Case Diary

Coordinated by: Mrs.S.Vaikunthavasan

Edited by: Suganya Selvalaxan

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CONTENTS PAGE NO
1. Kershaw V. Nicoll 04
2. Williams V. Robertson 05
3. Kapuruharmy V. Appuhamy 06
4. Mudiyanse V. Appuhamy 07
5. Sivagnanalingam V. Sunenthiralingam 08
6. Sivakumar V. Rajasegaram 09
7. Bentley V. Craven (1853) 10
8. Pathirana V. Pathirana 11
9. Pillans Bros V Pillans 12
10. Hamlyn v John Houston and Co 13
11. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893). 14
12. Gibson v. Manchester City Council, (1979) 16
13. Gunthing v. Lynn 17
14. Harvey v. Facey 18
15. Harris V. Nickerson 19
16. Partridge v. Crittenden 20
17. Fisher v. Bell (1960) 21
18. Hyde v. Wrench 22
19. Neale v. Merret 23
20. Dickinson v. Dodds 24
21. Routledge v Grant [1828] 25
22. Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v. Montefiore (1866) 26
23. Roscorla v. Thomas (1842) 27
24. Lipton v. Buchanan 28
25. Jayawickrema v. Amerasuriya 29
26. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. V Customs and Excise Commissioner 30
27. Balfour v. Balfour 31
28. Merritt v. Merritt 32
29. Nash v. Inman 33
30. AG v. Costa 34
31. Imperial Loan Company v Stone (1892) 35
32. Foster v Mackinnon 36

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33. Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) and Said v. Butt (1920) 37
34. Raffles v Wichelhaus 38
35. Couturier V. Hastie(1852) 39
36. Bell V. Lever Brothers 40
37. Poussard V. Spiers 41
38. JongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd V. Kawasaki Krisha Ltd (1962) 42
39. Cutter V. Landauer 43
40. Taylor V. Caldwell 44
41. Condor V. Barron Knight 45
42. Krell V. Hentry (1903) 46
43. Avery V. Bowden 47
44. Bank v Macmillan Arthur(1918) 48
45. Greenwood V. Martin’s Bank Ltd (1933) 49
46. Bavins Junior v London and South Western Bank (1900) 50
47. Arab Bank v Ross 51
48. Eaglehill Ltd v Needham Builders (1972) 52
49. Brooke v Hook (1871) 53
50. Don Carolis v De Soysa and Co.Ltd. 54
51. Vallipuram v Samthanam. 55
52. Ernest v Lebbe 56
53. Kandar v Sinnatchipillai 57
54. Sinnathangam v Meeramohaideen 58
55. Griffiths-v-fleming 59

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 Kandyan Law

1. Kershaw V. Nicoll
Subject: Kandyan Law

Year: 1860

Plaintiff: Kershaw

Defendant: Nicoll

Issues: Wife of a Scot domiciled in Kandy was held to be entitled to hold property
acquired by her as a separate estate in accordance with Kandyan law.

Court judgment: Supreme Court held the Kandyan Law should be applied to all
litigation in the Kandyan Provinces. The persons governed by Kandyan law would
have to prove that they had a Kandyan domicile, as distinct from a Ceylon domicile.

Today Kandyan law is not territorial but a personal law. This was brought about as a
result of radical changes by the Supreme Court on the applicability of Kandyan law:

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 2. Williams V. Robertson

Subject: Kandyan Law

Year: 2008

Plaintiff: Williams

Defendant: Robertson

Issue: In Williams v Robertson, the defendants were two Europeans, a husband and a
wife, who argued that as they were domiciled in Kandy, the Kandyan law applied to
them and the wife had a right to possess her property independent of her husband, Can
a person who comes to Ceylon and resides in Kandy acquire Kandyan domicile as a
choice distinct from Ceylon domicile?

Court’s reasoning: The court decided in the negative, Would European domiciled in
Ceylon by reason of residence in Kandy give wife the status of a Kandyan wife?

Conclusion: William v Robertson – overruled Kershaw v Nicoll; in this case a full

bench held that Kandyan law was personal law which applied only to Kandyan
Singhalese.

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 3. Kapuruharmy V. Appuhamy

Subject: Kandyan Law

Year: 1910

Plaintiff: Kapuruharmy

Defendant: Appuhamy

Issue: It is about the native of a child of a Low-country Sinhalese man, who had become
permanently settled in the district of Kandy and had married a Kandyan woman under
the Kandyan Marriage Law.

Rule of Law: Roman Dutch law applied to a child of mixed marriage between low
country Sinhalese man and Kandyan woman.

Court’s Reasoning: The child is not a Kandyan. So that, Kandyan law did not apply
to the case of Law-country Sinhalese who had settled in the Kandyan province.

Conclusion:
Children of Low country Sinhalese man settled in Kandyan district who married a
Kandyan woman are not kandyan. They can’t follow kandyan law.

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 4. Mudiyanse V. Appuhamy

Subject: Kandyan Law

Year: 1913

Palintiff: Mudiyanse

Defendant: Appuhamy

Issues: Plaintiff purchased the entirety of the land from Samuel Appu, a Kandyan who was
married with a Low-country Sinhalese woman, Mango Nona and John Sinno was their son.
Defendant had purchase the same land from Brampy, Mango Nona’s brother. The land
selling was happened after John Sinno’s death who was the original owner of the land.Can
the offspring of a Kandyan father by a Low-country Sinhalese woman be regarded as a
Kandyan? And who is the heir of that child?

Court reasoning: The child acquires the nationality and domicile of the father, and
would have to be taken as a Kandyan. Heir of the property of children born in a bina
marriage would be the maternal uncles or next of kin on the mother's side. The plaintiff's
action for declaration of title is dismissed with costs.

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 Thesawalamai Law

5. Sivagnanalingam V. Sunenthiralingam

Subject: Thesawalamai Law

Year: 1988

Plaintiff: Nagalingam Sivagnanalingam

Defendant: Nagalingam Suntheralingam’s 2nd Wife (the widow)

Issue: Suntheralingam died in 1974. Sivagnanalingam made an application for the grant
of letters of administration in respect of the estate of the deceased against the 9th
respondent of the case (the deceased 2nd wife). Here, the meaning of the expression
“Inhabitant of the Province of Jaffna” is a question of law.

Rule of Law: Thesawalamai would not apply to Jaffna Tamils only if there is
“unequivocal evidence of abandonment of inhabitancy in Jaffna.”

Conclusion: The basic contention of the respondent was that the deceased was not
governed by the law of Thesawalamai and that hence succession to his estate should be
in accordance with the provisions of the Matrimonial Rights and Inheritance Ordinance
of 1876 as amended.

