Research Paper - Gandhi

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The Salvation of a Nation: Gandhi’s Pursuit of Emancipation from the British Raj

“Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the
mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man.”
- Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

Introduction

Gandhi’s political strategy gained even more significance than his philosophy of life as he
activated the masses into political agitations through his unique tactics of agitation. His
political strategy recognised the limits on the sacrifices that the common people can make, as
well as the resources that British Raj could expend to curb the agitations. 1 His political
strategy was pivoted on bringing the general public into the fold of active politics which were
reflected from the unique non-violent methods that he would adopt to agitate. 2 He did not
want an agitation that would demand Herculean sacrifices on the part of his countrymen and
women which might also act as an inhibiting factor for some so as to prevent their
participation. Violent agitations were plagued with loss of momentum and inhibiting levels of
sacrifices, but the non-violent movements were not a war of arms, rather, they were a war of
position that required breaking the hegemony of the colonialists.

One instance of such non-violent and public centric agitation is the Salt Satyagraha,
spearheaded by Gandhi, which is remembered by history as one of the greatest acts of
resistance in history that acted as a campaign that decisively defeated the British empire.
Gandhi pioneered an advent of a journey exceeding 320 kilometres to the sea early on March
12, 1930, with a section of followers originating from his ashram. On 5 April, 1930, Gandhi,
being surrounded by thousands of people, neared the water's edge, made his way to the area
of the coast where evaporating water had abandoned its sediments and collected a fist full of
salt.

The Contradiction

Gandhi’s actions dethroned a draconian law imposed by the British that required Indians to


purchase salt from the authorities and forbade them from harvesting their own. His
disobedience sparked a nationwide movement of non-cooperation that culminated in around
one lakh detentions. Nevertheless, one might hold the satyagraha of salt to be a fizzle by
evaluating what Gandhi was able to secure at the negotiating table during the climax of the
movement. Analysts Ackerman and Kruegler have assessed the 1931 agreement among
Gandhi and the Viceroy of India at the time, Lord Irwin and have viewed the campaign to be
a failure which naturally was a triumph for the British.3

It appears to be an oxymoron that the Salt March could be seen as both a crucial step toward
the independence of India as well as a disastrous campaign that had little tangible effect. The
fact that this outcome is not unusual in the field of social movements makes it even odder.
The campaign of 1963 in Alabama had similarly paradoxical results: it led to a settlement that
fell far short of desegregating the city, disappointing local agitators whose aspirations

1
Bipan Chandra, The Long Term Strategy of the National Movement, India’s Struggle for Independence: 1857-
1947 (Penguin, 1988).
2
Id.
3
PETER ACKERMAN AND CHRISTOPHER KRUEGLER, STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT CONFLICT,
(Praeger, 1994).
extended beyond mere minor modifications at a few downtown stores. Regardless of the
disappointments, the campaign is recognised as a pivotal one in the civil rights movement.

Debates about how to assess a campaign’s effectiveness and when is it fair to sound the bugle
of triumph, are as pertinent as ever for those who want to comprehend today’s social
movements and those who want to enhance them. Gandhi may yet have something
miraculously helpful to teach them.

The Symbolic Triumph

Campaigns operate differently during huge mobilizations that are propelled by momentum,
such as the Salt Satyagraha. To convey the moral gravity of their battle, activists in large-
scale movements must devise strategies and pick demands that draw on deeper ideals. Here, a
demand’s prospective policy effects or capacity to prevail at the negotiations are not its most
crucial characteristics. The demand’s symbolic attributes are most important since they
determine how effectively it sensationalises for the general public the pressing need to right a
wrong.

Those attempting to create protest movements have strategic objectives, just like traditional
politicians and structure-based organisers, and they may look to address certain complaints in
the campaigns. Such agitators may not always be interested in reforms which are attainable
within the confines of the status quo. Instead, momentum-driven initiatives seek to change
the whole political environment by altering assumptions about what is feasible and
achievable. They accomplish this through influencing public perception of a problem and
mobilising an exponential number of supporters. These agitations transform what could be
deemed politically impossible into political ineluctability, that inter alia includes reforms
ranging from the women’s right to vote to the overthrow of a totalitarian regime. 

The final chapter of a movement, when public opinion has changed and those in positions of
power are clamouring to engage with the changes wrought by the mobilizations, is when
negotiations on policy proposals take effect. The ability of a demand to reverberate with the
general populace and elicit widespread support for a cause is the key indicator of a
movement in the early phases, when it gathers momentum. Simply put, symbolic value
outweighs instrumental value. Gandhi encountered a plethora of such criticisms during his
lifetime. However, the impact of initiatives like the Salt Satyagraha, whose outcome might
prima facie be merely symbolic, will indeed offer a compelling reply to the criticisms.

