Sociology: Ias Gurukul

IAS GURUKUL
SOCIOLOGY
CURRENT AFFAIRS
AND
VALUE ADDITION
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SOCIOLOGY BY PRANAY AGGARWAL IAS GURUKUL Call 9999693744
CONTENTS
S. No. Topic Page

1. Women in Armed Forces 1
2. Child Marriage Prosecution in India respect 3
3. Afghan refugee crisis 5
4. Report on religious freedom in India 6
5. Report on United Information system for education plus 2019-2021 8
6. Open Societies statement 10
7. Sunderlal Bahuguna dead 12
8. Turkey exits Istanbul Convention on Violence against women 14
9. Lokniti-CSDS Youth studies: Marriage trends 16
10. State of Environment in Figures Report 2021: Farmer Protests 18
11. Gail Omvedt died 20
12. Black Lives Matter 22
13. Critical Race Theory 24
14. Formation of new Cooperation Ministry and the Supreme Court 26
judgment
15. China’s Three Child Policy 28
16. Tokyo Olympics under attack for sexualization of Sports 30
17. Uniform Civil Code 32
18. Anti-Conversion Laws 34
19. Maratha Reservations 36
20. Virginity Test for Indonesian Army Scrapped 38
21. Twitter campaign to include Tulu in EighthSchedule 39
22. PM-CARES for Covid affected Children 41
23. Government decision on non-caste based census 43

24. Supreme Court fines political parties for covering up criminal pasts 45
of fielded candidates
25. Incel Movement 47
26. Proposal to revise creamy layer for OBCs and sub-categorization 49
27. All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) 2019-20 Report 50
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S. No. Topic Page

28. The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) 52
report on schools of minority communities.
29. Kamla Bhasin dies after battling cancer. 54
30. Huge numbers may be pushed into dire poverty or starvation…we 56

need to secure them (Impact of Covid) - Amartya Sen , Raghuram
Rajan , Abhijit Banerjee
31. What does it mean to be Indian? (Analysis of Pew Research report) - 58
Ashutosh Varshney
32. India’s democratic exceptionalism is now withering away. The 61
impact is also external- Ashutosh Varshney
33. Government needs to ready solutions that will facilitate agrarian 64
transition without hurting farmers - Ashutosh Varshney
34. A temple on contested site of mosque’s destruction departs from 67
judicial counter-majoritarianism (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple)
- Ashutosh Varshney
35. By numbers alone (Abrogration of Article 370) - Ashutosh 70
Varshney
36. As India gets vaccinated, women are falling behind. We must mind 73
this gap - Ashwini Deshpande
37. Normalisation of Work From Home is unlikely to raise women’s 75
participation in the labour force - Ashwini Deshpande
38. The gender gap in job losses caused by the lockdown 77
- Ashwini Deshpande
39. What India’s farm crisis really needs 79
- Christophe Jaffrelot , Hemal Thakker
40. Pew survey reflects growing affinity between majority community 81
and Hindutva - Christophe Jaffrelot
41. How do Indian Muslims and Hindus compare in their attitudes 83
towards identity and politics? - Christophe Jaffrelot
42. How the story of the cow in India is riddled with puzzles and 85
paradoxes - D.N. Jha
43. Why Dalit is no longer an empowering word for some marginalized 87

communities in UP - Badri Narayan
44. Explained: Why so many MPs are dynasts - Gilles Verniers, 89
Christophe Jaffrelot
45. Why China’s about-turn shows restrictive population policy doesn’t 91
work - Sonalde Desai
46. Make room for Women in the new normal - Sonalde Desai 93
47. With BJP in Delhi, States must find ways to regain autonomy 95
- Suhas Palshikar
48. The purpose of tradition (Khap Panchayats) - Surinder S Jodhka 98
49. One Above the other (Book Review of Suraj Yengde’s ‘Caste 100
Matters’) - By Surinder S Jodhka
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S. No. Topic Page

50. Free shots for all: This must be India’s vaccination strategy 102
- Jean Dreze
51. There is an urgent need for safeguards against unfair discontinuation 104
of social benefits - Jean Dreze
52. From panopticon to Pegasus, how ideas about surveillance have 106
evolved
53. Why Twitter altruism in Covid second wave gives us hope for social 109
media
54. How historical caste privilege became modern-day ‘merit’ 112
55. Women as temple priests: An idea whose time has come 114
- Pratap Bhanu Mehta
56. Why civil rights and protecting the planet go hand-in-hand for 116
environmental justice
57. Caste based census in India 119
58. BetiBachaoBetiPadhao Scheme 121
59. Inclusion of LGBTQ and Women in India’s New Science Policy 123
60. Religious Fundamentalism 124
61. Losing faith in Democracy 125
62. Fake News 127
63. After Zomato IPO, Can We Have a More Honest Discussion on Gig 129
Labour?
64. Richer, and poorer: Inequality will continue to scar the economy long 133
after Covid leaves us
65. Democratising higher education with ABC 135
66. The spiritual lessons from Covid-19 138

- Avijit Pathak
67. Remembering Birsa Munda, the Social Reformer and Revolutionary 140
Leader
68. Five big ways in which the covid crisis might change us as people 144
69. Sunderlal Bahuguna: Gandhian pioneer of Indian environmentalism, 146

spirit behind Chipko
70. Falling sick together: Covid-19 pandemic has immensely boosted the 148
case for Universal Healthcare - Dipankar Gupta
71. Greed triggers gross vaccine inequality 150
72. The price of pandemic is being paid by women 153
73. 'Time Poverty' Is a Real Issue For Women Everywhere, Says Gates 157
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S. No. Topic Page

74. Only 7% of India’s police force is women. This hurts investigations into 160
gender violence
75. Social Distancing and the Pandemic of Caste 163
76. Why a strong law against human trafficking is necessary in post- 167
Covid times
77. How Saleem Kidwai brought Indian history of same-sex love to 169
light
78. Haryana govt’s decision to ban ‘gorakhdhanda’ is an example of 171
policy that goes down the slipperiest of slopes
79. The swachhta journey: New targets, new approaches 172
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Women in Armed Forces
The News:
Supreme Court issued an interim order allowing women candidates to take National Defense
Academy examinations, which is a national level exam for entry into Army, Navy and Air
Force, conducted by UPSC.
Women in Armed Forces: The Timeline
Since 1993, women officers have been inducted into the Army.
In the starting, they were brought in for five years of service under the ‘Special Entry
Scheme’. This was later converted to Short Service Commission (SSC).
In 2008, a Permanent Commission was extended to women in streams of Judge Advocate

General (JAG) and Army Education Corps.
In 2019, Permanent Commission was granted to women in all ten branches that allowed
Women Officers through Short Service Commission, namely:Signals, Engineers, Army
Aviation, Army Air Defense, Electronics and Mechanical Engineers, Army Service Corps,
Army Ordinance Corps and Intelligence.
However, the incumbent Government in the latest development argued in the Supreme Court
that women may not be able to meet the challenges and hazards of military service due to
‘psychological limitations and domestic obligations.’
As of February 2021, 9,118 women officers are serving in the three services.
Arguments against induction of more women in the armed forces:
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The Government argued that the male troops recruited came predominantly from a rural
background. They, thus, supposedly may possess patriarchal attitudes and may be unwilling
to ‘accept’ the authority of a women commander.
Even armies of US and Israel that have female combatants do not deploy women in direct
infantry combat.
It has also been argued that women cannot match up to their male counterparts in physical
stamina and strength.
The Wall Street Journal in a study on Marine Corps comparing the performance of gender
integrated and male-only infantry units in simulated combat reported that the all male teams
greatly outperformed the integrated teams in all the events.
Arguments in favor:
In The Secretary, Ministry of Defense Vs BabitaPuniya and Others, Supreme Court pointed
out that “Women have played an important role since their induction the army in 1993”.
It also said that extending Permanent Commission to them is the right step in granting them
equality of opportunity in the Army.
Political Scientist Judith Hicks Stiehmhad earlier argued that induction of women in army,
especially in positions of agency and strength, makes it more difficult for male service
personnel to objectify and sexualize women.
This attitude shift can especially be beneficial to improve the perception of army by the
locales in disturbed areas.
These positive female role models in position of power can greatly help in shifting the
ingrained masculinist perception of power and cultural theories on the dominant male role.
Way Forward:
It is the need of the hour to allow Equality of opportunity (which is a fundamental right under
Article 16) to women in all spheres of life, including the military. However, it also needs to
be ensured that no compromises on the security of the nation or the dignity of the women
military personnel are made.
Hence, cautious and carefully thought steps need to be taken in this regard. The Prime
Minister’s Independence Day announcement that girls will be allowed admission in Sainik
schools to prepare them for an eventual equal role for life in military is a welcome step in the
right direction.
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Child Marriage Prosecution in India Report
The News:
Partners for Law in Development(PLD), a Delhi- based legal resource group, analyzed 83
high court and district court verdicts in cases relating to child marriage between 2008 and
2017 to release the ‘Child Marriage Prosecution in India’ Report.
The cases analyzed included those filed under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006;
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POSCO), 2012 and the Indian Penal Code.
Findings of the Report:
The study found that 65% of the legal prosecution for child marriages was for self elopement
or self arranged marriage by girls.
The punishment of elopement Vs punishment for arranged child marriage was also
disproportionate. The former could invite a punishment of upto 20 years while the latter
comes under no minimum punishment to a maximum of two years in imprisonment and/or
fine.
Only 5% of cases were of forced Child marriages; such as those involving enticement,
kidnapping or forcible marriage by parents.
Further, only 7% of the cases were initiated by a Child marriage prohibition officer, the state
functionary designated for implementing the law.
Girls accessed the law on their own the least, with only 3.5% of the cases filed for
nullification or to initiate criminal proceedings against the parents.
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Interpretation of the Report:
The study states that the ‘laws are being weaponized to settle family honor’.
The law is also tilted against older adolescents. This is confirmed by the statistics of the
National Crime Data. In 2019, 525 cases were registered under PCMA, compared with 6,590
children who were ‘deemed’ to have been kidnapped on account of elopement or love
relationship.
Case study on Child marriages:
In a separate case study, Indian sociologist Biswajit Ghosh conducted fieldwork in Malda
district in North Bengal, India.
He found that these communities have limited access to quality education and basic
infrastructure there. Due to lack of employment opportunities, investment in children’s
education is considered worthless . Also delays that may be caused in the marriage because of
pursuance of education by the girl child is seen as a threat to the family honor due to fear of
elopement.
Ghosh also found that legal sanctions and international campaigns to end child marriage are
dismissed at the local level as they do not connect with the people’s material experiences.
The negative consequences of early marriage are underplayed as ‘aberrations’ because many
of the mothers themselves have had early marriages.
Course corrections required:
Frontline workers and Child Marriage Prohibition Officers need to be activated to play a
greater role in identification and prosecution of forced marriages by parents of children.
Girl children need to be empowered with education and livelihood opportunities so that they
can become an active agency in the fight against child marriage and self report cases.
POSCO needs to be amended to decriminalize consensual, non-coercive relations between

consenting older adolescents to protect them from prosecution by vindictive parents, trying to
save the ‘family honor’.
Awareness generation at the grass root levels need to be conducted against the evils of child
marriage on physical and mental health of the girl child. A conscious efforts need to be done
to especially target the female population to sensitize them to re-assess their personal
experiences under the light of these newly acquired information.
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Afghan Refugee Crisis

The News:
As Taliban seized back control of Afghanistan, almost two decades after being ousted by a
US led coalition; it has led to a full blown refugee crisis as many Afghans flee the country for
safer pastures.
The refugee crisis: 2.2 million Afghan refugees are already in the neighboring countries. An
additional 3.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes within the Afghan borders.
According to UNHCR, even before Taliban retook control, more than 555,000 people had
been forced to flee their homes in 2020-21 due to fighting.
Uzbekistan, which borders Afghanistan in the North, has closed its main crossing point to
ensure ‘security’ while Pakistan, which shares the longest border with Afghanistan, has
refused to accept any more refugees.
Sociology of refugee crisis:
Vijay Prashad believes that the west is unwilling to see the global refugee crisis in terms of a
‘brokenglobal economy’ where preserving the West’s trade interest always leads to war and
ecological devastation. The ‘War on terror’ is invoked whenever this status quo is disturbed
and the immediate effect of this is always a refugee crisis.
Nigel Harris points out that there is no uniform authority to execute the 1951 Geneva
Convention to protect the rights of the refugees and hence many countries take great pains to
prevent the refugees from entering their border. This allows them to not directly violate 1951
convention by having to send the refugees back.
Harris also argues that the refugee crisis are ‘God send opportunities for right wing
politicians’, like Victor Orban in Hungary , who sail to power by exploiting the misfortunes
of the migrant populations.
Deepak K Singh writes that ‘Statelessness is a condition that is almost always caused and
maintained by the state’. Who gets the citizenship and rights associated with it is almost
always decided by the state, and those without it learn to live with the twin absence of state
and citizenship in their lives.
These stateless people are often referred to as “orphans of the nation-state system”.
Deepa Rajkumar writes that the refugee crisis is perpetuated because of the modern and
western construct of the notion of nation-state and these needs to be challenged. It divides
human beings into the ‘Citizens Vs Outsiders’ binary.
The fact that they are devoid of agency just because they are not bound by borders is a ‘statist
logic’ that has been normalized in ‘modern human existence’ and its dominance needs to be
questioned.
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Report on religious freedom in India
The News:
A nationwide survey on religious attitudes, behavior and beliefs in India was conducted by
Pew Research Centre, a nonprofit organization based in Washington DC.
The findings of the report:
The report found that 91% of the Hindus believed that they have religious freedom. Also 89%
of Muslims and Christians said they felt free to practice their religion. The comparative
figures for Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains were 82%, 93% and 85% respectively.
80% of the Hindus believed that respecting other religions was an integral aspect of ‘being a
Hindu’ and not merely a civic duty. 79% Muslims deemed religious tolerance as an essential
aspect of their religious identity.
Shared beliefs cut across religious barriers as 77% of Hindus said that they believed in
Karma, an identical percentage of Muslims reiterated the belief.
Relatively few Indians (13%) had mixed friends circles.
On the question of inter-religious marriages, most Hindus (67%), Muslims (80%), Sikhs
(59%) and Jain (66%) felt it was very important to stop the women in community to marry
outside the religion.
64% Hindu said that it was very important to be a ‘Hindu’ to be ‘truly Indian’.
Interpretation of the report:
The report highlighted the fact that Indians cutting across religions valued religious freedom
and tolerance. They also share a common belief system cutting across religions.
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However, they are not great at integration. The report observed that “In India, a person’s
religion is typically the religion of that person’s closest friend”. Majority of Indians are also
opposed to inter religious marriages and many have reservations about sharing the
neighborhood with members of other religions.
The PEW research came to the conclusion that India is a unique kind of plural society which
is neither a melting pot (where immigrants are encouraged to infuse into the dominant
culture), nor a salad bowl (where immigrants retain their own characteristics while infusing
into the society).
It is more of a thali, which has a selection of separate dishes served on a platter.
Sociological Debates on Secularism and Religious tolerance:
Upadhyay and Robinson write that there are four strands of debates on secularism and
religious tolerance in India, namely: Classical, soft Hindu state, Hard Hindu position and
attempts to go beyond secularism and religion.
The classical position is the Nehruvian idea of secularism which believes in leaving aside
identities and participating in the modernist project.
The second position is propagated by sociologists like TN Madan, which talks about
attachment to religious identity and its acknowledgement in public sphere. This is the ‘soft
Hindu state’ of secularism.TN Madan believes that India cannot survive as a secular state
because recognition of secularism as a social and political value is limited.
Hard Hindu position includes the vision that problematizes secularism.
Ashish Nandy thus writes that ‘secularism is dead’ because there is a gap in theory and
practice of religious tolerance.
Upadhyay believes that “the challenge of actualizing it through concrete social, political,
economic and educational measures is an enormous task”.
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Report on United Information system for education plus 2019-2020
The News:
The Union Education Minister released the Report on United Information System for
Education (UDISE+) 2019-2020 for school education in India.
Findings of the report:
In 2019-20, total students in school education from pre primary to higher secondary has
crossed 26.45 crore, which is higher by 42.3 lakh compared to 2018-2019.
Gross Enrolment Ratio has improved at all levels of school education.
In 2019-20, 96.87 lakh teachers have been engaged in school education, which is 2.57 lakh
higher compared to 2018-19.
The Pupil-Teacher Ratio has improved at all levels of school education.
Enrolment of Divyang students have increased by 6.52% over 2018-2019.
Gross Enrolment Ratio of girls has increased to 90.5% (from88.5%) at the Upper Primary
level. There has been an increase at Elementary level, Secondary level and at Higher
Secondary level as well.
Between 2012-13 and 2019-20, the GER for girls at both secondary and higher secondary
level has increased more than that of the boys.
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More than 80% of the schools in India in 2019-20 had functional electricity.
Number of schools having internet facility increased to 3.36 lakh in 2019-20 from 2.9 lakh in
2018-019.
Sociology of Education:
Eugene Staley believes that education should focus on more work-oriented schooling and the
school curriculum should thus undergo a drastic change for the same. Mere schooling without
focus on employment will just create more disillusioned and alienated youth.
J N Kaul writes that higher education in the country has expanded rapidly, but without
developing adequately in line with the goals of planning. M V Bhatawdekar reiterates that in
order to integrate education into the economic plan of the country, questions need to be asked
on what kind of education are required to attain the socioeconomic goals of the plan.
The National Education Policy, 2020 is only the third Education Policy that has been brought
out by the Government of India since independence, and promises structural reforms that give
more choices to the students as well as enhance employability. It needs to be seen whether
they will be able to achieve the desired goals.
Education as a medium of social reform is also highlighted when Suma Chitnis states that
Education should be viewed as a part of a two pronged strategy to improve the quality of life
of scheduled castes, along with the laws against untouchability and discrimination.
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Open Societies statement

