A Convenient Framework The Western European Union in The Persian Gulf, 1987-1988 and 1990-1991

This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]
On: 19 November 2014, At: 22:42

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
European Security
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20
A convenient framework: the

Western European Union in the
Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 and
1990–1991
a
Marc Ronald DeVore
a
Center for Security, Economics and Technology
(CSET) , University of St. Gallen , St. Gallen,
Switzerland
Published online: 22 Dec 2009.
To cite this article: Marc Ronald DeVore (2009) A convenient framework: the Western
European Union in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 and 1990–1991, European Security, 18:2,
227-243, DOI: 10.1080/09662830903460087
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830903460087
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Downloaded by [University of California Santa Cruz] at 22:42 19 November 2014
European Security
Vol. 18, No. 2, 227243, June 2009
A convenient framework: the Western

European Union in the Persian Gulf,

1987 1988 and 1990 1991
Marc Ronald DeVore*

Center for Security, Economics and Technology (CSET), University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen,
Switzerland
(Received 17 October 2009; final version received 3 November 2009)
ABSTRACT One important discussion about European security focuses on what types
of institutions will enable Europe to effectively intervene in regional crises. Thus far, the
consensus has been that a European Security and Defense Policy should possess, for its
military component, a highly institutionalized and integrative inter-governmental structure.
Ironically, Europe’s greatest collective foreign military successes were obtained under
the organizational auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), whose ill-defined
mandate and weak institutional structures contrast markedly from current policy
prescriptions. In two campaigns, the WEU coordinated efforts to protect maritime
commerce and swept sea lanes for naval mines during the IranIraq War (19871988),
enforced the United Nations embargo of Iraq during the 19901991 Gulf Crisis, and cleared
the naval mines left behind after the 1991 Gulf War. The lesson to be drawn from these
successful interventions is that Europe profited from a structure capable of limiting the
political and diplomatic costs of intervening abroad and not, as is often assumed, an
organization designed to maximize military efficiency.
KEY WORDS: Western European Union; interventions; Persian Gulf; ESDP;

institutionalism; Gulf War
Introduction
Today the European Union (EU) is at a crossroads where the future contours of
its institutions are, as yet, undefined. This is particularly true of European
defense policymaking institutions. Governments and experts disagree on the
degree to which European states should integrate their militaries and ministries
of defense and over whether European defense should be organized supra-
nationally or inter-governmentally. Given the prevailing confusion over the
*Email: marc.devore@unisg.ch
ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/09/02022717 # 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09662830903460087
228 MR. DeVore
future of European defense collaboration, it is worth examining what European

militaries accomplished in the past when they collectively intervened abroad.
Since the waning years of the Cold War, European states intervened in the
Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Congo, and Chad
under the respective banners of the Western European Union (WEU),
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU.1
In this paper I will examine the WEU’s interventions in the waters around the
Middle East during the IranIraq War and the First Gulf War.
Despite the WEU possessing an expansive and ill-defined mandate and
extremely weak institutional structures, it proved more capable and flexible
when it came to external interventions than several ostensibly more robust

organizations. The WEU coordinated the efforts of European states to protect
their maritime commerce and swept vital sea lanes for naval mines during the
last phase of the IranIraq War (19871988), enforced the United Nations
embargo of Iraq in the Red Sea during the 19901991 Gulf Crisis, and cleared
most of the naval mines left behind after the 1991 Gulf War.
Any thorough study of the WEU interventions in the Middle East must
necessarily pose three questions: (1) why did European states decide to
coordinate their actions through the WEU rather than alternative forums
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the EU’s European
Political Cooperation (EPC); (2) what were the perceived benefits to European
states of intervening collectively rather than joining an ad hoc USA led
coalition; and (3) how did the WEU practically organize and coordinate the
actions of member states.
Many of the answers to these questions are counterintuitive. European states
preferred the WEU as the forum to organize its foreign interventions precisely
because it was a weak organization with an uncertain and overlarge mandate.
Despite its shortcomings, the WEU’s European character provided a cover of
legitimacy enabling states unaccustomed to unilateral military action, such as
Italy and the Benelux countries, to use force to protect national interests. It
also enabled European states to collectively distinguish themselves and their
policies from those of the USA, something that would have been impossible
had European states joined ad hoc American-led coalitions. Finally, the WEU
provided a forum for coordinating the actions of national military contingents,
many of which where individually too small to make a difference.
Institutional choice
Advocates of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) argue that to be
effective, European defense policymaking must be institutionalized either on a
robust supranational basis, as the EU is in the fields of its monetary and
commercial policies, or as a highly institutionalized and integrative inter-
governmental organization, akin to the NATO. Ironically, European states
historically proved most willing and capable of military operations within the
European Security 229
confines of the WEU, an organization that was institutionally nearly the

opposite of both NATO and the EU.
Although the WEU is older than either NATO or EPC, the organization
played a muted role for most of its existence. Created by the 1948 Brussels
Treaty, linking France, the UK, Italy, and the Benelux states in a mutual
defense agreement, the WEU was stripped of most of its organizational
structures after the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949. Considered
redundant in the 1970s, the WEU’s ministerial committees stopped meeting
in the 1970s, effectively putting the organization into ‘hibernation.’ The WEU
was not brought out of hibernation until 1984, when transatlantic differences
over American President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the

