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Cognitive Bias and system complexity in Everest 1996 Disaster

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Cognitive Bias and system complexity in Everest 1996 Disaster

Introduction

In the field, interpersonal risks on individual, team, and management levels affect a team's

psychological trust and safety. During team building activities, each team member is physically

and psychologically vulnerable because the decisions and actions undertaken by others

teammates or team leaders affect them positively or negatively (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In

the movie Everest, three teams attempted to summit Everest and encountered a strong storm that

led to a disaster. The storm claimed the lives of five of the twenty-three climbers as it not only

obscured their visibility but made it impossible for them to return to the base. Although the

climbers were aware of the danger of climbing Everest, there needed to be better decisions made

on the individual, team, and system levels that contributed to the Everest disaster. System

complexity, team psychological safety, and cognitive bias (overconfidence and sunk-cost effect)

are some of the major players contributing to the Everest 1996 disaster.

In the movie, individual, team, and network issues and mistakes contributed to the ultimate

Everest disaster. As different authors and movie critics have discovered from their previous

exploration of what was the ultimate cause of the disaster, cognitive bias and system

complexities were the leading causes of physical and psychological danger the team found itself

in. although it is hard to point fingers on the victims' behaviors, it is important to learn from their

decision-making mistakes that put their lives in danger in terms of death and sickness. According

to Michael A. Robert's "lessons from Everest," there are several conflicts regarding the disaster's

ultimate cause that claimed five lives and affected the survivors psychologically and physically.
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According to the article's author, Roberto, individual and team decisions should be considered to

avoid cognitive bias in team-building exercises.

Cognitive Bias

Sunk-cost Bias

One of the mistakes made on the individual, team, and system levels was staying committed to

the course of action to fulfill the goal because they had invested a significant amount of

resources. According to Roberto, this is referred to as the sunk-cost effect. The effect clouded the

team's decision-making abilities, leading to poor decisions and devastating results. The sunk-cost

effect persuaded the team to stay committed to their goal despite the overwhelming storm that

affected the summit efforts and visibility because they had invested much money, effort, and

time to achieve it (Roberto, 2002). The effect affected their rational thinking. Roberto discloses

that considerable resources had been allocated and invested in the exercise. These resources were

in terms of time, effort, and money. In lessons from Everest, the author reveals that every one of

the twenty-three climbers had spent several years preparing to inform of intense training for the

summit. They spent the weeks before the summit hiking, camping, and getting accustomed to

Everest's extremely cold climate. Before starting the summit, the climbers spent eighteen hours

getting familiar with the base camp route so they would not get stuck or lost on their way back

and on making the limited oxygen they had last. The author also discloses that the Everest

summit cost a whooping amount of seventy thousand dollars. Before the disaster, the team

leaders, Scott Fischer, and Rob Hall, revealed that the climbers would find it hard to abandon the

exercise after investing so much in it and found it ridiculous when the team leaders said that they

turned around because there was a possibility of not making it to the summit due to the storm.
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In the movie, one of the climbers, Doug Hansen, who was on Rob's team, refused to abandon the

exercise, saying he had put too much effort, time, and money into it. He says, ‘’íve put too much

of myself into this mountain to quit now without giving it everything I've got.' He had climbed

the mountain the previous year, which gave him confidence that he could survive the storm and

ultimately make it back to the base camp. Although he made it to the summit past the set time, he

gave the mountain everything he got, and it cost him his life as he perished on his descent from

the summit. Doug exemplifies how the sunk-cost effect obstructed the climbers' thinking and

decisions. However, other climbers such as Taske, Fischbeck, Kasischke, and Hutchison made

individual decisions that saved their lives by not letting the sunk-cost effect affect their decisions

despite spending significant resources to undertake the exercise (Roberto, 2002). Like Doug,

they had each invested seventy thousand dollars and spent much time preparing for the summit,

yet when faced with the overwhelming storm, they chose their safety over their zeal to climb.

When faced with that decision, they were already above 26,000 ft. and near the summit, yet they

turned around and headed to the base camp. While most climbers were lucky to come out alive,

the sunk-cost effect led them to sickness and blindness because they were exposed to storms for

a long time, as none of them made it to the summit on time.