Reference: http://www.commonlii.org/lk/cases/LKSC/1988/9.html

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 6. Sivakumar V. Rajasegaram

Subject: Thesawalamai law & Rules regarding creation of Partnership

Year: 1962

Plaintiff: Sivakumaran

Defendant: .Rajasegaram

Issue: The plaintiff instituted the present action against the defendant for a declaration
that he, the plaintiff, was the owner of a two-third share of the assets and goodwill of
the business and for an order on the defendant for an accounting of all the assets and of
the profits of the business from the 31st December 1950. The claim was made on the
basis of a co-ownership.

Rule of Law: In a partnership business it is not essential that the partners’ shares in the
business should be equal.

Conclusion: In this case, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim that, under section 96
of the Trusts Ordinance, the defendant must be held to be a trustee for the plaintiff.

Reference : http://www.commonlii.or g/lk/cases/LKCA/1962/67.html

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 7. Bentley V. Craven (1853)

Subject: Thesawalamai law & Duties of partners

Year: 1853

Plaintiff: Bentley

Defendant: Craven

Issue: Craven bought huge stock of sugar on his own account and later sold it to the
partnership at a profit, without declaring his interest to other partners.

Rule of law: partnership law, Duty of good faith, the duty to account. Every partner
should be just, faithful and observe utmost good faith towards every other partner of
the firm. Section 29 of the PA 1980 provides that partners must account to the firm for
any benefit obtained, without consent, from any transaction concerning the partnership;
its property, including information derived from membership of the partnership; its
name; or its business connection.

Court’s reasoning:
The profit obtained from a partnership business must be divided among the partners. It
is not justice to make individual profits from a partnership.

Conclusion:
The partnership was entitled to recover the profit from the defendant.

References:
http://upload.news.esnai.com/news/20053713264089904.pdf
http://www.balohpedia.com/2014/02/partners-and-each-other.html
http://businesslawfaculty.blogspot.com/2012/11/law-relating-to-partnership.html
https://quizlet.com/gb/293398223/fiduciary-duties-flash-cards/

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 8. Pathirana V. Pathirana

Subject: Thesawalamai law & Duties of partners

Year: 1966

Plaintiff: Ariya pathirana

Defendant: Robert watte pathirana

Issue: A partnership between the parties had held a contract for the exclusive supply of
a foreign company’s goods in Ceylon. One of the partners cancelled the partnership’s
contract and took a new contract in his name alone. This contract was said to be personal
to that partner.

Rule of law:
Partnership law, after termination one partner carries on the partnership business using
the capital of other, that partner is liable to account to the partnership.

Court’s reasoning: This new contract was to be treated as partnership property. Since
it arose out of the substantial goodwill which the partnership had generated.

Conclusion:
The Privy Council advised that this new contract was to be treated as partnership
property. After termination one partner carries on the partnership business using the
capital of other, that partner is liable to account to the partnership.

Reference
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b2897cf2c94e06b9e19b82
https://swarb.co.uk/pathirana-v-pathirana-pc-28-jun-1966/

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 9. Pillans Bros V Pillans

Subject: Thesawalamai law & Duties of partners

Year: 1908

Plaintiff: Pillans Bros

Defendant: Pillans

Issue: One of the partners in a business that manufactured nuts and bolts bought another
nut and bolt factory a few miles away and began operating as a sole trader.

Rule of Law: Partnership Law, duty not to compete with the firm: A partner who carries
on a competing business of the same nature as the partnership’s business without his
partners’ consent must account for any profits made by him in that business.

Court’s Reasoning: The court held that he had to share profits with the partnership.
Presumably, then, the other partners had to take on a "share" of the liabilities connected
with the new factory.

Conclusion: Breach of fiduciary duties and was held in court that he had to account to
the partnership for the profits made in the business.

References: https://wenku.baidu.com/view/d93f5e24ccbff121dd36839f
https://quizlet.com/203941164/business-entities-flash-cards/

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 10. Hamlyn v John Houston and Co

Subject: Thesawalamai law & Liabilities of Partners- Liability for torts

Year: 1903

Plaintiff: Hamlyn

Defendant: John Houston and Co

Issue: One activity of the defendant, John Houston and Co as grain merchants was to
obtain, by lawful means, information about its competitors' activities. Houston, a
partner in the firm, obtained confidential information on the plaintiff Hamlyn's business
by bribing one of Hamlyn's employees.

Rule of Law: Vicarious liability: The firm is only liable where the partner was acting
(i) in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or
(ii) With the authority of his co-partners and where
(iii) Loss or injury is caused to any person not being a partner.

Court’s Reasoning: The firm was liable for the loss suffered by Hamlyn. If it was
within the scope of Houston's authority to obtain the information by legitimate means,
then for the purpose of vicarious liability it was within the scope of his authority to
obtain it by illegitimate means and the firm was liable accordingly. This was on the
broad 'risk' principle: the principal having selected the agent, and being the person who
will have the benefit of his efforts if successful, it is not unjust he should bear the risk
of the agent 'exceeding his authority in matters incidental to the doing of the acts the
performance of which has been delegated to him'.

Conclusion: It was held that the firm was liable to the rival for the resulting loss, despite
the unlawful means used by the partner to obtain the information.

References: https://swarb.co.uk/lisc/VicLi19001929.php
https://www.coursehero.com/file/p3e7bjd/2-Hamlyn-v-John-Houston-and-Co-
1903-acting-within-the-scope-of-the-authority/

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 Agreement

11. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co

Subject: Agreement & Invitation to treat

Year: 1892

Plaintiff: Mrs. Louisa Elizabeth Carlill

Defendant: Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.

Issue: The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. made a product called the "smoke ball" and
claimed it to be a cure for influenza and a number of other diseases. They published
advertisements in newspapers, claiming that it would pay £100 (equivalent to £11,000
($ 13,390) in 2019) to anyone who got sick with influenza after using its product
according to the instructions provided with it. Mrs. Carlill who used it but later
contracted the flu, claimed £100 from the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company. The issue is
to know whether there as binding contract between the parties.

Rule of Law: According to the English contract law decision, an advertisement

containing certain terms to get a reward constituted a binding unilateral offer that could
be accepted by anyone who performed its terms.

Court’s Reasoning:
The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the company’s arguments and held that there
was a fully binding contract for £100 with Mrs. Carlill. They stated,
1. That the advertisement was a unilateral offer to the entire world

2. The satisfying conditions for using the smoke ball constituted acceptance of the offer.
3. That purchasing or merely using the smoke ball constituted good consideration,
because it was a distinct detriment incurred at the behest of the company and,
furthermore, more people buying smoke balls by relying on the advert was a clear
benefit to Carbolic .

4. That the company’s claim that £1000 was deposited at the Alliance Bank showed the
serious intention to be legally bound.

