International

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International Review of Administrative

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Strengthen governability 2020, Vol. 86(3) 409–426
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democracy: why local DOI: 10.1177/0020852318801508
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governments introduce
participatory governance

Daniel Kübler
University of Zurich, Switzerland

Philippe E. Rochat
University of Zurich, Switzerland

Su Yun Woo
University of Zurich, Switzerland

Nico van der Heiden

University of Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract
Innovations in participatory governance have been widely discussed but their introduc-
tion as such is rarely examined. This article seeks to understand why, in a context of
established democracy, local authorities engage in participatory governance. Using a
data set on the implementation of mini-publics in 1505 Swiss municipalities in the
period 2000 to 2012, we test five hypotheses about the introduction of participatory
governance. We find that mini-publics in Swiss municipalities are policy-oriented pro-
cedures that involve only a small proportion of the citizenry. Municipalities who imple-
ment mini-publics are those that do not have a municipal assembly tradition, whose
public services are under growth pressure, who feature many different political groups
as well as strong party and community ties, and who have a strongly professionalized
public administration. We conclude that the expansion of participatory governance is

Corresponding author:
Daniel Kübler, University of Zurich – Department of Political Science, Affolternstrasse 56, Zürich 8850,
Switzerland.
Email: daniel.kuebler@ipz.uzh.ch
410 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

driven by an agenda to increase governability in an adversarial context with strong and

fragmented group interests.

Points for practitioners

This study explores the introduction of mini-publics in Swiss municipalities. Mini-publics
are participatory designs in which small groups of citizens deliberate on a topic related
to municipal policymaking. Most mini-public exercises found in this study were related
to spatial planning, but sustainability and youth were recurrent fields as well. Mini-
publics have become part of public administration practice and are set up in the
hope that they will help find solutions to conflicts and foster the acceptance of
policy decisions.

Keywords
local government, mini-publics, participatory governance, Switzerland

Introduction
New instances of citizen participation beyond electoral democracy have prolifer-
ated in the last three decades. Within the broad range of such ‘democratic inno-
vations’ (Smith, 2009), instances of participatory governance have been a
particular focus of scholarly attention. Participatory governance can be defined
as processes and structures of public decision-making that involve actors who are
not normally charged with decision-making (Newig et al., 2017: 273), and that
complement – but do not replace – traditional institutions of democracy
(Goodhart et al., 2012: 33). Participatory governance has gained increased atten-
tion as scholars and practitioners seek new avenues for engaging citizens in public
policymaking, not only in established democracies, but also in fledgling democra-
cies, and even in non-democracies. A prominent example is participatory budget-
ing, which, after its inception in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, has diffused
widely across the globe (Porto de Oliveira, 2017; Sintomer et al., 2016; Wampler
et al., 2018).
The scientific debate on participatory governance has focused on its functioning
and effects (see Ansell and Gash, 2007; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015), the criteria
by which the democratic quality of various instances of participatory governance
can be assessed (see Geissel and Newton, 2012), its potential to contribute to the
development of democracy more generally (see Michels, 2011; Warren, 2009), and,
more recently, its contribution to the quality of policy outcomes such as social
equity and health (see Gonçalves, 2014; Touchton et al., 2017). However, what has
been neglected until now is the introduction of participatory governance as such.
Many studies simply assume that participatory governance is introduced in
response to the inadequacies, limits or deficits of the existing institutions of
Kübler et al. 411

democracy, especially in clientelistic or developing contexts (see Goodhart et al.,

2012). However, participatory governance should also be seen as a strategic inter-
vention used to achieve certain goals, and therefore as a ‘choice rather than as a
necessity’ (Newig et al., 2017: 271). As Warren (2009: 3) has argued, the prolifer-
ation of participatory governance should be questioned rather than be taken for
granted: ‘Who would have thought that policy and policy-making – the domain of
technocrats and administrators – would move into the vanguard of democratiza-
tion?’ Against this backdrop, this article seeks to understand the motivations
underlying the introduction of participatory governance in an established democ-
racy, based on a study at the local government level in Switzerland.

Why introduce participatory governance?

