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    ‘The False Promise of International Institutions John J. Mearsheimer International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), 5-49, Stable URL: http flinksjstor.orgsici?sici=0162-2889°% 28 199 42492F 199524%2919%3A3%ICS%IATFPOMESE2 0 CORSBL-C Incernationel Security is curently published by The MIT Press Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at flip: feworwjtor org/aboutterms.htmal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in par, that unless you fave obtained pcior permission, you may not dowaload an cnt isus of @ journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial uss. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bhupsferwer,jstor.orp/joumals/mitpress.htrl. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hup:therww stor orgy ‘Sun Mar 13 04:06:47 2005 The False Promise of | /9! |. Mearsheimer Intemational Institutions Since me cold wer ended, Western palieymakers have sought to creste security arrangements in Europe, as well as in ather regions of the globe, that are based on iaternational institutions in daing so, they explicily reject balancect-power politics 2s an orgenizing concept {or the post-Cold War world. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, “in # world where freedom, not tyeanmy, is on the march, the cjnical calculus of puze power politics simply does not compute, It is ikauited to « new era” Before akong office, Anthony Lake, the presen’: national security adviser, exiteized the Bush administration for viewing, the warld through a “lassie balance of power pris” whereas he and Mr. Clinton took 3. “nore ‘near Wileonian’ views"? This approach to iuernational politics ests on the belief that insitutions are 2 key rans of promoting world peace’ In paticalay, Wester policymakers claim that the Inahtutions that “served the West well” hefote Ue Soviet Usion colapsed rust be reshaped to encompass Eastern Europe as well? "There is no reason,” according to Secretary of Seate Warren Chelstapher, "why our institusions or our sapiratons shold Jol 7 Maartetmer fo profesor i he Police Scnce Depuoment at tke Untsiy of Coeg. “This are emerge fom a working paper writen for “The Charging Securty Frome and ‘Amercan Navanal Ines” 4 pre of he John M. Ci Irate for Stee Sle at ‘ated Unvwergiy [spat o Rover Art Benfet Frankel, Macks Fascher Cares Clase, Hein Goemona, Jeph Gre, Raber leis, Chrstprer Lage, Ene Lapes Rober: Pape Ailey ‘Teil, Bradley Thayer, van Te Stephen an Evers, Stephen Wt, aed eapecaly Michael Desch {er ther moet bela comments, " 1, Bll Cimon, “American Foreign Polley ard the Demoerate teal” Campa spect, Fabt Theatr, Mitwoukes Wisconsin, Oetker 1, 1982; Steven A Hanes, “Choe Sor Nasional Secure ‘dues Hose Loag-Awattd Chane to Led," New Yr Tes, January 3, 188. 2 the other promsteat ther ia tern policymaking sites the impotence of spreading emocacy at eapaliom sees he pla opperase aeeacracen the eget gs Net fight each oles Thur (Ne am wo bene he umber of le democracies in the trraions Sjses. Ths ne of atgament snot examined have. For cocciones,nlarnaional etaton re eveeorth refers tsp a8 tutions $5 Douglas Hurd, “A New System of Secu in Earope" Speech othe Diplomatic and Corr “eat ers" Assocation, Cordon, Je 2 192. Hurd, te ise Reign Sere sa ees Specs “We have ir Wetern Buope tn the soc a ¢ whole sv of tareauanal iets ‘hich have proved thei worth for beset of proemethe prohbese for which they vores, Inet tow have to 9 asepted for another Tha the hy, the secenary cataee fall eee Insukatgns are ie kay wo geting the Aight help, the night ieasuraree tthe courteley of eats tind Easorn Europe” Coon Mangaret Thatcher ith all her reservations about Bovopean st ons, fas adopted tha teme She argued daye xe aq suacee Kwa that, “We meat ing {Be new democracies of Eastern Europe i coset aswel withthe insilations of Western Furope... The Zoropean Comminity Boe wconeled atagoniaes tuthin Westen Europes i Iweratnt Seciriy, Wsten 184/98 0. 18, Ne. op {21995 Wythe Pre ac Peo Maeva Coa pd he Masseuse nite of Taology 5 international Security 193 | 6 stop at [the] old frontiers of the Cold War" The institutions he has in mind include the European Comonuinity (EO), the North Alantie Treaty Organization (NATO), the Canference on Security and Coozeration in Eorope (CSCE), and the Western Bxropean Union QWEU). No single institution is expected to play a dominating role in Europe, however; instesd, the aim is to create “a framework af complementary, mutvally reinforcing” institutions } “We can promote snore durable European security,” Chniste pher claims, “through interlocking strictures, each with complementary roles and strengths" No other region of the world has institutions as extensive and as welldevelowed as those in Europe. Consequently, Western policymakers trumpet the importance of creat ing webs of averlapping institutions outside of Europe. Special emphasis is placed on Asia, where there are only a few weak institutions, ara where fear of Japan, coupled \with the rise of China and the prospect of a further teduction in the American presence, has observers worried about furure stability in the region? ‘Theze has also been a recent wave of academic interest in institutions. Academic institutionalists, nat surprisingly, consider institutions to be a powerfel force for stabil lty® Robert Keohane, for example, declares that, “avoiding military conflict in Ezrope alter the Cold War depends greally on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of istitntionalized cogpevation.