Euromissile Crisis and the Trans-Siberian Oil Pipeline convinced Western
European leaders that they needed a forum to articulate their common interests
and express their common opposition to certain American policies.
Compared to NATO and EPC, the WEU had three major characteristics:
(1) an expansive mandate; (2) extremely weak and ‘shallow’ institutional
structures; and (3) fewer members.
In terms of its mandate, the WEU’s mission is vast. The provisions for
common defense found in Article V of the Brussels Treaty (in both the original
1948 and revised 1954 versions) were more robust than equivalent statements
in Article V of the Washington Treaty that formed NATO (Dumoulin and
Remacle 1998, pp. 223224). The WEU also had the explicit right, guaranteed
by Article VIII § 3, to hold consultations on events occurring anywhere in the
world, while NATO Charter excludes that Alliance from intervening south of
the Tropic of Capricorn (Dumoulin and Remacle 1998, p. 225). Finally, both
the Brussels Treaty and the United Nations secretariat suggest that the WEU
was a ‘regional organization’, according to Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, meaning that it can intervene to enact United Nations resolutions, a
status that neither NATO nor the European Community shared (Vierucci 1995,
pp. 309329).
Despite possessing a vast mandate, the WEU was a very small organization,
characterized by few permanent employees and a bare minimum of structures.
At the time it intervened in the IranIraq War and the First Gulf War, the
WEU had neither military units attributed to it, nor an independent military
staff, nor even a modest planning cell. Besides bi-annual ministerial level
meetings presided over by a rotating presidency, the WEU consisted of only a
permanent council in London composed of ambassadors from WEU member
states, two special working groups staffed by civil servants from the defense and
foreign ministries of member states and four thematic groups dedicated to
specific policy questions (Dumoulin and Remacle 1998, pp. 160168).
In comparison to NATO and EPC, the WEU had a smaller and more
homogeneous membership. At the end of the Cold War the WEU still counted
only seven members France, the UK, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In late 1988 this number was increased to nine
230 MR. DeVore
by the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, while NATO counted 15 members and
the European Communities 12.
In sum, at the time of the IranIraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, the WEU
was little more than a potential forum for pro-Atlantic Western European
states to organize ad hoc responses to crises. Ultimately, it was this very
formlessness that attracted European statesmen when conflicts beckoned.

The Iran Iraq War
The tanker war

During the final phase of the IranIraq War, European states intervened
together, as a bloc, for the first time in history. Beginning in January 1984, Iraq
launched attacks on Iran’s ability to export oil with the hope of bankrupting it
into negotiating an armistice. Using French weapons, including Mirage F-1
aircraft, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and AS-30L laser-guided missiles, the Iraqi
air force targeted Iran’s petroleum loading facilities on Kharg Island and
any ships sailing to or from an Iranian port. Because Iraq’s only two ports, Fao
and Umm Qasr, were closed by Iran’s land offensives, Iraq exported oil and
imported arms and goods through neighboring states, notably the Gulf
monarchies. When Iran decided to retaliate for Iraqi attacks on its shipping,
it did so by striking ships trading with neutral Gulf states.
When the tanker war began there was a glut of oil and merchant shipping on
the world market, and even if the situation in the Persian Gulf deteriorated, oil
pipelines could be used to export at least half of the Gulf’s oil overland to
Mediterranean and Red Sea ports (Adelman et al. 1986, p. 237; El-Shazly 1998,
p. 245). Because the so-called ‘tanker war’ in the Persian Gulf did not initially
threaten Western Europe’s oil supplies, most European leaders did not see a
pressing need to intervene. In fact, only France and the UK dispatched naval
forces to the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman at this stage.
Beginning in October 1980, the UK maintained two to three frigates
outside the Straits of Hormuz to lower the economic costs of British merchant
ships plying the Gulf and reassure British allies, such as Oman, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates, of the UK’s continued commitment to the region
(Thatcher 1993, p. 164). France sent forces to the Persian and Omani Gulfs
later, in 1984, after the beginning of the tanker war because President François
Mitterrand feared that Iran would single out French shipping in retaliation
for France selling Iraq sophisticated weapons (personal communication from
Admiral J. Lanxade, 24 March 2005). Although France and the UK quickly
sent naval forces to the Sea of Oman, other European states did not until a
chain of Kuwaiti, Soviet, and American decisions produced an international
crisis.
In November 1986, the Kuwaiti government asked both the USA and the
Soviet Union protect its oil tankers from Iranian attack. While the USA
pondered over the request for several months, the Soviet Union immediately
agreed to provide a small escort for Kuwaiti tankers. Soon Soviet warships were
plying the Persian Gulf and several Kuwaiti tankers carried the Soviet hammer
and sickle ensign (Hippler 1988, p. 19).
The spectacle of Soviet warships in the Persian Gulf alarmed decision-
makers in Washington. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger reported to
Congress that, ‘Their [the Soviet] objective in the Gulf is to establish a presence
that ultimately enables them to manipulate the movement of Persian Gulf oil’
(Secretary of Defense 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 159).
To minimize the diplomatic benefits the Soviet Union gained from its naval
presence in the Persian Gulf, the USA decided to overshadow the Soviet
Union’s contribution to Gulf security with larger naval forces escorting more
re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers. Beginning in 7 March 1987, the USA committed
itself to re-flagging and protecting 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers as well as sending a
substantial American fleet to the Persian Gulf. Weinberger set forth that
American policy was designed ‘to foreclose opportunities for greater Soviet
influence’ (Secretary of Defense 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 160).
Almost as soon as it agreed to intervene, the USA pleaded for support from
its NATO allies. However, European leaders worried that the USA sought a
pretext for military action against Iran. These concerns were fed by comments
from senior American officials, such as Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard
Armitage who publicly declared that, ‘we can’t stand to see Iraq defeated’
and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy added that re-flagging could
lead to war with Iran (Stork 1987, p. 4).
In any case, Europe initially rebuffed American pleas for support. When
Weinberger asked NATO’s Defense Planning Committee to study how
America’s allies could participate in the USA deployment to the Persian
Gulf, European reticence became immediately apparent in their refusal to act
(Dumoulin and Remacle 1998, p. 141). Later, Prime Minister Thatcher
counseled Reagan not to raise the issue of allied assistance during the June
1987 Group of Seven (G7) conference in Venice because she feared that
the USA would be embarrassed (Hippler 1988, p. 18). Reagan disregarded
Thatcher’s request, but failed to obtain even unqualified moral support when
the assembled foreign ministers endorsed the United Nations Secretary
General’s mediation efforts rather than the USA military efforts (Statement
by the Group of Seven 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 558; Johnstone
1988, p. 32).
Not easily deterred, the Reagan Administration continued to press for allied
support. On 15 June, six days after failure at Venice, Weinberger wrote to
Congress that, ‘A symbolic presence on the part of our European allies and
possible financial support from Japan . . . are possible’ (Secretary of Defense
1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 169). This announcement was met two
weeks later by a statement from the British government specifying that, ‘there is
no question or intention of formal integration [between the United States Navy
232 MR. DeVore
and the Royal Navy]’ (Answers by the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 274).
In sum, until late-July 1987, the USA failed to enlist support for its European
allies, who were deeply skeptical of American policy in the Persian Gulf. The
potential for either deliberate or inadvertent escalation was perceived to be high
and it was feared that the USA’s resolutely anti-Soviet stance in the Gulf would
impede negotiations in Europe. Even before the mining incident, the arrival of
USA naval units in the Gulf precipitated a wave of panic buying on the
international oil markets, because it was feared that clashes between the USA
and Iran would close the Straits of Hormuz.
The mine crisis

