Camus and Nagel on Absurdity

There is a clear distinction between Thomas Nagel’s interpretation of life’s absurdity and
Albert Camus’, outlined in their works, The Absurd (1971) and The Myth of Sisyphus (1942),
respectively. The latter believes that our lives are absurd since our existence and the universe
which we inhabit is meaningless, thus rendering any search for purpose or meaning a futile
one, and ultimately absurd. Nagel, whilst agreeing that life is meaningless, does not believe
that fact makes it inherently absurd. Rather, he asserts that the human “capacity to transcend
ourselves in thought”1 and adopt sub specie aeternitatis, a “nebula’s-eye view,”2 where we
can “see ourselves without presuppositions, as arbitrary, idiosyncratic,” 3 absurdity arises;
wherein despite observing the futility of our existence, we continue to live life seriously. A
core aspect of such an explanation is the feature which doubt plays, arising from the point of
view which we can take external to our lives, prompting the experiences which we
considered once to be serious, now appearing gratuitous. 4 Regardless of this observation, we
continue to live seriously, but with newfound doubts about the futile nature of existence,
which characterise the absurd mindset. This fundamental difference in where the absurdity of
life derives from differentiates the two interpretations. Camus sees life to be entirely
meaningless, and thus absurd, whereas Nagel argues that our ability to comprehend its futility
and live seriously in spite of such is the true cause.

Nagel and Camus’ beliefs on the appropriate response to life’s absurdity also diverge, mainly
on the basis that Nagel does not think that its absurdity is truly problematic, but instead
something “sobering and comical.”5 He thus sees Camus’ proposed responses: suicide,
dependence on a higher calling, and particularly existential defiance as “romantic and slightly
self-pitying,”6 as he questions whether the absurdity of our “existence truly presents us with a
problem.”7 He proposes that the capacity for humans to comprehend their lives as absurd
shows our transcendental capabilities, and is one of our most human characteristics,8 and that
attempting to live in scorn to preserve nobility is not the ideal means of living an absurd life. 9

1
Nagel, Thomas. “The Absurd.” The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20 (1971): pp. 727
2
Ibid: pp. 725
3
Ibid: pp. 725
4
Ibid: pp. 719
5
Ibid: pp. 720
6
Ibid: pp. 726
7
Ibid: pp. 726
8
Ibid: pp. 726
9
Ibid: pp. 726
Also, if we were to return to our lives following our perception of existence from an elevated
consciousness and rely on reason to govern them, Nagel comments that we would fail to do
so given the lack of cause and motive in the world. Thus, it is necessary to re-enter our lives
with a sense of irony in order to accept our absurdity, as we cannot escape it. Nagel
concludes, and in such provides an apt response for which we may approach our absurd
existence: due to sub specie aeternitatis and its implications, as aforementioned, there is no
meaning or purpose in the world, thus that lack of meaning does not matter either, 10 allowing
us to lead an ironic life, Nagel’s proposal, and not one of “heroism or despair,” 11 as Camus
suggests.

Word count: 525

10
Ibid: pp. 727
11
Ibid: pp. 727