This document discusses the different modes of acquiring public office, focusing on appointment and election. It states that appointment is generally an executive act that involves discretion, while election is the choice of candidates by popular vote. The document also examines topics like the scope of an appointing authority's discretion, legislative restrictions on appointments, and requisites for a valid appointment.
This document discusses the different modes of acquiring public office, focusing on appointment and election. It states that appointment is generally an executive act that involves discretion, while election is the choice of candidates by popular vote. The document also examines topics like the scope of an appointing authority's discretion, legislative restrictions on appointments, and requisites for a valid appointment.
This document discusses the different modes of acquiring public office, focusing on appointment and election. It states that appointment is generally an executive act that involves discretion, while election is the choice of candidates by popular vote. The document also examines topics like the scope of an appointing authority's discretion, legislative restrictions on appointments, and requisites for a valid appointment.
public office are 1. Appointment 2. Election [DE LEON] Modes 1. Appointment The act of designation by the executive officer, board, or body to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the powers and function of a given office. It is to be distinguished from the selection or designation by a popular vote. [DE LEON]. 2. Election The choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot (Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198 (2003)]. The act of selecting or choosing a person by popular vote to occupy the office. 3. Designation The mere imposition of new or additional duties upon an officer to be performed by him in a special manner. It presupposes that the officer is already in the service by virtue of an earlier appointment, performing other functions. 4. Other Modes: A person may also acquire title to public office through two other means, namely: a. Succession by operation of law (when the office to which one succeeds is legally vacated) or; b. By direct provision of law (such as when the office is validly held in an exofficio capacity by a public officer). 1. Appointments Nature Appointment is a Discretionary Power “Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred” [Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. 69137 (1986)]. Administrators of public officers, primarily the department heads should be entrusted with plenary, or at least sufficient, discretion. Their position most favorably determines who can best fulfill the functions of a vacated office. There should always be full recognition of the wide scope of a discretionary authority, unless the law speaks in the most mandatory and peremptory tone, considering all the circumstances [Reyes v. Abeleda, G.R. No. 25491 (1968)]. Scope of discretion The discretion of the appointing authority is not only in the choice of the person who is to be appointed but also in the nature and character of the appointment intended (i.e., whether the appointment is permanent or temporary). Generally, a Political Question: Appointment is generally a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. Exception: Appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In such cases, the Commission on Appointments may review the wisdom of the appointment and has the power to refuse to concur with it even if the President's choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law [Luego v. CSC, supra]. Power of CSC to recall appointments does not include control of discretion: The CSC authority to recall an appointment which has been initially approved when it is shown that the same was issued in disregard of pertinent laws, rules and regulations. However, it does not have the power to recall an appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified [See Luego v. CSC, supra]. The promotion of the “next-in-rank” is not mandatory While there is a preference for the next- in-rank in the Civil Service Law [see Sec. 21(1)-(6), Bk. V, Admin. Code (Civil Service Law)], it does not impose a “rigid or mechanistic formula” that requires the appointing power to select the more senior officer. Unless the law speaks in the most mandatory and peremptory tone, there should be full recognition of the wide scope of the discretionary authority to appoint [Reyes v. Abeleda, G.R. No. 25491 (1968)]. There is no requirement that “vacancies must be filled by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification,in that order. That would be to construe the provision not merely as a legislative prescription of qualifications but as a legislative appointment, repugnant to the Constitution. What [the law] does purport to say is that as far as practicable the person next in rank should be promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification, as the appointing power sees fit, provided the appointee is certified to be qualified and eligible” [Pineda v. Claudio, G.R. No. 29661 (1967)]. “Upon recommendation” is merely advisory: In cases of provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, they shall be appointed by the President “upon the recommendation of the Secretary” [Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1275]. The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice” should be interpreted to be a mere advice. It is persuasive in character, but is not binding or obligatory upon the person to whom it is made [Bermudez v. Torres, G.R. No. 131429 (1999)]. N.B. The Secretary of Justice is under the control of the President. The rule is different with respect to recommendations made by officers over whom the appointing power exercises no power of control, e.g. as the recommendation by the Governor of a Province to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management in the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer. In the said example, the recommendation by the Governor is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment [See San Juan v. CSC, G.R. No. 92299 (1991)]. Courts will act with restraint: Generally, as regards the power of appointment, courts will act with restraint. Hence, mandamus will not lie to require the appointment of a particular applicant or nominee. Exceptions 1. When there is grave abuse of discretion, prohibition or mandamus will lie. [See Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. 19313 (1962), on the midnight appointments of President Garcia]. 2. Where the palpable excess of authority or abuse of discretion in refusing to issue promotional appointment would lead to manifest injustice, mandamus will lie to compel the appointing authority to issue said appointments [Pineda v. Claudio, G.R. No. 29661 (1967)]. Appointment is Generally an Executive Function General Rule: Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion [Concepcion v. Paredes, G.R. 17539 (1921)]. Exceptions 1. Congress may appoint its own officials and staff [See Springer v. Government, 277 U.S. 189 (1928)]. 