The sunk-cost effect is a cognitive bias that has the potential to lead to success in the corporate

world. However, in cases of life and death, it affects the decision makers where they focus on

what they have invested to achieve the set target instead of focusing on what they will lose when

something or everything goes wrong. In a team, the team members and leaders should be aware

of this bias to avoid disasters or tragedies, as witnessed in the movie Everest. It is also important

to understand that this effect can be very motivating, and sometimes even the most logical

thinkers can abandon their thinking due to this effect's influence.

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Overconfidence Bias

One of the two team leaders, Rob Hall was an accomplished guide who had climbed the

mountain several times. He had undertaken the exercise the previous year with other climbers,

including Doug Hansen, who perished in the disaster. Despite his extensive experience as a

climber and team leader, he made serious tactical mistakes that cost his teammates their lives and

psychologically affected others. He continued leading his teammates toward the summit even

when it became clear that they could not descend safely because it was late in the day. According

to one of the climbers, Krakauer, he may have felt compelled to lead his teammate Doug to the

summit because he had failed to do so in 1995. Hall foresaw the disaster before the climb, yet he

needs to make the right decision with so many incompetent people on board. He says, "with so

many incompetent people on the mountain, it is pretty unlikely that they will get through this

season without something bad happening up high”(7.49). As revealed by this statement, his

thought process should have compelled him to make better decisions to save the lives of those

incompetent people, as he calls them.

Scott Fischer, the other team leader, perishes in the mountain due to his mistakes as an individual

and team leader. Fischer decided to continue climbing the mountain regardless of having no

supplementary oxygen. His overconfidence clouded his judgment in climbing the mountain.

Although he did not die on the spot, the decision to climb to the summit with insufficient oxygen

ultimately led to his demise because his health declined, leaving him weak during the descent.

Fischer's decision to climb to the summit may be triggered by his fierce competitive spirit, as it

was clear that he desired to achieve because he wanted to beat his fellow team leader, Hall.
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Their team leadership was characterized by poor decisions in the mountain climbing exercise

that led to the tragedy. These poor decisions ranged from security measures, adhering to rigid

rules, poor team selection process, poor priority setting, lack of teamwork development, and poor

communication channels (Roberto, 2002). Although Hall and Fischer were accomplished

climbers, there needed to be better team leaders, and they made decisions that cost other climbers

their lives. The two leaders needed more leadership skills in organizing, grouping, and leading a

team of climbers. Their leadership decisions reflect their inability to set their priorities straight.

In the movie, no team leaders followed the rigid rule of turning around after 1 pm. Other team

members, such as Taske, Sherpas, and Hutchinson, showed more leadership initiative as they

turned around after the 1 pm deadline. However, they were a few feet from achieving their

mountain climbing goal. In the movie, Hall says, "we guarantee to maximize the safety and

success of your adventure" he does the opposite as he prioritizes the ambition of one team

member over the safety of others who depend on him. This initiative shows that they can be good

leaders who lead by example but also good rule followers.

Another team-level mistake exhibited by these two leaders is the need to develop teamwork. In

the movie, Hall chooses to lead one team member, Doug to the summit while leaving others who

depended on his leadership behind. This was one critical team-level mistake, as the team

members left behind needed help to track their route to the base camp. This delay saw them

caught in the storm, and it endangered their safety, health, and ability to trust in others (leaders).

Hall did not inspire or try to improve communication in his team leadership. He does not allow

any different opinion, idea, or policy from the team he leads, and this dictatorship kind of team

leadership saw his teammates without a guide on their descent. He allowed their guide

Bouyrkeev to use the additional oxygen to climb to the Everest summit. Although this was a
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wrong decision, nobody questioned him or raised a different opinion as he was rigid in his

leadership style and did not invite a contrary opinion. He also appointed Bouyrkeev as a guide

despite his poor ability to communicate in English. The team leaders and most climbers violated

the safety measures and continued their ascend despite getting to the 26,000ft past 2 pm. They

had set a rule to refrain from continuing their ascent if they reached that height past 2 pm to

avoid descending in the dark. Consequently, the two leaders should have focused on teamwork

and team-building exercises to survive the harsh mountain climbing conditions. As the climbers

revealed, most of them had not met before the exercise and, therefore, could not trust each other

as they were particular strangers (Edmondson et al., 2004).

