REBELLION / INSURRECTION / COUP D’ ETAT

CASE #1: ENRILE v. SALAZAR

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a
number of similar cases that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance
had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has
seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis
and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District,
Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a
supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence
was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of
probable cause.

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor
General filed a consolidated return for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 Which had been contemporaneously but separately
filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders
and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General
would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another,
which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound
crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause
of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date granting
Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a
more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues
raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two against granting bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses,
so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts
committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. -A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too
long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential
Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3,
which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated
Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real
thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of
Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos
sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las
que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article
48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of
said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could
have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the
other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating
to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial
court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's
complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with
accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the
Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a
mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by
the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise,
that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14
There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in
the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This
Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he
follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims
that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the
latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case,
and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion,
which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this
case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing
on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis,
the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there
instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent
Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity
or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing
established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind
the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of
its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the
respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation
regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing
and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their
cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has
only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should
have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court
of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly
short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has
thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that
of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared
before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency
with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have
become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions.
Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the
news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by
so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power
to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the
petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus
oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #2: ENRILE v. AMIN
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did
then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator
Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the
theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case
gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be
applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829. The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3)
employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the
mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly
reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied). As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to
the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only
one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a
separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the
latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug,
and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case
is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under
a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra,
at p. 528). The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to
all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed
in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same
accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and
so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly
similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based
his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD
1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of
the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for
subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to
drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should
be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act
is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With
this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining
respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan
Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #3: PEOPLE v. DASIG
G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally
defective and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge
for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the
lawyer who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by
Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged
use of force and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF. — The crime
of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion
though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the
victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). — The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him
guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information which reads:

"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use
of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the
victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties."

Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness,
accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said
accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.

The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora
were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon
controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading
building.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously.
He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being
followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a
series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat.
Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure
that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and fled from
the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nuñes because of a mole at the bridge of his nose
near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit
located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt.
Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo
pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver
with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig
was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army
Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requested by the
military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was
willing to avail of his services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The interrogation was
conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the
sparrow unit and that their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was
signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the
herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the signed conformity
of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.

In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to
his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated
the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
as said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in
protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has represented
high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined the affiant and
that he is convinced that the latter's statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under oath
as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to
its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the
room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation
with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.

Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?

A No.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which was about to be made?

A Yes.

Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.

Q What happened after that?

A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

A Yes.

Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to
testify or say something, that statement of his will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?

A The investigation started.

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

Q Was that reduced to writing?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the
investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?

A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and
then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?

A I was also present."

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the appellant was
voluntarily made. Said the trial court:

"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his
intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office
who was available at that time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp
Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented
to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him
as his counsel of his own choice.

"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his extra-judicial
confession or sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial confession, has informed him
(accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in
executing the same has done so voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language known
to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."

"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nuñes dated August 18,
1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."

The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at
bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:

"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

'Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'

"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but
if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged
in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In the
instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards
when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He
complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation.
Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn
declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated by
evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his
prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and
hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:

"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead
of Rebellion.

"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant
not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad
while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of
the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of
Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of
rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance
of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the
NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove
that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving
instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However, appellant being a
confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted
government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #4: PEOPLE v. Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked
beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that
he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro,
his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2 On autopsy,
the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3

As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant
Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of
Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already
charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large,
conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision,
dated September 24, 1993 states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the
heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral
damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not
rebellion.

Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged
with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,"4 (said killing)
should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not
fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in
the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only
the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.

Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant
may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for
"political and subversive ends."5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the
trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant
contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act

No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political
character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its
"common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes
imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this court stressed that:

Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them
to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the
resistance movement.

From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are
essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases
where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished
for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime
and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.11

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime — alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible
imposable penalty — could benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.

Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for allegedly harboring or concealing
in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the
prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised
Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and
92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot
prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15

Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:

[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would
not, by and of itself, suffice.

The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA
recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in
the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely
charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.

As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be
alleged in the information.17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and
satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was
one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in
testifying to that effect.18

Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their victim was to
further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas
Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an
acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no
political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20

People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the
Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an
extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein
was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted that:

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the
NPA.22

By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's belated claims to
membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self serving23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of
the case, we fully agree. He states:

[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the
political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter
card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence
for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24

In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as
follows:

Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?

A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown
to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger
jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)

Q Please continue.

A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped
walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)

Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?

A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as
to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead
of a small store, my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was
walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store, when the said
policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun
that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)

Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?

A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)

Q What is your participation in the group?

A Look-out sir.

Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir. 25

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People's Army.
A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political
purpose. Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the
involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn
statement of October 19, 1992.27

As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which
the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew
appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant
as an NPA member.28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court,
after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the rest of it.29 While disbelieving the portion of
Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the
crime was committed.30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony
of the appellant himself.

In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on
his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization's

goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization,"32 without, however, specifying what the
"offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so general and non-specific34 that they offer no
explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a
mere policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's
attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations
of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested
areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating
the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief
Justice Narvasa aptly observed:

The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot
be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated
despite the best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left
no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be
gainsaid.35

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial
court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a
look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.38
Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude
conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39 In the case at bench,
the strength of the prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his
own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind.41 The
killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the
accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 SEDITION

CASE #5: PEOPLE v. CABRERA

G.R. No. 17748. March 4, 1922

MALCOLM, J.:

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila,
charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the
trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the
maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of the
case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will
be taken up in the order named.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier
stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and member of the Philippine
Constabulary.

The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of
Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private
Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.

The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag and other companions of the
Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at
Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The officers of
the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the
commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.

During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman
Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he
received the night before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against
the policemen.

At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth Company approached private Nicolas Torio
who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company.
Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his
charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals.
When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.

One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection
of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk
in the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a
dying condition and in the face of overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that in
response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.

A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the passengers in the car were
innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely
wounding three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of
Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing and
advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.

The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police of the city of Manila,
riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by
Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.

About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon
by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen
Trogue and Sison.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken
Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the
motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were passing along Calle General Luna in
front of the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman
Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station,
and the office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.

General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the
streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after another returned to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers
was, however, made.

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of
Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time,
numbering some one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their
respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into
Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two statements.

What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in
Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which ones had been out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting, which
they did, and to tell me the names of those who were with them and who were not then present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two
(seventy-three) present and they named five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the previous night for
any purpose whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped
forward that had gone out for any purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to themselves and
to the other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned, that they step forward and they did." The names of the four who
took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.

The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same day, December 16. The questionnaire
prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in English or Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers,
translated not their dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or three witnesses.

Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in substance they are the same. One of them, the first in
numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be
selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:

1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the
General Service of the Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.

2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? — First Company, General Service of the Constabulary.]

3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,

1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.

4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.

5. For what reason, and where did you go? — We went in search of the policemen and secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now
since we have been having standing grudge against now since we have been having a standing grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of
one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this
woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad
reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag did
nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila
had given orders to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without
foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with carbines or
shotguns. For this reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of the policemen and secret service men, they would continue
abusing the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last night.

6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? — I saw that almost all the soldiers were jumping through the window and I
was to be left alone in the barracks and so I followed.

7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.

8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the night before last on Calle Real? — Yes, Sir, I know him
because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? — Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my companions also
were.

10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. — I cannot tell precisely the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat
obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I fired more than once.

11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the victim was a policeman or a civilian. — I cannot tell whether
I hit any policeman or any civilian.

12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. — I cannot given an exact account of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession
of my faculties until I reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching the barracks.

13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did you use? — I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the
number of cartridges I used; however, I placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.

14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? — By the window of the quarter of the Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.

15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? — Yes, sir.

16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? — Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.

(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.

Witnesses:

S. GALLARDO.

LAURO C. MARQUEZ.

The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another
information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different
judges of first instance.

All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña,
first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty
were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it case, presented the
seventy-seven confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made by
Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who
intervened in taking them. The prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.

The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the defendants and was based on the contention that
the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla,
Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Deceña,
Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect these men did not take part in the
riot.

The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the
defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however,
distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente
Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine of P10,000 was
imposed. The costs were divided proportionately among the defendants.

For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful
decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder
case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.

In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court
will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs.
Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance
appears.

OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error merit little or no consideration.
Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero
Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario
Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on
the special defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and three other and which was found untenable by the trial court. Any further
discussion of this question falls more appropriately under consideration of assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the
accused.

Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that the policemen were not aware of the armed
attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.

The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder
case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the
conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).

1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76

Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is alleged that some of the defendants signed
the confessions under the impression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not
in fact so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for the good of the service" in response to
appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet
were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to
them. Counsel for the accused entered timely objection to the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in
stating otherwise.

Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any
person charged with crime shall be received as evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court
that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency,"
was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly announced by
this and other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson
vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not voluntarily made or was obtained by undue pressure is on the
accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)

What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The source of the rumor that the defendant would
be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the confession is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer. With military orders given in English and living in
the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is
more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the
defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own men.

It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the Insular Police force. Because of the very nature of
their duties and because of their practical experience, these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal
offenses. Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him,
would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de corps, is the instinct
of self preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and
which would counsel prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.

These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That such was the case
was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been successfully impeached.

We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.

2. The conspiracy between the accused

The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the accused. Counsel emphasizes that in
answer to the question in the confession, "who asked you to join the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then
advanced that the appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is
claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of
their uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of conspiracy between the
accused.

The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the
crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people may be on solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case which
reaches the same result. It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible for all the acts of
the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his
part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of September 29,
1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)

Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished. It be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to
effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same
purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan
evolved from their military training was followed. The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face
of actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots
responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and
vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences therefor.

We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.

3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law

Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292)
makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of
Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and
we believe that such finding is correct. Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is
and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and that what really happened in this
instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the
Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.

We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.

JUDGEMENT

The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not
exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the
private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron
(Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto,
Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto
Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin
Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio
San Pedro, Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison,
Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo,
Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer
imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window
through which the defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg,
Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of
P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer
imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable
exercise of the discretion which the law reposes in him.

We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent observations found in the decision of the trial court in this
case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:

Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court
is only concerned in this case with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for ten year and a fine
P10,000, is not really commensurate with the enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is
worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to
them by the Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a
fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.

Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these same defendants and appellants, it would seem
to be a useless formality to impose penalties in this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh
of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.
 INCITING TO SEDITION

CASE #6: US v. TOLENTINO

G.R. No. 1451 March 6, 1906

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; PLEADING AND PRACTICE. — The rule quoted in the case of United States v. Dorr and O’Brien,
decided May 19, 1903, that it is a "well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense maybe committed in any of several modes,
and the offense, in any particular instance is alleged to have been committed into or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed in any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense," is reaffirmed.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an information charging him with the crime of "uttering seditious words and
writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, committed as follows: That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did
unlawfully utter seditious words and speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and
which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the
peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
which said seditious words and speeches are false and inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the
government established by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the people of said
Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and
scurrilous libels are in the Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was presented by him and others on
the said 14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled ’Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas’ (Yesterday
To-day and To-morrow). An exact translation of the said drama is included in the information, and various parts thereof are specially assigned,
which in the opinion of the prosecution, were more especially in violation of the statute in such cases made and provided.

It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact write the drama and the announcement thereof, substantially as
set out in the information, and did, with other members of a theatrical company, of which he was director, utter and publish the same substantially
in manner and form as charged, and as we understand it, the only question for decision is whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama,
the accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, upon which the information was based.

This section is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which
tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library

Counsel discussed at some length the question whether the drama or any part of it was of a "scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation of the
word, but for the purposes of this decision we do not deem it necessary to make a finding on this point. In the case of the United States v. Fred L.
Dorr and Edward F. O’Brien, 1 decided May 19, 1903, this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous
nature and directed against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend
to some one of the results enumerated in the section, the article in question being described in the complaint as ’a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends ti obstruct the lawful officers of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.’
But it is a well- settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense,
in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any
one ]of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense.’ (Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick, Mass. 206, 215), and the defendants
may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which the complaint may be separated has been made out."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Several allied offense or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that sections, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches;
(2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or
which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or
which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7)
knowingly concealing such evil practices."cralaw virtua1aw library

In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the judgment of conviction in this case must be sustained, if it appears
from the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these offenses.

We are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government.

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and
enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and
intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.

Counsel for the appellant insists that the intend of the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from the evidence of
record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined
by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.

This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years after the
establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a widespread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished,
and here and there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression.
A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of persons whose announced purpose and object in organizing was the overthrow of the present
Government, was actively engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these Islands from peaceably accepting the authority of that
Government, and this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it
hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.

The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was merely
or even principally a literary or artistic production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the
events portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should
they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and director of the play.

It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact guilty as charged, the court erred in imposing an excessive and unjust penalty,
and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars instead of Philippine currency. As to the latter objection it is sufficient to say that the use of the word
"dollars" was in strict conformance with the words of the statute, and that the equivalent of that word in Philippine currency is fixed by law. The
penalty was within the limits prescribed by law, and we are not prepared to hold that the trial erred in the exercise of its discretion in imposing it.

The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the Appellant. So ordered.
CASE #7: ESPUELAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITIOUS LIBEL. — The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon their minds.

2. ID.; ID.; — A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government,
is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

3. ID.; ID.; CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT; HOW IT MAY LEGALLY BE DONE. — Any citizen may criticise his government and government
officials and submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism should be specific and therefore constructive specifying
particular objectionable actuations of the government; it must be reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.

The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court,

"About the time comprised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibits A, C-I). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter’s supposed wife translation of which letter or note is hereunder reproduced:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don’t plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don’t need them.

"Please don’t bury me in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to be buried
among Christians.

"But don’t pray for me. Don’t remember me, and don’t feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.

"My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the
whole world about this.

"And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about
Julio Guillen and the banditry of Leyte.

"Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis.

"Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.

"I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.

"I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own
self."cralaw virtua1aw library

The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the
Bisaya, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said
note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a
tree."cralaw virtua1aw library

The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis
and Fascists i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government. 2

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are
against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings
since early times in England (V. op. cit.) .

As explained by Paterson, 3." . . the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of
justice, must all be recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with an established and well-high
unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the
weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each
burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional
function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within that limit there is ample room and verge enough for the freest
use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures on the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."cralaw virtua1aw library

Naturally, when the people’s share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticisms of the ruler or the
departments of government. But as governments grew to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of
expression grew apace. Yet malicious endeavors to stir up public strife continue to be prohibited.

The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous
prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the seditious libel amendment thereto in May, 1918.

Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or
mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action —
such legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must
be applied.

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by
the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" So statutes against
sedition have always been considered not violative of such fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily
curtail the citizen’s freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. 5

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government and government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade
of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive,
reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an
invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the
government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the
article drips with male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by
President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer’s simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with its failure to particularize. When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbance, the rationable of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article
142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people"
in the Government obviously refer at least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and
Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. 6

As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the people against the constituted
authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance of the offense
under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to
induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
8

"The idea of violence pervades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with
his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of
dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio
Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot
but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government,
the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of
lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.

To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary
and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods
to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men.

The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority
of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case against Appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with several persons in a public place uttered these words: "Filipinos must use
bolos for cutting off Wood’s head" — referring to the then Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a
judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned
by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who has been most outspoken on freedom of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here
the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States
and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a
figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."cralaw virtua1aw library

The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision
will be affirmed with costs.
 DIRECT ASSAULT

CASE #8: PEOPLE v. RECTO

G.R. No. 129069

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder, if the accused has not deliberately sought to attack the vulnerability of the victim. In
the present case, the latter evidently had the opportunity to escape or to defend himself, but chose not to grab the opportunity; instead, he placed
himself in a position more open to attack.

The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated April 2, 1997, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon (Branch 81),
which found Julio Recto y Robea guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) two counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971), (2) the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder (Criminal Case No. 1972), and (3)
homicide (Criminal Case No. 1973). The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads follows:

"WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 1970, this Court finds accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
qualified [d]irect [a]ssault [w]ith [f]rustrated [h]omicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law, and to pay the costs.

"In Criminal Case No. 1971, this Court finds accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of qualified [d]irect
[a]ssault [w]ith [f]rustrated [h]omicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs.

"In Criminal Case No. 1972, this Court finds co-accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of qualified
[d]irect [a]ssault [w]ith [m]urder and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
ANTONIO MACALIPAY the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

xxx xxx xxx

"In Criminal Case No. 1973, this Court finds co-accused JULIO RECTO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [h]omicide and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and he is ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim EMILIANO 'RENATO' SANTOS, alias REY, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death. without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx

"The 'pugakang' or homemade shotgun with one (1) live ammunition (Exh. C); twelve (12) gauge live ammunition (Exh. C-1); the revolver together
with the three (3) live bullets and two (2) empty shells (Exhs. D, D-1 to D-5, respectively) are confiscated in favor of the government.

"After the judgment shall have become final, the [o]fficer-in-[c]harge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit all
the foregoing exhibits to the [p]rovincial [d]irector, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to
any of the records of these cases and shall form part of these records.

"The period of preventive imprisonment both accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent and the penalties herein
imposed shall be served successively in accordance with Articles 29 and 70, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended." 2

On September 22, 1994, four (4) Informations,3 all signed by State Prosecutor II Felix R. Rocero, were filed against appellant. The fifth Information
was dated October 18, 1994.

