QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

INTRODUCTION

Ghana is an up-and-coming player in the oil and gas industry with operations in the upstream
(exploration and production), mid-stream, and downstream sectors. After the discovery of
oil and gas in commercial quantities in 2007, Ghana took steps to ensure a successful oil and
gas regime.

This essay attempts to examine the administrative, economic, and fiscal guidelines governing
Ghana's upstream petroleum subsector to find out whether the existing structure's purpose of
maximizing government revenue is congruent with stimulating foreign investment and petroleum
sector expansion. Although there is an agreement among academics that this is an essential priority
for many oil-rich countries, there is no coherent, agreed–upon concept or framework for carrying
out this goal.

There are primarily four major exponents that ought to be considered in the construction of oil and
gas investment structures, the jurisdiction's economic credence on oil and gas income; the
developmental status of the upstream hydrocarbon sector; the economic situation of the state; and
the degree or level of governmental participation in the petroleum sector. By using these factors,
this work will seek to respond to the question as outlined.

Some scholars question the dependability of the categorization processes because individual
country situations are highly context specific and emanate from evolving socioeconomic
encounters allied with governance and other innocuous factors. However, others have also argued
that quantifiable disparities in the political and institutional backdrop can have observable
predictability and are pertinent (Nakhle, 2015).

Investment trends are one of the key drivers in determining fiscal outcomes, with exploration being
the activity most responsive to tax changes. Governments closely monitor the impact on
investment from tax changes, while some make detailed assessments of the likely investment
response to planned fiscal changes. Rising investment may encourage governments to believe that
they can introduce a tax increase with little pain. Unexpected declines in investment may trigger
the opposite response.

A county's fiscal system is an essential metric or yardstick for investors who want to invest as it
highlights the limit to which the host nation and the prospective investors would allocate the

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

benefits and costs related to the venture (e.g. Mian, 2000; Gudmestad et al., 2010; Smith, 2012;
Samanhyia and Samanhyia, 2016, p. 66). Thus, an upstream oil and gas fiscal system also includes
all the numerous taxes levied by a selected oil producing state within a predefined period.

Though, the fiscal regime's management and structure stipulate how such prospective reserves will
be segmented between the oil rich state (the owner of the reserves) and the IOC or the investor,
the source of competence, technical knowhow, and financing. A study from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2011) and Nakhle (2014) also reported that a specific nation's fiscal scheme
is built from many fiscal and quasi–fiscal tools such as income taxes, royalty, and other unique
facilities. This study further indicates that the concepts in fiscal terms play an enormous role in
determining the administrative and economic investments being made in the upstream oil and gas
industry.

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL GUIDELINES FOR

INVESTMENT IN THE UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS SECTOR IN GHANA

Ghana, in 2007 confirmed the discovery of oil in economically commercial proportions. Later in
November 2010, the government commissioned the beginning of commercial extraction of oil and
natural gas, since the very first documented oil and gas exploration onshore Tano basin began
between 1896 and 1903 by the West African Oil and Fuel Company (WAOFCO) (Boateng, 2008).
As a result, Ghana's overall proved retrievable reserves as of 2015 were estimated to be
approximately 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and the recoverable reserves for oil were
approximated at 1.5 billion barrels (GNPC, 2016; Abudu and Sai, 2020, p. 851).

In any economic system, the discovery of oil and gas and its accompanying operations has three
major or valued economic benefits. In the context of Ghana, the very first benefit would include
income generation to the state from the sales of products and tax receipts, the second boost is the
creation of job prospects for the populace, both indirect and direct contexts, and finally, the supply
of electricity production to the state for internal usages. Currently, Ghana's oil and gas industry
already had bolstered the economy, with the first and second economic benefits underlined above
to a large extent (Abudu and Sai, 2020, p. 843).

ECONOMIC GUIDELINES

The economic investment into Ghana through the upstream oil ang gas sector have hugely
impacted the country's local industries. Most of the sectors in the country have doubled or tripled
their operating capacities and profitability since the launch of oil exploration in the country. Some
sectors that have significantly benefited from these initiatives include the food and beverage
industries, building and construction, and the transport and haulage sector. These sectors have
hugely benefited from these initiatives by providing complementary services to the oil exploration
companies in the region. Notably, the areas of Tema and Accra have extensively developed
because of these exploration activities in Ghana. The Banking and Insurance sectors have received
a heavy boost on operations given that oil exploration attracts a lot of transactions and money
being moved. The Bank of Ghana equally raised the capital ability of the Ghana banks to allow
them to qualify for the enormous transactions made by the exploration companies. The Ghana

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

National Insurance also followed the same example that the Bank of Ghana allowed insurance
firms to process vast amounts of money through their systems.