Regarding the rationale of participatory governance, the literature on the topic
emphasizes two main points. First, mechanisms of participatory governance are
considered democratic innovations (Geissel and Newton, 2012; Smith, 2009), mean-
ing that they represent procedures or instruments that open up opportunities for
citizen participation that did not previously exist in a particular context. Second,
participatory governance is discussed in light of deliberative democratic theory
focusing on a ‘talk-centric’ approach (Chambers, 2003), where the legitimacy of
democratic decisions is rooted in discursive exchanges of arguments. Accordingly,
the normative justification for mechanisms of participatory governance lies in their
contribution to the strengthening of the deliberative dimension of political process-
es (Goodin, 2008), in that they enable a greater number of citizens to take part in
the discussion of political decisions.

Reasons for the introduction of participatory governance: five hypotheses

While the causes for introducing participatory governance have not been a prom-
inent scholarly focus, five general hypotheses about the reasons leading to partic-
ipatory governance can nevertheless be derived from the literature.

A response to deficits of representative democracy. The most common line of argument

is to view participatory governance as a remedy for the crisis of representative
(local) democracy (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2002: 142). More particularly, it is
argued that decreasing participation in traditional democratic institutions has
led to legitimacy deficits that, in turn, increase the pressure for democratic renewal
and ultimately foster the introduction of participatory governance (Fung, 2015).
Goodhart et al. (2012: 50) additionally view participatory governance as a response
to democratic deficits in contexts of strong social inequality, such as is found in
developing countries and/or young democracies. Due to the low participation of
marginalized groups in traditional institutions of electoral democracy, govern-
ments tend to be unresponsive to the demands of such groups. Participatory gov-
ernance thus has the potential to restore social justice because it creates new
412 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

opportunities for marginalized groups to voice their claims (Touchton and

Wampler, 2014). The hypothesis that flows from this first line of argument
is that mechanisms of participatory governance are more likely to be found in
contexts characterized by low citizen participation in traditional democratic
institutions and high social inequality.

A strategy to improve governance effectiveness. However, this first line of argument

mainly operates at the system level, thereby neglecting the intentions of individual
actors. This is unsatisfactory because, as a rule, mechanisms of participatory
governance in concreto can only be introduced with the approval of existing
authorities. To plausibly explain the introduction of participatory governance,
we therefore have to look for reasons why authorities seek to relinquish some of
their power to citizens. One such important reason, as Fung (2015) argues, is that
authorities seek to achieve effective governance, and expect participatory mecha-
nisms to contribute to governance effectiveness. Klijn and Koppenjan (2002) offer
two expectations that governments formulate in this respect: the improvement of
policy quality; and the increase of policy acceptability by the public.
Due to a lack of knowledge and understanding of local situations, administra-
tive decisions often appear ‘aloof’ or ‘bureaucratic’ to stakeholders. By including
local stakeholders in the decision-making process, participatory governance can
counteract these problems: ‘[b]y reorganizing themselves to incorporate greater
citizen participation, public agencies can increase their effectiveness by drawing
on more information and the distinctive capabilities and resources of citizens’
(Fung, 2015: 517). Participatory governance is thereby seen to contribute to
social learning and as facilitating public agencies’ adaptation to developments in
their environment (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). A second hypothesis can thus be
formulated: the greater the pressure to act on policy problems, or the more difficult
these problems appear to a municipal government, the more likely it is that mech-
anisms of participatory governance will be introduced.
However, effective governance also depends on the acceptability of policies:
compliance by the target groups is a major condition for effective policy imple-
mentation. Participatory governance thus appears as ‘an attempt to maximize
support for policies and to minimize resistance by involving potential veto
groups in the process of policy formation’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2002: 141).
Creating public support for policies is particularly important given that modern
societies are complex and characterized by a multitude of groups that pursue their
own interests and often possess the legal and political means to bring those inter-
ests to bear. The consequences of such a fragmentation of power – also discussed
as ‘hyper-pluralism’ (see Judge, 1995: 23) – are decision-making blockades and
political standstills. Against this background, participatory governance helps gov-
ernments to discern the array of interests held by different groups early on, to
anticipate later resistance to policy decisions and reformulate these so as to reduce
the resistance to a level that does not endanger overall policies. In as much as
they enable decision-makers to discuss different policy options with the public,
Kübler et al. 413

mechanisms of participatory governance provide a platform for governments to

gauge ‘latent public opinion’ (Zaller, 2003) on potentially contentious governing
issues. Participatory governance therefore appears as an instrument to improve
governability by providing information to governments about the public accept-
ability of different policy options and strategies. Seen as an alternative to the
adversarialism of interest group pluralism, participatory governance can also con-
tribute to conflict resolution, and foster the acceptance of public decisions (Ansell
and Gash, 2007; Newig et al., 2017). Drawing on this line of reasoning, a third
hypothesis is that in municipalities with a large number of different political
groups, the introduction of mechanisms of participatory governance is more likely.

