Hungary in the First World War.

by Jozsef Galantai; Eva Grusz; Judit Pokoly; Mark

Goodman
Review by: Peter Pastor
Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Winter, 1991), pp. 1041-1042
Published by:
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BookReviews 1041

BEYOND NATIONALISM:A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HABSBURG

OFFICER CORPS, 1848-1918. By IstvanDeak. New Yorkand Oxford:OxfordUniver-
Maps. Tables.Cloth.
sityPress,1990. xiii,273 pp. Illustrations.

IstvanDeak's studyof theHapsburgofficer corpsis engagingon manylevels:Deak weaveshis

father,an officer duringWorldWarI, intothestorywithoutsentimentality; he deftlyblends
statisticalandanecdotalevidence;andhe has a giftforconciseexposition of themainelements
of Hapsburghistoryand relatinghis subjectto them.Above all, thethesisthatanimateshis
book-that theHapsburgofficer corpstranscended ethnicidentity and largelyforthatreason
was theinstitution thatheldthemonarchy together-touches on one ofthemostimportant prob-
lemsof centralEurope'spastand present.Deak explicitly contrasts theantinationalism of the
Hapsburgmonarchy anditsarmytothetanglednationality conflictsthatfollowed1918andfinds
favorwiththeHapsburgs.
Deak findsevidenceof thearmy'sindifference to ethnicityeverywhere: in theabsenceof
ethnicfavoritism in promotion, theextraordinarilyhighproportion of Jews(over18 percentin
1900) amongreserveofficers, therequirement thatofficerslearnthelanguagesof themenin
theirregiment, and theexplicitantinationalism of ethnically Germanofficers.Deak demon-
stratesthattheofficial statistics
accordingto whichroughly 80 percentofofficers wereGerman
couldnothavebeencorrectand suggeststhatthetruefigurewas closerto 50 percent.The rest,
he says,had assimilated to thearmyand itslanguageof command,notto a dominant German
nationality. Indeed,he claimsthatmanyofficers, comingfrommilitary familiesand moving
frequently frompostto post,hadno nationality. Whentheempiredissolvedintonationalstates,
theseanationalofficers had greatdifficultydecidingwhichwas theirhome.Admirableas their
indifference to ethnicitymayhavebeen,however, theofficers'dynasticloyaltywas bytheearly
twentieth century otherworldlyat best,inherentlyrepressiveat worst.Deak's detachment from
theethnicpassionsof EasternEuropedoes occasionallyvergeon sentimental nostalgiaforthe
imperialpast.
Deak coversmanyotheraspectsof theHapsburgofficer experienceas well: theirpoverty
and debts,theircastehonor,thedecliningproportion of noblesamongthem,theobstaclesto
marriage(almost60 percentof a sampleof 486 lieutenants of 1870 did notmarryduringtheir
military careers),homoeroticism in themilitaryschools,and theboredomof garrisonlife.He
has littleto say aboutwhatofficers actuallydid whenon dutyor aboutthecorrespondence be-
tweentheirtraining andtheirserviceinpeaceandwar,but,ofcourse,formostofthisperiodthe
Austro-Hungarian armywas at peace, andDeak didnotsetoutto writea military historyofthe
officercorps.On theotherhand,as thisworkis in partpoliticalhistory, Deak mighthavesaid
something abouttheline officers'attitude towardthepoliticaland military aggressiveness of
Conradand othermilitary leadersin thedecadebeforetheirlastwar.This lack, if suchit be,
detractsverylittlefromthisdelightful book.
JOHN BUSHNELL
Northwestern
University,

HUNGARYIN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By J6zsefGdlantai.Translated byEva Gruszand

JuditPokoly.RevisedbyMarkGoodman.Budapest:Akad6miaiKiad6, 1989.viii,334 pp.
$34.00, cloth.