The News:
India signed a joint statement by G7 and guest countries on ‘open societies’ that reaffirm the
values of “freedom of expression” both online and offline as well as “freedom that safeguards
democracy”.
The Open Societies statement:
The statement also affirmed for “human rights for all, right to vote in a free and fair election
and religious freedom”.
For India, these are important commitments amid global concerns over the controversial
Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).
The statement also refers to “politically motivated internet shutdowns” as one of the threats to
democracy.
However, the Prime Minister also shared the concern that “open societies are particularly
vulnerable to disinformation and cyber attacks.”
The joint statement was signed by G7 countries, and India, South Korea, Australia and South
Africa, which together were called “Democracies 11”.
The opposition hit back with official figures which quote that the number of arrests under
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in 2019 have increased by 72% as compared to 2015.
They also raised concerns about the clampdown of internet in Jammu and Kashmir after the
abrogation of Article370.
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Sociological Analysis:
The concept of Open society was most notably elaborated by Karl Popper in his The Open
Society and its Enemies (1945).
He believed that modern civilization is still in its infancy and is aiming for humanness and
freedom. However, it has yet not recovered from the shock of transition from the tribal or
‘closed’ society to an ‘open’ society.
He argued that while the tribal society submits its beliefs to ‘magic’, open society on the
other hand sets free the critical powers of man.
He observed that the shock of this transmission is one of the reasons of the rise of reactionary
movements which aim to overthrow civilization and return to tribalism.
Jan-Werner Muller believes that the greatest threat to open society is posed by authoritarian
populaism. In his book “What is Populism”, he argues that populists are always anti-pluralists
and they claim that they alone represent the people.
Populism is an exclusionary form of identity politics that poses a danger to democracy as

democracy requires pluralism and the recognition of rights of irreducibly diverse citizens as
equals.
According to Jan Werner Muller, Populist governance exhibits three features: a)Attempts to
hijack the state apparatus; b)corruption and c) Mass clientelism.
Mass clientelism refers to trading material benefits or bureaucratic favors for political support
by citizens who become the populists’ ‘clients’.
Francis Fukuyama in his ‘End of History’ (1992) thesis argues that there are no more rivals to
liberal democracy at the level of ideas and predicted that only religious fundamentalism and
fringe ideology may challenge democracy in future.
Robert Alan Dahl propounded the pluralist theory of democracy and introduced the concept
of ‘polyarchy’ as a descriptor for actual democratic governance.
Polyarchies have freedom of expression, alternative information, associational autonomy,

free and fair elections and inclusive suffrage.
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Sunderlal Bahugna dead
The News:
SunderlalBahugna, the Gandhian who was the driving force behind the 1970s Chipko
movement and the Anti-Tehri protests of 1980s to 2004 died of Covid-19 complications on
May21st, 2021.
Born on January 9, 1927; Bahugna lived a life dedicated to social causes, activism and
writing. He participated in the Independence movement and was a part of Vinoba Bhave’s
Sarvodaya movement.
Over the years, his name became closely associated with environmental issues like the
Chipko movement and Anti Tehri protests.
SunderlalBahugna helped bring the Chipko movement to prominence through a 5000

Kilometer Trans Himalayan march.
In 1981, he refused to accept the Padma Shri over Government’s refusal to cancel the Tehri
dam project.
The Chipko movement/Environmental movements:
According to social Historian Ramachandra Guha, author of the Unquiet woods, Chipko was
the latest in the series of peasant protests going back to the turn of century against
commercial forestry in Uttar Pradesh Himalayas.
He believes that Chipko gradually diverged into three streams:
One which blamed materialism for ecological degradation and wanted strict conservation;
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The other which wanted to work for environment regeneration with people at the centre
The third stream believed that human-nature relationship must be viewed in context of
relationships between humans. Hence, social and economic redistribution are more important
than ecological harmony.
International Ecologists saw Chipko as a cultural response of the people’s love for their
environment.
Eco-feminists pointed out that village women had to walk long distances to collect fuel and
fodder and thus became the first victims of forest destruction.
Women, hence, are closer to nature and thus more ecologically conscious. Hence, according
to Vandana Shiva, Eco-feminism takes the women-nature connection a step further.
Shobita Jain writes that women who participated in the Chipko movement became aware of
their potentialities and started demanding a share in the decision making at the community
level. Thus Chipko led to the political empowerment among women.
Mahendra Singh Kunwar believes that the greatest contribution of Chipko movement was
that it brought pro-poor environmentalism to the forefront. It dismissed the notion that poor
destroy their environment and do not want to protect it.
Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha have identified five broad strands within the
environmental movements in India:
The Crusading Gandhian: who rely heavily on propagation of eastern cultural values of
indifference to economic gain;
Ecological Marxist: who see the problem in economic and political sense of unequal access to
resources;
Appropriate Technology: which strives for a working synthesis of environment and industry;
Wilderness Enthusiasts: who present moral arguments in favor of ‘species equality’;
Scientific conservation: who are concerned with efficiency and management.
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Turkey exits Istanbul Convention on Violence against women
The News:
Turkey’s controversial exit from the Istanbul Convention on Violence against Women in
July, amid rising cases of domestic violence against women due to the pandemic, has
received severe criticism from various quarters.
Istanbul convention on Violence against Women:
The Council of Europe established the Istanbul Convention, a human rights treaty, with the
aim to prevent and prosecute all forms of violence against women and seeks rehabilitation of
women who are victims of violence.
The treaty was opened for ratification in May 2011 and in November, 2011; Turkey became
the first state to ratify the Istanbul convention. In March, 2012; it incorporated the treaty in its
domestic laws.
From the European Union, 34 countries signed this treaty.
Repercussions of the withdrawal:
According to UN Women data, 38 percent of women in Turkey face violence from a partner
in their lifetime.
Although there has been no official reason given, it is widely believed that it is due to the
belief of the ruling party that the convention demeans traditional family structure, promotes
divorces and encourages acceptance of LGBTQ in the society.
The main reason for the withdrawal is widely believed to the fear that the convention aims at
normalizing homosexuality.
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Sociology of domestic violence:
This withdrawal comes at a time when domestic violence against women has increased
during the Covid-19 pandemic (A Peterman).Sociologist Marianne Hester, also writes that
“domestic violence goes up whenever families spend more time together.”
UN Women speaks of a ‘Shadow Pandemic’ that is currently occurring along with the Covid-
19 pandemic where violence against women has seen a steady increase, especially during the
lockdown.
Patricia Uberoi states that the reason for women’s silence on being victims of violence is
attributed to patriarchal family structure and the idea of honor.
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) was enacted in 2005. But
Flavia Agnes wrote in 2019 that “even after a decade and a half, the assurances made in the
act have not actualized”. Thus, laws have not been effective against this issue.
Srinivas Goli and Jitendra Gouda have studied the effects of intimate personal violence on
women’s health and well being and speak of how Indian women ,especially, are unable to
access help and take counseling, which often leads to obstetric complications and adverse
pregnancy outcomes.
Watts and Zimmerman write that, “In true sense, all forms of violence are interrelated and
affect women, even before their birth and until their death.”
Jaleel and Ahmed in their 2015 study write that violence as a determinant of health is
relatively less discussed issue, although it has significant outcomes on the mortality rates.
They, thus, emphasize that the sustainable development goals (SDGs) of health will remain
difficult to achieve unless all forms of violence, especially on women, are eradicated.
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Lokniti-CSDS Youth studies: Marriage trends
The News:
Lokniti CSDS Youth studies in 2016 and 2017 reports its finding on marriage trends.
The Findings of the report:
The report found that compared to a decade ago, youth are marrying later in life.
The proportion of married youth decreased by eight percentage points from 55% in 2007 to
47% in 2016.
Educational attainment is an important factor associated with decline in proportion of married

youth.
In the age of online dating, growth of social networking and matrimonial sites, arranged
marriages is still a preferred choice, with only 6% reporting self choice in marriage.
The report also quoted Data from a recent study-‘Politics and society between election’-
showing a change in attitude, if not practice-with 72% supporting the women’s say in when
to get married and 74% in whom to worry.
There has been an attitudinal shift in the importance of marriage with 5 in 10 youth saying it
is important to get married, down from 8 in 10 from a decade earlier.
There is an upward trend in acceptance of inter caste marriage from 31% in 2007 to 56% in
2016.
However, in practice, very few among the married youth have opted for inter caste (4%) and
inter religious marriages (4%).
Interpretation of the report:
Youth are marrying late, but the institution of arranged marriage is still intact.
Marrying across caste and religion has still not gained widespread acceptance.
Hence, attitudes to marriage remain largely within boundaries of traditional thinking.
Sociology of Indian marriages:
K.M Kapadia in a study conducted in 1982, revealed that more than 50% parents expressed
their willingness to allow their children to marry outside their caste. Hence, he believes that
intercaste marriages are slowly gaining acceptance.
S.Afzal in his 2009 study writes that the economic condition of the women is an important
determinant in this matter as working women are more likely to have inter caste marriages
than non working women in Punjab.
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J Cadwell in his study of ‘ Marriage changes in South India’ writes that the increase in
educational attainment among women led to crumbling of the traditional system of
matrimonial arrangement in India which had the effect in form of raising the overall age of
marriage and greater autonomy in choice of spouse.
Divorce is increasing in India and across the globe. In agro based states like Punjab and
Haryana, there has been an increase of 150% and in Kerala, the most literate state of India,
there has been an increase of 350%.
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State of Environment in Figures Report 2021: Farmer protests
The News:
The State of Environment in figures Report 2021 by Delhi based think tank Centre for
Science and Environment (CSE) released data on farmer protests.
Findings of the Report:
The report found that there has been a fivefold increase in the number of farmer protests since
2017.
In 2017, there were 34 major protests across 15 states. The number has now shot up to 165
protests across 22 states and Union territories.
12 of these were pan-India protests, including 11 agitations against three farm reforms laws
introduced last year.
The other reasons for protests included protests against state legislation, land acquisition,
inadequate Budget allocations for the agriculture sector, against market failures and
demanding fair prices and loan waivers.
The largest numbers of recent protests have taken place in Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana.
The Report noted that India now has more farm labourers than landowning farmers and
cultivators.
Commenting on farmer’s suicide, the report revealed data claiming more than 28 agricultural
workers and cultivators end their lives everyday.
The CSE called for better maintenance of agriculture data, noting 14 states actually witnessed
deterioration in the quality of their land records.
The CSE commented that “India is sitting atop a massive time bomb of agrarian crisis and
disquiet, and the clock is ticking away.”
Sociology of Farmer’s protests:
Sudhir Kumar Suthar uses narratives from various parts of India to conclude that the farmer
protests are also an attempt to recover and consolidate dignity and is a quest for new identity.
It is a reaction to the identity crisis borne out of disillusionment with the urbanization process
and a desire to reimagine the rural spaces with city like facilities.
D N Dhanagare in his book Populism and Power: Farmers movement in western India writes
that agrarian crisis in post Green revolution was symptomatic of turning point of the agrarian
economy and transformation of ‘the peasant’ into ‘the farmer’. He believes that crisis evolved
when the subsistence farmer gave up his dependency on the landlord and found him self in
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the same league as the land owners owning large tracts of lands, as dependent on the market
forces.
Surjit Mishra in his study of farmer suicides in Maharashtra noted that suicide is a complex
interplay of multiple factors, with minimum number of two and maximum of nine risk factors
in his study sample. However, the most common was indebtedness (86 per cent), with 44
percent among them were harassed for loan. The second most common reason was fall in
economic position (74 percent) when it led to sale of assets.
Manjit Sharma states that when people believe land acquisition is made with vested interests,
government is far more likely to face resistance. He gives an example of the 2005-06 land
acquisition in Punjab which sparked violent protest, because farmers believed that the state
was working in favor of the industrialists.
Amit Narker points out that the state of agriculture in Maharashtra is so dire because of
successive governmental support to cash crops with very little state support of MSP of cereals
and pulses, which majority of subsistence farmers grow.
Satyendra Ranjan believes that the greatest highlight of the recent Farm protests over the
three farm laws was creation of their own ‘communication ecosystem’ by the farmers which
presented an antithesis to the ideological hegemony of the current ruling arrangement and
allowed for the possibility of an alternate narrative apart from the official narrative by the
government.
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Gail Omvedt died
The News:Gail Omvedt, American born Indian sociologist died on August 25, 2021. Her
writings clearly outline the vision of a casteless, classless, and democratic just society.
Her works in the field of sociology:
She was a zealous anti-caste crusader.In her book Seeking Begumpura: The social vision of
Anti Caste Intellectual, she offered a critical view of Indian history. She contrasted Gandhi’s
village Utopia of Ram Rajya with Ravidas’s anti-caste, tax free, sorrow less societyThe book
traces the cultural movement of depressed classes and their social experiences. She also
emphasized on the relevance of Dalit Bahujan anti-caste intellectuals in the era of
globalization.
Her dissertation on ‘Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: The Non- Brahmin Movement in
Western India’ became a pioneering study of Mahatma Phule and his movement.
In her book ‘Understanding Caste: From Buddha to Ambedkar and beyond’, she drew on
Buddhist writings to contextualize Dalit movements inspired by Dr Ambedkar and
deconstructed the Varna system that texts like Manusmriti tend to legitimize.
Gail Omvedt’santi-caste writings have a unique influence on the Dalit-Bahujan movement in

post-Independent India. Her intellectual activism was organised around a critique of
inequality and the struggle for social justice in India. Omvedt was influenced by Buddha,
Kabir, Phule, and Ambedkar. Her work reflects the important ways in which the non-brahmin
movement produce anti-caste intellectual thought in India. Indeed, Omvedt’s literature
reminds us of the radical bhakti movements in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries as a
rejection of the traditional brahminic hegemony.
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Omvedt suggested that Dalit protest was a key factor in shaping the discourse of rights and
constitutional safeguards. Her intellectual activism focused on the agency of the Dalits and
challenged the limits of the politics of the left and Hindutva impulses.
She was a spokesperson of the feminist movement in India. In her book Violence against
Women: New movements and new theories in India she wrote about how all women were
sexually exploited and culturally oppressed, but not in the same way. Lower caste, Dalit and
working class women were subject to what she termed ‘social patriarchy’, while women from
upper castes were subject to punitive ethics of the family.
She also wrote ‘We shall smash this prison: Indian women in struggle’ where she discussed
the concrete problems of organizing autonomous women’s movement in India.For her,
women’s liberation from daily caste experience and patriarchy was important for social
emancipation.
She was watchful of environmental struggles. She wrote about the alienation between two of
the most powerful social movements in India- the anti-caste movement and the environment
movement. She writes of her experiences of visit to three fishing communities in Odisha
accompanied by Dalit guides and records the resentment among the locals around top down
instructions by Government cooperatives on where they could live and where they could fish.
However, she faced criticism for portrayal of caste-discrimination and violence as a form of
racism. Andre Beteille, while acknowledging that discrimination exists, opposed treating
caste as a form of racism and described such attempts as ‘politically mischievous’ and
‘scientifically nonsense’.
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Black Lives Matter
Black Lives Mattermovement, which originated in 2013, gained prominence in the summer
of 2020 when tens of millions in the U.S marched under the ‘Black lives Matter’ slogan to
protest a Minneapolis police officer’s murder of George Floyd.
Background:
Black lives Matter started in 2013 as a messaging campaign, in response to 2012 acquittal of
George Zimmerman for shooting and killing black teenager Trayvon Floyd.
Three activists protested the verdict on social media and Patrisse Cullors came up with
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter.
The movement, which claims to be decentralized and non-hierachial, gained prominence

again in 2020 after the George Floyd incident.
Sociological analysis:
Sociologist Alex S.Vitale, in his 2017 book, The End of Policing, argues that since policing
in US was started to control race riots, racism is foundational to it. Policing in the country
expanded over a 40 years period. More funds, technology and criminalization of poverty
brought police deeper into society and aggravated the problems that they are incapable of
solving.
Richard Ellefritz writes that Black Lives Matter movement is a response to the increasing
views that racism is a growing social problem in US and the world.
Taylor(2016) and LeBron(2017) attempt to place BLM movement in a historical context

within the long tradition of African American struggle for racial equality in US.
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A long line of Black thinkers, including Fredrick Douglass, Ida B.Wells and Du Bois,
believe that Black people, with their meager economic and material resources, can only hope
to confront such an intransigent system through social protests.
Earl and Kimport believe that Citizen Journalism via digital media is playing an increasing
role in complicating the predominant framing of news by mainstream media. The
PewResearch Centre found that the Ferguson story broke on Twitter before it surfaced on
the cable news.
Paulo Gerbaudowrites that charismatic leadership is generally on a decline in contemporary

social movements and one of the defining features of the New Social Movements is their
utilization of social media to frame their causes and communicate with their adherents.
Freeman, however, argues that since the American scheme for understanding social
movements requires a sense of hierarchy and leadership, hence #BlackLivesMatter has been
appointed the de facto organizational leader of the movement.
Bonilla and Rosa claim that hashtag protests create a “shared temporality” in which users
can contest representations of racialized bodies.
Hashtags encourage elites to take position on the movements (Freelon and Clark).
However, as a critical view against the movement, Malcolm X in his analysis of the 1963
March on Washington(a previous movement),brought attention to the influence white
philanthropy and leadership held over ‘black’ social justice organizations, especially
regarding funding that was controlled by the white power structures.
The critics of Black lives Matter Movement raise similar concerns on its corporate findings.
Kwasi Konadu believes that earlier the movement started as a decentralized one. However,
in the present scenario, especially in US, although the BLM organizers work through various
groups, yet all are tied to centralized hubs, like the Movement of Black Lives Coalition.
These organizational choices confirm to a spider analogy rather than a starfish structure.
Spiderlike Organizations operate under the control of a central leader, and information and
power are concentrated at the top.
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Critical Race Theory
The News:
Republicans in US have been railing against the ‘Critical Race Theory’, with many state
legislatures controlled by the party passing laws restricting how race can be taught in schools.
This has been seen as a right wing backlash against nationwide protests that erupted after the
killing of George Floyd.
Critical Race Theory:
Critical Race Theory began as a leftwing academic discussion in the 1970s and the 1980s by
scholars who were studying the lack of racial progress following the passing of the landmark
civil rights laws in the decade preceding.
Put simply, CRT examines American history through the lens of racism, and acknowledges
that systemic racism is part of the country’s society.
Kimberle Crenshaw, who is among the founding scholars of the concept, writes that, “It is an
approach against the history of White Supremacy, and rejects the belief that laws and systems
that grow from the past are detached from it.”
Critical Race Theory asserts that laws are not always transformative, but can also play a role
in establishing the very rights and privileges that the legal reform was set to dismantle.
Right wing leaders lashed out against CRT and the Educational Curriculum teaching the
impact of slavery in the US as ‘revisionist history’ and ‘a crusade against American history.’
In their Book- Critical Race Theory: an Introduction, Delgado and Stefencic write that one of
the premises of CRT is that Race and Races are products of social thought and relations and
categories that society invents, manipulates and retires when convenient.
They also believe that intersectinality (a term coined by Kimberle Crenshaw) is another
premise of CRT. Intersectionality states that ‘No person has a single, easily stated, unitary
identity. Everyone has potentially conflicting, overlapping identites, loyalities and allegiance.
Hence, an individual may face multiple types of overlapping discriminations.
Khiara Silva writes that science (as demonstrated in the Human Genome Project) refutes the
idea of biological racial differences. Hence, she asserts that race is not biologically real, but
socially constructed.
Mari Matsuda described CRT as the work of progressive legal scholars seeking to address
racism in laws. She thus argues that law is not always objective and apolitical.
In the field of Education, Daniel Solorzano believes that CRT challenges the dominant
ideology of objectivity of scholarship.
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Bonilla Silva argues that racial inequality often gets misrecognized as a natural process rather
than a by-product of racial domination. She gives an example in form of white segregation in
US. Rather than explaining this through process of white discrimination and whites seeking
to ‘flock together’, the reality is often explained through a colorblind logic such as ‘like
minded people gravitate together.’
CRT also speaks of ‘Microaggressions’. Microaggressions refer to seemingly minute, often

unconscious, quotidian instances of prejudice that collectively contribute to racism and
subordination of racialized individual by dominant caste.
However, as a counterview, Daniel A. Farber is critical to CRT, and argues that the theory
relies heavily on an implausible belief that reality is socially constructed and rejects evidence
in favor of storytelling.
Farber and Sherry believe that CRT contains anti-meritocratic principles that can have far
reaching implications.
A 1999 Boston College Law Review article asserted that Critical Race Theory undermined
confidence in the Rule of Law.
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Formation of new Cooperation Ministry and the Supreme Court judgment
The News:
Government announced the formation of a separate Union ministry of Cooperation in July