The electoral benefits of participatory governance. Very few scholars, to date, have
discussed mechanisms of participatory governance in terms of the electoral benefits
that it could bring to politicians who introduce and practise them. In his studies on
participatory budgeting in Brazil, Wampler (2015) argues that the introduction of
and support for participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities is part of a strategy
devised by mayors to increase their chances of re-election. In fact, participatory
budgeting enables these mayors to reward party loyalists and to brand the party in
government as democratic and participatory, as well as to reach out to interested
constituents. Mutatis mutandis, we can build a more general argument about the
electoral calculus behind the introduction of participatory governance. First, it is
traditionally the Left and Green parties who campaign for the expansion of citizen
participation (Goodfrank, 2011). For politicians in municipalities with a strong
Left/Green voter base, the support for participatory processes provides an oppor-
tunity to score with their electorate. Second, mechanisms of participatory gover-
nance entail frequent direct interaction between citizens and government officials.
For elected politicians, these mechanisms thus offer a stage to present themselves
to the public, as well as opportunities to engage in personal contacts with citizens
and reach out to the electorate. For politicians standing for election, good direct
connections with their citizens are particularly important against the background
of weakening party ties in most established democracies (Wampler, 2008).
A fourth hypothesis can therefore be formulated: mechanisms of participatory
governance are more likely to be introduced in municipalities with a strong Left/
Green vote, but also in those with weak party ties.

Participatory governance as a public administration fad. Finally, several studies on par-

ticipatory governance convey the notion that participatory procedures are part of
professional administrative practice. Starting with Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) classic
article on the possibilities and limits of participatory instruments in planning
procedures, administrative theory nowadays emphasizes the importance of stake-
holder inclusion and dialogue (Heinelt, 2010). The introduction of participatory
governance is thus related to initiatives taken by public administrators, who
promote them as part of state-of-the-art administrative practice, and seek
to strengthen networked forms of governance that highlight the participation of
414 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

citizens and service users in the management or monitoring of public services

(Torfing et al., 2012). On this basis, a fifth hypothesis is that mechanisms of par-
ticipatory governance spread in the wake of public administration professionalism
and reforms.

The Swiss context and its relevance

In this article, we study the introduction of participatory governance in the munic-
ipalities of Switzerland’s German-speaking region.1 The Swiss context is relevant
to the study of participatory governance in two respects.
First, as in other established democracies, participation in traditional institutions
of electoral democracy has declined in Switzerland since the mid-1970s (L
opez
Pintor and Gratschew, 2002). The decline of electoral turnout in Switzerland has
been observed not only in national elections (Lutz and Selb, 2007), but also in those
of the 26 cantons (Freitag, 2010), as well as in the roughly 2300 municipalities
(Kübler, 2015). The situation in Switzerland is thus representative of the democratic
shortcomings found in many other established democracies, for which participatory
governance has been discussed as a remedy (Sørensen, 1997).
On the other hand, Switzerland has a long and very lively tradition of direct
democracy. At all three levels of government (national, cantonal and municipal),
direct democratic institutions encompass the possibility to submit parliamentary
Acts to a binding popular vote (a referendum), and the possibility for citizens to
formulate proposals that, if accepted in a popular vote, become law (the so-called
‘popular initiatives’). At the municipal level, Swiss direct democracy even goes
beyond those two instruments as the legislative municipal institutions are often
organized as citizen assemblies. This means that the legislative functions are per-
formed directly by the citizens, allowing them to straightforwardly engage in delib-
eration and decision-making on municipal policies. Like the New England town
meetings, Swiss municipal assemblies are thus good examples of ‘direct participa-
tory authority’ (Fung, 2006: 69) epitomizing the model of ‘unitary democracy’
(Mansbridge, 1983), featuring a strong commonality of interests, a sense of friend-
ship between citizens and consensus as the predominant mode of decision-making.
Democracy, then, can be assumed to run quite deep in those municipalities
featuring municipal assemblies, and we can expect that the introduction of addi-
tional mechanisms of participatory governance is unlikely in these settings.
The municipal landscape in German-speaking Switzerland thus offers a unique
opportunity to investigate the effect of a long-standing tradition of unitary
democracy and direct participatory authorities on the further expansion of partic-
ipatory governance.