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Conclusion: In unilateral contracts, communication of acceptance is not expected or
necessary. Statements made in an advertisement may be a mere “puff” and not intended
to be legally binding. If the advertisement shows a clear promissory intention to be
legally bound, it may constitute a unilateral offer

REFERENCES: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlill_v_Carbolic_Smoke_Ball_Co
https://www.deakin.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/728211/carlillvcarbol.pdf

12. Gibson v. Manchester City Council

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Subject: Agreement & Offer must be a definite one and not doubtful

Year: 1979

Plaintiff: Gibson

Defendant: Manchester City Council

Issue: He filled out and sent the application form he had received from the council and
in response received a letter from the council stating that it might be able to sell the
property to him. Mr. Gibson asked the council if the selling price could be lower as the
path to the property was in need of repair. The council stated that the price quoted had
factored in the condition of the path and hence the price was not negotiable. On 18
March 1971 Mr. Gibson sent a letter to the council asking to initiate the process for
purchasing the property as requested in the application he had sent. However, before
the process for selling the property could be initiated, the control of the council changed
in May 1971 and the council decided not to sell the property to Mr. Gibson.

Court reasoning: An invitation to treat is not an offer but merely an act in negotiation.

Contract Law
13. Gunthing v. Lynn

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Subject: Contract law

Year: 1831

Plaintiff: Gunthing

Defendant: Lynn

Issue: The buyer of a horse, who was the plaintiff in this case, promised the seller that
they would pay $5 more for the horse, or buy another horse from the seller if the horse
was lucky. The horse was not in the condition that the plaintiff believed and a dispute
arose between the parties as to whether the seller was owed the conditional payment
mentioned by the buyer.

Court reasoning: The court held that the condition to pay $5 extra for the horse if it
was lucky was deemed to be too vague to create a binding contract between the parties.
The words contained in an agreement must be clear so that the parties can be sure of
the terms upon they are contracting. As a result of this, the only part of the transaction
that was sufficient for the court was the purchase of the horse for the price of $63 and
that was the vast majority of the legal agreement between the parties.

14. Harvey v. Facey

Subject: offer and supply of information.
Year: 1893

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Plaintiff: Harvey

Defendant: Facey

Issue: Harvey was interested in buying a Jamaican property owned by Facey. He sent
Facey a telegram stating “Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash
price – answer paid.” Facey responded stating “Bumper Hall Pen £900”.Harvey
responded stating that he would accept £900 and asking Facey to send the title deeds.
Facey then stated he did not want to sell. Harvey sued, stating that the telegram was an
offer and he had accepted, therefore there was a binding contract.

Court’s reasoning: Privy Council held that the indication of lowest acceptable price
does not constitute an offer to sell. Rather it is considered as an invitation to sell.

Conclusion: It is important in case law that it defined the difference between an offer
and supply of information.

15. Harris V. Nickerson

Subject: Requirements of offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract

Year: 1873
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Plaintiff: Harris

Defendant: Nickerson

Issue: The defendant was an auctioneer who had advertised in the London papers that
certain brewing materials, plant, and office furniture would be sold by him the plaintiff
was a commission broker in London, who attended the sale on the final day. However,
on that day, all the lots of furniture were withdrawn by the defendant. The claimant
sought to recover his expenses and the time wasted by attending, arguing that the
withdrawal of the lots was a breach of contract which had been formed by the offer
made by the defendant in the advertisement, and accepted by the claimant.
The issue was whether the advertisement placed by the defendant was a legally binding
offer of sale, which had been accepted by the claimant’s attendance at the auction,
forming a completed contract.

Court reasoning: The court held, dismissing the claimant’s case, that the
advertisement was merely a declaration to inform potential purchasers that the sale was
taking place. It was not an offer to contract with anyone who might act upon it by
attending the auction, nor was it a warranty that all the articles advertised would be put
or sale. As such, it did not legally bind the defendant to auction the items in question
on any particular day.

References
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/harris-v-nickerson.php

16. Partridge v. Crittenden

Subject: Invitations to treat in contract law

Year: 1968

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Plaintiff - Anthony Ian Crittenden

The defendant - Robert Partridge

Issue: The defendant advertised for sale a number of Bramble finch cocks and hens,
stating that the price was to be 25 shillings for each. Under the Protection of Birds Act
1954, it was unlawful to offer for sale any wild live bird. The Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) brought a prosecution against the defendant
under the Act. At his trial, the defendant was found guilty of the offence by the
magistrates. Partridge appealed against conviction.
The issue on appeal was whether the advertisement was properly construed as an offer
of sale in which case the defendant was guilty) or an invitation to treat (in which case
he had committed no offence).

Court reasoning: The court held that the advertisement was not an offer but an
invitation to treat, and as such the defendant was not guilty.

References
https://youtu.be/0YtxRvVTVzs
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partidge_v_Crittenden

17. Fisher v. Bell (1960)

Subject: The requirements of offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract

Year: 1960

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Plaintiff: fisher

Defendant: bell

Issue: Fisher vs Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 is an English contract law case concerning the
requirements of formation of contract. In the formation of contract, the case established
that, where goods are displayed in a shop together with a price label, such display is
treated as an invitation to treat by the seller, and not an offer. The issues were whether
the display of knife constituted offer for a sale. In which case the defendant was guilty
or an invitation he was not. The issue was whether the display of the knife constituted
an offer for sale or a
Invitation to treat.

Court reasoning: The court held that in accordance with the general principles of
contract law, the display of the knife was not an offer of sale but merely an invitation
to treat, and as such the defendant had not offered the knife for sale within the meaning
of s1(1) of the Act. Although it was acknowledged that in ordinary language a layman
might consider the knife to be offered for sale, in legal terms its position in the window
was inviting customers to offer to buy it.

References
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/fisher-v-bell.php

18. Hyde v. Wrench

Subject: Termination of Offer

Year: 1840

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Plaintiff: Hyde

Defendant: Wrench

Issue:
Wrench offered to sell his farm in Luddenham to Hyde for £1200, an offer which Hyde
declined. On 6 June 1840 Wrench wrote to Hyde's agent offering to sell the farm for
£1000, stating that it was the final offer and that he would not alter from it. Hyde offered
£950 in his letter by 8 June, and after examining the offer Wrench refused to accept,
and informed Hyde of this on 27 June. On the 29th Hyde agreed to buy the farm for
£1000 without any additional agreement from Wrench, and after Wrench refused to sell
the farm to him, he sued for breach of contract.

Rule of Law: English contract law related to the issue on counter-offers and their
relation to initial offers.

Court’s Reasoning: Under the circumstances stated in this bill, I think there exists no
valid binding contract between the parties for the purchase of this property. Plaintiff
made an offer of his own, to purchase the property for £950, and he thereby rejected
the offer previously made by the defendant. I think that it was not afterwards competent
for him to revive the proposal of the defendant, by tendering an acceptance of it; and
that, therefore, there exists no obligation of any sort between the parties.