2021, a subject that till date was looked after by the Ministry of Agriculture.
In a separate issue, the Supreme Court quashed certain provisions of the 97th Constitutional
Amendment Act, calling cooperative societies as “a subject matter wholly and exclusively
belonging to state legislatures to legislate upon.”
News Summary:
The Government stated that the Ministry through its administrative, legal and policy
framework will streamline the processes of ‘Ease-of-doing-business for cooperatives’.
The Supreme Court struck down provisions of the 97th Constitutional Amendment that
prescribed the contours of the rules that state governments could create for cooperatives in
their own states.
However, the role of Union government regarding multi state cooperatives is clearly
recognized.
Sociology of cooperatives:
Marcel Mauss writes that “cooperative economic organizations guarantee the perpetuation of
the future society”. S Ray seconds this by mentioning that “Solidarity among humans has
become essential in view of the growing challenges like alienation, atomism, inequality and
ecological rift.”
EP Roy writes that “Cooperatives offer bargaining strengths to the poor to withstand
vulnerabilities and obtain needy services at a cost.”
However, due to structural constraints related to scale of operations and ability to access
capital, cooperatives have to struggle to thrive in the liberalized economy despite growing in
physical numbers. For example, the share of the credit cooperatives in the ground level credit
disbursed which was 62 per cent in 1992-93, plummeted to 34 percent in 2002-
03(Government of India Report, 2005).
Cooperatives have yet not been able to explore their full potential in India and Asia. A global
survey conducted for the United Nations in 2014(Dave Grace and Associates 2014) revealed
that cooperatives’ Gross revenue to GDP in Asia was 3.25 per cent against 7.08 per cent for
Europe.
On the issue of the new ministry, M. Rajashekhar argues that in addition to compromising on
the norms of federalism, the ministry may work as a front for dispensing political patronage.
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R.C Diwedi in “Jawaharlal lal Nehru: His vision of Cooperatives” writes that Jawahar Lal
Nehru,who wanted to ‘convulse India with cooperation’ was equally emphatic in believing
that government control over cooperation will act like “ an embrace of death”.
However B.S Baviskar and D.W Attwood believe that the policy of contributing to share
capital of cooperatives and providing financial assistance has enabled state governments to
directly intervene in the working of cooperatives which are legally autonomous. This has in
general only worked to the detriment of the cooperative movement, despite localized success.
Hence, Horace Plunkett, the pioneer of Irish cooperatives had aptly observed, “there is no
cooperative movement in India; there is only the cooperative policy of government.”
The poor outcome of state driven interventions led many civil society organizations into
organizing collectives outside the cooperative laws in form of trust or societies .There were
also efforts to form informal cooperatives and Self-help Groups (SHGs) under the growing
influence of the design-principles based on institutional Economics ( Agarwal 2010).
H.S. Shylendra writes that the economic and social world that will emerge after Covid-19,
which has put enormous pressure on the existing model, will be in a dire need of a
cooperative-based economy. However, what India needs is a real movement for cooperatives
than a mere creation of a Ministry of Cooperation. This will require proactive support for
ailing the cooperative sector without hurting its autonomy.
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China’s Three Child Policy
The News:
In a major policy shift aimed at increasing the country’s declining birth rate, China relaxed its
two child norm and endorsed a three child policy.
Background:
Earlier this year, China’s census data showed population growth slipping to its slowest rate
since 1950’s.
Last year, 1.2 Crore babies were born in China, down from 1.465 Crore in 2019-a fall of 18
percent in one year.
This spurred the Government in allowing three children per married couple, five years after it
first relaxed its controversial one-child policy to two.
China’s one-child policy was enforced by former leader Deng Xiaoping in 1980 and was
continued till 2015, till the fear of rapidly ageing population undermining economic growth
forced ruling part to change it.
JieyuLiu,in her five year study of Chinese family life reveals that only a very small
proportion of couples born in the 1980s-the first cohort of the “only-child generation”-had a
second child even once they were allowed, especially in Urban China. The exorbitant cost of
raising a child in China and a shift in the attitude caused by the two decade long ban are some
of the factors behind the fertility behavior of couples. Married couples in rural China,
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however, are more likely to give birth to a second child. Thus urbanization and the escalating
costs associated with it have an impact on the fertility choices.
In a recent paper on gender inequality in post reform urban China, Ji and colleagues (2017)
argue that China has transitioned from a socialist centralized economy to a profit driven
market economy and the state has reiterated from providing socialist welfare such as
publically funded healthcare and from promoting gender egalitarian ideology. Thus, women
are finding it difficult to get state support for their reproductive health.
The International Forum For Rights and Security(IFFRAS) has commented in an article that
three child policy will further aggravate problems for working women who are already
suffering gender discrimination at workplaces since the one-child policy was abolished in
2015. Lin Minghui, states that the biggest reasons behind the growing discrimination is the
employer’s reluctance to pay for maternity leave.
Feng Wang writes that before the two child policy was launched and the one child policy was
operational, fertility decision making was relatively homogenous regardless of the gender
relations between the spouses. However, the shift from the previous policy will lead to more
flexible decisions highly subject to negotiations between the spouses.
Empirical research finds that woman who are able to exercise more decision making power in
marriage have greater access to birth control(Dharmalingam and Morgan),longer birth
intervals ( Uphadhyay and Hindin) and fewer children(Hindin).
Couple dynamics in a marriage are measured by the conjugal power structure and spousal
pressure on fertility.
Yue Quian writes that in the post-reform China, growing gender inequalities in the labor
market likely reduces the women’s ‘marital power’(the ability to make decisions in a
marriage that affects the marital life of the couple), which has a negative impact on their
fertility autonomy.
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Tokyo Olympics under attack for sexualization of sports
The News:
The German women’s Olympic gymnastics team have sported full length unitards instead of
traditional leotards at the Tokyo Olympics games 2021 in a move towards “combating the
sexualization” in sports.
Sociology of sexualization in sports:
According to Harvard Law Review, despite the advancement of the feminist movement, the
American Public still has yet not become comfortable with the way in which female athletes
challenge the notions of femininity and masculinity.
Raney and Bryant believe that sport plays a part in defining gender in the society and the
way the female athletes are represented in the media has its effect on the definition. Thus,
when a woman succeeds in sports, she can be a challenge to established gender roles.
Susah k.Cahn writes that since female athletes inherently express strength and independence,
which are not traditional feminine qualities, they are often categorized as masculine and
homosexual.
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To counteract such claims, female athletes assert their femininity through media. Also since
only a few actually earn large salaries through sports, many embrace the media’s
sexualization to attain exposure and endorsements. (Padma Prakash and Victoria Carty).
Jo Ann Buysse writes that although the media may be trying to emphasize the athletes
heterosexuality and femininity along with their athleticism, they only “further distance the
image of women athletes from athletic competence”.
Modernist Feminist Betty Friedan whose The Feminine Mystique ignited the second wave
feminism of 1960s and 1970s warned against use of the feminine mystique by women. She
argued that living with the restrictive ‘feminine mystique’; athletes who volunteered for
sexualized poses consequently debased and relinquished their athletic achievements for their
sex appeal.
Elizabeth Daniels asserts that as female athletes adhere to sexualized standards and strives for
the perfect physique, they can experience severe dissatisfaction with their appearance, which
can cause ‘disordered eating, negative body esteem and negatively affect their psychological
well being.”
Catherine Mackinnon, a Modernist feminist who specializes in sexual harassment writes that
media’s action leads to degradation and objectification of female athletes that makes them
unreliable to the viewers. As a result, the public does not confer the same respect to female
athletes as it does to males and thus, the media effectively impedes “the development of a
base of women’s sports fan-a base that could financially sustain professional sports
opportunities for women.”(Harvard Law Review)
Steinem writes that the media sustains an “antifeminist stereotype of Superwoman”, which
characterizes female athletes as incomparable idols of beauty and sex appeal and leads to self
objectification and negativity among high school girls.
Victoria Carty writes that compelling female athletes to be sexualized and passive, the media
essentially “combines notion of feminism and traditional stereotypes of femininity”, to
reinforce male domination.
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Uniform Civil Code
The News:
The Delhi High Court has backed the implementation of Uniform Civil Code in the country.
Uniform Civil Code:
A Uniform Civil code involves having a common set of laws of marriage, divorce, succession
and adoption for all Indians, instead of allowing different personal laws for people of
different faiths.
Article 44 of the Constitution of India says that state shall “Endeavour to secure for the
citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”.
P B Mehta writes that the group identities between different religious groups were created by
the British Colonial Apparatus, which was invoked as a primary justification for India’s
suitability for modern institutions. Rochana Bajpai, however, argues that group identities no
longer remain a part of colonial policy alone, but with wider social, political and economic
processes; is a response of the elites and non elites to the opportunities created by the colonial
policy.
Zubair Ahmed Bader writes that insofar as the minority community continues to manifest
personal laws as an indispensable part of their socio-religious identity and as a part of their
right to live as a religious community, an abrupt transition from personal laws to the Uniform
Civil Code, politically, remains inexpedient.
Srirupa Roy writes that Muslim identity in India has emerged as resultant phenomena of “top-
down” construction of identity as a minority identity through actions and policies of the state
and the “bottom-up” construction of the identity as “other” at the societal level through
competing claims advanced in response to other identities.
Scholars like Zoya Hassan, Mushirul Hasan, Rina Verma Williams, Anupama Roy and others
have castigated the minority community leadership for structuring a religious controversy
that in real sense was an issue of gender and social justice.
Zoya Hassan writes that the argument of homogeneity and unification was associated with
the personal laws by Muslim elites, projecting them as a unifying symbol for the community
as opposed to the socio-economic differences, which divided the community.
Zoya Hasan also argues that initially the campaign against Shah Bhano judgment failed to
garner any substantial response from the minority community till it was an issue of women’s
right to maintenance. However, a shift in argument by the Muslim organizations to the larger
issue of the right of the minority community to exist as a religious community in a secular
society, provided momentum to the campaign.
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Zubair Ahmed Bader argues that the absence of any hostility in earlier cases of two similar
judgments-in the Bai Tahira and Fazlunbail cases-evokes significant questions around the
political opportunism of minority community leadership and their intentions to widen their
sphere of influence.
Rina Williams writes that the passage of Muslim Women Bill in Parliament, despite
exhaustive hostility to the bill from different sections of the society, buttressed the
conservative voice in the minority community and marginalized the progressive one.
SP Sathe writes that the word ‘Uniform’ contained in Article 44 does not mean the extension
of majority laws to all communities, for it would only make for ‘common’ law, and not
necessarily ‘uniform’ law. Rather, a uniform application of laws means that every community
must be governed by uniform principles of gender and human justice.
Nivedita Menon writes that complete abrogation of personal laws in the prevailing social and
political conditions look difficult because of right wing forces increasingly using personal
laws in their rhetoric against the minority community and the resultant counter mobilization
by the fundamentalist forces. However, post the Shah Bano judgment, women’s movement
have introduced a shift from the demand of complete abrogation to a more moderate demand
of –reforms within the personal laws to make them gender-just. This can be a more pragmatic
approach in present circumstances.
Zubair Ahmad Bader writes that the there is need for restructuring of the identity structure of
the minority community with civil reforms and socio-political justice, so that the religious
identity moves down the ladder of the structure, before the complete introduction of UCC,
which otherwise would cause resentment and be seen as a threat to minority identity.
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Anti-Conversion Laws
The News:
The Gujarat Government said that it would approach the Supreme Court challenging the stay
granted by the High Court on certain sections of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion
(Amendment) Act, 2021; that seeks to stop religious conversions through inter-faith
marriages using force or allurement or fraudulent means.
Gujarat Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Act, 2021:
The amendment aimed at bringing the 2003 law in line with the laws enacted in other states
like UP, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh.
The law seeks to prohibit conversion in marriage, even if it is with the consent of the
individual, except when prior sanction is obtained from the state.
The new anti-conversion laws shift the burden of proof of a lawful religious conversion from
the ‘converted’ to his\her partner, defines “allurement “in vague terms, prescribes different
jail terms based on gender and legitimizes the intrusion of family and society at large to
oppose inter-faith marriages.
The High Court order observes that the law, “Interferes with the intricacies of marriage
including the right to choice of partner under Right to Life, Article 21 and stands against
Right to freedom of religion under Article 25.”
Sociology of Anti-conversion laws:
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Christophe Jaffrelot writes that Criminalization of these marriages emboldens right-wing

vigilante groups as well as police apparatus. Hence, under the garb of protecting women from
forced conversion, women choosing interreligious marriages become vulnerable to attacks.
Saumya Uma writes that these anti conversion laws do not take into consideration the social
and demographic profiles of women and their ability to make informed choices. Instead it
treats women as a ‘homogeneous’ group of vulnerable and ignorant beings and infantilizes
women.
Geeta Ramaseshan writes that feminist law research have documented how family members
of women, in the name of family and community honor, misuse criminal law, lodging false
complaints of kidnapping, rape and other offences as tools to punish and seek revenge on
husbands-to-be in choice marriages. Thus, police and lower judiciary act in their official
capacity as extensions of father’s authority over their daughter(Uma Chakravarti)
Manisha Gupte, in context of rural Maharashtra, writes that while “Men posses Honor,
women possess the “gendered counterpart “of honor, namely “shame”. Since men lose honor
through behavior of women in their families or kinship, the control over women’s behavior
becomes imperative, as does punishing transgressors”. This becomes the rationale behind
honor killings and Anti-Romeo squads working against Love Jihad.
In a research conducted in 12 districts in UP, a total of 298 applications were recieved for
registration from 2015-19 under the progressive Special Marriage Act. However, only 56% of
the marriages resulted in solemnization of the marriage. The need for a notice period and
multiple bureaucratic hassles were significant reason behind this. Under the circumstances,
the marriages often are solemnized through the family law governing either party, which
often requires religious conversion. Niti Saxena argues that given the unequal power
dynamics that exist in most marital relationships (including choice marriages), women
invariably convert for marriages. Hence, removing the bureaucratic red tape around Special
Marriage Act and its implementation can play a more pragmatic role in reducing conversions
in marriage.
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Maratha Reservations
The News:
A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court struck down the Maharashtra law
granting reservation to Maratha Community in admissions and government jobs in the state.
The Verdict:
The Maratha quota exceeded the 50% ceiling for reservation led down by the Indra Sawhney
Verdict. However, the Court does allow for breach of the ceiling in exceptional
circumstances.
The State government argued that since the population of backward class is 85% and the
reservation limit is 50%, an increase in reservation limit would qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance.
The Court also said that while identification of ‘Socially and Educationally Backward
Communities’ will be done centrally, state governments retain the power to determine the
extent of reservation.
Ashwani Deshpande and Rajesh Ramachandran used data from the India Human
Development Survey to come to the conclusion that Marathas, a predominantly landowning
and a politically dominant group in the state of Maharashtra, are already closer to the upper
caste than many disadvantaged groups in their state. Hence, their anxieties seem to be based
more on perception than empirical evidence.
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Rajehwari Deshpande writes that earlier on the behalf of the Marathas, the state had invented
a caste category, Kunbi Maratha, which was flexible enough to accommodate the dualities in
Maratha identity and fulfils the political claims of the caste within the limited sphere of
politics of reservation. Not only the state, but the dominant caste had neatly manipulated the
reservation discourse.
However, A.Kalaiyarasan, using data from the same survey asserts that OBCs and even
Dalits have started catching up with poor Marathas-who do not form a small minority. Hence,
Christophe Jafferlot arguing against the Supreme Court verdict, states that Supreme Court has
failed to acknowledge the growing socio-economic differentiation within the dominant,
intermediate castes.
Gail Omvedt wrote that the Maratha agitation demanding reservations has a historical
significance because at one point, the Marathas were against the very idea of reservation.
Mridul Kumar writes that reservations in education, jobs and politics points to the
community’s desire(which comprises of around a third of the state’s population) to quit
farming due to its unprofitability and instead seek careers in service sector as well as protect
its political turf from an upwardly mobile OBC leadership.
Apart from holding the Maratha reservations unconstitutional, the Supreme Court also re-
interpreted the 102nd amendment to take away the power of state government to designate
communities as “socially and educationally backward classes.” Alok kumar argues that this
particular aspect of the Court’s judgment is poorly reasoned and threatens to upset the well-
set principles and practices in relation to reservations in India.
SuhasPalshikar writes that intra-caste stratification, something that was limited at the time of
the Mandal, is increasing in present times. Also, there is a need to differentiate between
backwardness primarily caused by a group’s social location in traditional social order and
backwardness resulting from distortions of the political economy. He suggests a third
backward classes commission to look into the issue.
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Virginity Test for Indonesian Army scrapped
The News:
The Indonesian army has scrapped the long standing practice of virginity tests for women
cadets.
The Virginity test:
The use of virginity tests by the Indonesian security forces was first exposed by Human
Rights Watch in 2014. Human Rights Watch called it a form of gender based sexual violence.
The test was required not only for women applicants, but also for those marrying army
personnel.
Even though most countries have scrapped the unscientific practice of ‘virginity tests’,
according to United Nations, women and girls in at least 20 countries including Afghanistan,
Egypt and South Africa are forced to undergo this vaginal examination for various reasons.
Gender based violence is “a violence that is directed towards a woman because she is a
woman, or violence that affects woman disproportionately.”
An important element of WHO definition of sexual violence is the use of ‘coercion’ or

‘force’. However, NJ Thompson argues that there is a high possibility of variability in what is
labeled as ‘forced’ due to widespread cultural differences.
MA Strauss writes that various cultures condemn certain forms of sexual violence, while
tolerating other forms, which are the culturally legitimized form of violence.
K Otterbein examined 17 cultures and reported that cultures with rigid sex-role systems
showed higher sexual violence. It thus explains sexual violence in terms of social expression
of male power or patriarchy.
The traditional family performs recreational, health care, procreative, protection and affection
role for its members. Gradually through industrialization, these responsibilities are taken
away from the family and institutionalized outside the home.
Different forms of marriages are emerging like gay and lesbian civil unions, cohabitation,
one-person households, LATs or Living Apart Together families, DINK(Double income No
kids) families.
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Twitter campaign to include Tulu in Eighth schedule

