Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.

L-40502 and L-42670, 29 November 1976 (filed

@ Laguna; Garcia died in QC; QC has JD. Preciosa assigned as administratrix)

FACTS: Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba, presided by Judge Malvar, a
petition moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the
estate of Garcia, who dies intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna and in other places, within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa, contending
that the order appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction and prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in
lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While this
reconsideration motion was pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as
special administratrix alleging besides the jurisdictional ground, that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations and has adverse interest against the estate. Judge Malvar ruled
denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule and that
Preciosa had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix
of the estate. An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of
action, and also that filed in behalf of Augustina Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for. Preciosa
and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings
before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Court of Appeals
affirmed stating the CFI of Calamba Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue is improperly laid.

HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case
based on the merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the
trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or
stipulated. On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a
portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is
more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some
cases, it may be waived or stipulated by the parties. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. In
the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be
the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna based on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death. With that, the conclusion
becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petiton for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Therefore, Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratrix. Wherefore, the
petitions of petitioner Fule are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. NOTE:
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus against his mother,
petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, before the RTC to compel petitioner to produce the
holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. In her
answer, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the
will were given to respondent and to his siblings. After the presentation and formal
offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed
to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first,
denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Respondent appealed to CA
who initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for
reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, issued the writ of
mandamus, and ordered the production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Petitioner then filed this instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to SC contending in the main
that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE/S: WON mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD: NO. Writ of Mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked. In the instant case, mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent
Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the production of the subject will. Rule 76, Section 1 and Rule 75,
Sections 2 to 5 provides the adequate remedy that respondent Lee can avail. Rule 76,
Section 1 provides that petition for allowance of will can still proceed regardless of
whether or not petitioner has the will in his possession. Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5
provides the remedy for the production of the original holographic.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 187942, 7 September

2016

FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals.The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the Regional Trial Court–
Branch 4 of Tuguegarao City declaring as null and void the sale to petitioner of
96,926 square meters of a lot located in Baggao, and ordering petitioner to reconvey
the property to Florentina Prudencio, substituted by her heirs, namely: Exequiel,
Lorenzo, Primitivo, Marcelino, Juliana, Alfredo and Rosario, all surnamed Domingo;
Avelina Prudencio, assisted by her husband Victoriano Dimaya; Ernesto Penalber and
Rodrigo Talang (respondents appellees). Felipe Prudencio married twice during his
lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio he begot five children, namely: Valentina,
Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad, he had
two children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora. During the marriage of
Felipe and Elena, they acquired a parcel of land located at Sitio Abbot, Barrio
Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot). When Elena died, Felipe and their children
became co-owners of the property. Felipe then died intestate during his second
marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of
Extra Judicial Partition of the Estate of the late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor
of Teodora .

While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the Cagayan lot was acquired
during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and Elena did not have
any children who could inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children with
Felipe are the only living heirs by operation of law. Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to
respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion Divini. Spouses Cepeda sold the
Cagayan lot to petitioner for P16,500.00. Thereafter, petitioner was issued TCT No.
T-20084. On September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for
Partition with Reconveyance against petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora,
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They alleged that they are the children
and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage.

Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful

shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declared
Teodora as the sole owner of the Cagayan lot. Thus, they prayed that they be
declared the owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion of 10.2512 hectares of the
Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to them. Spouses Cepeda
maintained that their title over the Cagayan lot was clean and that they had no
knowledge that other persons had interest on it because Teodora's title over the
property was clean. They asserted that like petitioner, they were purchasers for
value and in good faith. Therefore, petitioner has no cause of action against them.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the excluded heirs could recover what is rightfully theirs
from persons who are innocent purchasers for value 2.Whether the extra judicial
partition is binding on respondents-appellees

Held: This is a case of exclusion of the rightful heirs in the partition of the estate of
the deceased, followed by the sale of their shares to third persons who claim good
faith. Both petitioner and Spouses Cepeda consistently contend that they were not
aware that any person, other than the seller, has interest over the Cagayan lot. Thus,
they are innocent purchasers for value. In Segura v. Segura teaches that the answer
would not depend on the good faith or bad faith of the purchaser, but rather on the
fact of ownership, for no one can give what he does not have— nemo dat quod non
habet. Thus, the good faith or bad faith of the petitioner is immaterial in resolving
the present petition. A person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell; the
buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally
transfer.

The extra-judicial partition is not binding on respondents- appellees. Petitioner's title

over the Cagayan lot was derived from the title of Spouses Cepeda, who in turn
obtained their title from Teodora. Teodora, meanwhile, gained title over the entire
Cagayan lot on the basis of the ExtraJudicial Partition dated October 20, 1969.
Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) state that all
the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should
participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit: Art. 979. Legitimate children
and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Art. 981. Should children of the
deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. Thus, the children
of Felipe in his two (2) marriages should be included in the execution of the
Extra Judicial Partition. In this case, it is undisputed that respondents-appellees
were children of Felipe by his first marriage.

Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora did not deny respondentsappellees' relation
with Felipe. Despite this, however, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora declared in
the Extra-Judicial Partition that they are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of
law. They claimed that Felipe had no child with his first wife Elena, in effect depriving
respondents-appellees of their rightful shares in the estate of their parents. They
arrogated upon themselves not only the share of Felipe in the Cagayan lot but also
the shares belonging to respondents-appellees. Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is
void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no
force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and it
cannot be validated either by time or ratification.
Segura v. Segura, G.R. No. L-29320, 19 September 1988

F: A 4060 sqm land in Iloilo owned by deceased Gertrude Zamora was never divided
by her 4 sons (1 of which died) and thus 3/9 grandchildren (Defendants) executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to themselves alone as
equal pro indiviso owners excluding 6/9 of the grand children. This partition was
registered 5 years after it was executed. The six excluded grandchildren (Plaintiff)
alleged that the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null
and void insofar as these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of
the said property.

