KYKLOS, Vol. 50 - 1997 - Fasc.

4,457483

Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus. Political Economy, Constitutional Interest and Ecological Interest
Malte Faber, Reiner Manstetten and Thomas Petersen*

I. INTRODUCTION

The basis of modem democratic societies is the constitution of liberty (Hayek 1960/1971). There are two tendencies which endanger the preservation of this constitution. On the one hand there is a tendency of modem societies to degenerate into inefficient welfare states with strongly restricted individual liberty. On the other hand, the ecological crisis threatens the natural basis of human existence and by this the necessary prerequisites of human freedom. To make the latter problem more complicated, some authors argue that modem democratic societies are, in principle, incapable of meeting ecological challenges. Therefore, they favour a kind of ecological dictatorship (Hannon 1985). From this it follows that preserving the natural basis of human existence implies giving up the constitution of liberty. In contrast to this, however, many political theorists and political economists hold the opposing view, that democracy provides the best possible political institution for the solution of all fundamental political as well as ecological problems. In general, the questions of political liberty and of the preservation of the natural basis of human existence are considered as completely different matters. We argue, however, that political liberty within a constitutional state and

* Alfred-Weber-Institut, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat, Universitat Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, 69 I17 Heidelberg; Philosophisches Seminar, Philosophisch-Historische Fakultlt, Universitat Heidelberg, Schulgasse 6, 691 17 Heidelberg. We would like to thank Peter Bernholz, John Barry, Olaf Hottinger, Thilo Lowe, John Proops, Till Requate, Armin Schmutzler, Joachim Weimann, Ulrich Witt and an anonymous referee for critical and constructive remarks. For assistance in translation we are grateful to John Proops and Christine Sing.

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ecological sustainability cannot be separated. In this paper we attempt to show that there exists a potential for mankind to act effectively in the sense of both liberty and sustainability. In particular, we deal with the corresponding anthropological prerequisites. The most successful anthropology within modem science is methodological individualism as it is expressed in the homo oeconomicus assumption. This anthropology has been applied by public choice to the question of how a constitution of liberty can be established and preserved. In addition, public choice has suggested solutions of environmental problems on the basis of the homo oeconomicus assumption. We shall show, however, that this assumption is only partly helpful in clarifying the question of what are the sufficient anthropological prerequisites for successful constitutional and ecological politics. We develop the concept of homo politicus as an approach to overcome these difficulties. In this way, we are able to draw attention to dimensions of human behaviour which are often neglected by an exclusively individualistic perspective. The present paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce the notions of political action and political actor, which delineate the scope of our approach, and we further develop criteria to be fulfilled by political actors in order to be successful. In Section Ill we refer to the public choice approach, explaining political actions on the basis of methodological individualism in general and homo oeconomicus in particular. This allows one to analyse environmental problems, since Buchanan (1975) integrated Demsetzs (1 967) version of the theory of Property Rights. We then deal with Vanbergs and Buchanans (1988) concept of the constitutional interest, which is a prerequisite for our notion of an ecological interest. These interests have in common that they are long-term interests. We shall show that there are certain difficulties in arguing with the concept of the constitutional interest on the basis of methodological individualism. In Section IV, we develop and explain the concept of homo politicus. We contrast it with the concept of homo oeconomicus. Section V shows the extent to which the notion of justice is necessary for the formulation of the constitutional interest and of the ecological interest. In Section VI we discuss the empirical relevance of our concept of homo politicus. In the final Section VIT, we argue that our approach to conceptualizing political processes does not claim to be the only explanation of certain political

1. Concrete problems concerning environmental policy, in particular the suitability of various

economic instruments and the opposition to them, originating from the bureaucracy, industry, ) voters and interest groups. are examined, e.g., in Hahn (1989a, 1989b). Siebert (1995, ch. 8 . Tietenberg (1994).

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processes, but is an attempt to make certain aspects of these processes theoretically more accessible.

11. POLITICAL ACTIONS AND POLITICAL ACTORS

Clearly, economic behaviour can be explained by the anthropology of homo oeconomicus. It is, however, an open question whether the same holds for all kinds of actions outside of the economic area. While some economists apply the homo oeconomicus assumption to all kinds of social and political questions, other social scientists are rather sceptical (cf. Morgan 1997). In our approach concerning the preservation of a constitution of liberty and the achievement of ecological sustainability, we want to conceptualize the anthropological basis which is required such that actions towards these goals may be achieved successfully. Before doing this we first want to clarify what kind of actions lie within the scope of our approach, and what are the criteria for the actors to carry through such actions successfully. The achievement of a sustainable economy confronts us with the task of a fundamental reformulation of existing political rules. Of course, the same holds for the restructuring of the social welfare state. We call such a reformulation, which concerns the life of a whole society, political action. We shall use the term political action in a somewhat unusual sense. In general, political action is considered to be behaviour concerning state matters. We, however, will restrict this notion to those decisions and actions in the area of politics which are not completely predetermined by legal rules and decrees. Thus we refer to those situations, where there is a certain scope for free action, and where the outcome is open. Our definition will not include mere administrative or bureaucratic measures, which are often considered as part of politics. Since administrative or bureaucratic measures are carried out according to existing laws and rules, they are not creative2. In contrast, political actions, as we have defined them, necessarily have traits of creativity. We shall relate political action in particular to the changing of existing political rules. Hence, all actions concerning the establishment or the changing of the constitution, as well as all actions concerning the establishment of a sustainable economy, are political actions, according to our terminology. Our central question is: What kind of anthropological basis has to be applied to understand creative political actions'? To answer this, we first make some
2. Evidently, the analysis of bureaucracy and administration can be carried out using the concept of homo oeconomicus (see, e.g., Downs 1967, Niskanen 1971).