“" Commenting, oa the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the encl of the Cold War, Fok Ruggie anaintains that “there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their International consequences. Indeed, such nerms and institutions appear to be playing should nav help to overcame divixans between East and West in Europe." Margaset Thatches, “shaping A New Gichal Communi” Speech tothe Aspen Insute, Aspen, Calorade, August 5, 1550 4, Dheren Chrstapher, “Toward a More Inegrated World,” Statement at the Organization for Eeonomis Cooperation and Develgoment (OECD) Mistral Mest, Pate, Jane 8, 198 Posie dent Clinton and German Chancellor Fleimt Kahl share the same view, a2 Clinton made clear lwhen descrbing his private talks with Kohl July 1993: "We know fore ou experience how Ral ‘of Europe wes itigravedehzougla NATO arc ater inatitatians that belt ability ster World War IL At the heact of cur discussion today ans vehat we have t do to intgrate Europe's other fal the new independent nations” Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton Sees Germany as Main Pavey of the US. ts Burope,” New Yrk Times, july 12,1894 5. "Imerlockdng’ Iestations: The Conference on Securiy and Cooperation in Europe (CSCBY/ [NATO late Fact Sheet No. & (Brussels, June 1934) Also see ocaues ers, "Baropena Unication ‘and urapean Secsrty” im Eure Seurity effer the Cold Wir Por |, Adelphs Paper No 288 ondon: Inerratonal Intute for Strategic Studies (ISSI,Janoary 1999), pp. 3-14 4, Warten Christopher, “The CSCH Vitor Hurgpean Security Rootal in Shared Values” Statewent to the Plenary Session of the Conference an Secusty and Cooperation ia Furope, Rome, November 2a, 1993 7. See Stsphen f, Blan, Helin’ in Ast? (Calcle Barrack, Pe. Srategic Stadies Institute, US. ‘Army War College, 1958) 15 Staalty ie simply the absence of wars and major cise 9. Robert 0) Keohane, “Ue Diplomacy of Structial Crange: Mulliletzal [nations and Site Strarpies,” In Helge Hatendomn and Chetan Toschhol, es, Americ an Exoope tan Er of (Chg (Poles, Cole: Wostviene Press, 1998), p. False Promise of ternational Institutions { 7 a significant role in the management of a broad array of regional and global changes, im the world system today.” ‘This article examines the claim that institutions push states away from war and promote peace. } concentya’e on assessing the major ittemational relations thearies that employ institutions as a core concept: liberal institutionalism, collective security, and sitical theory" I begin, however, with a brief review of realisia, because of the “insti tutionalise” theories is largely a response to vealism, and each directly challenges realisin’s underlying logic? Realists and institutionalists particularly disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. Realists say no; instieationalises say yes. Realists maincsin ‘hat institutions are basically 2 reflection of the distribution af power in the world. They are based on the self-interested, calculations of the grest powers, and they have no mdependent effect on state behavior Realists therefore believe that institutions ate not an important cause of peace, They rmatéer only on the margins. Institutionalists divectly challenge this view of insityeions, arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relacive power positions. Tnstitations are indezendent variables, and they have the capability to move states away from wat “Although institutionalists ave uniced in theie oppasition to realist claims about inst lutions, each institutionalist theory makes 2 different argument about how institutions work to alter state behavior. My goal is ta evakzate these three theories ta determine whether the claim that instinttions cause peace ie persuasive. That task involves an: swearing four questions: 1) What are institutions? 2) How do they work to cause peace? ‘Specifically, what isthe causal logic that underpins each theory? 3) Are chese different logics that explain how institutions work compelling? 4) Does the evidence support these theories? ‘My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence an state behavior, and thus hold little promise far promaking stability in the past-Cald War world. The three theories on which the case for institutions is based are all flawed. Each has problems in its causal logic, and all Uoree institutionalist theories find Little support in the historical record “The remsinder of this article is organized as follows. [ begin with a brief definition lof instizttions and @ discussion of realism, because each af the institionalat theories takes its bearings from realism. In the main body af the article, I describe and evaluate 10. Jor G, Ruggie, “Mullateralism: The Anatomy of an Instistion Val. 48, No.3 Surminer 1992) 2 56, TL Preserptione about how best te maintain peace should vest ox general thecres about the caees ‘of war ad peace. This pou ee for both seadencs and policyrakers.altheugh pelicymakers ‘ax seldom self conscous in thelr use of theory, ther views alma Instications