-

and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
tures often already exist to manage local re-
CENTRAL THEMES IN
sources. One of the interesting features of de-
NATURAL RESOURCE
centralization is precisely the interest it has
DECENTRALIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 223
earned from both conservative and progressive
Who Should Receive Powers? . . . . . . 224
actors, which suggests a certain lack of concep-
The Role of Property Rights . . . . . . . 227
tual clarity: That is, decentralization has be-
When Is Local Better? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
come a term like “sustainable development”
Experts and Local Knowledge . . . . . . 229
that shifts in meaning depending on the speaker.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES:
These issues are addressed below.
IS DECENTRALIZATION
This article reviews literature relevant to
TRANSFORMATIVE? . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
the experience of natural resource decentral-
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
ization processes in developing countries with
a particular emphasis on forests. In many ways,
forests serve as an effective proxy for natural
resources in general in part because of their in-
INTRODUCTION timate relationship to other key resources, such
Governance has been defined as the formal and as biodiversity and water sources. Forests are
informal institutions through which authority also the resource that has been the most impor-
and power are conceived and exercised (1) and tant in natural resource decentralization pol-
as the political-administrative, economic, and icy debates and the most studied in the natural
social organization and accountability of power resource decentralization literature. But funda-
and authority (2). The decentralization of nat- mentally, decentralization is about governance,
ural resource governance has become increas- and the central questions are the same as for
ingly popular since the mid-1980s, in combina- other resources: Who should make which de-
tion with two important trends. First, political cisions over natural resources and why? Who
shifts, such as the end of colonial structures benefits from these shifts in rights and powers?
in Africa and of authoritarian governments Focusing on one resource also reduces variabil-
in Latin America, led to the establishment ity and thus facilitates comparison among cases
of newly elected and autonomous local au- and the possibility of drawing general lessons.
Governance: the thorities, which have gained increasing power Much of the forestry decentralization lit-
formal and informal and responsibility over the past two decades. erature consists of case studies or analyses
institutions through Second, there has been a growing tendency of multiple cases that provide insights rele-
which authority and
to see people less as a problem and more as vant to these underlying governance questions.
power are conceived
and exercised a solution with regard to land and natural Nevertheless, it is apparent that specific eco-
resource degradation (2a, 2b) and to recognize nomic and political interests, policy priorities,
214 Larson · Soto

and practical problems may vary depending on In additional to these issues, several key
the natural resource in question, partly ow- themes emerge from the literature. These are
ing to the property rights alternatives associ- discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.
Property rights: the
ated with the characteristics of the resource. First is the question regarding who in the local actions individuals can
For example, privatization is a central issue arena should receive decentralized powers, an take in relation to
in debates around water resources, and de- issue that has been addressed by proponents of others regarding
centralization is sometimes seen as a smoke polycentric governance (9, 10), pluralism (11), objects of value
screen for government intentions to promote and institutional choice (12–14), and includes
the former (4). Issues such as comanagement debates regarding the role of traditional author-
or management by nongovernmental organi- ities (15) as well as user groups and stakeholder
zations (NGOs) are often central in protected committees (16). Tied to this question of who
area debates (5). Nonrenewable resources, such should receive powers is the central, practical
as oil or minerals, almost always remain under question of how decentralization can best em-
centralized authority. These differences, how- power, increase participation, and improve the
ever, do not change the underlying substantive livelihoods of marginalized groups.
conceptual issues but rather are reflections of A second issue is the question of prop-
those. Hence, the conceptual and practical con- erty rights, which are often affected by de-
clusions drawn from forestry decentralization centralization policies. A property right is “an
experiences provide common lessons relevant enforceable claim” (16a) that defines the ac-
to natural resource decentralizations in general tions individuals can take in relation to oth-
and are presented as such in this review; other ers regarding objects of value (16b). Forests are
(nonforestry-specific) literature is included as often publicly owned and/or common prop-
well where relevant to the particular issues ad- erty resources, for which five types of prop-
dressed below. erty rights—access, withdrawal, management,
In the past decade, an important body of exclusion, and alienation—are usually analyzed
knowledge has been generated regarding the (17, 18). The literature demonstrates the im-
structure and process of forestry decentraliza- portance of understanding the extent and effect
tions around the world (6–8). The research of shifts in these rights for local resource users.
examines the mix of stated and unstated goals Third, the emphasis on “the local” in decen-
of decentralization, the myriad processes that tralization sometimes appears to be based on
have unfolded in each country’s political and an underlying assumption that local is neces-
historical context, and the effects of those pro- sarily better; these debates particularly address
cesses, particularly on poor resource users and resource use and sustainability goals (19, 20). A
on forests. It has principally aimed to un- fourth theme addresses questions regarding the
derstand the new institutional configurations interface between scientific or expert knowl-
and balance of power relationships emerg- edge and local knowledge when these come face
ing from decentralization—or policies imple- to face in decentralization (21, 22).
mented in the name of decentralization—in two The fifth part of this chapter takes up a
key spheres: interactions between (a) central au- final set of concerns: To what extent is de-
thorities and local governments and (b) among centralization technocratic rather than trans-
local governments and other local actors in- formative (22a, 22b)? If it is not aimed
volved in or affected by forest management, at transforming the underlying structures of
particularly their constituents. After discussing marginalization and inequity, what kind of
definitions of decentralization in the next sec- democracy is democratic decentralization pro-
tion, the third section of this review, based pri- moting? This section argues that the goals
marily on this abundant case study literature, and priorities associated with decentralization
examines the design, implementation, and out- are shaped by fundamental differences in con-
comes of decentralization. ceptions of development and participation and
www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 215

that, without demand from below, natural re- Devolution generally refers to a broader set
source decentralization is unlikely to be trans- of transfer options, including the transfer of au-
formative. This section is followed by our thority to community organizations. Given the
conclusions. importance of community organizations to lo-
cal resource management, as well as the blurry
categories that arise in practice (27) and the fre-
DEFINING DECENTRALIZATION quent combination of decentralization and de-
Decentralization typically refers to a trans- volution policies, it is often difficult to discuss
fer of powers from central authorities to decentralization without also addressing devo-
lower levels in a political-administrative and lution. It is also important to recognize that ac-
territorial hierarchy (23, 24). Democratic cepted definitions have shifted over time, and
decentralization usually implies transfers to researchers and practitioners still use various
lower-level governments, such as (a) local or terms in different ways; for example, Conyers
municipal governments, (b) state govern- (27) uses decentralization as the broader term
ments in federal systems or (c) regional au- and devolution to refer to elected authorities.
tonomous governments where these exist. This In other cases, a term like “privatization” is ac-
form of decentralization refers to representa- cepted as another type of decentralization, al-
tive and downwardly accountable local actors though Ribot (13, 24) argues that there is a fun-
who have autonomous, discretionary decision- damental difference: Decentralization is aimed
making spheres with the power and resources at expanding the public domain, whereas pri-
to make significant decisions pertaining to lo- vatization decreases it. The emphasis in this
cal people’s lives (8, 25). Democratic decen- review is on understanding the extent to which
tralization contrasts with administrative decen- resource policies promoted in the name of de-
tralization, or deconcentration, which refers to centralization or devolution foster the demo-
the transfer of powers by central ministries cratic processes and goals discussed in the previ-
to their branch offices located outside the ous definitions of democratic decentralization.
capital.
Arguing that decentralization is not only an
administrative act but also a political process,
several researchers have proposed a more dy- DECENTRALIZATION
namic definition of decentralization that takes IN PRACTICE
into account bottom-up demands for change. This section is divided into four parts. It first
Hence, democratic decentralization “is a set of discusses why decentralization has been pro-
institutional arrangements among public insti- moted both in terms of its theoretical bene-
tutions and social actors that emerge from a fits and in practice. The next part discusses
broader process with two principle dimensions: what is actually being decentralized in a variety
(a) top-down measures aimed at transferring of countries. The third part looks at who has
responsibilities [and powers]—political, admin- received powers, and specifically examines the
istrative and/or fiscal—to lower levels of gov- role of elected local governments. The fourth
ernment and (b) the gradual opening of spaces presents outcomes for local people and forests.
for participation from below, induced by the One of the most important points in the lit-
actions of social movements and local govern- erature is that democratic decentralization is
ments that challenge the traditional (central- rarely implemented in the way that theory sug-
ized) way in which public policy decisions have gests is required. Rather, central government
been made” (26). Among other things, this def- personnel are reluctant to redistribute power
inition takes into account the recognized im- and resources and frequently find ways to re-
portance of demand from below in making tain these even when discourse and policies
decentralization work in practice (18, 27, 28). suggest otherwise. At the same time, however,
216 Larson · Soto

