Acap v. CA (1995) Ponente: Padilla Facts: Lot No.

. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental with an area of 13,720 sqm was issued and registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. Spouses died, son Felixberto inherited the lot. Felixberto executed Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the land covering 9500 sqm. When ownership was transferred to Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant. Pido died intestate. His surviving heirs executed a Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre o Laurenciana, Ely, Elmer, Ervin and Elechor Pido do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy De Los Reyes, married to Virginia and resident of Hinigaran. Document was signed by Pidos heirs but Edy de los Reyes did not. At the time of Pidos death, title of the property was still in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Edy de los Reyes filed a notice of an advers claim against the original certificate of title. Delos Reyes informed ACap that he was the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals should be paid to him. Delos Reyes also alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay/yr as lease rental. Acap refused to pay further lease rentals on the land because he did not recognize delos Reyes ownership over the land but recognized Pido as the owner and when Pido died, he continued to pay rentals to Pidos widow. After 4 years, delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Acap alleging that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to pay the annual rental of 10 cavans of palay. Lower court: in favor of delos Reyes. CA affirmed. WON the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by delos Reyes over the lot in question? No WON said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of delos Reyes? No An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. The right or title must be completed by certain conditions imposed by law. Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. Art. 712 CC: modes of acquiring ownership:

Issues: 1. 2. Ratio:

Original mode- through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation 2. Derivative mode- through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts (sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum) Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights Contract of Sale o Contract of Sale- a party obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent o Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights- a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is an extrajudicial settlement between heirs. o Sale of hereditary rights- presumes existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties o Waiver of hereditary rights- mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession Delos Reyes, being a stranger to the succession of Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights was excluded by the trial court because it was neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Pido. A notice of adverse claim does not prove delos Reyes ownership over the lot. It is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, validity of which is yet to be established, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court. No evidence that a deed of sale was executed between Pidos heirs and delos Reyes. Delos Reyes interest over the lot remains an adverse claim which is not sufficient to cancel the OCT. No unjustified or deliberate refusal by Acap to pay the lease rentals.

1.

Equatorial v. Mayfair (2001) Ponente: Panganiban Facts: Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a parcel of land with 2 2-storey buildings thereon at CM Recto. June 1, 1967: Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. for a period of 20 years covering a portion of 2F and mezzanine of a 2storey bldg which will be used for a movie house Maxim Theatre March 31, 1969: a 2nd contract of Lease for another portion of Carmelos property for a period of 20 years which will be used for Miramar Theater. Bothe leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the properties. July 30, 1978 (within the 20-yr lease term): subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Devt., Inc. for P11.3M, without first being offered to Mayfair. Mayfair filed a complaint before RTC Manila for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial and for specific performance and damages. RTC decided in favor of Carmelo and Equatorial CA reversed Deed of Absolute Sale was rescinded. Carmelo was ordered to allow Mayfair Theater, Inc. to buy the lots for P11.3M However, Carmelo could no longer be located. Mayfair deposited with the clerk of court its payment to Carmelo in the sum of P11.3M less withholding tax. lower court issued a Deed of Reconveyance in favor of Carmelo and a Deed of sale in favor of Mayfair CA cancelled the deduction of withholding tax Equatorial filed with RTC an action against Mayfair claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for the its use of the subject premises after the lease contracts had expired. o RTC dismissed the complaint because the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale = void in its inception = Equatorial is not the owner and does not have any right to demand back rentals Issue: WON Equatorial is entitled to back rentals Held: No Ratio No right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer Rental- a Civil Fruit of Ownership o Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. Rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to Equatorial until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period. o Ownership of the thing sold is a real right which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him in any of the ways specified in Arts. 1497-1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

There is delivery when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. Delivery is a composite act, a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act by which one party parts with the title to and possession of the property, and the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same= transfer of possession= absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the vendee Equatorial never took actual control and possession of the property sold in view of Mayfairs objection to the sale and continued actual possession of the property. Execution of a contract of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal fiction. It holds true only when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor to the vendee. When there is impediment, fiction yields to reality=delivery has not been effected. Mayfairs opposition to the transfer of the property to Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment. The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies that delivery was not intended or when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected because a third person was actually in possession of the thing= sale not consummated Art. 1385 CC: rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest. Not only the land and building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if any, had to be returned by the buyer. That Equatorial has received rents from Mayfair during litigation does not constitute actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorials title. Equatorial filed 2 ejectment suits against Mayfair. Mayfair won them both. However, to be able to maintain physical possession of the premises while awaiting the outcome of the mother case, it had no choice but to pay the rentals. Payment of rentals was made merely to avoid imminent eviction. Sale to Equatorial may have been valid from inception, but it was judicially rescinded before it could be consummated. Equatorial never acquired ownership not because the sale was void but because the sale was not consummated by a legally effective delivery of the property sold. Assuming there was a valid delivery, Equatorial is not entitled to any benefits from the rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale because of its bad faith. It was aware of the lease contracts because its lawyers had o

studied the contracts. As such, it cannot tenable claim to be a purchaser in good faith and therefore, rescission lies. Court denied the payment of interest, a fruit of ownership. Rentals, another fruit of ownership cannot be granted as the decision in the mother case has long become final. If Equatorial suffered any loss, it must bear it in silence since it had wrought that loss upon itself. Otherwise, bad faith would be rewarded instead of punished. Cutanda v. Cutanda