are neverthdlss ‘shaped by Weir implicit preferences to: one theary of internahonal relations ever another 12 Keohane, fox example, wtes,"Insiutinalst thinking has focused its erica ee gn reliant” Robert 0: Keohave, "Inatianional Theory and the Relist Challenge Alter the Cald Wan” in David ‘A, Baldwin, ed, Nioruson sie? NuolBeraiene The Contemporary Debate (New Yorke Columba Uriversity ress, 1995), p 271 omations\ Organization, International Security 195 | 8 liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory: The concluding section considers why Institutions are so highly regarded by policymaiers and academics, ‘wher there is 90 litle evidence that they are an important cause of peace What Are Institutions? ‘Thee is no widely-agreed upon definition af institutions in the international relations literature" The cancept is sometimes defined sa broadly as to encompass all af eter- national relations, which gives i little analytical bite For example, defining Insttu- fions as “recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which, expectations converge” allows the concept to cover almest every reggilarized pattern of activity between states, from war to tariff bindings negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs anc Trade (GATT), thus vendering it largely meaningless." Stil, itis possible to dovise a useful definition that is consictent with how most Institutionalist scholars employ the concept T define institztions as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other" They prescribe acceptable farms of state behavior, ana proserihe unacceptable kinds of behavior These rules are negotiated by states, and according to many prominent theorists, chey entail the mutual acceptance fof higher norms, which are “standatds of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are 19. Regime and inatitations ao trated as epnenymause concep in this article They a2 also wed interchangeably inthe inttuionelst Iteratue, See Robert ©. Kechare, “Internationa tnstitations ‘wo Approaches,” Jnztuationt Studies Qurtr'y. Wel. 32, No, 4 (Decemtser 1938), p 384, Rabert Keohane, IiarationdInstutions aud Site Power Eas in Intrational Rlagons Thaory Caulder, Cola. Westview Pres, 1962), pp. 5-4, and Oran R. Young, Fuersaionsl Cooperation. Balding Regis (or Natural Resouces a te Beeronment (hace, NY: Coriell Univesity Press, 1989), chaps. and 5 The term “multilateralism” (salsa sally syronymeus unt msitations. To quote Joke Regate, “rhe ttm ‘lt laterl” isan adjeeeve that meses the noun ‘institution’ This, mastlaeralism picts a gars titttiond! for i nteraaional relations. (Specfea') malilateralsm i tnstttions! form which coontiates relations among ree or rare states cn the basis of gener lized’ principles of conduct” Ruggie,“Muateralise” pp. 570-571 “For iscusson otis paint, soe Aiur A, Stein, Wy Nations Cooperate Cheamatnes and Chice fs Internatons Reltions tthaca, N.Y: Cornell Ustversiy Press, 1990), pp. 25-27 Also see Suse Stage, "Cav! Hie Dragoon: A Ceti of Regine Analysis” tx Stephen 0. Krascon ener lionel Reps, specsl sve of ulrtatanal Orgonizahicn, NOL. 36, NO-2 png ID, pp. 479-495, 18. Oran R. Young. “Regime Dynamics The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” fm Kessner, Irirnational Rages, 972. 16. See Douglas C. Nerth ara Robert P Thomas, “An Beanomic Theony of the Grosith of the Wieser World,” The Econ History Retenn 2nd series, Vl. 23, No. L(ApSI 1970), p8 17. Kaaenex, Iniommtione Seg, p. 166, Nor realist inetnutions are often based en higher rors, while ew if any, realist instartons are Easel on norms The dividing line between nores and Tues [5 not sharply defined in the irsitutionalist Macatate. Seo Raoert O. Keohane, After Hagen Coopoion id Deseand in We Waid Poise Eestomy (Paces, Nj. Princeton University Press, 193), pp. 57-58, For example one might argue hat ules, not js norms, ate corezened with rights find oigations The key poss, however, lat for matty insiutionalsts, nore, which ate ore beh ak standards of appropriate state Behavior a8 the foundation on witch mare apes rls ae conseracted, Tis dltincton between norms and rules applies rather staighekrward False Promise of Ifernational Institutions | 8 usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets '§ Although rules are usually inconporated into a formal international organization, it i sot the organization per se that compels states to obey the rules. Instituvions are not a form of ‘world government, States theraselves must choose to obey the rules they created, Institutions, in short, call far the “decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of comunand.”"