According to the Bank of Ghana (BoG) (2021) report, the Ghana Petroleum Funds (GPF) has
generated total revenue of US$ 6.52 billion for the period of ten years (2011-2020) since operations
began in late 2010 to the state. According to the fiscal regime in Ghana and oil price at $69.09 per
barrel, the World Bank estimated the revenue from oil sales and exploration at the US $ 1 billion
on average, ranging from the year 2011 and 2099. The government revenue in 2008 reached about
US $ 3.7 billion, contributing to a GDP of US $16.1 billion (Degue, 2020). The estimated oil
revenue is subjected to a lot of sensitivity, and there exist various parameters that, in a way, could
have influenced this kind of central estimate (Nakhle, 2014). Provided a fixed cost of extraction,
an increase or decrease in oil prices would disproportionally impact the revenue earnings. At
approximate US $60 per barrel, the government earnings would decrease to an average of US $
0.4 billion per year. An increase of US $100 per barrel would imply US $1.6 billion per year.
However, an increase in the cost of oil extraction could equally significantly impact the revenue
earned. A 25% accumulation of overrun capital would equally hamper the government revenues
by 14%. A given two-year production peak could similarly lead to reduced payments by the US $
0.4 billion per year.

The extraction of oil in Ghana has equally seen gas production to about 1000 cubic feet of gas per
barrel of oil. The building of pipelines to supply gas to stations has also improved the country's
revenue over time. One of the challenges experienced by Ghana in exporting its oil is the
competitive prices from other countries. It has significantly affected the growth of the oil industry.
Countries that tend to produce oil in bulk are influenced by oil prices, thus prompting the
governments to make some losses in reduced exportation prices. However, Ghana still earns a lot
of revenue in oil exploration to the tune of billions. This has been possibly made through taxes
accrued due to exploration activities and the annual increase in its oil prices. The gross revenue
per year from the sale of gas accumulates to about US $ 260 million per year, which is currently
less than a tenth of the country's gross oil revenue.

Furthermore, based on GNPC (2016) reports, many people have been employed since oil
exploration in Ghana. Both Tullow and Jubilee oil exploration companies have significantly
engaged some people in the industry. About 70% of employment spaced created by these

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

companies have been utilized by Ghanaians. However, over the years, the number of people
employed in the industry has stretched to about 90%. The initial phase had many foreigners, with
the current degree seeing middle-level skills engaged. The development of roads, buildings and
social places has seen a significant increase in the number of people working in such areas, thus
improving the livelihoods in Ghana. Poverty level or index has equally been reduced given that
most people are engaged or employed by these corporations.

Ghana suffered from power shortage problems due to overreliance on one hydroelectric dam to
supply most of the country. However, with oil and gas exploration, the government is significantly
growing stable gas available energy, thus enabling centimes and uninterrupted power supply.
Ghana, in essence, had a substantial fiscal recurrent budget, based on the estimates from the World
Bank. However, the country is now mated to reduce its recurrent budget to below ten, thus enabling
it to finance its operations with minimal effort. Ghana's natural resources are vast; therefore, the
country does not risk falling into an Oil dependent country. Its immense natural resources and
investment are a perfect indication of a diverse economy with the ability to handle any challenges.
Nevertheless, given that economic investment accrued due to oil exploration forms a significant
part of the GDP, it is essential to say that Ghana will ultimately stand out as a giant economy in
Africa.

As part of the Petroleum Commission (PC) efforts to enhance local participation in the oil and gas
upstream industry, the Commission worked to improve the current number of Ghanaians employed
in the upstream subsector. The total oil and gas workforce in Ghana declined by 38% compared to
2019 due to the COVID–19 pandemic. As of the end of the year 2020, data available at the PC
suggested that the number of Ghanaian workforces in the upstream subsector dropped by 1,913
from 5,124 in 2019 to 3,211 in 2020 because of the pandemic. According to the Petroleum
Commission (PC), a total number of 37 positions that expatriates previously held were localized
within the year. In addition, the Commission placed a total number of 28 Ghanaians in various oil
and gas companies as part of efforts to build the technical competencies of Ghanaians.