Putting Salt on the Wound

A prime example of employing escalation and unarmed struggle to mobilise the public and
execute change is the salt satyagraha, or movement of nonviolent agitation that started with
Gandhi's march. Gandhi's answer, when asked to set a bullseye for civil disobedience, was
absurd. This was the most typical response to his emphasis on the salt legislation as the
cornerstone of the Indian National Congress’ (INC) opposition to British Raj. The Statesman
mocked the spotlight on salt, stating that it's hard to not laugh, and their expectation is that
they share this emotion with most of the conscious Indians.4

4
Gopalkrishna Gandhi, The Great Dandi March & eighty years after, THE HINDU,
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-great-dandi-march-eighty-years-after/article62123875.ece.
The INC's instrumentally motivated leaders were preoccupied with constitutional issues
during 1930, including if India would benefit from attaining the dominion status and what
concessions the British may make. The regulations governing salt were, at most, a minor
issue to them. According to Geoffrey Ashe, Gandhi's decision to use salt as the foundation of
a campaign was the oddest yet the most ingenious political endeavour of contemporary
politics.5

In fact, those who had mocked the campaign eventually had cause to stop. The satyagrahis
drew sizable crowds to every hamlet they passed through, with as many as 30,000 people
flocking to watch the pilgrimage and listen to Gandhi talk on the necessity for self-rule.
Gandhi, according to historian Judith Brown, understood instinctively that civil disobedience
was in many respects an engagement in the theatre of politics, in which the spectators are as
fundamental as the performers. Scores of Indians who worked in local administrative roles
for the colonial state resigned their offices in the light of the demonstrations.

The movement had an astounding scope after the procession approached the seashore and
disobedience erupted. Numerous dissidents started mining natural reserves and panning for
salt all around the nation. Even purchasing subpar unlicensed packs of the mineral became a
symbol of pride for millions. In an effort to stop production, the INC established its own salt
depot and organised groups of activists conducted nonviolent operations on the state salt
facilities, blocking paths and gates with their bodies. The physical abuse and
rehabilitation that followed were covered in news stories that were telecasted all over the
globe.

Gradually, the defiance evolved to include regional complaints and other non-cooperation
behaviours. Numerous village officials left their positions, lakhs of people embraced the
boycotting of British clothing and alcohol, in certain regions, peasants declined the payment
of land taxes. Mass non-compliance spread like wild-fire across the country in ever-morphing
shapes. Despite vigorous efforts by the British authorities to suppress it, the non-
cooperation persisted.

Instrumentality versus Symbolism

Through the lens of instrumentality, the Salt Satyagraha's resolution was inadequate. The
campaign had national repercussions by the beginning of 1931, but eventually it lost its
steam. A large portion of the leadership in Congress had been arrested as a result of
repression. Gandhi received requests for a solution from moderate politicians and
businesspeople that endorsed the INC. Including many of the organization's radicals agreed
that negotiations were necessary.

Gandhi then began negotiating with the then Viceroy and reached an agreement. Prima
facie it appeared to be an anti-climax, according to many historians. The INC vehemently
disagreed with the agreement's main provisions, which stated that in return for the suspension
of civil disobedience, prisoners of the protests would be freed, their charges will be removed,
and, with certain exceptions, the state would remove the oppressive safety ordinances it had
imposed during the satyagraha. Authorities would return the property seized which had not
yet go be sold as well as charges the government had collected for tax evasion. Additionally,
protesters would be allowed to carry out their nonviolent boycott of British textiles.
Nevertheless, the British made no promises to relinquish their political dominance, therefore
5
GEOFFREY ASHE, GANDHI: A BIOGRAPHY (Stein and Day, 1968).
the treaty adjourned discussion of issues related to independence until subsequent talks.  An
investigation into police behaviour during the protest campaign had been strongly demanded
by the INC activists, but the administration declined to do so. The Salt Act would still be in
effect, which is arguably the most alarming part, with the caveat that low-income residents of
coastal zones will be permitted to make a certain amount of salt for personal consumption.

The conditions of the accord shocked several of the Gandhi’s closest leaders, and numerous
historians have concurred that the campaign's objectives were not met. In hindsight, it is
definitely valid to debate whether Gandhi compromised too much during discussions.
Yet, the settlement’s wider implications will be neglected if it is only evaluated in terms of its
utility.

