LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO 

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018

DOCTRINE: Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.

FACTS:

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 which states that a group of police
officers was patrolling the diversion road when two teenagers approached and informed them that a
woman with long hair and dragon tattoo. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes,
who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers.

After trial, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt ruling that the prosecution was
able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and thereupon, found to be in possession of .11 grams of
shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police officers upon her arrest. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC ruling that the chain of custody was sufficiently established. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 should be upheld.

RULING: NO.

To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),  Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a general rule – be complied
with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1
Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything
wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as
to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of
walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet of shabu to the police
officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she
"simply let her senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but later, in the same
Comment, the OSG argued that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police
officers" that they were not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These material inconsistencies clearly render
suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and likewise, destroy the credibility of the police
officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that
the police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be
searched and the consent thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in
this case.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
 MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG v. PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY

G.R. No. 233922, January 24, 2018

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending
in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if
not in one court, then in another.

FACTS:

Galang filed a complaint for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure
proceedings against Peakhold alleging that the former is the registered owner of the subject land and
the same was mortgaged to, foreclosed, and eventually acquired by the latter without the former’s
consent and knowledge. While the annulment case was pending, Peakhold filed an Ex-parte petition for
the issuance of writ of possession over the subject lot which was granted by the RTC. Initially, Galang
filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review before the CA. Further, Galang filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment contending that the Ex-parte petition is not summary in nature  and
should have been threshed out in an adversarial proceeding, as it essentially deals with the validity of
the subject deed. After filing the said petition Galang manifested that he is withdrawing the filing of the
intended petition for review before the CA.

Peakhold sought the dismissal of the petition for relief on the ground of forum shopping.
holding that Galang deliberately failed to mention in her Petition for Relief from Judgment that she
likewise filed a petition for review before the CA, which had not been effectively withdrawn at the time
the Petition for Relief Case was filed. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but was later reversed it on
reconsideration and found Galang guilty of forum shopping. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Galang committed forum shopping when she failed
to declare the pending Certiorari Case and Criminal Complaint in her Amended Complaint in
the Annulment Case.

RULING: YES.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending
in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if
not in one court, then in another. It can be committed in three (3) ways: (1) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where
the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Thus, to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential to ask
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another or whether the following
elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

A judicious perusal of the records reveals that there is no identity of causes of actions and reliefs
prayed for among the said cases. As already adverted to, the Annulment Case seeks to nullify the
mortgage document executed in Peakhold's favor, as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings,
given that the alleged real estate mortgage covering the subject lot was void for having been executed
without Galang's knowledge and consent. In the Petition for Relief Case, Galang sought to set aside
the ex parte writ of possession, contending that the same should have been threshed out in an
adversarial proceeding, since it involves a fictitious deed of real estate mortgage, where the mortgagor
therein is supposedly an impostor of Galang; while the Certiorari Case sought to revive the Petition for
Relief Case which was dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. Finally, the Criminal
Complaint involves the determination of whether or not there is probable cause to indict the President
of Peakhold and Donasco for Qualified Theft.

Similarly, the issues raised and determined in these cases likewise differ. In the Annulment
Case, the issue is whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage is void, thereby entitling Galang to
the recovery of the subject lot. In the Petition for Relief Case, the issue is whether or not extrinsic fraud
was actually employed by Peakhold during the Ex-Parte Petition proceedings. In the Certiorari Case, the
issue is whether or not the RTC-Br. 122 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
dismissal of Galang's Petition for Relief. Lastly, in the Criminal Complaint, the issue is whether or not
there is probable cause to believe that the President of Peakhold and Donasco committed the crime of
Qualified Theft and should stand trial therefor.

Given the above, the Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended Complaint in
the Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding which involves the same
causes of actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or agency at the time she filed the said
Amended Complaint, or anytime thereafter. In this light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases
essentially involve different causes of actions, reliefs, and issues. Thus, any judgment rendered in one
will not necessarily amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This holds true even if the
complaint in the Annulment Case was subsequently amended by Galang. Moreover, the cases also differ
in their form and nature, for while a ruling in the Annulment Case may result in the recovery of
ownership and possession of the subject lot, a favorable ruling in the other cases will not have the same
effect, considering that: (a)the granting of the Certiorari Case will lead to the granting of the Petition for
Relief Case; (b) a favorable result in the Petition for Relief Case would end up in the conduct of
adversarial proceedings before a writ of possession concerning the subject lot may be issued; and (c) the
resolution of the Criminal Complaint is only determinative of whether or not the President of Peakhold
and/or Donasco should be indicted of the crime of Qualified Theft and stand trial therefor.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO

G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to
hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into
thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be
given credence for it has no probative value.