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FISCAL GUIDELINES

Ghana's upstream oil and gas fiscal system is a collection of rules, policies, and legal contracts
governing the state's upstream petroleum operations. As well, it also demonstrates the sharing of
the economic gains among both the nation and the IOCs (GNPC, 1983, p. 3).

The administrative arrangement brought the establishment of The Petroleum Exploration and
Production Act, 1984 (PNDC Law 84), the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983
(PNDC Law 64), as well as the Ghana Income Tax Law, 1987 (PNDC Law 188), which were the
prevalent upstream oil and gas industry legislations in Ghana prior to 2007. Among many other
critical components of the previous statutes, transparency was still an essential aspect. Legislations
have been instituted that modify the previous one, the Exploration and Production Act, 1984
(PNDC Law 84).

Some of the major legislations and rules that now regulate or govern the upstream petroleum sub–
sector in Ghana are listed below: ➢ The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) ➢
Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 [Act 821] ➢ Petroleum (Exploration and Production Law),

2016 [Act 919] ➢ Income Tax Act 2015 (Act 896) ➢ Petroleum Agreements (PAs)(MPA, 2019)
➢ Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983 (PNDCL 64) (GNPC Law) ➢ Petroleum

Revenue Management Act, 2011 [Act 815] ➢ Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation
in Petroleum Activities) Regulations, 2013 (LI 2204)

The newest Petroleum (Exploration and Production Law) Act 2016 [Act 919] also has some
outstanding features that entail demands for an open (smooth) and transparent competitive
tendering for the allocation of exploration and production rights, an obligatory openness by the
Minister of Energy, interpretations for state involvement regarding the competitive tendering
process, and also the establishment of a transparent, sustainable and efficient tendering structure
(e.g. Banful, 2013, p. 149; ACEP, 2016). Notwithstanding these transparency structures, spots of
agitation to the regulation linger or prevail because of the variability in fiscal systems, from the
production sharing contracts (PSC) to the 'hybrid or tax/royalty' model, a mixture of the
concessionary and PSC agreements (ACEP, 2016).

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

It has been argued that utilizing the 'hybrid' fiscal regime permits the state to achieve revenue gains
and socio–economic obligations (Ackah and Kankam, 2014, p. 402; Degue, 2020). Petroleum
royalty, participation interest, incentive payments, corporate taxes, and petroleum taxes are key
aspects of the fiscal framework (e.g. Sasraku, 2013, p. 167; ACEP, 2016; Suleman and Zaato,
2021).

In the case of the Jubilee Field, the GNPC adopted the Royalty/Tax System which is also a hybrid
in disguise. The regime has a typical element of a concessionary system as it is made up of royalties
and taxes with state participation and so profit sharing. The Ghanaian regime is assessed based on
the general principles of taxation and petroleum taxation. This assessment is based on the regime’s
effectiveness in sharing the economic rent accrued from the resource between the state and the
investor. The below are the current fiscal arrangement governing Ghana’s upstream oil and gas
industry.

Carried Interest

This is a type of interest held by the state or the Host Nation. At this stage the IOC’s bears the cost
for the exploration and development with no contribution from GNPC. Section 10 (14a) of Act
919 states that a petroleum agreement shall contain a term that the Corporation shall (a) hold an
initial participating carried interest of at least fifteen per cent for exploration and development.
The state enjoys this interest while the IOC pays all exploration and development cost incurred.

Additional Participatory Interest

This arrangement provides GNPC the option to acquire an additional interest in the field. GNPC
can decide to increase its interest from the 15% to an agreed percentage in the petroleum agreement
after a commercial discovery. Section 10(14b) of Act 919 states that the Corporation shall have
the option to acquire an additional participating interest as determined in the petroleum agreement.
At this stage GNPC can decide to increase its interest in the oil field and this increases its sense of
ownership. At this stage also GNPC is liable to cash calls so whenever there is the need to pay for
cost of operations in the Oil field, GNPC is liable to pay.

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

Royalties

This is an amount of money that will be paid to the state. Section 85 of Act 919 states that the
contractor shall pay to the Republic in respect of gross volume of petroleum produced and saved.
Royalties shall be paid to the state it is levied on gross production meaning whether there has been
profit or not Royalty shall be paid to the state. Times have proven that royalties is usually between
5%-12.5% this is calculated based on the level of risk involved. The higher the risk involved; this
may involve operating in deep waters you will be required to pay more royalty to the state.
However, the lesser the risk involved the lesser royalty IOC will be required to pay. This gives
the host state an advantage because it generates revenue from these operations.