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general remarks. The reformulation of rules in a democratic state cannot be considered as merely the implementation of a certain theoretical solution. For there exist many suggestions for solutions, and it is often the task of the political process to contribute to the evolution of a new solution. This requires interaction between the political actors, such as information exchange, argument, public discussion, persuasion and finally a decision. For the latter, the consent of a majority is necessary. Often, during the whole political process, the initial suggestions are transformed considerably over the course of time, until the new solution is found. In summary, the reformulation of the rules of a society by political action can be described as being an open and evolutionary process (see also Section IV.l below). The result of such a process is never predictable', because all suggestions for solutions, even scientific scenarios of future developments, are themselves part of this process. Of course, it is also as part of these processes that solutions are publicly discussed, rejected or accepted. Further, it may be that the accepted solutions are corrected, because of experience which occurs in the course of their realization. Suggestions for solutions that deserve to be seriously examined within such a political process should satisfy three criteria: 2 4 ) They have to be adequate concerning the matter in general, and concerning the present state of knowledge in particular. 2.(ii) They have to be flexible, so that they can be corrected in the light of new experience. 2.(iii) They have be such that it is possible, at least in principle, that the corresponding political action will find the lasting support of many individuals. Similarly, there are three criteria for the political actors participating in such political actions: 2.(iv) Individuals have to be open, so that they may learn from their experience, and be ready to change their decisions and eventually even their preferences correspondingly. 2.(v) The individuals must have an interest regarding the corresponding public affairs, i.e., an interest in finding an adequate solution, no matter what are their private interests. Only in this case can they be expected either actively to search for meaningful suggestions for solutions, or to be at least open to such suggestions. 2.(vi) A sufficient number of individuals must have the will to act according to their decision, not only temporarily, but also in the long-run. This implies

3. For the problem of predictability in politics, see Kuran (1995, p. 247 ff.). For the general limits of predictability see Faher, Manstetten and Proops (1992).

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that they are also willing to bear eventual personal disadvantage, during their pursuit of their constitutional interest or their ecological interest.

111. PUBLIC CHOICE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST AND

ECOLOGICAL INTEREST

1. State and Individual Utility Maximization

Public choice holds that each political action has to be interpreted as the aggregation of individual actions. Utility maximization of homines oeconomici leads to a state which is a constitutional democracy. The rules for collective actions are determined on the constitutional level by a constitutional contract (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). In this view, political actions result in gains for all of their participants. As political actors, however, the individuals have to incur transaction costs. If the corresponding gains could be achieved without political action, then this would be welcomed, because it would reduce the costs to the individuals. Thus, in the perspective of methodological individualism, except for their results, political actions have no value in themselves, but are seen merely as sources of costs for their participants (cf. Section IV.2 below). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) assume that, at the constitutional level, the individuals already possess certain exogenously given rights. Their approach is extended in Buchanans Limits of Liberty (1975). In contrast to The Calculus o Consent, the constitutional contract in The Limits of Liberty not only f determines the rules for decision, but also the rights of the individuals (Buchanan 1975, ch. 4). Thus these rights are endogenously derived. All these rights are interpreted as property rights, i.e., dispositional rights over resources. As Buchanan argues in the Limits of Liberty, the economic theory of rights is an indispensable prerequisite to deal with environmental questions: problems, such as the over-use of resources and of natural absorptive capacities for harmful substances, are interpreted as an insufficient definition of property rights concerning resources and environmental media, such as air and water. The constitutional contract may be reformulated or extended at any point in time, such that it also defines property rights concerning goods, which had been freely accessible up till then. In this sense, Buchanan (1975, p. 179 f.) speaks of The creation of Rights. This deals with the fact that previously unknown environmental problems may suddenly and unexpectedly arise in the course of time. Therefore, Buchanan is able to demonstrate how property rights concerning the environment may be established in a first stage of a two-staged 46 1

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Coase-process (Frey et al. 1991,p. 63 ff.). In the second stage, these rights may be negotiated and eventually exchanged on markets. In this case the participants are merely concerned with their own private utility. Comparing the prerequisites for this particular political action (viz. the creating and exchanging of property rights), it can be argued that none of the six criteria (2.(i)-2.(vi)) of Section I1 is violated. The reason for this is, however, that there is obviously no necessity to assume a public interest which is beyond the private interests of the individuals, because the creation of rights leads, at least theoretically, to gains for all of those who are concerned. Hence, criteria 2.(v) and 2.(vi) may be regarded as irrelevant for the political actors in this particular case. In the following sections we shall analyze cases in which public interests and private interests do not coincide.

2. Constitutional Interest
Buchanan (1975) and Bernholz (1978, 1995) noted an intrinsic dilemma of public choice. This approach can explain the rise of a constitutional democracy on the basis of the methodological individualism, but it cannot provide any reason for its continued existence. A constitutional democracy tends to develop into a welfare state, because of the assumed individual utility-maximizing behavioufi. This implies an ever-increasing budget, an expanding bureaucracy and a curtailing of individual rights. Because of this negative development, Buchanan (1975, 1993) pleads for a fundamental reform of those democratic states that tend to become inefficient welfare states. This reform, because of its fundamental character, is termed a constitutional revolution. It aims at the re-establishment of individual liberty, the reduction of state power, and the removal of state inefficiencies. In our terminology, a constitutional revolution is a prominent example of political

4. Buchanan conceives of a welfare state as a state which considers itself as responsible for its citizens welfare - with the corresponding expansion of political regulation and bureaucracy. Such tendencies lead to growing incapacitation of its citizens. A welfare state in the sense of Buchanan should not be confused with a state taking on social responsibilities, such as the provision of health care and others. A more optimistic view of the problems of the decay of constitutions than the one presented by Buchanan and Bernholz can be found in Frey/Kirchgissner (1994). These authors suppose that the content of the fundamental consensus based on the principle of liberty could be preserved or reestablished by suitable institutions. In particular, they emphasize the role of economic policy advisers who are capable of identifying problems and of suggesting solutions according to this fundamental consensus. 5. Compare Mueller (1989, ch. 14, 16 and 17.)

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action. A prerequisite for a constitutional revolution, however, is the willingness and agreement of virtually all individuals to behave as political actors according to criteria 2.(iv)-2.(vi). For they have to give up private advantages which are provided by the expanded welfare state, and to bear the costs which arise from their necessary political commitment for the constitutional revolution. The interest in a constitutional revolution is different from the identifiable private interests (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, pp. 139 ff.) of the individuals. In contrast to these private interests, the interest in the re-establishment of the democratic constitution is called constitutional interest (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, p. 139 ff.). In every case, the constitutional interest is a long-term interest, for to have this interest implies abandoning short-term advantages obtainable only by welfare state activity, which advantages will eventually be matched by future gains. The latter is regarded as a non identifiable self-interest, or, in a certain sense, a public interest (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, pp. 139 ff.). Following the economic, individualistic-utilitarian tradition (Vanberg and Buchanan 1988, p. I%), these three authors have tried to derive such a public interest in the re-establishment of the constitution from individual utility considerations. Their attempt, however, leads to the following problem. While the reduction of the welfare states activity certainly leads to the loss of short-term advantages, the corresponding gains are uncertain, because they may occur only in the long-run. Therefore, it can by no means be relied on that homo oeconomicus will opt for a reduction of the welfare states activity, and thus commit himselfherself as a political actor to actions in favour of the constitutional interest. Hence, political actions regarding the constitutional interest cannot be attributed to homo oeconomicus, as known in the present economic literature, because in this case it becomes obvious that homo oeconomicus does not fulfil criteria 2.(v) and 2 . ( ~ i ) ~ .