The trial court:declared petitioners to have acquired the ownership of the subject properties through prescription and dismissing private respondents' complaint. It held thatdefendants have long been in possession and cultivation of the land as owners whose possession if tacked with AnastacioCutanda since 1933 up to the present has been for more than 54 year and, even assuming the respondents have the right over the land in question, the fact that they have slept [on] their right since 1933 up to 1987 by failing to institute an action to recover its ownership and possession, plaintiffs are clearly guilty of laches; CA: affirmed the dismissal of the case against petitioners but held that there was no sufficient evidence that the petitioners were the owner of the properties. Issue: whether petitioners presented sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of the lands in question? Held: The petition is meritorious. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and another one is rendered declaring petitioners to be true and lawful owners of that parcel of land Issue of Prescription or Laches: While both the Court of Appeals and the trial court held that private respondents action for recovery of possession (accionpubliciana) was already barred, it appears that they relied upon different grounds. For the trial court, the ground was extinctive prescription. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held private respondents action to be barred by laches,: SC: insofar as petitioners are concerned, private respondents cause of action was barred, not by laches, but by extinctive prescription, regardless of whether their complaint is considered as an accionpublicianaor an accionreivindicatoria Court distinguished prescription from laches as follows: - While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not. - Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that by prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time, in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription. There are thus two kinds of prescription: (1) the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time, or acquisitive prescription; and (2) the loss of a right of action by the lapse of time, or extinctive prescription.

Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels of land in Bohol. One had an area of 31.0929 hectares and while the other was 7.0925 hectares Upon Roberto Cutandas death, these lands were inherited by his children, namely: Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia, all surnamed Cutanda. Except for Doque who stayed in Bohol and administered the lands, all of Roberto Cutandas children established residence in Leyte. DoqueCutanda had several children, namely, Anastacio, Saturnino, Esperidion, Pedro, Honorio, German, Fortunata, Eustaquia, and Ponciana; He declared under Tax Declaration No. 6983in the name of his eldest child, Anastacio, the parcel of land that Doque inherited from his father. Anastacio, who had no children, remained in possession of said land from 1933 until 1968 when he executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate which adjudicated and partitioned said parcel of land among his brothers and sisters; after 1968, Anastacios brothers and sisters worked on the land, as shown by several tax declarationsand subsequently, their children and successors, herein petitioners, remained in actual and peaceful possession of said land until 1988 when private respondents filed their action to recover possession of the land In 1987, Private Respondents returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands. Their plan, however, was frustrated as petitioners, who were occupying the lands, refused to leave. Private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession, accounting and damages against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. They prayed that each be declared owner of 1/5 of the subject real properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them said properties. Petitioners denied that private respondents predecessor-in-interest, Roberto Cutanda, was the original owner of the lands in question. Instead, they claimed that the owner was their uncle and predecessor-in-interest, AnastacioCutanda. Claiming a better right to possess the subject properties, petitioners alleged that while they occupied the shares which their parents inherited from AnastacioCutanda, some of them also worked as tenants cultivating the lands of their copetitioners

In the case at bar: Private respondents action was an accionpublicianato recover the right of possession and to be declared owners of the subject lands. Their complaint squarely put in issue the ownership of the lands in dispute. It may thus be properly treated as an accionreivindicatoria. however, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, AnastacioCutanda, acquired possession of said lands in 1933. On the other hand, private respondents did not assert ownership over the lands until 1988 55 years later, when they filed their present complaint for recovery of possession. It is settled that the remedies of accionpubliciana or accionreivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. Under Art. 555(4) of the Civil Code, the real right of possession is lost after the lapse of 10 years. Issue of sufficiency of evidence: Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts ruling that petitioners had acquired the lands by prescription on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that petitioners had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the lands. SC:The foregoing sufficiently establish that AnastacioCutanda was in possession of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6983, which has an area of 31.0929 hectares, from 1933 up to 1968, or a period of 35 years. Such possession appears to be adverse, continuous and in the concept of an owner because AnastacioCutanda cultivated the land, thereby, performing an act of ownership over it. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten years of actual adverse possession was required, regardless of how such occupancy may have commenced or continued, before possession ripened into full and complete title over the land. Applying this to the present case, by 1943, ten years after his possession of the subject parcel of land had begun, AnastacioCutanda became owner of the land in question through acquisitive prescription. Basis of Ownership of Petitioners The Court of Appeals limited its review of the evidence to the issue of acquisitive prescription. SC:Petitioners, however, submitted evidence to prove that they were heirs of AnastacioCutandas brothers and sisters, even as some of them were also working as tenants for their co-petitioners. Particularly compelling is the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Real Estate executed by AnastacioCutanda. As AnastacioCutanda had acquired ownership of said parcel of land through the lapse of the period required by law, he could validly adjudicate and partition it among his brothers and sisters who were his only heirs. Petitioners, in turn, as children of Anastacios brothers and sisters, acquired ownership of the subject land not through prescription but through hereditary succession.