The News:
A twitter campaign has been initiated to include Tulu in the Eighth schedule of the
constitution and give it an Official status along with 22 other languages in the constitution.
The Eighth schedule:
The Eighth schedule lists the official languages of India. The Pahwa Committee in 1996 and
the Sitakant Mohapatra Committee in 2003 was unable to evolve set of fixed criterion for
selection of a language for inclusion in the Eighth schedule.
The Lok Sabha in 2016 stated that there were demands for inclusion of 38 more language in
the eight schedule, including Tulu and Rajasthani.
Inclusion of Tulu in the Eighth schedule will accord it recognition from the Sahitya Akademi
and allow Tulu books to be translated in other recognized languages, allow MLAs and MPs
to ask questions in Tulu and allow candidates to write the All-India examination in this
language.
Tulu language:
Tulu is a Dravidian language spoken in two coastal districts of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi
in Karanataka and Kasaragod district of Kerala.
As per the 2011 Census report, there are 18, 46,427 Tulu speaking people in India.
Tulu has a rich oral literature tradition with folk song forms like paddana and traditional folk
theatre Yakshagana.
Sociology of language:
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According to K.L Pike, language holds the key to ‘social nucleation’ and can tell us what is
important to the particular culture. For example, in one Eskimo language, there are 22 words
for snow. According to Edward Sapire, the entire knowledge of world’s culture lies in
language.
India is referred to as a sociolinguist giant and according to Dholani and Singh, India
comprises of myriad streams of cultures and languages which exhibit distinct internal
homogeneity and external identity.
A study applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to language data from 2011 census at
the district level to get a picture of the linguistic diversity in India and found that a substantial
numbers of Indians speaking various languages were geographically segregated, that is,
linguistic states representing the scheduled languages were becoming increasingly
homogenous. The study adds the Indian cosmopolitanism of languages is higher in cities than
villages and border districts with multiple languages are being increasing forced into the state
language.
In an earlier study conducted by Shashidar, 2018; it was found that Kerala was India’s least
linguistically diverse state as of 2011, with 97% of state’s population recognizing Malayalam
as their Mother tongue. Thus, the studies claimed that the linguistic diversity of Indian
languages were under threat.
Linguistic rights can be classified into three broad streams-Identity based (all human thoughts
are conceptualized through language and thus it forms the centre of one’s identity); justice
based (as an important tool for participation in polity of the state) and Diversity based (to
maintain the linguistic diversity of the nation).
Linguistic nationalism, especially in South India, has also long been considered as a measure
to check Hindi domination in the Indian Union.
However, demand for linguistic diversity and recognition should not feed the Ultranationalist
streams in Indian polity with divisive tendencies towards the Union of India.
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PM-CARES for Covid affected Children
The News:
The Government announced that all children who have lost both parents, the surviving
parent, legal guardians or adoptive parents to Covid-19 will receive financial assistance under
the PM-CARES for children scheme.
PM-CARES
The PM-CARES will contribute through a specially designed scheme to create a corpus of Rs
10 Lakh for each child when he or she reaches 18 years of age.
For children under 10 years of age, the child will be given admission in the nearest Kendriya
Vidyalaya as a day scholar.
The child will also be assisted in obtaining educational loans for higher education and all
Covid 19 orphans will be enrolled as beneficiaries under the Ayushman Bharat Scheme (PM-
JAY).
According to UNESCO, the education of nearly 1.6 Billion pupils in 190 countries has so far
been affected-that’s 90% of the world’s school age children.
Since the poorest are hit the hardest, lockdown are expected to increase the inequalities for
disadvantaged children across the globe. Sociologist Wim Van Lanker calls it a ‘social crisis
in making’.
Van Lanker writes that access to internet and a quiet study area is a huge issue for children
living in poverty and overcrowded households.
Lloyd Morrisett coined the term ‘Digital Divide’ to indicate a gap between socioeconomic
groups in accessing technology tools. The pandemic will thus create the new haves and have-
nots, who will be the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information-poor’ as the academia is
increasingly shifting to the virtual space.
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Obiageri Bridget in her study of digital divide in Nigeria builds on Bourdieu’s work stating
that varying forms of capital are connected such that lack of one may cause disadvantages in
other. In the light of a digital divide, the lack of economic capital (wealth) could lead to a
corresponding lack of internet access, which has become necessary for education attainment
(cultural capital).
Research by Alison Andrew and Sarah Cattan shows that poorer families are less willing to
allow their children to return to education.
Nearly three decades ago, prominent sociologists of Education Doris Entwise and Karl
Alexander indicated in their study on summer setback that schools matter more for the
educational advancement of less advantaged students than they do for more privileged ones.
PritiMahara writes that after the pandemic, loss of livelihoods and absence of adequate
financial and social protection in India’s informal sector will force the poor families to send
their children to work.
RaviChandran and Shah write that child abuse are on a rise during the pandemic induced
lockdowns, as the perpetrators are many times at home or in the neighborhood, which is a
threat and mental distraction to the learners.
A Human Rights Watch Report urged governments around the world to swiftly redress the
harm caused to Children’s education in the wake of unprecedented disruptions from the
Covid-19 pandemic.
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Government decision on non-caste-based census
The News:
A multi-party delegation of politicians led by the Bihar Chief Minister met the Prime
Minister to press the demand for holding a caste based census in the country.
History of Census:
Every Census in Independent India from 1951 to 2011 has published data on Scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes, but not on other castes.
Before that, every Census until 1931 had data on caste. In 1941, caste based data was
collected but not published due to the ongoing WW2.
In the absence of such a census, there is no proper estimate for population of OBCs and
others.
Christophe Jaffrelot writes in favor of caste based census stating that it would provide up-to-
date evidence that would help analyze the accomplishments and limitations of reservation
policies.
Mary E John asserts that by not including caste in census, India would be harming its
ambition of annihilating caste as caste census have the “potential to be the beginning of the
end of caste.”
NancharaiahMerugumala writes that caste census is the need of the hour; otherwise caste
wars for quota benefits will become inevitable.
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Satish Deshpande, replying to critics who claim that India will never be able to rid itself of
the ghost of caste hierarchy if we keep counting it, writes that caste is not an exception, but
the norm in India. The Hindu caste system rules every aspect of social and economic life in
the country and thus there is a need to take it head-on rather then turn a blind eye to it.
However, the complexities of collecting data on caste are highlighted by R B Bhagat, who
points out that John and Deshpande do not consider the impact of linguistic differences,
migration and inter-caste marriages on the enumeration of caste. Sonalde Desai writes that
there is need for planning a new system to enumerate caste.
VK Natraj questions the purpose of determining the number of citizens from the backward
class, given that the state is no longer the leading employer in the country. He doubts the
premise that enumerating caste would help formulate government policy.
Ratna M sudarshan also arguing against the need for caste consensus for improving policy
believes that numbers from local levels, not caste census, would help administrators work out
more effective strategies.
Nandini Sunder writes that the complexity of the problem is highlighted by the fact that there
is no easy Left-Right division on the issue. Both Left liberals and upper caste Hindu Rightists
agree on not enumerating caste, the former because of their vision of a casteless society and
the latter because a caste census would show up the inequality and destroy the image of a
monolithic Hindu society.
Yogendra Yadav points out that the critics of caste census are those who oppose reservation
and the supporters are caste census are the ones who support positive affirmation.
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Supreme Court fines political parties for covering up criminal pasts of fielded
candidates.
The News:
The Supreme Court imposed fines on major political parties for covering up from voters the
criminal past of the candidates they had fielded in the Bihar Assembly polls last year.
Criminalization of politics:
The Court also ordered Election Commission to create a separate cell to monitor compliance
by political parties to the Court’s directions issued in the February 2020 judgment regarding
disclosure of criminal backgrounds of their candidates.
According to Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), 233 MPs in the current Lok Sabha
are facing criminal charges, up from 187 in 2014.
Christophe Jafferlot examines in detail the problem of criminalization of politics and

attributes its genesis in emergency.
George Haokip traces the problem to lack of ethics in politics and autocratic political party
leaders.
S Chauchard writes that as long as we have bad governance, politics will be governed by
ethnic identities which will lead to voters preferring tainted candidates who can dole out
patronage.
Milan Vaishnav in his book ‘when crime pays: Money and muscles in Indian politics’ writes
that mafias have been a part of electoral politics since the birth of Indian democracy. He
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believes voters prefer tainted candidates as they are seen to ensure some access to
government services and jobs.
Madhav Godbole recommends more information to voters in the absence of political will to
reform the system. M.Minch recommends greater voter awareness led by Civil Society
Organizations.
Chhoker argues for greater involvement of citizens in electoral reforms.
Trilochan Sastry writes that voters in states with high levels of education like Kerala and
some North Eastern states have been refraining from taking bribes and voting for candidates
with serious criminal cases. Hence, the idea is not so farfetched and changes in citizen
behavior are best guarantee for decriminalization.
Sridharan examines an important aspect of decriminalizing politics, namely, funding

elections, and recommends public funding.
However, D Tiwari argues that governance will not improve merely with cleaner candidates
and representatives, and a lot more needs to be done.
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Incel Movement
The News:
The Incel Movement has come into spotlight once again in the UK’s Plymouth, where a 22
year old man named Jake Davidson shot dead five people.
The Incel Movement:
The ‘incel’ movement is a dangerous online subculture comprising of men who identify as
‘involuntary celibates’ and regularly express deeply misogynistic views about women.
Experts have warned that they are slowly becoming a threat to law and order.
It promotes the ‘red pill ‘and ‘black pill’ mentality, referring to a Matrix-inspired metaphor.
The ‘black pill’ theory promotes the defeatist idea that your fate is sealed at birth and no
matter what changes you try to make, your sexual capital cannot be altered.
‘Red’ Pillers on the other hand, see feminism as female supremacy and believe that there is a
systemic bias in favor of women.
Bharath Ganesh writes that the explosion of digital hate culture represents the dark side of the
democraticizing power of social media.
Patton argues that the internet provides the perfect forum for ‘Group polarization’. Group
polarization theory states that the like-minded individuals in group settings may collectively
become more extreme than their individual views. Patton writes that the anonymity of
internet frees the individuals from normative and social constraints of behavior.
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E.Colleoni writes that social media can function as an ‘echo chamber’ because the user
chooses which opinions and contents are to be viewed, isolating them from dissenting
opinions and allowing radical views to be amplified.
Johnson finds that hate spread online has been recurrently tied to extremism and violence in
real life, including mass shootings. Angela Nagle believes that the Incel and their particular
brand of computer-enabled detachment easily seep into a mindset of entitled violence.
Dharmapala and McAdams found that the growth of online hate networks and tendency of
members to positively reinforce violent behavior lead to ‘opportunity for fame’ within the
group as a motivating factor for members to express their hatred in the real world.
Ruth Lewis writes that the part of logic of victimization of women on social media is to
exclude certain voices from cyberspace. Thus, although some incel members may undertake
actions simply out of hatred for women, others do so for more strategic reasons. Thus, online
abuse polices women’s voices, thereby limiting the use of online forum for feminist activism.
Feminist scholar Michael Salter argues that these online harassment movements reflect “the
masculine impulse to defend particular technologies, such as internet and videogames, from
perceived encroachment by women and more diverse users and uses the term ‘Geek
hegemony’ to refer to this dependence on technological hegemony. The concept of Geek
masculinity underscores the incels and their ‘beta-revolution’ (an identity they take in
contradiction a traditionally defined alpha-male identity).
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Proposal to revise creamy layer for OBCs and sub-categorization
The News:
Government is working on a proposal to revise the criteria for defining the ‘creamy layer’
among OBCs.The Government has also formed an expert committee headed by retired judge
G. Rohini to examine the sub-categorization of OBCs.
Creamy layer:
Based on the Second Backward Class Commission or Mandal Commission Report, the
Government in 1990 notified 27% reservation for socially and Educationally Backward
Classes.
The Supreme Court, in the Indira Sawhney Case (1992) upheld the 27% reservation, subject
to exclusion of creamy layer.
Following the order, an expert committee headed by Justice R.N Prasad was constituted for
fixing the criteria for creamy layer.
S Subramanium argues that excluding the creamy layer from the backward castes reservation
quotas could lead to upper-caste homogeneity in institutes of higher education and
government employment as economically disadvantaged backward class will not be able to
compete in the academic race. Hence, he believes that quota system was introduced as
affirmative action against caste discrimination, which is unconnected to economic status.
Ashwini Deshpande, in his study on the Indian Railways, asserts that ‘reservation affect the
efficiency of public service’ is a myth.However, Ashwini Deshpande argues that reservation
is not an anti-poverty program. The more advantageous sections of all caste groups are able
to enter higher education. To make sure that the poor are represented, we need separate
policies.
K Ravi Srinivas argues that contrary to widely held view, the question of ‘creamy layer ‘is
not decided on economic criterion alone. The idea in fact, is to ensure that socially and
educationally advanced persons do not corner reservations in the name of social justice for
OBCs.
Pradipta Chaudhury writes that reservations have served essentially as tools to absorb the
privileged sections of lower castes into the ruling class that has pushed real economic
problems facing the poor away from the centre stage.
Adfer Rashid Shah writes that further subcategorizing and dividing quotas will proliferate
caste, group and community politics, and excessive politicization of the very idea of welfare
will stoke mutual hatred and will prolong exclusion. Thus, the need of the hour is to appoint a
commission to assess the relevance and need for affirmative action among various castes,
groups and communities.
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All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) 2019-20 Report

The News:
The Ministry of Education released the latest edition of the All India Survey on Higher
Education (AISHE) 2019-20.
The Report:
The report mentions that the number of institutions of national importance have increased to
135 in 2020 from 75 in 2015.
Not only did women catch up with men in BSc and MBBS programs in 2017-18, they have
gone on to outpace them in 2019-20.However, the disparity remains worrying in engineering
and law.
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the rise in gross enrolment ratio in higher education (from
24.5 per cent in 2015-16 to 27 per cent in 2020), is being driven by a sharper relative rise in
GER for women.
However, the disruptive shift to an online mode of education has disproportionately left out
weaker sections of students. Women are likely to bear the brunt of this exclusion, undoing
these precious gains.
The influx of women into higher education for many years now, has added up to a paradox —
the appalling labour force participation rate of Indian women.
CMIE data shows that female labour force participation fell alarmingly in urban areas, where
more educated women are likely to be found, in early 2020 — as employment shrank and
domestic work increased due to Covid-19 pandemic.
Haas and Hajdar writes that higher education in a country provides the much-needed impetus
for growth and development, thereby benefiting both the individual and society.
Pankaj Mital argues that it is critical to re-imagine higher education as beyond general
university degrees, and develop a complementary vertical of equal status of skill and
vocational education to enhance employment opportunities.
Jayanti Dutta reports that much before it came into its own in Western countries, faculty
development in higher education was discussed in India right in the first Education
Commission after independence. However, In spite of the early attention, the implementation
has lagged behind. Policy changes, and the establishment and enrichment of dedicated nodal
centres of faculty development, are essential to address the pressing concerns of higher
education.
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Bheemeshwar Reddy, speaking in light of the Covid-19 pandemic induced lockdown of

educational institutions, warns that in the process of stressing on online mode of education,
the state and educational administrations, are behaving as “benevolent patriarchs,” and have
taken this key decision without the participation of important stakeholders in the educational
system, namely teachers, students and parents. Thus, female students are also at a greater risk
of facing the brunt of disruption in education due to pandemic.
Karuna Chanana argues that it is important not just to focus only on women’s entry into the
system of higher education but also to see what happens to them after they enter the system.
Their chances of their staying on and progressing from one stage of higher education to
another stage also need to be analyzed.
J Megarry, writing on feminist sociological perspectives on women’s educational experience,

has highlighted its several dimensions, e g, their under-participation, under-achievement and
under-representation.
Rachel Sharpe argues the clustering of women in specific subjects leads to their occupational
segregation later in life. Sandra Acker writes about the patriarchal imprint on the subject
choices of women in higher education and on the feminine and masculine dichotomy of
subjects.
Parikhe and Sukhamte write that the presence of women students in technology and
engineering has also increased but a study of women engineers showed that the most
preferred specializations of women were: electronics and computer engineering. Thus, even
interdisciplinary dichotomy of subjects is visible.
Slaughter and Leslie argue that globalisation is accompanied by an increased focus on techno
sciences which have gendered implications because women are less likely to be involved in
these areas which are frontrunners in the new economy and the market and they are also
likely to be at the lower levels.
Vineeta Bal, in her study of women scientists in biological sciences in the central universities
and the national laboratories concludes that there are fewer permanent women faculty in
comparison to those who obtain research degrees. It is argued that the researchers join as
faculty members when they are in their early thirties, a time when women are either married
or have to be married soon. They need a break to raise a family and after the break cannot
compete with men in research and professional experience. Thus, despite professional
degrees, they are not able to gain equity in labor force participation.
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The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) report on schools of
minority communities.
The News:
The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) has released a report
assessing minority schools in the country.
The report:
The Commission has found a disproportionately high number of Christian Missionary

schools in the country, in relation to the population of Christians, as well as to the number of
schools run by other minority groups
According to the report Christians comprise 11.54 percent of the minority population but run
71.96 percent schools, Muslims comprise 69.18 percent of the minority population but run
22.75 percent of schools
The report finds that Christian Missionary schools are admitting only a certain class of
students which has led to formation of a “cocoon populated by elites”.
As opposed to this, other types of minority schools, particularly Madarasas have become
“ghettos of underprivileged students languishing in backwardness”.
The Commission has said that students in madarasas which do not offer a secular course
along with religious studies – such as the sciences – have fallen behind and feel a sense of
alienation and “inferiority’’ when they leave school.
It adds that Article 15 (5) which exempts minority schools from RTE – as”creating a
conflicting picture between fundamental right of children and right of minority
communities’’.
Sociological analysis:Sarkar and Dadawala write that the financial capital of India, Mumbai,
witnessed the misuse of minority status to hoodwink the obligation of providing 25%
reservation for children belonging to EWS and DG categories.
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Sushant Chandra argues that this happened due to a regressive judgment given by the
Supreme Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v Union of
India (2014), exempting minority schools from the application of the Right of Children to
Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act).
Shirin Dalvi writes that by focusing on the issue of modernization of madrassas, the
government is deflecting opinion from the real issues and needs of Muslims in education.
Hence there is a need to have Muslim representation while making and implementing
educational policies.
Tahir Mahmood writes that absence of any proper law under Article 30 to look after the
establishment and administration of minority educational institutions shows the indifference
of the legislature to this pressing need.
Yoginder Sikand warns that indiscriminate targeting of madrasas will only alienate minorities
further and harden extremist sympathies on both sides. Besides, efforts set in motion by
several madrasas to adapt to the changing educational needs of Muslims may be severely
hampered.
D Bandyopadhyay argues that issue of modernization of madrasa education brings up the