Conclusion: There was no contract. Where a counter offer is made this destroys the
original offer so that it is no longer open to the offered to accept.

References: https://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Hyde-v-Wrench.php
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyde_v_Wrench

19. Neale v. Merret

Subject: Offer & Acceptance

Year: 1930

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Plaintiff: Neale

Defendant: Merret

Issue:
The defendant made an offer to sell land to the plaintiff for £280. The plaintiff replied
accepting the offer, enclosing £80 and promising to pay the balance in four monthly
instalments.

Court’s reasoning:
The proposal for deferred payment was a variation of the terms of the offer. No
acceptance since the normal terms of a contract for the sale of land are that the entire
price is payable as a single sum at completion. Therefore the plaintiff’s acceptance was
not an unqualified one

References
https://www.cram.com/flashcards/business-law-contract-acceptance-6574164
https://books.google.lk/books

20. Dickinson v. Dodds

Subject: Contract

Year: 1876

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plaintiff: Dickson

Defendant: Dodds

Issue: Dodds delivered an offer to sell houses to Dickinson on Wednesday. Dodds

promised to keep open the offer until 9 A.M. Friday. Although Dickinson decided to
accept the offer on Thursday, he said nothing to Dodds because the offer was valid until
Friday morning. Another man told Dickinson that the homes had already been sold to
someone. Dickinson met Dodds at 7 A.M. Friday then argued about the offer. Dodds
said it was too late. Dickinson decided to sue for breach of contract. The issue was
whether Mr. Dodds had promised to keep the offer until Friday morning and whether
the claim was binding between the two parties.

Court’s reasoning:
The court held that Mr. Dodds' statement was nothing more than a promise. In fact,
there was no binding contract formed.

References
Law teacher, (2020) Dickson v Dodds https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/dickinson-v-
dodds.ph

21. Routledge v Grant [1828]

Subject: Leasing

Year: 1828

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Plaintiff: Routledge

Defendant: Grant

Issue: Grant wrote to Routledge offering to purchase the lease of his house. The offer
was to remain open for six weeks. Grant then changed his mind about purchasing the
lease and, within the six weeks, withdrew his offer. After Routledge had received
Grant’s letter withdrawing the offer he wrote to Grant, within the six weeks, accepting
Routledge’s offer. Whether Grant could withdraw his offer within the six weeks period.
Whether he was bound contractually given that Routledge had accepted the offer within
the timescale.

Court’s reasoning:
The offer could be withdrawn within the six weeks period without incurring any
liability. One party cannot be bound without the other.

References
Law teacher, (2020) Routledge v Grant https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/routledge-v-
grant.php

22. Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v. Montefiore (1866)

Subject: Contract

Year: 1866

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Plaintiff: Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co.

Defendant: Montefiore

Issue:
The defendant, Mr. Montefiore, wanted to purchase shares in the complainant’s hotel.
He put in his offer to the complainant and paid a deposit to his bank account to buy
them in June. This was for a certain price. He did not hear anything until six months
later, when the offer was accepted and he received a letter of acceptance from the
complainant. By this time, the value of shares had dropped and the defendant was no
longer interested. Mr. Montefiore had not withdrawn his offer, but he did not go through
with the sale.

The complainant brought an action for specific performance of the contract against the
defendant. The issue was whether there was a contract between the parties after the
acceptance of the original offer six months after it was made.

Court’s reasoning: The court held that the Ramsgate Victoria Hotel’s action for
specific performance was unsuccessful. It stated that what would be classed as
reasonable time for an offer to lapse would depend on the subject matter. In this case,
it was decided that six months was the reasonable time before automatic expiration of
the offer for shares.

References :
Law teacher,(2020) Ramsgate hotel v Montefiore
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/ramsgate-hotel-v-montefiore.

23. Roscorla v. Thomas (1842)

Subject: contract law

Year: 1842

26
Plaintiff: Roscorla

Defendant: Thomas

Issue: This is a notable case in English contract law. And also, this case Stands as
authority for the principle that past consideration not sufficient consideration to support
a contract. The claimant bought a horse from the defendant. After the sale finished the
defendant told the claimant that it was a sound horse and did not have any vice such as
bad temper. The truth however was quite different from what the claimant had been
told. The horse had very bad temper and was ferocious and the claimant sued the
defendant.

Court’s reasoning:
The court only considered the contract for the sale of the horse. There was not good
consideration. Because this had preceded the defendant’s promise, and also it was not
part of the bargain and not given in exchange for the promise. The consideration for the
soundness warranty had already been made through the original contract of sale, and so
new consideration would have had to be provided in order for the warranty to have legal
effect. This decision demonstrates the rule in English contract law that consideration
contracted for in the past does not amount to good consideration for a present
agreement.

References
Australian contract law,(2020) Rescorla V Thomas
https://www.australiancontractlaw.com/cases/roscorla.html

24. Lipton v. Buchanan

Subject: contract law

Year: 1904

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Plaintiff: Lipton

Defendant: Buchanan

Issue: Sir Thomas Lipton who was a famous planter in Sri Lanka. He had promised
Buchanan not to sue him for a debt due to Lipton from Buchanan’s former partner until
Lipton exhausted all his remedies to recover that debt from that partner.

Court’s reasoning:
The Supreme court held that the matter should be governed not by English law but by
Roman Dutch law under which Lipton’s promise was legally enforceable because it
was made voluntarily and seriously.

References
Law net,(1997) Lipton v Buchanan https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/lipton-v-
buchanan/

25. Jayawickrema v. Amerasuriya

Subject: contract law

Year: 1918

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Plaintiff: Jayawickrema

Defendant: Amerasuriya
Issue: This was the case of Jayawickrema v Amarasuriya (1918) 20 NLR 289. The
plaintiff stated that the defendant had got property from his mother. which was meant
to be held in trust for both the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares. The plaintiff
had wanted to sue the defendant to implement that trust but the plaintiff had not done
so because the defendant had promised to pay him Rs. 150,000/- each year for five
years.
The defendant did not pay this sum and when the plaintiff sued, the defendant argued
that there had been no consideration for the undertaking.

Court’s reasoning:
According to Roman Dutch law applied and that the plaintiff undertaking not to sue the
defendant on the earlier occasion was sufficient to pay the plaintiff the Rs. 150,000/-
for five years as promised. Hence the plaintiff was entitled to sue the defendant for
breach of contract.

