The Nuclear Fuel Report:

Expanded Summary
Global Scenarios for Demand and
Supply Availability 2019-2040
Title: The Nuclear Fuel Report: Expanded Summary –
Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply Availability 2019-2040
Produced by: World Nuclear Association
Published: June 2020
Report No. 2020/005

Cover images: EDF Energy; Georgia Power Company

© 2020 World Nuclear Association.

Registered in England and Wales,
company number 01215741

This report reflects the views

of industry experts but does not
necessarily represent those of any
of the World Nuclear Association’s
individual member organizations
The Nuclear Fuel Report: Expanded Summary
Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply Availability 2019-2040

Contents
1. Introduction 2
1.1 Features of the nuclear fuel market
1.2 Energy and electricity demand
1.3 Factors affecting electricity demand growth
1.4 Factors affecting nuclear power growth

2. The Nuclear Fuel Report methodology 11

2.1 Supply methodology
2.2 Projection methodology and assumptions

3. Scenarios for nuclear generating capacity 13

4. Secondary supply 15
4.1 Concept of market mobility

5. Uranium supply and demand 19

5.1 Reactor requirements (uranium demand)
5.2 Overview of the uranium market
5.3 Recent uranium production
5.4 Primary uranium supply
5.5 Unspecified uranium supply

6. Conversion supply and demand 28

7. Enrichment supply and demand 30

8. Fuel fabrication supply and demand 32

9. Key findings of The Nuclear Fuel Report 36
9.1 Uranium
9.2 Secondary supply
9.3 Conversion
9.4 Enrichment
9.5 Fuel fabrication

10. Harmony programme 39

Appendix tables 40
Drafting group 43

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1. Introduction
The World Nuclear Association has published reports on nuclear fuel supply and demand at roughly
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two-yearly intervals since its foundation in 1975. The 19 edition of The Nuclear Fuel Report was
released in September 2019 and includes scenarios covering a range of possibilities for nuclear
power to 2040. Forecasts beyond 2040 are beyond the scope of the report and would require a rather
different approach to capture the larger range of uncertainty; however, the key issues examined in the
report are likely to have continued relevance during that longer period.

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This Expanded Summary covers the key findings of 19 edition, and explains the methodology and
the assumptions underlying the report’s three scenarios for future nuclear fuel demand and supply.

The full version of The Nuclear Fuel Report can be purchased from the World Nuclear Association’s
online shop.

Nuclear power currently contributes over 10% of the world’s electricity

production and is expected to continue playing an important role in future
electricity supply for several reasons, including:

 Nuclear power produces near-zero greenhouse gas and other

pollutant emissions.
 Nuclear power is a reliable and secure power source, which is
particularly attractive to industrializing countries and those lacking
indigenous energy resources.
 Nuclear power has long-term cost-competitiveness, compared with
the levelised cost of both fossil and clean energy sources.
 There are many industrial and human-capital benefits associated
with nuclear energy’s development and use.

Despite these advantages, nuclear energy faces competitive challenges

from other electricity generation sources, especially in deregulated markets
as they are currently designed, along with continuing regulatory and political
hurdles. Furthermore, electricity demand growth has slowed down especially
in the countries where nuclear power is well-established. However, the
nuclear sector remains strong in many developing countries and it is in these
countries that the majority of nuclear capacity growth is expected.

1.1. Features of the nuclear fuel market

The nuclear fuel market operates in a very different way to other energy markets. Uranium
concentrate produced by a mine cannot be fed into a nuclear reactor directly; it has to be processed
or pass through different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (see Figure 1).

The nuclear fuel cycle is complex, beginning with the mining of uranium and ending with the disposal
of nuclear waste. In order to use uranium in a nuclear reactor, it has to undergo mining and milling,
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication. These steps make up the 'front end' of the nuclear fuel
cycle. The ‘back end’ refers to all stages subsequent to removal of used fuel from the reactor. The

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used fuel may then go through a further series of steps including temporary storage, reprocessing,
and recycling before disposal of remaining waste products.

Figure 1: The nuclear fuel cycle

The fuel cost in nuclear power has historically been a minor element of the total production cost. Fuel
costs (inclusive of uranium, conversion, enrichment and fabrication) typically comprise less than 20%
of the total cost of electricity for a modern nuclear power plant, compared with up to 80% in fossil fuel-
fired plants.

Uranium supply can be characterized by two main categories: primary and secondary supply. Primary
supply refers to uranium that is newly mined and processed, while secondary supply includes uranium
received after reprocessing and returned back to the fuel cycle.

Primary production has recently (2013-2017) represented about 90% of the global reactor demand.
Primary uranium production is characterized by relatively broad geographical distribution (in 2018
uranium was produced in 14 countries), and also by a large number of companies representing major
and junior uranium miners. The intermediate stages of the nuclear fuel cycle – conversion, enrichment
and fuel fabrication – are services provided by specialist companies.

Secondary supply includes natural and low enriched uranium inventories, high enriched uranium,
mixed uranium and plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel, reprocessed uranium and re-enrichment of depleted
uranium. Secondary markets for uranium, conversion and enrichment services are well-established,
currently meeting about 15% of demand. However, the recycling of nuclear material depends largely
on political as well as economic factors.

An important feature of the nuclear fuel cycle is its international dimension. Whilst uranium is relatively
abundant throughout the Earth’s crust, but distinct trade specialization has occurred, due partly to the
high energy density and therefore the low costs of transport, in comparison with coal, oil and gas. For
example, uranium mined in Australia can be converted in Canada, enriched in the UK then fabricated
as fuel in Sweden for a reactor in South Africa. Recycled reactor fuel may follow similar international
routes, with their related political as well as economic implications.

A further aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle’s international dimension is the amount of licensing,
surveillance and national and multinational regulations in place throughout the fuel cycle to ensure
that safety and non-proliferation objectives are met. These are administered by governments, regional

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organizations, such as the Euratom Supply Agency in the EU, and by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).

The political influence on the uranium market has always been significant. Decisions taken to
increase uranium production, to build new reactors, and to allow new fuel cycle facility construction,
trade or transport in nuclear materials to take place, often contain significant non-economic
dimensions.

1.2. Energy and electricity demand

Nuclear power must be regarded within the wider framework of trends in energy demand and supply.
The World Nuclear Association does not prepare its own forecasts of world energy and electricity
demand and supply, but relies on the analyses of international organizations such as the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and others. The IEA in particular uses general equilibrium modelling of energy
markets that explicitly incorporates the interactions of different sectors and the relationship of the
energy sector to the wider economy. The World Nuclear Association scenarios are based on expert
opinion from within the nuclear industry and may usefully be compared with the IEA’s nuclear
scenario forecasts.

The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2018 (WEO 2018), published in November 2018, describes three
scenarios for global nuclear capacity based on different policy responses to climate change and the
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels (see Table 1). The central ‘New Policies’
scenario projects the impact of new measures, but on a relatively cautious basis, including broad
policy commitments that were announced as of August 2018. The ‘Current Policies’ scenario projects
the continuation of policies existing in mid-2018, excluding some ambitious targets declared by
governments around the world, and the ‘Sustainable Development’ scenario projects the
implementation of policies aiming to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goals of keeping the increase in
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

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Table 1: IEA and World Nuclear Association nuclear capacity scenarios for 2040, GWe

WEO New Policies 518 WNA Reference 569

2018 Current Policies 498 2019 Lower 402
Sustainable Development 678 Upper 776

The drivers for the World Nuclear Association scenarios embrace broader changes than climate
change policy alone. The Reference Scenario is largely a reflection of current government policies
and plans announced by utilities for nuclear in the next 10-15 years, which (with a few significant
exceptions) are generally rather modest.

While the Reference Scenario only assumes that officially announced plans are realized, taking into
account country-specific considerations, the Upper Scenario takes into consideration other
implications and projects how nuclear can develop if the overall landscape would be more favourable.

In contrast to the IEA Current Policies scenario, the Lower Scenario does not foresee a noticeable
impact of climate change policy and mainly focuses on other factors; for example, it is assumed that

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The IEA figures are gross GWe while the World Nuclear Association figures are net GWe, i.e. net of process
requirements. Net capacity is typically approximately 4-5% lower than gross capacity.

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nuclear becomes economically uncompetitive against the decreasing cost of intermittent renewables,
that there is a lack of political and/or public support for nuclear energy, and that the importance of
security of electricity supply and grid resilience are not sufficiently valued, amongst other factors.

A key advantage of nuclear is its proven ability to provide reliable and

economic base-load power on a near zero-carbon full life-cycle basis. For
example, it is worth mentioning that in the US alone, nuclear energy
currently provides around 55% of the country’s carbon-free electricity, and in
the European Union it accounts for 53% of the region’s carbon-free
electricity.

In 2018 the world's nuclear power plants supplied 2,563 TWh of electricity
through 396 GWe of operable capacity. This avoided the emission of 2.2
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide compared to the equivalent amount of coal
power generation, in addition to total avoided emissions of around 60 billion
tonnes since 1970. Nuclear power also avoids the emission of pollutants
including oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, and is therefore favoured by some
countries as a solution to combat air pollution.

In the future, nuclear energy could contribute substantially more given the
expectation of rapidly rising electricity demand and the changes in energy
consumption. The transport sector offers great potential with electric
vehicles, and programmes to implement higher use of passenger electric
vehicles are under way in numerous countries worldwide. Apart from
electricity generation, nuclear represents a credible low-carbon source of
process heat for various applications, such as district heating, water
desalination, oil and chemical refining, and hydrogen production.

Whilst policies aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions should help to create a level playing field for
nuclear, a preference for energy market liberalization by policy-makers may hinder the take-up of
nuclear power if this leads to shorter-term investment horizons. Nuclear power plants take longer to
build than, for instance, gas-fired plants, and have considerably higher initial capital investment.
Therefore, if electricity prices are unpredictable, this may tend to favour quicker payback projects such
as gas over the long-term commitment that is necessary to make a nuclear project financially viable.

1.3. Factors affecting electricity demand growth

There are many factors that affect electricity demand growth, some of the most important are
explained below.

Population growth, urbanization and electrification

Electricity demand is correlated with population growth. Indeed electricity demand growth has been
more than double that of population since 2000. With almost one billion people without access to
electricity globally, the extent to which large developing nations achieve universal access to electricity
will be a key driver of demand growth. Compounding the effect of population growth is the trend
towards urbanization.

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Global economic growth
Economic growth rates affect electricity demand, both industrial and household, particularly in
developing economies where growing incomes and standards of living enable new consumption of
domestic appliances, and domestic cooling and heating. However, in advanced economies growth in
gross domestic product has a lower correlation with electricity demand, primarily due to energy
efficiency initiatives.

Electrification of transport
The electrification of transport has played an important role in reversing projected power demand
declines in developed industrial economies and in supporting grid power growth in China. The most
visible electrification is that of passenger vehicles, with global plug-in vehicle sales increasing three-
fold from 773,600 in 2016 to 2.1 million in 2018. Initiatives are under way in numerous countries to
expand the electrification of motorcycles, buses, trucks, trains and water transport to reduce urban
pollution and vehicle emissions. The effectiveness of emissions reduction measures relies on low-
emission electricity for charging transport, providing an opportunity for nuclear power.

Alternative generation technologies

Competition between generating technologies has changed significantly in recent years. Nuclear
power has to compete with alternative generating technologies both in meeting the demand for
electricity from existing plants and especially for new investment. Given nuclear energy’s relatively
low operating costs, generation from an existing nuclear plant would expect to provide baseload
power over an extended period. However, in some circumstances these expectations no longer hold.
For example, in the USA, Entergy’s Pilgrim nuclear plant was shut down early for economic reasons,
and four reactors operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (Beaver Valley 1&2, Davis-
Besse, Perry) are scheduled to close prematurely during the next two years if the financial situation
does not improve, with some other US plants at risk. For plants closed prematurely, diminished
revenue expectations were a factor in the decision. Regarding new investment, alternative generation
technologies can decrease expected returns and therefore also the relative attractiveness of nuclear.