central government commitment and train- is different this time, however, is the empha-
ing are needed for decentralization to be sis on direct participation in decision making,
effective, particularly to build local govern- participatory democracy, pluralism, and rights,
Accountability: the
ment capacities as well as to promote equity at least at the level of discourse (27, 37). This exercise of
(29–31). means that natural resource management de- counterpower to
This reality suggests that decentralization is centralizations, specifically, are almost always balance arbitrary
unlikely to be implemented in this ideal way taking place in the context of other national po- action, manifested in
the ability to sanction
(19) and that greater attention therefore needs litical and economic policies, which also imply
to be paid to the political incentives that could shifts in governance (27, 38). As such, it is often
make a closer approximation more likely. One difficult to identify a clear before and after or to
important element appears to be demand from separate out effects of a particular policy. There
below, which also serves as a political incentive is also usually a significant gap between policy
to elected authorities and is needed, as well, and practice.

to demand accountability, from local govern- Decentralization is a political and economic
ments. Accountability is “the exercise of coun- process that implies, fundamentally, a redistri-
terpower to balance arbitrary action” (31a) and bution of power and resources. It does not im-
is “manifested in the ability to sanction” (24). ply, however, the decentralization of everything
Conyers (27) found that decentralizations ini- or even the weakening of central governments.
tiated from above were more likely to be seen Rather substantial central support is needed for
as a way of strengthening the national govern- decentralization to be effective; hence, it should
ment at the local level. In their study of four strengthen both central and local government.
cases of forestry decentralization in Nepal and It is about building local democracy to construct
India, Agrawal & Ostrom (18) found that such the legitimate states and governments that
demand is not needed to launch decentraliza- are the foundation of democratic systems (37,
tion processes but that local groups must ac- 39, 40).
tively pursue these new opportunities to avoid Natural resources, however, have political
their retraction or hijacking by more powerful and economic dimensions beyond those of
actors. other sectors, such as health and education, that
increase the level of conflict and resistance to
decentralization policies (29). Forests are highly
Why Decentralize? contested spaces (41). There are often differ-
In theory, decentralization should improve re- ences between the theoretical benefits of de-
source allocation, efficiency, accountability, and centralization and its democracy goals and the
equity “by linking the costs and benefits of reasons national governments actually design
public services more closely” (32). Local gov- or implement such policies (see also Reference
ernments know the needs and desires of their 42). Many have done so at the urging of in-
constituents better than national governments, ternational donors and/or in response to na-
and at the same time, it is easier to hold lo- tional crises (39, 43, 44). Forestry decentral-
cal leaders accountable (33). Decentralization ization is often aimed at reducing costs (45),
should promote democracy by “bringing the increasing forest department revenues (46), or
state closer to the people,” increasing local par- even increasing control over local communities
ticipation, and building social capital (34). It has (47–51). The latter appears to occur, in partic-
also been purported to improve sustainability ular, when local people are already managing
(35). resources under customary systems, or other-
Decentralization is not new. Rather gov- wise without necessarily holding a formal right
ernance structures have oscillated historically to do so, and decentralization extends the reach
between centralizing and decentralizing ten- of the state into areas where its presence was
dencies in both North and South (27, 36). What previously weak.

What Is Decentralized: Design ure rather than recognizing that devolution is

and Practice inadequate and carried out poorly, is a more ef-
fective government intervention in enforcing
Numerous case studies demonstrate that the
laws and providing a countervailing force to
purported benefits of decentralization have typ-
local elites.
ically been elusive, at least in part because the
Mali has adopted community-based land
institutional changes implied by theorists have
management that aims at a kind of comanage-
only rarely been implemented in practice (6,
ment between the state and local communi-
31). There is often a wide gap between discourse
ties. Nevertheless, the role of local communities
and action (52). According to Ribot (8, 24),
remains unclear, raising questions about how
to be effective, decentralization should trans-
these two actors will work together and who
fer meaningful powers and sufficient resources
will participate in decision making. The role of
to autonomous local authorities that are rep-
chiefs has been subject to debate but has not

resentative and downwardly accountable. In-
been defined. The majority of the population
stead, central governments often devolve obli-
is not organized around a fixed land area, such
gations rather than meaningful powers, with-
as pastoralists or fishing communities. The for-
out adequate resources, to traditional author-
est service is resisting community participation
ities that are not downwardly accountable, to
(47, 58).
private entities, or to upwardly accountable in-
Cameroon’s forest management decentral-
stitutions (52, 53). Where substantial powers
ization has been held up as an example, yet
are actually devolved to elected local govern-
benefits are being captured by bureaucrats and
ments, the geographical area over which those
state authorities (1, 44, 59). Its apparently pro-
powers can be asserted is highly circumscribed,
gressive program involves a mixture of policies,
as in Uganda (31). Sometimes well-designed
including the transfer of a portion of forestry
decentralizations are simply not implemented
fees to local governments and communities, the
in practice (54). In spite of this, however, new
transfer of forest ownership rights to local gov-
spaces have often been opened up for con-
ernments, and the establishment of commu-
stituents to make demands, possibly because the
nity forests in those areas where communities
discourse of decentralization itself has fostered
have traditional rights. These reforms were un-
expectations on the part of local communities
dertaken primarily because of economic and
and local governments (28, 52, 55).
political crises and donor pressure. Only the
Numerous case studies demonstrate the re-
council forest transfers establish secure rights;
sistance of central government to transferring
the application for community forests is highly
real powers to other entities. In India, the form
complex, time-consuming, and expensive, and
taken by devolution in the forestry sector has
the community’s rights can be withdrawn. Lo-
served mainly to reduce state costs and respon-
cal governments are under the strict supervi-
sibilities while increasing the reach of the gov-
sion of central authorities and are primarily up-
ernment and donors into new areas (56). Joint
wardly accountable. Management committees
forest management appeared as a better option
have been set up, in collusion with bureaucrats,
than existing policies, owing to the state’s loss of
in such a way that promotes elite capture, con-
legitimacy and financial difficulties, and seemed
flict, and corruption and have resulted in the
to offer “the ability to appear flexible and par-
emergence of a class of nouveaux riches.
ticipatory while at the same time retaining the
Comanagement arrangements may increase
deciding vote” (57). Hence, joint forest man-
the participation of local entities but are often
agement is not really joint because it is the state
designed to strengthen state control (55). They
that sets the overall agenda. Sundar (56) argues
may even further marginalize local communi-
that more important than devolution or build-
ties and resource users. A study of such arrange-
ing social capital, which is often blamed for fail-
ments between state agencies and indigenous
218 Larson · Soto