Corporate Income Tax

A tax is an amount of money that is paid to the state. Under the Income Tax Act, provisions
exclusive to petroleum operations are provided under Part VI. The rate of corporate income tax
applicable to a contractor is 35% or as otherwise stipulated in the Petroleum Agreement. This
amount of money is levied on profit. Section 87 of Act 919 states that a licensee, contractor, sub-
contractor, and the Corporation shall pay taxes, including petroleum income tax and capital gains
tax in accordance with applicable enactments. The Petroleum Agreement allows that the cost that
is recovered from all the revenue from the sale of the contractor’s share of the oil. Sometimes there
may be super normal profit and the state will expect that you pay taxes on them.

Surface Rentals

This is an annual amount of money that is paid to the state. It is a ground rent you pay to the state
or the Host State for using their land. Section 86(1) of Act 919 says that a contractor shall pay to
the republic an annual acreage fee. The Minister determines the amount of money to be paid so
whenever the minister determines this amount it is paid annually if there is use of the land.

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

Bonuses

Section 88 of Act 919 states that a contractor shall pay bonus to the Republic except where the
type of bonus payable is not prescribed but it shall be paid in accordance with the terms of a
petroleum agreement in respect of the area to which the agreement relates. The various parties in
the agreement are supposed to pay bonuses to the state anytime there is the need to. The types of
bonuses that may exist are signature bonus, discovery bonus and production bonus. These bonuses
are to be paid upon first discovery, when production commenced and when profit is made.

Revenue Management

The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815), (as amended), regulates the
collection, allocation and management of petroleum revenue derived from upstream and
midstream operations. The PRMA makes the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) responsible for
assessing, collecting, and accounting for petroleum revenue due to the State under the PRMA. An
entity that makes payment into the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF) must notify the GRA in writing
of that payment among other things. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act establishes three
public funds, namely, the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF), the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF),
and the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF), and indicates how revenue accruing from petroleum
operations are to be disbursed and utilized. The Petroleum Holding Fund receives petroleum
revenue due to the Republic and then disburses it in accordance with the PRMA. The gross receipts
of the PHF include royalties, corporate income taxes, surface rentals, capital gains tax and any
amount payable by GNPC as corporate income tax, royalty, or dividends.

The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) has foremost priority in the disbursement of
petroleum revenue from the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF), followed by the payment into the
consolidated fund to support the national budget, and then to the Ghana Petroleum Funds for
savings and investments. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act also provides for
disbursements from the PHF to meet exceptional purposes. Exceptional purposes have been
defined under the PRMA as withdrawals from the PHF necessary to meet tax refunds and the
payment of management fees.

Borrowing against the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF) and the assets of the Ghana Petroleum
Funds is prohibited. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act further prohibits borrowing against

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

petroleum reserves. The Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) receives the portion of revenue from the
PHF to be used for savings and investments for the purpose of creating a reserve fund to
supplement public expenditure during periods of unanticipated petroleum revenue shortfalls.
Conversely, the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) receives excess petroleum revenue to create an
endowment fund for future generations when petroleum reserves have been depleted. No other
disbursements are permitted out of the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF).

The Petroleum Revenue Management Act establishes the Public Interest and Accountability
Committee (PIAC) as an independent statutory body with a mandate to promote transparency and
accountability in the management of Ghana’s petroleum revenue. This committee monitors
stakeholder compliance with the revenue management provisions in the PRMA. The PIAC also
provides a platform for public debate to inform the public on how funds are used in accordance
with the development priorities of the country.

In Ghana, Petroleum Agreements (PAs) are contracts sealed between the Government of Ghana
(GoG), GNPC, and the Contractor(s) of the petroleum sectors and approved by Ghana's
Parliament. The current petroleum agreement model in place is the Model Petroleum Agreement
(MPA) 2019. A Model Petroleum Agreement with the contractor(s) would enumerate the
following: ➢ The definition of Exploration, Development, and Production periods; ➢ Foreign

exchange oversight limitations; ➢ Accounting procedures; ➢ Earnings to be made by the nation

in the form of income taxes and royalties; and ➢ The operative income tax rates and relevant local
tax laws.

The Strategic National Policy Framework for Ghana's energy industry reiterated that ''a more
efficient and flexible fiscal structure will permit the government to incentivize investment from
international organizations with the technical (technological) and financial abilities deemed
necessary'' (Energy Commission, 2006). However, if a strategy is endorsed and backed by
legislation, this does not infer that this has been properly executed. And as such, whenever an
appraisal of a strategy is done, it often turns out that their envisioned goals are not always
accomplished. These could be ascribed to the misappropriation of concepts, or the viewpoints are
not appropriate within that context, although this might seem to be effective on record (Banful,
2013; Mihalyi, 2014).