The ability to exploit shale gas on a commercial basis has transformed the economics of gas-fired
power generation in the USA. The natural gas resource base has been greatly increased by the
addition of unconventional gas. Moreover, the cost of exploiting natural gas has fallen.
Unconventional gas is widely available and the total cost of transporting gas to the customer has
fallen. Gas prices in the USA have essentially remained below $5/mmBTU since 2011, the price at
which gas-fired generation can be expected to start undercutting nuclear. The availability of low-cost
gas combined with a lower than expected level of power demand has affected the decisions of some
US utilities to invest in nuclear capacity uprates as well as in new reactors.

As with any source of energy, the exploitation of unconventional gas bears risks, including the
productivity and longevity of wells, the impact on water resources and other environmental concerns,
the outcome of which will become apparent only over time. At the global level, there is considerable
uncertainty as to how far unconventional gas might be developed in other parts of the world. To date,
the widespread exploitation of unconventional gas appears to be largely a US phenomenon. The EU
is believed to have quite extensive resources but to date exploitation has yet to be demonstrated and
in some countries hydraulic fracturing and even exploration have been prevented by regulation. China
has made significant efforts to identify and scope its unconventional gas resources which appear to
be very significant. In other countries where nuclear is an important contributor to electricity
generation such as South Korea, Russia and India, little information on unconventional gas has been
made publicly available or exploration activities are at an early stage.

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The development and promotion of renewable energy over the last decade or so has resulted in new
sources of power generation. The driving force behind renewable generation has been mainly the
political decision to set high levels of subsidies – under the form of power purchase agreements, tax
credits, amongst others – for renewables; the implementation of constraints on greenhouse gas
emissions has not been set yet at a level that would significantly reduce fossil generation. The
intention of policy-makers has been to develop the market for renewables not only to provide low-
carbon electricity but also to reduce the costs of renewable power. Politicians have expressed the
hope that subsidy support can be reduced and eventually removed, and in some countries – for
example Germany, Spain and the UK – this has happened to a degree.

The ambition to induce lower renewable costs has been met with limited success for bioenergy and
geothermal, with some success for onshore wind power and considerable success for solar power.
However, in the EU, where renewables have received the highest levels of support, the generation of
renewable power sits uneasily with existing power market structures and practices. Intermittent
renewables, such as solar and wind, generate power with very low operating costs yet incur high
capital costs. These power sources generally bid into the power market at very low (even negative)
prices and greatly increase the volatility of supply. This volatility reduces the capacity factors of other
producers, including nuclear, as well as increasing the maintenance costs arising from frequent
changes in output.

When the renewable generation is intermittent (as with solar and wind) the system costs related to
guaranteeing supply increase. These system requirements include extensive additional
transmission infrastructure, back-up generating capacity and energy storage. A 2019 study by the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency shows that when intermittent renewables supply more than 30% of
the electricity generated, system costs will grow exponentially and may double the price of
electricity to the final end user.

Grid storage technology

Challenges associated with the intermittency of renewables are hoped to be partly addressed through
the introduction of large-scale grid storage. Technologies such as pumped storage hydroelectricity,
lithium-ion batteries and vanadium flow batteries have been deployed at a commercial scale for both
stability enhancement and stored power release. Pumped hydro has been effective in limited
geographic circumstances where suitable infrastructure already exists. Lithium-ion battery storage
has been challenged by competition for resources in the electric vehicle market, limitations associated
with cycle times and the cost of scaling up to meet grid demands. Vanadium flow batteries have
demonstrated superior performance and lifecycles, although large-scale deployment is challenged by
vanadium supply availability and price volatility resulting from consumption from the steel industry.
The timeframe for commercialization of other technologies in the research and development stage
remains uncertain.

It is increasingly apparent that battery storage will not be available or affordable on the required
scale during the next few decades for mid- to long-term storage. Besides pumped hydro, which has
a very limited potential worldwide, there are some expectations placed on new technologies such
as power-to-X and hydrogen energy storage, but these are not yet developed and the b usiness
models are uncertain.

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1.4. Factors affecting nuclear power growth
There are many factors that will determine the rate of growth of nuclear power around the world. The
most important of these factors are outlined below.

Operating lifetime extensions

For the purposes of planning or licensing, the operating lifetime of most types of reactor was
considered to be 40 years. However, recent years have seen a strong trend towards operating
lifetime extensions beyond the initial design lifetime. Operating reactors are subject to continuous
upgrading and replacement of components, as well as rigorous licensing and inspection regimes. It is
expected that many, if not most, reactors will operate beyond 40 years and therefore apply for
extended operational lifetimes. Licence extensions offer the possibility of much extended operating
lifetimes and are the most economic way of generating power beyond the design lifetime period.

Carbon neutral energy sources

The global imperative to constrain climate change has seen widespread policy support for renewable
energy that has led to dramatically increased use of these energy sources over the last decade.
However, despite these policy interventions, global CO 2 emissions continued to rise in 2017 and
2018, widening the gap between current global emissions and the trajectory required to limit climate
change to 1.5°C (or even 2°C) above pre-industrial levels.

The nuclear power industry is achieving increasing recognition for its clean energy credentials
amongst policy-makers, environmentalists and the public. There is also increasing awareness of
environmental and societal effects from land consumption and decommissioning of solar energy, as
well as public resistance of onshore wind turbines. The degree to which this recognition results in
government policies supporting existing and future nuclear energy production will be a key factor
affecting the growth prospects for nuclear fuel demand.

The potential for government policy to play a positive role for nuclear energy will depend on many
factors. Should governments increase the urgency with which they seek to decarbonize energy
production, nuclear power stands to benefit from policies to avoid early closure of reactors and enable
operating lifetime extensions. Government policies to reduce base-load coal consumption are, in
many countries, only achievable through displacement by other base-load sources, such as gas,
hydroelectric power or nuclear power. Given environmental hurdles associated with hydroelectric
power installations and carbon emissions from gas, nuclear power is the logical choice for coal
displacement in most instances. However, many governments have been cautious in supporting
nuclear power because of the vocal role of interest groups, who have opposed nuclear power for both
ideological and competitive reasons, and also because of the complexity in assessing either system
costs or the socio-economic contributions of nuclear.

Air pollution imperative for clean energy in growth markets

Air pollution is an acute challenge in two of the most important growth markets for nuclear power:
China and India. Over the last two years, both nations have experienced instances of widespread
urban particulate pollution vastly exceeding acceptable limits. Awareness of the health effects of air
pollution has grown dramatically, with estimated deaths from air particulate exposure, in part due to
coal-fired power, numbering in the millions per annum.

This led the Chinese government in 2017 to promise to “make the skies blue again” and enact
broad policy measures to control air pollution. Immediate measures have included suspending

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factories and reducing vehicle traffic during air crises, as well as cancelling and suspending
operation of coal-fired power plants. Longer-term policies are directed at displacing coal power with
clean energy, ensuring that clean energy sources would be used to meet the increasing future
energy demand as transport transitions to become electrified and energy sources for domestic
heating and cooking are centralized.

Nuclear power is positioned particularly well as a solution to Chinese urban air pollution. As a
baseload power source, nuclear offers the preferred source of energy to displace coal-fired power
without sacrificing grid stability. China is the world leader in hydroelectric power production, but there
are environmental, social and multi-lateral constraints to expanding this energy source further.
Moreover, most of China’s air pollution crises occur during low pressure weather conditions in winter
when solar power generation is seasonally low and still conditions reduce or suspend the contribution
of wind power.

Although policies to reduce air pollution are already supporting the expansion of nuclear power in
China and India, the extent to which this could add further impetus to nuclear approvals and
construction in both countries depends on the effectiveness of current policies in addressing air
pollution and the extent to which other clean energy sources can contribute to reducing thermal
power. For instance, if efforts to reduce air pollution from industry and domestic cooking/heating fires
are not sufficiently effective then further measures may be required to displace coal-fired power.
Similarly, if intermittent renewables underperform at crucial times or put too much pressure on grid
stability, there is an opportunity for nuclear power to play a greater role in the clean energy mix.

Geopolitical security of supply

Nuclear power has a number of features that can be expected to continue to appeal to energy policy-
makers in many countries. The most important of these is its contribution to a country’s security of
energy supply. Nuclear power plants consume relatively little fuel compared with fossil-fired plants,
which means that, if it is thought necessary, several years’ supply can easily be stockpiled. Uranium
is in any case available from a diverse range of countries spread around the world, making major
disruption from primary suppliers unlikely. Countries with nuclear programmes are thus less exposed
to large swings in fossil fuel prices and to supply disruptions (such as occurred in the 1970s), as well
as to currency fluctuations.

There are also heightened fears today about dependence on imported energy, given the
concentration of oil and gas reserves in a limited number of countries. Indeed, this was the main
motivation for countries such as France and Japan taking the decision to pursue substantial nuclear
programmes in the 1970s, after the first oil crisis. Today this argument has returned, particularly in
Europe with increasing dependence on gas imports but also in East Asia, which is responsible for an
increasing share of the international trade in fossil fuels.

Geopolitical tensions have increased over the last two years, perhaps to levels not seen since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, as a result of trade disputes, tensions on the Korean peninsula,
instability in the Middle East, and the return of Cold War rhetoric between the USA and Russia.
These tensions are likely to lead to an increased focus on energy security, which will benefit
nuclear power growth.

Grid resilience
The large-scale expansion of intermittent renewables has placed increasing pressure on grid
infrastructure and reduced the grid resilience to non-conducive weather conditions and climatic

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aberrations such as the hurricane and extreme cold events experienced in the USA in recent years.
For example, the weakening of the polar vortex in 2014 and 2019 resulted in extreme low
temperatures in the USA, causing widespread power disruption. In many regions nuclear power
was the only power source, with renewables unable to function and coal and gas power supply
chains left disabled by extreme conditions. Nuclear power’s role in offering grid stability in all
climatic conditions has led to increased recognition of the economic and social value of grid
resilience, particularly in developed industrialized nations, evident by the US Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission launching proceedings in 2018 to examine the resilience issue. This trend
is likely to continue as weather volatility due to climate change increases and the penetration of
intermittent renewables increases.

Improved economics
The cost of nuclear generation mostly depends on the initial capital cost of reactor construction, with
nuclear fuel representing only a minor proportion of total production cost. Accordingly, changes in the
capital costs of new nuclear have substantial impacts on the lifetime cost-competitiveness of nuclear
power compared with other energy sources.

Over the last decade the nuclear sector has endured several examples of large cost overruns in the
construction of first-of-a-kind reactors. In addition to the financial burden this places on vendors and
financiers, these outlying capital costs have increased the average capital costs attributed to the
nuclear sector and the perceived cost of nuclear power. Furthermore, the detractors of nuclear power
frequently use these figures selectively in order to portray nuclear power as being more expensive
than alternative energy sources.

Fortunately, the nuclear power sector is currently in a phase of improving capital costs and, therefore,
economics. This is partly as a result of moving through the inevitable first-of-a-kind construction phase
associated with new reactor models. More significant, however, are the cost benefits associated with
reactors being built in significant numbers around the world. Moreover, Chinese and Korean reactor
builds have demonstrated a substantial improvement in construction time and up-front capital cost,
which is likely to continue. In recognition of the need to improve both the perception and reality of
nuclear construction costs, the industry is focused on a range of initiatives to reduce construction
times, costs and risk.