REFERENCES
Law net, (1977) Jayawicrama v Amarasuriya
https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/jayawickrama-et-al-v-amarasooriya/ 9

26. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. V Customs and Excise Commissioner (1976)

Subject: contract law

Year: 1976

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Plaintiff: Esso Petroleum Co

Defendant: Excise Commissioner

Issue:
Esso instruct its operator to give one World cup coin to consumer who purchases four
gallons of gas. It was advertised as “free”
Esso, a petrol company, by which customers would receive one free World Cup coin
for every four gallons of petrol purchased. The World Cup coins were manufactured
coins with the head of a 1970 World Cup English footballer on one side and the word
‘Esso’ on another for a sales promotion. Esso ran advertisements The Customs and
Excise Commissioners claimed that the coins were liable to purchase tax as goods
“produced in quantity for general sale,” under the Purchase Tax Act 1963, Sch 1, Group
25. Esso claimed that the coins were free gifts and, thus, there was no sale with the
intention to create legal relations and produce a legal effect.
The question arose as to whether, the distribution of the coins were goods “for general
sale,” and thus sold per a legal obligation by Esso to supply the coins under a contractual
relationship with customers.

Court’s reasoning:
The coins were offered in a commercial context which raised a presumption that they
did intend to be bound. However, the coins were not exchanged for a money
consideration and therefore the coins were not for resale.

References :
Law teacher, (2020) Esso petroleum v commissioners
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/esso-petroleum-v-commissioners.php

27. Balfour v. Balfour

Subject: contract law

Year: 1919

30
Plaintiff: Mrs.Balfour

Defendant: Mr.Balfour

Issue:
A husband worked overseas and agreed to send maintenance payments to his wife. At
the time of the agreement the couple were happily married. The relationship later soured
and the husband stopped making the payments. The wife sought to enforce the
agreement.
Do the husbands promise to pay £30 per month constitute a valid contract which can be
sued upon?

Court’s reasoning:
The agreement was a purely social and domestic agreement and therefore it was
presumed that the parties did not intend to be legally bound.

References
E law sources, (2020) Balfour v Balfour http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Balfour-v-
Balfour.php

28. Merritt v. Merritt

Subject: contract law

Year: 1970

31
Plaintiff: Mrs.Merritt

Defendant: Mr.Merritt

Issue:
Mr. Merritt and his wife jointly owned a house after that Mr. Merritt left to live with
another women. They made an agreement that Mr. Merritt would pay Mrs. Merritt a
euro 40 monthly sum and eventually transfer the house to her. But Mrs. Merritt kept
up the monthly mortgage payments. When the mortgage was paid Mr. Merritt refused
to transfer the house.

Mr. Merritt contended the agreement was a domestic arrangement between husband
and wife and there was no legal intention to create legal relations (non enforceable
contract). Then Mrs. Merritt argued that they were in the process of separation and the
presumption of there being no intention to create legal relations did not apply

Court’s reasoning:
Mr. Merritt’s appeal was unsuccessful because the parties were in the process of
separating and it was an intention to arrangement legal relations. The arrangement was
sufficiently certain to be enforceable and the paying of the mortgage was ample
consideration for Mr. Merritt promise. Mrs. Merritt was entitled to the matrimonial
home entirely.

References
All Answers ltd, 'Merritt v Merritt – 1970' (Lawteacher.net, May 2020)
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/merritt-v-merritt.php?vref=1

29. Nash v. Inman

Subject: sale of goods

32
Year: 1908

Plaintiff: Nash

Defendant: Inman

Issue: Nash, a tailor supplied 13 waistcoats and other things of that kind to an
undergraduate student Inman. Student was a minor and his father had been supplied
adequately clothes for him. Student refused to pay for the goods supplied and tailor
brought this suit against him for recovery of price of those goods.
Whether the goods so supplied fall into the category of necessary? If the answer is No,
whether the contract was enforceable at law? On whom does he onus responsibility to
prove or disprove the necessity of goods so supply fall?

Court’s reasoning:
Inman was a minor and already had enough clothing; the contract could therefore not
be for necessities. Then all three judges agreed with trail judge that judgement should
be entered for the defendant.

References
Australian contract law, (2020) Nash v Inman
https://www.australiancontractlaw.com/cases/nash.html

30. AG v. Costa

Subject: contract law

33
Year: 1921

Plaintiff: AG

Defendant: Costa

Issue: This is regarding a Bond, which is dated on July 24, 1921, by a minor, who is
the first defendant, along with her father, who is the second defendant. The bond says
that, the girl will finish her studies and work as a teacher in a registered school for five
years, otherwise they will pay Rs.300 to the majesty the king. She entered the mussels
training college on 11 November 1920, but she failed in the examination and she left
the college. So the bond breached.

Court’s reasoning:

The bond was not in a correct format but it didn’t affect the validity of the bond. If they
were not immanis or ingens they can be recovered by a penalty under the law.

31. Imperial Loan Company v Stone

Subject: contract law

34
Year: 1892

Plaintiff: Stone

Defendant: Imperial Loan Company

Issue: Defendant when lunatic signed a promissory note as surety upon which plaintiff
brought an action and defendant took the defense of insanity.
Whether defendant can successfully claim insanity as a defense?

Court’s reasoning:
To successfully take the defense of insanity as breach of contract, defendant must
show not only that he was so insane at the time of executing the deed such that he was
incapable of understanding the implications of the agreement; but also that at the time
of the contract his insanity was known to the plaintiff. The burden of proof must lie on
the defendant. Since the jury didn’t find on the second question, hence there must be
new trial.

32. Foster v Mackinnon

Subject: contract law

35
Year: 1896

Plaintiff: Foster

Defendant: Mackinson

Issue: Species of fraud were passed upon by reviewing courts in the ten years following
the decision in Foster v. MacKinnon. From i880 to 1890, about one-fifth of the cases
appeared. There has been a steadily decreasing number since that time. It is a little
strange that the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law has not reinvited
litigation, especially because the uniform draft makes no express reference to the rule,
while in two states it was deemed either necessary or desirable to add a clause expressly
preserving this real defense.

Court’s reasoning: The year following the decision in Foster v. MacKinnon, the
question arose in New York, and on the authority of the English case the same result
was reached.

33. Cundy v. Lindsay

Subject: contract law

36
Year: 1878

Plaintiff: Cunday

Defendant: Lindsay

Issue:
The property, notwithstanding the goods, had been taken from the owner by felony or
trespass The rule of law has been thoroughly established—the cases are numerous, and
I need not cite them—that where a contract is voidable on the ground of fraud, you may
avoid it, so long as the goods remain in the man's hands who is guilty of the fraud, or
in the hands of anybody who takes them from him with notice; but where a person has
fide acquired an interest in the goods, you cannot, as against that person, avoid the
contract.

Court’s reasoning:
If goods are stolen or taken away by trespass, no title whatever is conferred, in general,
upon a purchaser from the person who took them, however, find the purchase may have
been; but if the sale is in market overt to a person who does not know the felony or
trespass, then the purchaser acquires.