Despite Reagan’s enormous military buildup, which funneled $592 billion into
creating a hi-tech 600 ship Navy, the USA Navy was curiously unprepared for
the threat of naval mines (of which the Iranians possessed approximately 1000)
whose technology dated back to before the First World War (El-Shazly 1998,
p. 268). In fact, in 1987, the USA Navy counted only 21 minesweepers, all of
which had been constructed during the Korean War and only three of which
were in service (El-Shazly 1998, pp. 296298). By way of comparison, the tiny
Belgian Navy had 27 state-of-the-art minesweepers built in the 1970s and 1980s.
The USA was therefore woefully unprepared when the Iranians responded to
the re-flagging of Kuwaiti tankers by sowing the shipping channels and
approaches to ports in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman Gulfs with ancient
naval mines.
Dramatically, the first re-flagged Kuwaiti tanker, the Bridgeton, struck a
mine while escorted by three American frigates on 24 July 1987 (Stein 198889,
p. 149). Bereft of minesweepers, the small (4200 ton) frigates whose job was to
protect the Bridgeton were humiliatingly forced to huddle behind the stricken,
but large (100,000 ton), freighter to avoid striking mines themselves. This
was only the beginning and at least 10 merchant ships struck mines in the
10 months that followed (Stein 198889, p. 161; El-Shazly 1998, p. 38). If not
provided with minesweepers, the USA would face the dilemma of either not
sailing in certain parts of the Gulf, withdrawing from the region altogether or
attacking Iran (PC from Admiral J. Lanxade, 24 March 2005).
Faced with these unpleasant alternatives, the USA asked allied govern-
ments for minesweepers. On 11 August, France and the UK agreed to send
minesweepers to the Gulf after more mines were discovered moored outside of
the port of Fujairah, Oman. Oman’s neutrality and Fujairah’s geographic
position outside of the Persian Gulf led these European great powers to fear
that the tanker war was escalating. However, smaller or less assertive European
states, such as Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, believed that they needed an
international mandate and coordinating structure to dispatch warships to the
Persian Gulf.
The Netherlands, which held the presidency of the WEU, convoked the
organization’s member states for a debate on the Gulf crisis. At the onset of this
conference, on 20 August, the Dutch government announced its readiness to
deploy minesweepers to the Gulf, provided that Western European states
harmonize their policies toward the region and agree on a multilateral
framework for minesweeping.
The Dutch government, along with the Belgians and Italians, favored the
establishment of a United Nations naval presence in the Gulf.2 However, the
UK claimed that ‘formal practical difficulties’, such as the need to agree on
rules of engagement, rendered a United Nations intervention impossible.
Although not present at the WEU meeting, the USA had also previously
rejected proposals for a United Nations naval force because such a force would
necessarily include the Soviet Union (Second Report from the Foreign Affairs
Committee 1988 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, pp. 308309).
Failing intervention by the United Nations, Belgium, and the Netherlands
proposed that the WEU should coordinate minesweeping activities (Statement
by the Minister for Foreign Relations (Belgium) 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti
1993, p. 506). At this stage, France rejected a WEU operation because the
WEU was considered to be too closely affiliated with NATO. Ultimately, the
August WEU conference accomplished little.
After failing to reach an agreement at the Hague, WEU members next met
within the confines of the European Community’s EPC. With 12 members,
including neutral Ireland and non-interventionist Denmark, EPC proved a less
effective forum than the WEU. The statement issued by the 12 members of the
European Community on 3 September fell short of the Hague declaration in
only affirming ‘strong support for the fundamental principle of freedom of
navigation’ (Statement by the 12 Member States of the European Community
1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 554).
Unbeknownst to delegates attending the EPC meeting, events occurring that
same day in the Persian Gulf helped break the deadlock in the WEU. On 3
September, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards attacked an Italian merchant ship
(Johnstone 1988, p. 32). Thus provoked, the Italian government decided to send
naval units to the Persian Gulf the very next day to protect Italian-flagged
merchant vessels and assist with clearing naval mines (Resolution of the
Chamber 1-00021 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, pp. 452453). However,
Italian decision-makers desperately wanted a European mandate to cover their
actions. With a fleet bound for the Gulf, Italy annunciated its policy that ‘with
the European countries bilaterally, at the WEU and in the European
Community we will not cease to seek all possible links and to overcome
the difficulties we met so far’ (G. Andreotti 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti
1993, p. 435).
Later, on 7 September, Dutch officials met with their British and Belgian
counterparts to determine whether Dutch minesweepers would receive British
protection against air and surface threats while operating in the Gulf
234 MR. DeVore
(Statement by the Minister for Foreign Relations before the Joint Foreign
Relations and National Defence Committee of the Chamber of Representatives
1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 508). After some deliberation, Dutch
and British governments agreed, ‘that the British and Dutch activities would be
carried out with close tactical co-ordination’ (Letter of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Minister of Defense to the President of the Second Chamber of
the States General 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 496). For its part, the
Anglo-Dutch arrangements would be extended to Belgium as soon as the latter
state officially decided to send warships to the Gulf.
Faced with pressure from Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the WEU
convened another meeting on the situation in the Persian Gulf on 14 September.