vested interests of fundamentalist elements trying to protect their turf and the political system
which strives to utilize the backward for electoral gain. Strangely, the interests of the non-
secular religious groups and those of the so-called 'secular and progressive' politicians merge,
reinforcing one another.
Asghar Ali Engineer writes that the stereotypical definition of Muslim education ignores
changing realities. Though institutions are plagued by a lack of resources, and madrasa
education is still favored by the poorer classes, the growing middle class including increasing
numbers of women has increasingly turned to modern, secular education.
SaralJhingran in his article, ‘Madrasa Modernization Programme: An Assessment’ argues

that the introduction of modern subjects will create confusion in the minds of the students,
since the two knowledge systems are very different.
Arshad Alam ,however, criticizing the above mentioned article, states that for category as
diverse as Indian Muslims, there is bound to be a plurality of voices over issues like
modernization of madrasas. Hence, there is a need to highlight the reformist voices from
within madrassas that are demanding modernization.
Shirin Dalvi argues that debate now should be largely centered on whether modern formal
education should be introduced in conjunction with existing religious education in madrassas
or should religious education itself be strengthened by modernizing it.
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Kamla Bhasin dies after battling cancer.
The News:
Feminist icon, poet, author and a pioneer of the women’s rights movement in South Asia,
Kamla Bhasin, died in Delhi on 25th September after battling cancer.
Contributions to the society:
Bhasin was the founder of Sangat(South Asian Network of Gender Activists and Trainer), a
South Asian feminist network, and co-founder of Jagori, a women’s resource centre.
She was also the South Asian coordinator of the One Billion Rising campaign to end sexual
violence, besides being associated with several other organizations.
She is known for improvising and popularizing in India the ‘Azadi’ slogan, which she picked
up from Pakistani feminists.
Nurturing the dream of creating gender progressive households, she had taken up the onus of
eliminating gender stereotypes from nursery rhymes.
Sociological contributions:
In her book ‘What Is Patriarchy?’ Kamla Bhasin argued that religion has always been
misused to justify patriarchy by replacing logical arguments and discussion with the
infallibility of a belief system.
Traditions too play a part in sustaining patriarchy. Bhasin believed that Kanyaadan was an act
against the Constitution of India as it embodied the ideology of slavery, with a man giving
away the ownership of a woman to another man.
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However, in addition to religious and traditional patriarchy, she believed that neoliberalism
has given rise to a new form of patriarchy -capitalist patriarchy, which is manifested by the
rise of pornography, and cosmetics. It has reduced women to their bodies and deprived them
of agency.
Kamla Bhasin believed that mere economic development was not the answer to achieve an
egalitarian society. Rather,neo-liberasim increases the paradigms of inequality and leads to a
contest of -Mainstream versus those in the periphery, rich versus poor, upper caste versus
lower caste, men versus women, rich verses richer, because this becomes a fight for
resources.
Kamla Bhasin argued that while people across the world mistake feminism to be an urban
concept, all major women’s movements in history were initiated by rural women. Hence,
Feminism is not an urban phenomenon and only Upper class women cannot bring change in
the society. She cited the example of Chipko movement and land rights movement.
Kamla Bhasin observed that most of the violence inflicted on people is by men as it is
masculine to hide their emotions and become violent. Thus, patriarchy dehumanizes men.
In her book ‘Borders and Boundaries: Women in India’s partition’, Kamla Bhasin speaks of
how wars between communities were fought by violating the turf of women’s bodies and
policies by the states were formulated neglecting the female voice.
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‘Huge numbers may be pushed into dire poverty or starvation…we need to secure
them’
Written by Amartya Sen , Raghuram Rajan , Abhijit Banerjee
We in India worry a lot about the possible mis-steps that can happen in the implementation of
large-scale transfers; the money (or the food ) may end up in the wrong hands, some
intermediary may get rich at the expense of the taxpayer. In some ways, this is a welcome
shift from the see-no-evil optimism that gave us government-run hotels and “luxury” river
cruises. But in times like these, amidst the pandemic and the global economic crisis, with the
nation in lockdown and with lives and livelihoods at stake, it is the wrong set of concerns.
As it becomes clear that the lockdown will go on for quite a while, in a total or a more
localized version, the biggest worry right now, by far, is that a huge number of people will be
pushed into dire poverty or even starvation by the combination of the loss of their livelihoods
and interruptions in the standard delivery mechanisms. That is a tragedy in itself and,
moreover, opens up the risk that we see large-scale defiance of lockdown orders — starving
people, after all, have little to lose. We need to do what it takes to reassure people that the
society does care and that their minimum well-being should be secure.
We have the resources to do this; the stocks of food at the Food Corporation of India stood at
77 million tons in March 2020 — higher than ever at that time of the year, and more than
three times the “buffer stock norms”. This is likely to grow over the next weeks as the Rabi
crop comes in. The government, recognizing the disruptions to the agricultural markets from
the lockdown, is more than usually active in buying the stocks that the farmers need to get rid
of. Giving away some of the existing stock, at a time of national emergency, makes perfect
sense; any sensible public accounting system should not portray it as inordinately costly.
Indeed the government already has shown a willingness to use the stocks — it has offered a
supplementary PDS provision of 5 kg/person/month for the coming three months. However,
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it is quite likely that three months will not be enough, since even if the lockdown ends soon,
the process of reopening the economy will take time. More importantly, a substantial fraction
of the poor are excluded from the PDS rolls, for one reason or another (such as identification
barriers to get a ration card that turn out to be hard to overcome), and this supplementary
provision only applies to those who are already on it. For example, even in the small state of
Jharkhand, there are, we are told, 7 lakh pending applications for ration cards. There is also
evidence that there are a lot of bona fide applications (for example of old-age pensioners)
held up in the verification process, partly because the responsible local authorities try to
avoid letting anybody in by mistake to avoid any appearance of malfeasance.
Such punctiliousness has its merits, but not in the middle of a crisis. The correct response is
to issue temporary ration cards — perhaps for six months — with minimal checks to
everyone who wants one and is willing to stand in line to collect their card and their monthly
allocations. The cost of missing many of those who are in dire need vastly exceeds the social
cost of letting in some who could perhaps do without it.
This principle, once recognized, has a number of important implications. First, the
government should use every means at its disposal to make sure that no one is starving. This
means expanding the PDS, as discussed, but it also means setting up public canteens for
migrants and others who are away from home, sending the equivalent of the school meal to
the homes of the children who are now stuck at home (as some states are already doing), and
making use of reputed local NGOs that often have a reach among the most marginalized that
exceeds that of the government.
Second, starvation is just one of the worries; the unexpected loss of income and savings can
have serious consequences, even if the meals are secured for now: farmers need money to
buy seeds and fertilizer for the next planting season; shopkeepers need to decide how they
will fill their shelves again; many others have to worry how they would repay the loan that is
already due. There is no reason why, as a society, we should ignore these concerns.
The government has partly recognized this in the cash transfers it has promised to certain
groups; but the amounts are both small and narrowly targeted. Why only farmers and not
landless labourers, especially since MGNREGA is hobbled by the lockdown? And help needs
to be extended to the urban poor. Once again, the priority should be to err on the side of being
inclusive. P Chidambaram’s idea of using the MGNREGA rolls from 2019, plus those
covered by Jan Arogya and Ujjwala to identify the poor households and to send them 5000
rupees each to their Jan Dhan accounts, seems like a good first step. But we must recognize
that none of these lists are perfect and moreover the recent work of Rohini Pande, Karthik
Muralidharan and others have exposed the many gaps in the JAM infrastructure in terms of
reaching the very poor. Therefore, as a part of the commitment to not miss the needy, there
has to be funding available that state and local governments can use to find effective ways to
reach those who suffer from extreme deprivation.
If there was ever a challenge that requires brave and imaginative action, this has to be it. We
need to spend wisely given the enormous likely demand for fiscal resources in the coming
months, but skimping on helping the truly needy is the surest way to lose the plot.
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What does it mean to be Indian?
Written by Ashutosh Varshney
Are the various diversities of India — religious, linguistic, caste-based — being flattened by
the rise of Hindu nationalism? Are more and more Indians beginning to believe that Hindus
and/or Hindi-speakers are the only true Indians? Is celebrating all kinds of diversities as the
founding ideology of Indian nationhood — contained in India’s Constitution and constructed
under the combined influences of Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar — coming to an end?
These questions have invited an array of speculations, especially since 2014. But detailed
statistics have been hard to come by. We are finally lucky to have the most comprehensive
data set yet, summarised in “Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation”, a report
published by the Pew Research Center, Washington.
Religion has been studied a lot in India, but mostly in a village or town, or in a small set of
them. To my knowledge, until this report came out, there were no nationally representative
surveys of religious belief and practice in India. And if they did exist, they, or their findings,
were not in the public realm.
Any analysis of what the Pew Research Center finds must begin with the understanding that
surveys essentially present data, not explanations, which is left for analysts to develop.
Moreover, surveys are snapshots, not historical exercises, and they are an exercise in breadth,
not depth. Survey data must be interpreted, and the best interpretations will always be
informed by prior modes of understanding and knowledge.
The report uncovers the paradox of Indian identity — that despite the centrality of religion
and caste in India’s social and political life, there is a larger “superordinate” civic identity
that exists. It is layered on top of the building blocks of caste and religion. India’s freedom
struggle sought to create this superordinate identity, and scholars have repeatedly talked
about it.
The starting point of the Indian paradox is the high incidence of bonding as opposed to
bridging — bonding within one’s religious and caste communities, not bridging across such
boundaries. In the 1990s, the bonding-bridging distinction was proposed by Robert Putnam in
his exploration of America’s race relations and its civil society.
I had explored the distinction for India in my 2002 book on Hindu-Muslim relations, Ethnic
Conflict and Civic Life. More conclusively than any other document I know of, the Pew
Center Report shows that most Indians prefer to live in neighbourhoods of their caste or
religion; they make friends within their religion and caste; they marry overwhelmingly inside
their communities (endogamy), and they want strict prohibition against inter-religious or
inter-caste marriages (exogamy). Whether or not this was true to the same extent earlier, a
very large proportion of Indians today want religious or caste segregation.
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But an overwhelming proportion of Indians (82-88 %) also say that being “truly Indian”
means respecting all religions, respecting the army, respecting the country’s institutions and
laws, respecting elders, and standing for the national anthem. Region-wise, only in the East
(Bihar, Jharkhand, Bengal, Odisha) and Northeast are the proportions lower, but not
catastrophically so (70-83 %, instead of 82-88 %). And religion-wise, only Muslims and
Christians score lower, but not hugely so (72-81 %).
The report’s findings on Muslims are especially noteworthy. Departing from doctrinal purity,
the practised form of Islam in India has syncretistic features. India’s Muslims subscribe to the
idea of karma, as much as the Hindus do; every fourth Muslim believes in reincarnation, in
the purificatory power of the Ganga, in the multiple manifestations of God; and every fifth
Muslim celebrates Diwali. Neha Sahgal, the writer of the Report, and someone who has
surveyed Islamic practices in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Middle East, says that India’s
Muslims are closer to Indian Hindus than to Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslims. And yet, it is
also clear that they wish to maintain their identity as Muslims and would like Islamic, not
secular, courts to adjudicate upon community matters.
Stated differently, Indians want to be both Hindus and Indians, Muslims and Indians,
Christians and Indians, and so on. And such hyphenation, says the report, can be extended to
linguistic groups and, to some extent, castes as well. Being an Indian is basically a
hyphenated identity. There aren’t too many unhyphenated Indians.
To put the matter comparatively, India is not like France, which allows no hyphens. Indians
are closer to the American concept of national identity. According to nationalism theory,
France is the ultimate melting pot, not the US, which is a political melting pot, but a cultural
salad bowl. The latter concept allows hyphens to exist. Americans are Irish Americans,
Italian Americans, Latino Americans, Jewish Americans, Asian Americas, etc. And
Trumpian politics reinvigorated an older identity — that of White Americans.
But India’s hyphenation is not yet structured beyond the possibility of rupture. As many as 65
% of Hindus believe that to be a true Indian, you have to be a Hindu, and nearly 50 % believe
that to be a true Indian, you have to be both a Hindu and a Hindi speaker. The idea of Hindus
or Hindi speakers being equated with India never went this far in modern Indian history.
Will the Hindu-Hindi-Indian equation go substantially further? If it does, then the paradox of
having both a Hindu-centric identity and a superordinate civic identity, which respects the
Constitution, existing laws, and all religions — simply can’t last. The Constitution is
completely against the doctrine that only Hindus are true Indians.
Whether or not this will happen depends on the political process. The survey statistics are not
cast in stone. So long as India remains a democracy, pushes and pulls of politics will
strengthen or weaken the existing snapshot of reality, which the survey represents.
At this time, South India, says the survey, is leading the charge against politics that equates
Hindu and Hindi with India. On all measures relevant to this equation, South India differs
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radically from Northern and Central India. Parts of the East, as we know, have also joined the
pushback.
If this pushback expands its geographical ambit, the Hindi-Hindu-India politics will be
weakened, and the superordinate identity will become stronger. If the BJP manages to reverse
the pushback, India will be headed towards a breakdown of its superordinate civic identity.
Political struggles of the coming years are thus monumentally important.
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India’s democratic exceptionalism is now withering away. The impact is also external
“Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by
generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves”. This is a central claim of How
Democracies Die, one of the most widely read books worldwide on politics in recent years. It
is coauthored by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, two of the finest political scientists of
their generation.
The recent military coup in Myanmar was an aberration for contemporary times, as was the
coup in Thailand in 2014 and in Pakistan in 1999. Such coups were quite common in the
1960s and 1970s. More prevalent now is what scholars are calling “democratic backsliding”,
a new concept to depict democratic erosion led by elected politicians, often quite legally.
“Many government efforts to subvert democracy”, write Levitsky and Ziblatt, “are legal in
the sense that they are approved by the legislatures or accepted by the courts”. They use
copious examples from Latin America and Europe, their respective areas of expertise, and the
damage done by Donald Trump to the US, the land of their birth and residence. What is legal,
they emphasise, is not necessarily democratic. Undemocratic legislation can be passed, or
existing laws manipulated to undermine democracy.
Levitsky and Ziblatt are now clearly relevant to India. India’s democracy is backsliding, not
because of the generals and soldiers, but because elected politicians are subverting
democracy. Very soon, two of the most widely read annual democracy reports — by
America’s Freedom House and Sweden’s V-Dem Institute — will be published. They had
argued last year that India was on the verge of losing its democratic status. Let us see whether
this year’s reports call India undemocratic, or only “partly free”.
Partisans of Delhi’s ruling regime will vociferously decry these formulations, contending that
the BJP government was elected by the people, and it is only enacting what it was voted for.
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They will say that parliament has approved BJP’s legislation, from Kashmir to citizenship
amendment, from preventive detention to farm reforms. Therein lies the fundamental
conceptual confusion.
For democratic theory, elections are necessary, but not sufficient. Elections alone cannot be
equated with democracy. Democracy is measured by a composite index. The overall
judgement depends partly on elections, and partly on what the elected governments do
between elections.
Democratic theory lays out two kinds of post-election requirements: One pertains to
institutional constraints on the executive, another to civil liberties. Is the power of the
executive checked by the legislature and/or judiciary? Are citizens free to speak? Are they
free to organise and protest? And after the anti-Jewish horrors of Germany’s “Nazi
democracy” (1933-1945), an inescapable question also is: Are the minorities protected from
majoritarian fury?
Democratic backsliding in India is especially concerning because India’s democracy,

according to most leading scholars, was exceptional. Decades of research showed that
democracies could indeed be established at low levels of income, but they tended to survive
generally at high levels of income. Until recently, barring the exception of 1975-77, India had
spectacularly defied this statistically valid theorisation. Only one developing country, Costa
Rica, has a better democratic record. But Costa Rica is infinitely smaller and six times richer
than India. Robert Dahl, the world’s leading democratic theorist after the Second World War,
called India the greatest contemporary exception to democratic theory.
India’s democratic exceptionalism is now withering away. Democracies do not charge

peaceful protestors with sedition, do not have religious exclusionary principles for
citizenship, do not curb press freedoms by intimidating dissenting journalists and
newspapers, do not attack universities and students for ideological non-conformity, do not
browbeat artists and writers for disagreement, do not equate adversaries with enemies, do not
celebrate lynch mobs, and do not cultivate judicial servility. A democracy which speaks with
one voice, which elevates citizen duties over citizen rights, which privileges obedience over
freedom, which uses fear to instil ideological uniformity, which weakens checks on executive
power, is a contradiction in terms. For democratic theorists, these are all signs of creeping
authoritarianism, not of democratic deepening. Elections alone cannot define what it means to
be democratic.
The biggest impact of these developments is, of course, internal. Those opposed to the ruling
regime are frequent targets of attack — political, legal, physical, financial. But the impact is
also external. Prime Minister Modi has often claimed that since his rise to power, India has
been accorded greater respect in the world. Even if that was true in his first term, the
perceptions are now changing.
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The international standing of nations is normally a combination of the strategic, the economic
and the political. Compared to China, whose GDP is now five times as large as India’s, India
exercises lesser economic power internationally, and the expected economic invigoration
after 2014 is yet to occur. Democracy was unquestionably one of India’s biggest international
assets.
In purely strategic terms, given the rising anti-China chorus in world capitals, India’s
significance will no doubt remain, but politics may now compete with geopolitics. Because of
China, India will certainly be embraced as a partner, but the embrace will not be ardent or
wholehearted if its democratic backsliding continues. President Biden can’t define foreign
policy in non-Trumpian ways, as he repeatedly claims he wants to, if democracy and human
rights are completely ignored, as they were under Trump.
In its annual democracy report last year, Freedom House had put the matter thus: “Almost
since the turn of the century, the United States and its allies have courted India as a potential
strategic partner and democratic counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region. However,
the Indian government’s alarming departures from democratic norms under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party … could blur the values-based distinction between
Beijing and New Delhi. While India … held successful elections last spring, the BJP has
distanced itself from the country’s founding commitment to pluralism and individual rights,
without which democracy cannot long survive.”
Here, then, is the key question: Will India’s democracy decline further? India today is closer
to Indira Gandhi’s 1975-77 Emergency than ever before. There are, of course, two critical
differences. Beyond Kashmir, there has been no mass arrest of politicians, and many more
state governments are run by political parties that do not rule in Delhi. If these two variables
also change, India’s democracy will be well and truly dead.
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Govt needs to ready solutions that will facilitate agrarian transition without hurting
farmers
Since the mid-1980s, a truly voluminous amount of research on economic reforms has made
a rather obvious point. Such reforms are never purely economic. They are inevitably political.
Over two decades back, I added an analytic distinction to the political economy literature.
Some reforms, such as trade and exchange rate and capital market reforms, were primarily in
elite politics, whereas labour and agricultural reforms tended to enter mass politics. My
premise behind the elite-mass distinction was not that trade and exchange rate reforms were
irrelevant to mass welfare. It was simply that their impact on the masses was indirect unless
external trade constituted a large proportion of a country’s GDP. In contrast, elites were more
directly connected to the global flows, and, therefore, changes in the external economic
regime had straight consequences for them.
Another implication of this distinction was that in democracies, reforms affecting the elites
were easier to put through, whereas those aimed at altering mass behaviour were much
harder. Influencing imports and exchange rates, industrial licensing and capital markets,
India’s 1991-93 reforms were essentially contested in elite politics. A Bombay-Plan business
group did emerge to oppose reforms, but it disappeared into thin air.
Agricultural reforms affect millions of farmers directly. Thus, they quickly enter mass
politics in developing countries, where the rural sector is huge. If the English language
media, the internet and the bureaucratic corridors are the primary arena of elite politics, the
street and vernacular media are where mass politics is fought. Mass mobilisation does not
head directly to finance ministries; it occupies the streets.
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Of course, this is not the Modi regime’s first encounter with mass mobilisation. The anti-
CAA protests were the first. The pandemic killed those protests. Moreover, because they
were led by Muslims, they were an easy target for the government, for the regime could use
against them its standard ideological trope of national disloyalty and the menace of vigilante
counteraction. The farmers pose a far more serious political threat. Few categories are as
legitimate in Indian politics as that of farmers. One can defeat them, but not easily crush
them.
This is not to say that delegitimising tropes of national disloyalty were not tried. That
protesting Sikh farmers were Khalistanis was briefly suggested by regime-supporters. Delhi
quickly figured out the danger of such a delegitimising strategy. If the government were to
decide to beat back Sikh farmers as Khalistanis, it would only raise the spectre of 1980s-style
violent politics in Punjab. Moreover, the farmers are not agitating as Sikhs, but as
agriculturists, as kisans. The Modi regime clearly has a serious political problem on its hands.
It has no quick delegitimising tools in its kit.
If politics thus is tricky, how about economics? After all, a political solution now would in
any case require economic proposals. What options does the government have?
While the economics of the three reforms is not faultless, let us note that some of the
proposed steps go in the right direction. Fundamentally, the reforms seek to deal with a larger
problem of development that all societies must face, with the exception of those that did not
have a peasantry, such as Singapore. In the political economy of development, the concept of
“agrarian transition” captures what is at stake.
This concept means most of all that farm incomes cannot go up in a durable manner (i) if
farmers remain tied to the land and do not proceed to non-agricultural occupations; (ii) if a
substantial proportion of farmers does not move from producing grains such as wheat and
rice to higher value-added cash crops such as vegetables and fruits, or engage in dairy or
poultry production; and (iii) since the land quantity is relatively fixed (unlike other factors of
production such as capital and labour), the per capita size of farms goes down with increasing
family size, making farm consolidation necessary for higher income gains for farmers, either
through farm cooperatives or contract farming.
Even in 1995, when I published a book about the agrarian transition in India, it was becoming
clear that Punjab and, to a lesser extent, Haryana were producing too much wheat and rice,
water tables were dropping, and chemical fertilisers were being overused, giving a short-run
production boost but hurting long term productivity. It was also clear that driven by minimum
support prices (MSP), the Food Corporation of India was procuring too much grain, far
beyond the storage capacity, with a few million tonnes actually rotting.
In trying to address these problems, the government has made several mistakes. Basically, the
government has the right long-term transformation in mind, but it has no good theory of
transition. The latter is necessary for success.
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First, democratic governments achieve progression to higher value-added farming by creating