Continued progress in reducing the capital cost of new nuclear builds will have a substantial impact
on the relative economics of nuclear power and, therefore, its growth.

New financing models

Reactor vendors have continued to evolve to meet the needs of governments and power utilities,
particularly in new markets and developing nations. This evolution has included the emergence of
build-own-operate reactor packages, with the provision of associated finance. The continued
development of this method of financing reactor construction may help to a certain extent to expand
the market for nuclear reactors and therefore reactor demand.

Cost of capital is a key component in the total cost of nuclear power. Large-scale reactors require
large capital spending over a long period of construction before generating any revenue. Financing
costs may therefore add 30-50% to the cost of construction. In order to reduce costs, the industry and
developers have to reduce the construction time and cost, and should also discuss with governments
new financing schemes where risk is appropriately allocated, to lower the cost of capital. Given that

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nuclear power is such a key contributor to economy, governments should play a significant role in
their development, similar to the measures implemented for renewables development.

Superior safety record of nuclear

Public acceptance of nuclear reactors typically requires host communities to consider nuclear
power on its merits through the evaluation of facts. One of the most relevant facts supporting
nuclear power is its superior safety record – a fact that is not widely understood by the public.
Independent analysis of the fatality rate of the full lifecycle of various energy sources (including
renewables) has confirmed that nuclear power is the safest form of energy ever used when
measured as deaths per TWh generated.

Furthermore, as more evidence becomes available on the effects of radiation exposure, bodies such
as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation have concluded that
low-to-moderate exposures to ionizing radiation present significantly less danger to health than is
commonly perceived. As these statistics become better understood, public acceptance of nuclear
power can be expected to increase.

Long-term storage/reprocessing solutions

Another potential barrier to public acceptance of nuclear power is concern over the permanent
storage of waste products. The industry continues to make progress with the development of long-
term storage facilities in Finland, France and other countries, together with ongoing development of
fast neutron reactors and reprocessing technologies.

Advanced reactors
A number of advanced reactors are under development, including SMRs, floating reactors and fast
neutron reactors. As these advanced reactors have distinct advantages and applications, they have
the potential to expand nuclear power beyond large-scale Generation III/III+ reactors. Whilst some
designs have passed through the regulatory and demonstration stages, the total impact on nuclear
power growth will depend on the timing of their development.

2. The Nuclear Fuel Report methodology

The Nuclear Fuel Report follows previous practice by making extensive use of information from the
World Nuclear Association’s members who represent all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle on a
worldwide basis. Some of these contributions have been made via working groups made up of
member representatives. The cut-off date for information input was 30 June 2019.

Questionnaires to both World Nuclear Association member and non-member organizations active in
the fuel cycle were used to help produce the projections for nuclear capacity and uranium production
included in this report. In addition, commercially sensitive information on inventories was requested,
the confidentiality of which was secured by having answers compiled by a firm of accountants, with
only regionally aggregated data being provided to the World Nuclear Association. The information in
the questionnaires was supplemented by judgements applied by the Association and its working
group members, based on published material and other information deemed to be accurate. Sources
of information include regular reports produced by industry participants, conference papers, and the
publications of public bodies such as the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the USA and the
Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) in the EU.

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The projections for fuel requirements were generated by a proprietary model developed at the World
Nuclear Association over many years, incorporating the key operating characteristics of reactors
throughout the world.

2.1. Supply methodology

For any mineral resource, the future availability of supply depends on many factors beyond the
geological availability of the mineral. Uranium supply can also face political and policy uncertainties in
some jurisdictions. For this reason, both primary and secondary supply sources are classified
according to two main groups:

 Specified Supply. Supply that is either known or has a sufficient degree of certainty so that its
volume and timing can be predicted.
 Unspecified Supply. Supply that is either unknown or lacks a sufficient degree of certainty so
that its volume and timing cannot be predicted.

This classification is applied to each category of supply within the report, including secondary supply
(see Figure 2). Those supply sources allocated to Specified Supply are identified in the supply stack
for each component and, in general, include primary supply, secondary supply, and future supply.
2
Those supply sources allocated to Unspecified Supply , in general, comprise unspecified secondary
supply sources and future primary supply that at this time cannot be predicted with any degree of
certainty due to technical and economic factors, as well as policy constraints.

Figure 2: Methodology of specified and unspecified supplies

2
The concept of Unspecified Supply as it relates to secondary supplies is discussed in detail in Sections 4.2 and
specifically in relation to uranium supply in Section 5.6 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

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2.2. Projection methodology and assumptions
Individual country nuclear capacity scenarios are formulated by a World Nuclear Association working
group, taking into account responses to a questionnaire survey and publicly available information.
New reactor additions for each country and area are considered on the basis of existing plans and
policies within three categories: those under construction; those in the planning and licensing process;
and those which are proposed but on which no firm commitments have been made. Where official
nuclear targets or objectives have been published, they are used to inform the Reference Scenario
projections, with any adjustments to timings or levels of the targets deemed necessary by the drafting
group. In countries where the official objective is to limit or reduce the nuclear contribution, this is
factored into the projections. The Upper Scenario projections consider where realistic opportunities
exist for improved plans for existing and new reactors. In the Lower Scenario, plans for new reactors
may be scaled down or cancelled.

For existing reactors, the projection includes an estimation of the operating lifetimes, which is based
on consideration of technical, licensing and policy issues within the framework of each scenario.

3. Scenarios for nuclear generating capacity

To reflect the range of uncertainties which surround any projection, three scenarios are considered;
these are referred to as the Lower, Reference and Upper Scenarios. No attempt is made to attach
probabilities to the scenarios. In principle, the starting point is that all three must be entirely
plausible as representations of future events and are thus worthy of the reader’s consideration. If a
scenario is judged to be very unlikely it would not be included in the report. Although there is a
natural tendency to consider the Reference Scenario as the most probable, the Upper and Lower
cases should not be ignored, as they are considered to be fully plausible, depending on underlying
political and economic trends.

In every scenario the impact of the following factors to the development of nuclear energy is
3
analysed :

 Economics of nuclear power generation

 The level of political (energy policies)/public support to nuclear energy
 Energy mix decarbonisation
 Electricity market structure/security of electricity supply
 Regulatory standards.

As of mid-2019, world nuclear capacity was 398 GWe (including the idled Japanese reactors). In the
Reference Scenario this is expected to rise to 462 GWe by 2030 and to 569 GWe by 2040. In the
Upper Scenario, the equivalent figures are 537 GWe in 2030 and 776 GWe in 2040. In the Lower
Scenario, nuclear generating capacity is effectively flat throughout the forecast period (see Figure 3).

3
Three scenarios are examined in Section 2.4.1 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

13
 Figure 3: Nuclear generating capacity scenarios to 2040, GWe

Figure 4 compares the new scenarios with those of the 2017 edition of The Nuclear Fuel Report
showing the following results: the Upper Scenario and the Reference Scenario almost overlap with
the 2017 projections before 2035, and keep rising 2035-2040; the Lower Scenario is significantly lifted
(10% annually on average), turning the previous declining trend into a slightly increasing one.

Figure 4: Comparison of 2019 and 2017 generating capacity scenarios, GWe

Since the publication of the previous edition of The Nuclear Fuel Report in September 2017, there has
been a reversal of the negative trend in nuclear industry development. For the first time since March
2011, this led to a positive trend in nuclear capacity projections over the forecasting period in all three
scenarios presented in the 2019 report. There are four main reasons for this:

 In France, the country’s energy policy was modified, delaying the timeline of planned
reduction of nuclear power in the share of its electricity mix to 50% from the previou s
2025 target to 2035, and allowing operating lifetime extensions of existing reactors
beyond 40 years.

14
  In the USA, state legislatures are starting to pass measures that support the continued
operation of reactors, recognizing the valuable role of nuclear in providing low-carbon
electricity. At the same time, the process of granting a second operating licence extension for
US nuclear reactors has begun, allowing reactors to operate for 80 years.

 Both China and India have extensive nuclear expansion programmes. The Reference
Scenario projects nuclear generation capacity in India to grow more than six times to
approximately 41 GWe from the current level of 6.2 GWe; and China is expected to reach
almost 179 GWe in the Reference Scenario, quadrupling its current nuclear capacity.

 The prospects for new reactors in many countries have improved with several newcomer
countries launching construction projects (e.g. Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt) and several more
demonstrating a clear interest in developing nuclear programmes (e.g. Uzbekistan,
4
Kazakhstan, Poland) .

4. Secondary supply
Secondary supplies may be defined as the material other than primary production, sourced to satisfy
reactor requirements. There is a broad spectrum of secondary supply sources including, but not
limited to, commercial and governmental inventories, stockpile drawdowns, fuel assemblies no longer
useable in reactors (e.g. in Japan, Taiwan, Germany and the USA), and use of recycled materials of
various types. In the widest sense, secondary supplies may be regarded as previous uranium
production returned to the commercial nuclear fuel market.

For the purposes of this report, all secondary supply sources are divided into two major groups.

Specified Supply – secondary supply that comprises supply sources that have been specifically
identified to enter the market in a form, quantity, and timeframe that can be estimated or predicted to
a reasonable accuracy. For these sources, three scenarios of future secondary supply are provided
5
for uranium, conversion and enrichment .

Unspecified Supply – secondary supply that contains the sources that do not offer an adequate level
of predictability in terms of expected time of market access or availability for consumption, for several
reasons, including limitations in information sources, arbitrary and proprietary policies of individual
entities, technical challenges, geopolitics, and economics. In terms of the limited predictability of this
group’s material, its degree of mobility is included as a new element in the 2019 edition of The
6
Nuclear Fuel Report . Table 2 shows the allocation of secondary supply sources among both groups.

4
A country-by-country analysis of nuclear programmes is detailed in Section 2.4.2 of The Nuclear Fuel Report
5
Three scenarios of secondary supply for uranium, conversion and enrichment are discussed in detail in Section
4.4 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.
6
The concept of market mobility is discussed in the section ‘Nuclear Fuel Report methodology’ above and
examined in detail in Section 4.2.1 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

15
 Table 2: Secondary supply categorized as Specified and Unspecified supply

Category of secondary supply Specified sources Unspecified sources

Major commercial inventories (U3O8, UF6, EUP) x

Unusable fresh fuel bundles (EUP) x
Other government stocks x
Spent fuel and products derived from it x
US DOE material inflows
- High assay depleted uranium (DUF 6) x
- High assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) x
- Environmental management (EM) transfers of natural UF 6 x
- Energy Northwest (ENW) depleted UF 6 (DUF6) x
Plutonium recycled as MOX x
RepU recycled as ERU x
Underfeeding x
Tails re-enrichment x

These categories of secondary supply originate from various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. A
categorization of secondary sources of supply by originating stage is given in Table 3.

Table 3: Categorization of various secondary supply sources by originating stage

Originating Type of initial Marketable forms of

Economic role Owners
stage secondary sources secondary materials

• Natural U3O8, UF6;

Commercial entities
(producers, traders, utilities)
Targeted (desired)
products
Pre-irradiation in Governments and their
nuclear reactors contractors
(front-end) Commercial entities
(enrichers) or governments
By-products (including
and their contractors
underfeeding)
Commercial entities
(enrichers)
Commercial entities or
Post-irradiation in Reusable products governments and their
nuclear reactors contractors
(back-end)
By-products of recycled Commercial entities
materials (enrichers)
Commercial inventories • LEU as UF6, UO2, fabricated fuel
and its feed/SWU components
Military-related materials • LEU from surplus weapons-grade
and depleted uranium HEU
• Natural uranium equivalent as UF 6
Legacy tails and from tails
underfeeding
• LEU from tails or underfeeding as
UF6
• Reprocessed uranium
• Enriched reprocessed uranium
(ERU) mostly as UO2
• MOX fuel containing plutonium from
Recycled materials spent fuel or defence
• Unprocessed spent fuel (potential
source)
• LEU from irradiated tails (DSIU)
• Depleted RepU as UF6 or UO2

Uranium that has been mined and held as inventory for a period of time before it is further processed
is the simplest form of secondary supply. This inventory normally accounts for only a relatively small
portion of total supply. However, in the current market situation, given historic low U 3O8 prices, this
source has become more significant not only for primary producers and utilities, but also for numerous
7
intermediary parties (e.g. traders, investment funds, banks) .