At this meeting, the WEU’s member states agreed to attempt to harmonize their
policies toward the Gulf and collaborate concretely within the theater. The press
guidelines issued after the meeting noted that, ‘They [the WEU members]
underlined the importance they attach to the freedom of navigation. They noted
the decisions taken by some member countries since the last meeting to commit
naval forces in the Gulf region.’ Following upon this vague appreciation of the
situation, the guidelines announced that WEU members will ‘continue the
process of concertation’ through a series of meetings between representatives
of member countries (Press guidelines concerning the meeting on the situation
in the Gulf 1987 in de Guttry and Ronzitti 1993, p. 556). Although almost
imperceptibly different from previous communiqués, the 15 September press
guidelines marked the beginning of ‘Europe’s’ first military operation.
The WEU in the Gulf

By the middle of September 1987, five of the WEU’s seven members committed
naval forces to the Persian Gulf. Of the remaining two members, landlocked
Luxembourg contributed financially to the success of WEU operations in the
Gulf. West Germany, for its part, sent naval units to the Mediterranean and the
English Channel to compensate for WEU and NATO ships diverted to the Gulf
(Hippler 1988, pp. 1921).
The remaining five member states of the WEU collectively fielded a substantial
fleet in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Comprised of 33 ships, the
European military presence in the Gulf dwarfed its Soviet equivalent and fielded
a minesweeping capability the larger USA fleet desperately lacked. For full
details on the size individual European contingents, see Table 1. (Balancier 1992,
pp. 441453; Ballantyne 2004, pp. 6062; Johnstone 1988, pp. 3233).
Once deployed to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, WEU naval forces
were coordinated through a ‘three-tiered’ network of flexible relationships
(Dumoulin and Ramacle 1998, p. 142). In Europe, high-level diplomats from
WEU member states met to exchange information and discuss the evolving
situation in the Gulf. Below this level, the WEU regularly hosted collective
meetings involving naval officers from member states. Finally, in the Gulf itself,
Table 1. European naval forces in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, late-1987.
Aircraft Destroyer/
State carrier Frigate Minesweeper Logistics Total
France 1 5 3 2 11
UK 3 4 2 9
Italy 3 3 1 7
Netherlands 3 3
Belgium 2 1 3
Total 1 11 15 6 33
WEU navies exchanged intelligence data and consulted with one another, and
the USA, on a constant basis.
Overall, the WEU divided up minesweeping tasks without imposing a unified
chain-of-command. Geographically, the French and Italian navies accepted
responsibility for sweeping sectors in the Gulf of Oman, thereby keeping critical
ports such as Khor Fakkan, and Fujairah open (personal communication from
Admiral J. Lanxade, 24 March 2005). Elsewhere, the Dutch, Belgians, and
British operated together within the Persian Gulf. Here, military necessity
namely the fact that Belgium and the Netherlands did not possess anti-aircraft
frigates dictated tighter integration.
Although there was not a unified command, British destroyers and frigates
provided protection from Iranian aircraft or gunboats while Belgian, British,
and Dutch minesweepers labored to clear sea-lanes of naval mines. As time
went by, bilateral and multilateral meetings between member states clarified
operational relationships (Balancier 1992, p. 460).
Despite the evolving nature of command arrangements, the WEU’s actions
in operations in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman were both efficient and
successful. Critically, the WEU’s 15 minesweepers sustained freedom of
navigation in the two Gulfs and rescued the USA from the humiliating position
it found itself in following the Bridgeton incident of July 1987.
Concretely, WEU operations led to a decrease in ships hitting mines.
Whereas five tankers struck mines in May, June, and July 1987, only an
additional five ships collided with mines during the following 12 months.
This three-quarters drop in mine-related ship casualties is largely attributable
to WEU minesweepers. Although only fragmentary evidence exists on the
effectiveness of the WEU force, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, commander of
French naval forces in the Indian Ocean, estimated that French minesweepers
cleared more than 100 mines moored outside the port of Fujairah alone (PC
from Admiral J. Lanxade, 24 March 2005). Elsewhere, a single French
minesweeper destroyed 14 mines and identified another nine near Khor
Fakkan, while another French minesweeper detected two mines offshore of
the Rostam oil field (Balancier 1992, p. 462). By March 1988, the British
236 MR. DeVore
government acknowledged destroying at least 10 mines dotting shipping lanes

