Penultimate draft. To be presented at the 2013 meeting of the Tennessee Philosophical Association.

Why Homosexual Sex is Immoral

Timothy Hsiao
The Florida State University

ABSTRACT: Critics of homosexual activity often appeal to some form of natural law
theory as a basis for their arguments. According to one version of natural law theory,
actions that “pervert” or misuse a bodily faculty are immoral. In this paper, I argue that
this “perverted faculty argument” provides a successful account of good and evil action.
Several objections are assessed and found inadequate.

Critics of homosexual activity often appeal to some form of natural law theory as a basis for

their arguments. According to one version of natural law theory, actions that “pervert” or misuse a

bodily faculty are immoral.1 In this paper, I argue that this “perverted faculty argument” provides a

successful account of good and evil action. Several common objections will be assessed and found

inadequate.

I.

Sexual ethics begins with the person as an embodied subject of the good. Our bodies are a part

of us, not an instrument that we inhabit or operate.2 It is no wonder, then, that natural law theory has

historically placed such a heavy emphasis on the body, for the human good is our good. Natural law

theory bears the title natural because it grounds morality in human nature and the conditions for its

fulfillment. It is law in the sense that our capacity for reason grounds moral obligation. The distinction

between what is “natural” and “unnatural” should not be understood along the lines of what animals do,

what is non-artificial, what is statistically normal, or even what God commands; but rather in terms of

whether something conduces to the flourishing of our human capacities, powers, and functions. 3 Many

common criticisms of natural law fail because they misrepresent its claims on a very basic level.
1. Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics: General Ethics (Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, 1930); Austin Fagothey, Right and
Reason (St. Louis, C. V. Mosby: 1959); Edward Feser, The Last Superstition (South Bend: IN: St. Augustine's, 2008): 132-
153; Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010); 183-188; Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
2. For a defense, see Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (New York,
NY: Cambridge, 2008).
3. For a detailed explanation of the natural/unnatural distinction, see David S. Oderberg, “Towards a Natural Law Critique
of Genetic Engineering” in Nafsika Athanassoulis (ed) Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005): 110-114.
 Natural law theorists understand goodness as derivative from teleology. Something is good by

functioning as it should. A firefighter is good by fighting fires, since that is what firefighters are

supposed to do. A vehicle is good by transporting people and goods well, since that is how vehicles are

supposed to function. An orange tree is good by producing fruit, since that is how orange trees are

supposed to develop. “Good” is an analogical property: its content varies depending on the subject of

predication. Good firefighters, good cars, and good orange trees are all good in the sense that they are

fulfilling their respective ends. The standard of goodness for a being qua being is found in what

perfects it according to the kind of thing it is.

Something is bad when it does not function as it should. Badness is a type of privation: a lack

of goodness where it ought to be. Now there are two ways to understand this. First, something may be

bad by failing to realize the end towards which it is properly directed. If something has a purpose or

proper function, then it ought to bring about a certain effect when used. Since a pencil has the purpose

of writing, it ought to create marks on some material when used for that purpose. Failure to bring this

about is a kind of defect, a lack of some result that ought to be present. Second, something may be bad

by failing to realize the direction towards its proper end. Thus, a judge acts badly as a judge when he

directs the powers of his profession – powers that are properly ordered to justice – to an end

incompatible with justice, such as when he sentences an innocent person to jail. Unlike the previous

example, the judge's action lacks the very direction to its proper end. His action should be directed to

the end of justice, but it is in fact directed away from this end.

Human actions follow this same pattern. Humans are good by realizing human goods. The

human good, unlike the good of cars or orange trees, is a distinctively moral good on account of our

capacity to reason and engage in free actions. These characteristics make us morally responsible for our

actions because we can understand the good and voluntarily apply it in our lives. Good actions are

those which direct a human power, capacity, or function to its proper end. Evil actions are those which
are contrary to the human good. We act contrary to the good when we direct a human power or function

to an end that is by nature incompatible with their natural purpose. An end counts as a fitting subject

for a given purpose when it is by nature able to bear the type of change that the purpose seeks to bring

about. For example, a sheet of paper is a fitting subject for a pencil because it is able to written on.