2. When the Constitution vests the powers in another branch of the State (i.e. Judiciary, Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII) or an independent office (e.g. Constitutional Commissions, Sec. 4, Art. IX-A; Ombudsman, Sec. 6, Art. XI; Commission on Human Rights, Sec. 18(10), Art. XIII). N.B. Mechem believes that when appointment is exercised by Congress, the courts, and similar non- executive bodies, the exercise is still an executive function. The power to appoint may be granted by law to officials exercising executive functions. This is expressly sanctioned by the provision which holds that “Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank [...] in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” [Sec. 16, Art. VII, Constitution] Congress cannot vest such power in officials not mentioned in the above provision, such as heads of bureaus [DE LEON]. The power of local chief executives to appoint local government employees under the Local Government Code is separately sanctioned in the power of Congress to “provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units” [Sec. 3, Art. X, Constitution]. Must be Unhindered by Congress The President’s power to appoint under the Constitution should necessarily have a reasonable measure of freedom, latitude, or discretion in choosing appointees [Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, G.R. No. 16263 (1960)]. Congress cannot either appoint the Commissioner of the Service, or impose upon the President the duty to appoint any particular person to said office. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting [1] from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and [2] from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office [Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. 6898 (1954)]. Legislative appointments Legislative appointments are repugnant to the Constitution [Pineda v. Claudio, G.R. No. 29661 (1967)]. Effectively legislative appointments are also prohibited: “When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. [...] when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.” [Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732 (1993)] In this case, the law assailed provided that “for the first year of its mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed [by the President] as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.” N.B. This is not to be confused with the power of Congress to appoint its own staff and officials, supra. Requisites for a valid appointment 1. Position is vacant 2. The appointing authority must be vested with the power to appoint at the time appointment is made; 3. The appointee should possess all the qualifications including appropriate civil service eligibility and none of the disqualifications; 4. The appointee accepts the appointment by taking the oath and entering into discharge of duty. [Garces v. CA, G.R. No. 114795, (1996)]. 2. Election Election is the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of the government. (Garchitorena v. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258) In an election, an officer occupies the office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. [Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387 (2003)]. The first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will of the majority. 3. Designation It is the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in public office. [Binamira v. Garrucho, G.R. No. 92008 (1990)]. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. An employee who is designated in an acting capacity is not entitled to the difference in salary between his regular position and the higher position to which he is designated, in the absence of any authority to authorize the payment of his additional salary [Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 122197 (1998)].
B. Modes and Kinds of Appointment
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A permanent appointment is extended to a
person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the eligibility required for the position, and thus, protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer in Political Law) 2. Temporary A temporary appointment is an acting appointment; it is extended to one who may not possess the requisite qualifications or eligibility required by law for the position, and is revocable at will, without the necessity of just cause or valid investigation. [NACHURA] Temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. [P.D. 807, Sec. 25(b)] An “acting” appointment is a temporary appointment and revocable in character. [Marohombsar v. Alonto, 194 SCRA 391] A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity. [Sevilla v. CA, 209 SCRA 637] Acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility by a temporary appointee will not ipso facto convert the temporary appointment into a permanent one; a new appointment is necessary. [Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, G.R. No. 104639, (1995)] The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure. Such right will have to depend on the nature of the appointment which, in turn, depends on the appointee’s eligibility or lack of it. [De Leon v. CA, G.R. No. 127182 (2001)] When temporary appointments not allowed: In no case shall any Member [or Chair] of the (a) Civil Service Commission, (b) Commission on Elections, or (c) Commission on Audit be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1(2), Art. IXD, Constitution] a. Presidential Appointments Four Groups of Officers the President is Authorized to Appoint [Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974 (1987)] 1. Specifically enumerated under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, i.e.: a. Heads of the executive departments; b. Ambassadors; c. Other public ministers and consuls; d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; e. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution: 1. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council 2. The Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission 3. The Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC 4. The Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit 5. Members of the Regional Consultative Commission
All other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3. Officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint (e.g. heads of GOCCs, undersecretaries, heads of bureaus and offices, and other officials); 4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Requires CA Confirmation or Not WHEN CA CONFIRMATION REQUIRED [Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution; Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549] 1. Specifically enumerated under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution: a. Heads of the executive departments; b. Ambassadors; c. Other public ministers and consuls; d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; e. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution. WHEN CA CONFIRMATION NOT REQUIRED [Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]: 1. All other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 2. Officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 3. Appointments explicitly exempted from the confirmation requirement under the Constitution: (a) Vice-President as a member of the cabinet [Sec. 3, Art. VII]; (b) Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts [Sec. 9, Art. VIII]; (c) The Ombudsman and his deputies [Sec. 9, Art. XI]. The list of appointments requiring confirmation is exclusive. Congress cannot, by law, require confirmation by the CA for a public office created by statute. This would be unconstitutional as it expands the powers of the CA [Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636 (1992)].
