GR. NO.

192330 November 14, 2002

ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,
Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided
construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild
their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio
Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped
reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for
such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina
Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished
children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes
of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food
to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
On August 27 2001 Alfredo Doller, a former SB member filed a
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, his wife and former MSWDO head
testified that the goods were intended for Leyte’ malnourished children
and pointed that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for
LGUs governed the distribution of SFP goods. Hence, Mayor Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP
goods to CSAP beneficiaries.
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James
M. Ysidro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case28228 of violation of
illegal use of public property (technical malversation) under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code.
Mayor Ysidoro averred that he was in good faith, and the diversion
of the goods to a project also meant for the poor of the municipality
was valid since it came from the savings of the SFP and Calamity Fund.
SandiganBayan found Mayor Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of technical malversation. Since there was no damage to public service, he
was only fined with 50% of the sum misapplied. The SB also held that he
applied public property to a public purpose other than for which it has
been appropriated by law.
Issue:
Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to
a public purpose different from their originally intended purpose.
Rulings
Yes, The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is
an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property
under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use
for which such funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Anent Ysidoro’s averment that he acted in good faith, the Court held
that criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law
punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or
ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently
immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and
not the character or effect thereof that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely
irrelevant.

GR. NO. 4963 15 September 1909

United States, plaintiff vs Go Chico, Defendant
Facts:
On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed on the
window of his store, medallions in form of small buttons, upon which were
faces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the
late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to designate the identify those
in armed insurrection against the United States. Prior to the day
aforementioned, appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store,
of which the medallions formed part, at a public sale made under authority
of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On August 4, appellant was arranging
his stocks for the purpose of displaying them to the public, placing them
in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store.
The appellant states he was ignorant of the law against the display
of the medallions and adds that he had no corrupt intention. He was
charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Art. 1696 of the Philippine Commission.
 Go Chico moved to acquit himself on the grounds that (1) criminal
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt upon the part of the
accused before being convicted and; (2) the prohibition of the law is
directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems
actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.
ISSUE:
WON intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws
HELD:
NO. In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the
appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made
such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. The court ruled that the act
alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words “used
during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or
identify those in armed rebellion against the United States“ mean not only
the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which
is of that type. The description refers not to a particular flag, but to
a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an
absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
G.R. NO. 157171 March 14, 2006
Arsenia B. Garcia vs Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
Facts:
About May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period
during theMay 8, 1995 elections, Arsenia B. Garcia – Election Office,
Herminio R. Romero – Municipal Treasurer, Renato R. Viray – Public School
district supervisor, Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Member Secretary of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Rachel Palisoc &
Francisca De Vera – Tabulator, conspired, confederated, and willfully and
unlawfully decreased the votes received by senatorial candidate,
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. From 6,998 to1,921 as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate
of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of 5,077 votes. The
RTC acquitted all the accused in a decision due to insufficiency of
evidence, except Arsenia B. Garcia who
was pronounced GUILTY of the crime defined under RA 6646, Section 27(b
) and violation ofElection Offense.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not violation of Section 27(b) of RA No. 6646 is classified
under mala in se or mala prohibita.
RULING:
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Electoral
Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is inherently immoral to
decrease the vote of a candidate. What is being punished is the intentional
decreasing of a candidate’s votes and not those arising from errors and
mistakes. She amenably accepted certain duties, which were not supposed
to be hers to perform. Hence, a clear sign that she facilitated the
erroneous entry.

G.R. NO. L- 18924, October 19, 1922

The people of the Philippines vs Wong Cheng
Facts:
The appellee is charged with having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the city's shores,
according to the information that started this case. The Attorney-General
requests that the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila be
reversed in this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have the jurisdiction
over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels in our jurisdictional
waters.

Rulings:
There are two main rules in international law that apply to this
specific situation: the French rule, which states that crimes committed
aboard foreign merchant boats shall not be punished in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission threatens the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, which is based on the territorial concept
and is applied in the United States, which explains that crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed. Only the last of these
two criteria applies since the Philippines, which is currently a US
territory, is currently governed by the ideas and jurisprudence that
are currently in effect in the US on this issue.
Since protecting Filipinos from the negative consequences of
opium use is the primary goal of the Philippines' Opium Law, we have seen
that simple possession of the drug aboard a ship passing through Philippine
waters is not enough to warrant prosecution. This is because merely
transporting opium across the country's borders does not constitute
use of the drug within the country's borders. Consequently, simple
possession is not regarded to be a threat to public safety.
However, it is a violation of the public order here established to
smoke opium within our territorial borders, even if you are doing so on a
foreign commercial ship, because this allows the drug to have its harmful
effects within our territory. It stands in contrast to the goals our
legislators had when they enacted the aforementioned restrictive law.
And, as the Attorney General so astutely points out,