Now our actions are executed by engaging bodily faculties. When we breathe, we use our lungs.

When we see, we use our eyes. When we engage in sexual activities, we use our sexual organs. These

faculties have natural purposes that direct us to the achievement of their end. Lungs are for breathing,

eyes are for seeing, and sex, as I will argue, is for procreation. These purposes provide a standard for

good and evil action. To act well as a human is to respect these purposes by realizing the direction to

their proper ends. To act badly is to misuse these purposes by directing them away from their proper

ends. Evil action, as Stephen Jensen puts it, “makes the person himself to be evil, for it removes the

order the person has to the good.”4

That a bodily faculty is for a specific end does not imply that the end will always be achieved.

A blind eye that is unable to see is still directed to sight in virtue of the kind of organ it is. Teleology

directs a faculty to a proper end, but does not guarantee that the end will actually be achieved. A good

or permissible action need only realize the direction to the end provided by teleology. Any failure

associated with the actual achievement of the end is not the fault of the actor, for such failure lies

outside of his intention.

Thus, evil actions consist of more than just the mere failure to actualize some proper end. A

doctor who prescribes medicine to a patient that neglects to take it has in fact failed to heal, but his

actions nevertheless still possess the proper direction towards the end of healing. An evil action, then, is

properly characterized as one that lacks the proper direction toward its end. Such actions must engage

some power that is properly directed to some end and divert it to another end that is unfit for this

4. Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010): 252.
direction. It is active choice against a good. Hence, the second understanding of badness outlined

earlier correctly describes the nature of evil actions.

Now teleology is something we discover by reason. Whatever purposes we may consciously

assign to them is irrelevant to the actual function of some bodily faculty. 5 Someone who decides to use

his nose as a paperweight has not thereby changed the actual function of the nose.

From this we see that each human act has two orders: 6 The first order consists of the end

towards which an action ought to be directed. The second order consists of the end that an action is in

fact directed to. An act is good when these two orders agree with each other, and evil when they differ.

The second order is found in the intention of the actor, for intention constitutes one's plan of action.

The first order is found in the nature of the faculty that is being engaged, since it functions as a

standard of moral goodness, and is known through right reason.

II.

Sex has two purposes, procreative and unitive.7 These purposes are closely related to each other,

for it is on account of its procreative purpose that sex is capable of uniting persons as persons.

Now it is blindingly obvious that sex is by nature directed toward procreation. The

physiological aspects of sexual activity bear witness to this. Every behavior exhibited by our sexual

organs during intercourse – from their shape to the secretion of lubrication and incomplete reproductive

material during orgasm – point toward procreation. It is no coincidence that the male penis and female

vagina are classified as reproductive organs. Actions that arouse or engage the procreative powers of

these organs are classified as sexual acts precisely because they make use of these powers. Again, that

these purposes may at times be circumvented does not mean that sex is not directed toward procreation.

5. Unlike artifacts, which derive their purposes from the intentions of their designers, biological substances receive their
unity through an internal principle of organization. Artifacts are externally constructed wholes whose parts bear no intrinsic
direction to the good of the whole. Their teleology is extrinsic.
6. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, 246.
7. Edward Feser, “The Role of Nature in Sexual Ethics” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.1 (Spring 2013): 69-76.
Whatever purposes we may have are independent of what purposes these faculties have by their very

nature.

Sex is unitive in that it brings together a male and female to form a single unit. A union of any

sort is formed by the coordinated activity of its constituent members to a common end that completes

them.8 They must work together to achieve a common end toward which they are directed. 9 The

engines, wings, and avionics of a plane, when combined together, are united as a single whole given

their coordination toward the end of flight, a common end that fulfills the functions of its parts. A sports

team is united as a single team when the players coordinate to the common end of playing well. Note

that it is not required of them that they actually win; in order to be united, they must only aim for it as a

common goal.

The type of union being formed depends on the end toward which the members coordinate.