FACTS:

Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 alleging that when she and her
co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a
discrepancy in the land area. There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the
presentation of respondent's evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of
the jurisdictional requirements. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC order finding that respondent, by
preponderance of evidence, was able to prove the true and correct area of the subject property.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in
OCT No. 46417.

RULING: YES

A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the court a quo shows
that the former failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of the
subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters.

Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the correction prayed
for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who
issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness and attorney-in-
fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not
prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies.
Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection
to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it should be borne in
mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent
can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule," which do not,
however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's documentary evidence may have been admitted
due to the opposing party's lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded
any probative weight. The Court has explained that:
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay
testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that
such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value.
 BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAGSANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF
LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, and HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG,
vs. ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ,
JR., and MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017

DOCTRINE: Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs
without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
petitioners before the RTC alleging that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest sold to them separately
various portions of a 159,496-square meter parcel of land situated at Baguio City and that they
registered the corresponding Deed of Sale with the RD of Baguio. For their part, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction averring that the subject lands are untitled,
unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands of
the public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land Management
Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues of
ownership over unregistered public lands. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal the CA
reversed the RTC’s decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for trial. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration which was still denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No.

In a catena of cases, and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271, it was
expressly declared that all orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Town site Reservation are null and void and without force
and effect. While PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership over lands forming part of the
Baguio Town site Reservation, it requires, among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued on such
lands on or before July 31, 1973. In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and
untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the
award of lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as
Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 - which includes the subject lands - to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is covered by the blanket nullification
provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing, it
is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the public
domain as well.

Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners
correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership. 30 Thus,
the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents'
action for quieting oftitle. In Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly
dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine
who among the parties have better right over the disputed property, which is admittedly still part of
public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, viz.:

The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under the
Land Registration Act. The Office of the President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in
accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite
Reservations and other applicable rules.

Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore
correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is
admittedly still part of the public domain.
CITY OF DAVAO, REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR, RIZALINA
JUSTOL, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY ACCOUNTANT, AND ATTY. WINDEL E. AVISADO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CITY ADMINISTRATOR v. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN

G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017

DOCTRINE:  The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in
extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.

Facts:

On July 15, 2002, respondent was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. On
July 25 an election protest was filed by the opposing candidate Celso Tizon which was dismissed by the
MTCC but was later granted by the COMELEC on appeal. Hence, Tizon was declared the duly-elected
Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC but to no avail. Thus, he
filed a petition for mandamus which was given due course by the court and accordingly issued a Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), and immediately implemented by the DILG. Respondent was reinstated in the
office.

On March 31, 2005, the Court en banc dismissed respondents petition and recalled its SQAO. The RTC
dismissed respondent's mandamus petition on the sole ground that there was still an adequate remedy
still available to respondent in the ordinary course of law. The CA nullified and set aside the RTC's
Orders, holding that the latter court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
respondent's mandamus petition on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In so
ruling, the CA observed that an exception to the said doctrine was present in that
the mandamus petition only raised pure legal questions; hence, the same should not have been
dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of respondent's mandamus petition.

RULING: YES

"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special People, Inc. Foundation v.
Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is
issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be
compelled.

In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To
recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city
government, release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the
compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue to Brgy. 76-A,
including legal interests until full payment. As it appears, respondent anchors his legal interest to claim
such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. In this regard, Section 332 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," provides
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 332. Effectivity of Barangay Budgets. - The ordinance enacting the annual budget shall take
effect at the beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An ordinance enacting a supplemental budget,
however, shall take effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein.

The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets and the accountability
therefor shall be vested primarily in the punong barangay concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by
the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-
elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. While the Court en banc indeed issued an SQAO on November
9, 2004 which temporarily reinstated respondent to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March
31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered dismissing respondent's petition in G.R. No. 165491. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the status quo ante order issued by this Court on
November 9, 2004 is hereby RECALLED.

While respondent did file a motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 2005 Decision, the Court's recall
of the SQAO was without any qualification; hence, its effect was immediate and non-contingent on any
other occurrence. As such, respondent cannot successfully argue that the SQAO's recall was suspended
during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration.