people in Canada and South Asia found that being earmarked for decentralization were not
the latter were not always given an opportunity seen as worth the effort for collective action.
for negotiation of the contract. In Bangladesh, a
social forestry project actually used a preprinted
contract for its comanagement agreements for Local Governments
agroforestry, which also served as legal mecha- Another central issue, in addition to which pow-
nisms to assert forest department control over ers are transferred, is to whom those powers
contested land. The results were often inten- are allocated. As with the failure to transfer sig-
sified conflict and tensions between the forest nificant powers, a clear tendency is to allocate
service and forest communities. Nevertheless, responsibilities in such a way that forest ser-
researchers also found that local stakeholders vices still maintain control. It is argued that
had gained renewed impetus for action because elected local governments are more likely to
of a more open and pluralist climate. be downwardly accountable than unelected lo-
Decentralization in Bolivia is top-down, giv- cal authorities, such as chiefs, NGOs, or user
ing restricted powers to local governments and committees established without effective repre-
limited autonomy for local forest users; the cen- sentation (66). But there are numerous ways in
tral government still decides how forest rights which local government accountability is atten-
are allocated and to whom. Though indigenous uated as well, such as the structure of elections,
people have won land tenure rights, titling has the role of political parties, or the influence
moved very slowly, and state forestry regula- of powerful economic interests, to mention a
tions have little scope for adapting to indige- few.
nous people’s own management practices (61). In a study of four African countries, Ribot
In spite of changes in discourse, forest policy (66) found that rather than transferring pow-
in the Philippines is still very top-down as well; ers to elected representatives, these authorities
technical and productivity aspects are empha- are integrated into projects as advisors to ad-
sized over social and environmental concerns, ministrative bodies or committees created by
and state control is seen as a necessary feature of projects. Chiefs may be empowered as roman-
community-based management. The empha- tic symbols of the indigenous, without taking
sis of policy is still on controlling communities into account autocratic behavior or the lack of
rather than devolving decision-making author- accountability mechanisms. Forest services
ity (62, 63). In Zimbabwe, little effective power continue to control management decisions and
has been decentralized, owing to the reluc- incorporate local populations through a cir-
tance of central institutions to relinquish power, cumscribed set of roles and relations with the
Zimbabwe’s general economic crisis, political forest, with little room for autonomy (66).
tensions, and the lack of funds to implement The question of who should receive pow-
decentralization (43). ers is a key issue of debate in both theory and
When policies include the devolution of practice and as such is discussed below as one
forests to local authorities or communities, of the central themes in decentralization. The
these may be low-quality forests. This has choice of authority is indicative of the goals of
been a central complaint of Joint Forest decentralization (maintaining central control,
Management in India (64) and is also notable appeasing political allies, reinforcing certain au-
in Nepal (65). In Nepal, Nagendra (65) studied thorities over others, etc.) as well as of the con-
forest conditions in recently declared commu- ception of democracy, particularly regarding
nity forests and found them to be significantly the role of participation, deliberation, and/or
poorer than national forests—a point that must local decision making. This section presents
be taken into account in evaluations of commu- the findings of case studies, with a particular
nity forest management. In India, Baumann & emphasis on elected governments. The section
Farrington (64) concluded that degraded lands below considers specific theoretical debates

regarding traditional authority and stakeholder granting rights more broadly. Hence, municipal
groups versus elected governments. governments in Bolivia and Nicaragua and state
A 2005 review (67) of forestry decentraliza- governments in Brazil have signed agreements
tion summarized experiences with local govern- with national forest agencies primarily for su-
ment with the following propositions: pervision and control of forest activities, and
Local governments may be representa- sometimes for the authorization of small-scale
tive authorities, accountable to their con- permits. Guatemalan local governments have
stituents, or they may constitute another similar responsibilities and coordinate closely
local interest group in competition for with the forestry institute through municipal
resources; forestry offices, which exist in about a third of
Local governments often have little mo- the municipalities (69). Although contracts help
tivation to take forest-related initiatives, address capacity issues and are more likely to
especially when they have little real guarantee upward accountability, they do not
authority over, and receive few bene- promote downward accountability or, there-
fits from, forest resources; when they fore, the democracy goals of decentralization
do, these initiatives tend to emphasize (8). In contrast, in Nicaragua, no resource ex-
obtaining economic benefits; traction permits, for renewable or nonrenew-
Problems with low capacity are com- able resources, can be authorized in its two
mon among local governments but can autonomous regions without the approval of
be solved; the elected autonomous Regional Councils. In
Downward accountability alone, how- practice, though not in law, Nicaragua’s forestry
ever, is not sufficient to guarantee sustain- institute is turning toward a similar arrange-
able forest management; and ment with municipal governments, which by
Local government associations can im- law are only required to provide a nonbinding
prove the effectiveness of local govern- opinion (A.M. Larson, unpublished data).
ment. A 1998 study on Bolivia’s forestry decen-
Indonesia represents one of the few cases in tralization found that “local governments are
which substantial powers have been transferred unlikely to manage resources appropriately”
to local governments. Indonesia’s forestry de- without strong support and supervision by out-
centralization was implemented in response to side agencies; however, evidence suggested that
a serious national crisis and questioning of cen- their management was no worse than the previ-
tral government; a few resource-rich provinces ous institutional arrangement. Because Bolivia’s
were threatening secession (39). The central forested municipalities, located in agricultural
government responded with a series of decen- frontier regions, tend to be dominated by elites,
tralization laws that were both confusing and strengthening local government also strength-
contradictory, but for a short period of time, ened these groups. But they were also under in-
these laws transferred substantial powers over creasing pressure to acknowledge and negotiate
forests to local governments. The result was de- with groups that were previously marginalized
scribed by some as disastrous (68). The main (70). Since that time, both local governments
problems were that decentralization occurred and social movements have made headway. Al-
too quickly, those receiving powers were not ac- though the forest service has resisted the partic-
countable to the central government or to local ipation of local governments, municipal forest
populations, and there were few control mecha- offices have fought for a greater role and for
nisms. The result was an increase in logging and resources to hire technical personnel; by 2005,
the proliferation of opportunistic behaviors. five municipalities in Santa Cruz province and
In Latin America, the tendency has been two in Pando were collaborating with the for-
to turn to contractual arrangements to trans- est service and playing a much more active role
fer powers to local governments, rather than in forest resource management. For their part,
220 Larson · Soto

social movements have also increased their in- ticipation, especially of marginal groups) and
fluence over municipal authorities, but this is ecological effects (in this case forest condition
more likely to occur in regions with strong or deforestation).
agrarian unions and/or indigenous organiza- Before turning specifically to forests and
tions (71). natural resources, it is important to men-
As suggested earlier, local governments’ tion several key studies of decentralization and
main interest in forest management is likely to poverty alleviation more generally. Crook &
be as a source of income. To manage resources Sverrison (76) looked at the responsiveness of
well, they need capacity (technical and financial, local governments to the poor across several
as well as the ability to promote democratic pro- cases of political and administrative decentral-
cesses) and incentives (from NGOs, projects, izations. They argue, on the basis of their se-
and potential income, or the need to solve seri- lected cases, that there is no predictable link be-
ous local environmental problems) (29, 72). In tween decentralization and pro-poor outcomes
particular, these authorities are politicians, who such as poverty alleviation. In contrast, how-
are likely to take an active interest in environ- ever, using a 20-year data set for 250 Indian
mental governance initiatives if they perceive villages, Foster & Rosenzweig (77) find a clear
potential financial and/or political benefits, and positive relation between local democracy and
these local institutional incentives explain why greater pro-poor public investments. Johnson
some mayors are more interested in forest gov- (25) argues that three conditions can strengthen
ernance than others (37, 73, 74). Fiscal incen- the livelihoods of rural people: finding the right
tives played an important role in defining the balance between autonomy and accountability,
interest of Guatemalan mayors versus mayors engaging the support of external actors, and
in Bolivia; the former were more motivated by encouraging democratic deepening. A central
local pressure because they depend more on issue with regard to social outcomes in natu-
income from local sources (73). The strength ral resource decentralizations is the question—
of demand from local interest groups as well what was there prior to the new policy? Are
as central government support and supervision governments imposing new rules, challenging
were other key incentives that explained why an informal or customary set of practices, or
some mayors were more interested than others. actually enhancing powers and rights; and if so,
In addition, greater communication among ac- for whom?
tors involved in forest governance—central and In general, forestry decentralizations have
municipal government, NGOs, forest users, been found to have positive effects when they
and other individuals—was associated with bet- seek to empower local people and when those
ter governance outcomes, as measured by forest receiving powers are accountable to local pop-
user satisfaction and forest tenure security (75). ulations, and negative social effects have been
found when they seek to extend state control
over local people, when they fail to address
Outcomes of Current Policy equity concerns, and when those receiving
and Practice powers are not accountable to local people (67).
It is important to remember that the outcomes Decentralizations that fail to clarify the roles of
discussed here are not often the outcomes of different actors in a way that is seen as locally
democratic decentralization but rather of myr- legitimate are likely to increase conflict. In
iad policies that are put in practice in the name Zimbabwe, decentralization led to (a) conflicts
of decentralization. The discussion of results over decentralized resources, such as revenues
demonstrates a wide variety of expectations from CAMPFIRE, a wildlife management
with regard to decentralization, but the two project; (b) increased tribal tension because of a
central issues in the literature generally refer history of discrimination; and (c) confusion ow-
to social effects (poverty, livelihoods, and par- ing to the proliferation of institutions such that