When the players on a team unite to the end of playing well, they unite as players on a team, not as

persons. Unity between persons requires that an aspect of their humanity biologically coordinate

toward a common goal.

But biological coordination involves more than just a mere coming together of bodies. A

surgeon who sticks his hand inside a patient during a surgery or a person who bumps another's fist is

not thereby uniting with him. Bodies come together all the time in fights, contact sports, and large

crowds. Biological unions requires that the bodies of two persons strive together to fulfill a common

goal that neither individual can fulfill on their own. This common goal is none other than procreation,

the only biological function with respect to which everyone is inherently incomplete.

Since sex has a unitive function in addition to a procreative function, we can frame the

perverted faculty argument from a different perspective. An alternative formulation, might go as

8. An illuminating account of comprehensive sexual union can be found in Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P.
George, What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense (New York, NY: Encounter, 2013): 23-32; and Alexander Pruss,
One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013).
9. Either by nature, as in the case of living things, or by external intention, such as in the case of artifacts.
follows: Sex is properly directed toward the formation of a loving union with another person. 10

Therefore, when we have sex, we ought to enter into a loving union with another person. Now a union

of any sort is formed by the mutual coordination of various parts to a common end. Since sex is a

biological activity, the kind of union it forms must also be biological. But biological union is only

possible with an individual of the opposite sex, for the the only way in which two distinct human

beings can unite biologically is through procreation. It follows that sexual union can only be embodied

through the procreative-type act. Sexual acts that are not of the procreative-type (e.g. homosexuality,

bestiality) do not embody the good of bodily union. Such actions are immoral because they involve the

willful rejection of the order to the end that sex ought to have.

Pleasure plays a subordinate role in relation to these two ends of sex. It is not an independent

purpose of sex, but has as its own goal the purpose of motivating persons to engage in sexual

intercourse. Pleasure is only good when it follows from or is an aspect of a real perfection, for it is

possible for one to derive pleasure from evil ends or activities.11

Consider the activity of eating. A good meal will ideally include the property of being

pleasurable to one's palate, but it is a mistake to think that therefore pleasure is an independent function

of eating. Pleasurable food is only good insofar as it aligns with the primary end of nutrition. Many

different kinds of food are pleasurable, but are nevertheless bad because they are detrimental to one's

health. Similarly, good sex will ideally include feelings of pleasure, but it is a mistake to think that

therefore pleasure is an independent purpose of sex. Pleasure enhances sex by making the activity more

desirable, just like pleasure enhances nutrition by making eating more desirable, but neither are

purposes of their respective activity.12

III.

10. Despite contemporary Western society's rejection of traditional sexual mores, this belief remains widespread – even if
only understood superficially.
11. See George and Lee, Body-Self Dualism, 108-115.
12. This point is compatible with the clitoris or female orgasm having the function of producing pleasure, for they exist as
subordinate parts of a larger system that is directed toward reproduction. Their purpose is not pleasure itself, but to make
pleasurable the act of procreation, much like how the pleasure associated with eating makes pleasurable the act of nutrition.
 We may thus state the argument as follows: It is always immoral to misuse a bodily faculty, for

in doing so we reject the standard of goodness that is constitutive of us as human persons. Since sexual

activity exists for the sake of procreation and unity, all sexual activity that is not open to the creation of

new life is therefore immoral.13 Aquinas aptly summarizes:

All human acts are said to be disordered when they are not proportioned to the
proper end. For example, eating is disordered if it is not proportioned to the
health of the body, to which the act of eating is ordered as to an end. Since the
end of using the reproductive organs is the generation and education of
offspring, every use of these organs that is not proportioned to the generation of
offspring, and to their due education, is of itself disordered, for example, every
act of these organs outside the union of male and female is manifestly unfit for
the generation of children.14

Those who engage in homosexual conduct bring their sexual faculties to bear on a member of

the same sex. In doing so, they direct the function of sex – which ought to be directed toward the

generation of new life – to an end that is intrinsically unfit for this direction. We may conclude,

therefore, that homosexual activity is immoral.