In fact, as petitioners correctly argue, the Court's SQAO is akin to preliminary injunctions and/or TROs.
As per the November 9, 2004 Resolution issuing the SQAO, the parties were required "to observe the
STATUS QUO prevailing before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the Commission on
Elections." Therefore, as they carry the same import and effect, the recall of the SQAO subject of this
case should be accorded the same treatment as that of the recall of said provisional reliefs.

The recall of the SQAO is effectively a dissolution of the said issuance. In Defensor-Santiago v.
Vasquez, the Court discussed the immediately executory nature of orders dissolving preliminary
injunctions and/or TROs:

[A]n order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A
dismissal, discontinuance, or non suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction
has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no
formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the
court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a new exercise of judicial
power.

Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed
his mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no
valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. In fact, it should be pointed out that respondent's motion
for reconsideration before the Court was altogether denied with finality even prior to his filing of
the mandamus petition, i.e., on June 28, 2005. This means that, for all legal intents and purposes,
respondent could not have even relied on the supposed effectivity of the SQAO during the pendency of
his motion for reconsideration, because at the time he filed his mandamus petition, the Court's March
31, 2005 Decision against him had already attained finality. Therefore, stripped of the technical niceties,
the Court finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be
compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.

In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by
respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[m]andamus only lies to
enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a
discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting
officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and
not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others."

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to
respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of
Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds
would not be released to a person without proper authority. Section 305 (1) of RA 7160 provides that:

Section 305. Fundamental Principles. - The financial affairs, transactions, and operations of local
government units shall be governed by the following fundamental principles:

xxxx

(1) Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs,
transactions, and operations of the local government units;
Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer, at the option of the
barangay, and any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or
custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in
conformity with the provisions of the law.

Moreover, "[t]he city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise
general supervision over component barangays to ensure that the said barangays act within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions." Hence, given the COMELEC's ruling revoking respondent's
election and proclamation as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A, which in fact, was later on validated by no
less than the Court, petitioner could not have been faulted for not automatically releasing the funds
sought for by respondent in his mandamus petition.
 KEVIN BELMONTE Y GOROMEO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017

DOCTRINE: It is important to note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance
from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, 78 as
well as jurisprudence nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will
not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and
should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

FACTS:

An information was filed against petitioner, Gumba and Costales for violation of Sec 5 Article II of RA
9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 9am of November 23, 2010 PDEA received an information
that a certain “Macmac” later identified as Gumba was selling marijuana. A buy-bust operation was
conducted and all three were arrested. For their defense, they denied the charges against them
advancing the defense of alibi.

The RTC ruled that they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales
elevated their conviction to the CA, arguing that the chain of custody of the seized items was not
established because the markings and inventory were done in San Gabriel, La Union, while the signing of
the Certificate of Inventory by the representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media
took place in Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that the
subsequent signing of the Certificate of Inventory undertaken after the arrest of the accused at a
different place is not fatal to the case since the prosecution was able to show the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibits between the time it came into their possession and until it was tested in the
PDEA laboratory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Belmonte's conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

RULING: Yes.

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for
each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

It is important to note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the
aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as
jurisprudence nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and
should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the marijuana confiscated from the accused were preserved, and any deviation
from the chain of custody procedure was adequately justified.

Records bear that the bricks and bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused were immediately
marked, photographed, and inventoried upon the arrest of Belmonte and Gumba, and that the markings
were done by Ominga herself who placed her initials, signature, and the date of confiscation thereat in
the presence of Belmonte, Gumba, the back-up officers from the PDEA and the PNP, and the Barangay
Captain of Poblacion, San Gabriel. After the inventory and photography at the arrest site, Ominga and
her team returned to the PDEA office where Ominga personally prepared the crime laboratory
examination request which she delivered to the PDEA chemist, Valdez, together with the bricks and
bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused.

Ominga's testimony on this point was corroborated by Valdez who testified that at around 5 o'clock in
the afternoon of November 23, 2010, Ominga delivered four (4) bricks of suspected marijuana leaves
and a bundle of marijuana fruiting tops for examination. Valdez also gave a clear account of the
procedure for testing the specimen submitted to her such as, weighing and marking them, taking
representative samples therefrom, and performing the screening and confirmatory tests
thereon. Ominga and Cañero also identified in open court the bricks and bundle of marijuana
confiscated from the accused, which matched Valdez's testimony.