The majority of secondary supplies are derived from uranium that has undergone transformation in
reactors, enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities. The second largest potential secondary
resource by mass is the world’s inventory of not-yet-treated used nuclear fuel, held largely at
reactor sites. It is categorised as a future potential resource, as, up to now, used fu el in most

7
Commercial inventories are examined in detail in Section 4.3.1 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

16
countries remains destined for interim storage rather than for further use in the nuclear fuel cycle in
the medium term.

A substantial quantity of used nuclear fuel has already been reprocessed in the civil nuclear sector,
leading to separated plutonium and uranium. These are gradually being used as mixed oxide (MOX)
8
fuel and enriched reprocessed uranium (ERU) fuel . Natural uranium requirements so far displaced by
these sources are relatively modest. The future developments in reprocessed uranium (in ERU fuel)
and plutonium (in MOX fuel) utilization depend primarily on back-end policy and the timely availability
of the supply chain to process these materials. ERU and MOX fuel developments are therefore
influenced only marginally by natural uranium market price levels.

Depleted uranium (known also as ‘tails’) is the largest form of potential secondary supplies by
mass. Tails offer a number of opportunities for future use, although not all tails re -enrichment is
economically viable.

The potential for underfeeding enrichment plants is also an important source of secondary supply. In
certain circumstances, particularly if enrichment capacity is underemployed as it is today, it can be
financially and operationally worthwhile for an enrichment facility to have an operational tails assay
below the level that was contracted with the customer, making use of more enrichment capacity. This
so-called underfeeding of the facility ‘creates’ some surplus uranium which can be sold. In this report,
underfeeding is regarded as an additional source of secondary supply as it has become increasingly
important in the current market.

4.1. Concept of market mobility

Regarding the availability for consumption, it is important to differentiate between primary supply and
secondary supply. Primary supply refers to fresh fuel in the form of uranium, conversion, enrichment
or fabricated fuel that is transferred from a producer to a consumer, either directly or through various
intermediaries. In contrast, secondary sources often require additional operations or processing (e.g.
reprocessing or recycling) applied to the material (many of them highly technical in nature) before it
can be returned to the nuclear fuel cycle at various stages. Further processing (at conversion,
enrichment or fuel fabrication facilities) also extends the time needed for certain secondary sources to
re-enter the market and become available to the consumer.

The Nuclear Fuel Report examines the degree of mobility of Unspecified secondary supply. The
concept of ‘degree of mobility’ is the availability of the supply source to access the market and
contribute to satisfying reactor requirements. A source’s mobility does not necessarily refer to
its movement (for example, from a non-end user to an end user); rather, any ability of the
source to offset the need for newly-produced uranium, conversion, or enrichment concerns its
degree of mobility.

In other words, a supply source with the highest degree of mobility is the one that is available for
immediate consumption – the most relevant here would be fabricated, utility-owned fuel inventory that
can be consumed in a reactor almost immediately. Alternatively, an example of a source with a very
low degree of mobility would be spent fuel that requires reprocessing but resides in a district that does
not have a reprocessing programme.

8
More details about recycling of materials from reprocessing could be found in Section 4.3.6 of The Nuclear
Fuel Report.

17
Thus, sources of Unspecified secondary supply can be divided into two major parts:

 A high degree of mobility but insufficient predictability in terms of quantity and timing of
consumption (e.g. commercial inventories and some government stocks).

 A notable future potential for market access but low degree of mobility due to any number of
commercial, policy, technical, and/or capacity-related limitations (e.g. spent fuel or products
derived from it).

9
Three scenarios of future secondary supplies for uranium are compared in Figure 5. As can be seen
in all scenarios, the share steadily declines to 2040. In the Reference Scenario, secondary supply
provides 15% in 2019, 11% in 2025, declining to 8% in 2030 and ending up at 5% in 2040, with
shares a few percent higher for the Lower Scenario and a few percent lower for the Upper Scenario.

Figure 5: Secondary supply scenarios for uranium, tU

For the near term picture, secondary supplies are currently at a level of around 10,000 tU/yr for all
scenarios, slightly declining to 8,000 tU/yr towards 2028 and staying in the range of 5,000 to 7,000
tU/yr from 2030 to 2040.

9
Three scenarios of secondary supply for conversion and enrichment could be found in Section 4.4 of The
Nuclear Fuel Report.

18
5. Uranium supply and demand

5.1. Reactor requirements (uranium demand)

The World Nuclear Association’s reactor requirements model was revised for the 2019 edition of The
Nuclear Fuel Report, with a reassessment of the various factors affecting nuclear fuel demand, such
as enrichment levels, characteristics of first core loads and fuel burn-ups. For the first time, fast
neutron reactors were included in the model. Capacity factor assumptions, for current and future
reactors, were revised and updated using the most recent data.

Forward reactor requirements can be calculated knowing the nuclear generating capacity in operation
together with various data about reactor operations and fuel cycle characteristics (e.g. load factors,
tails assay, burn-up level). This provides a good measure of how much fissile material and fuel cycle
services will be required to prepare the fuel to be physically loaded into reactors in a given year. The
World Nuclear Association bases its demand projections in this report on such calculations, using
data provided by utilities and from other sources about reactor operations and fuel cycle
characteristics. Reactor requirements are a measure of the longer-term demand for nuclear fuel. They
underpin many of the multiannual supply contracts negotiated in the market. However, current primary
uranium production levels and other market activity are not closely related to requirements.

Primary production levels in the short term are much more closely related to expected utility
procurements in the next few years. Although utility requirements may also be partly met from other
sources, such as inventories held by producers, traders or governments, utility procurement is the
main driver of primary production in the short term. For longer-term planning of production levels (e.g.
decisions on investments in new mines), reactor requirements will be the more important indicator. As
this report covers a period of 20 years, reactor requirements are the principal demand measure
considered. Whenever the term ‘demand’ is used, it means ‘reactor requirements’.

5.2. Overview of the uranium market

The uranium market is primarily composed of transactions between:
 Producers or suppliers (uranium miners, convertors, enrichers or fuel fabricators).
 Public and private electrical nuclear utilities or fuel consumers.
 Various other uranium market participants that buy and sell uranium (agents, traders,
investors, intermediaries).

These organizations carry out a great number of daily transactions, entering into short-term (spot) or
long-term contracts to buy or sell uranium ore concentrate (U3O8). However, the main aim of this
report is to consider reactor uranium requirements, which is driven by utilities (as the main buyers)
and comprises the vast majority of primary uranium demand, along with primary uranium supply, i.e.
the uranium produced by miners, which might be displaced by other forms of uranium, such as UF 6,
EUP or secondary sources.

Figure 6 shows how uranium production and reactor requirements are distributed around the globe,
listing the major uranium producing and consuming countries.

19
 Figure 6: Uranium production and reactor requirements for major producing
and consuming countries, as of end 2018, tU

Utilities have a relatively stable demand for uranium based upon the amount needed to manufacture
the fuel for operating their reactors. They typically purchase their requirements a number of years in
advance, due to the long time taken to process and convert natural uranium into fuel assemblies, as
well as to hold some strategic inventory based on their perception of future supply risk. Long-term
contract arrangements suit utilities because they know their likely requirements many years in
advance. The stability and certainty associated with such arrangements also suit the uranium miners
on the other side of the long-term contracts.

World reactor requirements for uranium in 2019 are estimated at about 67,600 tU. In the Reference
Scenario, these are expected to rise to 84,850 tU in 2030 and 100,000 tU in 2040. In the Upper
Scenario, uranium requirements are expected to be about 103,500 tU in 2030, and 137,600 tU in
2040. These requirements are relatively consistent with those for the same scenarios in the 2017
edition of The Nuclear Fuel Report (2019 through 2035). Requirements in the Lower Scenario are on
average 10% higher compared than in the 2017 edition.

Geologically established resources of uranium globally are more than adequate to satisfy reactor
requirements to well beyond 2040. Uranium resources are quite widely distributed around the world
and Table 4 shows the distribution of resources by country. Three countries traditionally lead this list:
Australia hosts the largest total resources (26% of the total), with Kazakhstan and Canada having an
almost equal resource base, roughly 11% of the total each.

20
 10
Table 4: Uranium resources by country in 2017, ranked by 2017 total , thousand tU

2017
Reasonably Inferred
Country assured resources resources Total
Australia 1,401 654 2,055
Kazakhstan 435 470 905
Canada 593 254 846
Russia 260 397 657
Namibia 369 173 541
South Africa 260 190 449
Niger 336 89 426
China 137 154 290
Brazil 156 121 277
Ukraine 138 81 219
India 149 8 157
Uzbekistan 58 82 139
United States 101 NA 101
Others 425 502 926
Total 4,815 3,173 7,988

5.3. Recent uranium production

After peaking in 2016, uranium production then decreased as a result of deteriorating market
conditions. This reduction in production was led by Canada, where the biggest mine, McArthur River,
was idled at the beginning of 2018, and Kazakhstan, which in 2017-2018 ceased its continuous
expansion programme to follow a ‘market-centric’ approach that reduced production for at least three
years. As the existing production centres shut down or idled capacity, as well as reduced production
levels, capacity utilization factors fell globally. For example, in October 2017 Areva NewCo (now
Orano) announced a 20% reduction of uranium production at its Somair mine in 2018, effectively
achieving a 15% reduction of uranium production at both its uranium mines in Niger in 2018.

In aggregate, uranium production showed a decreasing trend over three consecutive years from 2016
through to 2018. The results of these production changes can be seen in Table 5 above. In fact, if
McArthur River’s nameplate capacity of 9,616 tU/yr were included in the 2018 figures, then the
industry capacity utilization would have been an all-time low of 63% instead of 72% (see Table 5).

10
The resources in this table are recoverable resources in the <$260/kgU category. Recoverable resources are
uranium recoverable from mineable ore, i.e. taking into account mining and milling losses, as opposed to
quantities contained in mineable ore.

21
 Table 5: World uranium production, nameplate capacity and capacity utilization, 2015-2018,
ranked by 2018 production, tU
Production Nameplate capacity Capacity utilization

2015 2016 2017 2018 2015 2016 2017 2018 2015 2016 2017 2018
Kazakhstan 23,800 24,576 23,321 21,705 25,640 25,714 29,764 29,764 93% 96% 78% 73%
Canada* 13,313 14,039 13,116 7,001 17,038 16,282 16,538 6,922 78% 86% 79% 100%
Australia 5,654 6,315 5,865 6,517 10,059 7,497 10,655 10,655 56% 84% 55% 61%
Namibia 2,993 3,507 4,224 5,525 5,462 5,654 11,232 9,232 55% 62% 38% 60%
Niger 4,116 3,479 3,448 2,911 4,400 3,600 3,600 3,600 94% 97% 96% 81%
Russia 3,055 3,004 2,916 2,904 4,885 4,885 4,600 4,600 63% 61% 63% 63%
Uzbekistan 2,385 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,400 2,400 3,000 3,000 99% 100% 80% 80%
China 1,616 1,616 1,692 1,885 1,500 1,808 1,808 1,923 108% 89% 94% 98%
Ukraine 1,223 1,005 836 1,180 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 74% 61% 51% 71%
USA 1,238 1,125 960 582 7,539 2,780 3,596 1,673 16% 40% 27% 35%
India 385 385 423 423 610 610 610 610 63% 63% 69% 69%
South Africa 393 490 308 346 1,269 1,269 769 769 31% 39% 40% 45%
Others 315 276 116 116 812 812 116 116 39% 34% 100% 100%
Total 60,486 62,221 59,629 53,498 83,264 74,962 87,939 74,514 73% 83% 68% 72%
*McArthur River produced 77tU in 2018, but its capacity is not included in Canada's capacity in 2018. Other idled mines are
treated likewise.