Data, operationalization and method

Empirically, the research strategy consists of analysing the features of municipal-
ities that have introduced mechanisms of participatory governance in a given
Kübler et al. 415

period with the ones of municipalities that have not done so. So far, the introduc-
tion of mechanisms of participatory governance in Switzerland has primarily been
studied in individual case studies (see Koch, 2013; Kübler, 1999) or in a limited
number of regions or policy fields (see Gundelach et al., 2016; Van der Heiden and
Krummenacher, 2011). This study, instead, provides a comprehensive overview by
using data from all municipalities of the German-speaking cantons (N ¼ 1505).

Dependent variable: mini-publics as a proxy for participatory governance

Mechanisms of participatory governance come in many different varieties. In this
study, our empirical focus is on so-called mini-publics. Drawing on Gr€ onlund et al.
(2014), mini-publics can be described as designs in which small groups of people
deliberate together on a topic related to contemporary political decision-making
processes, and that have some claim to representativeness, meaning that they aim
to involve lay citizens and non-partisans. While they are often established by gov-
ernmental agencies, mini-publics usually have a merely advisory function and lack
any decision- or lawmaking power of their own. Mini-publics are often imple-
mented by specialized associations or businesses ‘devoted to cultivating the pro-
fessional expertise – and providing the business services – required to implement
successful public forums’ (Fung, 2015: 514). To hire an external provider for orga-
nizing one or several mini-publics not only reflects the desire to ensure a successful
participatory process, but also shows a sign of a conscious choice and a substantial
investment in participatory procedures. Indeed, the engagement of external pro-
viders entails financial resources that require an explicit decision by the munici-
pal government.
Data collection took place via a survey of professional providers of mini-publics
between July 2011 and August 2012. Similar to developments elsewhere, non-profit
and for-profit organizations specializing in the provision of services for the orga-
nization and implementation of mini-publics have emerged in Switzerland since the
millennium. In the absence of a centralized directory, desk research, followed by
‘snowballing’ (i.e. information provided by respondents about other providers),
was undertaken to identify 112 professional mini-public providers in German-
speaking Switzerland. All of these were invited to be interviewed through an
online questionnaire, and followed up by telephone in case of non-response to
the first invitation.
The interview protocol ascertained the number of mini-publics implemented by
the company within the study period (2000 to mid-2012), as well as, for every single
mini-public exercise, the year of implementation, the municipality in which it was
implemented, the topic (policy area), the approximate number of participants and
the applied procedures. Of the 112 providers contacted, 87 took part in the survey.
Of these, 71 had, in fact, implemented mini-publics in German-speaking munici-
palities during the period under study. Most of these companies (57) were involved
in a maximum of five mini-public exercises, while 12 companies had organized
mini-publics between six and 20 times. Two companies had organized more than
416 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

20 mini-publics in German-speaking municipalities during the study period:

Metron AG (26 times) and Frischer Wind AG (77 times). These two are the
main professional providers of mini-publics in Switzerland. From the responses
to our survey, it appears that the providers are well connected with one another.
This suggests that with the 112 companies on our list, we have covered all the
relevant providers of mini-publics in German-speaking Switzerland in the study
period. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely excluded that some municipalities
have used the services of small mini-public providers who have not answered our
survey. This means that if there is a bias in our data, it is a bias towards an under-
rather than over-reporting of mini-publics in municipalities. (Analyses with data
from an alternative source presented in the supplemental material suggest, how-
ever, that the external validity of the data collected in our survey is high.)
Our main dependent variable – the implementation of mini-publics in a given
municipality – is operationalized as a dichotomous variable. It takes the value of 1
if any of the providers surveyed declared having been involved, at least once, in the
implementation of a mini-public exercise in the given municipality in the period
from 2000 to mid-2012.