Disapproval vs. Bypass
An ad interim appointee disapproved by the COA cannot be reappointed. But a by-passed appointee, or one whose appointment was not acted upon the merits by the CA, may be appointed again by the President, because failure by the CA to confirm an ad interim appointment is not disapproval. Renewal of by-passed appointment “A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution.
Absent such decision, the President is free to
renew the ad interim appointment of a bypassed appointee.” An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment, and its being subject to confirmation does not alter its permanent character. (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, 140 SCRA 22) Classification of appointments into regular and ad interim can be used only when referring to the four (4) categories of appointments made by the President of the Philippines in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, viz.: (a) Heads of executive departments; (b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (c) Officers of the armed forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and (d) Officers whose appointments are vested in the President under the Constitution. (Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549) 3. Midnight Appointments General rule: A President or Acting President shall not make appointments two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term Exception: Temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution] This provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure. [De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136 (2001)] The prohibition does not apply to Members of the Supreme Court and the judiciary. [De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, (2010)] b. Appointing Power Par. 1, Sec. 16, Art. VII, Constitution The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Power to Appoint as Presidential Prerogative The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government. [Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554 (2006)]. However, the grant of power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards, the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board. The Constitution is clear that the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. Four Groups of Officers the President is Authorized to Appoint [Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974 (1987)] 1. Specifically enumerated under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, i.e.: a. Heads of the executive departments; b. Ambassadors; c. Other public ministers and consuls; d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; e. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution; 1. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 2. Officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 3. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
C. Powers and Duties of Public Officers
1. Scope of power of a public officer
l Source of Powers of Public Officer Authority of Public Officers is derived from the people themselves. The people, directly or through representatives, create offices and agencies as they deem desirable for the administration of the public function. [DE LEON] Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. [Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987 Constitution] The right to be a public officer, then, or to exercise the powers and authority of a public office, must find its source in some provision of the public law.
In the absence of a valid grant, public officials
are devoid of power. A public official exercises power, not rights. The Government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-26534 (1969)]. But once the power is expressly granted, it will be broadly construed in line with the doctrine of necessary implication. [DE LEON] Doctrine of Necessary Implication All powers necessary for the effective exercise of the express powers are deemed impliedly granted [NACHURA] Authority can be exercised only during the term when the public officer is, by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office. Territorial limitation of authority of public officers: a. The authority of public officers is limited to territory where law has effect, by virtue of which they claim, has sovereign force – the authority cannot exist in places where the law has no effect b. Action at a place not authorized by law is ordinarily invalid – where a public officer authorized by law to perform his office at a particular place, action at a place not authorized by law is invalid. (i.e. judge levying and selling property outside its jurisdiction is invalid.) [DE LEON] Duration of authority Limited to the term during which he is by law invested with the rights and duties of the office [DE LEON] Construction of grant of powers Express grants of power are subject to a strict interpretation and will be construed as conferring those powers only which are expressly imposed or necessarily implied. [DE LEON; Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Monetary Board, G.R. 70054 (1991)] 2. Classification of Powers and Duties a. As to Nature 1. Ministerial – Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. Where the officer or official body has no judicial power or discretion as to the interpretation of the law, and the course to be pursued is fixed by law, their acts are ministerial only. [State ex rel. School Dist. v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86 (Neb. 1956)] General Rule: Performance of duties of this nature may be properly delegated to another. Exceptions • Delegation is expressly prohibited by law; or • The law expressly requires that the act be performed by the officer in person. Mandamus will lie but only upon a clear showing of a legal right [Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court] 2. Discretionary – Acts which necessarily require the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course pursued. When the law commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts and acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature, the function is discretionary (e.g. quasijudicial acts). General Rule: A public officer cannot delegate his discretionary duties to another. Rationale: In cases where the execution of the office requires exercise of judgment or discretion by the officer, the presumption is that he was chosen to because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise such judgment. Exception: The power to substitute another in his place has been expressly granted by law.