Table 6 shows the top ten uranium mines based on 2018 production results. At least three of these
top ten mines (Rössing, Arlit (SOMAÏR) and Ranger), representing 10% of 2018 production, are
scheduled/expected to close before the end of the 2020s and will need to be replaced by new mine
capacity by then, in order not to cause further reduction of primary uranium production.

Table 6: Ten largest world uranium mines, ranked by 2018 production, tU

Mine Country Main owner Type tU % of world

Cigar Lake Canada Cameco/Orano Underground 6,924 12.9
Olympic Dam Australia BHP Billiton By-product 3,159 5.9
Husab Namibia Swakop Uranium (CGN) Open-pit 3,028 5.7
Inkai 1-3 Kazakhstan Kazatomprom/Cameco ISR 2,643 4.9
Rössing Namibia Rio Tinto Open-pit 2,102 3.9
Budenovskoye 2 Kazakhstan Uranium One/Kazatomprom ISR 2,081 3.9
Tortkuduk Kazakhstan Orano/Kazatomprom ISR 1,900 3.6
Arlit (SOMAÏR) Niger Orano Open-pit 1,783 3.3
Ranger Australia Rio Tinto/ERA Open-pit 1,695 3.2
Kharasan 2 Kazakhstan Kazatomprom ISR 1,631 3.0
Others 26,553 49.6
Total 53,498 100

5.4. Primary uranium supply

The Nuclear Fuel Report describes the worldwide uranium market by balancing the material produced
from primary uranium production with the uranium feed requirements for the conversion stage of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Any imbalances are addressed in the chapter where secondary supplies are
11
described , which captures inventory build-up or depletion, and any uranium substitution impacts
from more refined products such as enriched uranium or uranium hexafluoride.

11
Secondary supplies are examined in Chapter 4 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

22
Uranium supply assumptions are based on the premise that supply and demand will balance over
time via market mechanisms. As future production remains heavily dependent on uranium demand, it
is unlikely that uranium producers will continue to produce for long if they are unable to secure
customers for their production. When assessing likely future uranium supply, it is important to
distinguish between production capacities subject to different levels of uncertainty. The operational or
development status of a project is related to the certainty of start-up dates and annual production. For
example, experience shows that delays almost always occur for planned mines and not all planned
mines reach their nameplate capacity, or even reach production.

Five categories of production capacity are therefore considered according to their level of uncertainty.

Current capacity refers to mines already in operation and expected to continue at least into the near
future. Production figures for projects included in the current capacity category account for only known
reserves reasonably well characterized and included in production planning. These projects may be
extended by further exploration and delineation of resources (see Appendix I.1).

Idled current capacity refers to mines that were previously included into the ‘current capacity’
category, but are now temporarily taken offline for economic reasons and can be brought back online
rather quickly, within approximately one year, when market conditions become more favourable. Once
restarted, they would be referred to as ‘idled-restarted’ in future supply-demand aggregated scenarios
(see Appendix I.2).

Mines under development refers to mines for which development decisions have been made,
financing has been achieved, and mine pre-strip or construction of production or processing facilities
has begun (see Appendix I.3).

Planned mines refers to mines for which bankable or definitive feasibility studies have been
completed and all major approvals (environmental, social, regulatory, operating) have been achieved
(see Appendix I.3).

Prospective mines refers to mines for which some level of feasibility assessment has been completed,
e.g. scoping study, preliminary economic assessment, preliminary feasibility study (see Appendix I.3).

Reserve mines refers to uncategorized supply positioned to meet future demand. Some examples of
supply pipeline possibilities include material from new resource discoveries, development of early
stage discoveries, restart of cancelled or deferred projects, re-opening of temporarily closed mines,
unexpected mine lifetime extensions and additions of reserves/resources at existing operations.
Projects considered to be included into this category have completed technical reports on resources
(see Appendix I.4).

The distinction between current capacity, mines under development, planned mines and prospective
mines is based on the assessment of the probability of production reaching the market.

Three supply-demand scenarios for uranium have been developed, which correspond with the three
scenarios for nuclear generating capacity. The three scenarios for uranium supply differ based on
discounts to the full capacity levels and delays to the expected start-up dates assuming that existing
mines operate near their capacity levels, that some delays in the commissioning of planned and
prospective mines can be expected, and that a portion of the mines currently being considered for
development will never be developed due to surplus supply, a lack of financing, technical issues
discovered in further feasibility assessments, or changes in market conditions. These assumptions
are outlined in Table 7.

23
 Table 7: Production capacity utilization and delay assumptions by scenario

Reference Upper Lower

Expected Expected Expected
Delay (y) Delay (y) Delay (y)
utilization utilization utilization
Current capacity 0 90% 0 95 - 100% 0 85%
Restarted idled capacity -3 30 - 90% -2 40 - 100% -5 30 - 50%
Mines under development -2 60 - 90% -2 80 - 100% -4 30 - 50%
Planned mines -3 60 - 90% -2 75 - 100% 0 0%
Prospective mines -4 50 - 90% -3 70 - 100% 0 0%

For existing mines, projections of future uranium production for approximately 90% of them are
derived from either official company announcements or from the questionnaire responses received by
the Association at the beginning of 2019. As a result, for the scenarios, the utilization factors are
applied to current capacities rather than using nameplate capacities.

In addition, dynamic utilization factors are introduced in this report for the first time. These are based
on the assumption that the production and likelihood of development of uranium mines will gradually
increase in the long term due to the anticipated change in supply-demand balance, as demand should
keep growing and some existing mines will be exhausted. Thus, in Table 7, a range of utilization
factors is given for different categories. It is assumed that the mines in the categories will be operated
at the lower limit of the range until 2030, then gradually increase to the upper limit in 2030-2035, and
finally remain at the upper limit in the years beyond 2035.

Three scenarios for uranium production to 2040 have been developed by evaluating current and
future mine production capabilities. Based on this report’s methodology, production volumes are
projected to remain fairly stable until the late 2020s in all three scenarios, then decrease sharply in
the last five years of the forecasting period, mainly due to the end of production life of a quarter of all
mines listed in the model, resulting in a 30% decrease of uranium production over the five-year period
(2035 through to 2040).

Figure 7: Reference Scenario supply, tU

24
 Figure 8: Upper Scenario supply, tU

In the Reference case, world uranium production is expected to be 66,400 tU in 2030 before declining
to 48,100 tU in 2040. In the Upper case, the equivalent figures are 71,500 tU and 49,400 tU,
respectively. The partial return of idled mines to production is expected to commence in 2022 and in
2023 in the Upper and the Reference Scenarios, respectively, and in 2026 in the Lower case.

Figure 9: Lower Scenario supply, tU

25
5.5. Unspecified uranium supply
As a new component of this edition of the report, the concept of ‘unspecified supply’ is being used to
characterize the material that will fill the gap between identified supply sources (both primary and
Specified secondary supplies) and requirements for the various fuel cycle components.

Unspecified supply is therefore a reflection of the future potential of the fuel market as it
recognizes that there are various sources of potential supply that will compete for market access;
however, the conditions necessary to achieve such market access differ according to each
source of potential supply.

The following supply sources are included in unspecified supply:

 Unspecified secondary supplies.

 Idled production capacity.
 Expansion of production capacity.
 Reserve projects.

Each source, depending on its characteristics, will be available to the market either as uranium and/or
conversion and/or enrichment to satisfy demand.

Unspecified Secondary Supplies

Unspecified secondary supplies are not predicted to enter the market in any defined quantity
or volume, but nonetheless have varying degrees of mobility. This component of unspecified
supply comprises:

 Major commercial inventories (U3O8, UF6, EUP),

 Unusable fresh fuel bundles (EUP),
 Other government stocks,
 Spent fuel and products derived from it.
 US DOE material inflows:
- High assay depleted uranium (DUF6).
- High assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU).

These Unspecified secondary supplies are characterized by having declining degrees of mobility, with
commercial inventories being the most available and others having higher technical thresholds and
12
longer times to reach the market .

Idled Production Capacity

To date, the depressed market conditions have resulted in substantial closures of existing capacity –
almost 18,000 tU/yr. Cameco placed Rabbit Lake mine and its US ISR operations (Smith Ranch,
Highland, and Crowe Butte) on care and maintenance in 2016. Furthermore, in 2018 Cameco ceased
production at McArthur River mine, the largest uranium mine worldwide with production of 6,945 tU
U3O8 in 2016. In 2017-2018 production was also suspended at Langer Heinrich mine in Namibia, and
at several other mines in the USA: Willow Creek, White Mesa and Alta Mesa.

12
Various sources of secondary supplies are examined in Section 4.3 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

26
Idled production capacity consists of previous production capacity that has voluntarily been removed
from the market as a result of market fundamentals or economic conditions. It differs from shutdown
operations, as the production facility remains available for redeployment under conditions that meet
the requirements of their owners and the unique aspects of each of the sites.

For uranium production facilities, idled production capacity implies that there are significant reserves
and/or resources remaining and an operating licence is either still in place or can be received in short
order. For fuel cycle facilities, idled production implies that the facility also has an existing operating
licence and has been moved into care and maintenance, is operating below nominal production rates,
its capacity has been redeployed for purposes other than its intended use, or otherwise has existing
capacity available for production.

In general, idled production capacity exists as a result of economic (market prices versus production
costs) or market (oversupply) conditions being unfavourable to continue production at its previous
level or at all.

Expansion of Production Capacity

Expansion of production capacity is the expansion of existing production facilities beyond their
nominal capacity and is another source of potential unspecified supply.

In some cases, the licensed capacity at existing production facilities already allows for production
beyond what has historically been produced at the facility. Here, primarily the lack of economic
incentive to make the necessary investment (as well as some potential development hurdles)
prevents higher production rates being achieved.

For production facilities that do not produce uranium, this category would refer to expansions at
existing facilities beyond their nominal licensed capacity (additional conversion, SWU, or fabrication
capacity at established facilities). The uncertainty surrounding the quantity and timing of this category
of unspecified supply is high considering the proprietary nature of these developments and the
associated economic and/or technical hurdles unique to each of the production facilities.

Reserve Projects
The final component of unspecified supply is Reserve projects (See Table 9). These consist of
uncategorized supply required to meet future demand and are associated with the greatest amount of
uncertainty within unspecified supply. The category includes those projects for which activities are
insufficient for them to be categorized as ‘planned’ or ‘prospective’ mines but for which development
work has been undertaken in the past and for which there is knowledge of the orebody and the likely
costs of its exploitation. They are included in the ‘unspecified supply’ category since they currently do
not have publicly available startup dates and other qualifying criteria.

Reserve projects for all fuel cycle components require particular market conditions to be in place in
order to support their development, not the least of which is for a supply gap to exist.

Materialization of Unspecified Supply

As can be inferred in the descriptions of the unspecified supply components, there is a natural order
of probability in how they will ultimately materialize as supply: Unspecified secondary supplies
(namely commercial inventories), followed by the return of idled capacity, followed by expansions at
existing production facilities, and finally, reserve projects.