The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971 charged appellant with direct assault with frustrated murder, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 1970

"That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in [B]arangay Ambulong, [M]unicipality of Magdiwang,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, by
means of treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with a shotgun locally called 'pugakang' one MELCHOR RECTO,
knowing that the latter is a duly appointed [b]arangay [c]hief [t]anod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon, while he was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused and that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death."4

Criminal Case No. 1971

"That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in [B]arangay Ambulong, [M]unicipality of Magdiwang,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, by
means of treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with a shotgun locally called 'pugakang' one Barangay Captain
PERCIVAL ORBE, knowing that the latter is a duly elected barangay captain of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon, while he was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused and that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death."5

The Information6 in Criminal Case No. 1972, which charged appellant with direct assault with murder, was worded thus:

"That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in [B]arangay Ambulong, [M]unicipality of Magdiwang,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this [H]onorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there, by means of treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with a shotgun locally called 'pugakang' and strike with a long bolo, one ANTONIO MACALIPAY, knowing that the latter is a duly elected
[b]arangay [k]agawad of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds in different parts of his body which were the cause of his untimely death."7

In the Information8 in Criminal Case No. 1973, appellant was charged with murder, as indicated hereunder:

"That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in [B]arangay Ambulong, [M]unicipality of Magdiwang,
[P]rovince of Romblon. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, by
means of treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a shotgun locally called 'pugakang' and strike with a long
bolo, one EMILIANO 'RENATO' SANTOS9 , alias EMY, inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death."10

Finally, appellant was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1975, which we quote:

"That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in [B]arangay Ambulong, [M]unicipality of Magdiwang,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control, one (1) handgun locally called 'pugakang' with one
live ammunition, which he used in killing Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano 'Renato' Santos and [which was] confiscated by the
police authorities."11

When arraigned on all the five charges on November 24, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,12 pleaded "not guilty."13 In due
course, he was tried and, thereafter, sentenced.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:14

"In the early afternoon of April 18, 1994 at Ambulong, Magdiwang, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his
residence together with Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto, appellant's cousin. They were trying to settle
a land dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in progress, Orbe was summoned by SPO4 Fortunato Rafol
to proceed to the bodega of Rance.

"There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed, and the palay stored therein, stolen. Forthwith, Barangay Kagawad Macalipay,
who happened to be the chairman of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), conducted an investigation.

"SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male, also made their investigation and reported their findings to Linda Rance. At this point, Barangay Tanod Melchor
Recto passed by. He saw SPO4 Rafol, Wilfredo Arce, [S]pouses Crestito and Linda Rance at the bodega. He went to Barangay Captain Orbe and
inquired why they were there. Barangay Captain Orbe told him that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed and the palay, stolen. Orbe
requested Melchor Recto to stay as he might be needed. Thereupon, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto began his own ocular investigation.

"While SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the group of [A]ppellant Julio Recto, Cornelio Regis, Jr., Dante Regis, Melvar
Relox, Teodoro de la Serna, Enrica Regis and Nida Regis arrived. The group stopped at the first 'trampa' near the bodega. Barangay Captain
Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, [A]ppellant Recto, while
holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender the balisong.
Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while
Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: 'Do not do it. We'll just settle this. (Ayoson ta
lang ine).' Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground.
Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy.

"Melchor Recto saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated bathroom of the bodega.
Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom, Melchor Recto peeped through the window and saw [A]ppellant Recto fire his gun at
Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another shot towards
Regis, Jr[.], but, the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo.

"Amidst the din, Percival Orbe and Melchor Recto heard [A]ppellant Julio Recto saying: 'Where is that kapitan?' When Melchor could no longer
see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran. While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter's thigh. Barangay Captain
Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the top and landed [o]nto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also shot by [A]ppellant
Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded
Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano 'Renato' Santos
died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant." (citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the trial court presented appellant's version of the incident, as follows:15

"x x x Julio Recto interposed self-defense and defense of his co-accused Cornelio Regis, Jr. . . . According to co-accused Julio Recto they were
berated at about 12 meters away from the bodega and it was there that the late Emiliano Santos shot co-accused Cornelio Regis, Jr. and he was
hit and he (Julio) retreated two (2) steps backward. Then, he took two (2) steps forward and said why are you like that. Alberto Rance, the son of
Mrs. Linda Rance, shot him, hitting him on his left side. He ran towards Alberto Rance who shot him with the latter behind the concrete porch
holding his gun with his two (2) hands resting on the concrete wall (porch) of the bodega, and with Emiliano Santos also holding his gun [which] he
used in shooting Regis, Jr. The distance between Alberto Rance and the unarmed Julio Recto was 11½ meters when x x x Julio Recto r[a]n
towards Alberto Rance[;] the latter ran and he saw Wilfredo Arce [turn] and [pick] up a gun and he grabbed the gun and while pulling it, it fired and
he did not know whether it hit somebody. Emiliano Santos incredibly was no longer there to shoot him. However, Julio Recto was able to take
possession of this gun from Wilfredo Arce, took cover behind a post and still managed to shoot Santos who was somewhere else. He threw the
gun later on the disputed land and ran to the direction of the banana plantation of Regis, Jr. and he reached his house. Both of them were outside
the house of Regis, Jr. x x x when [M]aritime [P]oliceman Morada and Galin arrived. x x x" (citations omitted, underscoring in original)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that appellant had fired at a barangay tanod, Melchor Recto, who was at the crime scene "on the occasion of the
performance of his official duties."16 It added that appellant had shot a barangay captain, Percival Orbe, also "on the occasion of the performance
of his official duties."17

The lower court ruled out treachery in the killing of Emiliano Santos, because there had been a gun duel between him and appellant. However, it
convicted and sentenced appellant to death for the murder of Antonio Macalipay.

Because of the trial court's imposition of the death penalty, this review by the Supreme Court is mandatory and automatic, without need of a notice
of appeal.18

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:19

"The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of direct assault in Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1972 which accordingly resulted in
his being convicted of complex crimes in those cases.

II

"The lower court erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in Criminal Case No. 1972 which accordingly resulted in
his being convicted of murder in that case."

In the interest of justice and despite appellant's anemic Brief, we deem it wise to review the entire assailed Decision, particularly the crimes
imputed and the penalties imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The Decision of the trial court should be MODIFIED.

Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative

Appellant contends that he committed the crimes attributed to him in self-defense and in defense of his uncle, Cornelio Regis Jr.

By invoking self-defense and defense of a relative, appellant plainly admits that he killed Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano "Renato" Santos and
fired the shots that injured Melchor Recto and Percival Orbe. Thus, appellant has shifted the burden of evidence to himself. Consequently, to
escape criminal liability, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of the essential requisites of self-defense; namely, (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.20 For defense of a relative21 to prosper, appellant must prove the concurrence of
the first and the second requisites of self-defense and "the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the
one making the defense had no part therein."22

Appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. In fact, he was clearly the aggressor. Without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
there can be no viable self-defense or defense of a relative.23

"There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual force or actual use of
weapon."24 In this case, Antonio Macalipay was unarmed and actually trying to pacify appellant when the latter shot him. After shooting Antonio,
appellant again cocked his gun, pointed it at Emiliano Santos and shot him. The latter's act of drawing his gun and firing at him was merely
self-defense.

As for Melchor Recto and Percival Orbe, no aggression ever emanated from them during the entire incident. They were unarmed and in fact
already running away from appellant when he shot them. Clearly, there was no unlawful aggression from any of the victims.

For purposes of clarity and simplicity, we deem it wise to discuss separately the crimes attributed to appellant and the proper penalties imposed by
the trial court.

Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of four (4) crimes: two counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide, one count
of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder, and one count of homicide. We will now discuss each of these crimes.

Qualified Direct Assault with Frustrated Homicide

(Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971)

In these two cases, appellant claims that he "did not mind" the two victims because they were not his enemies. He, however, testified that the de
sabog gun had merely misfired and hit them. The court a quo was correct in not giving credence to his attempt to paint the victim's injuries as the
result of an accident. Evidence to be believed must be credible in itself.25 His weak and incredible testimony cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses stating that he deliberately shot them.

However, the trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide.

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;" and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance."26 The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or
sedition, without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated
when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand
upon a person in authority.27

An agent of a person in authority is "any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority."28 In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto29 — being then the
barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon — was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the
trial court, he was not "engaged in the performance of his official duties" at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked "on the occasion of such
performance," as we will now show.

It must be emphasized that Melchor Recto was on his way home when he happened to pass by the bodega of the Rance couple. He testified as
follows:

"PROSECUTOR MORTEL:
Q: On April 18, 1994 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you said you were in the ricefield gathering the harvested palay[;] what time did
you leave that place?

A: Nearing 5:00 o'clock already.

Q: And in going to your house, do you remember if you ha[d] to pass by the bodega of Rance?

ATTY. MONTOJO:

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:

Leading.

PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: Now, did you go to your house that afternoon?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why?

A: Because when I pass[ed] in the bodega there were plenty of people.

Q: Whose bodega are you referring to?

