1.University of the Philippines v.

Dizon, 679 SCRA 54 (2012)

Facts:

University of the Philippines entered into a business contract with Stern Builders Corporation for
theconstruction of the extension building and the renovation of College of Arts and Sciences BUilding in
UP Los Banos. UP failed to submit the third billing worth Php. 237,729.47 stated in the contract with
Stern Builders due to disallowance by COA. Despite the lifting of the disallowance, UP failed to pay the
billing. As a result, Stern BUilders sued UP for the unpaid billing and to recover various damages.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Stern Builders. Stern Builders
then sought the release of the garnished funds in which the RTC granted the motion to release the
garnished funds. UP assails the motion, hence the case was brought to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.

Ruling:

Yes. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of
the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendere against UP in a suit to which
it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. As the court stated in Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union v. Firme: “ Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”

2.Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693 (1993)

Facts:

The Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract on April 1, 1989 for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said entity. On September 13, 1990, several guards
of Sultan Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,non-payment of 13 th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay as well as damages against the DA
and Sultan Security Agency.

Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner and Sultan Security Agency liable for the
money claims. Petitioner did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. A
writ of execution was commanding the City Sherrif to enforce and execute the judgment was issued. DA
assails the writ, pointing out that seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner’s
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

Issue:

Whether the Department of Agriculture, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-
suability of the State.

Ruling:

No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be sued. Section 3,
Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its consent." This
principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice Holmes, a
sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends."

However, this privilege is not absolute; with its consent, the State can be sued. The Court clarifies that
there are two kinds of consent: (1) express consent, which may be made either through a general
law or a special law; and (2) implied consent, which is conceded when the State either
commences litigation or enters into a contract.

But entering into a contract does not automatically mean the State can be sued. Once again, the Court
clarifies that contracts or agreements that constitute sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
cannot be the subject of any lawsuit, while private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionisis)
can be made the subject of litigation.

3. Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)

Facts:

USS Guardian, a warship belonging to the US, with permission from the government entered the
territorial waters of the Philippines. While in Sulu Sea, the warship ran aground the South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs is considered a natural park of the Philippines. Petitioners filed a Writ of Kalikasan
against US respondents claiming that the grounding, salvaging and post salvaging of the US warship
cause and continue to cause environmental damage to the nearby provinces of the Philippines, which
events violate their rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Issue:

Whether the Supreme Court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over the US respondents.

Ruling:

No. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law. Under the maxim - in parem, non habet imperium- that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A state’s immunity from suit
also extends to the head of state or his representatives and even foreign agents acting in his
official capacity is included. This is because suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effectsuing the state itself.

The traditional rule is that a State is exempt from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former’s consent or waiver. This rule has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts ( Jure Imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts ( Jure
Gestionis ). Under this restrictive rule, State immunity is only applicable to Jure Imperii.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Thus, the principle of State
immunity bars the excecise of jurisdiction of the Supreme COurt over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.

4. JUSMAG Philippines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108813, Dec. 15, 1994

Facts:

Florento Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel
(SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-
Phils). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed, he held the position of illustrator
2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils. Filipino Civilian Employees Association, a labor org. duly
registered with DOLE.

His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Sacramento filed a complaint
with DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He
asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit. The Labor
Arbiter in an Order, dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.

Sacramento appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that the
petitioner had lost his right not to be sued because the principle of estoppel JUSMAG failed to refute
the existence of employer- employee relationship Jusmag has waived its right to immunity from suit
when it hired the services to private respondent. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether JUSMAG has immunity from suit.

Ruling:
Yes, JUSMAG has immunity from suit. When JUSMAG took the services of the private respondent, it
was performing a governmental function in behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military
Assistance Agreement between the Phils. and the US. JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group
and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on air force, army and naval matters.
A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver
or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

The case also anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state
cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts.

5. DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, February 30, 2013

Facts:

AO No. 27 series of 1998 was issued by then DOH which set the guidelines and procedure for
accreditation of government suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public,
such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual review.
It was later amended by AO 10 series of 2000 which reduced the accreditation period to two years.
On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of
adverse findings regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations
committed by them during their accreditation.