® ‘To answer the three remaining questions about how institutions do or do not work, swe must examine the different institutionalist thearies separately. However, a brief discussion of realism is in order frst Realism Realm pints a rather grim picture of world poltics® The international system is poxtrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opparturties to take advantage of each other, and therefore have lite reson to trust eaca eiter® Daily hfe is essentially a struggle for power, where each slate strives not only to be the mast powerful actor in he system, but alo to ensure that no other state achievea that foty position. Intemational relations is not a constant state of war, but i i a state of relentless security competition, with the possibilty of war always inthe background. The inter- sity of that competition varies fom case to case. Alchensgh it might seem coxnterinte vive, states do requently cooperate in this competitive world. Nevertheless, cooperation among states has its limits, mainly Because iio constcained by the dominating logic of sccusity competition, which no amount of cooperation ean eliminate. Gentine peace, or 2 world where states do not compete for power, isnot likely, aecating to realism. ryan phen isan, Dt clave iy ae! itl iy cas he ai ke that states behave in a sloteresind way, anc atgurintead for deetptngnorne that fejuie lstes fo act ore eivuiicaly Liberal iaituiotalley, on the ace Ran accepts te {Sie sw th son acon the bass esnees, steers om demas that leet congestion ong et {i nsemuonal patente are publ agencies eatablehed though the cooperative elt of fir or more sate These adminiaative recures have th own budge persornel, ae bu itge Toh agg defines thers 28 “patytole entnes wh Resdquare ad Teverheads, Yo Drectres aot generous ponclon plane” Raggle,"Mtiaterlin p 379 Once ile are fear Forsed into an inematonal argenization, “ey may acem almost Cotrmiaus even though Ey ae “dtngashable analyte” Kechane, itrratonat halts ant Se Paap. $B chess pon “she Far of Codes Seely Lins the natn Sg Was Ghee Sey tend the Cold a Cann Arbor Unversity of Mikigan Prey, 2 TV 24. alana rea scholars oprsshoct many sepec of arn fale, gee mipartet intelectual dhagrecments ang them. Consider Fane Morgenthau tet Kenseth Wall, probly the ewo mst enfuental resis oer the past ity years Mengentta eatin sha ues have 3 il 9 power, hd Wate begins Ne henry wih the aesanpton that states merely eat furvive aft ave therefore drwen fo maim sccunty See Hans. Mongentat, Paitta Anoey Naons: Te Sra for Pew and Pete, thea. New York: Kap 140) ane Kenneth N. Wale Frey of havnt ies edn, le: Ao ie 12) Th seen to on my on hnking abou elem rch certo Walston to Morgen Bi, Sw Supe van Evora ee Hand Reniton of Ioana Polen Stn Nene Vl 1, No € Oloweber December 12, 1 International Security 19:3 | 10 ‘This pessimistic view of how the world works can be derived from realism’s five ssamptions boat tte international system. Tae fist is thatthe international system is anarchic, This ees not mean that itis chaotic or riven by disorder” It is easy to draw that conclasion, since realisia depicts a world characterized by security competition and wat. However, “anarchy” as employed by realists has nothing to do with conflict rather itis an onering principle, which says that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have a central autharity above them. Sovereignty, in other swords, inheres in states, because there ss no higher ruling body in the international system. There is no “government over governments" ‘The second assumption is that states inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other States are potentislly dangerous to each other. A state's military power is usually identified with the particular weaponzy at its disposal, although even if there were no ‘weapons, the individuals of # state could sill use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state ‘The third assumption i that states can never be certain about che intentions of other states. Specitically,no state can be certain another state will not wse its offensive military capability ageinst the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Arother state may be reliably benign, but Its impoesible ro be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty ‘There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sue that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore intentions can change quickly, 60 1 saie’s intentions can be benign one day and mealigh the next. Uncertainty is unavoide able when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have aifensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability “The fourth éssemption i that the most basic motive driving states is survival. States want to maintain their sovereignty, The filth assumption is that states think strategically bout how to survive in the international system, States are instrumeneally rational Nevertheless, they may miscaleulate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfect information, schere potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own sizenglh or weakness and to conceal their true aims. None of these assumptions alone mandates that states will behave competitively Tn fect, the fundamental assumption dealing with motives says that states merely airs to survive, which is a defensive goal When taken together, however, these five assum 22, See Waltz, Theory of ernatinat Palites, pp. 88-93. Also see Robert J. Art and Rober: Jeri, feds, iteration! Falter. Farce, itv Boston: Lite, Brown, 197%, par and Helen Milter, “Tntxnational Theorles of Cooperation amang Nations Strengths and Weakesees," Ward Pokies, Vol 48, No.3 (Apuil 1997}, p. 468 23. Inia L Chai, Jr, Std Jno lanes Th Probl ad Pragras of lteretional Organization, 40h ec New York: Recor House, 197), U 24, Morgenthau, as emphasized, maintains tat statce haee an imate will to power, and are ‘herefore inherently olzasve in their autlook The