6. For Smith, as well as for Mill, political actions were not a matter of homo oeconomicus: What is now commonly understood by the term Political Economy ..._ does not treat of the whole of mans nature by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end (Mill 1836, 1967, p. 321, cf. also Persky 1995).

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3. Ecological Interest
A prerequisite for the survival of any society is the preservation of its natural foundations. This means that resources are not excessively used, that species are reasonably protected, and that the waste degradation capacities of the environment are not overused by the discharge of emissions in gaseous, liquid or solid forms. To achieve this goal implies that humans restrict their behaviour within certain limits (Solow 1992). Political actions such as considerable redistributions of property rights, reforms of political institutions, as well as drastic changes in production and consumption habits, seem to be necessary to achieve this. As a consequence, this would lead to a fundamental modification of the way of life in modem societies. All this concerns the constitutions of modem democracies. We will call the interest in the preservation of the natural basis of existence, or the interest in a sustainable economic development, an ecological interest. Evidently, all difficulties which arise from the conceptualization of the constitutional interest, concerning the preservation of liberty, are also inherent in the conceptualization of the ecological interest. Hence, given the assumption of the unrestrictedness of preferences (Arrow 1963, p. 24), the ecological interest cannot be derived from the preferences of homo oeconornicus either. The commitment to a sustainable economic development usually implies a preparedness to pay expenses now, the gains of which will only be received by future generations. Hence, there is a considerable difference between the constitutional and the ecological interest with regard to the time horizon. This is because the preservation, and re-establishment, of a constitution of liberty is primarily to benefit those alive at present. In contrast, the preservation of the natural basis of existence is, above all, beneficial to future generations. Both of these interests, the constitutional and the ecological one, have in common that they require political actions which lay down particular limits to human behaviour. The constitutional interest affords limits concerning behaviour regarding other human beings; the ecological interest affords limits concerning behaviour regarding nature. However, while the constitutional interest demands limits to behaviour, only in the sense that the liberty of all individuals has to be respected and eventually re-established, the pursuit of the ecological interest is far more restrictive to human behaviour. From methodological individualism it follows that all limits which restrict individual behaviour, be they related to human beings or to nature, have to be accepted voluntarily by the individuals at the constitutional level. Furthermore, as we have argued in Section I1 above, a sufficient number of individuals must be willing to behave

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as political actors according to criteria 2.(iv)-2.(vi), i.e., to suggest and enforce the respective limits within the political process. Neither a discussion of the ecological interest, comparable to that of the constitutional interest, nor the attempt to base the ecological interest on individual preferences, exists in the economic literature7.Hence, the individualistic approach of public choice theory does not seem to have much impact on environmental and ecological economics. Instead, the approaches of welfare economics prevail8. The characteristic feature of this approach is that the possibilities to realize individual preferences are externally limited. This has been justifiably criticized by authors of public choice theory, by posing the questions: who limits the possibilities of the individuals? And from where does the corresponding authorization and legitimization come? This criticism of public choice reproaches welfare economics for favouring authoritarian political structures. A much stronger criticism concerning authoritarian political structures holds for several authors in the area of ecological economics. Thus, for example, Hannon (1983, Bergstrom ( I 993), Berrens and Polasky (1999, even consider a forcible limitation of individual liberty to be an inevitable condition of successful environmental policy. This, however, implies two problematical consequences: (a) Ecological economics, if oriented according to welfare economics, risks favouring undemocratic, even dictatorial, solutions to environmental problems. (b) Since these policy recommendations are in contrast to the interests and preferences of very many individuals, it is hardly possible to enforce them within the actual political process. From our argument so far,it follows that there exists a dilemma: welfare economics can conceptualize an ecological interest, but it does not respect the liberty of the individuals to act according to their own will. In contrast, public choice theory respects the will of the individuals, but is not able to formulate an ecological interest, on the basis of methodological individualism. Similarly, an analogous dilemma exists for the formulation of the constitutional interest. How can we conceptualize a constitutional and an ecological interest based on the free decisions of individuals?

7. For public choice approaches see, e.g., Daly and Mayor (1986), Abbot and Brady (1990), Horbach (1992). Mixon (1995). That there are relatively few studies on public choice and environmental issues is also noted by Frey and Schneider (1996, p. 14, fn. 5). For a criticism of the public choice perspective on environmental topics in general see ONeill (1995). 8. Exceptions are, for example, Downing (1981, 1984). Maloney and McCormick (1982), Hahn (1989a. 1989b).

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In the following, employing our two notions of political action and political actor, we attempt to develop a theoretical approach, which allows an answer to these questions. We will show, at least theoretically, that it is possible to enforce long-term environmental policy in a constitutional democracy, which allows the achievement of sustainable economic development. Further, a successful long-term environmental policy can only be expected to be developed in a constitutional democracy. Dictatorships, on the other hand, not only destroy liberty, but they are also incapable of solving environmental problems. For the latter statement there is plenty of evidence, as the experience concerning environmental policy in the East European socialist states, or in other authoritarian states, has shown.

1V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST AS THE INTEREST IN THE COMMUNITY: THE HOMO POLITICUS

1. The Notion of Hotno Politicus

Our analysis leads to the result, that whenever long term interests are concerned, such as the constitutional and the ecological interest, the representative homo neconoinicus does not fulfil the criteria 2.(v) and 2.(vi). Nevertheless, we observe in reality, that at least once in a while long term interests are realized. Therefore, we suggest the methodological principle of homo oeconomicus be supplemented by a complementary methodological principle. Of course, homo oeconomicus remains indispensable for the explanation of certain dimensions of politics. This approach, however, does not represent the only method to explain such processes, because its scope is limited. Generally, it is assumed that the behaviour of homo oeconomicus is predictable, if hisher preference ordering and restrictions are known. In contrast, political action requires behaviour which has essential aspects of spontaneity. Since the political process is open and evolutionary, the political actors have to respond to changing circumstances, i.e., have to act spontaneously and flexibly.
9. Of course, the concept of homo oecononzicirs can he supplemented such that it comprises also long term interests. It is in this sense that Buchanan (1975, 1977) requires a constitutional interest and Bernholz (1991, p. 278; 1995, p. 247) a lexicographic preference for liberty as part of the preferences of homo oeconomicux Both authors thus solve the problem by adding heterogeneous presuppositions. For such an approach, however, Kirchgassners (1991, p. 143, p. 164) remark holds that by the addition of heterogeneous presuppositions the theory loses its empirical meaning, becomes empty and finally the model is reduced to a mere tautology.