In line with this, DOH former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon invited representatives of 24
accredited drug companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting
which handed them copies of Report on Violative Products issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD). Specifically, PPI’s products were included in BFAD`s Report which were being sold to the public
but unfit for human consumption.

The 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their
respective explanations on the adverse findings. Instead of submitting its written explanation within the
10-day period as required, PPI belatedly sent a letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon on November
13, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to
prepare the corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor
did it seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on November 6, 2000, much
less offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.
In a letter-reply, Undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s letter and therein informed PPI that,
effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and
Memorandum No. 171-C.

PPI through counsel questioned the suspension of its accreditation as without the benefit of notice and
hearing, in violation of its right to substantive and administrative due process. PPI filed a Complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 68200, seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative
issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and
DOH Undersecretary Galon.

Issue:

Whether or not Civil Case No. 68200 should be dismissed for being a suit against the State.

Rulings:

YES, Civil Case No. 68200 should be dismissed for being a suit against the State.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or
general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation.”

In this case, the DOH, being an “unincorporated agency of the government” can validly invoke the
defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued.
Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental character.
The Complaint against them should likewise be dismissed for being a suit against the state which
absolutely did not give its consent to be sued. Based on the foregoing considerations, and regardless of
the merits of PPI’s case, this case deserves a dismissal.
6. Garcia v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-20213, January 31, 1996
Facts:

Appellant Mariano Garcia, suffered injuries which caused him to lose his eyesight rendering him
permanently disabled in his military training. His application for disability benefits was disallowed by the
Adjutant General’s Office. Garcia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinanto
collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and Adjutant General of the AFP, the Chairman of the
Philippine Veterans Board, and the Adjutant General. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court, and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitation.

Issue:

Whether the Court of First Instance has no Jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim
against the government.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court already held that a claim for the recovery of money against the government
should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued without
its consent.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been
exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should be entertained if superior
administrative officers could grant relief is squarely applicable to the present case.

7. THE HOLY SEE vs. ROSARIO G.R. 101949 Dec 1 1994

Facts:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B
and 5-D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to
Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned
his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate the
lots sold to private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters occurred. Complicating the relations of the parties was the
sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Private
respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific
performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit.

Ruling:

YES, the Holy See is immune from suit. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in
the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In Article
31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in
the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes
of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should
immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

8. Republic V. Purisima G.R. L-36084 Aug 31, 1977

Facts:

The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge
Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated
doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It
was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil
suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

Issue:

Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?

Ruling:

NO. The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any
agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was
misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within
the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from
the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

9. Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists (KMP), led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by
landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments; There was a marchers-police confrontation
which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded.

As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose
of investigating. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the
deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic
and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issue:

Whether the case qualifies as a suit against the State with its consent.

Ruling:

The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation
of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for
a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled
rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority,
hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

10. Callado VS. IRRI GR 106483 May 22, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).
On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer,
explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the
latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990. Petitioner then filed a complaint
before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter,
through counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. However,
the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the defense of
immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

Issue:

Whether IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship.

Ruling:

No, IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Immunity
from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear.
Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will
not waive its diplomatic immunity.

11. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping GR L-6060 SEPTEMBER 30, 1954

Facts:
Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the
Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by the government, following the original purchaser,
Fernando Froilan’s, default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said
vessel. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and
paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat
charter contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation. The Cabinet resolved to
restore Froilan to his right sunder the original contract of sale on condition that he shall pay a sum of
money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due,
and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. Pan Oriental
protested to this restoration of Froilan’s right sunder the contract of sale, for the reason that when the
vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the
property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan paid the
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed
an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner
of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for
the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. II.

Issue:

Whether the Republic of the Philippines is immune from suit.

Ruling:

No, because the moment when the government filed its complaint in intervention which in effect waived
its right of non-suability. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the

12. Lim VS. Brownell GR L-8587, March 24, 1960

Facts:

The property in dispute consists of 4 parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. The lands were, after the last
world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the US to be registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, a national of an enemy country, Japan. On March 14, 1946 the Alien Property Custodian
issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, as
amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots - Lots No. 1 and 2.On July 6, 1948,
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator under the authority of the same statute issued a
supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself the title to the remaining lots - Lots No. 3 and 4.On
November 13, 1950 the claimant Benito E. Lim, as a administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia
Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The complaint was later
amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

Issues:

Whether Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) can be sued.