Now let us look at some objections to this argument.

IV.

4.1. Sterile/Infertile Couples

Perhaps the single most common criticism of the argument is that it would render as immoral

sexual activity between infertile couples. This objection easily fails for reasons that were alluded to

earlier. Infertile couples who engage in sexual intercourse are not misusing their sexual organs, for

although they may foresee that they are incapable of having children, their sexual powers still realize

the direction to the end of procreation, even though a defect has rendered this end unable to be actually

achieved. So long as this direction to the end is present in their actions, it does not matter whether the

end associated with it is actually achieved.

However, one might insist that infertile sex does in fact constitute a misuse of the sexual

13. Jensen argues that all evil actions can be explained in terms of some failure of teleology. I focus only on these specific
examples (paying special attention to homosexuality) in the context of this paper.
14. Aquinas, De Malo, q.15 a.1. (trans. Steven Jensen).
powers, for one directs the function of sex towards a subject that is unfit for the end of procreation. An

infertile heterosexual couple, it seems, is no more capable of reproduction than a homosexual couple or

one that uses condoms. But there is, nevertheless, an important difference between the two types of

cases. Infertility is a kind of defect, a lack of what ought to be present. 15 Defects make sense only in

relation to a standard of proper functioning, a standard grounded in the nature of the thing in question.

Lungs lack the ability to see, but we do not refer to this as a defect because lungs aren't supposed to

see. Infertility is properly classified as a defect because human sexual organs ought to reproduce. The

members of an infertile heterosexual couple are by nature fitting subjects for reproduction, but are

unable to realize this end through some accident of nature (used loosely). The nature of an infertile

person as a fitting subject for reproduction with a member of the opposite sex does not change through

some accidental defect.16 A blind eye still ought to see, a damaged kidney still ought to process blood,

and infertile sexual organs still ought to reproduce. Losing the ability to achieve some purpose does

not entail loss of the purpose itself.

The very nature of a homosexual coupling, however, is intrinsically non-procreative. Artificial

methods of reproduction, such as IVF and surrogacy, do not change this. In the case of IVF, sperm/eggs

from a donor of the opposite sex is required. Children created as a result of this procedure possess a

biological mother and father. Homosexual couples who “have” children this way are not procreating in

a literal sense.

4.2. Hume's Fork/Naturalistic Fallacy

Another familiar criticism brought up by opponents of natural law concerns the deriving of

“ought” claims from “is” statements. As Hume famously pointed out, we cannot move from descriptive

statements of fact to prescriptive claims of what one ought to do. There is a conceptual gap between

15. The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) classifies both male and
female infertility as diseases. See N46/N97.
16. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, 255. “Nature disregards this or that contingent factor... for nature can concern itself only
with types and not with contingent details... [T]he power that directs to the end is itself a nature; it directs itself upon a
corresponding nature. Nature cannot consider the contingent details; it must be directed upon a corresponding nature.”
facts and values. Because of this, the natural law theorist cannot simply “read off” moral norms from

facts about human nature.

But no such derivation is occurring. On the natural law theorist's picture of the world, values

and norms are built in to the fabric of nature. The teleology inherent within our bodily faculties

provides a standard of normativity that determines our well-being. This standard of normativity is a

moral standard insofar as human persons possess the capacity to reason. It would indeed be fallacious

to infer a prescriptive claim from a purely descriptive claim, but this is not what the natural law theorist

is doing. Rather, he begins with value-laden premises and ends with value-laden conclusions. On the

metaphysical framework that natural law morality is premised on, there is no fact-value distinction.

A similar argument from G. E. Moore, dubbed the “open question argument,” fails for similar

reasons. Moore's mistake was in his treatment of "good" as a univocal term, similar to "yellow." When

one speaks of yellow cars, yellow books, and yellow paint, the term "yellow" has the same meaning in

each instance. But “good” is different. As we saw, goodness is defined in terms of what perfects a being

according to the kind of thing it is. It is an analogical term that varies in meaning depending on what it

is attributed to.17 Good cars, good books, and good paint are each good in different senses of the term.

