POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy

Assignment for 9-17-16

* Study the following.

* Read all cited cases in the original.
* Prepare for graded recitation.

III. Legislative Department

A. Who may exercise legislative power

1. Congress

* RE: delegation of legislative power

*The stand-by authority granted to the President to increase the rate of
VAT from 10% to 12% is not an undue delegation of legislative power.
There is but simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rateunder the law is
contingent. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. - Abakada Guro vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005.

*Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the

Court’s authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in
R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid
delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to
issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom,
reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of
protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang,
Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,
G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

2. Regional/Local legislative power

3. People’s initiative on statutes

a) Initiative and referendum

B. Houses of Congress

1. Senate

*Pimentel, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008. - The
Court struck down as unconstitutional Section 36(g) of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Section 36(g), as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
 resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution. As couched, it
unmistakeably requires a candidate for senator to be certified as “illegal-
drug clean”, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug testing.

*The Senate as an institution is “continuing” as it is not dissolved as an

entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate
of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before
it. Thus, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. - Romero II vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.

*As the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of

the Senate of the Congress before it, the same is required to republish
the Rules in order to comply with Section 21. - Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No.
180643, September 4, 2008.

2. House of Representatives

*RE: natural-born citizenship qualification for district representatives

*A natural-born citizen who loses his citizenship by naturalization in another
country but later is repatriated recovers his status of being a natural-born
citizen and therefore is qualified to be a member of congress. - Bengzon vs.
Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001.

a) District representatives and questions of apportionment

*There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a

250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province. - Aquino vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.

* The second sentence of Section 5(3) Article VI of the Constitution,

succintly provides: “each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the
subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase
“or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but NOT
for a province. - Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7,
2010.

b) Party-list system (R.A. No. 7941)

C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications

D. Quorum and voting majorities

E. Discipline of members

*Members of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan or by the

Office of the Ombudsman – Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364,
August 10, 1995; Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18,
2001.

F. Electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments

*The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is
necessary before one may bring his petition to court. Furnishing a copy of
petitioner's letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - Drilon vs. De Venecia, G.R. No.
180055, July 31, 2009.

1. Nature

2. Powers

G. Powers of Congress

1. Legislative

*RE: privilege from arrest

*Members of Congress are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be
arrested, even when the House is in session, for crimes punishable by a
penalty of imprisonment of more than six years. - People vs. Jalosjos, G.R.
Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000.

*In Pobre vs. Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, the Supreme Court
sustained the privilege of speech of Senator Santiago over her duties as
member of the bar. The Supreme Court ruled that, “We, however, would be
remiss in Our duty if We let the Senator's offensive and disrespectful language
that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on
Our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect the courts
of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not
to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress
against governmental pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

a) Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions

*The SUBJUDICE rule restricts comments and disclosures

pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. -
Romero II vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.

*Investigations in aid of legislation and court proceedings have

different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like
adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law,
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely
and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit
the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. - Romero II
vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.

*However, when a resolution which was explicit on the subject and

nature of the inquiry to be conducted by the respondent
Committee was passed before the conduct of the investigation,
mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative investigation. - Standard Chartered Bank vs.
Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007.

*Persons under legislative investigation are not being indicted as

accused in a criminal proceeding but are merely summoned merely
as resource persons, or witnesses in a legislative inquiry. Hence,
they cannot, on the ground of their right against self-incrimination,
altogether decline appearing before the Congress, although they
may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded. - Standard Chartered Bank
vs. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27,
2007.

*While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain

from issuing subpoenas to executive officials until resort to it
becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a
compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call
for an assertion of executive privilege. Thus, respondents' failure to
invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did
not amount to a waiver thereof. - Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No.
170516, July 16, 2008.

*Executive privilege – the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress
*Operational Proximity Test – Communications which are close
enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to
pose a risk to the candor of his advisers are covered by the
privilege. - Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.

*When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department

heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid
of legislation” under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory. And
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves from it is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power – the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. - Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.

*The President, however, has the constitutional authority to

prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry by virtue of his power as commander-in-chief,
 and a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. - Gudani vs. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15,
2006.

b) Bicameral conference committee

c) Limitations on legislative power

(i) Limitations on revenue, appropriations and tariff measures

*The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are

indispensable prerequisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. - COMELEC vs. Judge
Quijano-Padilla, et al. G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002.

*Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566,

November 19, 2013.
FACTS: Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English

origin. Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading
ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of
black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the
porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from
the generosity of their well-fed master. This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. While the advent
of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it
persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. In a more
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.
Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative
control of local appropriations.

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred

to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

ISSUE (substantive): Whether or not the 2013 Priority

Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (A) separation of powers; (B) non-
delegability of legislative power; (C) checks and balances; (D)
accountability; (E) political dynasties; and (F) local autonomy.

DEFINITION: the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the

collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for
local projects, are utilized through the respective participations
of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the
fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF,
as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows
individual legislators to wield a collective power; and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows
the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such
term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund. (which will be discussed later on in the outline)

HELD:
(A) Separation of Powers – unconstitutional
The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or
acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law. Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end
and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive."

However, since the restriction only pertains to "any role in

the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows.
Congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation

and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws

pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

(B) Non-delegability – unconstitutional

The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law”. The power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by
law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b)
a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature are unconstitutional.

(C) Checks and Balances – unconstitutional

The PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later on". The item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting. Accordingly, Congress cannot choose
a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion

only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that
the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the President to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators
with legitimate projects.

Moreover, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be

treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does
not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President‘s power of item veto.

(D) Accountability – unconstitutional

The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed
out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization
runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that:
 Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.

(E) Political Dynasties - deferred

Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the argument that the Pork
Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in
power, as largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.

(F) Local Autonomy – unconstitutional

The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local

development council and initiate projects on his own, and even
take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-
driven project identification has not only contributed little to the
overall development of the district, but has even contributed to
"further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."

(ii) Presidential veto and Congressional override

2. Non-legislative

a) Informing function

b) Power of impeachment

*Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of

public officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional
principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the second sentence
of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the
more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured
public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no
way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for
Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While
the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional
determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional
guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
 substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of
checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to
Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all
other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress
can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

*Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and

cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by
nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for
a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required
to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its
initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined
instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the
number of votes required for a finding of guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales
III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.

c) Other non-legislative powers