Ruling:
No suit or claim for the return of said proper ties pursuant to Section 9 or 32 (a ) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from the date of vesting, the “later” date and the last on
which suit could be brought. A condition precedent to a suit for the return of property vested under
Trading with the Enemy Act is that it should be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or within two years
from the date of vesting, whichever is later, but in computing the two years, the period during which
there was pending a suitor claim for the return of the property of the Act shall be excluded. The court
states that in view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar as it dismisses the complaint with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the Attorney General of the Unite d States
and the Republic of the Philippines, is affirmed, but revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with
respect to Lots 3 and 4, as to which the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.

13. US vs GUINTO GR 76607 Feb 26, 1990

Facts:

Private respondents sued several officers of the US Air force regarding a bidding for barbering services
contract. Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C Tanglao and Pablo C Del Pilar were among the bidders
however Ramon Dizon won the bidding.

The respondents want to cancel the award to Ramon Dizon ( the bid winner) because they claimed that
Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the initiation to bid and they wish to conduct a
rebidding.

Issue:

Whether the defendants were immune with suit.

Ruling:

Yes, defendants were immune from suit. The barbershop, subject of the bidding awarded were
commercial enterprise , operated by private person. Therefore they are not agencies of the US Armed
Forces nor part of their facilities. Although the barbershop provide service to military , they were for a
fee. State immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioner for the fact that they entered into a contract with
private party, commertial in nature.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assist jurisdiction over one another.

The doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials the states for act allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgement against such official will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act of satisfy the same. The suit must be regarded against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded.

14. US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985

Facts:

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in
May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de
Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company
received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the
requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify
to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs,
and that the projects were awarded to third parties. The company sued the US and its officers in the US
Navy who were responsible for rejecting their services to order the defendants in allowing the company
to perform the work for the projects, and in the event that specific performance was no longer possible,
to order the defendants to pay the damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on
the projects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to
this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint. Subsequently a motion to
dismiss the complaint was filed by the defendants, who included an opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved
twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issues:
1. Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
to be able to invoke state immunity. 
2. Whether US is suable.
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense
of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 

2.The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a
contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level
of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

3.The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. In that case the plaintiffs leased three
apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs
sued to recover possession of the premises on the
ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated. The Court decided that the “US Government has not, given
its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is
not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but
it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent,
which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.” o In Syquia, the United
States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the US was not
deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.

15. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991

Facts:

The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was
denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,restitution and damages," and was avowedly
filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with
summons, Tantoco, Jr. And Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out
Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an
opposition thereto,and the movants, a reply to the opposition.

Tantoco and Santiago then presented a"motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court" of which the PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with
the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan
denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan apleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as
a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents respectively. PCGG
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the
Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing,the
Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.

Issues:

1. Whether PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT INACCORDANCE

WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
2. Whether SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF
SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THEPOSSESSION OF PCGG.

Ruling:

1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule,be sued without its
consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its
immunity from suit, descending to the levelof an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.

2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and
inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the
movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments
thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents.

16. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, Nov. 11, 1993

Facts:

The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
respective premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and
overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
implement and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter,
the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for
assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC
has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other
hand, argue that the petitioner has waived its immunity from suit when they entered into a service
contract with Sultan Security Agency. 

Issues:

Whether the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. 

Ruling: 

No. The Doctrine of non-suability of the State does not apply. The State may be sued if the consent is
given. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.” in this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims.