incentives for the shift, not by punishing those farmers who have become used to producing
grain. This is normally done via some kind of income support for farmers, while they make
the switch. Without income support, withdrawal of MSP for wheat and rice is too punitive.
Second, it is also odd that the government wishes to expose the farmers, not the industrialists,
to the rigours of the market. Scholars often draw a distinction between business-oriented and
market-oriented economic policies, the former relying on the government’s favouritism
towards some industrialists, the latter driven by the idea of free competition. The
government’s overall economic policy is business-oriented, but it now wants agricultural
policy to be market-oriented.
Third, the idea of contract farming is meaningful only when legal and administrative support
is provided to farmers. Otherwise, the bargaining situation is heavily stacked against the
small farmer for the industrialist possesses greater economic, administrative and legal
knowledge. Instead of providing such support, the new law says that farmers have no legal
recourse if things go wrong. They should assume an absence of malintentionality.
Belief in good intentions is established through trust, not by administrative fiat. The trust
deficit between protesting farmers and the government is enormous. In Parliament, the debate
on farm bills was shabbily short. And outside Parliament, there was no great consultation
with farmer organisations.
The solution can now only be premised upon the government listening in a credible manner,
and coming up with solutions that facilitate the agrarian transition without hurting peasants.
Punjab’s farmers have staying power. Coercion will backfire.
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A temple on contested site of mosque’s destruction departs from judicial counter-

majoritarianism
For the first time since Independence, an entirely new electoral prospect has been
consolidating itself. This phenomenon can be conceptualised as the political irrelevance of
Muslims. It came to life with the 2014 general elections, though some might drag it back
further. Its implications, serious in any case, have become even more so after the Ayodhya
judgment of the Supreme Court.
The Court has held Hindu mobs responsible for an egregious violation of the law on
December 6, 1992 — when they destroyed the Babri mosque — but deploying the kind of
legal reasoning that frustrates non-specialists of law, it has handed over the site, where the
erstwhile mosque stood, to the Hindu community for the building of a Ram temple. In a
display of religious equidistance that marks Indian secularism, the Court has also allowed a
mosque to be built on a plot twice as large as the original site. But those who destroyed the
mosque, according to India’s highest court, now have the right to construct a temple in its
place.
If the Court intends to draw a distinction between the law-breakers, who ought to be
punished, and the larger Hindu community, whose wishes should not be denied, it can still
argue it has not abandoned the idea of justice. But given its lack of resolve to confront
electorally enabled power, one cannot be too sanguine about whether it would punish those
who violated the law but are currently in power. How the Court actually pronounces on the
culprits of December 6, 1992, will, therefore, be carefully watched.
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Admittedly, some Muslims will not mind the judgment, thinking it ends a seemingly
interminable period of painful contention and provides an opportunity to move on. But many
are likely to feel doubly marginalised. They are being made electorally irrelevant, and even
the judiciary has not sufficiently protected them.
Two points should immediately be noted. First, in the 1940s, Jinnah’s argument for partition
was precisely that democracy in a Hindu-majority India would serve the interests of Hindus,
not of the Muslim minority. The argument was wrong, as both Nehru and Ambedkar
painstakingly demonstrated. It is ironical that the argument, false then and for decades later,
is starting to acquire credibility now, for the system after seven decades is threatening to
generate Muslim helplessness. The trend is still not irreversible, but it is dire.
Second, a lot of democratic theory, and much of modern democratic practice, envisions the
judiciary as a counter-majoritarian institution. In a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic
polity, the electoral process can easily begin to reflect the wishes of the ethnic or religious
majority. But the judiciary’s functioning is fundamentally based on constitutional principles,
not the wishes of the majority. If the judiciary only replicated what governments, legislatures
or political parties based on electoral victories did, we would not really need it as a separate
and autonomous institution. That is also why minorities in a democracy have often looked up
to the courts for protection, when popular electoral currents go against them. A small fraction
of political/legal theory does say that courts could endorse majoritarianism, if it was
legislatively approved, and some courts have historically done that. Legally, Blacks suffered
a lot — and for decades — in America’s South. But most theorists would prescribe to the
judiciary a majority-constraining role, should the majority or its representatives cross legal
lines. A Hindu temple on the contested site after a mosque’s destruction departs from the
principle of judicial counter-majoritarianism.
The distinction between the electoral and the judicial, towards which the SC judgment is
pushing us, requires further elaboration. Let us begin historically.
Should India treat its Muslims the same way as Pakistan was dealing with its Hindus? This
question repeatedly arose in the early years of freedom when India’s Constitution was
debated. Supported by Ambedkar, Nehru argued: “Whatever the provocation from Pakistan
and whatever the indignities and horrors inflicted on non-Muslims there, we have to deal with
(our) minority in a civilised manner. We must give them security and the rights of citizens in
a democratic state. If we fail to do so, we shall have a festering sore which will eventually
poison the whole body politic.” Earlier, critiquing Jinnah, Ambedkar argued that
constitutional and institutional safeguards could easily be devised to check majoritarianism
and protect minority rights. That Hindus are a majority, said Ambedkar, does not
automatically lead to Hindu rule.
India’s Constitution thus developed a charter of minority rights — educational, cultural,

religious — and gave no special privileges to the Hindu majority. Secularism came to be
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defined not only as equal rights for all, regardless of religious affiliation, but also as
comprising special minority rights on the assumption that minority numbers alone would not
allow them to protect their interests in a democracy.
This constitutional settlement was further bolstered by the electoral realities of India. Until
2008, 81 parliamentary constituencies of India were more than 20 % Muslim (including 10
that were Muslim-majority) and 126 seats were 10-20 % Muslim. Thus, in 38 % of
parliamentary seats, Muslim voters could play an important role. Even if mainstream
politicians had anti-Muslim feelings, these electoral realities would partly check them. The
2008 redrawing of constituencies has most probably not significantly changed Muslim
proportions.
This long-lasting electoral logic was fundamentally altered in 2014 and 2019. The BJP came
to power with only 8 % of the Muslim vote each time, an outcome inconceivable under the
earlier electoral calculus. The key to this transformation was the consolidation of the Hindu
vote. The BJP received 37.4 % vote in 2019; roughly 35 % was Hindu. Compared to 2014,
BJP’s vote went up in all caste categories, including Dalits. Muslims can play an important
electoral role only if the Hindu vote is sufficiently caste-cleaved. Analytically, Hindu
consolidation and Muslim irrelevance are two sides of the same electoral coin.
If Hindu consolidation goes further, Muslims will become electorally even more irrelevant.
We can’t still be sure this would happen. But even if Hindu electoral consolidation remains at
the current level, India’s Muslims would need the judiciary’s counter-majoritarianism to
safeguard their interests. If the judiciary bows to the executive and legislature, supporting
majoritarian logic, Jinnah’s fears will be affirmed, Ambedkar’s constitutional optimism
nullified, and Nehru’s prediction about a “festering sore” might also come true. Production of
Muslim helplessness is most unlikely to strengthen India, or its polity.
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By numbers alone
Did the abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status express India’s democratic wish,
or did it violate basic democratic canons? The government’s claim is the former, critics say it
is the latter. How do we judge?
Democracy has at least four meanings. Democracy, first of all, is a system of electoral power.
The BJP received 229 million votes in the recent elections. If all voters were to exercise
franchise in Jammu and Kashmir, the erstwhile state would have at best eight million votes,
of which the Kashmir Valley had approximately 4.5 million. The BJP has been committed to
the abrogation of Article 370, saying it gave undue privileges to India’s only Muslim-
majority state. Having received a larger mandate for the directly-elected Lower House of
Parliament, and confident that it could get enough votes in the indirectly elected Upper
House, it went ahead with its ideological project and removed Article 370 via parliamentary
majorities. This is consistent with the first meaning of democracy — namely, electoral
majorities as a cornerstone of democratic power.
But elections alone do not define democracy. The second idea of democracy is that it is not
simply a system of majority rule, but also a system of minority protection. All post-Nazi
democracies since 1945 have had this character. The Nazi regime and its theorists, such as
Carl Schmitt, had argued that democracy was only about majority wishes and if the German
majority wanted Jews to be second-class citizens, the Jewish minority of German lands would
have no choice but to submit. Only liberalism, argued Schmitt, protected the Jews, not
democracy.
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The logical culmination of this view of democracy was the concentration camp, or the
incarceration and death of several million Jews because their loyalties to the German nation
were considered suspect by those who won power. Unless minority rights constrain the
majority-rule principle, democracies can, in principle, lead to concentration camps. That is
why post-1945, democracies have tended to be liberal democracies, not simply electoral
democracies. Modern democracy first enables majority rule and then also checks and
balances it with minority rights.
In and of themselves, 4.5 million votes cannot carry greater democratic weight than 229
million votes. Election winners do get the right to frame policies or enact laws in a
democracy, but in post-Nazi democracies, this rule is radically modified when the 229
million voters are primarily of one religion (or race), and the 4.5 million votes are
overwhelmingly from a minority religion (or race), as opposed to both being racially,
religiously, ethnically so mixed that voters can be identified primarily as individual citizens,
not as members of the religiously defined majorities and minorities. The problem is not rule
by a majority, but rule by a religiously (ethnically or racially) defined majority.
Nearly 44 % of Hindus voted for the BJP in the recent elections and only eight % of Muslims
did. India is about 80 % Hindu, and the Kashmir Valley over 96 % Muslim. The minority-
protection principle of democracy means that even with 229 million overwhelmingly Hindu
votes, the BJP should not impose its will on seven million Kashmiris. The agreements made
to protect minority rights — Articles 370 and 35A — would have to be respected, unless the
minority itself agreed to their termination.
It is suggested that Kashmiri Muslims have no right to this reasoning because in the early
1990s, with the insurgency at its peak, they actively engineered the outmigration of Kashmiri
Hindus, a minority community in the Valley where Muslims are a majority. This argument is
flawed. All it can logically require is (a) identifying and punishing those organisations that
forced the outmigration, and (b) insisting on the return of Kashmiri Hindus. By no democratic
reasoning does it entitle a government to inflict majoritarian retribution on an entire
community — to avenge an earlier majoritarian excess.
The third meaning of democracy is that it is a constitutionally-governed system. All modern

democracies, except the British, are constitutionally-based. Elections establish who will rule,
but the rulers so elected are also constitutionally bound. Here, there are three key questions.
First, can routine legislative action scrap an article of the constitution? Or, was a special
legislative procedure, mandated by a constitutional amendment, required? If the latter, the
change should also have been proposed as a constitutional amendment, and super majorities
in the two Houses of the central legislature pursued ex-ante, not celebrated post-fact. Second,
can the governor’s approval, procured in this case, be taken as the state’s consent for change?
Constitutionally, the governor represents Delhi, not the state in question. The governor
cannot be called a substitute for the state’s elected political representatives. If the elected
state legislature is not in session, a constitutional change pertaining to the state must await the
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return of elected representatives. Third, we know that Article 3 of India’s Constitution allows
the change of state boundaries without the approval of state assemblies, but the Centre, on
August 6, did not simply hive off Ladakh from a state, a la Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. It
also demoted Jammu and Kashmir. Can India’s Parliament, without a constitutional
amendment, turn a state with full federal rights into a Union Territory, which has reduced
rights and whose law and order are centrally governed, not by the state? It is analogous to
turning Pennsylvania, a state in the American federation, into a Washington DC, which is not
a state.
The fourth meaning of democracy is that it is a system of political ethics. In a democracy,

those vitally affected by a decision are given a chance to speak, even if they are likely, or
destined, to lose. Losers are silenced in authoritarian polities, not in democracies. The
Kashmir Valley is vitally affected by this constitutional change, but it was locked down, its
leaders arrested, and a curfew imposed. This is similar to what happened on the eve of the
Emergency, on June 25, 1975. Indira Gandhi arrested major Opposition leaders before a
president-approved order was presented to Parliament and democracy suspended. Since
August 5, we have witnessed a Kashmir-level emergency, though clearly not a national
emergency.
In short, only in one democratic sense — democracy as a system of electoral power — can
the decision to change Kashmir’s status be called potentially legitimate. In all other
democratic senses, we have witnessed severely anti-democratic conduct. It was electorally-
enabled brute majoritarianism.
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As India gets vaccinated, women are falling behind. We must mind this gap
Written by Ashwini Deshpande
The second wave of Covid-19 is finally slowing down after tearing through India with a
ferocity that the country was tragically underprepared to handle. Given that public health was
a low priority item for government expenditure for decades, expecting the medical
infrastructure to be ramped up, even though it was urgently needed in the wake of the
pandemic, might have been unrealistic. Some might argue that decades of neglect cannot be
reversed within months.
But if a radical overhaul was difficult, there were, and continue to be, several interventions
that are not at all infeasible, provided there is adequate recognition of the gravity of the
problem, a willingness to engage with scientific evidence and the political will to act on
immediate recommendations.
When the caseload was low between October 2020 and February 2021, the government could
have made productive use of the lull to push for speedy and free mass vaccination, as many
experts had recommended. But it did not, because it believed that India had won the war
against the pandemic, that India was somehow immune to second waves which had ravaged
other countries around the world.
The roll-out was slow and marked by a complicated and inefficient procurement and pricing
policy, which threatened to exacerbate inequalities in access to vaccines between states and
between the rich and the poor.
After a great deal of tumult and the loss of precious time, the central government has
announced a course correction and decided on the central procurement of vaccines. This is
long overdue and a welcome move.
As the country gears up towards accelerating the vaccination drive, we need to be mindful of
the ground realities that could impede the progress towards mass vaccination. In addition to
the slow pace and the abysmally low absolute numbers of people vaccinated, women are
getting left behind in the ever-lengthening vaccine queue. At the Centre for Economic Data
and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University, we have created a moving map that shows the
gender gap (female to male ratio) in vaccinations by district each day since vaccinations
started (https://bit.ly/3w6vR68).
Till June 3, 2021, this ratio for India was 0.90, which means that 90 women received Covid
vaccine doses for every 100 men vaccinated. The vaccination programme was unrolled in
phases. Phase 1 started on January 16 and covered all healthcare and frontline workers, a
large proportion of whom were women. Subsequent phases opened up vaccine eligibility to
different age groups.
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The CEDA maps reveal that as vaccination has opened up to the larger sections of the general
public, the ratio has declined. In other words, the ratio in the first phase was high because
women formed a high proportion of frontline health workers. As citizens are voluntarily
getting vaccinated, women are falling behind, which is a matter of concern.
One might legitimately ask whether adopting a gender lens to assess the progress on
vaccinations is the right approach when, surely, the overarching aim should be to prevent
mortality. This should mean that we should put sections with higher vulnerability to the
disease, men or women, young or old, ahead in the vaccine queue. Undoubtedly. However,
the problem is that there is no official data for India, sliced by age group, gender, state, rural-
urban residence or any other classification, which would help identify these sections
accurately, and be a good guide to plan proper targeting.
Analysis of early evidence, based on crowdsourced data, suggests that men have a higher
overall burden of the disease, but women have a higher relative risk of Covid-19 mortality in
India. A study in Lancet indicates that while globally men are at greater risk of mortality, in
some countries (and India is one of them), the case fatality rate is higher among women than
men. This is subject to data caveats.
In a country with low smartphone penetration, lack of English fluency and a deep digital
divide, the logic of making vaccine access conditional on app-based registration is mysterious
at best and callous at worst.
Even if these divisions were a secret before March 2020, the first wave definitely unveiled
these in too glaring a light to be ignored. It should have been obvious that making access to
an English-language smartphone-based app compulsory for getting vaccinated would be a
recipe for guaranteed exclusion. Women are seriously disadvantaged, more than men, in
being able to meet these conditions and book appointments for themselves.
Finally, when vaccines are not free for all (or there is not a sufficient number of free
vaccinations), households that can pay will be ahead of the queue, and within families, men
will take priority over women. The evidence on an unequal gendered division of precious
resources within families is unambiguous and sadly, shows long-standing and pervasive
disparities, whether in the allocation of food, private school or tuition fees, property or asset
ownership.
The need of the hour is to ramp up vaccines for all. The abysmally low levels of health
infrastructure notwithstanding, India’s record in vaccine production and delivery has been
very good. However, mass vaccination can succeed only when we take into account structural
inequalities, recognise the specific challenges these impose, and find solutions to circumvent
them. The Indian vaccination programme cannot succeed if women are left behind.
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A normalisation of WFH is unlikely to raise women’s participation in the labour force
A recent report from LinkedIn suggested that Indian women increased their participation in
paid work between April and July because the new normal of “work from home” (WFH)
allowed them to combine their domestic and employment responsibilities. This sounded
hopeful because women’s (in)ability to work outside the home is critically intertwined with
their predominant responsibility for domestic chores and unpaid care work. Historically,
women’s LFP has increased when the time cost of domestic/unpaid care work is reduced, or
is shared more equally with men, or made more compatible with market work.
History tells us that calamitous events like wars and pandemics have the potential to shift pre-
established labour market patterns and norms. The first month of the strict lockdown showed
an increase in time spent on domestic work by men. The subsequent unlocking has seen a
steady increase in employment. If the COVID-19 pandemic did, in fact, manage to shift the
needle on sticky gender norms in paid and unpaid work in India, it would be a massive silver
lining to the dark clouds of the pandemic and economic recession.
Not only would it be a mini-miracle for India, it would buck international trends, which show
women dropping out of the workforce in large numbers as the burden of childcare has
disproportionately fallen on them during the prolonged school closures and pressures of home
schooling.
National-level data reveal that the pandemic has not succeeded in shifting the needle on
gender gaps in paid and unpaid work. The biggest contraction in employment was in April
2020. According to Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) data, the average
employment for January 2019-March 2020 was 403 million, which declined to 282 million in
April 2020 and recovered steadily thereafter to reach 393 million by August 2020. The
corresponding figures for men are 360, 256 and 353 million, and for women are 43, 26 and
39 million, respectively. Thus, male employment in August is 98 %, and female employment
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is 91 %, of the respective pre-pandemic average.It is clear that the large gender gaps in paid
work have not declined. My estimates show that accounting for previous employment,
women were 9.5 % points less likely than men to be employed in August 2020 compared to
August 2019.
What about domestic work? Gender differences in time spent on unpaid work are ubiquitous:
Everywhere in the world, women spend much more time than men on domestic chores and
care work, including childcare. But India has among the most unequal gender divisions:
Women spend between five to 10 times more time on housework compared to men.
The first month of the strict lockdown was marked by an absence of domestic helpers,
integral to the lifestyles of a large number of Indian families. Anecdotal accounts suggest that
men stepped up their contributions to housework in this extraordinary situation. Did the
pattern persist with “unlockdown” as domestic helpers returned to work, and men returned to
their paid jobs?
My estimates reveal that men’s time spent on housework went down from the April high,
though not to the pre-lockdown level of the December 2019 average. Thus, while the green
shoots of gender equality within the household — seen in the clear decline in the gender gap
on time spent on housework in April, did not get further enhanced in August 2020 — the
good news is that men did not relapse completely into their pre-lockdown habits.
Despite the presence of two strong preconditions for women’s participation in paid work —
falling fertility and rapidly rising female education levels — India’s female LFP has not only
been persistently low, but has registered a decline over the last 15 years. Whether this
represents a willing dropping out (that is, women unwilling to work despite opportunities), or
a combination of lack of suitable jobs, fractured nature of work especially in rural areas, and
inaccurate measurement of their work (that is, women willing to work but not able to find
suitable work; plus the work that they do that does not get measured correctly) has been a
matter of fierce debate. My own work supports the latter contention.
Several surveys have documented an unmet demand for paid work by women. Women want
to work but are hampered by a combination of factors. One, they need work commensurate
with their rising educational qualifications; two, they need conducive and enabling conditions
(transportation, toilets), and three, they have to balance the pressures of domestic chores.
The experience of the pandemic teaches us that a normalisation of WFH — without