A: Rance.

Q: Do you know the name of the owner?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please give us the name?

A: First owned by Jose Rance now owned by Crestito and Linda Rance.

Q: What relation has this Crestito Rance to Jose Rance?

A: Jose is the father of Crestito Rance.

Q: And this Linda, what relation has she with Crestito Rance?

A: Wife.

Q: You said, that when you passed by the bodega on your way to your house there were people in that bodega, please give us [the] names
of the people thereat whom you know?

A: SPO4 Fortunato Rafol, SPO1 Male, Bgy. Captain Percival Orbe, Kag. Antonio Macalipay, Wilfredo Arce and Spouses Crestito and Linda
Rance and those who were threshing palay thereat."30

Melchor explained that when appellant's group arrived, it was Barangay Captain Percival Orbe and Kagawad Antonio Macalipay who talked to the
group. Melchor did not do anything to avert the tension. He only watched what was transpiring and later hid himself when the first shot was fired.
He continued:

"PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: Because of that, what did Orbe tell you as a barangay tanod?

ATTY. MONTOJO:

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT: Leading.
PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: What else did he say?

A: He told me not to leave because he might need me.

Q: And did you remain?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As you were there, did you observe what [t]he policemen were doing?

A: I observed [them] going there and through around [sic] the bodega.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now later on, do you remember what the policemen did?

A: I observed that the policemen were already passing the rice paddies towards the road.

Q: And after they were gone . . . . By the way, who were these policemen whom you observed going towards the road, will you please name
them?

A: SPO4 Fortunato Rafol and Male.

Q: Do you know the first name of SPO1 Male?

A: No sir.

Q: Now, after they were gone, do you remember if there were persons who arrived?

ATTY. MONTOJO:

Misleading

COURT:

Leading.

PROSECUTOR MORTEL (continuing):

Q: After they were gone, what happened?

A: I saw Cornelio Regis, Jr., Julio Recto, Melver Relox, Dante Regis, Teodoro dela Serna, Nida Regis, Enrica Regis. I saw these seven (7)
passing through the rice paddies towards the bodega.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: Were these group of people able to reach the bodega?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why?

A: They stopped on the first trampa that they reached.

Q: And upon reaching that place, what happened?

A: Dante Regis thr[e]w a piece of wood.

Q: Going to what direction?

A: Towards the bodega.

Q: And when Dante Regis thr[e]w that piece of wood towards the direction of the bodega, what happened?

A: The barangay captain, Percival Orbe, approached them and told them not to do it.

Q: And what did you observe . . . . By the way, who was that barangay captain?

A: Orbe.

Q: And what did you observe when [B]arangay [C]aptain Orbe [told] them not to do it?

A: I observed that the group got angry so Percival Orbe retreated.

Q: And when Percival Orbe approached the group, did he have any companion?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: Kagawad Antonio Macalipay.

Q: And when Percival Orbe retreated, what did Antonio Macalipay do?

A: When the barangay captain retreated, Antonio Macalipay proceeded towards the group and stop[ped] at the second trampa coming from
the bodega.

Q: Now, when you reached that place of the second trampa, what happened?

A: Julio Recto raised his jacket and pulled out a gun and pointed it to Antonio Macalipay.

INTERPRETER:

Witness standing and demonstrating.

PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: And when the gun was pointed to Kagawad Antonio Macalipay, what did Antonio Macalipay do?

A: He raised both hands.

INTERPRETER:

Witness demonstrating by raising his two (2) arms up with open palms as if in surrender, and said ['D]o not do it we will just settle this.[']

PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: And after Macalipay had said that, what happened?

A: Julio Recto shot him.

Q: And what happened to Macalipay after being shot?

A: Antonio Macalipay fell down backward.

INTERPRETER:

Witness demonstrating . . . fall[ing] backward.

PROSECUTOR MORTEL continuing:

Q: And when you saw Antonio Macalipay fall down backward, what did you do?

A: I hid behind a pil[l]ar?

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After hiding behind the pil[l]r, what did you do?

A: I ran towards an old broken down bathroom. . . . "31

Thinking that appellant had already left the bodega, Melchor, while hiding inside the old bathroom for several minutes, decided to jump out of a
broken down window32 and ran towards the national road.33

Clearly, from his arrival at the scene of the crime to his departure therefrom, Melchor was not engaged in the performance of his official duties.
Neither was he attacked on the occasion thereof.

This fact was corroborated further by the testimony of Linda Rance, who said that it was Orbe and Macalipay who had pacified appellant and his
six companions. She testified thus:

"PROSECUTOR VICTORIANO continuing:

Q: While they were discussing, what happened?

A: When they were discussing, Dante Regis thr[e]w a piece of wood.

Q: To what direction was that piece of wood thr[own] by Dante Regis?

A: Going towards our group.

Q: And how is this Dante Regis related to Cornelio Regis Jr.?

A: He is the son of Cornelio Regis, Jr.

Q: When that piece of wood was thrown towards your direction, was somebody hit?

A: No, sir.

Q: Where did that piece of wood land?

A: In front of our bodega.

Q: Was there anything hit by that piece of wood?

A: No, sir.

Q: When that piece of wood was thrown, what followed next?

A: They were already agitated.

Q: Now, because of the agitation, what happened?

A: Bgy. Captain Orbe was trying to pacify them.

Q: What about Bgy. Kagawad Antonio Macalipay, what did he do?

A: He was trying to pacify but they would not be pacified.

Q: Now, when they refused to be pacified, what did Julio Recto do?

A: Julio Recto turned his way (witness turning to her left side) and open[ed] his jacket and drew a gun.

Q: When Julio Recto drew his gun, what did Antonio Macalipay do?

A: Antonio Macalipay said, ["L]et us settle this (witness raising . . . both [of her] hands) and do not do it. (at the same time raising . . . both [of
her] hands as if in surrender[)"].

INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating.

PROSECUTOR VICTORIANO continuing:

Q: Now, [in] spite of what Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay did, what happened?

A: Julio Recto shot him once."34

Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting
and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault.35

We now determine the criminal liability of appellant with respect to the attack. He shot Melchor only once, but the latter sustained five gunshot
entry wounds36 all located at his backside, at the vicinity of his buttocks. Because the gun used by the former was a de sabog,37 each bullet
contained several pellets inside.38 In other words, a single shot from a de sabog results in the spewing of several pellets. The nature of the
weapon used for the attack and the direction at which it was aimed — the victim's back — unmistakably showed appellant's intent to kill.

However, for reasons other than his own desistance, appellant was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the
killing, since the wounds he inflicted were not mortal. In United States v. Eduave,39 this Court has held that if the wounds would not normally cause
death, then the last act necessary to produce homicide has not been performed by the offender. Thus, appellant's liability amounted only to
attempted, not frustrated, homicide.

The penalty that is lower by two degrees40 than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide shall be imposed upon appellant. After applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.

In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe — then a barangay captain, a person in authority41
— amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to
pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups.

A felony "is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." In this case, the nature of the weapon used by
appellant unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds inflicted by the accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe
were not fatal.

As evidenced by the Medico-Legal Certificate42 prepared by Dr. Ramon D. Villanueva of the Romblon Provincial Hospital and the testimony given
by Dr. Giovannie C. Fondevilla of the same hospital, Orbe sustained several gunshot wounds in the vicinity of his right elbow. Those injuries could
not have caused his death. Moreover, according to Dr. Fondevilla, no surgical intervention was required; only medication was given to him43 to
prevent any secondary infection from setting in.44

Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the death of Orbe, because the latter was
able to run away after being fired at. Although appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe
with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed
attempted homicide.

Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To
be imposed therefor should be the penalty for the most serious crime — in this case qualified direct assault — the same to be imposed in its
maximum period.45 The Indeterminate Sentence Law should also be applied in this case.

Qualified Direct Assault with Murder

(Criminal Case No. 1972)

In Criminal Case No. 1972, appellant does not question the finding of the trial court that he shot Antonio Macalipay. However, he submits that it
erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. We agree.

First, the victim's companions outnumbered those of appellant. As shown by the pleadings and records of the case, his group consisted of seven
individuals; the victims, sixteen.46

Second, the heated confrontation on April 18, 1994 arose as a consequence of an earlier judgment47 of the trial court in favor of appellant's group.
This case strained the relations of the parties who, after all, were related by blood and marriage. In fact, prior to this event, appellant — believing
that his uncle Cornelio Regis Jr. should get the landlord's share of the palay or rice harvest — attempted to harvest the fields thrice: (1) in October
1993; (2) in December 1993; and, (3) in March 1994.48 All of these attempts failed, because Linda Rance hired a group of bodyguards headed by
the victim, Emiliano "Renato" Santos.49 In short, the confrontation was not totally unexpected.
Third, both groups were armed. The exchange of gunfire was substantiated by the Medico-legal Certificates presented by both the prosecution
and the defense.50 Moreover, the deceased Santos carried a gun which Alberto Rance, son of Crestito and Linda, had given him for his
protection.51

Fourth, appellant's group asked the police station commander to assemble the workers of the disputed rice field on April 15, 1994 at the Municipal
Building of Magdiwang, Romblon, to inform them of the trial court's Decision awarding the land to Cornelio Regis Jr. For this reason, the members
of the group were to start collecting the landlord's share starting April 18, 1994. 52

Fifth, appellant was seen holding a balisong or fan knife during the heated confrontation, before he pulled out the shutgun and pointed it at the
other group.53 Macalipay, in a bold yet foolish attempt, stepped forward in front of appellant and told him: "Ayosan ta lang ini?54 (No, don't, because
we will just settle this)."55 And "[s]imultaneously with the last word in the phrase [']don't because we will just settle this, [']"56 appellant fired his gun,
killing the victim.

Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the
opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more open to attack.57 Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately
sought by appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately choose the mode of attack to kill the
victim with impunity and without risk to himself.

Jurisprudence teaches us:

"Treachery does not exist [when] the evidence does not show that appellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to ensure the killing of
[the victim] with impunity, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself. Further, the shooting took place after a heated exchange
of words and a series of events that forewarned the victim of aggression from appellant. In this case, it appears to have occurred on sudden
impulse but preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and put the deceased on
guard.58

"If the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by
the accused, but was purely accidental.59

"When there is no evidence that the accused has, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the crime, or there is no proof that the
death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, treachery cannot be considered."60

Section 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code states that "there is treachery when the offender commits any of crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

In this case, appellant was out in the open during the entire span of time from the heated discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the
shooting of Macalipay. At the time, his every action, which indicated the imminence of more violence, was visible to them — to the victim and the
latter's companions. Appellant was actually vulnerable to any attack that they could have made at the time, had they chosen to. His mode of attack
was therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder.

Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him
constituted direct assault.

Applying the provisions of Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty for complex crimes), appellant should be held liable for the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious
crime, to be imposed in the maximum period. This penalty shall comprise the maximum of his indeterminate sentence, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed for homicide.

Homicide (Criminal Case No. 1973)

We sustain appellant's conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. 1973 because, in the words of the trial judge: "The late Emiliano Santos was
only beaten to the draw by co-accused Julio Recto). It was a gun duel between the two."61 In his Brief, appellant hardly disputed this holding.
Neither do we. The maximum of the penalty imposed by the court a quo in this case was, however, taken from the minimum period of the penalty
for homicide. Considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances were proven, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence in this case
should be taken from the medium period.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 2, 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

First, in Criminal Case No. 1970, appellant is hereby CONVICTED of attempted homicide and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.

Second, in Criminal Case No. 1971, appellant is hereby CONVICTED of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide and
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty, of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional as
maximum.
Third, in Criminal Case No. 1972, appellant is hereby CONVICTED of qualified direct assault with homicide aggravated by the use of a weapon
and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum. We AFFIRM the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto.

Fourth, in Criminal Case No. 1973, the trial court's judgment convicting appellant of homicide and awarding to the victim's heirs an indemnity ex
delicto of P50,000 is AFFIRMED; but the maximum of the penalty imposed is increased to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal.

All other portions of the trial court's disposition that were not modified in the above pronouncement are deemed AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #9: RIVERA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 138553

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari are the October 16, 1998 decision1 and April 5, 1999 resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17284, which respectively affirmed in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet convicting herein petitioner Enrique "Totoy" Rivera of the crime of direct assault, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information3 for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly
committed, as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and
seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter
grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of
his official duties.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of the victim himself, Lt. Edward Leygo, and the two alleged
eyewitnesses to the incident, SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda Dup-et. For its part, the defense presented the petitioner himself and one Alfredo
Castro.

As summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals in the decision herein assailed, the People’s version 4 is, as follows:

On March 20, 1993 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo, Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol of
the La Trinidad Police Station, La Trinidad, Benguet and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conducting routinary patrol on board a police car
somewhere in Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet when they came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the stall of accused Enrique "Totoy"
Rivera which was located along the Halsema Highway at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the
manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. I-91 (Exhibit "C") which prohibits, among others, the loading and unloading of chicken
manure along the sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15 meters from the center of the Halsema Highway located at La Trinidad, Benguet. The
driver complied with the police directive. The policemen then escorted the truck back to Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet and proceeded to the
police headquarters.

Not long after, SPOI Jose Bangcado and SPOI Rivera Dayap, members of the La Trinidad Police under Inspector Leygo were conducting patrol
aboard a police car somewhere at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet when they observed a truck loaded with chicken dung proceeding towards Shilan,
La Trinidad, Benguet. Having in mind the instructions of La Trinidad Mayor Edna C. Tabanda and their Commanding Officer Inspector Leygo to
Implement Ordinance No. I-91, the two policemen followed and stopped the truck at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet. Immediately they called Inspector
Leygo on the radio and informed him that they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung. Inspector Leygo ordered them to restrain the truck, as he
would be proceeding to the area.

Knowing that the truck being restrained by the two policemen was the same truck which they had escorted earlier from Shilan, La Trinidad,
Benguet, Inspector Leygo felt ignored and insulted. He immediately called SPO4 Justino Tiwtiwa, SPO1 Baldwin Ngolab and SPO1 Joseph
Basquial and the group sped to Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet.

Meanwhile, back at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the accused arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo did and ordered the driver not to obey
the policemen but instead obey him, as he (accused) was the boss. The truck driver followed the accused’s order and drove the truck towards
Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet with the accused following closely behind in his vehicle.

Inspector Leygo and his group arrived in time to see the truck pulling away and so they gave chase. The police were able to overtake and stop the
truck at Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo confronted the truck driver and asked him why he still insisted on proceeding to
Shilan to unload chicken manure despite the fact that he was ordered to go back earlier in the evening. The truck driver stated that he was just
following the orders of the accused. Immediately, Inspector Leygo turned around to see the accused who had at that time alighted from his vehicle
behind the truck. Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying the ban on the unloading and loading of chicken manure. Instead
of answering however, the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and uttered words like "Babalian kita ng buto" (I’ll break your bones).
"Ilalampaso kita" (I’ll scrub you). "Pulis lang kayo" (you are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector Leygo who was a
little bit angry warned the accused to stop uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and then informed him that he was
being arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance
and challenged the policeman. Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he was being arrested. The accused
responded by punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused.
Finally, with the help of Policemen Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but
he resisted until Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany him.

The accused was brought to the police headquarters where Inspector Leygo immediately called Mayor Tabanda who arrived at about 10:00
o’clock that same evening. She confronted the two protagonists and at the same time admonished the accused for violating Ordinance No. I-91.
Mayor Tabanda then accompanied the accused and Inspector Leygo to the Benguet General Hospital where both were examined by Dr. Antonio
T. Carino. In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "A") of Inspector Leygo, his injury described as "contusion with 0.5 laceration, upper lip, left side"
with healing period from 5 to 7 days. Subsequently, this present case was filed against the accused.

Reproduced from the same decision of the appellate court, the defense’s version5 runs:

At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of March 20, 1993, while the accused was at the Trading Post at Km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet, the driver
reported to him that he was prevented by the police from unloading chicken manure at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. The accused reminded the
driver that he should have brought the chicken manure to Acop, Tublay, Benguet where dealers sell it when prevented from unloading within the
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. As it would be more expensive to return the chicken dung to Batangas where it came from, the accused told
the driver to bring the chicken dung to Acop, Tublay, Benguet. The driver expressed his fear that the police might stop him along the way and so
the accused ordered the driver to proceed and gave him the assurance that he (accused) would follow later.

The truck then proceeded as instructed and the accused following after a short while. Arriving at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the accused noticed
that the truck was stopped at the side of the road while a police vehicle and three policemen were across the road. Thinking that the policemen
were there trying to extort money from the driver, the accused told the truck driver to proceed. The truck driver complied and the accused tailed
along.

When the truck and the accused reached Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, he heard a police siren from behind. Immediately, a police vehicle
overtook the truck, another police vehicle was running along side the accused’s vehicle and a third police vehicle was right behind them. Thus, the
truck and the accused had no recourse but to stop.

Inspector Leygo alighted from one of the police vehicles and angrily uttered so many words at the accused. The policeman then held the collar of
accused’s jacket and forced the latter to get out of his vehicle while shouting "Ang tigas ng ulo mo. Sige, bumunot ka." (You are very stubborn. Go
ahead, draw your gun.) The accused explained that he had no gun to draw while removing his jacket and raising his hands to show that there was
no gun on his body. Inspector Leygo then held the left hand of the accused and tried to put handcuffs on him. The accused tried to resist, pleading
that he had no fault and at the same time asking what infraction of law he committed. Inspector Leygo answered by uttering insulting words and
pointing his left forefinger on the accused’s face while his right hand was poking a gun on the accused. The accused noticed that the policeman
smelled of liquor.