it was unclear who did what (43). The results There may be trade-offs between positive
have been similar in Cameroon, where younger social benefits and forest condition or sus-
generations in particular are angry at being ex- tainability. On Ethiopian woodlots, for ex-
cluded from benefits and see forest destruction ample, village-level management demonstrated
as a way to get back at elites (1). Not all conflict greater income benefits, but sustainability was
should be seen as necessarily bad, however. For greater on woodlots managed at the level of the
example, Agrawal & Chhatre (78) found that municipality (20, 85). In Indonesia, in spite of
women’s participation in decision-making in- the problems associated with a forestry decen-
stitutions was unlikely to occur without conflict tralization that appeared to have occurred too
and that the prospects for resource conserva- quickly, communities are getting greater bene-
tion were higher when women were involved. fits from forests than they were previously (39,
In Guatemala, the forestry administration 86). At the same time, because rights are un-
has supported the creation of municipal forestry clear and poorly enforced, a community’s abil-
offices under the jurisdiction of local govern- ity to claim a share of logging profits depends
ments and, through these, has extended and on its ability to self-enforce its rights, which
deepened state control over local resource use, is more likely over smaller areas where self-
including the control of domestic firewood con- enforcement costs are lower, forests are more
sumption. In addition, forests are often un- valuable, and communities are more homoge-
der the legal jurisdiction of municipal govern- nous and have higher social capital (87).
ments, even when they have been managed by Although decentralization may not improve
local communities for years. Decentralization incomes for the poor, it has often been found to
has reinforced municipal authority and weak- have other positive livelihoods effects, partic-
ened community management, ignoring local ularly with regard to empowerment, participa-
institutions, practices, knowledge, and historic tion, and the general opening of political spaces.
rights (50, 79, 80). Rubber tappers in Brazil have not been empow-
Social benefits for marginalized groups are ered economically by policies granting rights
unlikely to change without targeted policies for to extractive reserves, but they have been em-
those groups (26; see also 81 for equity issues powered politically. It cannot be assumed that
in forest management, particularly gender). A economic empowerment will follow, however,
review of development projects, which were because economic conditions are affected by a
based on community participation, found that variety of other factors, such as world markets
these were rarely effective at targeting the poor (88).
(82). In Australia, regional panels composed of In India, communities that did not orga-
civil society members were set up to review nize around natural resource demands still
proposals for community-based environmental responded with political mobilization and con-
management projects, but these systematically testation over access to decision-making insti-
failed to approve the proposals of indigenous tutions. This new political space is exploited
communities (83). A municipal government in mainly by intermediate rather than poor castes,
Honduras discouraged community-based for- but “given the all-encompassing structures of
est enterprises, which had doubled household traditional authority in most villages, this is not
income for participants in a five-year period, an insignificant achievement” (64). These new
from logging on municipal lands by requiring political spaces could also be used more strate-
an up-front advance payment that only larger gically for the poor if they were tied to a clearer
loggers could afford (84). In contrast, Bolivian vision of development and were more demand
policy allocates a portion (20%) of the national driven.
forest for municipal forest reserves to be given Important political progress has also been
as a concession to local logging associations made in some parts of Indonesia. A study of
(26, 71). small-scale district-led forest exploitation in
222 Larson · Soto

Malinau, Indonesia, found that the district be- In Nepal, a comparison of community
came more independent and, hence, free to forests and national forests, after protection
pursue local priorities; authorities became in- policies were initiated in the 1990s, found the
creasingly downwardly accountable and local incidence of tree lopping, grazing, and fire to
people more influential; and communication be lower in community forests (65). A compar-
and understanding between officials and civil ison of local forests in India found better out-
society had improved. Still, less powerful eth- comes when municipal-level governments were
nic groups have been excluded from many of not involved (92). Expanding political forums
the benefits (86). through decentralization policies, however, can
In a different approach to the social out- have potentially positive benefits for forests, as
comes of decentralization, Agrawal (89) exam- they do for empowerment. In El Salvador, de-
ines the way in which changing relationships centralization “set the framework for the de-
of power and governance can lead to new sub- velopment of new local political arenas where
jective relationships among people and between an emerging environmental language and ap-
people and the environment. He traces this pro- proaches to rural development could evolve”
cess over the past century in Kumaon, India, (93).
and argues that the constitution of “environ- There is clearly no single institutional pat-
mental subjects,” “those for whom the environ- tern; each particular situation is a dynamic in-
ment constitutes a critical domain of thought teraction among a variety of social institutions
and action,” is what will determine the ulti- and exogenous variables. One attempt to iden-
mate success and effectiveness of decentralized tify relevant causal factors concluded that “it
environmental governance (89). might be impossible to identify a set of nec-
Outcomes for forests are also highly varied, essary and sufficient conditions that constitute
although this has been studied less often and a theory of . . . local resource governance” (78).
less systematically. There is clearly no direct The authors argue that to identify the effects
correlation, however, between decentralization of institutional variables on resource conditions
and better forest management. A comparison of “it is necessary to take into account the role of
land-cover change in 30 lowland Bolivian mu- the biophysical, economic, social, political, and
nicipalities concluded that decentralized gov- demographic context as well.” They emphasize
ernance was not inherently superior to central- the importance of biophysical factors in partic-
ized systems (90). Decentralization can lead to ular, which are often omitted from the analysis,
greater sustainability or greater deforestation as influential factors on sociocultural conditions
(67). The tendency to believe that local means and resource governance outcomes. Also highly
better is discussed among the themes addressed significant are the strength and resilience of in-
in the next section. stitutional enforcement and the durability of
Indonesia’s decentralization led to increased institutions.
forest encroachment, land conversion, and for-
est fires (68). In Yunnan, China, there was
also a dramatic increase in deforestation when CENTRAL THEMES IN
local authorities were given new powers over NATURAL RESOURCE
forest resources; this increase, however, turned DECENTRALIZATION
out to be temporary, and the trend reversed This section addresses four important (and in-
(91). Analysis suggests that the increase was terrelated) themes that appear in the litera-
caused by tenure insecurity and the fear that the ture on forestry decentralization and are appli-
rights to manage forests would again be with- cable to other natural resources as well. One
drawn. The same was probably true in Indone- of the most important theoretical and practi-
sia, and in fact, these local rights have since been cal issues is the question of who, in the local
withdrawn. arena, should receive decentralized powers.

This question reflects a principal underlying system referred to as decentralized despotism

concern regarding how those who have been that was “feared rather than respected” by ru-
traditionally marginalized or excluded can best ral communities (15). Chiefs have also been
be included. A second important issue is the role empowered through forestry decentralizations
of property rights in decentralization. A third in Uganda, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe (8).
concern involves the conception of community Traditional authorities in Mali have reemerged
and the tendency to assume that local control in reaction to the women’s movement and to lo-
will necessarily be better for both livelihood and cal democracy (24). In contrast, in some cases,
sustainability outcomes. A fourth is the conflict chiefs may be progressive forces and capable
between scientific knowledge and local knowl- leaders. Nevertheless, although there are many
edge inherent in processes of decentralization kinds of accountability mechanisms in addition
and devolution. to elections, when these authorities inherit their
posts, there is no systematic way to guarantee