The Triumph of Symbolism

Gandhi often emphasised the value of being amenable to make concessions on non-essentials
in his lifetime as a negotiator. One of Gandhi’s crucial political postulation was the
“diminishing of demands to the infinitesimal coherence with the truth,” as Joan Bondurant
notes in her insightful analysis of satyagraha.6 Gandhi believed that the agreement with Irwin
proffered him this bare minimum, enabling the movement to put the campaign to an
honourable cessation and gear up for further struggle. Gandhi saw the viceroy's decision to
grant exceptions to the salt ordinance as a crucial victory for morality despite they were few
in number. Additionally, Gandhi compelled the British to bargain on an equal footing, setting
a crucial precedent that would be carried over into future independence negotiations.

Many of Gandhi's opponents, each in their own way, concurred on the magnitude of these
negotiations, viewing the treaty as a flaw with long term repercussions for imperial powers.
According to Ashe, the British officials moaned over Irwin’s action as the frail miscalculation
from which the British Raj never recuperated. 7 A prominent supporter of the British Empire,
Winston Churchill, declared in a now-famous discourse that it was direful and sickening to
watch Mr. Gandhi... marching half nude to the Vice-regal palace, to deliberate with the envoy
of the King-Emperor on equal terms. He asserted that Gandhi, whom he perceived as a fakir
and fanatic was able to egress prison and surface as a victorious man as a result of his action.

The general public was much less divided over the aftermath of the campaign than the
insiders
When Subhash Chandra Bose, a leftist of the Indian National Congress who had been
dubious of Gandhi's pact, observed the response in the countryside, he was compelled to
change his mind. Ashe relates that Bose experienced ovations in a manner that he was
unwarranted, while travelling with Gandhi from Bombay to Delhi.8 Bose acknowledged the
exculpation and the Mahatma had made the right decision. 9 By every political rule, he was
verified. However, the simple fact that the Englishman were negotiating rather than issue
orders, overshadowed any number of factors in the eyes of the people.

In his enduringly popular 1950 biography of Gandhi, Louis Fischer offers the most striking
assessment of the legacy of Salt March. He stated that India had attained freedom, although,

6
JOAN V. BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE: THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT
(Princeton University Press, 1988).
7
Supra, note 5.
8
Supra, note 5.
9
Supra, note 5.
legally everything remained the same in essence, the British still wielded authority in India. 10
Nevertheless, following the Salt Satyagraha, it seemed ineluctable that Britain would
eventually be reluctant to rule over the Indian people and that India would eventually decide
to no longer be ruled.

Later historians have made an effort to offer more complex views of Gandhi’s role in
bringing about Indian independence, breaking with the tradition of laudatory biographies that
fanatically praised Gandhi as the nation’s father. Judith Brown lists a number of social and
economic influences, especially the geopolitical developments brought on by World War II,
that led to Britain evacuating India. 11 She does, however, acknowledge the importance of
movements like the Satyagraha, which were crucial in establishing the INC’s structure and
popular hegemony.12 Mass protests solely did not drive the imperialists from power, but they
had a significant impact on the political environment. Civil disobedience had a significant
role in the circumstances that compelled the British to decide whether and when to withdraw
from India.

Conclusion

Gandhi’s political strategy brought the struggle between the colonised and the colonisers on
level ground by compensating for the lack of material resources like manpower and weapons
with the sheer will of the people to attain independence. His non-violent approach did not, by
its very nature, demand the altruistic individuals to make the supreme sacrifice. His method,
irrespective of its instrumental success, did succeed in achieving his primary objective of
bringing the masses into the fold of active politics, to fight for their own freedom. His method
not only succeeded in attracting the amount of people, but also the type of people. Women,
for instance, were not able to contribute to violent struggles as much as men, yet, when it
came to resilience during prolonged non-violent agitations or enduring the sufferings inflicted
by the oppressors, they were more capable than their male counterparts. 13 The fight opposing
racism, prejudice, corporate exploitation, and colonial aggression is still being waged by
social movements today. However,  should they so desire, they might do it with the guidance
of the inspiring example of the ancestors who succeeded in transforming moral
triumph towards enduring change.

10
LOUIS FISCHER, THE LIFE OF MAHATMA GANDHI (HarperCollins 2006).
11
JUDITH M. BROWN, GANDHI'S RISE TO POWER: INDIAN POLITICS 1915-1922 (Cambridge
University Press, 1974).
12
Id.
13
Supra, note 1.

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