A crowd started to gather around the scene. Sensing that the onlookers were on his side, the accused stated that he was going to get his camera
inside his vehicle. As he was opening the door, Inspector Leygo suddenly slapped and boxed him in the stomach causing the accused to feel
dizzy. This assault weakened him and so he did not resist when the police pushed him inside the police vehicle. Inspector Leygo then ordered his
men to bring the accused to the police headquarters. The accused recognized Alfredo Castro among the onlookers and because he (accused)
knew him to be one of the chicken dung dealers, asked him (Castro) to accompany him to the police headquarters for fear that something might
happen.

At the police station, the accused suggested that Inspector Leygo should undergo medical examination to determine if the policeman was positive
of alcoholic breath. The accused, however, was examined ahead and was issued a medical certificate (Exhibit "4") which described his injury as
"erythema, lip left side face" and "contusion-midepigastric area". The healing period is from 3 to 5 days. With him sustaining this injury, the
accused now wonders why this charge was filed against him.

After weighing the parties’ respective versions of the incident, the trial court found that of the People more credible. Accordingly, in its decision of
April 22, 1994,6 it convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault and sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused
Enrique "Totoy" Rivera GUILTY and sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor as
MINIMUM to One (1) Year, One (1) Month and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner then went on appeal to the Court of Appeals whereat his
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17284.

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its decision7 of October 16, 1998, affirmed in toto that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED,
and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its resolution of April 5, 1999. 8

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, submitting for our consideration the principal issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.

We AFFIRM.

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.9

Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault
is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in
authority.10

In this recourse, petitioner argues that the appellate court, like the trial court, erred in finding the testimony of complainant Lt. Leygo as clear and
convincing. In an attempt to impugn the latter’s credibility, petitioner contends that Lt. Leygo was mumbling while giving his testimony, adding that
the latter failed to identify which of his (petitioner) hands was used and the precise distance between them when he punched the police lieutenant.

Admittedly, the record shows that the trial judge had to call Lt. Leygo’s attention for testifying in such a low voice while on the witness box.
Evidently, however, this did not prevent the trial court into believing his testimony and from according it full faith and credit. As it is, the witness was
able to narrate and communicate the events that transpired. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the witness to have clearly and
adequately recounted how the incident happened, and we find no valid reason to discredit the truth and veracity of his narration. We quote:

Q Now, you said that Mr. Rivera faced you, when he faced you after he removed his jacket what did you do?

A He positioned himself in a fighting stance, sir.

Q What do you mean "in the fighting stance"?

A He raised his fist. (Witness raised his hands with his clenched fist in front of him).

Q How about you, what did you do when Mr. Rivera did that?

A I informed him that I am arresting him.

Q How far were you when he faced you at first?

A At first before I went near him is about 6 feet, sir.

Q Now, you said you approached him, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when you approached him?

A I told him that I am arresting him, sir.

Q And what was his response?

A He punched me at my face, sir.

Q You said he punched you, with what hand did Mr. Rivera punch you?

A I think it is his left hand, sir. 11

Nor is Lt. Leygo’s credibility any less diminished by the circumstance that he failed to categorically identify which of petitioner’s hands was used in
punching him, and the exact distance between them at that time. In all likelihood, this police officer was not expecting a physical attack by the
petitioner as he was just confronting the latter about the prohibited unloading of chicken dung when petitioner laid hand on him. Under this
scenario, any person, like Lt. Leygo, cannot be expected to remember every single detail of the incident with perfect recall.12 For sure, far from
adversely affecting Lt. Leygo’s credibility, his failure to recall every minute detail of what transpired even fortifies it. We have thus held that the
failure of a witness to recall each and every detail of an occurrence may even serve to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility because it
erases any suspicion of a coached or rehearsed testimony.13 What is vital in Lt. Leygo’s testimony is the fact that petitioner punched him on his
face, about which he was steadfast and unflinching.
In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the
trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while
testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are
final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.14

Petitioner also asserts that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda Dup-et did not corroborate Lt. Leygo’s
testimony. For, while SPO1 Bangcado merely testified during direct examination that petitioner punched Lt. Leygo, this witness failed to reiterate
said testimony during cross-examination. As regards prosecution witness Brenda Dup-et, petitioner alleged that this witness never testified that
petitioner boxed Lt. Leygo.

The imputed shortcomings in the testimonies of said two (2) prosecution witnesses are not of their own making. A witness is supposed to confine
his answers only to questions propounded of him. Here, the defense counsel focused his line of questioning on what the two protagonists were
doing immediately prior to the punching incident, and the answer correctly received by counsel was that both petitioner and Leygo were pushing
each other. There is no showing that counsel asked the witness as to what happened after the pushing incident, as what the public prosecutor did
of SPO1 Bangcado during the latter’s direct examination, to wit:

PROS. BOTENGAN:

Q And what happened when they faced each other?

A Totoy Rivera was shouting at Lt. Leygo, sir.

Q What was he shouting?

A "Bakit ninyo ako tinutugis, hindi ako criminal. Magbabayad kayo rito. Hindi ninyo ako kaya, pulis lang kayo." And some other words but I cannot
remember them all, sir.

Q What else, if any, did he say?

COURT:

He said he cannot remember the other words.

WITNESS:

There is one thing more, sir. "Ilalampaso kita. Babalian kita ng buto." And others, sir.

PROS. BOTENGAN:

Q To whom was Mr. Rivera saying this?

A To Lt. Leygo, sir.

Q What was Mr. Rivera doing when he said these?

A He was pointing to the face of Lt. Leygo and they are becoming closer and closer with each other, sir.

Q At that time, what was Lt. Leygo doing?

A What I saw was they were pushing to one another and after that Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, sir.

Q You said they were pushing one another, what part of their body were they holding?

A At the breast, sir.

Q So each one was holding each other’s breast, is that what you mean?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long did they push each other?

A Seven to ten seconds, sir.

Q And was Lt. Leygo saying anything?

A He was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, sir.

Q You said that he was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, did you hear him if he says anything?

A He was convincing Totoy Rivera to go to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q You said Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, what part of the body of Lt. Leygo was hit?

A His face, sir.

Q What part of his face?

A Here, sir. (Witness referring to his lower lip. Witness is holding his lower lip).

Q What happened when Lt. Leygo was hit?

A He ordered us to arrest Totoy Rivera, so were able to subdue Totoy Rivera and placed him in the car, sir. 15

But even assuming, in gratia argumente, that Lt. Leygo’s testimony was not corroborated by the two (2) other prosecution witnesses during their
cross-examinations, still the day cannot be saved for the petitioner. Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a single witness,
if straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and evidence are assessed in terms of
quality, not quantity. It is not uncommon, then, to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. Corroborative
evidence is deemed necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observations
had been inaccurate.16 Unfortunately for the petitioner, the trial court found nothing to indicate that Lt. Leygo falsified the truth or that his
observations had been inaccurate.

Petitioner theorizes that he could not have hit Lt. Leygo, what with the circumstance that his co-policemen were present at the scene of the
incident, and he finds it unusual that none of them retaliated if he really hit Lt. Leygo.

We are not persuaded. The evidence on record clearly bears out that it was Lt. Leygo who was attacked by petitioner, not the other way around,
as petitioner would want us to believe. Both the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are one in saying that it was only petitioner who
was in confrontation with Lt. Leygo. Evidently, petitioner’s anger started to burst when the truck driver reported to him that Lt. Leygo prohibited the
unloading of the chicken dung and ordered him to return, such that when the same delivery truck was again intercepted by Lt. Leygo’s group,
petitioner’s anger was too much for him to contain. We quote with approval what the trial court has said in its decision:

The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on the cop. But the bigger question is, how then did the policeman sustain his injuries? It is
highly improbable, if not absurd, for the policeman to inflict it on himself. It is also very unlikely that his co-policemen would punch him just to make
it appear that the accused did it. The accused admits of being at the place. He admits having been confronted by the policeman but he denies that
he ever lifted a finger against the policeman. Yet all the witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense are in accord in saying that it was only
the accused who was in confrontation with the policeman. The only logical conclusion that can be derived from this is that it is indeed the accused
who punched the policeman. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness but it must be credible in itself.
No better test has yet been found to measure the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 186 SCRA 751).1awphi1.zw+

That the other police officers did not retaliate is no basis for us to share petitioner’s submission that Lt. Leygo was the aggressor. In the nature of
things, they naturally reacted the way they should, i.e. placed petitioner under arrest when ordered by Lt. Leygo.

Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his official duties as a police officer and as Deputy Chief of Police for
Operation and Patrol at the time he was attacked.

Again, We disagree.

It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He was wearing the
designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken
manure. Because the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck
driver to return from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver to return to Shilan, the place
where the truck was first intercepted, and on being informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to assume it did
return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing so.

Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his lawful duties as a police officer when
the assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.