their accountability to local populations (24).
Who Should Receive Powers? At the same time, despotic or not, tradi-
The choice of institutions receiving powers tional authorities may have local legitimacy, and
is often based on political expediency without projects that simply exclude them may fail (95).
consideration for its long-term implications Even if they are not representative or down-
(12, 13). This is in part because the ministries wardly accountable, the elite are often gate-
managing natural resources may not consider keepers for relations with outsiders, and gaining
broader democracy goals as their primary the village head’s approval can confer legitimacy
concern and in part because of different inter- and acceptability to villagers (96). One com-
pretations of democracy. (As discussed above, parison of traditional and modern authorities
the choice of institution may also be governed in Zimbabwe concluded that both regimes are
primarily by an interest in maintaining central generally weak and have overlapping and in-
control rather than decentralizing.) Two main consistent rules that are largely ignored; local
concerns arise in the literature, each with people oscillate between the two depending on
regard to a particular type of institution: the the issue at hand (97).
role of traditional authorities and the effect In Latin America, customary authorities are
of creating user groups or stakeholder com- less likely to inherit their posts, and a continent-
mittees. Pluralism, polycentric governance, wide social movement in defense of indige-
and institutional choice theorists provide three nous people’s rights places the question of
different perspectives on who should receive tradition and identity politics in a somewhat
decentralized powers. different light. In particular, the state—over
The first concern relates to the history and a much longer period of independence from
meaning of traditional or customary authori- colonialism—played a central role in the history
ties. In much of Africa, for example, tradition of land expropriation from indigenous peoples
was an ideological construct of colonial author- and in attempts, first, to annihilate and, later,
ities, and custom was the “language of force.” to assimilate that population. Hence, there is
The chief was the “clenched fist” that fused little reason to believe that an elected munic-
all powers: judicial, legislative, executive, and ipal government, which forms part of a state
administrative (94). These chiefs and headmen that has historically repressed the indigenous
continue to exert power over lands and forests population, will necessarily be more represen-
under decentralization policies in some parts of tative of or accountable to indigenous people
Africa. In South Africa, for example, the failure than a customary authority (98). The very dif-
to empower and support elected municipal au- ferent political-historical contexts of these two
thorities reinforces apartheid-era and Bantus- continents suggest a somewhat contradictory
tan land management structures, which was a set of challenges for decentralization advocates
224 Larson · Soto

and an interesting possibility for comparative At the same time, the formation of user
research. groups can clearly be beneficial under some cir-
At the same time, the failure to define clearly cumstances. A comparison of watershed com-
the mandates of these two different authorities mittees in Brazil found that civil society groups
is likely to lead to confusion and the failure of were more effective at encouraging downward
either one to manage resources effectively (97). accountability than elected municipal author-
The result is “forum shopping” and the possible ities (103). Stakeholder processes, such as the
creation of an open access regime, a discussion adaptive collaborative management approach
that has been addressed more fully in the prop- to community-based resource management,
erty rights literature (see, for example, 99). have promoted joint learning and improved for-
The second concern, the proliferation of est management. Key factors for success include
user groups and stakeholder committees, ac- correctly identifying appropriate stakeholders
cording to contrasting theoretical perspectives (and, hence, participants) at each stage, clari-
and case studies, is seen as undermining (16) fying their role, as well as identifying and re-
or promoting (45) local democracy. User com- solving conflicts before they become too serious
mittees of all kinds have rapidly become a (45, 104).
widespread new form of grassroots participa- These kinds of multistakeholder processes
tion in the implementation and/or design of de- in forestry are advocated by the pluralist school,
velopment programs and projects. In contrast which argues that approaches recognizing di-
to elected governments, these committees are versity, creating coordinating mechanisms, and
usually created by donors and NGOs, tend to be using participatory methods are crucial to de-
well funded, and are often not elected. Although centralization (105). But pluralist methods,
there is a great variety of groups, those involved such as collaboration, represent more than just
in natural resource management are often sub- participation (106) because they are aimed at
ject to top-down control, are upwardly account- understanding—and acknowledging the legiti-
able, and may simply co-opt civil society rather macy of—differences in culture, identity, law,
than foment real participation in decisions livelihoods, institutions, values, and interests
(16). in order to build a basis for cooperation; they
In Cameroon, for example, NGOs have are processes that can ensure the participation
played a key role in establishing community of marginalized groups but need checks and
forests because of the exhorbitant technical balances and accountability measures to chal-
needs, time, and funding required. Rather than lenge existing power structures (11). What re-
seeking cooperation with communities, how- search to date makes clear, however, is that the
ever, these organizations have disregarded tra- rhetoric of promoting civil society or building
ditional forms of organization or logics of social capital in the formation of stakeholder
power and set up new management committees groups or committees may be only just that;
that do not represent their villages, although underlying motivations may be quite different
they “speak the official language,” and have of- (102).
ten misappropriated funds (100). Polycentric governance systems refer to the
User groups may actually undermine local coexistence of multiple centers of decision mak-
government by usurping functions, being bet- ing that operate within a general set of rules
ter funded, and creating confusion with regard but are formally independent of each other (10).
to jurisdiction and authority (16), just as seen Small groups regulating the use of resources at
in the overlapping mandates of traditional and the most local level possible take best advan-
local government authorities above. The pro- tage of the paramount need for high levels of
liferation of institutions has sometimes led to trust in the management of common-pool re-
conflict and competition rather than coopera- sources (9). Rules are better adapted, have lower
tion (47, 59, 101, 102). enforcement costs, and rely on disaggregated

and local knowledge. In these systems, certain long-term construction of democracy requires
rules are made locally; other governing author- residency-based citizenship.
ities exist at other scales with other sets of rules. Elected local governments, however, have
Polycentric and multilayered institutions are also often failed to bring about the expected
highly flexible and respond more adaptively be- democracy results of decentralization. One of
cause they provide a better fit between knowl- the most important problems is elite capture
edge, action, and local socio-ecological contexts (110) and the tendency to be accountable not to
(107). They may be most effective in spatially the electorate but to those who funded the cam-
heterogeneous contexts. Problems may arise paign or, with regard to forestry specifically, to
in coordination among these bodies, however, those who can provide greater tax income more
particularly where local policies have negative quickly (84). How political parties organize and
externalities for other jurisdictions (108). It is select candidates as well as electoral rules are
also unclear (a) how and by whom local rules likely to affect the downward accountability of
would be monitored to promote social inclu- elected officials. Although they are far from
sion as well as sustainability and (b) if and how perfect, elected governments at least have the
local enforcement failures and the movement mandate to be representative and downwardly
of products across jurisdictions would be mon- accountable, which is not necessarily true of
itored and controlled. Although, on the one other entities (24). Some researchers question
hand, this approach appears compatible with whether Western style democracy is necessarily
calls for central authorities to accept and sup- the right model for all (36).
port local knowledge and effective existing gov- These discussions regarding who should re-
ernance systems, on the other hand, it may ceive decentralized powers reflect a second,
be based on a limited conception of commu- fundamental underlying question: What needs
nity (see the following theme, below). (See also to be done to include—and, hence, improve
Reference 109.) the livelihoods of—groups that are tradition-
Ribot’s institutional choice framework ally marginalized or excluded? Without con-
places the questions of accountability and certed efforts to challenge existing power re-
representation at center stage in the choice lations, marginalized groups, such as women,
of entities receiving powers and argues that, the poor, and indigenous people, are likely to
pending systematic comparative research continue to be marginalized whether decision
that suggests otherwise, local governments making is decentralized to elected authorities
are the institutions “that should hold public or to stakeholder committees (111). Customary
powers in the local arena and with which authorities may be autocratic but, for local peo-
citizens and all local institutions can interact to ple, may still be preferable to elected authori-
coordinate and improve public accountability ties that look down on other racial and ethnic
and responsiveness” (8, 12, 13). Ribot uses groups.
concepts from literature on identity politics There is little question that deliberative fo-
and multiculturalism to argue that the recogni- rums of different kinds can lead to better recog-
tion of a particular institution “confers power nition of different points of view, greater nego-
and legitimacy, and cultivates identities and tiation of outcomes, and increased social capital
forms of belonging” (13). In other words, (11). If building social capital is a necessary part
traditional authorities continue to have le- of effective accountability and democracy, then
gitimacy in part because governments have grassroots participation and empowerment are
reinforced them through decentralization. also necessary. Accountability is not a static
For their part, pluralist processes without mechanism to be included in decentralization
clear mechanisms for representation, such as prescriptions but rather is constructed and per-
stakeholder committees, may be “a formula for formed among multiple actors in a dynamic
division and elite capture” (12). For Ribot, the process (112). Detailed comparative research is
226 Larson · Soto

needed to understand the kinds of institutions Forest-sector decentralizations may or may

that, on the one hand, undermine local elected not include significant shifts in property rights.
authority, create confusion and conflict, or are For example, they may only involve shifts in
centrally controlled, and, on the other hand, the location of some aspects of state regula-
lead to “virtuous circles” and greater democracy tion from central to local government offices.
and participation. At the same time, the specific It is also important to distinguish between lo-
nature of the institution chosen may not be the cal users and local governments, as in the sec-
deciding factor but rather the context and his- tion on who should receive powers, above.
tory of a particular place, such as existing struc- Decentralization may involve significant shifts
tures of power and inequity and the strength of in property rights to the latter but not to the
civil society and social movements. former; strengthening property rights of local
governments can weaken the property rights of
communities when they compete for the same