17. Malang v. PNRC, G.R. No. L – 49930, August 2, 1985

Facts:

This case is about the immunity of Philippine National Rails. On October 30, 1977, Francisco Malong
and Rosalina Aquino Malong filled a complaint for their son a passenger, he have fell from PNR train
while it was b/n Tarlac and Capas.The accident happen because Jaime sit near the Coach of the door of
train Due to All Saints Day was, approach the train was overloaded with baggage and passengers . The
Malong spouses wishes to compense the damages by paying them R 136, 370.The Motion , of Solicitor
General in the trial court dismissed the complaint: For a reason that the PUR is government
instrumentiality, the action was a suit against the State ( Sec. 16, Art XV of the Constitution )The
Magalong spouses appealed through pursuant to RA 5440. ( Law amended ). It is under the Office of the
President of the Philippines RA 6366 provides :

Section 1 -a, State of policy. The PNR, being a factor for socio – economic development
and growth shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the gov’t and as such shall
remain in and under gov’t ownership during its corporate existence …

The suit against the State agencies is not a suit against the state.

Issue:

Whether the PNR is immune from the suit of the Malang spouses.

Ruling:

No, it would be unjust to the heirs of the victim cause by the negligence of PNR employees. The suit to
be filed is not against the state.

18. Air Transportation Office vs. SPS David GR. No 159402, February 23, 2011

Facts:

The respondents are Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, discovered that their land 985 square meters
was being part of runway and shoulder of the Loakan Airport operated by Air Transportation Office. The
respondents demand P778,150.00 for the compensation of their land. ATO and respondents agreed on
that deed of Sales but ATO failed to pay despite of verbal and written demands.

Issue:

Whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

Ruling:

Yes, it is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution said:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. 

19. Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. V. Board of Liquidators, G.R. No. 84992, Dec.
15, 1989

Facts:

On July 30, 1982, PHILROCK filed in the RTC, a complaint against the Board of Liquidators for Specific
Performance or Revaluation with Damages for the reasons: (a) replacement of the defective rock
pulverizing machinery which it purchased from REPACOM or in the alternative, to refund the value of the
defective rock pulverizing machinery at 31 % of its contract price; (b) refund of actual damages of P
5,000 per month for losses it allegedly incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the plant,
(c) P 4,000 per day as unrealized profits due to exemplary damages and (d)attorney fees of P 50,000,
including the expenses and costs of the suit.

In a counterclaim, the Board of Liquidators also alleged that: (A) after complete delivery of the
machinery, no demand was made regarding the defect; (B) the machinery and equipment were
inspected; (C) the defect was attributed to PHILROCK's improper use of the machinery; (E) PHILROCK
is now in estoppel and guilty of laches for not calling REPACOM's attention to the alleged defects within
the equipment's warranty period; (F) the Board demanded payment by PHILROCK of the expenses of
litigation, moral and exemplary damages and costs. But even after this claim, the court ruled in favour of
PHILROCK wherein the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal and an opposition to the "Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal" on the ground that the funds sought to be garnished by PHILROCK are
public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution. On May 19, 1987, RTC judge issued a Writ
of Execution. An order of Garnishment was served to PNB against the funds of REPACOM in the
account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy the judgment in favour of PHILROCK.

Issues:

Whether the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators, a government agency, in
the Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money judgment in favour of PHILROCK?

Ruling:

NO. The BOARD is a government agency under the direct supervision of the President as per EO 372,
wherein, it was tasked with a specific duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of the
defunct REPACOM and is not created for profit or to engage in business and the sale of machinery was
just part of its governmental functions od settling the afffairs of REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the PNB
are public funds exempt from garnishment. Furthermore, being an unincorporated government agency,
itt possesses no juridical personality, and suit directed against it,, is a suit against the principal which is
the State. The state enjoys immunity from the suit except when it conducts business thru a government
owned and controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency sete up primarily for business purposes.
Contention of PHILROCk is nnot tenable, for an executive order is not an appropriation law which must
only emanate from legislature and not from the chief executive.

20. Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

Facts:

Private respondent General Assemby of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verba contract of
lease in Rizal APrk by the NPDC (National Parks Development Committee) but the verbal contract
accommodation is unclear because there was no document or instrument involved. Thhus, the new
Chairman of the NPDC, Amado lansang sought to clean up Rizal Park ad terminate the said verbal
agreement with the general Assembly of the Blind and demanded that they vacate the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, Jose Iglesias(who is totally blind), allegedly to indicate
his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice. He then
filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against Lansang on the day of the supposed
eviction but it was DISMISSED by the RTC on the ground that it was actually directed against the state
which could not be sued withoit its consent. In additional, the RTC also ruled that GABI could not claim
damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since they were a mere accommodation
concessionaire.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from the liability for the
acts done without or in excess of his authority. They also observed during the trial that the eviction was
caused by significant incidents such as (a) after private respondent Iglesias extended monetary support
to striking workers of the NPDC, and (b) after Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26,
1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in the NPDC.

