GR. NO.

192330 November 14, 2002

ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO VS PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Municipal Social Welfare and Development
Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a
Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that
provided construction materials to indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their
homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor
needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction
for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-
a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the
beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the
reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia),
the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of
construction materials particularly the cement.
Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio
(Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge
of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding
Program (SFP) that rationed food to
malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that
the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of
sardines in its storeroom. And since she had
already distributed food to the mother
volunteers, what remained could be given to the
CSAP beneficiaries.
On August 27 2001 Alfredo Doller, a former
SB member filed a complaint against Ysidoro.
Nierna Doller, his wife and former MSWDO
head testified that the goods were intended for
Leyte’ malnourished children and pointed that
the Supplemental Feeding Implementation
Guidelines for LGUs governed the distribution
of SFP goods. Hence, Mayor Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to CSAP
beneficiaries.
 The Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidro
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case28228 of violation of illegal use of public
property (technical malversation) under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code.
Mayor Ysidoro averred that he was in good
faith, and the diversion of the goods to a project
also meant for the poor of the municipality was
valid since it came from the savings of the SFP
and Calamity Fund.
SandiganBayan found Mayor Ysidoro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. Since there was no damage to
public service, he was only fined with 50% of
the sum misapplied. The SB also held that he
applied public property to a public purpose
other than for which it has been appropriated by
law.
Issue:
 Whether or not he approved the diversion of
the subject goods to a public purpose different
from their originally intended purpose.

 
Rulings
Yes, The crime of technical malversation as
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code has three elements: a) that the
offender is an accountable public officer; b) that
he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that
the public use for which such funds or property
were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law
or ordinance.
 Anent Ysidoro’s averment that he acted in
good faith, the Court held that criminal intent is
not an element of technical malversation. The
law punishes the act of diverting public property
earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law
forbids its commission based on considerations
of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is
the commission of an act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof that
determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent
is completely irrelevant.

GR. NO. 4963 15 September 1909

United States, plaintiff vs Go Chico, Defendant
Facts:
On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go
Chico displayed on the window of his store,
medallions in form of small buttons, upon which
were faces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or
banner or device used during the late
insurrection of the Philippine Islands to
designate the identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States. Prior to
the day aforementioned, appellant had
purchased the stock of goods in said store, of
which the medallions formed part, at a public
sale made under authority of the sheriff of the
city of Manila. On August 4, appellant was
arranging his stocks for the purpose of
displaying them to the public, placing them in
his showcase and in one of the windows of his
store.
The appellant states he was ignorant of
the law against the display of the medallions and
adds that he had no corrupt intention. He was
charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Art. 1696 of the
Philippine Commission. Go Chico moved to
acquit himself on the grounds that (1) criminal
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
upon the part of the accused before being
convicted and; (2) the prohibition of the law is
directed against the use of the identical banners,
devices, or emblems actually used during the
Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.
ISSUE:
WON intent is necessary in crimes
punishable by special laws
HELD:
NO. In the opinion of this court it is not
necessary that the appellant should have acted
with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made
such by statutory enactment, the intention of the
person who commits the crime is entirely
immaterial. If it were not, the statute as a
deterrent influence would be substantially
worthless. The court ruled that the act alone,
irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
The words “used during the late insurrection in
the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United
States” mean not only the identical flags
actually used in the insurrection, but any flag
which is of that type. The description refers not
to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The
literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an
absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent
of the legislature.
G.R. NO. 157171 March 14, 2006
Arsenia B. Garcia vs Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines
Facts:
About May 11, 1995, which was within the
canvassing period during theMay 8, 1995
elections, Arsenia B. Garcia – Election Office,
Herminio R. Romero – Municipal Treasurer,
Renato R. Viray – Public School district
supervisor, Chairman, Vice Chairman, and
Member Secretary of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Rachel
Palisoc & Francisca De Vera – Tabulator,
conspired, confederated, and willfully and
unlawfully decreased the votes received by
senatorial candidate, Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr.
From 6,998 to1,921 as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No.
008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial
No. 436156 with a difference of 5,077 votes.
The RTC acquitted all the accused in a decision
due to insufficiency of evidence, except Arsenia
B. Garcia who
was pronounced GUILTY of the crime defined 
under RA 6646, Section 27(b) and violation ofE
lection Offense.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not violation of Section 27(b) of
RA No. 6646 is classified under mala in se or
mala prohibita.
RULING:
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined
and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When
the acts complained of are inherently immoral,
they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Electoral Reforms
Law is a mala in se crime because it
is inherently immoral to decrease the vote of a
candidate. What is being punished is the
intentional decreasing of a candidate’s votes and
not those arising from errors and mistakes. She
amenably accepted certain duties, which were
not supposed to be hers to perform. Hence, a
clear sign that she facilitated the
erroneous entry.

G.R. NO. L- 18924, October 19, 1922

The people of the Philippines vs Wong Cheng
Facts:
The appellee is charged with having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel
was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the city's shores, according to the
information that started this case. The Attorney-
General requests that the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila be reversed in this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines
have the jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels in our jurisdictional
waters.

Rulings:
There are two main rules in international
law that apply to this specific situation: the
French rule, which states that crimes committed
aboard foreign merchant boats shall not be
punished in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission threatens
the peace and security of the territory; and the
English rule, which is based on the territorial
concept and is applied in the United States,
which explains that crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Only the last of these two criteria
applies since the Philippines, which is currently
a US territory, is currently governed by the
ideas and jurisprudence that are currently in
effect in the US on this issue.
Since protecting Filipinos from the negative
consequences of opium use is the primary goal
of the Philippines' Opium Law, we have seen
that simple possession of the drug aboard a ship
passing through Philippine waters is not enough
to warrant prosecution. This is because merely
transporting opium across the country's borders
does not constitute use of the drug within the
country's borders. Consequently, simple
possession is not regarded to be a threat to
public safety.
However, it is a violation of the public order
here established to smoke opium within our
territorial borders, even if you are doing so on a
foreign commercial ship, because this allows the
drug to have its harmful effects within our
territory. It stands in contrast to the goals our
legislators had when they enacted the
aforementioned restrictive law. And, as the
Attorney General so astutely points out,