concomitant changes that reduce the burden of domestic chores and care work, and an
increase in paid work opportunities — is unlikely to raise women’s participation in the labour
force. As the pandemic forces our economy to hit the “reset” button, paying attention to job
creation with a gender equity lens is essential for India to realise its tremendous gender
dividend.
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The gender gap in job losses caused by the lockdown

India imposed one of the strictest lockdowns in the world to contain the spread of Covid-19.
This resulted in a near-complete shutdown of all economic activity, with gradual and partial
lifting of restrictions later. The obvious effect of this lockdown was a massive increase in
unemployment.
According to data from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)’s Consumer
Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS), the average number of employed persons between
March 2019 and March 2020, i.e. in the one year preceding the lockdown, was over 403
million. In April 2020, this number came down to a little over 282 million, which was a
roughly 30 % drop. In other words, employment in April 2020 was 70 % of the average in the
preceding year.
Globally, it is expected that in the Pandemic, women are likely to be more vulnerable to
losing their jobs compared to men. A research from Citibank estimates that there are 220
million women employed in sectors that are vulnerable to job cuts: of the 44 million workers
in vulnerable sectors globally, 31 million women face potential job cuts, compared to 13
million men.
What would a similar picture for India reveal? Note that between 2004-5 and 2017-18, while
the male-female gaps in educational attainment have narrowed considerably, gaps in labour
force participation have widened. Female labour force participation rate, stubbornly and
persistently low in India over decades, has declined precipitously over the last 15 years. Will
the already widening gender gap in work participation and employment widen further due to
the lockdown and recession? Are the women who are already in the labour force (a small and
declining proportion of working age women) more vulnerable to job losses compared to
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men? Are the socioeconomically disadvantaged caste groups more vulnerable compared to
the upper castes?
More generally, are the effects of the pandemic-induced lockdown neutral with respect to
social identity, or are the outcomes worse for groups that are already disadvantaged?
In a recent paper, I explore the gender and caste dimensions of the first job losses. Total
employment for men was greater in the pre-lockdown year than for men, and more men lost
jobs in the first month of lockdown than women. However, given the pre-existing gaps, to get
a sense of relative losses, we can compare the number of people employed in April to the
average for the previous year.
A comparison of this estimate for various groups reveals that there are gender and caste
disparities in the early lockdown-induced job losses, where women have suffered relatively
more than men (rural women more than urban women) and Dalits suffered relatively more
than upper castes, specifically rural Dalits. Rural women’s employment has suffered
maximum relative loss.
Women who were employed in the pre-lockdown phase were 23.5 % points less likely to be
employed in the post-lockdown phase compared to men who were employed in the pre-
lockdown phase. Male heads of household were 11.3 % points more likely to be employed in
post-lockdown phase, compared to female heads of household who were employed in the pre-
lockdown phase. The caste differences are smaller than the gender differences, but the
lockdown affected employment of the SC-ST-OBC groups relatively more adversely
compared to the higher ranked group of castes.
While women and Dalits have suffered disproportionately more job losses, risky, hazardous
and stigmatized jobs are exclusively their preserve. All frontline health workers (ASHA) are
women; manual scavengers are exclusively Dalit. Thus, for several women and Dalits, the
choice seems to be between unemployment and jobs that put them at risk of disease and
infection and make them targets of vicious stigma.
India’s economy has “suffered even more than most” as a result of the lockdown. India’s
growth rate has been faltering over the last six years, decelerating each year since 2016, to
reach 3.1 % in the first quarter of 2020, just before the pandemic hit India. My study reveals
that in addition to mounting overall unemployment, pre-existing inequalities along gender
and caste lines are likely to get reinforced, unless the specific contours of disadvantage are
recognised and addressed.
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What India’s farm crisis really needs
Written by Christophe Jaffrelot , Hemal Thakker
The farmers’ movement invites us to revisit the trajectory of India’s agriculture so as to

understand its real problems. Beginning in the mid-1960s, India and, especially, Punjab
experienced a massive productivity boom as a result of widespread adoption of Green
Revolution technologies. This transition was driven by public investment in irrigation and
market infrastructure. Essential to the system’s success was the minimum support price,
which incentivised the cultivation of wheat and rice. Area under paddy cultivation in Punjab
jumped from 4.8 % of total cropped area in 1960-61 to 39.19 % in 2018-19. Similarly, wheat
area share increased from 27 % to 45 %. The production of wheat in Punjab during the Green
Revolution period increased by over 7 % annually, with yield increases accounting for a little
over half of that growth. By contrast, other crops began to decline. In 1960-61, Punjab had a
total of 21 crops in the cropping system which fell to nine in 1991. The Green Revolution had
other adverse long-term economic and ecological effects. Partly because of water scarcity,
growth rates of yield have decreased to 2 % per year for wheat; and are stagnant or negative
for rice. The wheat-rice cropping monoculture has not only led to depletion of groundwater
levels, but also to the excessive use of chemical pesticides, posing a threat to biodiversity.
Secondly, the absence of land reforms has worsened the challenges in rural India. In Punjab
and Haryana, the bottom 50 % of the smallholders owned 0.47 % of the land in 1953-54. The
figure increased to 0.52 % in 1961-62 but fell to 0.28 % by 1971-72 before increasing
marginally over the next decade to end at 0.32 % by 1982. The number of households in
Punjab without land or on sub-marginal land holdings (less than 0.99 acres) has only grown.
In the same period, “middle peasants” saw their share of land holdings rise from 22.69 % to
34.19 % of total land under cultivation. The 10th agriculture census of 2015-16 shows that
small and marginal farmers with less than two hectares of land account for 86.2 % of all
farmers in India but own just 47.3 % of the crop area. In comparison, semi-medium and
medium land holding farmers (owning between 2-10 hectares of land) account for 13.2 % of
all farmers, but own 43.6 % of crop area.
The National Statistical Office’s (NSO) household consumer expenditure survey for 2017-
2018 shows that inflation-adjusted consumer spending in 2017-18 fell for the first time in
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four decades. India’s monthly per capita consumption expenditure in FY 2017-18 was Rs
1,446, down 3.7 % from Rs 1,501 in 2011-12, the last time the NSO conducted this survey.
The average money spent every month by rural residents in 2017-18 was 8.8 % less than six
years earlier, while urban consumption was up 2 %. The disparity in land holdings coupled
with an exacerbating rural-urban divide points to rural distress.
Do the new farm laws address these problems? A study by the NCAER shows that the Bihar
experiment of scrapping APMC markets in 2006 has not improved its agricultural
performance. Farm growth in the state averaged 2.04 %, lower than the all-India average of
3.12 % in the period between 2001-02 and 2016-17. However, the post-reforms period does
show an increase in the average wholesale prices of major crops. The average price of paddy
increased by 126 %, wheat by 66 %, and maize by 81 %, the authors remarked. But the
simultaneous increase in volatility of prices affected the “stability of farmers’ income”,
ultimately affecting their ability to invest and diversify. This instability in prices, the authors
note, could be a reason for Bihar’s lower agricultural growth. Another analysis by the
Chaudhary Charan Singh National Institute of Agriculture Marketing (CCSNIAM) conducted
in 2011-12, states that after APMC market yards were abolished in the state, there has been
hardly any private investment in new marketplaces.
The three contentious farm bills put together do not address these aspects but seek to
deregulate and dismantle the APMC network. P Sainath uses the analogy of government
schools in this context: Should all schools be privatised because public sector schools have
deficiencies? Perhaps not, since that would exclude a large population from formal education.
If market accessibility is a major issue, the state should help the smallholder farmers to have
access to the market. For that, investments are needed. Public sector investment in
agriculture, as per the RBI, has been around 0.4 % of the GDP between 2011-12 and 2017-
18. This is woefully inadequate for a sector on which 60 % of the population directly or
indirectly depends for livelihood.
Public investment on infrastructure and MSPs needs to increase to improve access of

smallholder farmers to APMCs, as the private sector will not replace the state in this matter,
as is evident from the Bihar example. This, coupled with an agroecological transition which
includes crop diversification, will ensure sustainability for Indian agriculture. Here again,
state intervention and public policy support could be a part of the solution. In June 2018, the
Andhra Pradesh government announced an ambitious programme to bring all 80 lakh
hectares of its cultivable land under agroecological farming by 2024. Agroecology
emphasises minimising external, artificial inputs by using resources available in the local
ecosystem.Only one year after its introduction in Andhra, a study by Azim Premji University
showed that yields had increased by 11 % in paddy and 79 % in brinjal even while following
sustainable agro-ecological principles.
Instead of handing over India’s agriculture to a couple of agribusiness companies, the

government of India should make this key sector of the economy one of its priorities in terms
of investments.
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Pew survey reflects growing affinity between majority community and Hindutva
Written by Christophe Jaffrelot
The title of the last Pew Research Center survey, Religion in India: Tolerance and
Segregation, sounds paradoxical — but it’s not, except that in this context “tolerance” is
different from “toleration”. This is primarily true of Hindus’ perception of other
communities.
Certainly, 80 % of the Hindu interviewees said that “respecting other religions is a very
important part of their religious identity”, but many of them do not interact with other
religions and even consider such interactions undesirable. Not only do 86 % Hindus say that
“all” or “most of their close friends are the same religion as them”, but only 23 % of Hindus
also consider that Hindus and Muslims “have a lot in common”. Only 3 % of Hindus say they
have prayed in a dargah, though Sufi saints attracting Hindu devotees in large numbers was
common once. This figure could be an underestimate, but it might also mean that some
Hindus do not wish to say they are visiting an Islamic place of worship. In the same vein, 66
% Hindus say “it is very important to stop women/men in their community from marrying
outside their religion”, and 36 % “would not be willing to accept a Muslim as a neighbour”.
The fact that Hindus want to live separately also partly explains that only 52 % Hindus look
at diversity as benefiting the country and also, possibly, that 43 % Hindus consider Partition
“a good thing”.
This contradicts the stated desire of the Sangh Parivar for an “Akhand Bharat”, but the rest of
the survey throws light on the reasons why so many Hindu voters support Narendra Modi
and BJP leaders who tend to equate India with the majority community —as evident from the
fact that the Prime Minister attends the Kumbh Mela but does not hold iftar parties (in
contrast to all his predecessors, including A B Vajpayee). Indeed, for 64 % Hindus, to be
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Hindu is “very important to be truly Indian”, and for 59 %, to “be able to speak Hindi” is
equally important. These views echo the Hindu nationalist slogan, inherited from V D
Savarkar: “Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan!” By contrast, religious beliefs do not matter so much:
51 % Hindus do not hold it necessary to believe in god to be a part of their religious
community; for 70 %, those who “disrespect India” cannot be Hindu. This brand of
ethnicisation of religion is very similar to Zionism, another ideology defining the nation on
the basis of the sacredness of the land, the “historicity” of the people, lineage and language.
Hindutva, similarly, defines the Hindu community not so much on the basis of religion, but as
a people with ethnic and cultural features which make them the core of the nation.
While 50 % of Hindus consider that India “should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve
its problems”, 45 % think that a “democratic form of government” would do the job more
effectively. In parallel, 64 % Hindus consider that “politicians should have a large or some
influence in religious matters”, an opinion in tune with Modi’s decision to preside over the
laying of the Ayodhya temple’s foundation stone.
Beyond growing affinities between the majority community and Hindutva, the Pew Research
Center’s survey illustrates the decline of reformist attitudes. The attachment to traditions not
only finds expression in the beliefs in astrology (87 % Hindus say they fix important dates
according to auspicious times) but also to the resilience of caste endogamy: 63 % Hindu men
and 64 % Hindu women told the researchers that it is very important to stop the members of
their community from marrying into “another caste”.
In fact, one can understand the high score of “tolerance” precisely in relation with the
resilience of caste. After all, upper castes traditionally tolerate lower castes (including Dalits)
provided they remain on the periphery of society. A similar attitude towards religious
communities helps to make sense of the report’s title — “tolerance and segregation” go
together the moment Muslims become the new untouchables. The Pew Research Center,
interestingly, uses the word that traditionally applied to caste relations — “discrimination” —
to measure this trend — and finds that 24 % of Indian Muslims say that “there is a lot of
discrimination against Muslims in India today”. Regional variations are worth noticing: This
% rises to 35 % in north India.
These data need to be emphasised for resisting a sanitised interpretation of this report: The
situation is not fine because “to live separately” is not the same thing as to live peacefully —
tolerance is not toleration. Communal violence is listed as one of the “very big problems” of
India by 65 % Hindus and Muslims. This is not only due to the activities of vigilantes and
politicians who polarise religious communities, but also because of the fact that Hindus and
Muslims used to live — to some extent — together, as evident from the architecture of the
pols of Old Ahmedabad. Violence leads to separation and ghettos like Juhapura. But
ghettoisation is only one dimension of the violence that the destruction of a composite culture
like the Indian civilisation implies — and that the shift from toleration to tolerance causes.
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How do Indian Muslims & Hindus compare