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As a consequence of our analysis of political action in Section 11, the political actor has to be understood as being capable of spontaneously doing what shehe considers beneficial to the community in a given situation, no matter what the external incentives, hisher habits and preferences may be (cf. criterion 2 4 ~ ) ) . Thus the political actor has to be able to do something which may be completely unexpected by others, and perhaps even by himselfherself. However, not only is the outcome of a political action unpredictable at the level of the individual, but also, and above all, at the level of the community. For the political actor cannot be regarded as a representative individual behaving like all the others, as it is often assumed for homo oeconomicus. At the level of political action, the individuals heterogeneity is an essential element, in so far that human beings are not only many in number but, at the same time, are different individuals. The outcomes of the interaction of spontaneously acting political actors are fundamentally unpredictable. This explains why, as stated above, we conceive political action to be an evolutionary process. We shall call the political actor, i.e., the individual who takes part in political actions and fulfils the criteria 2.(iv) to 2.(vi) stated above, homo politicus). With this concept we take up the idea of the citizen (the citoyen in contrast to the bourgeois), which was developed and repeatedly expounded in political philosophy, in particular in the period of classical liberalism. Homo politicus is a principle to explain political action as defined above. Political action, although neither irrational nor altruistic, has its own logic which is different from that of economic action.ll To elaborate the specific difference between economic and political action, as well as the difference between the corresponding homines, we conceive homo politicus and homo oeconomicus as

10. The term honio pditicus was introduced by Anthony Downs in English-speaking countries (1957), and by Ralf Dahrendorf (1958, 1964, p. 13) in the German-language literature, This term, however, is frequently used in an unspecific way, such as by Gerhardt (1990, p. 229), for example. Often, as, e.g., Downs does, honiopoliricus is defined as the human being in the field of political institutions. Downs maintains that hurnans behave in the political area as rational utility maximizers. In this sense Kirchgdssner points out that homopoliticus has in the mean time proved to he identical with homo oeconomic.us (1991, p. IX; our translation). In contrast to this approach, our notion of homo politicus is rather different. 11. Recently, Brennan and Lomasky (1993) and - implicitly - Kuran (1995) argue against the assumptions of Public Choice theory that economic action and political action are different. In marked contrast to our approach, however, Brennankomasky and Kuran analyze politics a h typically being a process of preference falsification. BrennanLomasky, in particular, are arguing the BuchananfTullock assumption of equivalence of Pareto criterion and unanimity rule to he false (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p. 252, Brennan and Lomasky 1993, p. 125. p. 130, p. 14 I). According to Brennan/Loinasky and Kuran, in most cases political decisions and public opinion dont mirror private preferences (Kuran 1995, p. 60).

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mere methodological postulates. The question whether homo politicus is or is not of empirical relevance will be discussed in Section VI below. Here we are interested in the theoretical implications of homo politicus. Of course, we claim that the concept of homo politicus, just as the concept of homo oeconomicus, provides insights for the comprehension of important features of reality. What traits characterize homo politicus? Besides the general criteria 2.(iv) to 2.(vi) given in Section 11, homo politicus acts according to the following two specific conditions: Shehe acts voluntarily in public, in community with others, and shehe has the aim to further the welfare of the political community. In the following we will elaborate and discuss these two conditions.

2. Homo Politicus in Public Homo politicus does not necessarily differentiate himselfherself from homo oeconomicus by hisher motivation. Political actors often exhibit ambition; they strive for power and public office, and also the material advantages these bring*. Of course, behaviour according to such motives may be interpreted as a special kind of utility maximization by homo oeconomicus. If these motives were the only ones, we would not need the concept of homopoliticus. In contrast to homo oeconomicus, however, homo politicus acts in public. For this reason a political actor will, in general, not argue with his private preferences in a public debate. Rather s h e h e is forced to formulate hisher position in such a way that shehe can claim, be it correct or not, that hisher argument articulates the interest of the societyL3.

12. Our notion of homo politicus touches upon Habermas concept of deliberative politics (1992, p. 349 ff.). However, Hahermas (1981, I, p. 397) leaves little room for selfish goals in his framework. With its strong normative implications. the concept of Habermas is not suitable for the description of real political processes (cf. Kirchgassner 199 I , p. 182, pp. 184 f., FreylKirchgassner 1994, p. 36). In contrast to Habermas, for the homo politicus, in our view, the success of a political action is by no means irrelevant. 13. It is in this line that Smith draws a distinction between commercial spirit and public spirit. Commercial spirit is restrained to the pursuit of selfish interests, and thus it confines the views of men (Smith 1766, 1982a. p. 528). Public spirit, on the other hand, is related to public welfare (Smith 1789, 1982b. p. 185, pp. 232 ff.). While commercial spirit can be seen as a trait of the homo oeconomicus, public spirit is an essential feature of the homo politicus in our terminology. Similarly Sagoff distinguishes between consumer and citizen: As a con1 sumer... concern myself with personal or self-regarding wants and interests. As a citizen, 1 am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest; with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being of my family. (Sagoff 1988, p. 8)

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Homo politicus engages in public debates, because shehe has the aim to convince others of hisher opinions and to gain their consent. Hisher arguments will only be convincing if shehe can make the others believe that hisher opinions reflect not merely hisher private preferences, but a common or general interest. There are two prerequisites to being successful in this endeavour: The political actor has, first, to be able to recognise essential problems of the society, and second to make proposals which are adequate to the corresponding problem. The public engagement of homo politicus demonstrates that shehe differs in a characteristic manner from homo oeconomicus concerning hisher relationship to other human beings. Homo oeconomicus
behaves _.. neutrally towards hidher fellow man (Kichgassner 1991, p. 46; our translation).