argument here ie that cate begin wie 3 defensive motive hut are forced to think and sometimes 8c offersively Imcause of Ue siuctore of the international peter. False Promise of Siternationaltnsttutons | 21 tions can create incentives far states to think and sometimes to behave a Specifically, tee main pattoras of behavior result First, states inthe international systern fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be inthe offing. They andeipate dangee Thete is ttle roam for trust among states. Although the level of fear varies across time and space, ican never be reduced toa tival level The bass ofthis fear i that ina world where states have the capability to offend against each ater, and might have the mative to da s0, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of ather states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the assumption that there is no central authority that a threatened state can tum (0 for help, and states have even greater incentive to fear exch other Moreover, there is no mecianism—other than the possibie self interest of third. parties—far punishing an aggressor Because it is often ciffcult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason to take steps to be prepared for war ‘The possinle consequences of falling vetia to aggression further iisstate why fear 4s a potent farce in serld politics. States do not eampete with exch other as if ineerna- tional polities were simply an economic marketplace. Political competition among states fsa much more dangerous business than economic inercenese; can lea ta War and ‘war often means mass killing on the balefild and even mass murder of civilians. In etreme cases, war can even lead to the toial destriction of a state. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other nat just as competizors, but as potentially deadly enemies Second, each state im the incemational system alms to guarantee its own survival Because other states are potential thats, and because there is 20 higher authority to zesee them when danger arses, states cannot depend on others far them security. Fach state lends €o see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it sims to provide fr its own survival, As Kenneth Waltz puis it, states operate in a “selPhelp” system, This ‘emphasis on selF-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alisnces arc only temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be tomormow’s enemy, anc! today’s enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. States operating in a sel-heip world should alwwoys act according to their own selfnterest, because st pays to be selfish in a selt-help svoeld, This is te inthe short cam at well a5 the long term, because ifa state loses inthe short run, it may not be around for the Jong haw Third, states in the intemational system aim to maximize thelr relative power pos: tions aver ater states The reason is simple: the greater the mubtary advantage one ressively, 25. This point ie Mustraed by the reaction of Britain and France to German reunification st Ge ‘end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that thoue three slates had been close allies for lmaat fonty-ive years both Britain and France ininedintly began thinking about the cangers Of ried, Germany. See David Gamnhar, “Buropean Defense Cooperation: The 19808 nd Beyond,” tm Dale LSrath and [ames Lao Ray, ss, Ts 1901 Proj dhe Futur of hetegrtion fs Faroe (Arron NY ME. Sharpe, 1693), pp. 203-205; aed Margaret Thatcher, The Deunng Sir ors (New Yorke HarperCollins, 1991, chaps, 25-25 26, See Stephen M, Wale, The Origine of Aitces hace, N'Y Corvall Univansity Press, 1987) 1B. Thore disagreement amorg realists on tis point. Some realists argue that sts ate princi pally interested in malataining the exsing balance of power, ot maxinizing telative power For International Security 19:3 | 12 state has over other states, the more secure itis. Every slate would like to be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to grarantee survival in a world that can be very dangerous. This logic creates strong incentives for sates to take advantage of ane another, including going to war ifthe circumstances are right and victory seems likely. The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense ‘of potential rivals, The ideal autcome waulld be to end up as the hegeman in the system. Survival would then be almost guaranteed, Al states are influenced by this logic, which means not only that they look for ‘opportunities to take advantage of one anather, but also that they work to insure that other states do not take advantage of them States are, in other words, both offen sivelyoiented and defensively-oriented, They Uhini about conquest themselves, and they balance against aggressors; this inexorably leads to 2 world of constant security competition, with the possibilty of war always in the background. Peace, i one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concard, is nat likely to breale oxt sm this world, Although reslism envisions world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation between states dees occur. It Is sometimes diffeutt to achieve, however, and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations, anc concern about cheating, States contemplating cooperation