By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous chain of custody which
preserved the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated from the accused,
notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ at the time of the
arrest and the taking of inventory. Notably, the absence of media representatives at the time Ominga
prepared the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she
testified that when contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the area
and would not be able to arrive on time. As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio
Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office
for him to go to the PDEA office to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the crime. While
this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is
not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v.
Rebotazo, the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or
confiscated inadmissible.

The Court also observes that while the inventory was not signed by the accused and that they did not
have copies of it, such omission was sufficiently explained by the prosecution witnesses who testified
that Belmonte and Gumba were given copies thereof but they refused to sign it. The accused also had
no relatives or lawyers at the time the arrest and confiscation were effected. As such, their copy of the
inventory was given to Barangay Captain Caoeng as their representative.
 DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA

G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017

DOCTRINE: When there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had -
as in this case - the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice.

FACTS:

Cariaga filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) accusing
respondents of the crimes of  Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed,
defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code alleging that
respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur,
Asingan, Pangasinan. In their defense, Sapigao denied the accusations against him while Acosta averred
that she was merely performing her duties as Barangay Secretary. The OPP dismissed the complaint for
lack of probable cause. The ORSP affirmed the OPP ruling prompting Cariaga to file a petition for review
before the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition.It held that the ORSP is not the final authority in
the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service, as one could still appeal an unfavorable ORSP ruling to
the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As such, Cariaga's direct and immediate recourse to the CA to assail the
ORSP ruling without first filing a petition for review before the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on the ground
of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies.

RULING: YES.

To recapitulate, Cariaga's petition for review before the CA was dismissed on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies as he did not elevate the adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before
availing of judicial remedies.

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides
that resolutions of, inter alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall
be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ. However, this procedure was
immediately amended by the DOJ's Department Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000, entitled
"Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases," pertinent
portions of which read:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases
In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City
Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State
Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with the pertinent
rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.

The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his
power of supervision and control over the entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest of
justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned above, Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule
with finality cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that:
(a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the
courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only violations of city or municipal ordinances,
but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto.  This
is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling should the former deem
it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further strengthened by a
later issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-14 dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of
Authority on Appealed Cases," pertinent portions of which read:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14

SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases

In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws with the objective of
institutionalizing the Department's Zero Backlog Program on appealed cases, the following guidelines
shall be observed and implemented in the resolution of appealed cases on Petition for Review and
Motions for Reconsideration:

1. Consistent with Department Circular No. 70-A, all appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City
Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital Region, in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, shall be by way of a petition for
review to the concerned province or city. The Regional Prosecutor shall resolve the petition for review
with finality, in accordance with the rules prescribed in pertinent rules and circulars of this Department.
Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the power of control and supervision
over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the resolutions of the Regional
Prosecutor in these appealed cases.

2. Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital
Region, in all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of Secretary of Justice.
3. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in cases cognizable by
Metropolitan Trial Courts shall be by way of a petition for review to the Prosecutor General who shall
decide the same with finality. Provided, however that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the
power of control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or
reverse, the resolutions of the Prosecutor General in these appealed cases.

4. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in all other cases shall
be by way of a petition for review to the Office of the Secretary.

xxxx

This Circular supersedes all inconsistent issuances, takes effect on 01 July 2014 and shall remain in force
until further orders.

For guidance and compliance.

A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with regard
to complaints subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the
complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original jurisdiction
over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as
follows:

(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of
the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with
finality;

(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with
finality;

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of
the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling
shall be with finality;

(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with
finality;

(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c ), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control and
supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the
ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.

In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR)
accusing respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification,
and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the RPC. Of the crimes
charged, only False Certification and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, while
Falsification of Public Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.  Applying the prevailing rule
on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as regards Falsification of Public Documents
may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to the courts may be availed of. On the other hand, the
ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and Slander by Deed should already be deemed final -
at least insofar as the NPS is concerned - and thus, may already be elevated to the courts.

Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of
Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False
Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have
resolved Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed
are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the
CA for resolution on the merits. "However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper
evaluation of the merits may be had - as in this case - the Court may dispense with the time-consuming
procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve
the ends of justice." In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on
the merits - the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
 ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR vs. ROSARIO L.
MANZANO

G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017

DOCTRINE: The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused,
or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

FACTS:

In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's administratrix, Elsa A.
Poblador , to negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, including the shares of stack in Wack-
Wack Golf and Country Club Inc. Upon Elsa’s instruction, Rafael looked for interested buyers and
engaged the services of respondent. Respondent later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. and in
September 1996 the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the the Wack-Wack share.
for the gross amount of P18M. Out of the P18M purchase price, Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount
of P15.2M through a Metrobank check. The balance of P2.8M was allegedly given to Manzano for the
payment of the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other pertinent fees, as well as for her
service fee.