27
With the exception of price inelastic secondary supply and state-owned commercially insensitive
operators, economics plays the crucial role in how the supply side will materialize in the future,
especially when it comes to unspecified supply. In general, in a low price environment for the fuel
component, there is a high probability that only the most mobile Unspecified secondary supplies
(commercial inventories) and the lowest cost idled capacity will be the sources of unspecified supply
made available to the market. In the event that those supplies are insufficient to meet demand, then
the conditions must arise to support the necessary commercial investment in order to either bring
back additional idled capacity, expand production capacity, and/or advance reserve projects.

6. Conversion supply and demand

Uranium conversion is commercially important, although historically it has represented the smallest
share in the overall cost of the components in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The commercial
purchase of conversion services is made largely by electrical utilities, and the resulting natural UF6 is
shipped to enrichment facilities for which it is essential, as uranium hexafluoride gas is the only form
that can be processed at all enrichment plants currently in operation.

The uranium conversion sector is characterized by a small number of companies producing UO 2 for
those reactors fuelled with natural uranium and UF6 for those using enriched uranium. For the last
eight years the market was in oversupply caused by reduced conversion requirements and the
accumulation of sizeable UF6 stockpiles.

In contrast to conversion capacities which have been drastically reduced, conversion requirements
show an upward trend, both in the Reference and in the Upper Scenarios, with requirements broadly
stable in the Lower Scenario.

Figure 10: UF6 conversion requirement scenarios to 2040, tU

Today, annual primary production is far lower than annual conversion requirements.

28
As a result of weaker demand and excess inventories, in the last five years, four primary producers
have either reduced (Cameco) or suspended production at their conversion facilities (ConverDyn), or
closed permanently (Springfields Fuels and two out of three Rosatom facilities), while only one new
conversion plant (Orano’s Philipe Coste) has come online – to replace equivalent shuttered capacity
at the same site.

Identified idled capacity among the primary Western converters is listed in Table 8.

Table 8: Idled conversion production capacity, tU

Company Conversion facility Estimated idled Capacity
ConverDyn Metropolis 7,000
Cameco Port Hope 2,500
Total 9,500

In deriving a worldwide supply and demand Reference Scenario for UF6 conversion, various
assumptions were agreed upon that are believed to be reasonable, though the market could be
affected by many additional factors that are more difficult to model.

Model assumptions include:

 In aggregate, Western primary conversion facilities are currently operating at approximately

35% of nameplate capacity but this will increase to 70-85% on average.
 Springfields Fuels will remain shutdown.
 Orano, which is transitioning to the new Philippe Coste plant, will have a production ramp-up
period within the next three years.
 Russian conversion facilities will produce enough feed to meet domestic enrichment capacity
requirements, net of secondary sources.
 Chinese conversion facilities will produce enough feed to meet domestic enrichment capacity
requirements, net of underfeeding, from 2019 onwards.

Figure 11 shows the projected Reference, Upper, and Lower Scenario reactor requirements in
comparison to projected primary conversion supply.

Figure 11: Reference Scenario global UF6 conversion supply and demand, tU

29
Figure 11 demonstrates that supply will need to rise to meet growth in demand in both the Reference
and Upper Scenarios. Unspecified supply is deemed to satisfy this gap between identified supply
sources and the demand line.

In the near-term, any gaps between supply and demand are likely to be filled by the most mobile
sources of unspecified supply, primarily the commercial inventories. The inventories held by the
various industry participants currently make up the balance of supply between existing primary supply
and demand.

As growth in demand occurs and inventories are depleted, additional unspecified supply is needed
to meet it. As low-mobility secondary supplies encounter limitations to market access, it is likely that
the return of at least some of significant existing idled capacity (see Table 8) will meet this growth in
demand.

The presence of a gap in Reference supply and demand is likely to provide an incentive for the
primary converters to increase capacity factors.

However, it is uncertain that the combination of Unspecified secondary supplies and idled capacity
would satisfy the growing demand over the forecast horizon, and construction of additional primary
conversion capacity may be necessary. This hypothesis would materialize either: in the 2030-2040
time period under the Reference and Upper Scenarios for demand; or if an existing conversion facility
would be prevented from producing as expected (a risk that may increase with the age of current
facilities). This would require expansion of capacity at existing facilities or the construction of new
conversion facilities.

7. Enrichment supply and demand

Uranium and enrichment costs constitute the two largest components in front-end nuclear fuel costs,
with uranium costs representing the larger share since 2004 (predominantly due to the less energy-
intensive gas centrifuge technology replacing gaseous diffusion). Because natural uranium is needed
to produce enriched uranium, there is a fundamental link between enriched uranium and natural
uranium (feed) requirements, but the relationship is not simply linear. A number of factors have the
potential to significantly affect the level of the enrichment (product) assay of enriched uranium needed
for commercial power applications. These include nuclear generating capacity, load factors, burn-ups,
and cycle lengths.

Figure 12 shows three scenarios of worldwide enrichment requirements in the period through to 2040.
In projecting uranium and enrichment requirements in this report, the World Nuclear Association has
13
assumed a tails assay of 0.22% for determining global SWU requirements. The tails assay
assumption is held constant for all years and all demand scenarios for nuclear generation. The World
Nuclear Association also has annualized reactor requirements, although operating parameters and
reactor-specific supply contracts are often cyclical – for example, reactors are normally refuelled in
cycles that generally range from 12 to 24 months.

13
Chapter 3 of The Nuclear Fuel Report explains why tails assay assumptions must be closely examined.

30
 Figure 12: Enrichment requirements by scenario to 2040, thousand SWU

As shown in Figure 13 for the Reference Scenario, projected primary supplier capacities in the near
term will be in an oversupply position showing an increasing deficit in the supply of SWU, which is
insufficient for the Reference Scenario enrichment demand beyond 2033-2034.

Figure 13: World enrichment demand versus installed capacity, thousand SWU

Excess global enrichment capacity has resulted in the extensive use of existing capacity for
underfeeding and tails re-enrichment. Currently the global enrichment capacity used for underfeeding
and tails re-enrichment is estimated in the region of 5,000-7,000 tonnes of natural uranium equivalent,
depending on the scenario, declining steeply by the end of 2020s.

Of the major suppliers of enrichment services, CNNC will be the only one to significantly expand its
capacity over the forecast period due to the Chinese target of achieving self-sufficiency. The three

31
other major suppliers will not need to expand their capacity through to 2040 in the Reference
Scenario. In the Upper Scenario, additional capacity might be needed as early as in the first half of
the next decade. However, given the modular nature of centrifuge technology and the construction
times for nuclear power reactors, enrichment capacity expansion can take place in a timely way, and
supply challenges should be avoided.

8. Fuel fabrication supply14 and demand

In common with uranium, conversion and enrichment requirements, fuel assembly demand is made
up of a mixture of first cores and reloads. However, fuel design and fabrication is a fundamentally
different market to the other three front-end fuel cycle businesses (mining, conversion and
enrichment) as nuclear fuel is not a fungible commodity but a hi-tech product accompanied by
specialist support.

The market value is split between the designer (responsible for the product performance in the
reactor) and the manufacturer.

 Designers have both design and manufacturing capabilities, integrated with a reactor
original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Designers are the main fuel vendors nowadays.
As reactor vendors, they often supply the initial cores and early reloads for reactors, built to
their own designs.

 Manufacturers have manufacturing capabilities only, with commercial and export activities.
In the regions, manufacturers are also represented by smaller local manufacturers, which
mainly act on the local markets to supply domestic demand only and usually are not
present on other markets.

As a fuel assembly is not a fungible commodity but a complex product incorporating design, licensing
and R&D activities, it is specific to each reactor type. The fuel fabrication market can be categorized
according to reactor type and by fuel type.

Segment 1, by reactor type:

 Light water reactor (LWR) sub-categories:

 Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) including Russian VVER reactors.
 Boiling water reactors (BWRs).
 Pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), mainly CANDU.
 Gas-cooled reactors (GCRs), mainly advance gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) in the UK.
 Russian high-power channel reactors (RBMKs).
 Future and other reactor designs (Generation IV reactors, including fast breeder reactors,
high-temperature gas-cooled reactors) introduced in this report for the first time.

This categorization does not, however, adequately reflect the complexity of this market in terms of fuel
design. The cost and time to develop a fuel assembly design – which depends on the reactor model
and assembly structure – is significant. Designers are the owners of the fuel-related intellectual

14
Fuel fabrication primary supply is analyzed in Section 8.4 of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

32
property and are the ones who define the specifications for manufacturing their fuel designs. Some
manufacturers operate under technology licences granted by the designers.

Segment 2, by fuel type:

PWR fuel is a major fuel type that has the highest requirements worldwide, and is itself a diversified
sector in terms of the various sub-categories of fuel assembly design.

Those sub-categories depend in particular on the reactor OEM and the fuel assembly structure (fuel
assembly array, number of fuel rods, positioning of guide tubes), the main one being the PWR17
encompassing Westinghouse, Framatome, and the newly-introduced Kvadrat-fuel of the Russian
design. Chinese vendors are also working on their proprietary PWR17 designs such as CNNC’s CF3
or CGN’s STEP12 fuel assemblies.

Other PWR designs worldwide include: PWR14, PWR15, PWR16, CE14, CE16, KWU15x15,
KWU18x18, B&W15, and many others. These are classed as ‘PWR-others’ sub-segment in the report,
in order to simplify the analysis.

Although VVER fuel is classed as PWR fuel, the assemblies have hexagonal cross-sections. VVER
fuel assemblies are manufactured by Rosatom and Westinghouse and have several designs: VVER-
440, VVER-600, VVER-1000 and VVER-1200. For the purposes of this report, two fuel types are
covered, VVER-440 and VVER-1000 (for VVER-600, VVER-1000 and VVER-1200 fuel designs).

BWR fuel includes several design arrays, such as BWR10x10 and BWR11x11, which can be loaded
in the same plant.

CANDU/PHWR use deuterium oxide (‘heavy water’) as moderator, and non-enriched uranium as fuel.
Current common designs of bundles consist of 37-element rods with Zircaloy cladding. CANDU
assemblies have a circular cross-section.

RBMK is a very specific type of fuel which comprises two bundles, two tailpieces, and central rod with
a bar or a supporting tube with central void (to accommodate sensors), fasteners and retainers.

AGRs are operated in the UK and use fuel assemblies consisting of a circular array of 36 stainless
steel clad fuel. They employ a vertical fuel channel design, and use carbon dioxide gas as the
primary coolant.

RBMK and AGR fuel as well as other types of fuel (such as fuel for fast neutron reactors and high-
temperature gas cooled reactors) are taken into account in the model but are not covered in this
chapter due to their limited application.

Whilst the market categorization by reactor type is sufficient for analysis of fuel manufacturers, the
division by fuel type is required for the fuel designers. Each fuel assembly design is a specific product
that requires significant development costs and time.

The overwhelming majority of world demand remains for reloads rather than first cores (which have
different specifications to reloads).

Fabrication of reloads (only a portion of the reactor core) is linked to operating cycles, and
consequently easy for fabricators to plan for, whereas fuel for first cores represents a large number of

33
fuel assemblies (full core), creating a significant demand on fabrication that depends upon a reactor’s
startup date.

Projections are made both for reload demand and first core demand. As well as the assessment of the
global and regional fabrication requirement trends, reload requirement projections according to fuel type
are also analysed. In addition to the fuel types listed above, the ‘unknown fuel type’ category has been
introduced for those reactor types that have not yet been determined. This category becomes more
widely employed closer to the end of the forecasting period, where, from the current perspective, it is not
possible to say with a high degree of certainty what type of reactor will be constructed.

15
Figure 14 shows the projection of global reload fabrication demand for all fuel designs , including
LWRs, PHWRs, AGR, RBMK and unknown fuel. Whilst there is little change to overall demand
before 2024, steady increases appear from around 2025 in all three scenarios, albeit with different
growth rates.