within the Persian Gulf (Ballantyne 2004, p. 62).
Taken as an ensemble, the European contributions to minesweeping in the
Gulf led certain experts to claim that WEU forces accounted for 60% of
Western efforts to keep the Persian Gulf open to merchant traffic (Ballantyne
2004, pp. 6466).

The Persian Gulf War, 1990 1991
A turning point
Barely had the IranIraq War ended that a new crisis erupted in the Persian
Gulf region, eliciting a second WEU intervention. This intervention showed
many similarities to, but also remarkable differences from its predecessor. As
during the IranIraq War, most European states felt the need for a multi-
national framework to coordinate their individual military contributions and
legitimate a military intervention in the eyes of domestic publics highly skeptical
of foreign military adventures. Also, the WEU continued to serve the function
of enabling European states to distinguish their actions from those of the USA.
However, since the IranIraq War, the perspectives of key member states
toward the WEU had changed. Whereas the French previously approached the
WEU with barely disguised trepidation, while the UK played a central role in
the military operation; now the French embraced the WEU as a means to
promote a European defense identity, while the British rejected it as a potential
obstacle to transatlantic cooperation.
The existence of a larger American/Saudi-led ad hoc coalition also forced
European states to choose which military coalition they would contribute
forces to. Ultimately, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands only contributed
combat forces to the WEU; France and Italy lent naval forces to the WEU, but
contributed air and land forces to the American/Saudi coalition; and the UK
devoted almost all of its forces to the American/Saudi coalition.
American policymakers, for their part, had mixed opinions of WEU
initiatives. President Bush’s closest advisors, Secretary of State James Baker
and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, considered the WEU to be a convenient
vehicle for mobilizing European support for American initiatives. At a lower
level, military commanders, including General Norman Schwarzkopf, resented
the WEU because it burdened them with an independent non-hierarchical
military command that had to coexist in the same theater as the American/Saudi-
run coalition.
Iraq invades Kuwait

Unlike the ‘tanker war’, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait produced immediate alarm
throughout Europe and much of the world. The United Nations condemned
Iraq’s actions almost immediately and the USA forthwith sent military forces
to Saudi Arabia. Four days later, on 6 August 1990, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 661 instituting an embargo on Iraq.
Pressure quickly mounted on European states to act. Prime Minister
Thatcher immediately declared the UK opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
and on 9 August her government announced the deployment of combat aircraft
to Saudi Arabia (Thatcher 1993, p. 822). On 8 August, Spain followed suite and
announced its intention to militarily contribute to finding a solution to the
crisis, but did not specify how.
France’s President Mitterrand was particularly sensitive to the need to
appear active. He observed that, ‘if France does not participate, she will be
morally, militarily and politically discredited in both the European and Euro-
Atlantic spheres at the moment when her credit and future role are at stake’
(Vedrine 1996, p. 527). Mitterrand also hoped that the end of bipolarity and the
drafting of the Maastricht Treaty would permit Europe to play a greater role in
global affairs than had been the case during the Cold War.
Motivated by twin desires to give France a visible role in the Gulf and
promote European integration, Mitterrand utilized France’s temporary pre-
sidency over the WEU to call a meeting of member states’ foreign and defense
ministers on 10 August (personal communication from Admiral J. Lanxade, 24
March 2005).
At this stage, the USA encouraged Mitterrand’s initiative. On 16 August,
USA Secretary of States James Baker publicly saluted Mitterrand’s initiative.
On 20 August, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney went further and addressed a
letter to the WEU identifying areas where contributions were particularly
welcome (Fawcett and O’Neill 1992, p. 163). After the USA’ experience during
the IranIraq War, American policymakers appear to have concluded that the
WEU was a useful vehicle for enlisting the support of smaller and less
interventionist European states.
Initiated by French diplomacy and supported by the USA, the inter-
ministerial meeting on 21 August disappointed its organizers. Although
European states rapidly agreed to coordinate their actions in the Middle East
along the same flexible lines as the intervention in 1987 and 1988, they
disagreed over the WEU’s ultimate status. Certain states, such as Belgium and
Germany, thought that the WEU should answer to the United Nations, while
others, including the UK, held that the WEU should subordinate itself to the
USA-dominated coalition. France, for its part, thought the WEU should
operate autonomously from both the United Nations and the USA (Dumoulin
and Remacle 1998, p. 231).
Six days after the inter-ministerial meeting, the Chiefs of Staff of WEU
armed forces again failed to agree on a centralized command structure
(Fawcett and O’Neill 1992, p. 164). Once again, conflict over the WEU’s role
prevented member states from agreeing to greater integration. As in 1987
1988, the burden of cooperating militarily fell in an ad hoc fashion on
238 MR. DeVore
the commanders of individual national contingents and accompanying