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

An article from the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC, 2016) stated that the state, in
its pursuit for further investment inflow from the IOCs in the form of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI), would constantly interact with the global petroleum sector and guarantee that there is a
positive transition to formulate regulations as well as fiscal structures that will guarantee that the
sector becomes very enticing and productive. Therefore, with the blueprint to spur Foreign Direct
Investment, the Government of Ghana has entered into an agreement through the Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), which stands for the GoG, with Tullow Oil Plc and Kosmos
Energy (e.g. Boadway and Keen, 2010; Ackah and Kankam, 2014, p. 400; Oppong and Klaas,
2016; Abudu and Sai, 2020).

The ultimate focus of the GoG was to entice as much investment that would be accessible for the
exploitation of the state's natural reserves. As a result, quite a few policies have been changed. It
thus means that the petroleum corporations retain a minimum earnings amount of US$2.30/bbl;
after royalties and taxation of the company's capital crude oil. However, GNPC in 2009 revealed
that companies are being encouraged to pursue dynamic exploration operations, as this will aid the
crude oil stockpiles in Ghana to soar from 18.0 billion barrels to 22 billion barrels. As a result, the
revenues of Ghana in the upstream oil and gas subsector rely heavily on the design of its oil and
gas fiscal structure (Oppong et al., 2016; Degue, 2020).

In oil-exporting countries, the petroleum industry performs or plays an essential part in their
economic advancement via income creation for those jurisdictions (Odularu, 2008; Smith, 2013).
The ludicrously massive supply of oil and gas, which has surpassed demand, has helped retain the
price per barrel of oil steady throughout recent history (Sieminski, 2014). The worldwide slump
in oil prices will have deleterious implications on investment in the industry, just as high rates of
capital expenditure in exploration and production amidst surging oil prices. For this and other
factors or reasons, investors nowadays depend much more on the fiscal system in reference to the
exploration for and the production of petroleum resources (Nakhle, 2015). The oil and gas fiscal
regimes in each nation of interest affect the amount of capital expenditures the investors are
prepared to invest in petroleum industries (Hvozdyk and Mercer–Blackman, 2010). A petroleum
fiscal system is essential because it offers helpful scrutiny of a state's natural reserves (Mihalyi,
2014; Oppong et al., 2016).

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary purpose of this essay was to examine the principal administrative, economic, and
fiscal guidelines for investment activities in the oil and gas sector in Ghana. The analysis made
above shows that the state significantly benefits from its oil and gas exploration activities across
various sectors. It is critical to note that Ghana is not a leading oil-exporting country in Africa, yet
its foreign direct investment inflow percentage has significantly increased since the exploration
began in 2007. Surprisingly, most African countries with vast resources continue to attract a
meagre portion of foreign direct investment inflow compared to other countries with relatively few
natural resources. One of the critical factors that influence the rate of foreign direct investment
inflows in the country is its ability to do business with foreign entities which is guided by a strong
administrative, economic, and fiscal framework. It is vital to note that these countries are ranked
high in ease of business, thus attracting more foreign investments and developments into the
regions in agreement with scholars (Gudmestad et al., 2010; Smith, 2012; Samanhyia and
Samanhyia, 2016, p. 66).

One critical factor affecting almost all oil–producing counties is poor management and misuse of
funds and oil proceeds. The level of corruption in these countries is the main stumbling block to
any meaningful impact on the progress of these countries. It is essential to note that although
Norway is an oil–producing country, its resources are well managed, and as a result, the country's
economy has significantly been transformed. On the other hand, African countries such as Angola,
Nigeria still struggle with appropriation and management of oil exploration and proceeds, a sad
factor that is detrimental to the establishment of the oiling corporation and a negative outlook on
the economy (Boateng et al., 2015; Oppong and Klaas, 2016).

Ghana has been profiting a lot from the foreign direct investment inflows in her oil and gas sector,
thus triggering strong economic growth. However, for the sustainability of these economic
developments, government regimes also play a very crucial role. For example, Norway has been
able to fully profit from its exploration activities due to the discipline and strategic policies placed
by the government to help grow the revenues coming into the country. Therefore, Ghana must
learn to harness its resources through strategic policies aimed at fully empowering the economy.

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QUESTION 3, INDEX NUMBER: 10936009

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