System complexity

According to Edmondson (1999), when team leaders support and coach their teams accordingly,

they ensure the team's psychological safety. This also improves the team's effectiveness in

achieving the desired goal as they work together and are motivated because they participate in

the decision-making process. This was not the case in Everest, as team leaders made all the

decisions for the team and needed to prepare them psychologically. As a leader, Hall warned his

team that he did not welcome any conflicting ideas, debates, or disagreements during the

expedition. “I will tolerate no dissension up there. My word will be absolute law, beyond

appeal.” this statement made the climbers follow his instructions blindly despite having doubts

about his judgment. For instance, the guide Bouÿrkreev had concerns regarding some of his team

leader's decisions but did not raise them. After the disaster he revealed, ï tried not to be too

argumentative, choosing instead to downplay my intuitions. All these mistakes and lack of

teamwork development did not help the team's psychological state when the storm struck, and it

became hard to descend due to the darkness (Edmondson et al., 2004).

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In the Everest movie, an overwhelming storm, human mistakes, group errors, and equipment

failure led to the ultimate disaster. This means the systems were complex and hard to maneuver,

contributing to the tragedy. According to Krakauer, a journalist who participated in the

expedition, "Four of my teammates died not because Rob Hall's systems were faulty-indeed

nobody is were better-but because on Everest it is the nature of the systems to breakdown with a

vengeance. This statement suggests that although Hall's systems may have been fine, they may

have been complex and prone to breakdown when exposed to the Everest challenges. In the

Everest disaster, minor mistakes, errors, and insignificant incidences created a chain of events

and reactions that led to the ultimate disaster. According to Roberto (2002), complex systems

comprise organizational rules and procedures, supplies, equipment, materials, and the natural

environment. If there is a fault in one of them, it results in systematic errors.

Application of cognitive biases and system complexity in the Everest tragedy

Although there is much speculation about what led to the Everest disaster when the two theories

(cognitive bias and system complexity) are applied, they explain what contributed to the tragedy.

However, some scholars believe that every team member knew of the potential risks before

committing to climbing to the summit (Edmondson, 1999). When integrated, the two theories

expound on the risk of failure on May 10, 1996, in Mount Everest's death zone. The two theories

are interrelated as cognitive bias seems dominant in complex systems, increasing the chances of

failure. Cognitive bias, which happens to be a human error, results in a chain of small errors that

later contribute to the main failure of a complex system (Roberto, 2002). Due to cognitive bias,

leaders and team members tend to ignore safety measures that are put in place to limit the risk of

failure or, in this case, accidents or disasters. When combined, the two theories make people

abandon rules and underestimate the level of risk, as seen when Fischer decides to climb to the
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summit past the death zone with no supplemental oxygen. He underestimated the risk of hypoxia

(absence of adequate oxygen in the brain), which made his health deteriorate rapidly so that he

could not move. These errors also resulted in delays where climbers spend a significant amount

of time without supplemental oxygen as they spend more hours than scheduled before they

reached the camp where the oxygen had been stored. Another example of a cognitive bias

mistake made in the complex system is the delays, lack of oxygen, and sleep deprivation that

made Harris, one of the guides, inform the team that there was no supplemental oxygen left they

could use as they descended. However, this was not the case, as additional canisters of

supplemental oxygen were stored in the south summit camp.

Most team members needed to adhere to the set routine more. For instance, most of them ignored

the turnaround rule that was put in place to prevent climbers from descending after nightfall.

Another underestimated rule was the supplement oxygen rule, where some team members, like

Fischer, decided to climb to the summit without oxygen. The teams also failed to stick together

and ended up stuck in the dark and unable to make it to the camp. These small errors triggered a

chain of reaction due to the complex system they were operating in and caused five deaths and

many more chronic health conditions to the survivors. The sunk-cost and overconfidence bias

motivated the climbers to stay on the ship despite the storm hitting hard and reaching 26,000 ft.

height past the scheduled time. When underestimated, integrating cognitive bias and system

complexities can lead to failure.

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References 

Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative science
quarterly, 44(2), 350-383.

Edmondson, A. C., Kramer, R. M., & Cook, K. S. (2004). Psychological safety, trust, and learning in
organizations: A group-level lens. Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and
approaches, 12(2004), 239-272.

https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/make-your-employees-psychologically-safe
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https://www.dropbox.com/s/ngapnxe67z2sao1/Edmondson_2004_Psychological%20Safety,%20Trust
%20and%20Learning%20in%20Organizations.pdf?dl=0

Roberto, M. A. (2002). Lessons from Everest: The interaction of cognitive bias, psychological safety, and
system complexity. California Management Review, 45(1), 136-158.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157),
1124-1131.Links to an external site.