diplomats.
Enforcing the embargo

Despite disagreeing on the organization’s ultimate authority and mission in the
Middle East, the WEU’s presence encouraged European states to send forces to
the region. Although the UK and France would have acted without the WEU
(and did so before the WEU intervention), other states, such as Spain and
Belgium would not have sent forces unilaterally or joined the American/Saudi
coalition.
Belgium, for example, dispatched minesweepers and a support vessel to the
Mediterranean on 13 August, but predicted their passage through the Suez
Canal on a WEU mandate. With 54% of Belgians opposed to the use of force,
the Belgian government ruled out any participation in combat and specified
that its ships would limit their operations to cooperating with the WEU to
enact United Nations’ embargo on Iraq (van Beveren 1992, pp. 912).
In Spain, anti-Americanism, pacifism, and the presence of conscripts in the
Spanish armed forces made it difficult for Spain to integrate into the American/
Saudi coalition. Ultimately, between 52 and 62% of Spaniards approved of their
country’s policy of not joining the coalition. However, with 58% of Spaniards
favored of a common European defense organization, committing forces via the
WEU therefore became an attractive option (Zaldivar and Ortega 1992, pp.
129136).
Even states that were not members of the WEU found it expedient to join the
WEU force. For example, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey each sent a ship to
participate in the WEU naval force (Dumoulin and Remacle 1998, p. 231).
Ultimately, the contributions of WEU members and other states produced a
formidable armada. Although the number of ships available to the WEU varied
over time, the Table 2 presents WEU naval forces as they were in January 1991
(Bonnot 2001, pp. 6971).
As during the prior WEU intervention, Germany deployed ships to the
Mediterranean to take the place of WEU ships sent to the Middle East, while
Luxembourg subsidized its WEU partners’ operations. Of all WEU members,
Portugal alone failed to contribute anything to the WEU operation.
Although they sent a large number of ships to the Middle East, it was at first
unclear what roles WEU member states would play. To begin with, because the
WEU refused to subordinate itself to the American naval force in the Persian
Gulf yet had a mandate to perform the same mission of enforcing the United
Nations’ embargo on Iraq, the question arose as to how the WEU and the USA
would divide the task. The fact that WEU governments issued their respective
naval forces with different rules of engagement complicated the issue.
British vessels were encouraged to integrate themselves into American naval
battlegroups, which necessarily implicated them in fighting if Iraq attacked
Table 2. WEU naval forces in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, January 1991.
Destroyer/ Small
State Frigate warships Minesweeper Support Total
France 2 5 5 12
UK 2 2
Italy 3 2 5
Spain 1 2 3
Netherlands 2 1 3
Belgium 1 2 1 4
Non-members
Denmark 1 1
Greece 1 1
Turkey 1 1
Total 14 7 2 9 32
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Belgium did not even permit its ships to fire
warning shots at merchant ships evading the United Nations embargo.
The WEU’s solution for assigning roles to member states’ naval forces and
carving out a distinct WEU role in a region dominated by American forces
was a series of ad hoc meetings. To begin with, naval commanders and
diplomats representing WEU states met in the French Embassy in Bahrain on
3 September 1990 (personal communication from Admiral P. Bonnot,
4 December 2004).
Although British reticence and restrictive Belgian rules of engagement
prevented the representatives in Bahrain from agreeing to an integrated
command structure, they settled on a framework for assigning missions to
individual national contingents.
In effect, a WEU naval staff, presided over by Admiral Pierre Bonnot,
commanding officer of French forces in the Indian Ocean, proposed missions
to the commanders of national naval contingents. These officers could then
either accept or decline the proposed missions.
Besides establishing how WEU states coordinated their actions, the WEU
established two zones for member country ships to refuel each other afloat, one
in the Sea of Oman and one in the Red Sea. Termed ‘gas alleys,’ this refueling
arrangement permitted WEU forces to operate more effectively than otherwise
would have been the case and permitted warships to remain at sea for longer
periods of time. At the meeting at the French Embassy, it was also agreed that
the overall progress of the embargo would be reviewed in monthly meetings
involving the commanders of national contingents.
A meeting jointly chaired by the USA, the WEU, and Arab states followed
the WEU meeting on 4 September. At this meeting and another like it on
10 September, the USA, WEU, and other involved states hashed out their
respective zones of responsibility. Ultimately, the WEU undertook the
240 MR. DeVore
responsibility of patrolling certain zones of the Persian Gulf as well as enforcing