Figure 14: World reload requirement scenarios to 2040, tHM

Geographical distribution is extremely important for the fuel fabrication market as utilities tend to
choose local suppliers due to transport being technically challenging and costly. In addition,
fabricators usually provide onsite services for utilities. To simplify the data presented in this chapter,
reactor requirements are combined into four large regions:

 Americas (North, South and Latin America).

 Europe (Western and Eastern Europe, Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine).
 Asia (East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia).
 Africa, Middle East and Central Asia (African and Arabic countries, Iran, Turkey,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).

Regional projections for reload demand are shown in Figures 15-18.

15
Regional reload demand by fuel type (PWR17, BWR, VVER, etc.) is illustrated in Section 8.3.2 of The Nuclear
Fuel Report.

34
 Figure 15: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Figure 16: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040,
Americas, tHM Europe, tHM

Figure 17: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Figure 18: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040,
Asia, tHM Africa, Middle East and Central Asia, tHM

In the Americas region (see Figure 15), although a decline is expected before 2025, demand then
exhibits an upward trend in the Reference and Upper Scenarios, while in the Lower case the
downward trend is relatively slow from 2025.

In Europe (see Figure 16), while the fuel demand is fairly stable in the Upper Scenario, declines are
expected in both Lower and Reference Scenarios, which are largely caused by the expected closures
of RBMK reactors in Russia and AGR reactors in the UK.

Asia (see Figure 17) is where the majority of growth comes from. With China and India, as well as
many other developing economies in the region, fuel demand is expected to double, triple or
quadruple in the Lower, Reference and Upper Scenarios, respectively. Growth is observed in all fuel
types utilized in this region, even in the Lower Scenario.

Similar growth is also expected in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia (see Figure 18), though at a
much smaller scale. Fuel demand is expected to reach 400, 600 and 1,000 tHM/yr in the Lower,
Reference and Upper Scenarios.

The expected first core fabrication demand for the three demand scenarios is displayed in Figure 19.
This is calculated in the same way as for the reloads – according to uranium demand.

35
 Figure 19: First core fabrication demand by scenario, tHM

First cores are assumed to be required two years in advance of a reactor start-up. These first core
requirements become significant with expansive reactor plans, which affect the demand for fabrication
capacity in two ways. The demand for reloads increases in line with the newly-installed reactor capacity,
approximately 16-20 tonnes/year per GWe. Additionally, the first cores create a temporary demand peak,
since their volume equals around three times the annual reload batches of currently operating LWRs.

At present, existing fuel fabrication capacities are sufficient to cover anticipated demand for both first
cores and reloads; however, in some circumstances it is still possible that supply bottlenecks could
occur for certain designs.

9. Key findings of The Nuclear Fuel Report

9.1. Uranium

Excessive oversupply of primary uranium production has led to very low uranium prices, which have
been decreasing for more than a decade. This situation has resulted from: all Japanese reactors
being taken offline in 2011, followed by their much slower than anticipated return to operation; a
number of premature reactor closures in the USA, Germany and some other Western European
countries; and cancellation of several planned construction projects, and delay of others due to
economic slowdown following the global financial crisis as well as revision of safety standards. These
unfavourable market conditions caused a sharp fall in investment aimed at developing new mining
projects, and the reduction of production levels at existing mines.

The most recent (2018 edition) Red Book highlighted that global uranium exploration mine
development expenditures fell by 69% from $2.12 billion in 2014 to $663.7 million in 2016.
Besides cutting investment in exploration and mine development, uranium producers delayed
investment in current, developing and planned mines, waiting for positive supply-demand signals
in order to start reinvesting.

36
Over the longer term, the Reference Scenario shows a solid 1.9% compound average growth rate
(CAGR), mainly resulting from nuclear expansion in the Far East, driving uranium requirements to
over 80,000 tU/yr within the next decade. The Upper Scenario doubles uranium requirements within
15 years with demand growth of 3.4% CAGR. The Lower Scenario provides a solid baseline as
existing reactors support the currently-operating production facilities

Several mines are expected to be closed before the end of the 2020s due to resource depletion and
will need to be replaced by either the restarting of idled capacity or launching of new projects.

Regardless of the particular scenario (Reference, Upper or Lower), in the long term the industry
needs to at least double its infrastructure of current, idled, under development, planned and
prospective projects by 2040. Undoubtedly there are more than adequate project extensions, uranium
resources and reserve projects in the pipeline to accomplish this.

However, the issue remains that, due to current oversupply and associated
low market prices, very few participants are able or willing to begin investing
to convert these resources into reserves and ultimately into mines to keep
the market in balance. Some state-owned strategic developments are
proceeding, but there continues to be a lack of long-term fixed-price
contracts, which are needed to underpin new projects controlled by market-
based companies.

9.2. Secondary supply

Whilst there is likely to be a continuing high level of secondary supply, the relative contribution of it to
overall uranium supply will gradually diminish from the current level of about 10,000 tU/yr to 5,000-
7,000 tU/yr from the beginning of the 2030s. Besides the secondary supply that can be quantified, a
large amount of unspecified secondary supply exists, which includes commercial inventories held by
utilities, producers and other market participants. Although the size of these inventories cannot be
accurately estimated mainly due to commercial sensitivities, they could be immediately available for
direct consumption or re-sale. It is expected that any supply gap or shortfall in the short or medium
term will be covered by commercial inventories.

As a major component of secondary supply, commercial inventories are playing an increasingly

important role in the market, as many participants try to benefit from the current low prices of uranium
and enrichment, increasing their stockpiles.

9.3. Conversion

The most likely scenario for conversion supply and demand remains as follows:

 In the near term, highly mobile secondary supplies will bridge the gap between new primary
supply and demand (such as in the case today where fuel buyers rely heavily on inventory to
meet demand).

 In the medium term, it is expected that idled capacity will return as the demand side of the
market requires.

37
  In the long term, it is possible that the market will require capacity expansion at existing
facilities or even the construction of new conversion plant.

For expansion of primary conversion capacity or new projects to be economically justified before
2030, either:

 The most optimistic demand scenario must occur.

 The return of idled capacity, when required over the medium term, does not occur because of
technical or regulatory difficulties.

 The market sees an unexpected and long-term closure of an existing primary conversion facility.

 Chinese plans to achieve ’self-sufficiency’ in conversion supply are not realized.

Overall, the change in the conversion market over previous versions of The Nuclear Fuel Report is
characterized by a heavy reliance and corresponding reduction in inventories as a result of a
curtailment of primary conversion production. After these inventories are exhausted over the near to
medium term, the market should incentivize the restart of idled capacity, and potentially the expansion
or construction of a new conversion plant.

9.4. Enrichment

Enrichment requirements are expected to rise over the projection period from 2019 to 2040 due to
prospective new nuclear build, primarily in Asian and Middle Eastern countries, particularly China and
India. However, production capacities appear to be sufficient to cope with demand. Moreover, as a
result of the current market oversupply, the major suppliers have delayed, postponed or abandoned
the new SWU projects that were featured in earlier editions of The Nuclear Fuel Report.

The enrichers are also trying to reduce existing capacity by not replacing centrifuges that have
reached the end of their operation. Excess global enrichment capacity is used for underfeeding and
tails re-enrichment, which results in an annual gain of approximately 5,000-7,000 tUeq.

9.5. Fuel fabrication

The fuel fabrication market differs significantly from other stages of nuclear fuel cycle due to
the specificity of the product: fuel assemblies are highly engineered and technological products.
Moreover, the market itself is more regional in character than global. In addition, the fuel supply
should be split into reloads and first cores, with their own specific characteristics. As a result,
the market should be segmented both regionally and technologically, thus leading to a more
complex analysis.

The fuel fabrication market has historically shown strong competition among different vendors and
manufacturers, either regional or national fuel suppliers. World fuel fabrication capacity outweighs
global requirements and this conclusion can be mostly applied at a regional level. Also, with nuclear
fuel demand increasing in Asia and decreasing in the West, fuel vendors are likely to shift from a
regional to a global market approach. This would help to balance the supply-demand equilibrium,
increase competition and enhance security of supply.

38
10. Harmony programme
Harmony is the global nuclear industry’s vision for the future of electricity. To meet the growing
demand for reliable, affordable and clean electricity, we will need all low-carbon energy sources to
work together as part of a diverse mix. The Harmony goal is for nuclear energy to provide at least 25%
of electricity by 2050.

The Nuclear Fuel Report scenarios are based on an ‘outlook’ approach which projects potential
development from current policies and trends. The scenarios derived from such a bottom-up method
are based on assessing each country individually (according to the criteria of the scenario) in order to
determine the likelihood of individual projects going ahead. The Harmony goal is derived from a
‘normative’ approach, which starts with a vision and specific target and backcasts to identify the
pathway to achieve the target. Normative scenarios present future visions that are achievable (or
avoidable) only through certain actions.

The Harmony goal would require a tripling of nuclear generation from its present level. This
equates to 1250 GWe of total nuclear capacity in 2050, including approximately 1000 GWe of
new nuclear capacity.

While the Harmony goal is ambitious, it is achievable. In order for nuclear energy to reach the
Harmony goal and to support the world in keeping global temperature increases below 2°C, a rapid
ramp-up of new nuclear build to an annual connection rate of 33 GWe within the next decade is
required, which is comparable to that already achieved in the 1980s.

Achieving the Harmony goal would mean that there were more reactors than outlined in the Upper
Scenario. Unless there is also a radical transformation in reactor technology during that time frame, it
will require greater amounts of uranium, enrichment, fuel fabrication, transport and used fuel services.

As proven during the past decades, in any mineral mining industry (e.g. the oil and gas industry)
exploration and extraction techniques improve over time and it is anticipated as nuclear power
expansion gets under way, that additional and unconventional resources would greatly extend
known uranium reserves. In the longer term, the development of advanced reactors and fuel cycles
that recycle nuclear fuel could permit much greater amounts of energy to be obtained from each
tonne of uranium.

Uranium resources are unlikely to be a limiting factor for the expansion of nuclear programmes.
However, the availability to the market of adequate uranium supplies is unpredictable in the absence
of proper incentives. The development of new mines, both to replace exhausted existing mines and
expand overall production capacity, will require large investments over the coming decades. In
addition, licensing and developing new mines, often in remote areas, can take many years. However,
the corresponding lead time for nuclear power expansion under Harmony is also long enough to allow
sufficient time to provide the appropriate market signals – whether for the development of uranium
reserves or capacity of fuel cycle facilities – so that these facilities should be developed as and when
they are needed.