The Role of Property Rights resources (50, 98, 114). Tenure rights may also
There is substantial lack of clarity with re- come with conditionalities: In The Gambia,
gard to the role of property rights in decen- communities gained rights to state forests but
tralization. Contexts that involve very differ- only on the condition that they contribute their
ent rights configurations are often discussed labor to a rigorous set of management tasks,
in generic ways, yet the nature of prop- whereas donors maintain managerial control
erty rights may be central to outcomes (18). and obtain a cheap labor supply (51). Even when
Certainly the literature on property rights property rights recognize the customary rights
and natural resources in general has demon- of some local people, they may exclude oth-
strated that tenure relations—particularly those ers by failing to acknowledge their customary
pertaining to tenure security—shape incen- rights (115).
tive structures for sustainability. The right to The effects of changes in property rights, of
manage resources and to exclude outsiders is course, depend on the arrangements that ex-
essential (113). isted previously. For example, forests are pri-
Agrawal & Ostrom (18) argue that “decen- marily public owned in both Honduras and
tralization can be said to have occurred only Bolivia, and both governments have given in-
when governments devolve property rights creased forest management decision-making
over resources that conform to the collective power to municipal governments (26). But in
and constitutional choice levels,” rather than Honduras, small-scale agroforestry groups had
just operational level decisions, to local users. negotiated previously with the central author-
Collective choice decisions refer to defining the ity’s social forestry program, and increased mu-
operational rules, and constitutional choice de- nicipal control has sometimes resulted in a
cisions determine collective choice situations loss of rights (84, 116). In Bolivia, small-scale
(17). These are correlated with different types foresters were previously illegal and precari-
of property rights, on a continuum from the ous occupants of logging concession lands with
right to withdraw or use resources (opera- no rights of their own; they now have legal
tional), to the right to manage the resource, rights to land through municipal allocations
to exclude others, and to alienate resources or (26, 71). In addition, the effectiveness of local
rights (collective choice). Constitutional choice government in providing these formal prop-
decisions are those that determine who has the erty rights to local forest users was associated
authority for making these rules. In a study of with lower levels of uncontrolled deforestation
four cases in India and Nepal, the authors find (90).
that decentralization is limited when the right Forest property rights, in practice, are not
and capacity to make these higher-level deci- always the state’s to allocate (113), even if
sions are limited. the state is the de jure owner. State lands in

Indonesia were only the property of the When Is Local Better?

state on paper; hence, efforts to solve man-
There is a tendency in literature advocating nat-
agement problems through decentralization
ural resource decentralization and devolution
reforms, without directly addressing overlap-
to assume that local or community is necessar-
ping de facto property claims, only exacer-
ily better. It is not surprising that a primary in-
bated the political and ecological crisis (117).
terest in the inclusion of marginalized groups
There are many situations in which local people
and the promotion of democracy would priv-
have made decisions on the basis of customary
ilege local actors, but it is also important to
practices prior to state intervention. In Latin
recognize limitations. Discussions on this point
America in particular, indigenous movements
can be grouped around two main issues. One is
have demanded recognition of land and re-
the nature of community, the other pertains to
source rights that predate the state. Decentral-
outcomes.
ization policies that attempt to increase state

Although research and practice has re-
control may contribute to legal dualism or
peatedly demonstrated otherwise, the concept
overlapping authority, increasing insecurity and
of community in natural resource manage-
“desperate strategies” (59), such as serious de-
ment often assumes—or appears to assume—
forestation or a rush on land for cultivation
a small and stable spatial unit, homoge-
(115). Nevertheless, recognition of ancestral,
nous social structure, and shared norms (120).
customary, or other collective rights, such as
Project interventions in particular may require
through land titles, raises the issue of who
a blueprint that ignores complexity (121). Com-
should receive those rights in representation of
munity populations may be highly mobile, eco-
the community.
nomically and socially differentiated, and have
Even if decentralization results in an in-
different interests and values; they are likely to
crease in local property rights, this does not
be affected by numerous outside social, eco-
necessarily result in shifts in actual access to
nomic, and political forces and may be highly
natural resources and benefits (118). For ex-
conflictive (41, 120). A community may be well
ample, in Senegal, forests are owned by the
organized and have effective institutions for
state, and decentralization policies gave local
making decisions and resolving conflict, but
governments the right to decide who has ac-
in many cases, substantial institution building
cess to those forests, but these policies have not
could be required. Without attention to social
been able to operate in practice owing to the
equity and inclusion, initiatives such as commu-
interference of forest-sector bureaucrats (54).
nity forestry may be hijacked by an internal elite
In Nicaragua, indigenous peoples won owner-
(122). (The term community can also be used
ship rights to their historic lands and natural re-
in different ways and does not necessarily refer
sources, but forest regulations are so complex,
to a community of place. It may also refer to
expensive, and time consuming that it is virtu-
a group organized around a particular interest,
ally impossible for communities to participate
such as forest management.)
in logging without significant donor support
In what Brown & Purcell call “the local
(118a). Sikor & Nguyen (119) use endowments
trap” (123), proponents of local resource
to refer to shifts in access to land and forests
management also may assume that local man-
and entitlements to refer to shifts in access to
agement will have better outcomes for people
benefits. They find that some people receiv-
and forests, but this, of course, is not always
ing resource rights through devolution benefit
true. In particular, there may be trade-offs
more than others because political factors af-
between income generation and sustainability.
fect the ability to take advantage of new rights
A comparison of the management of woodlots
to endowments, and economic factors impede
in Ethiopia at four different scales (household,
turning new endowments into entitlements
subvillage, village, and group of villages)
(119).
228 Larson · Soto

demonstrated that smaller scales were better general, the conception of science and public
for empowerment and income generation, administration as neutral endeavors has been
whereas management by groups of villages shifting toward their recognition as value-laden
under local government administrations were practices (125), and political decisions, such as
better for sustainability (20). In the interest of who has which access rights, continue to be sep-
income and livelihoods, local people may prefer arate from more technical decisions (126).
the conversion of forest to other uses over When decentralization or devolution poli-
conservation; hence, decentralized forest man- cies involve working directly with communi-
agement policies require financial incentives, ties, as under Joint Forest Management in
among other things, to promote conservation India, the foresters’ role has shifted from pro-
(19). Greater attention should be paid to the tecting the forests from local people to work-
factors that make resource users willing and able ing with those same people to manage forests
to expand their role, use resources wisely and (127). Management models, such as for conser-
sustainably, and distribute benefits equitably vation, are based on Western science and the
(113). Brown & Purcell argue that a theoretical creation and maintenance of manageable land-
approach to scale as socially constructed, scapes, whereas local knowledge as well as social
both fluid and fixed as well as fundamentally processes are often fluid and negotiated (21).
relational, is needed to counteract the tendency Hence, communities are “viewed as tools for,
to romanticize local processes (123). or ‘commodities’ of, conservation rather than
as active knowing agents” (21). Forest manage-
ment is a technological practice both in terms
Experts and Local Knowledge of the scientific procedures it mandates but also
If decentralization and devolution suggest a as a technology of power as it defines the so-
greater role for local people in resource man- cial routines necessary for implementation (22).
agement, the implication is that scientists and Rather than accepting that other kinds of in-
expert knowledge should not be the only source formation could be valuable for decision mak-
of information and criteria for decision making, government scientists may assume that the
ing. Agrawal (124) argues that the dichotomy principle task at hand is to train local govern-
between indigenous and scientific knowledge is ments and communities in the foresters’ tech-
entirely artificial and that a productive dialogue nical ways (47). Hence, contests over resources
would result from recognizing similarities. But are also struggles to reorganize government
democratizing science is not a simple task. As (22), and a transformation of science implies a
Sivaramakrishnan writes, “How can something shift in power relations.
quintessentially scientific escape the tyranny of
hierarchies and shrinking circles of expertise to
become one with popular practice?” (22). CONCEPTUAL ISSUES:
Forestry office personnel are rarely on the IS DECENTRALIZATION
front lines in support of decentralization. They TRANSFORMATIVE?
often see local government as “too political,” It is clear from the many experiences reviewed
in reference to their interest in pleasing con- in the literature that the goals behind decen-
stituents (or possibly wealthy supporters such tralizations are highly varied. Particularly strik-
as loggers) rather than doing what is correct ing is the “unprecedented convergence between
in technical (or perhaps legal) terms. Inter- the neo-liberal right and the post-Marxist left,
views with state forest administration foresters where both emphasize local civil society and
in Nicaragua found, repeatedly, a willingness give it priority over inefficient and centralized
to work with municipal governments if (and states” (22a). This convergence around decen-
only if ) they could work with technical per- tralization and local participation suggests that
sonnel (A.M. Larson, unpublished data). But in these terms gloss over important underlying