34. Raffles v Wichelhaus

Subject: contract law

37
Year: 1864

Plaintiff: Raffles

Defendant: Wichelhaus.

Issue:
Raffles offered to sell Surat cotton to the Wichelhaus. It would be bought by a ship
From Bombay. The ship was called by the Peerless. There were two ships that had the
same name. But both of them thinking about the different Peerless ships. Wichelhaus
thought about which was leave in October, but Raffles sold them which was left in
December. So Wichelhaus refused to pay due to months' delay.

Court’s reasoning:
It is a mutual misunderstanding by the parties a ground for invalidating a contract. The
two parties did not agree to the same thing and there was no binding contract. Therefore,
the defendants prevailed and did not have to pay.

35. Couturier V. Hastie

Subject: contract law

38
Year: 1852

Plaintiff: Gustavus Couturier

Defendant: Robert Hastie.

Issue:
The sales of a specific cargo of corn were on broad for sailing from Salonica to the
UK.When the contract was made the cargo of corn was sold by the master of the ship
because it was fermented.
Buyer would sue for non-delivery of the goods. Seller’s argument was that the buyer
he agreed to pay against delivery of the shipping document. So, it’s a common mistake.

Court’s reasoning:
Between two contracting parties about the possibility of performing of an agreement.
The corn effectively did not exist at the true of contract. There was a total failure of
consideration and the buyer were not liable to pay the price.

36. Bell V. Lever Brothers

Subject: contract law

39
Year: 1932

Plaintiff: Bell

Defendant: Lever Brothers

Issue: Mr. Bell was the managing director for five years of a company that was owned
by Lever Bros Ltd. Mr. Bell had traded for personal profit during his employment,
which was opposite to his contract with the company. Without knowledge of this, Lever
Bros Ltd made an offer of redundancy to Mr. Bell, terminating his contract and offering
a £30,000 payment as compensation.

Due later finding out about his trading whether the redundancy contract that was created
and accepted by Mr. Bell, could be void by a common mistake. Lever Bros Ltd argued
that this cover-up and misconduct was a breach of his duty that was detailed in his
earlier employment contract.
Court’s reasoning:
The court held that the contract was not void, as the mistake was not an ‘essential and
integral’ part of the contract. The personal trading that had happened during the
employment was not related to the subject matter of the contract and was said to be
minor compared to the profits Mr. Bell had made for Lever Bros Ltd. Only a mistake
to the identity of the parties or of subject matter to the contract, as well as an item’s
quality, would be able to successfully negate consent and therefore void a contract as if
it had never existed. The mistake must be essential to the identity of the contract.

37. Poussard V. Spiers

Subject: contract law

40
Plaintiff: Poussard

Defendant: Spiers
Issue:

Madam Poussard was under contract with Spiers, a theatre company to sing in an opera
at the Criterion Theatre. She agreed in writing to sing and play the lead role at Spiers
and Pond’s French opera at the Criterion Theatre for £11 a week for three months. The
opera was to run for three months and started around November 14. The obligation to
perform from the first night was a condition of the contract. The first performance was
announced for November 28 and Poussard did not object to it.
She came to the rehearsals but the composer delayed the music and she did not get the
music for the last part of the opera till a few days before the date of the show (November
28). Thereafter she was taken ill and did not attend the final rehearsals in the last week.
Spiers and Pond engaged another performer, Miss Lewis to be ready to take over if
Poussard could not make it on the first night of the show. It was agreed that Miss Lewis
would receive a douceur if she was not hired, and £15 a week is she was, Poussard
continued to be ill for the first three days of that week. On Thursday December 04, she
was well again, but Spiers and Pond refused to have her back.
Mr. Poussard sued Spiers for the breach of contract and claimed for wrongful dismissal
on his wife’s behalf.
Court’s reasoning:
Was the dimensional of Madam Poussard legally wrong and be treated as breach of
contract? It was held that the absence excused the theatre company from continuing to
employ her. It was further stated that the defendant’s refusal was justified and that they
were not liable in damages. The factor influenced the court most, was that Poussard’s
illness was a serious one of uncertain duration and the defendants could not put off the
opening night until she recovered. The obligation to perform from the first night was a
condition of the contract. Failure to carry out this term entitled the producers to
repudiate their contract with Poussard’s contract.

38. JongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd V. Kawasaki Krisha Ltd

Subject: contract law

41
Year: 1962

Plaintiff: - Jongkong

Defendant: Kawasaki

Issue: Hong Kong Fir agreed to rent their ship to Kawasaki for 24 months and stated
on the date of delivery that the ship was fitted or use in ordinary cargo service. However,
due to the fact that the engine room staff was inefficient and the engines were very old,
the ship was held up for 5 weeks, and then needed 15 more weeks’ worth of repairs
after the deal had been made. Kawasaki repudiated the contract, and Hong Kong Fir
sued for wrongful repudiation. Hong Kong Fir was successful at trial and Kawasaki
appealed. The issue here is, what is the test for determining if a breach of a contract
leads to a right of repudiation Here the appeal was dismissed. Diplock, writing for a
unanimous court, states that the test does not always depend on whether the thing that
was breached was a warranty or a condition, as sometimes the circumstances are more
complex than this. He states that the correct test is to look at the events which have
occurred as a result of the breach at the time
when the contract was purported to be repudiated and to decide if these events deprived
the party attempting to repudiate of the benefits that it expected to receive from the
contract.
Court’s reasoning:
He decides that in this case, as the charterers still get to have the boat for 20 more
months, the expected benefits can still be received. Therefore this breach should not
lead to repudiation, but only to damages.

39. Cutter V. Landauer

Subject: Discharge of contract law

42
Year: 1921

Plaintiff: Cutter

Defendant: Landauer

Issue:
There was an agreement for the sale of 3,000 tons of canned fruit packed in cases of 30
tins. When delivered it was discovered that half the cases contained only 24 tins
although the total number of tins was still 3,000. So, the market values were not
affected.

Court judgement:
The Court of Appeal held that notwithstanding that there was no loss to the buyer, he
could reject the whole consignment because of the breach of s13 of the Sale of Goods
Act (goods must correspond with the description).

Cutter v Powell

Subject: Discharge of contract law

43
Year: 1795

Plaintiff: Cutter

Defendant: Powell

Case background
This case deals with discharge of a contract by partial performance.
Mr. Cutter, a sailor, was hired for a voyage and given a promissory note from his
employment (Mr. Powell) that ten days after the ship arrives at Liverpool, he will be
paid.
Cutter began sailing the ship as second mate for about six weeks, yet died before its
arrival in Liverpool.
Major issue
Mr. Cutter’s wife brought an action for a proportionate part of his due wages for the
substantial amount of the voyage on which he acted as second mate.
His widow was not able to recover any of his wages.
Court judgement
The Court stipulated that, “where parties conclude an express contract, no terms can be
implied into the contract.”
On the facts, even though the sailor was not to blame for failure to perform the contract,
the express terms of the contract renders payment conditional on the full performance
of the contract.
Thus, on a construction of the express terms of the contract, no payment was due for
partial performance.
This situation is now provided for by the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.