In their community, homines oeconomici are characterized by their

mutually disinterested rationality (Kichgassner 1991, p. 47; our translation).

This means that the homines oeconomici mutually tolerate their private actions, as long as they are legal. For example, in the case of market failures, they are forced to communal action. To find a solution, they have to engage in public debate, even in conflict, all of which is experienced by homines oeconomici as decision costs (cf., e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962, pp. 43 ff.). For homo oeconomicus, as well as for homo politicus, political actions (at least at the constitutional level) aim at the consent of all those who participate. While homo oeconomicus perceives discussions with others, and the communal search for solutions, merely under the perspective of decision costs, homo politicus considers it as an essential activity, if not the essence of hisher lifeI4. Homo politicus is not merely interested in the result of the political process, but in the process itself. Human beings as hominespolitici look for political debate with others who are also interested in public affairs. They aim at the participation of other members of the society who share their political actions. During their commitment in public discussion, they are prepared to correct, or even to give up, their positions.

14. Aristotle, who can be regarded as the founder of political science and as the greatest empiricist amongst all philosophers of the ancient world, observed this kind of human action and behaviour f in the Athenian polis. The Athenians considered the acts o convincing and persuading other people, as well as public action, their true tasks as citizens or the truepoliricalaction. Aristotle concluded from his observations that man is a political being (Aristotle 1973, p. 49, p. 230, p. 241, MacIntyre 1988, p. 34).

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Our considerations imply that man is not yet homo politicus by his mere appearance in the political sphere, as a voter, a member of a political party, of parliament or government. He will only be homo politicus if he presents himself as a part of the public and focuses his words and deeds on the whole communitys.

3. The Welfare qf the Community and the Concept o Justice f

The welfare of the community concerning a certain matter is not something which is given in an objective sense. Hence, it cannot be determined uniquely by the scientific analysis of experts. It is a characteristic feature of totalitarian ideologies that they maintain such an objective welfare, and insist on knowing exclusively and exactly how to achieve it. What appears as the welfare of a community arises from a process of public debate, in which different humans, perhaps also competent experts, engage themselves. Those who are engaged in this process consider this welfare, although in the beginning often unknown, as by no means something arbitrary. What criteria have to be satisfied by the process itself and its participants, such that the result of the process is not arbitrary? Our first prerequisite is that all members of the community who express their interest in the political process must be able to take part. Further, the participants of the process have to acknowledge themselves as free, competent and interested in justice. We shall deal with these three characteristics in turn. The process of debate of homines politici presupposes freedom of speech and public appearance. This allows the participants to inspire the process with their creativity, which in turn is enhanced by the competitiveness of all those involved. Homines politici conceive of the competitiveness of the political process not as an obstacle, but as a stimuIusl6.
15. Some essential aspects of the hornopoliricus can be found in the concept of the economic policy adviser developed by Frey and Kirchgassner (1994, p. 13 f., p. 451-470). She/he is expected to he above the short-term and interest-related claims (p. 455; our translation). Even if the interest in income, recognition and influence may also play an important role in the motivation of the economic policy adviscr. the authors do not exclude thc possibility of an intrinsic motivation referring to the common welfare (p. 14). 16. Kant (1960.111, p. 280, ourtranslation) justifies the liberty ofpublic discussion as follows: How much and with what degree of precision would we think if we did not think in community with others who communicate their thoughts while we let them know ours! And in a similar way, Madison (quoted by Arendt 1994, p. 292) points out: The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires finnness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it i

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Further, the process presupposes that the participants believe that they are mutually capable of forming a qualified judgement concerning the interest of the community. Of course, this does not imply that they all will have the same judgement at the end of the process. However, everyone will concede that all involved have, at least in principle, the ability to judge competently. For if some of the participants are regarded as incompetent in a certain matter, a real debate cannot take place. Such competence implies free access to all relevant information. In particular, homo politicus must have at his disposal the ability of judgement in the sense of Kant, and further requires this ability regarding the other participants. Finally, the participants have to believe that they are all mutually interested in an outcome of the political process which is just. A political action can be qualified as just, if it can, in principle, find the consent of all who are concerned. Justice is a central category of political philosophy (cf. Hoffe 1989) and is essential for our concept of homo politicus. Therefore, we shall deal with justice extensively in the following. As noted above (Section IV.2), private motives and interests are not excluded from political debates, but they have to be transformed in such a way that they appear as public interests which satisfy the criterion of justice. If someone makes a proposal which furthers hidher own private utility, shehe has to make plausible that this is done not only in hisher own interest, but in the interest of the community, i.e., that the realization of the proposal is just. In the short-run, it may be difficult to distinguish whether a seemingly just proposal contains nothing but disguised private interests, or whether it is really in the public interest. As we know from history, however, in the long-run this disguise is usually uncovered. In summary, even though political actions may also contain motives of homo oeconomicus, their true political nature is precisely that the perspective of justice dominates. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the action of a politician seeking political influence only for the sake of personal advantage, and the action of those who, although they may also want private advantage, additionally develop solutions to political problems that may endure, in the judgement of posterity, as just solutions.

4. Homo Politicus and Hotno Oeconomicus Concept of Justice

We now relate the concept of justice to homo politicus and homo oeconomicus. In each case we can speak of two kinds of justice, objective and subjective justice. We first turn to homopoliticus. Objectivejustice is, in the view of homo

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politicus, the order of a community which allows all individuals to act as homines politici. The following requirements are necessary for this order. 4.(i) The community has to be democratic. This implies that everybody must have political liberty; i.e., be able to influence the public affairs of the community. 4.(ii) The liberty of speech and public appearance has to be guaranteed. These two criteria have been already mentioned in Section IV.3 above. 4,(iii) All members of the community have to be granted equal rights. 4.(iv) Each member of the community has to be granted elementary individual rights. These rights protect the sphere of liberty in which the individual is able to act independently from the community. This includes the domains of family, economy and religion. 4.(v) A fair balance of competing interests that arise in these private spheres has to be possible. Hence the state has to make sure that certain conditions concerning the social and economic order, as well as the relationship between the economy and the environment, are established and maintained. This implies that the state has to guarantee a sphere in which man as homo oeconomicus can be free and independentI7.Politics has to remain outside of this sphere, and has to provide for its preservation and protection. Further, the state has to set limits to the sphere of homo oeconomicus. It should make sure, e.g., that financial needs prevent nobody from partaking in political lifex. If these five requirements are fulfilled, we will term the order of a community to be justiy. As a consequence homo politicus is not related to an arbitrary community, but to the just community2.

