THE PILOT AND THE BRIDGE TEAM:

AN ESSENTIAL AND COMPLEX

RELATIONSHIP

CAPT. SIMON PELLETIER

President

Marine Accident Investigators' International Forum

23rd Meeting
Panama, July 2014
 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

I appreciate this opportunity to be with you today and

thank you for your invitation.

Our organizations have much in common. We are both

very much engaged in the discussions that take place at
IMO and we both pursue the same fundamental objectives of
promoting safe navigation and preventing maritime pollution.
And we both put the public interest at the very center of what
we do.

Being together today to share views on issues of

common interest is an excellent opportunity to get to know
each other a little better, and to see how we can work
together to further these shared objectives.

I understand that, at your meeting last year, the

relationship between the pilot and the bridge team was
discussed and that it is a topic of interest to you. Since, in
addition to my duties as IMPA President and as President of
the Canadian Marine Pilots’ Association, I am also an active
pilot in the Lower St. Lawrence District – and have been for
over 18 years now – I can tell you that the relation between
the pilot and the bridge team is a topic that is also of interest
to me, and one that is of great relevance in the context of my
daily life as a pilot. Having been involved for more than 32
years already in the navigation of ships, dealing with pilots in
my earlier years and with bridge teams in the latter ones, I
believe I have a well-rounded perspective on this very
unique relationship.

I will therefore focus my remarks on this topic, which I

will examine, first, from a somewhat abstract perspective,
and then from a more pragmatic point of view.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

PILOTS AND THE BRIDGE TEAM

Pilots are expected to act, first and foremost, in the

public interest and to maintain a professional judgment that
is independent of any inclination that is not aligned with the
needs of maritime safety.

Pilots are not part of the regular complement of a

vessel. They are typically licensed by an independent
government agency and are dispatched to take all
reasonable actions to prevent ships under their navigational
direction from engaging in unsafe operations.

This independent position provides assurance that

safety remains, at all times, paramount. As a result of this
particular position, pilots are not part of the bridge team.

For their part, bridge teams have to balance

considerations that are not only related to safe navigation
but also to the commercial concerns and imperatives of
shipowners, charterers, agents, ports etc. To some extent,
these considerations could influence the assessment made
of the risks associated with a particular passage.

The safe navigation of a ship obviously involves

teamwork. And this is especially true in waters where risks
are such that compulsory pilotage is required. Pilots are
therefore expected to develop a cooperative working
relationship with the master and bridge crew. The same, of
course, is also true for the master and the bridge team with
the pilot.

IMO recognizes this in Resolution A960. It states that:

Masters and Bridge Officers have a duty to support the Pilot

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

and to ensure that his/her actions are monitored at all times

(A960, Annex 2, paragraph 2.3).

IMO also formally encourages pilotage authorities to

provide pilots with appropriate training on bridge resource
management so as to facilitate communication and
information exchange with the master and the bridge team
and to foster an effective working relationship in both routine
and emergency situations (A960, Annex 1, paragraphs 5.3
and 5.5.4).

Clearly, this is an approach that pilots support. BRM

training is viewed as something that contributes to safety
and as a means for enhancing the performance of
individuals involved in the navigation of vessels.

In addition to IMO-approved BRM training, in order to

maximize the effectiveness of bridge resource management
in pilotage waters, the BRM training of pilots, called BRM-P,
is specifically designed to fully take into account the
particular role that pilots play on the bridge of a vessel.

In general terms, BRM-P aims at ensuring that pilots

use the skills and training that they already possess in ways
that maximize the safety performance of all the individuals
on the bridge.

This training typically seeks to have pilots gain:

- an increase in situational awareness skills;
- improved abilities to foresee and prevent potential
errors before an accident becomes unavoidable;
- a greater regard for the importance of communication
and an understanding of the common barriers to
effective communication; and,

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

- a more developed concept of teamwork and

leadership in the navigation of a ship.

Licensing authorities now typically require completion of

a BRM course for pilots as a prerequisite for issuing an initial
pilot license. Completion of a refresher course at least once
every five years is also usually required.

So, it is fair to say that virtually all pilots have now had
BRM training and/or BRM-P that specifically takes into
account their own particular responsibilities and position on
the bridge team of a piloted vessel.

BRM AND CASUALTY INVESTIGATION

In spite of what I just described, I note that accident

reports sometimes identify shortcomings in the initial
master/pilot exchange or in bridge team management as
contributory, or even causal, factors in marine accidents.