Hypotheses and independent variables

In the earlier theory section, we formulated five hypotheses about why mechanisms
of participatory governance are introduced. These five hypotheses are operation-
alized with a total of 12 variables (see Table 1).
For most of these hypotheses, the operationalization is straightforward. With
respect to the first hypothesis (H1): electoral participation is operationalized by the
average turnout of the municipal electorate in national elections in the study
period;2 social inequality is measured by the Gini index of taxable income
within the municipality; and the absence of the municipal assembly tradition is
captured with a dummy variable. Policy problem pressure faced by municipal
decision-makers (H2) is operationalized with population growth in the study
period – used to capture the strain on municipal public services – as well as with
the unemployment rate, seen as a proxy for the severity of social problems within a
municipality. The presence of different political groups (H3) is operationalized
with Laakso and Taagapera’s (1979) ‘effective number of parties’ on the basis of
the municipal-level results of the national elections at the end of the study period.3
Regarding H4, we measure the strength of Left and Green parties in a municipality
via the cumulative share of votes obtained by the Social Democrats, the Greens
and the Workers Party in the latest national elections. The strength of party ties is
measured by the volatility of party votes in national elections (according to
Pedersen, 1980), as well as by the share of out-commuters in a municipality.4
Finally, drawing on previous studies on municipal administrative reforms in
Switzerland (Ladner, 2001), we measure the professionalism and reform orienta-
tion of the municipal public administration (H5) via the size of a municipality
(larger municipalities have a more professional administration), as well as via
Kübler et al. 417

Table 1. Implementation of mini-publics (MPs) in municipalities: Hypotheses and

operationalization.

Independent variables (measured at the

No. Hypotheses municipality level)

H1 Democratic deficits Average electoral turnout in national

The use of MPs is more likely in
municipalities with low participa-
tion in electoral democracy and
high social inequality, as well as in
municipalities without a municipal
assembly tradition
H2 Problem pressure
The use of MPs is more likely in
municipalities that face more
pressing policy problems
H3 Create public support
The use of MPs is more likely in
municipalities with large numbers
of different political groups
H4 Electoral benefits
The use of MPs is more likely in
municipalities with a large share
of Left/Green parties, as well as in
those with weak party ties
H5 Public administration fad
The use of MPs is more likely in
municipalities with a highly pro-
fessionalized and reform-oriented
public administration
C Control variable
The wealthier a municipality, the
more likely it is to have hired an
external provider for MPs
Note: Data for independent variables stem from Swiss Statistical Office (population census data), the Federal
Finance Administration and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.
elections 1999 and 2011 (in percent
of all voters).
Social inequality 2009 Gini Index of
taxable income
Dummy for absence of municipal
assembly
Population growth in percent (2000–
2010)
Average unemployment (2000–2010)
(percent of active population)
Fragmentation of the party system,
2011 National Council Elections
(‘effective number of parties’
according to Laakso and
Taagepera, 1979)
Left/Green parties share of the vote in
percent, 2011 National Council
Elections
Volatility of National Council Elections
1999–2011 (according to Pedersen,
1980)
Percentage of commuters in 2000
Population size (mean 2000 and 2010,
logged)
Presence of MPs in the 20 geographi-
cally nearest municipalities
Wealth of municipal population (median
of 2009 taxable income, in CHF1000)

the implementation of mini-publics in the 20 geographically nearest neighbouring

municipalities in order to take into account the ‘copycat effect’ of administrative
reforms. Finally, the median taxable income in a municipality was used as a con-
trol variable to measure the financial resources available to municipal govern-
ments. Indeed, given our focus on mini-publics implemented or supported by
418 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

external providers, poorer municipalities might be less likely to commission mini-

publics simply because they lack the financial resources to pay profession-
al providers.
Data on the independent variables were provided by the Swiss Statistical Office,
the Federal Finance Administration and the State Secretariat for Economic
Affairs, and could be collected for all municipalities in the German-speaking can-
tons of Switzerland (N ¼ 1505). However, data were not available on all variables
for all years of the study period. Data close to the end points of the study period
were used, and means calculated, in these cases.