17. As a consequence, it would he a misunderstanding that the dimension ofthe homo oeconomicus is inferior to that of homopolificus,as, e.g., Aristotle maintained. 18. Thus the American revolutionaries saw the political problem of poverty in the fact that the poor are excluded from public life by the ever-present constraint to work. As far as the political problem of poverty and wealth and its perception by the Founding Fathers are concerned, see Arendt (1994, pp. 85 ff.). On the other hand, according to Tocqueville (1976, p. 227), abundant prosperity may also alienate man from general issues. 19. Aristotle says in this sense (1972, p. 155, our translation): This way we call just what causes and preserves bliss and its components in a society. See also Petersen (1997). 20. The five conditions/presuppositions mentioned can be found in Aristotles political philosophy as well as Immanuel Kants -the exception being presupposition (iv) which does not play an important role in Aristotle. Compare Aristotle (1973, p. SO, p. 56, p. 114 (the state as a community of the free and equal), p. 152 and p. 230) and Kant (1960, IV, pp. 432 ff., VI, p. I61 and p. 233 (as regards the public)).

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These five criteria of justice may be referred to as institutions. These institutions are objective characteristics of the constitution. Political action in our sense cannot be determined by the institutions, because they constitute only the framework for the free action of homo politicus. This framework can be, called, according to Hayek (1960/197 I), the constitution of liberty. In contrast to homo politicus objective justice, hisher subjective justice manifests itself in actions preserving or, if necessary, renewing the constitution of liberty or the just community, i.e., objective justice. Homo politicus realizes by this kind of action the interest in the community, that characterizes him as we explained above at the end of Section IV. 1. How could this subjective justice be more closely defined? Whenever man acts as homo politicus, he always acts in favour of the community, and in particular of the just community (see above in Section IV.3). In doing so he will be attentive if his proposals and deeds conform to the spirit of the constitution of liberty. This implies that homo politicus not merely adheres to the letter of the law, but also has the will to maintain or restore an order which fulfils the criteria 4.(i) to 4.(v). The maintenance of this order itself, and not only legal behaviour, is, finally, the measure of what is just in each individual case. The subjective justice of homo politicus has four characteristics. 4.(vi) Similarly to homo oeconomicus, homo politicus acts rationally, because he wants to be successful in his actions. The rationality of homo politicus, however, is employed to strive for justice. This implies that homo politicus is not going to act by force or wiles (Hobbes 1973, p. 64), for criteria 4.(i) and 4.(ii) imply liberty of political discussion, as well as the same political liberty for all. Hence, he is going to bring up openly for discussion his view of liberty. In this sense, there exist certain restraints on his rationality21, different from that of homo oeconomicus. 4.(vii) Homo politicus needs the ability of judgement to be able to decide, in each individual case, what is constitutional and therefore just. Aristotle (1972, p. 189 ff.) describes this faculty as phronesis, i.e., as moral sense or moral intelligence. 4.(viii) In order to be able to defend his convictions in public debates, homo politicus needs courage or bravery (Aristotle 1972, p. 113 ff., Arendt 198 1, p. 36 f.), or rather, the courage to stand up for his beliefs.

21, See MacIntyre for this conception of rationality (1988, particularly pp. 30-46, p. 123).

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4.(ix) Homo politicus can only judge or act in a just way, and thus succeed permanently if, in so doing, he is not dominated by his passions, or by his personal affections or antipathiesz2. These four faculties 4.(vi) to 3.(ix) constitute subjective justice and the prerequisites for just action of homo politicus. They are not only about certain dispositions to follow moral rules or laws, but they are faculties that have to be willingly acquired, developed and practised. This can only be achieved in a community. We now turn to a comparison of the concepts of justice of homo politicus with that of homo oeconomicus. Like homo politicus, homo oeconomicus has aims that can only be reached through cooperation with others. For this purpose, the individuals come together to provide themselves with a constitution. This constitution establishes rules which indicate what is just and what is unjust. For this reason, the constitution itself cannot be qualified as just or unjust. The only criterion which a constitution has to fulfil, from the perspective of public choice, is the realization of Pareto efficiency23. After the constitution has been laid down, from the viewpoint of homo oeconomicus one can speak of justice in the two following ways: (a) A law can be considered as just by homo oeconomicus if it is in accordance with the constitution. A law will be considered as unjust if it is unconstitutional, e.g., if it breaks property rights guaranteed by the constitution. We call this objective justice or in.justice of homo oeconomicus. (b) An individual uction can be seen as just by homo oeconomicus only if it keeps to the legal order, i.e., if it is legal. It is, however, unjust if it violates the legal order, i.e., if it is illegal. We call this subjective justice or injustice of homo oeconomicus. Beyond these two kinds of justice and injustice, it is not meaningful to employ these two notions within the frame of methodological individualism. In particular, homo oeconornicus cannot be considered to be interested in the political community for its own sake, nor in justice as such. From an individu-

22,Aristotle (1972, p. 121 ff.) calls this faculty suphrosye, i.e., the virtue of self-control or temperance. Aristotle holds that the four faculties mentioned above can only be developed together. 23. With this model, public choice is in accordance with Thomas Hobbes state theory. For Hobbes the state is based upon a contract of its members. This social contract is, according to Hobbes, useful, yet it cannot be called just or unjust itself; for just or unjust action can only exist because of contracts. Acting in ajust or unjust way consists in keeping to or breaking a contract (Hobbes 1973, p. 74, Petersen 1996, p. 20 f.).