40. Taylor V. Caldwell

Subject: Frustration with regards to contract law

44
Year: 1863

Plaintiff: Taylor.

Defendant: Caldwell

Issue: Taylor sued Caldwell for breach of contract to rent out Defendant’s facility for
four concert dates.

Rule of law: The case is a fundamental case in the area of frustration with regards to
contract law.

Court’s reasoning: The parties regarded the continuing existence of the hall as the
foundation of the contract, and the contract contained an implied condition that both
parties would be excused if the hall did not exist. Therefore, the destruction of the hall
without fault of either party excuses both parties, the Plaintiff from taking the gardens
and paying the money and the Defendant from performing their promise to give the use
of the hall.

Conclusion: This is the case where the doctrine of impossibility through destruction of
the subject matter was established in this case.

References: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_v_Caldwell
https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/taylor-v-caldwell.php

41. Condor V. Barron Knight

Subject: Frustration of contract law

45
Year: 1966

Plaintiff: Condor

Defendant: Barron knight

Issue: The claimant suffered a mental breakdown and was told by his doctor that he
should not play the drums perform more than 4 nights per weeks
He brought a claim for wrongful dismissal.16 year old agreed by contract to play the
drums for the defendant band for 7 nights per week for 5 years. was told by his doctor
that he should not perform more than 4 nights per week. The band dismissed him.
Court’s reasoning:
The claimant's action was unsuccessful as his medical condition made it impossible for
him to perform his contractual obligations and the contract was thus frustrated.

42. Krell V. Hentry (1903)

Subject: Frustration of purpose in contract law

46
Year: 1903

Plaintiff: Krell

Defendant: Hentry

Issue:
By contract in writing of 20 June 1902, the defendant agreed to hire from the plaintiff
a flat in Pall Mall on 26 June and 27 June, on which days it had been announced that
the coronation processions would take place and pass along Pall Mall. The contract did
not contain any express terms on the coronation processions or any other purposes for
which the flat was to be hired. The defendant paid the deposit upon signing the contract.
The processions, however, did not take place on the announced dates. As a result, the
defendant declined to pay the balance of the agreed rent.
Court’s reasoning:
Was the defendant obliged to pay the rent despite the fact that the processions did not
take place as planned?

43. Avery V. Bowden

Subject: Discharge of contract law

47
Year: 1856
Plaintiff: Avery
Defendant: Bowden

Issue:
By contract the claimant was to carry cargo for the defendant. The claimant arrived
early to collect the cargo and the defendant told them to sale on as they did not have
any cargo for them to carry and would not have by the agreed date. The claimant
decided to wait around in the hope that the defendant would be able to supply some
cargo. However, before the date the cargo was supposed to be shipped the Crimean war
broke out which meant the contract became frustrated. The claimant therefore lost their
right to sue for breach. Had they brought their action immediately they would have had
a valid claim.

Facts:
A case involving an agreement to supply a cargo for a ship at a port in Russia. The
claimant was advised that the cargo would not be supplied.
Legal Points:
The court decided this was anticipatory breach.
However as the C decided the wait until the end of the agreement expired before
claiming damages the Crimean war with Russia then made the contract unenforceable.

Law of Agency
44. Bank v Macmillan Arthur
48
Subject: Law of Agency
Year: 1918
Plaintiff: Bank
Defendant: Macmillan

Facts: A clerk prepared a cheques for signature for one of the partners of the firm of
stockbrokers. The cheques as presented to the partner was made out in name of firm for
a sum of £ 2, with a large gap between the sterling symbol and the actual figures, and
left the space for the words in blank. The clerk then altered the cheques to £120.00 &
wrote the words “One hundred and twenty pounds” in the blank space. The clerk cashed
the cheques at the bank and took the money for his own purposes. The brokers sued the
bank for breach of contract on the basis that it had only ordered the payment of £2,
whereas the bank had paid out £120.

court’s reasoning:A customer must exercise reasonable care when drawing cheques
so that the bank is not misled.
The customer had breached its duty of care – the alteration of the cheques and loss was
a direct result of the customer’s breach – so that the bank was entitled to debit the
account for £120.
The drawer of a cheques (the customer) was responsible for any loss caused by her
drawing of a cheques in such a manner as to facilitate a fraudulent alteration of the
cheques.
Scope of duty is confined to the mode of drawing and signing of cheques:

45. Greenwood V. Martin’s Bank Ltd

Subject: law of banking

49
Year: 1933
Plaintiff: Greenwood
Defendant: Martin bank

Facts: Greenwood discovered that his wife has forged his signature in a number of
cheques and operated in his account. When he confronted his wife about it, she
promised to stop. Because of his wife’s promise, Greenwood decided not to tell his
bank. However, his wife continued to secretly forge his signature. When he discover
this, he again confronted her and she subsequently committed suicide. Greenwood then
sued the bank for payment on the forgeries.

Issue: Does knowledge of forgeries impose a duty on the customer to tell the bank?
Decision: The customer was estopped from denying that the cheques were authentic.
The error had been contributed to by the customer’s failure to draw the cheques
properly.

Case Reflection: Do you think this was a fair result, given that the individuals in
question were husband and wife and it would be assumed that each would trust the
others?

46. Bavins Junior v London and South Western Bank

50
Subject: Law of banking
Year: 1900
Plaintiff: Bavins
Defendant: London and SW bank

Issue:
In Bavins v. London and South Western Bank, a customer brought a man to the bank
with a cheque drawn by the Great Northern Railway Company and payable to the order
of Bavins, Junior & Sims. The intended cheque contained after the words “Pay, etc,”
the words “Provided the receipt form at foot hereof is duly signed, stamped and dated”.
It was about whether this cheque qualifies as a cheque.
In this case the fact that the bank had credited the customer's account with the
proceeds of the cheque, and that amounts had been drawn out which, on the ordinary
system of appropriation, exhausted those proceeds, was held not to preclude the true
owner from recovering as money had and received, inasmuch as the state of the account
was such as admitted of the bank debiting the amount to the customer, and therefore
the bank were not, in fact, prejudiced, and had not irrevocably altered their position.

Court’s reasoning:
the Court of Appeal held the collecting bank guilty of negligence in not detecting that
an indorsement did not correspond with the name of the payee, though the discrepancy
had apparently escaped notice even in the court below.