Issues:

Whether the respondents’ complaint against petitioner Lansang, Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit
against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

Ruling:

NO. The complaint is not against the state. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to
complaints filed against public offficials for the acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is
that the suit must be regarded as ONE against the STATE where satisfaction of the judgement against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act.
Thus, it can be inferred that Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal
capacity as it is evident from the complaint that HE was sued allegedly for having personal motives in
ordering the ejection of GABI from Rizal aprk. There was no evidence proving that there was an abuse
of authority.

21. Ministerio v. CFI G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971

Facts:

Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, as they sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging
that the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road without paying just compensation and
without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the
payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the
Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

In the answer filed by defendants, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P.
Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the
government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown.

**The ff paragraph is not included as facts of the case but Just an additional /supporting detail
on the assumption that Sir Consti might ask**
(Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are
the registered owners of the lot described in the Survey plan and more particularly described in Transfer
Certificate of Title containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927
took possession of the Lot and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal
Committee approved and fixed the price of Lot at P50.00 per square meter; That the lot is still in the
possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of Gorordo Avenue and that the
National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use.”)

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants are immune from the suit.

Ruling:

NO, defendants are not immune from the suit. Where the judgement in such a case would result not only
in the recovery of the possession of the property but also in a charge with financial liability tp the
government, then the suit should be regarded as ONE against the GOVERNMENT itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with the consent the said
government. It should also be noted that “In as much as the state authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts or government officials of officers are not acts of the State, and cases filed
against the officials by the person whose right have been violated by such acts, for the protection of their
rights, IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE within the rule od immunity of the State from the suit.

In addition, when government takes any property for public use, which condition is upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it must be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for it is
the court that proceeds and determine the compensation as woo which the petitioners are entitled.

22. CITY OF MANILA v. GENERO M. TEOTICO, GR No. L-23052, 1968-01-29

Facts:
On January 27, 1958, Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, waiting for a jeep he managed to hail a jeepney,that came along to a stop. As he stepped down
from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper
arm, the right leg and the upper lip, apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic... eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital,
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1 ,400.00.
Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint - which was, subsequently, amended
- for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and
chief of police. As a result of the... incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about ¥50.00 during his incapacity to
work.Hence, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he
was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the
sum of P2,000.00.The defense presented evidences that there are reports of a missing uncovered
catchbasin but as soon as they receive reports they are replacing the cover.They claimed that stealing of
iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court
resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City... by constructing them under the sidewalk
with concrete cement covers and openings on the sides of the gutter; and that these changes had been
undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available."
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the
City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00
Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the... province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act

1. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:

"SEC. 18. Legislative powers.- The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
"(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and
improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves,
piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and...
sprinkling of streets and public places; ... to provide for the inspection of, fix the license
fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and
other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in
and... under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to
provide for and regulate cross-walks, curbs, and gutters therein; ... to regulate traffic and
sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances
in the same and... punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction
and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts, and culverts; to prohibit and
regulate ball playing, kiteflying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy
persons using the streets and... public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to
regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and
locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all such vehicles,
cars, and locomotives; ... to provide for and... change the location, grade, and crossing of
railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such
provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any
part thereof, to provide suitable protection against... injury to persons or property, and to
construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracts, so
that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed."
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order
No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or
appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered... cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive
Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the
disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it... provides that "the construction,
maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under
the supervision of the Commissioner of
Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic
of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the... affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court, thereon are not subject to our review.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila.
It is so ordered.
Issues:
1. Whether the City of Manila is suable for the said incident

Ruling:
Yes, The City of Manila is held liable for the said incident as the Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 is not
applicable on this case but rather the Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines should govern.