must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among chem. They can think about the division in ¢wa different ways, They can think in terms of absolute gains, which means each side focuses on maximizing its own profit, and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. Alterrately, states can think in terms of relative gains, which means each side not only considers its individual gain, but also hhow welt it dacs compared to the other side Because states in a realist world are concerned about the balance of power, they must bbe motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation. While teach state wants ta maximize its absolute gains, itis more important to make suce that it does better, oF at least ro worse, than ihe other state in any agreement. Efoweven, cooperation is more difficult to ackieve when states are attuned to relative-gains logic, rather than absolute geins logic. This is because states concerned about absolute gains examples ofthis "defensive realise,” which contrasts with my “olfensve realism” se: fosep M, Geico, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: & Realist rique ofthe Newest Liberal Inst Alonaim,” Jurist Orgeniation, VoL 42, No. 3 Gummer 1988), pp. 498-600; Jack L. Snyder, ‘Myths of pie Doras Pttcs and Intemeonat Anion Ciheca, NY. Cornell Unversity Press JBN), pp. 10-13; and Waltz, Dory of International Poitis, yp. 146-177. Also see Fareed Zakaria "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay” Inerstna! Secury, Vol 12, Not Grimes 1992), pp 190-198. Morgenthas i also an aftensive realist. This disagreemene notwithatanding, al realists a beiove tat stag cre greatly about the rlasive halanee 98 ower 235. See Whit, Orignr of Allumons 29, Sen Greco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” False Promise of ternational Institutions | 13 need only make sure that the pie is expanding, and that they are getting at least some portion of the increase, while states that worry ahout relative gains must care alsa about how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts Cancecns about cheating alsa hinder cacperation. States are often reluctant to enter ingo cooperative agreements for fear dhat the other side will chest an the agreement and again a relative advantage There és a “special peril of defection” in the military realm, Ibecause the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts inthe balance af power. Such a development could create a window of opportunity for the cheating state to inflict a decisive defeat an the victim state ‘These barriers ta cagperation notwithstanding, states do cooperate in a realist world. For example, balance-ol-power logic often calises states ig form alliances and cooperate against comman enemies, States sometimes cooperate to gang up on a third state, 26 the Germans and the Soviels did against Poland in 19395" Rivals as well as allies cooperate, Afterall, deals can be struck that roughly reflect the distribution of power, and satisfy concern about cheating. The various arms control agreements signed ay the superpowers during the Cold War illustrate this point ‘The bottom line, however, is that cooperation takes place in a world that is compet tive at its core—one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage af other states. This point is graphically highlighted by Eurapean politics in the forty years defor World War 1. There was much cooperation among the great powers during this period, but thar dic nat stop them fom going to war in 191%. Realists alsa recognize that states sometimes operate through ‘they believe that thee rules reflect state calculations of sel interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that ¢hey can maintain their share of world power, or even Increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power rela- tionships" For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly function of the ‘balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system, In short, the balance of power isthe independent variaile that explains war; institutions. are merely an intervening variable in the process NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about insteutians, NATO is an. institution, ad it certainly played a role in preventing World War ill ane helping the 2. Lipson, “Intemational Cooperation.” p. 51 Randal, L Schl, “Boodragnoing for Prft: Exnging che Revsoret State Bac In Teteratoral Sci 1, Not armmer 194), pp. 72 1 Ge oh Maya Keynes, The Ecnomne Core of he Pc (Neos York Penguin Hooks, 1968) chap 2; and [¥M Robere, Enrpe 1680-1042 Lando Longman, £990, pp. 2-24. here tins ako Scand cooperation etecen the Unilad tales and ine Soviet ikon dung Word ‘Warf but fat cooperation did not prevent the outtveak othe Cad War arly ater Cermany de Japan wore eee 4. Tony Beans and Peter Wikon, Regime Theory an che Sng Sehoo of Iieoational Rea tions X Camporese ata onaiona St, Wl 2, Noss Ges 1992, pa International Security 193 | 14 West win the Cold War: Nevertheless, NATO was basically a manifestation ofthe bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balan: of power, not NATO pr 2, that provided «he key to maaintaining stability on the continent NATO. twas essentially an American tool for nianaging power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis ofthe new distribution of power in Europe * NATO cannot remain as it was curing the Cold War Varieties of Institutionalist Theories ‘There ate three institutianalist theories, and each offers a different argument about how institutions push states away from war and help foster stability? Liberal institutional sm Is the least ambitious af che three theories. It does not directly address the important {question of how to prevent war, but focuses instead on explaining why economic ancl environmental cooperation among states is more Fkely ean realists recognize. In ercased cooperation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war, although hbera) institutionalists do nat explain how. The theory is predicated on the belief that cheating is the main inhibitar of international cooperation, and that institu- tions provide the key ta overcoming that problem. The aim is to create rules that constrain states, but not to challenge the fundamental realist claim that states re selFintorested actors. Collective security direcly confronts the issue of how to prevent war. The theory starts with the asaurnption that force will continue to matter in world politics, and that states will have to guarc against potential aggressors. However, the thteat of war ean be greatly reduced, according ta the theory, by challenging realist thinking about state behavior, and substituting in its place three anticrealist norms First, states should veject, the idea of ueing force to change the status quo. Second, to deal with states that violate that nocm and threaten (or start) a war, responsible states must not act on the basis of their own narrow self-interest. Rather, they must suppress the templation to respond in whatever way would maximize their individual gains, and instesd automaticaly join together lo present the aggressor with the threat of overwhelming force. Third, states smilst tist each other to renounce aggression andl to mean that renuaciation, They must also be confident that other states will come to their rescue, shauld they become the target of aggression. CCeitical theory is the mast ambitious of the theories, a its ultimate aim is to transforrn the fundamental nature of intemational politics and to create a world wire there is rot just ineveased cooperation among states, but the possibility of genuine peace. Like collective secusity, but unlike liberal institutionalism critical theory directly challenges 35, See Guother Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoiteral Institutianalisn, amd the ature of NATO,” Security Sluis, Vol 3, No. | Autumn 1985), pp. 3. 58, Despite these liflerences armemg insttutioalist theories, pepesents af each theary accasion- ally make favorable refezence to the other theores, and thus seem to recognize that all thee ‘haces a8 part of a ineutionslst body of Mteratve shat takes ap-tellsm as its rain point of reference See, or example: Charles A. Kupehan ond life A. Kupchas, “Concerts, Calective Secunty and the Putsee of Purope,” faerational Security, Vl. 18, No. Gusamer 1980), pp. tH Telrend Ruggie, “Multilateral” pp. 61-398. False Promise of International Institutions | 15 realist thinking about the self-interested behavior of states, The theory is predicated on the assumption that ideas ard ciscourse—how we think and tall about! international politics are the driving forces behind state behavior. It ulterly rejects realism’s claim. that state behavior is latgely a function of the given structure ofthe extersal world, For critical theorists, ideas shape the material wor'd in important ways, and thus the way to revolutionize international politics is ta change drastically the way individuals think. and tal about world politics, Intellectuals, especially the critical theorists themselves, are believed fo play a key role in that pracess, Liberal institutionalism does nat directly address the question of whether institutions ‘cause peace, but instead focuses on the less azabitious goal af explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed. Specifically, the theory looks at cases where states are having difficulty cooperating because they have “mixed” interest; n other words, each side ias incentives bath to cooperate ara not to coaper~ ates7 Fach side can benefit from cooperation, havwever, which liberal institutionalists define as “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments sa that al sides fend up better off than they wauld otherwise be." The theory is af litle relevance in situations where states’ interests are fundamentally conflictual and nether side thinks it has much fo gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states alm to gain advantage aver each other. They think In terms of winning and losing, and this invariably leads to intense security competition, and sometimes war But liberal insti- tutionalism oes not deal directly with these situations, and thus says litle aout have to resolve or even ameliorate them. Therefore, the theory largely ignores socurity issues and concentrates instead on economic ard, to a lesser extent, environmental issues.” In fact, the theory is buile on the assumption that international politics can be divided inta two realms—secusity and 25. Among the key Uheral tnstitutionslist Works ave: Rebert Axclod and Retert