However, in October 1996 the Probate Court annulled the sale. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland
the amount of P18M plus interest and likewise asked respondent to return the broker’s service fee but
to no avail which prompts petitioner to file an Information for the crime of Estafa against respondent.

In the course of proceeding respondents Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence praying for the
dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution to establish the essential elements of Estafa which
was granted by the RTC finding the element of deceit lacking. The Ca affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring that the prosecution did not only fail to prove all the elements of Estafa through
misappropriation,  it also failed to prove the alleged civil liability of Manzano in the amount of P2.8M.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto of
Manzano.

RULING: No.

It is a fundamental rule that "[t]he acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."

In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People,43 the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex
delicto in Esta/a cases under paragraph 1 (b ), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise
charged), stating that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be
no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist.

The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from
the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the
contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime.
Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the
criminal case." In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the R TC and the CA that the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in, and
penalized under, paragraph 1 (b ), [Article 315] of the [RPC]. As the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the
representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the entire arrangement,
including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself admitted that it received the
full amount of ₱15,200,000.00 - the full amount to which it was entitled to under the terms of the sale
of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not claim that it was deceived. Thus,
absent the element of fraud, there could be no misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would
justify the charge of Esta/a and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto.
 EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and EDMER Y. LIM vs THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
SURIGAO DEL SUR, represented by GOVERNOR VICENTE T. PIMENTEL, JR.

G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017

DOCTRINE: If a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and
consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent
before the RTC alleging that they entered into 3 separate construction agreements for the construction
of the Leaming Resource Center of Tandag, Tandag Bus/Jeepney Terminal, and Tandag Public
Market. Petitioners claimed that despite their completion and respondent's consequent acceptance of
the works the latter had yet to pay them the aggregate amount of P8,870,729.67, despite numerous oral
and written demands. In its Answer with Counterclaim , respondent admitted the existence of the
aforesaid construction contracts. However, it nevertheless maintained, inter alia, that: (a) there is no
unpaid balance; (b) petitioners are in fact liable for underruns and defective works; (c) petitioners had
already waived or abandoned their right to collect any amount on the ground of prescription; and
(d) petitioners are guilty of nonobservance of the specifications indicated in the construction contracts. 

More than a year after the filing of its Answer, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss  dated May
24, 2010 on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. It argued that under Paragraph 4.3, Article
IV of the construction agreements, final payment to petitioners shall be made only after the submission
of a sworn statement attesting to the fact that all of the latter's obligations for labor and materials under
the contracts have been fully paid. In this regard, respondent contended that since petitioners have yet
to submit such sworn statement, then the latter do not have a cause of action against it.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and accordingly, ordered respondent to pay them. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently,
dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.

RULING: No.

At the outset, the Court notes that the CA's dismissal of petitioners' complaint is heavily-
grounded on the latter's alleged non-submission of the sworn statement required in Paragraph 4.3,
Article IV of the construction agreements.

Such reliance is misplaced.

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

It may be gleaned from the said provision that except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses
must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof.
Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived,
and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.

In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with
Counterclaim dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-execution
of the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact,
such matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer, or on
May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of
action. However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it can no longer
be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides
that motions to dismiss should be filed "[w]ithin the time for but before the filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim." More importantly, such matter/ defense raised in the motion
does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such,
respondent was already precluded from raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted
in: (a) issuing an Order dated August 11, 2010 denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a
discussion of said issue/defense in its Decision dated December 28, 2010 and Order dated September
16, 2011.

In light of the foregoing, the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on a ground belatedly and
improperly raised by respondent.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court is constrained to overturn said dismissal and
in turn, uphold the RTC's finding of liability on the part of respondents, especially considering that it
issued Certificates of Final Acceptance essentially stating that the projects were satisfactorily completed,
free from major defects, and that it was formally accepting the same. As a result, respondent is hereby
adjudged to be liable to petitioners in the amount of ₱4,326,174.50, which is the valuation of such
liability according to the Presidential Flagship Committee's valuation accepted by petitioners.