Results
The providers covered in the survey indicated a total of 362 mini-publics that they
had implemented in the municipalities of German-speaking Switzerland during the
study period. A closer look at these mini-public exercises shows that they have
covered a variety of topics, related to specific policy areas (see Table 2). By far the
most important field is spatial planning, the subject of almost 40% of the mini-
publics implemented by the survey respondents. Participatory governance at the
municipal level therefore seems to be employed primarily in processes of local
planning and development. Only around 10% of mini-publics were open and
not policy-related.
In terms of the numbers of participants, the survey responses show that only
around a quarter of mini-publics had more than 100 participants. For almost half
of all mini-publics in our sample (47.3%), the number of participants was between
25 and 75. Mini-publics are clearly events of a relatively manageable size.
Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between the number of participants

Table 2. Topics or policy areas of mini publics (multiple topics possible).

Number of Mentions in
Topics mentions percent of cases

Spatial planning 127 39.1%

Sustainability 72 22.2%
Youth 69 21.2%
Strategy/concept 65 20.0%
Environment 34 10.5%
Energy 34 10.5%
Open topic 34 10.5%
Local agenda 21 33 10.2%
Tourism 33 10.2%
Traffic 19 5.8%
Fusion 5 1.5%
Other 74 22.8%
Total 599 325 (184.5%)
Kübler et al. 419

in mini-publics and the population size of the municipality in which they are
implemented.

Features of municipalities with or without mini-publics

The 362 identified mini-public exercises took place in 233 municipalities within the
Swiss-German cantons – 15.5% of all municipalities in these cantons. The distinc-
tion between those municipalities with mini-publics and those with no evidence of
any mini-public during the study period shows that mini-publics were used pri-
marily in (core) cities or suburban municipalities of metropolitan areas, while rural
municipalities are under-represented (see Table 3).
In most municipalities with mini-publics, only one exercise was held in the study
period, but occasionally several mini-public exercises were mentioned for the same
municipality during the study period. This was the case in larger cities in partic-
ular: 24 different mini-public exercises had taken place in the city of Zurich alone,
while in the city of Basel, there were 11, and there were five in Lucerne.

Explanatory factors for the use of mini-publics at the municipal level

Using logistic regression analysis, we can identify the characteristics that differen-
tiate municipalities with mini-publics from those without (see Table 4).
Specifically, six different regressions models were estimated – one with those var-
iables assigned to each hypothesis – and a combined model.5 Model 1 estimates the
influence of predictors for a democratic deficit (H1), and shows that low electoral
turnout, high social inequality and the absence of a participatory tradition increase
the likelihood for the implementation of mini-publics in municipalities. Model 2
shows that high population growth and unemployment – measures of policy pres-
sure beyond the control of municipal governments – also make it more likely that
municipalities have implemented mini-publics (H2). Model 3 shows that high
party-system fragmentation in a municipality makes mini-publics more likely,

Table 3. Municipalities with or without mini-publics (MPs) in the study period, and number of
mini-public exercises in municipalities with mini-publics according to municipality type.

Number of MPs in
municipalities
Municipalities with MPs

Municipality type Total Without MPs With MPs Mean Median

Core city of a metro- 40 (100%) 19 (47.5%) 21 (52.5%) 3.6 2

politan area
Suburban municipality 501 (100%) 388 (77.4%) 113 (22.6%) 1.5 1.0
Isolated city 4 (100%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (75.0%) 1.3 1.0
Rural municipality 960 (100%) 864 (90.0%) 96 (10.0%) 1.2 1.0
Total 1505 (100%) 1272 (84.5%) 233 (15.5%) 1.6 (233) 1.0 (233)
420 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

Table 4. Summary statistics and logistic regression of the implementation of mini-publics in

Swiss municipalities.

Summary statistics Logistic regression coefficients (SE in parentheses)

With Without Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Variables MP MP (H1) (H2) (H3) (H4) (H5) full

Average turnout 46.9% 48.2% –3.105** –2.248

in national (1.103) (1.286)
elections
(1999–2011)
Social inequality: 0.344 0.321 3.065** 0.818
Gini Index (1.159) (1.424)
taxable
income
(2009)
No municipal 18.5% 3.6% 1.715** 0.975**
assembly tra- (0.236) (0.289)
dition
(dummy ¼ 1)
Population 9.9% 6.5% 0.017** 0.017*
growth (0.006) (0.007)
(2000–2010)
Unemployment 1.4% 1.2% 0.300** 0.128
rate (2010) (0.092) (0.123)
Fragmented 4.76 4.37 0.295** 0.326**
party system (0.076) (0.107)
(2011) (effec-
tive number
of parties)
Share of the 21.5% 19.8% 0.032** –0.011
vote for (0.009) (0.014)
Green and
Left parties in
national
elections
Volatility of 12.3 13.7 –0.073** –0.061**
national (0.015) (0.016)
councillor
elections
(1999–2011)
Percentage of 61.0% 65.7% –4.530** –3.969**
out-commut- (0.566) (0.683)
ers in
municipalities
(continued)
Kübler et al. 421