the United Nations embargo in the Red Sea.
France committed the bulk of its naval forces to the WEU mission, but
continuously assigned one frigate to the American-led naval force. The UK, for
its part, did nearly the opposite, detaching two vessels to the WEU while
assigning the rest the American force (PC from Admiral P. Bonnot, 4 December
2004). Other European states integrated their smaller naval forces into the
WEU force.
Once the WEU had settled how and where it would operate, it was able to
devote itself to its principle mission enforcing the United Nations embargo on
Iraq. Overall, WEU ships performed 30% of the military operations conducted
in support of the United Nations embargo, which entailed checking 35,000
ships and boarding 2000 (Bonnot 2001, p. 62). Although data is only available
for certain contingents, Belgian sailors checked 3000 ships and boarded 18,
the Spanish checked 3487 vessels, and France checked 8527 ships and boarded
988 (Zaldivar and Ortega 1992, p. 134; van Beveren 1992, p. 10; Bonnot 2001, p.
75). After Iraq’s defeat, the WEU gathered a force of minesweepers and cleared
the Persian Gulf of naval mines. Ultimately, WEU ships destroyed 898 out of
1240 mines in the Gulf (Bonnot 2001, p. 63).
Although the WEU accomplished its mission admirably by making
the United Nations embargo of Iraq effective and then clearing the Persian
Gulf of naval mines, the WEU’s Gulf War operations failed to elicit the same
attention as had their precursors during the IranIraq War. Even if the United
Nations embargo on Iraq was effective, it ultimately failed to convince Iraq to
evacuate Kuwait. Therefore, the political crisis that Saddam Hussein initiated
by invading Kuwait could only be resolved by a ground campaign, which
entailed American leadership. Once this had been accomplished, WEU
minesweeping was a necessary, but unglamorous task.
Nevertheless, by collaborating under the aegis of the WEU, European states
were able exert a greater influence on the Gulf War than would have been the
case had they contributed their oftentimes miniscule forces to the American
military coalition. Although Hussein ultimately rejected European offers of
mediation, the WEU presence in the Gulf arguably gave European states the
leverage necessary to make credible diplomatic overtures.
Conclusion
The WEU was one of the militarily most active organizations during the
years marking the end of the Cold War. Generally, the WEU’s roles during the
IranIraq War and the 1991 Gulf War have been little appreciated and
frequently forgotten in histories of the larger conflicts that formed their
context. Understandably, conducting such low key missions as sweeping mines,
escorting oil tankers and enforcing an embargo by hailing and occasionally
boarding merchant ships lacks the glamour of high intensity war. However, the
WEU played a critical role in containing the ‘tanker war’ between Iran and
Iraq and contributed to making the United Nations embargo effective during
the 19901991 Gulf Crisis, which in turn put pressure on Iraq to evacuate
Kuwait.
Moreover, both of these operations were conducted under complex
geopolitical circumstances and in an environment characterized by a high level
of military danger. During its contemporaneous interventions in the Persian
Gulf, the USA Navy suffered no less than four of its warships being crippled by
hostile action (one by an Iraqi missile [1987], one by an Iranian mine [1987],
and two by Iraqi mines [1991]). The willingness of WEU member states to
operate in this environment reflects their confidence in the ad hoc cooperative

