Bar Matter No.

914, October 1, 1999 Issue:

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs. Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:  Rulings:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, 1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship
was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made
resided in the Philippines within 3 years from  "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old.
Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason
application to take the 1998 Bar Examination. why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an
the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship: affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil
1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified registry.
accountant; Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
scheduled on May 5, 1999. Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
oath. 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a comment on Ching's petition "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
for admission to the Philippine Bar. Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition
In his report: (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
person whose mother is a Filipino citizen" was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
jurisprudence. alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two
assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
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existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23
January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or
any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR
161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only
the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on
the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie
of the President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may
be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis
– had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering
the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1)
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on
20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time
of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Moy Ya Lim Yao Vs Commissioner Of Immigration
GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 [Naturalization - Qualification and Disqualification;
CA 473]
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage of the
alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine
citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the qualifications required for
applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that she possesses none of
the disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully
naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications
enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
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Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal  of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on
the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship
rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was
naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative.
When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a
natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On
the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to
prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces
States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
3

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of
the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31,
1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens.  It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship.  That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with.  The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.  The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.  No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.  In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
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petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national.  A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consti II case digest: TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of
votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on
May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006,
she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and
ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation
as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the
second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September
27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she
filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
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(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she
filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath.

The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid
due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering
the act of Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC
(AE).