conceptual issues. If, as we have seen, decentral- one of the most important ways in which cit-
ization is often not pro-poor, then what kind of izens have won new tenure rights to forests
development and democracy is it promoting? is through grassroots movements demanding
One of the central issues is the extent to land rights—such as those for indigenous and
which decentralization is seen as reinforcing or traditional communities—rather than specifi-
challenging existing power relations. Clearly, in cally through decentralization or forestry poli-
practice, it does not often result in transforma- cies (69), which tend to be more technocratic. In
tions in the underlying structures of inequity India, Baumann & Farrington (64) found that
and exclusion (22a, 22b, 64). Power-sharing ar- the basic structure of dominant states’ rights
rangements may be ways to increase central le- to forests is not open to political negotiation,
gitimacy and domination, off-load burdensome thus limiting grassroots demands. Rather, pow-
tasks, and/or share power with a select few, but erful centralizing forces as well as rigid and
without challenging local power relations (128). inequitable local social structures impede
However, the failure to implement transforma- meaningful transfers of access and powers to the
tive decentralization is not the only difference rural poor, whether through Joint Forest Man-
between theory and practice. Both conserva- agement (resource access) or by the strength-
tive and progressive forces are targeting local ening of local government through Panchayat
citizens through the same means but with Raj institutions (political access). Nevertheless,
apparently different intentions. Conceptions these institutions offer windows of opportunity
of development, democracy, participation, and for change, although, in the authors’ estima-
citizenship shape the goals, strategies, and tion, they are still unlikely to bring about a
priorities associated with decentralization. fundamental change in the distribution of rights
As part of a good governance agenda, decen- and resources (64).
tralization is primarily promoted as a “techno- The simple technocratic opening of new
cratic means of ‘reducing’ or ‘smartening’ the spaces for participation may, however, open
central state, rather than as a political project channels for the energies of popular movements
aimed at transforming state legitimacy and or social organizations that could be transfor-
forging a new contract between citizens and the mative, at least under some circumstances. Us-
local state” (22b). Technocratic decentraliza- ing the example of the Indian state of Himachal
tion is primarily aimed at increasing efficiency Pradesh, Chhatre (112) argues that the suc-
and building transparency and institutional cess of decentralization depends on the degree
stability as essential governance conditions for of articulation among local political participa-
the promotion of private investment (69, 129). tion, political parties, and electoral systems (or
Only a few decentralizations have “achieved “political articulation,” which affects the abil-
both greater participation of and social jus- ity of citizens to harness higher-level elected
tice for” groups that have been traditionally bodies to make local governments accountable).
marginalized (22b). These experiences not only Thanks to this articulated context, a long pro-
ensured participation but also were directly cess of protest against an unwanted ecodevel-
linked to redistributive policies with pro-poor opment project resulted in significant changes
outcomes (22b). Redistribution thus refers in the project and “increasingly representative
both to political power and to resource access, and downwardly accountable local governance
and fundamental change appears unlikely to institutions” (112). But far more needs to be
occur without both. understood about such processes in different
Resource access can refer to budget allo- contexts. In Brazil, for example, the articula-
cations, such as through participatory plan- tion between civil society movements and the
ning exercises, or to property rights associ- Workers Party (PT) helped strengthen democ-
ated with natural resources. A study of forestry racy while they were in the opposition but re-
decentralizations in Latin America found that inforced “centralization and . . . neo-corporatist
230 Larson · Soto

clientelist practices” after the PT won the plemented in ways compatible with fulfilling
elections (102). this democratic potential. The results have been
Hickey & Mohan (22b) argue that access largely disappointing. Myriad forest and other
to political power through participation pro- resource policies, undertaken in the name of de-
cesses can be transformative under four condi- centralization, have rarely resulted in pro-poor
tions. First, participation is part of a broader outcomes or shifts in power relations that chal-
project that is both political and radical, challenge underlying structures of marginalization
lenging existing power relations rather than and inequity.
prioritizing efficient service delivery. Second, Decentralization is one of many policies be-
participation engages with underlying pro- ing implemented at any particular time by cen-
cesses of development and patterns of domi- tral governments and is one of many banners
nation and subordination, rather than just with that local populations, or local governments,
development projects. Third, the priority is not may raise in the name of demands. It cannot be
just to involve people in the political process, understood separately from these other policies
but “to transform and democratize the political and demands, and as such, it has become an inte-
process” itself. Finally, processes for the accu- gral part of debates and discourse on democracy
mulation of political and economic power are and governance in numerous countries. Nev-
structurally separate. ertheless, at least without an executive man-
Because they are important both for date to promote democratic decentralization,
livelihoods and for income, natural resources natural resource institutes, which are mainly
highlight the transformative potential of concerned with instrumental objectives, have
decentralization. As sources of income, often little incentive to concern themselves with these
government owned and regulated, they also broader and more long-term, procedural goals.
highlight the importance of grassroots demand Hence, such policies are most often aimed at
to bring about more fundamental changes political expediency and/or improving central
in resource rights and access. This reality control over resources, such as forests. Decen-
underlines the importance of collective action tralization proponents must consider the po-
and improving the capacity to make demands, litical and economic incentives for central au-
especially of marginalized groups, if decen- thorities to transfer powers and resources away
tralization is to promote the transformation of from themselves and the political and economic
underlying structures of inequity. incentives of local authorities to take on addi-
tional powers in a responsible way.
There is little reason to believe the situ-
CONCLUSIONS ation is very different with regard to other
This chapter has reviewed literature discussing natural resources, although the specific tenure
the theory and experience of natural resource relations, resource values, and conflicts of
decentralization with a primary emphasis on interest may vary in each case, as well as the
forests in developing countries. Although de- mechanisms by which local populations gain
centralization formally refers to transfers be- access to benefits. High-value nonrenewable
tween levels of government, it has little mean- subsoil resources, such as important minerals
ing without taking into account the effect on and petroleum, are almost always centrally
and role of local populations. Democratic de- owned and managed and are rarely even
centralization is purported to have the goal and considered for decentralization, although local
potential of promoting democracy and partici- communities may receive compensation for
pation, as well as efficiency, but in the natural exploration or exploitation on their lands.
resource sector, it has often been very poorly Water resource decentralization is more
implemented—if at all—and in response to a complex than forest decentralization for a
set of confused priorities. It has rarely been im- variety of reasons, including its direct, daily