47. Arab Bank v Ross

Subject: Bill of exchange

51
Year: 1952
Plaintiff: Ross
Defendant: Arab bank
Issue:-
Ross made a promissory note payable on demand to ‘Fathi and Faysal Nabulsy
Company or order’. One of the partners of that firm indorsed the note ‘Fathi and Faysal
Nabulsy’ omitting the word ‘company’ and discounted it to the Arab Bank. The Arab
Bank claimed against Ross arguing, inter alia, that they were ‘holders in due course’.
Judgement :-
Section 29(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act states that a holder in due course must take
the bill ‘complete and regular’ on the face. Held the Arab Bank were not holders in due
course. The omission of the word ‘company’ raised a reasonable doubt whether the
payees and the indorsers were the same. The Court held that omission of ‘Company’
was sufficient to create reasonable doubt whether the payee and the indorser were
necessarily the same. The bank could not succeed as holders in due course within s29
of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (UK), s34 of the Australian Act.

48. Eaglehill Ltd v Needham Builders

Subject: Bill of exchange
Year: 1972

52
Plaintiff: Eaglehill
Defendant: Needham
Issue:-
Needhams drew a bill of exchange on Fir View Furniture Ltd payable at Lloyd’s Bank
on 31 December. They then discounted it to Eaglehill (who become ‘holder’). Shortly
afterwards, Fir View Furniture went in liquidation and both Needhams and Eaglehill
were aware that the bill would be dishonored upon presentation for payment. Section
49 Bills of Exchange Act provides that the holder of a bill which has been dishonored
may hold the drawer or indorses liable, but only if he gives a ‘notice of dishonor’ after
the bill’s dishonor to those parties. Eaglehill prepared a notice of dishonor dated 1
January but by mistake posted it on 30 December. In the first post of the morning of 31
December, Needhams received the notice and the bank received the bill. Eagle hill sued
Needhams on the bill. Needhams argued that as the notice was given before the bill had
been dishonoured they were discharged from liability.
Judgement:-
Held Needhams were liable. First, the notice is ‘given’ within s 49 when received, and
not when posted. Secondly, where the notice was given on the same day that the bill
was dishonored and it is impossible to prove which preceded the other, the court would
assume that events took place in the order that they ought to have done. Therefore the
House of Lords regarded the notice as having been given after the bill was dishonored.

49. Brooke v Hook

Subject: Parties in an endorsement
Year: 1871

53
Plaintiff: Brooke
Defendant:Hook

Issue:
The question arose as to whether a ‘principal’ could ratify his signature which his
brother-in-low had forged on a promissory note. A man forged his uncle’s signature on
a promissory note. When a third party came into possession of the notes and discovered
the forgery, he intended to bring proceeding against the forger. The uncle then
purported to ratify his nephew’s act by signing the note, but later refused to honor it.
Court judgement:
• When the ‘principal’ was sued on the note, the court drew a distinction
between a voidable act, which can be ratified, and an act which is void and
which cannot be ratified.

• The court held that the act of the ‘agent’ was void and could, therefore, not be
ratified.

50. Don Carolis v De Soysa and Co.Ltd.

Subject: bill of exchange and cheques

Defendant: Who credited the cheques to their accounts

Plaintiff: Don Carolis v De Soysa and Co.Ltd

54
Facts:

▪ 20 cheques crossed ‘not negotiable’ were stolen before they were delivered by the
drawer to the payee.

▪ After the endorsements of the respective payees were forged, the clerk of the
drawer gave the cheques to the defendant who had them credited to their account at
their bank.

▪ It was that the forged endorsements made the cheques inoperative and therefore
defendants had no rights to these cheques.

Court’s reasoning: The defendant has rights to the cheques as the forged signatures
made them invalid.

Customs

55
 51. Vallipuram v Samthanam.

Type of law: - custom

Rule of law: Custom must be curtain and it must be observed as a right.

52. Ernest v Lebbe

Subject: Custom

Year: August 19, 1919

56
Plaintiff: A. St. V. Jayawardene

Defendant: B.F.de Silva

Issue: The appellant claims a right by immemorial custom to expose his goods for sale
outside the shop over the drain by the roadside. It was contended on appeal that this
was a right of market, and that statute giving the local authorities control over the streets
do not in general affect pre-existing market rights. This is not a wright of a market. It
is a claim by an individual to exercise a private and exclusive right over a public street.
This is an appeal from a conviction under section 156 of the Municipal councils
Ordinance No. 6 of 1910.
Court’s reasoning: The learned judge observed such a private owner would be
considerably surprised to find the strip of road alongside his house used by the public
as a market. The cases cited in support of the proposition enunciated by counsel for the
appellant do not apply in this particular instance. So, the appeal was dismissed.
Conclusion: A person cannot by immemorial use acquire a prescriptive right to expose
his goods for sale outside his shop over the drain by the roadside.

53. Kandar v Sinnatchipillai

• Type of law: - custom

57
 • A custom has to confirm with statute law if it was to be recognized as a source
of law. This was described under the Kandar V Sinnatchipillai.

54. Sinnathangam v Meeramohaideen

Subject: Custom

Plaintiff: Sinnathangam

58
Defendant: Meeramohaideen

Reason to case
Due to the custom of the village (Kal- munaikudy), Rs. 600 given to the E.
MEERAMOHAIDEEN(defendant) by A. SINNATHANGAM(plaintiff) was recorded
as Rs. 900 in agreement and legal status of settlement.

Batticaloa district court decision

The indigenous custom couldn’t be granted in violation of the law and the pledge
couldn’t be enforced. On 19th June 1958, judge decided that the lender was not entitled
to relief.
Supreme Court decision
Request for high court to amend the batticaloa district court decision
The plaintiffs demonstrated the unreasonableness of the district court’s decision on two
similar cases, and the defendant party indicated that the actual debt was Rs 600. The
purpose of the money-laundering act is usually the protection of the creditor and can’t
be substantiated by the fact that there is a custom in the village. Therefore, the district
court overruled the district court’s ruling and ordered the plaintiff’s action to be
dismissed with costs in 30th December in 1958.

55. Griffiths-v-fleming
Subject: Insurance
Year: 1909
Plaintiff: Griffiths and his wife

59
Defendant: Fleming

Fact:
Husband and wife have an insurable interest in the life of each other. Griffith and his
wife each signed a proposal form for a joint life policy on their life and both contributed
towards the premium. After the policy was taken, the wife committed suicide and the
husband claimed the sum assured. The insurer alleged that at the time of taking the
policy the husband had no insurable interest in his wife’s life as required by the Life
Assurance Act, 1774. In this case Vaughan Williams L.J. held that ‘the husband has an
interest in his wife’s life which ought to be presumed’.

Court’s reasoning:
It is not uncommon for one partner to ensure the life of another; or for two partners to
insure the life of a third. A husband can be presumed to have an insurable interest in
the life of his wife. A married couple had taken out an insurance policy on their joint
lives.

60