Nor are we impressed by petitioner’s submission that the prosecution’s failure to present the doctor, who examined Lt. Leygo, proved disastrous to
the People’s case, arguing that the alleged injury of Lt. Leygo cannot be proved without the testimony of the attending physician.
That Dr. Antonio T. Carino did not testify on the medical certificate he issued is of no moment. If ever, the medical certificate is only corroborative
in character and is not an indispensable element of the crime of direct assault filed against petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against
petitioner is no less Lt. Leygo’s credible and consistent testimony that he was punched on his face by the petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task for sustaining the trial court’s observation that he exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of
authorities.

We have consistently ruled that the trial court judge is in the best of position to see and observe the demeanor, actuation and countenance of a
witness, matters which are not normally expressed in the transcripts of his testimony. We see no reason, therefore, to disturb the following
observations of the trial court in its decision:

The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also shows that he is the kind who is impatient with authority. His manner of answering
questions bespeaks of one who has trouble abiding with authority. He portrayed a very aggressive manner and his answers were always on the
defensive as if he had every right in this world to do and say whatever he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of
authority.

In closing, let it be noted that the attention of this Court has not been called to of any ulterior or improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. Absence such a motive, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CASE #10: MALLARI v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020

LEONEN, J.:

When a person being apprehended by a police officer resists or uses force that is not dangerous, grave, or severe, the offense is not direct assault
under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Instead, the proper offense is resistance and disobedience to an agent of a person in authority,
penalized under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 questioning the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Municipal Trial Court4 and the Regional Trial Court's5 conviction of Jonah Mallari y Samar (Mallari) for the crime of direct assault
upon an agent of a person in authority.

An Information was filed against Mallari on May 31, 2007.6 It read:

That on or about the Twelfth (12th) day of January 2007, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused while being pacified by PO2 Richard F. Navarro who was a duly qualified and appointed police officer of Olongapo City
and while the latter was in the actual performance of his official duties, that is, maintaining peace and order in the said locality, and the said
accused well knowing before and during the assault that PO2 Richard F. Navarro who was a duly appointed police officer, as such, an agent of a
person in authority, did then and there willfull, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, kick and slap said police officer.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

Mallari pleaded not guilty to the charge during her arraignment. Trial then ensued.8

The prosecution presented the victim, Police Officer 2 Richard Navarro (PO2 Navarro), along with Senior Police Officer 3 Melanio Merza (SPO3
Merza) and Dr. Rolando Mafel Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), as its witnesses.9

The incident transpired on the early morning of January 12, 2007. According to the prosecution, at around 6:45 a.m., the Olongapo Police Station
3 received a report of an altercation on the ground floor of GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon Avenue. At this, PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza, who
were both in uniform, went to the scene. There, they found two (2) groups of women fighting and pulling each other's hair out, among them a
visibly drunk Mallari. The officers rushed to stop the fight.10

Once the squabble was over, the officers asked the women to go to the police station to file proper complaints. However, the intoxicated Mallari
shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka sasama sa inyo."11 She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and
kicked his legs several times. To restrain her, PO2 Navarro held her by the shoulders and brought her to the back of the patrol car. SPO3 Merza
was about to pacify the other women, but they eventually agreed to go to the police station. The incident was entered in the blotter and Mallari was
detained for direct assault.12

PO2 Navarro was treated at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital for the minor injuries he got from Mallari.13 Dr. Ortiz issued him a medical
certificate stating that he had sustained swelling on the zygomatic area, or the cheekbone.14

The defense presented the sole testimony of Mallari.15

Mallari testified that at around 6:00 a.m. that day, she and her co-workers were singing at a karaoke bar in GenX Billiard Hall when they got into a
heated argument with another group of women, which then escalated to a physical fight. The ruckus prompted the bar owner to send the women
downstairs, but their fighting only continued.16

Later, Mallari added, the police arrived and ordered them to board the patrol car. Mallari initially obeyed, but after noticing that her companions did
not, she alighted from the vehicle. PO2 Navarro pushed her back in by holding her stomach and the collar of her blouse. When she still attempted
to alight, PO2 Navarro grabbed her by the ankles, spreading her legs open in the process. When he pulled her down, she hit her head and neck
on the vehicle's floor, her buttocks hitting the ground.17

After composing herself from the embarrassment, Mallari boarded the car and went with the officers to the police station. There, she was surprised
that PO2 Navarro claimed that she had slapped him several times. She then called her mother and went to the hospital for a medical
examination.18 She was found to have sustained the following injuries:

Contusion 2x2 cm medical aspect M/3 left forearm

Contusion 2x2 cm medical aspect P/3 left forearm

Contusion 2x2 cm post aspect D/3 left forearm

Contusion 0.5x0.5 cm antero-medical aspect M/3 right forearm

Abrasion 2 cm interscapular area

Swelling left thenar eminence.19

Mallari later filed a Complaint against PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza for unlawful arrest, illegal detention, maltreatment of prisoners, and physical
injuries. This was eventually dismissed by the Office of the Prosecutor.20

In its September 5, 2013 Decision,21 the Municipal Trial Court found Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. It noted that Mallari admitted to kicking PO2 Navarro and grabbing his shirt while he was performing his official duties. It
likewise gave premium to the prosecution's positive testimony against Mallari's defense of denial.22 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JONAH MALLARI y SAMAR, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and hereby sentences her to suffer an imprisonment of prision
correccional in its medium period of 3 yrs, 6 mos and 21 days to 4 years, 9 mos and 10 days and to pay the fine of PHp1,000.00. With costs
against the accused.

SO DECIDED.23 (Emphasis in the original)

The Regional Trial Court affirmed Mallari's conviction in its July 30, 2014 Decision.24 It found that all the elements of the offense were present:
PO2 Navarro was an agent of a person in authority, and Mallari kicked, slapped, and injured him while he was engaged in the performance of his
official duty. It found that no improper motive could be traced to the prosecution's witnesses who clearly testified on the matter. It also noted that
Mallari's defenses and denials were weak and uncorroborated.25

The Court of Appeals, in its October 27, 2015 Decision, 26 affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court's Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 30, 2014 of the RTC, Branch 74, Olongapo
City, in Criminal Case No. 44-14 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the imposable penalty.

Petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred (Php500.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original)

In ruling so, the Court of Appeals found that PO2 Navarro's testimony was credible and clear on how the incident occurred, while Mallari was
unable to substantiate her claims. It held that Mallari was the aggressor and PO2 Navarro was only compelled to restrain her as she was kicking
him.28

The Court of Appeals denied Mallari's Motion for Reconsideration in a May 12, 2016 Resolution. 29

Thus, Mallari filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,30 claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining her conviction.

Petitioner argues that PO2 Navarro's testimony that she repeatedly kicked and slapped him was inconsistent with his injury of a slightly swollen
cheekbone.31 She points out that it was she who suffered several injuries, consistent with her allegation that PO2 Navarro "held her feet, pulled her
to the ground and caused her to hit her head, neck and buttocks,"32 despite no aggression coming from her. Thus, she says that her testimony
should have been given more credence.33

Assuming that she did kick PO2 Navarro, petitioner asserts that she was fully justified in doing so as the officer unnecessarily held her feet, which
constitutes unlawful aggression on her honor and dignity.34

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, argued back that the Petition must be denied as it raises a
question of fact, which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.35

In any case, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that petitioner's assault on PO2 Navarro was sufficiently established. It points out that the
medical certificate stating that PO2 Navarro had a slightly swollen cheekbone does not negate his testimony that he was repeatedly kicked by
petitioner, as she herself admitted attacking the officer. It also raises the other officers' testimonies affirming what had happened. From the totality
of evidence, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that Mallari is the aggressor and her denials are weak defenses.36 That PO2 Navarro was a
police officer on official duty when petitioner assaulted him completes the elements of the offense charged.37

For this Court's resolution is the sole issue of whether or not petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct assault
upon an agent of a person in authority.

This Court modifies the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

We affirm that the prosecution's evidence is sufficient to uphold the findings of fact against petitioner. Questions of fact may no longer be raised in
Rule 45 petitions. In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Company:38
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of
Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject
of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts.

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it
is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is
one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are
correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.

....

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly, holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court
may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. 39 (Citations omitted)

In this case, the Municipal Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals all consistently found that petitioner slapped and kicked
PO2 Navarro while he was on official duty as a police officer.40 The lower courts arrived at this conclusion after thoroughly examining both parties'
evidence. This Court will no longer disturb their uniform findings.

However, petitioner should not be held guilty of direct assault, but rather, of the crime of resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes direct assault:

ARTICLE 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any
of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Direct assault may be committed in two (2) ways:

[F]irst, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance.41 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In this case, petitioner is charged with the second mode of assault. Its elements are the following:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.

5. That there is no public uprising.42

A police officer is an agent of a person in authority.43 An agent of a person in authority is one who, "by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority[.]"44 Being a police officer,
PO2 Navarro is an agent of a person in authority.