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alistic perspective, the political community, the constitution and justice are nothing but instruments to reach individual goals24. The two types of justice of homo politicus are opposed to those of homo oeconomicus in Table 1.
Tubk I The Concepts of Justice of Homo Oeconoinicus and Homo Politicus
Justice of Objective Subjective Homo Oeconomicus Homo Politicus

laws according to the constitutional constitution according to legal contract principles 4.(i)-4.(v) obedience to legal order
.~

action according to the faculties 4.(vi) justice, 4.(vii) intelligence 4.(viii) courage, 4.(ix) self-control

V. HOMO POLITICUS, CONSTITUTION AND ECOLOGY

I . Homo Politicus and the Constitutional Interest

We identify homo politicus concept of justice with the constitutional interest (as defined by Buchanan). The criteria 4.(i) to 4.(v) of the objective justice of homo politicus constitute the very content of the interest in the preservation of the constitution of liberty. For, if these criteria are fulfilled, the political community will be based upon principles of liberty. Thus individual liberty is secured by condition 4.(iv), while conditions 4.(i) and 4.(ii) guarantee political liberty in a democracy, and criteria 4.(iii) to 4.(v) exclude the excessive expansion of the welfare state. The subjective justice that is expressed in the characteristics 4.(vi) to 4.(ix) of homo politicus is the realization of the constitutional interest. For these four characteristics lead to a will which pertains to the preservation of the constitution of liberty. The advantages of the conception of homo politicus concerning the issue of the constitutional interest consist in two points:
24. John Rawls (1971) theory of justice can be seen as a variant of this concept of justice. For Rawls, however, the political constitution itself can either be just or unjust. A just constitution would be established in a fictitious original state, in which the individuals refrain from their particular abilities, inclinations, assets and from their individual future prospects. Apart from this difference, Rawls, too, regards man as honio orconornicus (Hiiffe 1985, p. 172). For Rawls (1992, p. 268) the individuals are also in pursuit of their own rational advantages.

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(a) The constitutional interest could only be attributed to homo oeconomicus by arbitrarily curtailing his sovereignity of preference. In contrast to this procedure, our argument allows one to derive the constitutional interest consistently from the concept of homopoliticus. For homopoliticus as such is aware of the circumstance that he can be homo politicus only in a community which satisfies the above mentioned criteria 4.(i) to 4.(v) of objective justice25.Thus the concept of homo politicus necessarily implies the constitutional interest. Hence the constitutional interest is essential for homo politicus. (b) From homo oeconomicus concept of subjective justice as legal behaviour, the pursuit of the constitutional interest cannot be derived. For in politics, as we showed above, the subjective justice of homo oeconomicus, i.e., behaviour according to the existing rules, does not necessarily lead to laws which are objectively just. Rather, it may lead to the corruption of the constitution, as, e.g., the inefficient expansion of the democratic state into the welfare state shows. In contrast to this, the subjective j u t i c e of homo politicus is characterised by the circumstance that it aims at the preservation of objective justice, i.e., at the preservation of the constitution of liberty. We note that the preservation of the constitution of liberty should not be considered only as a result of homo politicus just actions. Rather, it is the process of this action itself that contributes to the generation of three elementary criteria of objective justice, i.e., 4.(i) democracy, 4.(ii) liberty of public speech, and 4.(iii) legal equality. For by exercising their subjective justice (in the form of the four characteristics (1) to (4)) during the political process, at the same time homines politici are realizing partly these three elementary criteria which they demand with their action.

2. Homo Politicus and the Ecologicul Interest

The ecological interest is concerned with the question of whether it is possible to enforce environmental policy claims in a comprehensive way. This interest refers in particular to the problem of sustainability (see Section 111.2 above). We showed in Section 111.2 that public choice is not capable of explaining the interest in the preservation of the natural foundations of human existence, i.e.,

25. If these five criteria are not given, homo poliricus will uwally be a revolutionary. Thus, the American and French revolutionaries were concerned with the realization of democratic self-determination (4.(ii)) and of public liberty (4.(i)) to he able to be politically active at all. Hannah Arendt (1994) clearly elaborates this point in her study Uher die Revolution (On Revolution).

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the ecological interest, on the basis of homo oeconomicus. This is because the preservation of the natural environment in the long-run does not necessarily increase the utility of a current representative individual utility-maximizer. This holds even more, because sustainable development is probably not possible without far-reaching alterations in the distribution of income and wealth. Such question have to be dealt with at the constitutional level (cf. Wicksell 1896, pp. 110-138, in particular p. 123, Buchanan/Tullock 1962, pp. 5 f., pp. 14 f., Fdber 1973). As we know from public choice theory, humans as homines oeconomici, who are negatively affected, will not give their consent to such a change. Thus the homo oeconomicus assumption, for merely theoretical reasons, inevitably leads to pessimism as far as sustainable development is concerned. However, does human as homo politicus have an interest to reduce the excessive consumption of nature if she/he, as a particular individual, does not benefit from this reduction? In fact, such an ecological interest follows directly from hisher interest in the community which is constitutive for man as homo politicus. For it is an essential characteristic of a community that it is intended to be durable from the perspective of homo politicus, and the community's existence is invariably connected to natural conditions. For this reason, man as homo politicus is bound to have an interest in the preservation of the natural conditions of the community. Thus it is necessary to ascribe an ecological interest to homo politicus.

VI. EMPIRICAL RELEVANCE OF THE HOMO POLITICUS

Is homo politicus a mere theoretical construct, or does it correspond to certain phenomena in the empirical world'? To answer this question, we recall our definition of political action given in Section 11. We restricted this notion to those decisions and actions in the area of' politics, which are not completely predetermined by legal rules and decrees. Hence, e.g., for the analysis of standard economic situations, as well as bureaucratic and administrative actions, there is no need for the concept of homo politicus. To explain the empirical relevance of homo politicus we will distinguish three cases. (a) Is it possible to examine political actions solely on the basis of hoino politicus? This would imply that all human beings participating in political actions are predominantly interested in the welfare of the community, i.e., that all private interests are subordinated under the concept of justice (see Section IV.4 above). Evidently this is not the case in reality. (b) Is it possible to examine political actions solely on the basis of homo oeconomicus? As we noted above (see Section IV.3) this would imply that
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homines oeconomici disguise their private interests as public interests. As we know from experience, this is often the case. If this would happen exclusively in open political processes, however, everyone would distrust everyone else to such an extent that politics would rapidly degenerate. This would lead to a fundamental pessimism, and would destroy any hope for the realization of the constitutional interest, as well as the ecological interest. (c) In our view, neither the pure homo politicus nor the pure homo oeconomicus exist in reality. These concepts do not serve the purpose to define two different types of empirically observable human beings, but they express real dimensions in which any human being partakes to a different degree. Since the political process is open and evolutionary, we cannot predict whether it will lead to solutions which, in the long-run, prove to be in the communal interest of society. But the concept of homo politicus allows one to conceptualize, at least theoretically, that a development may occur which satisfies our criteria of justice. Whether or not this is the case, we can say only ex post. For example, the policy pursued by Konrad Adenauer to integrate Germany into the Western States, and the New Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, clearly fulfilled this requirement2(j.As regards environmental policy, the origin and development of green movements and citizens initiatives have to be explained, at least partially, by the concept of homo politicus. Thus homo politicus is not the ideal of a new human being, but a concept by which it is possible, theoretically, to comprehend important aspects of actions that are empirically observable. Up to now, we have explained negative tendencies of politics only by the circumstance that human beings are too exclusively interested in their private affairs and thus neglect the interest of the community. However, there exists another important tendency which endangers the constitution of freedom. At first sight surprising, this danger may arise from the ecological interest. Political actors may attempt to enforce their ecological interests without any connections to the corresponding requirements of objective justice (see Section IV.4 above). On the one hand, there is the possibility that this interest remains without effect. On the other hand, it is possible that the ecological interest causes aconsiderable number of supporters to undertake violent actions. This may occur to such an extent that they leave the field of political action, and thus jeopardize the political community (cf. Hannon 1985; see Section I above).
26. This also holds for Vaclav Havel, who, as it is emphasized by Kuran (1995, pp. 49-50), in the 1970s shouldered the enormous burden of starting an opposition movement in communist Czechoslovakia, although it was not clear that there would be any success within Havels own lifetime.