But while there is sufficient evidence of ownership with respect to that parcel with an area of 31.0929 hectares covered by Tax Declaration No. 6983, we find no similar evidence to support the finding of the trial court that AnastacioCutanda was also the owner of the other parcel of land consisting of seven hectares. Petitioner Florencio Cutanda himself admitted that he and the other petitioners were only claiming the 31-hectare land.

Seraspi v. CA (2000) Ponente: Mendoza Facts: Marcelino Recasa was the owner of 2 parcels of land. He contracted 3 marriages. At the time of his death, he had 15 children. His intestate estate was partitioned into 3 parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage. Patronicio, representing the heirs of 1st marriage, sold the share of the heirs to Dominador, an heir of the 2nd marriage. Dominador, representing the heirs of 2nd marriage, sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the petitioners. (included was the property sold by Patronico to Dominador) Seraspis loaned from Kalibo Rural Bank on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. They failed to pay the loan so the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to Kalibo Rural Bank. The bank sold the lands to Manuel Rata, Quirico Seraspis brother-in-law. Rata allowed Quirico to administer the property. Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his 3rd wife, forcibly entered the lands and took possession thereof while Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke. The Seraspis purchased the lands from Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands. RTC: in favor of Seraspis on the reason that they acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. CA reversed. Action was barred by the statute of limitations. WON Seraspis action is barred by extinctive prescription? No WON Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties through acquisitive prescription? No Art. 1141, CC: Real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Art. 1117, CC: Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription

Issues: 1. 2. Ratio:

requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Art. 1134, CC: Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription throught possession of 10 years. Art. 1137, CC: Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for 30 years, without need of title or of good faith. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Recasa did not acquire ownership by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for 10 years because he has neither just title nor good faith. Art. 1129, CC: For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Recasa did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by the CC: occupation; intellectual creation; law; donation; succession; tradition on consequence of certain contracts; prescription. o Not acquired through occupationownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714) o Not succession- property belongs to the 1st and 2nd marriages o No good faith- entered the property without consent of previous owner. He is a mere usurper. Seraspis also have not acquired the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. o The contract of sale they had with Rata is insufficient to make them owners of the property. The ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property. Non nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of things) o At the time they bought the property from Rata, it was in the possession of Recasa. Seraspis title to the property prevails over Recasas possession in fact but without basis in law. When the property belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action against wrongdoer.

Pajunar v. CA (1989) Ponente: Paras Facts: Mauro Eluna bartered his 3-yr old male cow for 1-yr old female carabao then in the possession of Aurelio Enopia. The female carabao bore the brand ART in her front and hind legs at the time she was acquired by Mauro. Although the animal was branded, Enopia did not/could not register the transfer to him. Pajunar learned that the disputed carabao was in the possession of Eluna. Claiming to be the original owner of the carabaoa, he demanded her return and the delivery of the 2 offsprings which were 5 yrs and 8 ms old at the time they were registered in 1980. Eluna refused. CA: since Eluna had possessed the carabao since 1969 (for more than 10 yrs), he acquired ownership by prescription under Art. 1132 CC. Issue: WON Eluna acquired ownership of the carabao by prescription under Art. 1132 CC? Ratio: Although the animal was branded ART in her front and hind legs at the time she was acquired by Eluna, he did not or could not register the transfer to him in accordance with Sec. 529, Revised Admin Code (Registration necessary to validity of transfer. No transfer shall be valid unless the same is registered and a certificate of transfer obtained as herein provided, but the large cattle under 2 yrs of age may be registered and branded gratis for the purpose of effecting a valid transfer if the registration and transfer are made at the same time.) Eluna did not comply with this requirement. They are not possessors in good faith. Eluna did not make a closer inquiry into the certificate of registration of the female carabao which was the subject of the barter. Possession in good faith for 4 years is not applicable, neither can possession in bad faith of 8 yrs benefit Eluna, for when the owner of a movable has lost or has been illegally deprived of his property he can recover the same without need to reimburse the possessor (Art. 559) Art. 716 does not apply for this refers to a possessor in good faith. o Art. 716, CC: The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner has not pursued the swarm, or ceases to do so within two consecutive days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated animals may also claim them within twenty days to be counted from their occupation by another person. This period having expired, they shall pertain to him who has caught and kept them. (612a)