Suggesting that there may be systemic deficiencies in

terms of how the pilot and the bridge team interact can make
attention-grabbing headlines and soundbites.

In my view, such statements deserve due attention. But

they also need to be approached with caution and warrant
further examination.

I just said that virtually all pilots have received specific

training in bridge resource management. So, if all pilots have
had BRM training but inadequate bridge resource
management is still a contributing factor to accidents, as is
sometimes suggested, what does this mean?

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

Is the nature of the training inadequate? While that

might be a factor in exceptional cases, I have no reason to
think that this would be a particularly significant trend.

Are pilots somehow reluctant to put in practice the

training that they have received? Again, when you deal with
a population of many thousands of individuals, you might
find a few who deviate from the norm but, here as well, since
being able to count on a dynamic and engaged bridge team
actually absolutely serves the interests of pilots, I am not of
the view that this is where we need to be looking.

So, if it’s not the training and its implementation, what

might it be?

To answer this, there is perhaps no other way but to

take a cold, hard look at how things often really happen on
board vessels.

IN THE REAL WORLD

Since an image is worth a thousand words, I can tell

you that, ideally, the world would look like this! (Image of NI
Model of ideal communications flow)

Here, everybody has a clear understanding of his job

and actually does it. Everybody monitors the work of others
and offers relevant observations. Everybody shares the
same “mental model of the voyage”. Everybody is
communicating clearly and expresses any concern without
being intimidated.

Of course, we must strive to achieve this.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

But in the real world, sometimes things look like this

(Picture of a vessel bridge where there is only one,
perplexed, crewman).

Exceptional, I admit. But it still happens on occasion.

On this one, this is the bridge of a large cruise ship under
pilotage.

In general, things look more like this (Picture of a vessel

with one officer and a wheelman) bridge. And, during
berthing operations, add the master to the picture.

When I leave home at 1:00 in the morning on a cold -25

Celsius winter night to conduct a cape size bulker through
fast-moving ice on the St. Lawrence River, in a restricted
channel and with virtually no floating aids to navigation;
when I am greeted by a crew on deck, including a Master
alone on the bridge with the wheelsman, who does not
effectively speak English, and who are experiencing their
first time in such conditions and are asking me if they may
go ashore in Canada because it is their first concern –
having been forbidden to so at the last two ports they called
in – a crew that is often hard-pressed and fatigued, the truth
is that, despite best efforts to communicate, the sheer reality
that I am now facing puts all the principles that we have just
discussed in an entirely different light.

I am not sure that there is any amount of additional

communications training that would actually allow me to
overcome the very real constraints that I am then facing in
this respect.

It’s just a fact of life.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

Of course, as we get underway and throughout my

assignment, the interaction I have with my bridge team
keeps revolving around the central notions of: what is it that I
know that they need to know? And what is it that they know
that I need to know?

I do not expect the officer on watch, however, to know

what years of expert training and experience have taught me
in respect of navigation on the very specific body of water for
which I am licensed as a pilot. So there is an obvious limit in
respect of the extent to which he can effectively monitor my
work, share the same mental model of the pilotage passage
we are performing, even though a proper Master/Pilot
exchange has taken place.

For my part, I face a similar constraint and, given the

circumstances, I do not have the latitude to explain each and
every detail of what is unfolding.

So, in the real world, the level of support that pilots can
get from the masters and bridge teams of the vessels they
conduct will often be limited. And we can live with this; it is
understandable.

But there is one thing on which I count and which,

unfortunately, in my experience is waning: true seamanship.

The ship has the responsibility of having a passage

plan, berth-to-berth. And officers have the responsibility to
monitor this. I expect them to have the core competence of
being able to do so and of maintaining a safe watch even in
pilotage waters.

That job must be done!

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

Let me give you, however, some candid examples of

what I mean.

I sometimes witness situations where no routes at all

have been laid down on the paper charts or on the ECDIS
for the passage to the berth, let alone the comprehensive
passage plan that is required by regulation. Or, worse,
where one line, where only one single course has been
plotted from the pilot station to the berth, a single line of 120
NM long that goes over land, mountains and shoals...

... Or an officer of the watch who is plotting a GPS

position on a 4 meter depth area when I am piloting a
Panamax size vessel at 13 meters draft, and who does not
raise an eyebrow when so doing, who does not have the
reflex to recheck its plotted position or to use an alternative
positioning method! Obviously, the ship is still doing 13 knots
and just by looking out the window there is a set of leading
lights confirming that the ship is in the center of the channel
– not on the track he has plotted. But he never turns to me to
either challenge me or inquire whether the ship is in a safe
position.