4.3. Counterexamples

Some point to apparent counterexamples to the account of good and evil action outlined in

section (ii). Versions of this argument have been made by John Corvino, Burton Leiser, James Rachels,

and Steven Sullivan.18 According to this objection, actions such as using earplugs, blindfolds,

17. See Peter Geach “Good and Evil” Analysis 17 (1956): 33-42.
18. John Corvino, “Homosexuality: The Nature and Harm Arguments” in Alan Soble (ed), The Philosophy of Sex:
Contemporary Readings 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002): 137-138; Burton Leiser, “Is Homosexuality
Unnatural?” in Rachels (ed), The Right Thing to Do 3rd ed. (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2003): 148-149; James Rachels,
The Elements of Moral Philosophy 5th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2007): 48-49; Stephen J. Sullivan, “A Critique of
the Impeded Function Objection to Gay Sex” APA Newsletter on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Issues (Spring
2011): 13. Recent philosophers in the “new” natural law tradition also have made arguments along these lines. cf. Germain
Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing, 1964): 28. John Finnis dismisses the
perverted faculty argument in a single paragraph, calling it “ridiculous.” cf. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980): 48. Similarly, Patrick Lee and Robert P. George write in a footnote that it
is “easily disposed of.” cf. Lee and George, “What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Unity” American
Journal of Jurisprudence 42 (1997): 135, n.1.
antiperspirant, holding one's breath, cutting one's nails, or shaving one's head would appear to be

immoral because they go against the natural functions of the faculties in question.

On the understanding of natural law outlined in section (i), all of these examples fail. There is a

clear difference between preventing a natural function from being engaged and directing it to a contrary

end. Evil action consists in the exercise of a natural faculty to achieve an end other than the one it

should be directed toward by nature.19 The action must begin with some faculty and actively engage it

to an end other than the one it should take. This criterion is not satisfied by any of the examples. When

someone holds his breath, for example, he is not engaging the power of breathing at all. Nor can we

engage the powers of hair or sweat, for these are not under our direct voluntary control. Now this is not

to say that we can freely prevent the exercise of any natural faculty whenever we so desire, only that it

is not inherently wrong to do so. Whether a particular action of this sort is wrong will depend on the

external circumstances.

What about actions that do engage a bodily power, such as using one's tongue to lick stamps or

one's eyes in order to flirt? These do not fare any better. It is not inherently wrong to enhance or to

impose another purpose of our own on top of a faculty's natural function, so long as it is consistent with

its function being achieved. A person who uses his eyes to flirt is still seeing, and a person who uses his

tongue to lick stamps is still tasting. The direction to the end is still present in the act, even if not

intended by the agent. No faculty is being misused.20

V.

There is no doubt that many people today will find some of the implications of natural law

theory difficult to accept. But given that we can (and often do) reject what is really good for us, should
19. “Not every instance of inhibiting some natural function, therefore, counts as a voluntary error. We must voluntarily use
some power that directs to some end or some material, but we divert that power to some other end or material." Jensen,
Good and Evil Actions, 245-246.
20. Two other considerations should be noted. First, as we saw with sex, not every bodily faculty has a single determinate
function. Second, not all activities engage a power with a definite end. Many activities are performed by engaging our
body's general power of movement, a power with no determinate end that can either be directed to a variety of ends or
toward engaging more specific powers with determinate functions. Sexual activity, for example, uses the power of
movement to engage the power of reproduction. See Jensen, Good and Evil Actions, 258. It would, at any rate, be
impossible to offend against the power of movement, for by using the power of movement to not-move, one thereby moves.
this really be much of a surprise? A close examination of natural law theory reveals it to be based on

foundational premises that are quite amenable to common sense. The virtuous person is one who

pursues his good as a human being, for the human good is that which perfects him. Sexual morality is

no different.21

21. Special thanks to Timothy Wilson, Matthew Su, David Rodriguez, Aline Kalbian and various others for feedback on
earlier versions of this paper.