O. Kechaxe, “achioving Cooperation urder Anatchy: Suatepes and Tasitutons,” Wérld Polis, VoL 38, No. (Gctoter HAS, pp. 226-254, Keahane, After Hegemony, Keobase, fersational Institutions: Two Approaches,” pp 379-306; Keohane, tnernational Istwns aad Site Pout, chap. 1 Charles “upaon, "eenational Cooperation Is Economic and Security Afar,” World Paltz, Vel. 37, No. 1 {Oetiber 195i), 2p. 1-29 Flas b Martin, "Tnsicutions and Caoperation: Sanctions During the Falsiand Islands Confit,” iuerntion! Surty, Vo. t6, No. 4 Gpeing 1993), pp. HBA178 Lisa Marts, Cotere Cooperation: Explaining Maltfaeral Econamic Santtone (Princeton, Ni: Princeton Universky Pres, 1821; Keaneth A. Oe, "Explaining Conseation Under Ararcky: Hypotheses and Stitagies,” Wirid Poiues, Vel 38) No. 1 (Cexober 1985), pp. 1-Mr and Stein, Wy Nass Conperate 7. Stein, Wy Nations Capente, chap. 2. Alo see Keohane, After Hegemony, g0.6-7, 12-18, 67-6, 48. Milnes, “Truernatonal Theartes of Cooperation,” p68. 58. For examples of the theory 4 wad: inthe onveoronental realm see Peter M. Hass, Rober! O. Kahane, and Mae A, Levy, en, Inatitutn forthe Ear Sunes of Ect jntervatnal Enea mantel Proton (Carbide, Mass: MIT Pres, 1953), especially chaps. 1 and 9. Some ofthe most Important war on istiuions and the enviranment fas been done by Oran Young. See, for ‘@amnple, Young, fxtorn:iona! Cooperation. The res: of my discussion cancestrates on ecorcnb, not fexvronmental issues, or conciseness, and alsa because the Hey theoretical works io the Uber {stlntonalst Kteratuee lous dm ceosemic ater than envieonmenal masters International Security 19:3 | 16 politcal econesny—and that liberal institutonalism mainly applies to the later but not the former: This theme is elesry azticulated by Chatles Lipson, who writes that “sia- ruficantly diferent institutional arrangements axe associated with international ecd- rromic and. security issues'"® Moreaver, the lkelihood of cooperation is markedly , “Realist Thoory and the Pegblem of tleations} Cooperation: ‘Analysis with az Amended Tsonee’s Dilemma Medel" The journal of Pats, VoL 0, No. 3 GAugort 1988), Pe. 60-624, Green, Caaperation among Nations: Europe, Amanca, avd Néw Tarif Barrrs te Trade Cikaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Greco, “Understanding the ‘Prasiem of International Cogperatiane The Limits of NecMberal lestitianaliem and the Putute of Realist Theory” ts Baldo, Neoredisrr and Neate, pp. 301-838, The telling elec of Grieco's ticism is refined in id, which is extartially organi around the relative geina vs, absolute Jains debste, a Issue giver Iie atertion befove Grlec vase itn his wily clted 1988 article ‘The matter was briefly discussed by two other scholars before Giec. See Joanie Gowa, “Anarchy, goin, and Tried reaper: Tae Eola af Caperatuoe apa inernational Relations,” Jnterations Gigarcaton, Val $0, No. (ater (880), pp 172-199; ad Oran 2. Young, “international Ries ‘Toward s Neve Theory of Insitutions,” Hd Polite, Vol 39, No, | (October 1388), pp, S119 57. Robert O. Keohare "astitstonal Theory apd the Realist Challenge.” in Baldwin, Navan tint Nonthoninn, p25, Whew liberal insruionalsts developed the theary in the mic 156s, they cic not expicty aeaume that stator sutete sake paisa Theve ix achally ite evidence that they thought much abowt the distinction betweun lative gains and absolute gals. Howeves, the asingtlan chat antes purse absolute but nat relative gains if implct in thee rings. S58 Lipson Writes “The Paoner’s Dilensma, in its simplest torn, involves zo ‘asnames fo be 4 self-interest, af rehartt macnn of ia oven wiht sesumpsion A arallels the Realist conception of sovereign states im international politics” Lipson, “eternation International Security 193 | 20 cannot ignore relativesgains considerations, because they assume that states are selbin= terested actors in an anarchic system, and they recagnize that malitary power matters to states. A theory that explicitly accepts realism's core assumplions—and liberal inst:= tutionalism dacs thar—must confrant the istue af relative galas If it hopes ta develop 2 sound explanation for why states cooperate ‘One might expect liberal Intitucianalists to offer the counterargumment that relative. agains logic applies only to the security zealm, while absolute-gains logic applies to the economic realm. Given that they are mainly concerned with explaining economic ard environmental cooperation, leaving relative gains concems aut of the theary does not matter ‘There ave two problems with this argument Firs, if cheating were the only significant obstacle to cooperation, liberal insbtulionalsts could argue that their theary applies to the economic, but not the military resim. Infact, they do make that argument, However, ‘once relative-gains considerations are factored into the equation, it becomes ienpassible to maintain the neat dividing line between economic and military issues, mainly because military might ls significantly dependent on econorale might. The relative size ‘of a state's economy has profound consequences for ifs standing in the international Isslance of military power Therefore vlative-gains cancers must be taken into account for security reasons when looking at the economic as well at military domain. The neat

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