Thistranslation appearedin Hungaryin

is a revisedversionof J6zsefGalantai'sbookthatfirst
1974andis theonlystudyin theEnglishlanguagethatsurveysHungary's rolein WorldWarI.
Unfortunately,therevisionsdid notincludean updatedbibliography; thusspecializedstudies
publishedin the1980sin western languages,andevenin Hungarian, areneglected.The exami-
nationof thesecould have not onlybuttressed the author'sviews but also led to different
conclusions.
1042 Slavic Review

Duringtheyearof thebook'spublication HungaryabandonedCommunism, and forthis

reasonthebook'sMarxistterminology, including theoverusedtermrulingcircles,seemsante-
diluvian.Once thereaderovercomestheMarxistconstraints of thebook, a greatnumberof
usefulfactsand interpretationsare available.Throughout thebook IstvanTisza's leadershipis
emphasized.Tisza, whoheadedthegovernment from1913to 1917,is seenas playinga greater
rolein monarchial thananyotherHungarian
affairs primeminister. Contrary to theprevailing
view thatis reiteratedeven in such a recentpublication as SamuelWilliamsonJr.'sAustria-
Hungaryand theOriginsoftheFirstWar(1991), GalantaiclaimsthatTisza hadno reservations
aboutthewisdomof usingforceagainstSerbiaduringtheJulycrisisof 1914.
Galintai gives a good description of the mobilizationprocessof the variousAustro-
Hungarianforces,whichincludedtheHungarian army,theHonveds.Unfortunately, thefateof
theHungarian armyis ignoredintherestofthebook.In a bookthatdealswithHungary's rolein
thewarthisis a seriousomission.In fact,whilemanybooksaboutWorldWarI couldbe criti-
cized forbeinglongon battlescenesand shorton warpolitics,thisbook is unbalancedin the
otherdirection.Although thewarfront is notcoveredadequately, theattention paidtothehome
frontis an important contribution.Whilethehomefronts of Germanyand theEntentepowers
havebeenexaminedin detail,littlehas beenwritten on theHungarian homefront.
The defeatsof theAustro-Hungarian army,whichare attributed to bad military planning,
areidentifiedas strengtheningthenationality movements on thehomefront, especiallyin Tran-
sylvaniawheretheRomaniannationalleadership's goals changedfromequalityto autonomy,
fromautonomy ThusGalantaiimplicitly
to separation. negatestheviewthattheeventualseces-
sionof thenationalitieswas due to a mistaken Ententepolicyfavoring thebreak-up oftheAus-
tro-Hungarian monarchy. Thisunconvincing interpretationhasbeenrecently revivedbyFrancois
FejtowhoseRequiempour un empiredefunct, histoirede la destructionde l'Autriche-Hongrie
(1988) wonan awardas thebestbookofhistory publishedin Francein 1988.
Galantaisees the1916Brusilovoffensive as thedeathblowtoAustro-Hungarian goals,as it
prevented an Austro-Hungarian victoryagainstItaly.The huge losses on the easternfront,
coupledwiththelack of reserves,led to thenearbreakdown of thearmy.Consequently, the
Austro-Hungarian armywas incapableofindependent actionandneededGermanaid to holdthe
frontsforthenexttwoyears.
The monograph endswiththearmistice signedin Paduaon 3 November1918,butitoffers
no conclusionsaboutthewar-a warthatturned outto be a majorturning pointin history.The
bookalso lacksan index.
PETER PASTOR
MontclairStateCollege

THE HUNGARIANECONOMIC REFORMS: 1953-1988. By IvanT. Berend.SovietandEast

EuropeanStudiesSeries.Cambridge;
New York;PortChester,N.Y.: Melbourne;andSyd-
ney:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990. x, 347 pp. Tables.$59.50, cloth.

In thecurrentwaveofdiscussionaboutmarket reform in EasternEuropeitis sometimes forgot-

tenthatsucha reform processhas alreadybeenunderway forsometimein Yugoslavia,China,
Poland,andHungary. WiththeintroductionoftheNewEconomicMechanism in 1968,Hungary
becamethefirstclassicalSoviet-type systemto attempt a comprehensivemarketreform.The
subsequent twenty-two yearhistoryoftheHungarian economyoffers manyvaluablelessonsfor
newcomersto marketreform.Ivan T. Berendhas documented theentirehistory of economic
reform in Hungaryfrom1953to 1988,withparticular emphasison theperiodbefore1980.
Berendapproachesthetopicas a historian,notan economist.The bookcontainsverylittle
economicanalysis.Noris theremuchattempt to drawspecificeconomicconclusionsfromthe
successor failureof variousmeasures.Berendfocusesinsteadon thegeneraleconomic,politi-
cal, andintellectual
trendsthataffectedthereform process.He therebyemphasizesexplanation