Table 4. Continued
Summary statistics Logistic regression coefficients (SE in parentheses)

With Without Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Variables MP MP (H1) (H2) (H3) (H4) (H5) full

Municipal popu- 9638 2361 0.865** –

lation (aver- (0.076)
age
2000–2010)
Mini-publics in 0.437 0.366 0.377 0.729*
neighbouring (0.306) (0.308)
municipalities
Municipal 54,254 51,958 0.031** 0.024** 0.017 0.065** –0.001 0.047**
resources in (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
terms of
median of
taxable
income
(2009)
Constant –3.071** –3.541** –3.961** –2.062** –8.441** –2.058*
(0.624) (0.519) (0.499) (0.522) (0.713) (0.806)
Nagelkerke – – 0.100 0.037 0.035 0.115 0.204 0.178
R square
AIC – – 1162.4 1229.1 1245 1142.7 1094.7 1091.6
Number of 233 1272 1452 1452 1472 1441 1481 1420
observations
Note: Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

supporting the hypothesis that mini-publics are introduced in contexts character-

ized by the presence of a larger number of different political groups, where the
creation of public support for policies is more cumbersome (H3). The results of
model 4, however, go partially against the underlying hypothesis: although the
likelihood of mini-publics increases with the share of Left and Green parties and
can thereby be assumed to be part of a Left/Green political agenda, the estimates
for the variables measuring the strength of party ties (electoral volatility and
proportions of out-commuters) go in the opposite direction from what was
expected. The implementation of mini-publics in a given municipality is thus asso-
ciated with strong, rather than weak, party and community ties. Finally, the fifth
hypothesis is supported by the results of model 5: in larger municipalities that are
associated with a higher level of professional administration, mini-publics are more
likely to have been introduced. The ‘copycat effect’ of mini-publics in neighbouring
municipalities is explained away, however, by municipal size.
422 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

The results of the combined model, which simultaneously considers all potential
influencing factors (due to strong correlation with other variables, municipal pop-
ulation is excluded from the combined model6), help to clarify the robustness of the
effects considered previously. It shows that the effects of two democratic deficit
indicators (low electoral turnout and high social inequality) are explained away by
the other variables; the same is true for the effect of the unemployment rate, as well
as for the strength of Left and Green parties. The factors that retain explanatory
power for the occurrence of mini-publics in municipalities are: the absence of a
municipal assembly tradition; high rates of population growth; high fragmentation
of the party system; low electoral volatility and low proportions of out-commuters;
and the presence of mini-publics in neighbouring municipalities.7

Discussion and conclusion

The aim of this study was to provide an overview of the use of mini-publics by
municipalities in German-speaking Switzerland, as well as to better understand the
context in which local governments introduce mechanisms of participatory gover-
nance in established democracies. The results of the study suggest that mini-public
exercises in Swiss municipalities are primarily policy-oriented participatory proce-
dures, involving a rather small proportion of the citizenry, and employed in a
variety of policy areas but particularly in the field of spatial planning and munic-
ipal development. Our analysis of the factors associated with the implementation
of mini-publics shows that municipalities most likely to have used mini-publics are
those that do not convey the participatory and deliberative tradition of unitary
democracy (epitomized by the existence of the municipal assembly system), whose
public services are under growth pressure, who feature a large number of different
political groups and strong party and community ties, who have professional and
reform-minded public administrators, and, finally, who are wealthy enough to hire
professional providers to support the implementation of mini-publics.
The hypotheses found in the literature to explain the introduction of participa-
tory governance by local governments hence need to be qualified. First and fore-
most, participatory governance is often presented as driven by the quest to solve
legitimacy deficits that arise due to declining citizen participation in traditional
electoral democracy (see Goodhart et al., 2012). The results of our analysis call this
widely held thesis into question – at least in the context of established democracies.
In the Swiss municipalities studied here, the introduction of mini-publics is not
robustly related to (low) rates of citizen participation in elections, or to a context of
social inequality in which representative deficits are most likely to appear. Rather,
the analysis suggests that municipal authorities set up mini-publics in the hope that
they will help find solutions to pressing policy problems in a context of an increas-
ingly adversarial logic. This is especially pertinent in the face of fragmented group
interests and in the context of strong party and interest group ties, in which public
support for policy decisions – or, at least, the absence of resistance to these deci-
sions – is a crucial source of effective governance. Furthermore, it is plausible to
Kübler et al. 423