Some typical lines sum it all:

- What is your gyro error mister mate? I don't know

pilot.

- Do you have a gyro error log book? Let me check

pilot. 2 degrees west, pilot.

- When was that? The entry is dated march 2008 pilot!

- What is the ship's speed at full maneuvering

revolutions? The GPS speed is now 13.34kts pilot.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

- What is the airdraft? I dont know pilot, let me check.

- What is the heading marker error on the radars? What

is that pilot?

- Captain, we need to reduce speed to have better

steering in this shallow channel and avoid too much
squat. A few minutes later, however, the captain
confirms giving more RPM to have more power on the
rudder for better steering??

- Mister mate, the ECDIS safety zone alarm has been

going off for the last 2 hours. Could you change the
setting from 30 meters to 10 meters depth in order for
you to to better monitor the ship’s progression?

Ok pilot, I have to call the captain. Why? He’s the only

one who is allowed to change the settings of the
ECDIS. Does this sound familiar? Remember 30-40
years ago, when we couldn’t touch the radar with some
Masters…. Some things don’t change. We need to find
out why!

Talking about ECDIS, here is an interesting picture (of an

ECDIS with the following warning on it « ECDIS not to be
used for navigation, only for training»), it was taken on a
125,000tdw bulker 2 months ago. Have I missed something
at IMO…?!

And now, what assurance do people have that things

will be different when e-navigation is finally implemented?

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

Cell phones are a plague nowadays. Pilots, OW,

Captains, some people just can’t turn off the bloody thing!
Something has to be done about this!

Driving up core competence and professionalism would

go a long way to help ensure pilots are effectively supported
by bridge teams and can have an optimal interaction with
them.

Another systemic trend that I observe first-hand and

that has a direct impact on the relationship between the pilot
and the bridge team is the administrative burden that is now
placed on the shoulders of officers.

There is not a single pilotage assignment during which I

don't see an officer of the watch sitting down at one of the
bridge computer desks to do administrative work, sometimes
for several minutes, even up to hours.

I sometimes think that officers don’t have the time to be

mariners anymore. Of course, I’m saying this tongue in
cheek but perhaps the extent to which the mountains of
paperwork associated with meeting the requirements of the
ISM Code, for example, actually contributes to causing
accidents should be scrutinized in greater detail!

UNFORTUNATELY, ACCIDENTS SOMETIMES HAPPEN

A careful examination of the suggestion that there may

be systemic deficiencies in terms of how the pilot and the
bridge team interact leads to the conclusion that, in the real
world, this is not only a complex question, but also a matter
where further progress will not easily be made.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

As we have seen, many factors influence how the pilot

and the bridge team interact. For my part, I believe that, in
the overwhelming majority of cases, what can be done to
make sure that this relationship unfolds as smoothly as
possible is actually done.

If one incident happens in a pilotage district in which

there are, say, 20,000 assignments per year and if, in that
particular case, it is found that the interaction between the
pilot and the bridge team could have been better, are we
actually dealing with systemic deficiency?

What is systemic about this situation? Is it not rather the

fact that 19,999 assignments unfolded without incident?

There is risk in suggesting that there might be systemic

deficiency where there is actually systemic effectiveness.

Great caution needs to be exercised when making such

statements. They can be used by others to move forward
agendas that are unrelated to the objectives we both share.

While there is obvious value in identifying facts and in

doing everything that can reasonably be done to prevent
accidents from reoccurring, it is also essential not to appear
making value judgements on entire professions based on
exceptional occurrences.

If a pilot fails to order a change of course as a vessel

approaches a curve and the officer on watch does not pick it
up – even though his berth-to-berth passage plan clearly
indicates that a change of course is required – maybe it’s not
a question of training or of systems; maybe it’s a case of
specific individuals simply not doing the job that they should
be doing at the time this is happening.

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 Remarks by Simon Pelletier, MAIFF, Panama, July 2014

An error is made and, without diminishing its

importance or the consequences it can have, perhaps that is
all there really is to it!

Accidents happen to inexperienced persons; but they

also happen to those who have a lot of experience.

Ultimately, my message is about competence, and

about doing everything that can be done to drive up levels of
competence. Certainly not drive them down.

But, it is also even more about responsibility – and

doing your job. Taking charge. And fighting complacency at
all times.

Thank you.

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