Mandamus will not lie for the performance of a
discretionary duty. Exception to the Exception: When the discretion is granted only as to the manner of its exercise and not the discretion to act or not to act, the court may require a general action [BF Homes v. National Water Resources Council, G.R. No. 78529 (1987)] b. As to the Obligation of the Officer to Perform His/Her Powers and Duties 1. Mandatory – Powers conferred on public officers are generally construed as mandatory although the language may be permissive, where they are for the benefit of the public or individuals. 2. Permissive – Statutory provisions define the time and mode in which public officers will discharge their duties, and those which are obviously designed merely to secure order, uniformity, system and dispatch in public business are generally deemed directory. If the act does not affect third persons and is not clearly beneficial to the public, permissive words will not be construed as mandatory. [DE LEON] c. As to the Relationship of the Officer to His/Her Subordinates 1. Power of Control – It implies the power of an officer to manage, direct or govern, including the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment for that of the latter. 2. Power of Supervision – Supervisory power is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body which does not include any restraining authority over such body. A supervising officer merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. [DE LEON] 3. Duties of Public Officers a. General (Constitutional) duties 1. To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; to act with patriotism and justice; and to lead modest lives [Sec. 1, Art. IX] 2. To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law [Sec. 17, Art. XI] 3. To owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times [Sec. 18, Art. XI] [NACHURA] 4. Duty to make financial disclosures for Members of Congress— All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interest. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. [Sec. 12, Art. VI] b. Duties of Public Officers as Trustees for the Public 1. In general a. Duty to obey the law b. Duty to accept and continue in office c. Duty to accept burden of office d. Duty as to diligence and care in the performance of official duties e. Duty in choice and supervision of subordinates 2. Ethical duties – bound to perform honestly, faithfully, and to the best of his ability, and to act primarily for the benefit of the people. An attempt to exercise those powers corruptly for some improper purpose is null and void. a. Duty to refrain from outside activities that interfere with the proper discharge of their duties b. Duty not to use his official power to further his own interest. c. Duty to act with civility [DE LEON]
c. Specific Duties under the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 1. Act promptly on letters and requests 2. All public officials shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communication sent by the public. The reply must contain the answer taken on the request. 3. Submit annual performance reports 4. All heads or other responsible officers of agencies of the government or of GOCCs shall, within forty-five (45) working days from the end of the year, render a full and complete report of performance and accomplishments, as prescribed by existing rules and regulations of the agency, office or corporation concerned. 5. Process documents and papers expeditiously 6. All official papers and documents must be processed and completed within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more than three (3) signatories therein. 7. Act immediately on the public’s personal transactions 8. All public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices, and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously. 9. Make documents accessible to the public 10. All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours [DE LEON, citing Sec. 5, R.A. 6713].
D. Rights of Public Officers
1. Rights incident to public office
a. The rights of one elected or appointed to office are, in general, measured by the Constitution or the law under which he was elected or appointed. b. Right to office – The just and legal claim to exercise the powers and the responsibilities of public office. 2. Rights as a Citizen a. Protection from publication commenting on his fitness and the like i. The mere fact that one occupies a public office does not deprive him of the protection accorded to citizens by the Constitution and the laws. ii. However, by reason of the public character of his employment or office, a public officer is, in general, held not entitled to the same protection from publications commenting on his fitness and the like, as is accorded to the ordinary citizen. b. Engaging in certain political and business activities i. Public employees may be required to suspend or refrain from certain political or business activities that are embraced within the constitutional rights of others, when such activities are reasonably deemed inconsistent with their public status and duties. [DE LEON] c. Right to Compensation/ Salary Compensation In reference to the remuneration of public officers, whether it is in the form of a fixed salary or wages, per diems, fees, commissions, or perquisites of whatsoever character. Distinguished from honorarium which is something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered. Salary Personal compensation to be paid to the public officer for his services, and it is generally a fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the time and not on the amount of the services he may render [DE LEON] Basis of Right to Compensation [DE LEON] 1. Created by law 2. Services rendered - actual performance of duties Exceptions: Vacation leaves under CSC MC No. 41-98; Preventive suspension subsequently found to be unjustified [Gloria v. CA, G.. No. 131012 (1999)]; Back salaries in case of reinstatement [Constantino-David v. Pangandaman- Gania, G.R. No. 156039 (2003)]. 3. Compensation fixed by law 4. Legal title to office Exception: When there is no de jure officer claiming the office, the de facto officer is entitled to salaries for the period when he actually discharged functions [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896 (1991)]. 5. Amount of compensation 6. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions [Sec. 5, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution]. Salary Not Subject to Garnishment The salary of a public officer may not, by garnishment, attachment or order of execution, be seized before being paid to him and appropriated for the payment of his debts. [The Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-9031, (1922)]. Delivery required The salary check of a government officer or employee does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time, the check belongs to the government as public fund and may not be garnished. [De la Victoria v. Burgos, G.R. No. 111190(1995)]. Prohibition against receiving additional , double, or indirect compensation No elective or appointive public officer employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation [Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution]. Ex Officio Position The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive any other form of additional compensation for his services in the said position [Philippine Health Insurance Corp v. COA, G.R. No. 222838, (2018)] Other Constitutional Provisions Regarding Compensation of Public Officers a. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase [Sec. 10, Art. VI] b. The salaries of the President and Vice- President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not emolument from the Government or any other source. [Sec. 6, Art. VII] c. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. [Sec. 10, Art. VIII] 3. Other Rights [DE LEON] Rights under the Constitution a. Right to self-organization The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B] b. Right to protection of temporary employees Employees in the government given temporary appointments do not enjoy security of tenure. They shall be given such protection as may be established by law to prevent indiscriminate dismissals. c. Freedom of members of Congress from arrest and from being questioned A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof [Sec. 11, Art. VI]. d. Right not to be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law Rights under the Civil Service Decree and the New Administrative Code a. Right to preference in promotion b. Right to present complaints and grievances c. Right not to be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process d. Right to organize On the right to Collective Bargaining in government employment, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. While employees of chartered GFIs enjoy the constitutional right to bargain collectively, they may only do so for non economic benefits. The DBP is bound by the Salary Standardization Law, and monetary awards and benefits can only be granted in accordance with the law. SSL: "coverage, conditions for the grant, including the rates of allowances, benefits, and incentives to all government employees, shall be rationalized in accordance with the policies to be issued by the President upon recommendation of the Department of Budget and Management." [DBP v. COA, G.R. No. 210838 (2018)] Rights under the Revised Government Service Insurance Act Covered employees are entitled to retirement benefits, separation benefits, unemployment or involuntary separation benefits, disability benefits, survivorship benefits, funeral benefits and life insurance benefits. Right to Retirement Pay Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiree [Profeta v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104139 (1992)]. It may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government [Tantuico v. Domingo, G.R. No. 96422 (1994)]. Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity When a public officer, in the due performance of his duties, has been expressly or impliedly required by law to incur expenses on the public account, not covered by his salary or commission and not attributable to his own neglect or default, the reasonable and proper amount thereof forms a legitimate charge against the public for which he should be reimbursed. Within the same limits, the officer is entitled to be indemnified by the public against the consequences of acts which he has been expressly or impliedly required to perform upon the public account, and which are not manifestly illegal and which he does not know to be wrong. Right to Reinstatement and Back Salary Reinstatement The restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. One who is reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to the dismissal. Back salary or wages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal. Back Salary An officer who has been lawfully separated or suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was so suspended. Where an officer was unlawfully removed and was prevented for a time by no fault of his own from performing the duties of his office, he may recover back wages, and the amount that he had earned in other employment during his unlawful removal should not be deducted from his unpaid salary. The officer cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service. [Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, supra] Right to Property, Devices and Inventions Title to a public office carries with it the right, during the incumbency of the officer, to the insignia and property thereof. The question whether records, discoveries, inventions, devices, data and the like, made or prepared by an officer while he is occupying the office, belong to the public, must be determined with reference to the facts of each case. a. Where such are indispensable in the proper conduct of the office, the officer may not take them as his own property. b. If, not being required by law, they are prepared by the officer apart from his official duties and are not indispensable in the proper conduct of the office, the officer may acquire a property right therein.
Henk Visser v. Supreme Court of State of California California State Bar Commission on Judicial Performance, Henk Visser v. Richard Thornburgh, Henk Visser v. Superior Court/appellate Department for the County of Los Angeles Commission on Judicial Performance Supreme Court of State of California, and City of Los Angeles, Real Parties in Interest. Henk Visser v. Supreme Court of the State of California Court of Appeals, for the Second Appellate District of California State of California, Henk Visser v. Sheldon Sloan Demsey Klein, 919 F.2d 113, 2d Cir. (1990)