39
Appendix tables: Existing and prospective primary uranium
supply by project
Table I.1: Existing mines at nameplate capacity as of the end of 2018
Capacity (tU)
Country Mine Type Operator
By m ine By country

African Namibia Husab Open-pit Sw akop Uranium (CGN) 5,770

countries Rössing Open-pit Rio Tinto 3,462
Niger Arlit (SOMAÏR) Open-pit Orano 2,200 13,601
Akouta (COMINAK) Underground Orano 1,400
South Africa Vaal River Region By-product Harmony Gold 769
Australia Ranger Open-pit Rio Tinto/ERA 4,616
Olympic Dam By-product BHP Billiton 4,500 10,655
Four Mile ISR Quasar 1,539
Canada Cigar Lake Underground Cameco 6,922 6,922
Kazakhstan Inkai 1-3 ISR Inkai JV 4,000
Katco (Moinkum, Tortkuduk) ISR Katco JV 4,000
Budenovskoye 2 ISR Karatau JV 3,200
Central Mynkuduk ISR Ortalyk 2,000
Kharasan 1 ISR Khorassan-U JV 2,000
South Inkai 4 ISR SMCC JV 2,000
Budenovskoye 1, 3 & 4 ISR Akbastau JV 1,931
Kharasan 2 ISR Baiken JV 1,530
Semizbai ISR Semizbai-U 1,200
29,764
Akdala ISR SMCC JV 1,000
Eastern Mynkuduk ISR SaUran 1,000
Kanzhugan (including Kainar) ISR SaUran 1,000
Karamurun, North and South ISR RU-6 1,000
Western Mynkuduk ISR Appak JV 1,000
Zarechnoye ISR Zarechnoye JV 970
Moinkum 1,3 (Central) ISR SaUran 900
Irkol ISR Semizbai-U 731
Uvanas ISR SaUran 300
Russia Priargunsky 1, 8 Underground ARMZ 3,000
Khiagda ISR ARMZ 1,000 4,600
Dalur ISR ARMZ 600
USA Nichols Ranch-Hank ISR Energy Fuels 577
Lance ISR Peninsula 442
1,673
Lost Creek ISR Ur-Energy 385
White Mesa mines Underground Energy Fuels 269
Uzbekistan Navoi Mining ISR Navoi 3,000 3,000
Other China Domestic use ISR & conventional CNNC 1,923
India Domestic use Underground UCIL 610
Iran Domestic use Underground Iran (Gachin) 71 4,299
Pakistan Domestic use Underground PAEC 45
Ukraine VostGOK mines Underground VostGOK 1,650
World total 74,514

40
 Table I.2.: Idled mines at nameplate capacity as of the end of 2018

Capacity (tU)
Country Mine Type Operator
By m ine By country
Namibia Langer Heinrich Open-pit Paladin/CNNC 2,000 2,000
Australia Honeymoon (SX plant) ISR Boss Resources 338 338
Canada McArthur River/Key Lake Underground Cameco 9,616
11,924
Rabbit Lake Underground Cameco 2,308
USA Cameco US ISR (Smith Ranch, Crow Butte, Highland) ISR Cameco 1,923
Alta Mesa ISR Energy Fuels 577
3,577
White Mesa (Tony M, Daneros, Whirlw ind) Conventional Energy Fuels 577
Willow Creek (Irigaray & Christensen Ranch) ISR Uranium One 500
World total 17,840

Table I.3: Mines ‘under development’, ‘planned’ and ‘prospective’ mines, estimated capacity

Mines under developm ent

Estim ated
Country Project/Mine Type Operator Startup
capacity (tU)
Russia Priargunsky No 6 Underground ARMZ 2,300 2023
USA Canyon Open-pit Energy Fuels 385 2020
Other Brazil Cachoeira Underground INB 340 2023
Brazil Engenho Open-pit INB 300 2019
World total 3,325

Planned m ines
Estim ated
Country Project/Mine Type Operator Startup
capacity (tU)
African Namibia Etango Open-pit Bannerman Resources 4,231 2024
countries Tanzania Mkuju River Open-pit Uranium One 3,513 2025
Australia Mulga Rock Open-pit Vimy Resources 1,346 2021
Honeymoon (IX plant) ISR Boss Resources 931 2021
Other Brazil Santa Quiteria By-product INB 1,346 2023
Spain Salamanca Open-pit Berkeley Resources 1,692 2021
World total 13,060

Prospective m ines
Estim ated
Country Project/Mine Type Operator Startup
capacity (tU)
Mauritania Tiris Open-pit Aura 385 2020
Australia Angularli Open-pit Vimy Resources/Rio Tinto 769 2025
Canada Wheeler River/Gryphon Underground Denison Mines 3,462 2024
Wheeler River/Phoenix ISR Denison Mines 2,308 2030
Russia Elkon Underground ARMZ 5,000 2035
USA White Mesa (Roca Honda, Bullfrog) Conventional Energy Fuels 2,000 2024
Sheep Mountain Heap Leach Energy Fuels 577 2025
Other Finland Talvivaara By-product Terrafame 250 2020
Greenland Minerals and
Greenland Kvanefjeld By-product 385 2021
Energy
World total 15,135

41
 Table I.4.: Reserve projects, estimated capacity

Reserve projects

Estim ated
Country Project/Mine Type Operator
capacity (tU)

African Namibia Trekkopje Open-pit Orano 3,200

countries Niger Imouraren Open-pit Orano 5,000
Dasa Open-pit Global Atomic Fuels 2,154
Madaouela Underground GoviEx 1,000

Azelik/Teguida Open-pit CNNC 692

Malaw i Kayelekera Open-pit Paladin 1,269
South Africa Ezulw ini (Cooke 4) By-product Sibanye-Stillw ater 500
Australia Yeelirrie Open-pit Cameco 2,968
Kintyre Open-pit Cameco 2,308
Open-pit-
Valhalla/Mount Isa Paladin 1,923
Underground
Westmoreland Open-pit Laramide Resources 1,539
Wiluna Open-pit Toro Energy 695
Manyingee ISR Paladin 385
Open-pit/
Canada Patterson Lake South (PLS) Fission Uranium 5,000
underground
Arrow Underground NexGen 5,000
Nunavut (Kiggavik) Conventional Orano 3,000
Millennium Underground Cameco 2,500
Shea Creek Underground Orano 2,500
Open-pit/
Michelin Paladin 1,923
underground
Midw est Open-pit Orano 1,500
Kazakhstan Zhalpak ISR Ortalyk 500
USA Cameco US ISR expansion ISR Cameco 615
Reno Creek ISR UEC 577
Church Rock/Crow npoint ISR Laramide Resources 385
Hobson (Palagana, Burke Hollow , Goliad) ISR UEC 385
Other India Kyelleng-Pyndengsohiong, Maw tahbah (KPM) Open-pit UCIL 340
Gogi Underground UCIL 130
Lambapur-Peddagaltu Underground UCIL 130
Mongolia Zoouch Ovoo ISR Orano 2,050
Peru Macusani Open-pit Plateau Uranium 2,300
Turkey Temrezli ISR Westw ater Resources 308

World total 52,777

42
Drafting group
Co-Chairs
Thomas Cannon Arizona Public Service
Riaz Rizvi Kazatomprom

Chairs of sub-groups
Brandon Munro Bannerman Resources Demand sub-group
Carole Marot EDF Demand sub-group
Francisco Tarín ENUSA Enrichment sub-group
Frank Hahne Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth Uranium sub-group
Lawrence Mercier Framatome Fuel Fabrication sub-group
Nikko Collida ConverDyn Conversion sub-group
Rolf Kwasny Consultant Secondary Supply sub-group

Other contributors
Alex Nieto Ferro EDF
Alexander Boytsov TENEX
Alice Cunha da Silva Westinghouse
Andrey Chernyakov Uranium One
Andrey Tovstenko TENEX
Anthony Schillmoller Uranium Solutions
Benoit Rousseau EDF
Carl Evans ConverDyn
Chris Frankland Nuclear Fuels Corporation
David Doerksen Cameco
Dustin Garrow Bannerman Resources
Dylan Bryngelson Cameco
Emilio Bobo Perez ENUSA
Eric Rockett Rockett Science
Gabriele I.C. Schneider Namibian Uranium Association
Ilya Sesyutchenkov Rosatom
James Malone Lightbridge
James Nevling Exelon Generation
Jean-Noël Lacroix Orano
Jose G. Aycart GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
Julian Tapp Vimy Resources
Kyeong Lak Jeon KEPCO Nuclear Fuel
Ladislav Havlícek CEZ
Luminita Grancea OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Mikhail Platov TENEX
Nadezda Kolosovskaya TVEL
Nicole Dellero Orano
Patrick Signoret Orano
Philip Benavides Kazatomprom
Philippe Goyard Urenco
Raizwan Butt Urenco
Richard Loretz Westinghouse
Richard Patterson Uranium Solutions
Sashi Davies Boss Resources
Timothy McGraw Cameco
Tomas Vytiska CEZ
Valeria Nazimova TENEX

43
Figure and Table references used in The Nuclear Fuel Report
Figure 1 – Figure 1.1: The nuclear fuel cycle. Page 6.
Figure 2 – Figure 1.2: Methodology of specified and unspecified supplies. Page 11.
Table 1 – Table 1.1: IEA and World Nuclear Association nuclear capacity scenarios for 2040. (Sources: IEA
World Energy Outlook 2018, World Nuclear Association). Page 12.
Figure 3 – Figure 2.4: Nuclear generating capacity scenarios to 2040. Page 56.
Figure 4 – Figure 2.6: Comparison of 2019 and 2017 generating capacity scenarios. Page 58.
Table 2 – Table 4.1: Groups 1 and 2 by category of secondary supply. Page 69.
Table 3 – Table 4.2: Categorization of various secondary supply sources by originating stage. Page 70.
Figure 5 – Figure 4.1: Secondary supply scenarios for uranium. Page 101.
Figure 6 – Figure 5.1: Uranium production and reactor requirements for major producing and consuming
countries, as of end 2018. (Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, World Nuclear Association). Page 109.
Table 4 – Table 5.2: Uranium resources by country in 2017 versus 2015, ranked by 2017 total. (Source: OECD-
NEA & IAEA). Page 116.
Table 5 – Table 5.4: World uranium production, nameplate capacity and capacity utilization, 2015-2018, ranked
by 2018 production. (Sources: Company reports, presentations and press releases, OECD-NEA/IAEA, World
Nuclear Association estimates). Page 119.
Table 6 – Table 5.5: Ten largest world uranium mines, ranked by 2018 production. (Sources: Company reports
and press releases, World Nuclear Association, OECD-NEA/IAEA). Page 121.
Table 7 – Table 5.11: Production capacity utilization and delay assumptions by scenario. Page 130.
Figure 7 – Figure 5.9: Reference Scenario supply. Page 138.
Figure 8 – Figure 5.10: Upper Scenario supply. Page 140.
Figure 9 – Figure 5.11: Lower Scenario supply. Page 142.
Figure 10 – Figure 6.1: UF6 conversion requirement scenarios to 2040. Page 148.
Table 8 – Table 6.2: Idled conversion production capacity. Page 153.
Figure 11 – Figure 6.5: Idled conversion production capacity. Page 156.
Figure 12 – Figure 7.2: Enrichment requirements by scenario to 2040. Page 161.
Figure 13 – Figure 7.4: World enrichment demand versus installed capacity. Page 168.
Figure 14 – Figure 8.1: World reload requirement scenarios to 2040. Page 173.
Figure 15 – Figure 8.2: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Americas. Page 174.
Figure 16 – Figure 8.3: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Europe. Page 174.
Figure 17 – Figure 8.4: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Asia. Page 174.
Figure 18 – Figure 8.5: Reload requirement scenarios to 2040, Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. Page 174.
Figure 19 – Figure 8.10: First core fabrication demand by scenario. Page 178.

Appendix tables:
Table I.1 – Table 5.7: Existing mines at nameplate capacity as of the end of 2018. (Sources: OECD-NEA/IAEA
and other governmental sources, World Nuclear Association estimates, company reports and presentations).
Page. 126
Table I.2 – Table 5.8: Nameplate capacity of idled mines. (Sources: OECD-NEA/IAEA and other governmental
sources, World Nuclear Association estimates, company reports and presentations). Page 127.
Table I.3 – Table 5.9: Mines ‘under development’, ‘planned’ and ‘prospective’ uranium production capacity.
(Sources: OECD-NEA/IAEA and other governmental sources, World Nuclear Association estimates,
company reports and presentations). Page 128.

Table I.4 – Table 5.10: Reserve projects. (Sources: OECD-NEA/IAEA and other governmental sources, World
Nuclear Association estimates, company reports and presentations). Page 129.

44
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This Expanded Summary of the The Nuclear Fuel Report: Global Scenarios for
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