assume that mini-public exercises have become part of a professional practice

driven by administrative actors.
The expansion of participatory governance in Swiss municipalities seems not so
much motivated by a desire to redress the representation deficits of existing dem-
ocratic institutions. Rather, participatory governance is expanded primarily in
adversarial contexts characterized by problems of governability. In established
democracies, mechanisms of participatory governance thereby appear ‘more like
management and communication techniques . . . than effective instruments of
democratization of the decision-making process’ (Papadopoulos and Warin,
2007: 596). Found essentially in contexts with fragmented but cohesive groups,
participatory governance appears as a tool to discern latent public opinion on
potentially conflictive policy choices in order to create support by adapting policies
to what can be anticipated as acceptable to the main political groups present in a
jurisdiction.
In conclusion, a pragmatic logic of governability appears as the major driving
force for the expansion of participatory governance, which has been overlooked in
many accounts of democratic innovations with often sweeping postulations about
their origins. This study thus demonstrates the need to adopt a more nuanced look
at the motivations for the introduction of participatory mechanisms. In particular,
the Swiss case, with its varying models of democracy found at the municipal level –
unitary versus adversary – has allowed us to identify the adversarial nature of local
politics as one of the important conditions under which municipal governments
turn towards participatory governance. Where unitary democracy prevails, the
need for participatory governance does not seem to be felt very strongly.
The quest to increase governability in an adversarial local context might be the
main driver for the adoption of participatory governance in the Swiss context, and,
by extension, probably also in other established democracies with relatively few
problems of representation. However, in clientelistic, developing contexts with
serious democratic deficits, such as many parts of Latin America, Africa and
South-east Asia, where participatory governance is also expanding rapidly, the
story is likely very different.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.

Supplemental data
Supplemental data is available at journals.sagepub.com/home/ras.
424 International Review of Administrative Sciences 86(3)

Notes
1. Focusing on the German-speaking region enables us to hold the cultural context
constant. Compared to the French- and Italian-speaking regions in which the liberal-
representative model of democracy is emphasized, institutional architecture and
democratic politics in German-speaking cantons is more inspired by radical models of
democracy emphasizing direct citizen participation and assembly democracy (Bühlmann
et al., 2014).
2. We chose to use turnout in national rather than local elections. Indeed, turnout in
municipal elections in Switzerland is often strongly driven by locally specific constella-
tions (see Ladner and Millner, 1999), so that it is not a reliable and comparable measure
for the propensity of the municipal electorate to participate in electoral democracy.
3. We use municipal-level results of national elections to estimate the strength of parties,
rather than local election results. Party strengths in local elections are subject to specific
electoral constellations and not easily comparable across municipalities. Besides, data on
local elections are not readily available in Switzerland.
4. Commuting for work was found to be a strong predictor of loose ties with a municipality,
which affects not only community attachment, but also interest in municipal politics
(Sellers et al., 2013).
5. Several robustness checks were performed – see supplemental material for details.
6. Municipal population is strongly correlated (i.e. coefficient larger than 0.3) with the
following variables: absence of municipal assembly tradition (r ¼ 0.42); fragmentation
of party system (r ¼ 0.37); and municipal resources (r ¼ 0.32). Including municipal pop-
ulation would thus result in multi-collinearity. See supplemental material for details.
7. Note that no confounding effect was found for the urban–rural distinction, as further
analyses based on a matching procedure show. See supplemental material for details.

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Daniel Kübler is Professor at the Department of Political Science and at the Centre
for Democracy Studies of the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

Philippe E. Rochat is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Political

Science and at the Centre for Democracy Studies of the University of Zurich,
Switzerland.

Su Yun Woo is currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science

and at the Centre for Democracy Studies of the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

Nico van der Heiden has been a Post Doc researcher at the Department of Political
Science and at the Centre for Democracy Studies of the University of Zurich,
Switzerland.