I: Did res judicata or prescription set thus warranting the dismissal of the case?

H: No and no, We hold at the outset that the present action is not barred by prior
judgment as the dismissal of the earlier complaint was without prejudice to its
refiling at a future date. plaintiffs' counsel himself moved for its dismissal on the
ground that his clients had gone to Mindanao and he did not know when they would
be returning. There is here no showing of failure to prosecute, such as an
unreasonable delay on the part of the complainants, and the appellees have not so
contended. It was clear that the plaintiffs' counsel had the intention of reviving the
case, and that must have been the impression too of the trial judge because his
order of dismissal did not state that it was with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of
Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two
years from the date of its execution in 1941.

As the challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941
was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was commenced in 1968,
should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court. This section provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of
his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor,
must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement
of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter,
he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed. It is clear that
Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who
were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right
to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

Heirs of Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005

Facts: Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel (deceased), wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in
Malabon City.The deceased left behind a sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real
estate and shares of stock. Crisanta has 2 children, Belinda (legitimate child with ex-
husband Lorenzo) and Roberto (legally adopted son).Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally
adopted son of the deceased, filed a petition for probate of an alleged will and for
the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor before the RTC of Malabon City. He
alleged that: Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of the deceased who had predeceased the
latter, was named executor therein. He was designated as alternate executor and
instituted as the testatrix’s sole heir. The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel
as special administrator of his mother’s estate. When Roberto died, his widow,
Dolores Gabriel (respondent), filed a “Manifestation and Motion where she informed
the probate court of her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as
substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the
estate of Crisanta Gabriel. She alleged that she had a bachelor’s degree in law and
had worked for several years in a law office. The heirs of Belinda (petitioner)opposed
Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta
Gabriel’s next of kin, nor the lawful wife of the late Roberto. Petitioner Bena Jean
filed a “Motion for Appointment as Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel”
praying that she be appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother
Crisanta. The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix.Lower court
held that:Dolores L. Gabriel has amply proven her kinship Roberto Y. Gabriel, and
therefore her kinship, by operation of law, with decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel. She is
the lawfully wedded wife of petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel and that the previous
marriage between petitioner and one Lucita V. Cruz was already long dissolved prior
to the celebration of marriage between Roberto and Dolores.The stringent rules
regarding the order of preference in the appointment of an (regular) Administrator
does not find application in the instant case, for what is at stake here is the
appointment of a Special Administrator as such position was vacated by the death of
Roberto, the previously appointed Special Administrator. Heirs of Belinda moved to
reconsider, which the probate court DENIED.The said heirs then filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari, praying that Bena Jean be appointed as the regular
administratrix of Crisanta Gabriel’s estate.CA dismissed the petition, finding that the
probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in appointing Dolores as
special administratrix.

Issue/s: WON the appointment of respondentDolores Gabriel as special

administratrix of the estate left by Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel is proper/correct. (YES)

Argument: Petitioners argue that: Since the respondent does not have any right to
inherit from their grandmother, either by her own right or by the right of
representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as administratrix of the estate.
They insist that the respondent’s late husband, Roberto, was just a nephew of the
decedent and not a legally adopted son as he claimed to be. Even assuming this
claim was true, the fact that the respondent is not naturally related to the decedent
by bloodin the direct descending line makes it unfair to appoint her as the special
administratrix. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court establishes the order of
preference in the appointment of such administrators, and that the underlying
assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the estate, or suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly.

Ratio: Yes–appointment of Dolores Gabriel as special administratix was

proper/correct.A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed
by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed. The appointment of a special administrator lies in the
sound discretion of the probate court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that
is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle (De Guzman
v. Guadiz). When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a
representative of the agent parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. Issuance
of such appointment is only temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator
is appointed.The principal object of appointment of temporary administrators is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, especially that the appointment
of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted4litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses
unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim
is appointed. Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Appointment
of Special Administrator.—When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance
of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. The new Rules have broadened
the basis for appointment of an administrator, and such appointment is allowed
when there is delay in granting the letters testamentary or administration by any
cause.

The Basis For appointing a special administrator under theRules5is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration such as where a contest as to the willis being carried on in the same
or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves(De Guzman v. Guadiz).oIn this case, the probate court has ample
jurisdiction (reasons)to appoint respondent as special administratrix. oThe deceased
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel left a will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the
sole heir and executor of all her properties. However, pending probate of the will,
Roberto died leaving his widow, the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the
respondent has much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s will is allowed
probate. The emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator, the
probate court does not determine the shares in the decedent’s estate, but merely
appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution.
Thus, the preference of respondent Dolores is sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. (In my understanding, special
administrator need not be the next of kin. As long as may interest siya sa estate, he
can be a special administrator.)

The Section 6, Rule 78 refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates;

Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator.The appointment of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. Thus, “the statutory
provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under Section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator (Roxas v. Pecson). oThe
petitioners’ strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. Wherefore,the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its Resolution of
March 26, 2004 are AFFIRMED. 51997 Rules of Court g. Bonds for Administrators h.
Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, Removal of Executors and
Administrators i. Inventory, Appraisal, Provision for Support for Family j. Powers and
Duties of Executors and Administrators k. Accountability and Compensation of
Executors and Administrators l. Claims against the estate - Compare with Rule 39,
Sec. 7

Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

FACTS: In 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo
and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of
the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). Claiming that the venue of
the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac
and not in Las Piñas City.

ISSUE: Was the venue of Elise’s petition improperly laid?

RULING: NO. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death: Sec. 1. Where estate
of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. The term
"resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule
in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the
estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village,
Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid
in the said city.