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VII. FINAL REMARKS

The kind of pessimism that may arise from the exclusive use of the homo oeconomicus assumption represents a one-sided view. It is true that our introduction of the category of the homo politicus does not solve problems in the real world, but it leads to a more differentiated view of reality and its possibilities for change. For the concept of homo politicus appeals to the potential of humankind to act successfully in the spheres of liberty, justice and sustainability. This potential can easily be overlooked and neglected, if human beings are regarded merely as utility maximizers. It is difficult to estimate the quantity and effectiveness of this potential empirically. However, the experience of the last hundred and fifty years shows that people are ready to engage themselves for justice, as the many social achievements in the western democracies demonstrate. Similarly, the experience of the last three decades has shown that there is a readiness amongst people publicly to commit themselves to the protection of the basis of existence of future generations, and to the preservation of plants and animals, i.e., that there exists an ecological interest. Regarding humans in the dimension of the homo politicus allows us to believe that they have the potential to preserve the constitution of liberty and the natural basis of their existence.
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MALTE FABER, REINER MANSTETTEN AND THOMAS PETERSEN

Are modern democracies capable of preserving the constitution of liberty and capable of preserving the natural hasis of human existence in the long-run'? The achievement of these aims requires political actions toward fundamental changes in the life of modern societies. The respective political actors have to develop and to sustain long-term constitutional and ecological interests. Can these actors he conceived as homines owonomici? Within public choice there have been important homo orconornicus. These attempts have led, attempts to derive long-term interests on the however, to theoretical difficulties. Todevelc tion we introduce the notion of horno poiiticus. Honio politicus is concerned with the common search for the general interest of a political community which in traditional philosophy is called 'justice'. The concepts oflzorno oecononticus and homo politicus are not mutually exclusive alternatives, hut dimensions of human hehaviour. Neither ofthem can he empirically observed i n its pure form. We argue that we need a combination of both concepts to understand political phenomena. Thereby we seek to contribute to a theoretical which allows the derivation of the constitutional interest and the ecological interest.

Konnen moderne demokratische Rechtsstaaten langfristig eine freiheitliche Verfassung bewahren und den Forthestand der naturlichen Lehensgrundlagen sichern'?Dic Verwirklichung dieser heiden Ziele macht politische Handlungen erforderlich, die zu fundamentalen Anderungen in der Lehensweise moderner Gesellschaften fuhren. Die politisch Handelnden mussen hierzu von langfristigen Interessen an einer freiheitlichen Verfassung (konstitutionelles Interesse) und am Forthestand der naturlichen Lehensgrundlagen (okologisches Interesse) geleitet wcrden. Konnen diese politisch Handelnden angemessen als homines oeconornici aufgefasst werden? In der Public Choice sind hedeutsame Versuche unternommen worden, LangLeitinteressen auf der Basis des homo oeconomicus abzuleiten. Dahei ergabeu sich indes hetriichtliche konzeptionelle Probleme. Um eine Losung denkhar zu machen, luhren wir den Begrifl des homo polificus ein. Der homo politicus ist der Mensch, insofern er sich gemeinsam init andern in einem Handlungsfeld hetiitigt, in dem es urn das allgemeine Interesae einer Gesellschatt, in der philosophischen Tradition: u m die 'Gerechtigkeit', geht. Die Konzepte des horrio oeconornicus und des homo poliricus schliessen sich nicht gegenseitig aus, sondern verweiaen auf verschiedene Dimensionen menschlichen Verhaltens, die in ihrer Reinform empiriach nicht beobachtet werden. Wir sind der Ansicht, dass die Untersuchung politischer Phiinomene vielfach eine Komhination heider Konzepte erforderlich macht. Unser Ansatz versteht sich als Beitrag zu einer theoretihchen Grundlegung, die die Ableitung des konstitutionellen und des okologischen Interesses ermoglichen soll.

Est-ce que les d6mocraties modernes ont capahles de prCservcr la constitution de la liherti et en m&me temps la base naturelle de I ' e x 'tence humaine? Pour attcindre ces buts, il faut dcs actions politiques pour des changementa fundamentals dans le\ societes modernes. II faut que les acteurs politiques diveloppent et soutiennent un interet constitutionel et un interst Ccologique i long terme. i Est-ce qu'il est possible que ces acteurs soient dCnotCs comme hominrs orconomici?Dans la thiorie de public choice il y avait des essais importants de diriver des inter& h long ternie en base de 1 'homo oeconomicus. Mais ces ehsais ont menis B de graves difficultis thkoretiques. En adressant ces prohlkmes nous introduisons la notion horno pditicus. Hortio politicus est concern6 a I'action politique. Cette action consiste en la recherche de I interet gCnCral d'une communit6 politique que

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HOMO OECONOMICUS AND HOMO POLITICUS

Ion appelle justice. Les conceptes de homo o e c o ~ i o n ~ i ~ ~ ~ . politicus ne sexclusent pas et homo ~ mais sont des dimensions differents de la maniere dagir humaine. Aucune ne peut Ctre observie dans sa forme pure. Nous argumentons que souvent Ion a besoin dune combinaison des ces deux concepts pour bien comprendre des phCnomenes politiques. Avec cet article nous essayona de contribuer h la base thkorique qui permet la derivation de IinterCt constitutionel et de Iinteret icologique.

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