arrangements that they had established and their recognition that more
institutionalized forms of organization were both militarily unnecessary and
politically deleterious.
Overall, incomplete though the WEU’s accomplishments in the Persian Gulf
may have been, they represent more than European states have accomplished
subsequently through other forums, including the more institutionalized ESDP.
Since 1998, Europe has indeed created more permanent, institutionalized
and, presumably, robust tools for conducting military interventions. These
include the 15 battlegroups of 1500 troops that have gradually taken shape
since 1999 (through the Helsinki Headline Goal to the Headline Goal 2010)
and the creation of three distinct operational planning centers (Hollworth 2007,
pp. 106112). Paradoxically, Europe’s creation of increasingly potent and well-
organized intervention capabilities has been accompanied by a perceptible
reluctance to employ them in trying circumstances.
Europe’s five collective military interventions since 2003 all involved the
deployment of less military force, undertaking less complicated missions and
opposed by opponents possessed of limited military capabilities. The two
interventions in the Balkans (Macedonia in 2003 and Bosnia beginning in 2004)
merely involved replacing NATO forces in upholding pre-existing peace agree-
ments. Of Europe’s three African missions, only two encountered any resistance
and both of these (the Congo in 2003 and Chad in 2008) involved confronting
armed factions lacking the military organization or training to provide real
opposition. Even in terms of aggregate size, only the EU’s placid Bosnia
deployment (7,000 troops) surpassed the WEU’s two complex interventions in
the Persian Gulf (involving between 4,800 and 5,500 personnel at any time).
That European states accomplished so much through the WEU, an
organization oftentimes considered so weak, yet accomplished so little once
it created the more institutionally robust structures of ESDP begs the question
whether debates on European security have been misguided. Contrary to
popular belief, European states were less willing to intervene under more
integrated and hierarchic are the institutions than they were under the WEU.
Military integration, whether on a supranational or inter-governmental level,
imposes constraints and limits states’ freedom of action.
242 MR. DeVore
Ultimately, what European states needed most in the two Gulf crises and
even today is a structure capable of limiting the political and diplomatic costs
of intervening abroad and not, as is often assumed, an organization designed to
maximize military efficiency. The WEU was admirably suited to the former
role. For one thing, its declared European character provided member states
with a cover of multi-lateral legitimacy, making it easier for them to deploy
forces abroad. Diplomatically, the WEU’s ill-defined mandate enabled every
state to find an interest in it. For the British, the WEU was a European pillar of
NATO; for the French, it was an embryonic European defense organization,
while for the Belgians and Spaniards it was the United Nations’ deputy.
Perhaps less is more when it comes to how clear and institutionalized European
defense should be.
Notes
1
Of these interventions, only the European interventions in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the
Congo involved forces conducting military missions during a period of hostilities. The OSCE
mission in Croatia had an observer role and the EU’s presence in Bosnia and Kosovo were
established after peace had been established by the United Nations and the NATO.
2
de Guttry, A. and Ronzitti, N., eds. 1987. Letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister
of Defence to the President of the Second Chamber of the States-General. Netherlands, 495.
Cambridge: Grotius; de Guttry, A. and Ronzitti, N., eds. 1987. Statement by the Minister for
Foreign Relations before the Joint Foreign Relations and National Defence Committee of the
Chamber of Representatives. Belgium, 506. Cambridge: Grotius; de Guttry, A. and Ronzitti, N.,
eds. 1987. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Chamber. Italy, 448452.
Cambridge: Grotius.
Notes on contributors
Marc DeVore is currently a lecturer/senior research fellow at the University of
St. Gallen’s Center for Security Economics and Technology (CSET). He
completed his Ph.D. in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) in February 2009. Dr DeVore has received prestigious
awards including Fulbright and Truman Scholarships, and fellowships from
MIT, Harvard (the Minda de Gunzburg Center), Colombia (the Center for
European Studies) and the French government. He is also a graduate of
France’s Institute for Higher National Defense Studies (IHEDN), which
grooms military commanders, civil servants, elected officials, industrialists
and academics to oversee French national security affairs.
References
Adelman, M., Gately, D., and Griffen, J., 1986. Lessons from the 1986 oil price collapse. Brookings
papers on economic activity, (2), 237284.
Ballancier, J-M, 1992. La diplomatie navale française en ocean indien, 19671992. unpublished
dissertation: Université Pierre Mendes-France.
Ballantyne, I., 2004. Strike from the Sea: The Royal Navy and US Navy at War in the Middle East,
19492003. Annapolis: Naval Institute.
Bonnot, P., 2001. La marine dans la guerre du golfe. In: M. Vaı̈sse, ed. La participation militaire
française à la guerre du golfe. Paris: CEHD, 5977.
de Guttry, A. and Ronzitti, N., eds., 1993. The IranIraq War (19801988) and the law of naval
warfare. Cambridge: Grotius.
Dumoulin, A. and Remacle, E., 1998. L’Union de l’Europe occidentale: phénix de la defense
européenne. Brussels: Bruylant.
El-Shazly, N., 1998. The gulf tanker war: Iran and Iraq’s maritime swordplay. London: MacMillan.
Hippler, J., 1988. NATO goes to the Persian Gulf. Middle East report, (155), 1821.
Hollworth, J., 2007. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Palgrave: New York.
Johnstone, D., 1988. Italy to the Gulf and back. Middle East report, (151), 3233.
Ortega, A. and Zaldivar, C., 1992. The Gulf Crisis and European cooperation on security issues:
Spanish reaction and the European framework. In: N. Gnesotto and J. Roper, eds. Western
Europe and the Gulf. Paris: The Institute of Security Studies, Western European Union.
Stein, J., 19881989. The wrong strategy in the right place: the United States in the Gulf.
International security, 13 (3), 142167.
Stork, J., 1987. Reagan re-flags the gulf. MERIP Middle East report, (148), 25.
Thatcher, M., 1993. The Downing Street years. London: HarperCollins.
van Beveren, R., 1992. Belgium and the Gulf crisis, August 1990March 1991. In: N. Gnesotto and
J. Roper, eds.Western Europe and the Gulf. Paris: The Institute of Security Studies, Western
European Union.
Védrine, H., 1996. Les mondes de François Mitterrand: à l’Elysée, 19811995. Paris: Fayard.
Vierucci, L., (1995) The role of the Western European Union (WEU) in the maintenance of
international peace and security. International peacekeeping, 2(3), 309329.

A Convenient Framework The Western European Union in The Persian Gulf, 1987-1988 and 1990-1991

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Convenient Framework The Western European Union in The Persian Gulf, 1987-1988 and 1990-1991

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]

On: 19 November 2014, At: 22:42

A convenient framework: the

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830903460087

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

A convenient framework: the Western

Marc Ronald DeVore*

(Received 17 October 2009; final version received 3 November 2009)

KEY WORDS: Western European Union; interventions; Persian Gulf; ESDP;

ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/09/02022717 # 2009 Taylor & Francis

future of European defense collaboration, it is worth examining what European

when it came to external interventions than several ostensibly more robust

confines of the WEU, an organization that was institutionally nearly the

over American President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the

The tanker war

The mine crisis

convened another meeting on the situation in the Persian Gulf on 14 September.

The WEU in the Gulf

government acknowledged destroying at least 10 mines dotting shipping lanes

Iraq invades Kuwait

the commanders of individual national contingents and accompanying

Enforcing the embargo

responsibility of patrolling certain zones of the Persian Gulf as well as enforcing

operate in this environment reflects their confidence in the ad hoc cooperative

You might also like