importance to livelihoods as well as the interests integral association with crucial issues of
of corporate users, such as for irrigated agricul- democracy, development, and so on, future re-
ture; the distinction between the resource itself search could go in a number of directions. The
and service provision; and its fluidity through recommendations here focus on research in the
space. Though the central issues raised here interest of a transformative decentralization
are also relevant to water resources, research that would improve livelihoods and increase
on water decentralization may contribute addi- political participation specifically for marginal-
tional insights and lessons for natural resource ized groups. Greater attention should be paid
decentralization. to understanding how natural resource decen-
Decentralization has a multifaceted theoret- tralization can generate effective spaces for
ical foundation. As stated in the introduction, participation—for women, indigenous people,
natural resource decentralization is located at and other marginalized groups—in a context
the intersection between good governance and of unequal power relations, with detailed
democracy, development and poverty allevi- descriptions of experiences that lead to greater
ation, common property, community-based meaningful participation and to livelihood
resource management, and local resource improvements. This includes understanding
rights. It is unreasonable to believe that a single the relationship between access to political
policy or process such as decentralization spaces for decision making and access to
could capture or embody such a complexity natural resources. It also means analyzing how
of concepts and issues. Yet, as an idea and an to promote pluralism and participation without
ideal, decentralization cannot be separated creating multiple decision-making centers,
from these, and the way in which it is designed which would promote insecurity and open
reflects these underlying conceptions. Greater access. Detailed comparative research is needed
attention to who receives decentralized pow- specifically to understand the kinds of institu-
ers, the role of property rights, the notion of tions that undermine local elected authority,
community or local, and the meeting of expert that create confusion and conflict, and that are
and local knowledge provides insights into centrally controlled, as well as the kind that
key issues and contradictions. Fundamental lead to virtuous circles and greater democracy.
differences in conceptions of democracy, par- In-depth comparison among different natural
ticipation, and development shape priorities resources could also be useful for teasing out
and strategies, with regard to the redistribution differences and further developing common
of access to political power and resources that lessons. Also useful would be studies that ex-
is implied by decentralization. plicitly analyze the conceptions of democracy,
Given the pervasiveness of decentralization development, participation, and citizenship
discourse and practice today, as well as its held by decentralization’s many proponents.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Natural resource decentralization is located at the intersection of literature on good
governance and democracy, development and poverty alleviation, common property,
community-based resource management, and local resource rights.
2. In practice, central government personnel are often reluctant to redistribute power and
resources and often find ways to maintain control.
232 Larson · Soto

3. Local governments, whether or not they are representative or accountable, often have
little motivation to take on forest management responsibilities but will respond in the
interest of potential political and/or financial benefits.
4. Decentralizations are more likely to have positive social effects when they seek to em-
power local people and to have negative effects when they extend state control over local
people, and there may be trade-offs between social and environmental effects.
5. The choice of institutions receiving powers in the local arena is often based on political
expediency without consideration of long-term implications, but even in the long-term
interest of promoting democracy, theorists have a variety of different conceptions in this
regard.
6. Shifts in property rights associated with decentralization should promote increased tenure
security for local resource users, and as such, policy makers should pay close attention to
the configuration of previously existing (legal, customary, and de facto) rights.
7. Both conservative and progressive forces support decentralization but with different sets
of goals, strategies, and priorities, which are based on different conceptions of democracy,
development, participation, and citizenship.
8. Redistribution associated with decentralization should include political power and access
to resources that improve livelihoods; hence, natural resource decentralizations have a
high potential to be transformative.
FUTURE ISSUES
1. More detailed comparative research should be pursued on who receives powers in the
local arena and with what effect.
2. Detailed descriptions are needed of the experiences that lead to greater participation
and livelihood improvements for marginalized groups, such as women and indigenous
people.
3. Detailed comparative research should be undertaken to understand the kinds of insti-
tutions that undermine locally elected authority, that create confusion and conflict, and
that are centrally controlled, as well as the kinds that lead to virtuous circles and greater
democracy and participation.
4. We need to learn how to promote pluralism, meaningful participation, and citizenship
without creating multiple decision-making centers, which promote insecurity and open
access.
5. Closer attention should be paid to shifts in property rights in studies of decentralization.
6. Conceptions of democracy, participation, citizenship and development behind decen-
tralization should be explored.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this
review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It would be impossible to thank all of the many people who have contributed to our understanding
of natural resource decentralization. Special thanks go to Jesse Ribot for providing comments on
this chapter, for invitations to various workshops over the years, and for not tiring of our ongoing
debates; to the participants of the Bali workshop on Institutional Choice; to Arun Agrawal for
suggesting key readings for this review; to the Center for International Forestry Research for
supporting this research over the years; and to the community foresters and municipal government
and forest service personnel in Nicaragua and Guatemala who have contributed substantially to
the practical grounding of theory. We also gratefully acknowledge two anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments on the previous draft.
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Annual Review of
Environment
and Resources
Contents Volume 33, 2008

Preface p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p pv
Who Should Read This Series? p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p pvi
I. Earth’s Life Support Systems
Climate Modeling
Leo J. Donner and William G. Large p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Global Carbon Emissions in the Coming Decades: The Case of China
Mark D. Levine and Nathaniel T. Aden p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p19
Restoration Ecology: Interventionist Approaches for Restoring and
Maintaining Ecosystem Function in the Face of Rapid
Environmental Change
Richard J. Hobbs and Viki A. Cramer p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p39
II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

Advanced Passenger Transport Technologies
Daniel Sperling and Deborah Gordon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p63
Droughts
Giorgos Kallis p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p85
Sanitation for Unserved Populations: Technologies, Implementation
Challenges, and Opportunities
Kara L. Nelson and Ashley Murray p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 119
Forage Fish: From Ecosystems to Markets
Jacqueline Alder, Brooke Campbell, Vasiliki Karpouzi, Kristin Kaschner,
and Daniel Pauly p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 153
Urban Environments: Issues on the Peri-Urban Fringe
David Simon p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 167
Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests and Forestry
Graeme Auld, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, and Constance L. McDermott p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 187
vii
AR357-FM ARI 22 September 2008 22:50
III. Management, Guidance, and Governance of Resources and Environment

Decentralization of Natural Resource Governance Regimes
Anne M. Larson and Fernanda Soto p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 213
Enabling Sustainable Production-Consumption Systems
Louis Lebel and Sylvia Lorek p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 241
Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, Moving Forward
Frank Biermann and Philipp Pattberg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 277
Land-Change Science and Political Ecology: Similarities, Differences,
and Implications for Sustainability Science
B.L. Turner II and Paul Robbins p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 295

Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis
Giles Atkinson and Susana Mourato p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 317
A New Look at Global Forest Histories of Land Clearing
Michael Williams p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 345
Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System:
Contributions of Remote Sensing
Ruth DeFries p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 369
A Rough Guide to Environmental Art
John E. Thornes p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 391
The New Corporate Social Responsibility
Graeme Auld, Steven Bernstein, and Benjamin Cashore p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 413
IV. Integrative Themes

Environmental Issues in Russia
Laura A. Henry and Vladimir Douhovnikoff p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 437
The Environmental Reach of Asia
James N. Galloway, Frank J. Dentener, Elina Marmer, Zucong Cai,
Yash P. Abrol, V.K. Dadhwal, and A. Vel Murugan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 461
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 24–33 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 483

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 24–33 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 487
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Environment and Resources articles may
be found at http://environ.annualreviews.org
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ANRV357-EG33-10 ARI 15 September 2008 16:9

• Top cited articles

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2008. 33:213–39 Key Words

that management and controls are more

has made it clear that local governance struc-

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www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 215

216 Larson · Soto

to elected authorities and is needed, as well, and practice.

www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 217

What Is Decentralized: Design ure rather than recognizing that devolution is

chiefs has been subject to debate but has not

218 Larson · Soto

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www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 221

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This question reﬂects a principal underlying system referred to as decentralized despotism

posts, there is no systematic way to guarantee

224 Larson · Soto

www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 225

226 Larson · Soto

needed to understand the kinds of institutions Forest-sector decentralizations may or may

communities when they compete for the same

www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 227

Indonesia were only the property of the When Is Local Better?

ization policies that attempt to increase state

228 Larson · Soto

www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 229

230 Larson · Soto

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232 Larson · Soto

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Ser. 7, World Resour. Inst., Washington, DC

www.annualreviews.org • Natural Resource Decentralization 239

Contents Volume 33, 2008

II. Human Use of Environment and Resources

III. Management, Guidance, and Governance of Resources and Environment

B.L. Turner II and Paul Robbins p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 295

IV. Integrative Themes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 24–33 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 483

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