Petitioner was also aware that PO2 Navarro was a police officer. He introduced himself as one and was in his police uniform.1a₩phi1 He was
performing his official duties as a police officer when he was pacifying the melee, and right when petitioner attacked him. Thus, the second, third,
fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this case.
However, the first element of the offense is not present.

To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of a person in authority must be serious.

In United States v. Gumban,45 this Court held that the amount of force employed against agents of persons in authority spells the difference
between direct assault and resistance of disobedience:

In reaching this conclusion, we took into account the decision rendered by this court in the case against Gelacio Tabiana and Canillas, in which it
is said that the distinction between an assault and a resistance to agents of authority lies largely in the amount of the force employed in each case,
and that a sudden blow given to a policeman while engaged in effecting an arrest does not constitute that employment of force which is
punishable as assault. We have also considered the decision rendered by this court in the case against Cipriano Agustin . . . in which it was also
held that a blow upon a policeman was not an aggression amounting to an assault. It must be remembered, however, that in these two cases the
crime involved was that of assault upon agents of authority, in which the essential element is substantially the force employed. It is said in these
two cases that any force is not sufficient to constitute an assault[,] but that it is necessary to consider the circumstances of each case to decide
whether the force used is, or is not, sufficient to constitute assault upon an agent of authority.46 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Previous convictions for direct assault against an agent of a person in authority involve force that is more severe than slapping and punching. In
United States v. Cox,47 the accused "seized [the police officer] by the throat, threw him to the ground, and struck him several blows with the club
which he succeeded in wresting from the policeman[.]"48

In Rivera v. People,49 the accused repeatedly hurled menacing threats against the police officer, challenged him to a fight, and scored a punch on
the lip as they grappled. The officer sustained an injury that would take several days to heal, while the accused was only subdued with the help of
other police officers. Thus:

... the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and uttered words like "Babalian kita ng buto" (I'll break your bones). "Ilalampaso kita" (I'll scrub
you). "Pulis lang kayo" (you are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the
accused to stop uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and then informed him that he was being arrested for violation of
the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the
policeman. Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he was being arrested. The accused responded by
punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the
help of Policemen Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but he resisted until
Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany him.

. . . In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "A") of Inspector Leygo, his injury described as "contusion with 0.5 laceration , upper lip, left side" with
healing period from 5 to 7 days. Subsequently, this present case was filed against the accused.50

As clarified in People v. Breis,51 if the use of physical force against agents of persons in authority is not serious, the offense is not direct assault,
but resistance or disobedience:

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not serious in nature constitutes resistance or
disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of
a person in authority or his agent is measured by the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of the
transgression, rather than the source of the order disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be considered direct
assault, but is resistance nonetheless.52 (Citations omitted)

Resistance or disobedience is punished under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously
disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100
pesos shall be imposed upon the offender. For this crime to be proven, the two (2) key elements must be shown: "(1) That a person in authority or
his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously
disobeys such person or his agent."53

In United States v. Tabiana,54 where the accused hit the police officer with his fist, this Court explained the rationale behind the distinction in the
force used: Upon the whole we find the defendant Tabiana guilty of resistance and serious disobedience to public authority under article 252,
Penal Code, and not of the more serious offense indicated in subsection 2 of article 249, Penal Code, which was applied by the Court of First
Instance. The question whether an offense consists of simple resistance or to grave resistance is to be determined with a view to the gravity of the
act proved and the particular conditions under which committed. In considering this question reference should also be had to the nature and
extend of the penalties attached by the authors of the Code to the different offenses. Thus, when it is observed that the offense indicated in article
249 carries with it a penalty ranging from prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum degree, with corresponding fines, it is obvious that
the lawmaker here had in mind serious offenses, characterized in part at least by the spirit of aggression directed against the authorities or their
agents. . . .
The greatest hesitancy which we have felt in applying article 252 instead of article 249 to this case arises from the words "shall employ force
against them" (emplearen fuerza contra ellos) contained in article 249. These words, taken without reference to the context, would seem to make
absolutely necessary the application of article 249 in every case where any degree of force is exerted. We believe, however, that the words quoted
are to be understood as applying to force of a more serious character than that employed in the present instance. We are led to this conclusion
not only because of the grave penalty attached, as indicated above, but for the further reason that the Code mentions grave resistance further on
in the same paragraph and also makes special provision for the offense of simple resistance in article 252. Now practically and rationally
considered in connection with the subject of arrest, resistance is impossible without the employment of some force. A man may abscond or evade
or elude arrest, or may disobey the commands of an officer without using force but he cannot resist without using force of some kind or in some
degree. If at the ultimate moment no force is employed to resist, there is not resistance but submission; and if it had been intended that every
manifestation of force, however slight, against the authorities and their agents should bring the case under article 249, it was an idle waste of
words to make other provisions to cover grave resistance and simple resistance. It therefore seems reasonable to hold that the words in article
249 relating to the employment of force are in some degree limited by the connection in which they are used and are less peremptory than they at
first seem. Reasonably interpreted they appear to have reference to something more dangerous to civil society than a simple blow with the hands
at the moment a party is taken into custody by a policeman.55 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, it was established that petitioner grabbed the shirt of PO2 Navarro, then slapped and kicked him several times. PO2 Navarro testified:

Q: When you [saw] these (sic) commotion, what did you and Police officer Merza do?

A: We tried to stop them and introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.

Q: Who directed them to stop, and did they stop?

A; Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do next?

A We invited them at the police station, so that they will file their complaint if there is any.

Q: Did they abide on (sic) you?

A: No, sir.

Q: And what did they do?

A: After telling them to go to the police station, there was one (1) woman who shouted: 'WALA KAYO PAKIALAM SA AKIN. HINDI AKO SASAMA
SA INYO."

Q: Was the woman who shouted part of the group?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do then after you heard those words?

A: We continued telling them to board on the vehicle, but this woman slapped me and kicked me, sir.

....

Q: You said that this woman held your collar, and slapped and kicked you. How many times [were] you slapped?

A: I could not remember, sir.

Q: Where were [you] slapped?

A: On my right cheek, sir.

Q: And where were you kicked?

A: On both legs, sir.

Q: How many times were you kicked?

A: Many times, sir.56

In the January 12, 2007 Joint Affidavit of PO3 Merza and PO2 Navarro, they stated:
That upon arrival thereat we saw a two group of female persons fighting each other in front of gen-ex Billiard hall, located along Gordon Avenue,
New Asinan Olongapo City, That we immediately pacified them, introduced ourselves as a Police officers (sic) despite we wearing our official
Police uniform and invited both parties involved to our station for proper disposition, but one of the person (sic) involved later identified as Jona
(sic) Mallari Y Samar who reeking with the smell of alcoholic beverages resisted and shows disrespect and disobedience upon us, and uttered the
following remarks on top of her voice "WALA KAYO PAKIALAM SA AKIN HINDI AKO SASAMA SA INYO!" then she grabbed PO2 Navarro (sic)
uniform and repeatedly kicked him and slapped him on his face that cause (sic) an injury to his person, and placed us to an embarrassing
situation;

That we compelled to used (sic) a necessary and sufficient forced (sic) to arrest him and brought (sic) to our Station for proper disposition[.]57

Mallari also admitted to this. Her testimony reveals:

Q: Ms. Witness, in your complaint affidavit [and] ear[l]ier you mentioned that PO2 Navarro was in uniform, and he was inviting you to go to the
police station, and in 2.4 paragraph of your complaint affidavit Ms. Witness, on the last portion of the paragraph you mentioned "I was afraid he
might again harm me, so I grabbed his shirt to push him away and kick him away." Now, you admit having grabbed the shirt of police officer
Navarro?

A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.

Q: You admit having kicked him?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: I will let you read the part, "when I get up, PO2 Navarro approached me." So he was not doing anything but approaching you, correct?

A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.

Q: And upon getting near you Ms. Witness you grabbed his shirt and kicked him?

A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.58

Based on the circumstances, petitioner's resistance and use of force are not so serious to be deemed as direct assault. While she exerted force, it
is not dangerous, grave, or severe enough to warrant the penalties attached to the crime.

Moreover, PO2 Navarro himself stated that he was not kicked hard:

Q: Were you kicked hard by the accused?

A: Not really hard, sir.

Court: Did you resent being kicked in the presence of other ladies?

A: Yes, Your Honor. 59

Thus, instead of direct assault, this Court convicts petitioner of resistance or disobedience.

When the crime proved is different from the offense alleged, the accused may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proven.60 Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court provide:

SECTION 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SECTION 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

In this case, although the charge is direct assault, the prosecution was able to prove resistance or disobedience. These offenses have similar
elements, varying only as to the degree of seriousness of the offender's resistance. Direct assault necessarily includes resistance or disobedience.

WHEREFORE, this Court MODIFIES the October 27, 2015 Decision and May 12, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
36835. Petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of resistance or disobedience under Article 151
of the Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor, which covers one (1) month and one (1) day,
as minimum, to six (6) months, as maximum, and a fine not exceeding P500.00. SO ORDERED.