in their attitudes towards identity & politics?
Written by Christophe Jaffrelot
Lately, it has been argued that if one goes by the recent Pew Research Center survey,
“Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation”, Muslims do not behave differently from the
Hindus. This is true to some extent, with differences of degree. But in many domains,
Muslims are not as willing as Hindus to “live separately”, and their attitudes are more similar
to those of other minorities.
In an earlier article, ‘The lines that divide’ (IE, July 22), I had emphasised that the Pew
survey suggests Hindus appear as unwilling to mix with others. Muslims are no different
from certain standpoints: 78 % of them consider that “stopping intermarriage is a high
priority” (against 66 % on the Hindu side) and 89 % of them say that all or most of their
friends come from their own community (against 86 % on the Hindu side). But only 16 % of
them would not be willing to accept a Hindu as a neighbour, whereas 36 % of Hindus would
not be willing to accept a Muslim as a neighbour.
Similarly, Muslims are imbued with Hindu religious notions: 77 % of them believe in karma,
27 % in reincarnation and 26 % in the Ganga’s power to purify. This is a clear legacy of what
“unity in diversity” used to mean in India — a concept that was encapsulated in the old
formula of “composite culture” or, in Hindustani, “mili juli/mushtarka/Ganga-Jamuni-
tehzib”. The resilience of this approach is not unrelated to the fact that in northern India, 37
% of Indian Muslims identify with Sufism. Incidentally, many Muslims do not identify to any
“sect” — 36 % do not even know whether they are Sunni, or Shia or any other sect.
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This erosion of sectarian identification has probably something to do with the sentiment that
Muslims form a minority. This sentiment is fostered by discriminations: One fifth of Muslims
say that they have “personally faced religious discrimination recently” (40 % in North India)
and 24 % – 35 % in North India — say “there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims in
India today”. Sixty five % of them — like among Hindus — consider that communal
violence is “a major issue”.
A remarkable finding of the Pew survey pertains to the manner in which minorities —
including Muslims — identify with the Indian nation. Asked whether to be a member of their
community is only a question of religion or only a matter of ancestry and culture or whether
both things matter, Muslims’ responses are 38, 22 and 38 % respectively, and those of
Christians 29, 34 and 27 %. These figures show that though historical roots of their religion is
often emphasised — Islam and Christianity were not born in the country — their followers in
India see themselves as Indian Muslims and Indian Christians. This is partly because of
historical roots and the “Indianness” of their culture. Similarly, 91 % of Muslims and 89 % of
Christians consider that “respecting India is very important to what being a member of their
religious group means to them”.
It was found that 49 % of Hindus think that one can be a part of their community without
believing in God whereas 64 % and 59 % think that being Hindu and Hindi-speaking are very
important for being “truly” Indian. This ethnoreligious definition of the nation is making
progress among the minorities as well: 27 % of Muslims, 20 % of Christians, 31 % of Sikhs
and 30 % of Buddhists think that “being Hindu is important to be ‘truly’ Indian”, and 47, 28,
27 and 43 % respectively think that “to be able to speak Hindi is important to be ‘truly’
Indian”. These %s suggest that languages like Urdu and Punjabi are not seen as good Indian
language as Hindi and that some minorities are internalising the majoritarian view of the
nation and its implications — the creation of second class citizens.
However, minorities are completely different from the Hindus in matters related to political
culture. While the % of Hindus who consider that “the country should rely on a leader with a
strong hand to solve the country’s problem” is higher than those who think the country
should rely on a “democratic form of government” (50 % against 45 %), among the
minorities those believing in democracy outnumber those believing in the strong man theory.
Last but not least, Muslims are equally attached to some traditions as Hindus: 72 % of them
say that “it is crucial to stop inter-caste marriages” (against 63.5 % on the Hindu side) and 74
% of them are eager “to go to their own religious courts to solve family disputes”. But 56 %
of them consider that “Muslim men should not be able to divorce their wives by saying
‘talaq’ three times”, an indication of socio-religious reformism that used to prevail in all
communities but has now receded to the background.
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How the story of the cow in India is riddled with puzzles and paradoxes
Written by D.N. Jha
The cow has been a political animal in modern India, but it has become more political under
the present BJP governments at the Centre and in some states, which are obsessed with beef
bans and cow slaughter. But the ritual killing of cattle was de rigueur among the Vedic
people, who routinely sacrificed cattle and ate their flesh. The Rigveda frequently refers to
the cooking of the flesh of animals, including that of the ox, as an offering to the gods,
especially Indra. In most Vedic yajnas, cattle were killed and their flesh eaten. Although
some post-Vedic texts recommend the offering of animal effigies in lieu of livestock, ancient
Indians continued to kill cattle and eat beef, which was the favourite food of Yajnavalkya, the
respected sage from Mithila. He made the obdurate statement that he would continue to eat
the flesh of cows and bullocks so long as it was tender (Shatapatha Brahmana). The practice
of cattle-killing on sacrificial and other occasions, attested to by a number of post-Vedic
texts, possibly continued for centuries.
However, post-Mauryan lawgivers are either ambivalent or generally reticent on the issue or,
more often, disapprove of cattle-killing. The Manusmriti (200 BC-200 AD), the most
representative of the legal texts, allows the consumption of the flesh, among others, of all
domestic animals with teeth in one jaw, the only exception being the camel, not the cow.
While the text remains noncommittal on the issue of beef-eating, it tells us that one does not
do any wrong by eating meat while honouring the gods, the manes and guests, for eating meat
on sacrificial occasions is a divine rule. The commentator Medhatithi (9th century) interprets
that passage to mean that the eating of cattle flesh was in keeping with the Vedic and post-
Vedic practice, which included the killing of cattle. Another law book, Yajnavalkyasmriti
(100 AD-300 AD), also discusses lawful and forbidden food and endorses the Vedic practice
of killing animals and eating the consecrated meat, but unlike the Manusmriti, it clearly states
that a learned Brahmin should be welcomed with a big ox or goat, delicious food and sweet
words.
Thus, unlike earlier normative texts, post-Mauryan law books either restrict cow-killing to
guest reception or are reticent about it. Interestingly, they try to cover up the issue by
approving of all sacrifices having Vedic sanction because, according to them, Vedic killing is
not killing. This obfuscation was accompanied by the almost-simultaneous development of
the idea of the Kali Yuga, first described in the Mahabharata and the early Puranas. During
the Kali age, the brahminical texts tell us, a number of earlier practices, including the killing
of kine, were prohibited and came to be known as kalivarjas. Repeated assertions that the
cow should not be killed in the Kali age tended to make the cow unslayable and led to the
disappearance of beef from the Brahmin’s menu. The killing of cows now came in for
condemnation in the dharmashastra texts and the cow killer was doomed to become an
untouchable. The Vyasasmriti categorically states that a cow killer is untouchable and that
one incurs sin by even talking to him. Beef-eating thus seems to have become a criterion of
untouchability. Earlier a part of the brahminical haute cuisine, beef now gradually became an
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important component of the food culture of the untouchable castes, whose number
proliferated over time.
During the medieval period, cow-killing became the basis of religious differentiation between
Hindus and Muslims, who were stereotyped as beef-eaters. This led to occasional tensions;
two such clashes in the 17th and 18th centuries are well documented. It may have been in
response to this kind of conflict that Akbar (1556-1605), under the influence of Jains, issued
firmans ordering his officials not to allow the slaughter of animals (including the cow) on
specific occasions — a policy followed by Jahangir (1605-1627). Obviously both were trying
to control inter-religious tensions. Even the will of Babur, which advised Humayun not to
allow the killing of cows, may have been a response to the views of the Brahmins. Although
the will itself was a later forgery, it does indicate the state’s willingness to respect the view
that was gaining ground. There is no doubt that during the medieval period, the cow was
emerging as an emotive cultural symbol in brahminical circles. It became more emotive with
the rise of Maratha power in the 17th century under Shivaji, who was often viewed as an
incarnation of god, descended on Earth for the deliverance of the cow and the Brahmins. It
was first used for mass political mobilisation by the Sikh Kuka (Namdhari) movement, which
rallied Hindus and Sikhs against the British, who had allowed the killing of cows in the
Punjab. At around the same time, Dayanand Saraswati founded the first Goraksini Sabha in
1882. He made the cow a symbol of the unity of a wide range of people against Muslims and
challenged the Muslim practice of its slaughter, provoking a series of Hindu-Muslim riots in
the 1880s and 1890s. This was accompanied by an intensification of the cow-protection
movement following the decree of the North-Western Provinces High Court that the cow was
not a sacred object. The cow now emerged fully as a mark of Hindu identity.
So the story of the cow is riddled with puzzles and paradoxes. In Vedic and post-Vedic times,
when the ritual killing of this animal and eating its flesh was in vogue, it was considered to be
an item of wealth and was likened with Aditi (mother of gods), the earth, the cosmic waters
whose release by Indra established the cosmic law, maternity, and to poetry, which was the
monopoly of the Brahmins. Subsequently, if it was killed according to Vedic precepts, it was
not killing, because Vedic killing was not killing. Even when the slaughter of bovines came
to be forbidden in the Kali age, cow-killing remained a minor sin. When the dharmashastras
assigned a purificatory role to the cow’s five products, they considered its faeces and urine as
pure but not its mouth; and food smelt by it needed to be purified. Yet, through these
incongruous attitudes, the Indian cow has struggled its way to sanctity. But its holiness is
elusive. For there is no cow goddess, nor any temple in her honour — though it should not
surprise us if some disgruntled elements set up one.
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Why Dalit is no longer an empowering word for some marginalised communities in UP

Written by Badri Narayan
Who wants to be called a Dalit? A young student from an Uttar Pradesh village, who belongs
to a Scheduled Caste, asked me this question. He said, please don’t call us “Dalit”. He
explained that it is an insulting term that produces an inferiority complex and that they prefer
to be called by their “caste names”. These have a glorious history as the communities have
produced kings and seers.
The student further said that one of their main struggles is to acquire an identity that may give
them social confidence. This is the post-Bahujan social truth that one observes in a state like
UP. There are many Twitter handles and Facebook pages run by youngsters from various
marginalised communities arguing for, describing and asserting their caste identity as a form
of social glory. They are engaged in inventing their caste heroes, histories and icons and
creating various social groups to disseminate this information and forge a caste-centred
public sphere. In another conversation, a few educated youngsters from these communities
explained that those who see them from the outside, such as people from non-SC social
groups, politicians, academics, media and many civil society organisations, call them “Dalit”.
On the other hand, many people from SC communities who are mainstream Ambedkarites
also call themselves Dalits and, while using this term, they seek to project themselves as an
assertive community struggling for social empowerment.
The term Dalit is not so popular in states like Punjab, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.
Among a sizeable section of the marginal communities in Punjab, asserting oneself as
“chamar da puttr” (son of a leather worker) is preferred. The verdicts of various high courts
and Supreme Court commissions also discourage the use of the term “Dalit” in official
communication.
In the villages of UP, very few people from the marginalised communities use “Dalit” to
define their social and political identities. Most of them use their caste names or the
governmental term, “SC”. However, some politicians frequently use “Dalit” in their political
discourse, thus showing the gap between political language and the people’s language. Many
social activists, civil society groups and NGOs use the term “Dalit” without understanding
the ongoing reconfiguration of the communities’ sense of identity.
Kanshi Ram may have recognised the problem in using “Dalit” while addressing the rural
marginalised communities of UP, which is why he preferred to use “Bahujan” in his political
discourse. Mayawati also preferred to use “Bahujan”. Kanshi Ram’s project of invoking caste
identities among the marginalised and their conversion to a broader Bahujan identity is
almost non-functional in UP now. When the Bahujan movement was stronger in the state, the
emphasis on separate caste identity-based glory and pride was almost invisible. Now, when
Bahujan assertion seems to be weaker, the assertion of caste pride and dependence on caste
glories appears among marginalised communities. They claim their own icons and are
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reshaping Dalit public discourse in urban and rural north India. Where the sense of caste
glory once worked as a socio-psychological resource for the production of the Bahujan
public, it is now also working to facilitate the formation of the Hindutva public.
The growing trend of asserting caste identity among the marginalised is a replication of the
“graded inequality” of the caste system diagnosed by B R Ambedkar. It may cause the
production of a new set of multiple inequalities. This emerging phenomenon may also hurt
the Ambedkar-initiated project of the annihilation of caste in Indian society but it needs to be
documented and discussed to understand the mobilisation of marginalised communities of
north Indian society. We also need to understand what Michel Foucault meant when he
opined that identity is not fixed but, rather, is a discourse mediated by our interactions with
others. “Dalit”, which was once an empowering term for a section of the marginalised, is now
considered insulting by other sections.
In fact, changes in identity also denote changes in aspirations. Managing this new sense of
identity requires the crafting of new electoral and mobilisational politics and political diction.
Let’s see which political group comes up with a new craft to mobilise the support of various
castes and communities under the Dalit-Bahujan-marginalised categories.
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Explained: Why so many MPs are dynasts

Written by Gilles Verniers , Christophe Jaffrelot
While prominent dynasts of the Congress party and other regional parties have bitten the dust
— including of course Rahul Gandhi himself in his fiefdom of Amethi — the dynastic factor
has not been absent in 2019 election at all. If anything, the phenomenon has increased.
We define ‘dynast’ any candidate or MP having a relative who in the past or in the present
has served or serves an elective mandate, at any level of representation. It also includes
candidates with relatives who serve or have served prominent positions in party
organisations.
In 2016, a book edited by Kanchan Chandra showed that a “quarter of Indian

parliamentarians were dynastic, on average, between 2004 and 2014…” (Democratic
dynasties). Even higher figures emerge from the data collected by a team of researchers of the
Trivedi Centre for Political Data (Ashoka University) and CERI. The data suggest that in
2019, 30% of all Lok Sabha MPs belong to political families.
Among the large states, those where the proportion of dynasts stands above the national
average are, in the increasing direction, Rajasthan (32%), Orissa (33%), Telangana (35%),
Andhra Pradesh (36%), Tamil Nadu (37%), Karnataka (39%), Maharashtra (42%), Bihar
(43%) and Punjab (62%). Clearly, the phenomenon is all pervasive geographically.
More surprisingly, it affects all parties too — and not necessarily the usual suspects. One
would assume that state-based parties, which tend to function as private family-holdings,
would be more dynastic. That is not actually the case. National parties are at the forefront of
the phenomenon, across all states. The gap is particularly striking in Bihar (58% of dynasts
among the candidates of the national parties against 14% among those of the state parties), in
Haryana (50% against 5%), in Karnataka (35% against 13%), in Maharashtra (35% against
19%), in Odisha (33% against 15%), in Telangana (32% against 22%) and even in Uttar
Pradesh (28% against 18%). Some state parties however stand above the average proportion
of dynastic candidates: JD(S) (66%), SAD (60%), TDP (52%), RJD (38%), BJD (38%), SP
(30%). Most of these parties are led by political families, often large ones, as the case of SP.
The only parties which do not indulge in dynasticism are the CPI and the CPI(M), where less
than 5% of the candidates belonged to a political families. They are today at rock bottom (for
reason others than lack of dynasticism, admittedly).
Among the national parties, Congress remains the most dynastic one, with 31% of his
candidates belonging to a political family. But the BJP is catching up with 22% of dynast
candidates. This last figure is counter-intuitive for two reasons. First, the BJP relentlessly
criticises all opponents for being dynastic enterprises, accusing them of forming an anti-
democratic establishment. Second, the BJP has made a special effort to renew his candidates
by denying ticket to about one hundred of its 282 outgoing MPs. But in spite of this massive
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change of guard, the % of dynasts among the BJP candidates has reached an unprecedented
level. Why?
The main reason quite simply is that parties try to maximise their chances at winning seats by
fielding candidates that tick most of the winnability boxes. The fact remains that locally,
being a dynast remains by and large more an asset than a liability.
Second, women candidates are more “dynastic” than male candidates. Parties tend to select
their women candidates from within existing political families, as they still perceive that
fielding women candidates constitutes a risk. As a result, 100% of the female candidates
fielded by the SP, the TDP, the DMK and the TRS belong to political families. In smaller
parties, they also tend to be directly related to the party leader. For the RJD, the three women
candidates fielded are wives of jailed party goondas.
This trend applies to Congress and BJP as well, with respectively 54% and 53% of their
women candidates being dynasts. Even the Trinamool Congress, which has given tickets to a
record number of women and which is one of the less dynastic parties of India, tends to play
it safe by nominating a large fraction of women belonging to political families (27%).
However, one of the main reasons why dynasts are nominated by parties in large proportion
pertains to their influence within the parties themselves and by the fact that they tend to
perform better than non-dynastic candidates. While 22% of the BJP candidates were dynasts,
the share of these dynasts among the BJP MPs jumps to 25%. The gap is even larger on the
Congress side (from 31% to 44%) and among key state parties, including the Shiv
Sena where dynasts represented only 8% of the party candidates, but 39% of the party MPs!
Across parties, the over-representation of dynasts is stronger among the elected MPs than
among the candidates. The question then is why are voters more attracted by dynasts, even
when they sometimes claim that they want some political change?
It may be that the delegitimisation of dynasticism worked at the general level, as part of a
national political narrative. But it does not mean that the factors cease to operate at the local
level. The data suggests that the phenomenon has increased in this election, including within
the winning party. Therefore, one should be cautious with statements that the vote for the BJP
represented an indictment against democratic dynasticism.
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Why China’s about-turn shows restrictive population policy doesn’t work
Written by Sonalde Desai
Recently China announced that married couples may have up to three children, officially
marking an end to the population control experiment that led to the draconian one-child
policy in 1980. This policy reversal came as data from the 2020 Chinese census showed a
sharp increase in the proportion of the population above age 60 to 18.7 %, up from 1.3 % in
2010. Whether this relaxation will be successful remains unclear. For India, an even bigger
question pertains to the lessons we might draw from this about-turn.
The success of this announcement signaling a pro-natalist turn will depend on the answer to
two questions. First, how strong was the impact of the original policy? Second, what can
governments do to encourage people to have more children?
China’s one-child policy led to human rights abuses encouraging sex-selective abortion and
abandonment of girls in a society where parents desperately wanted a son but were able to
have only one child. However, in recent years, the importance of the one-child policy in
reducing Chinese population growth has come under surprising contestation. The Chinese
government claimed that over and above the impact of socioeconomic growth, the one-child
policy averted 400 million births. Demographer Daniel Goodkind in a paper published in the
journal, Demography, supports this conclusion.
Demographers Wang Feng, Yong Cai, Susan Greenhalgh, and others disagree. In the same
journal, they argue that most of the fertility decline in China’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
from 5.8 in 1970 to an estimated 1.6 in 2015 came from socioeconomic development rather
than population control policies. There may be some validity to this latter argument as the
relaxation of the one-child policy to two children in 2016 failed to halt fertility decline, and
the TFR fell to 1.3 in 2020.
More importantly, the role of government policies in reversing fertility decline remains
questionable. A TFR of 2 is needed for a couple to reproduce itself. However, many countries
are experiencing spectacularly low fertility. While Korea led with extremely low TFR (0.98)
in 2018, Taiwan (1.06), Hong Kong (1.08), Singapore (1.14), Spain (1.25), and Italy (1.29)
are not far behind.
Concern about depopulation and the increasing burden of supporting senior citizens has led
many countries to institute policies encouraging people to have more children. They range
from providing cash benefits to parents (France), providing generous maternity and paternity
leaves (Sweden, Japan), and improving childcare availability (Norway, Japan). A review of
these policies by Tomáš Sobotka and colleagues for the UN Fund for Population Activities
documents mixed success. Family-friendly policies in countries like Sweden seem to have
halted the slide, with TFR in Sweden hovering around 1.7. In contrast, despite many policy
initiatives, the TFR in Japan has refused to budge from a level of about 1.4. Large cash
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incentives, called baby bonuses, in countries like Spain, brought about only a tiny increase in
fertility and were eventually dropped. In 2018, Spain’s TFR of 1.25 was among the lowest in
the world.
Extremely low fertility in Southern Europe and East Asia may be a result of entrenched
gender inequality. Expansion of childcare availability only reduces some burden on parents.
With rising education and increasing economic opportunities, women have a greater incentive
to participate in the labour force. Still, they also retain most domestic responsibilities, making
marriage and childbearing less attractive. In East Asia, intensive parenting demands add to
this pressure. Competition in education and the job market is fierce in these nations,
incentivising families to focus on a single child, pouring in money and time in that child.
Reports in The New York Times suggest that these pressures may result in a lack of success
for China’s new pro-natalist policy. Increasing costs of raising children, pregnancy
discrimination against women, and care responsibilities for older family members create a
time and money squeeze for families that do not facilitate fertility increase. In 2016, China
already relaxed the one-child policy, allowing families to have two children. Despite this, the
TFR has continued to slide, falling from 1.6 circa 2015 to 1.3 in 2000.
What are the lessons for India? First, India should be pleased that fertility has been falling
steadily, with TFR declining from 3.4 in 1994 to 2.2 in 2015. The recently released National
Family Health Survey shows that fertility has continued to fall. The TFR for Bihar, for
example, fell from 3.4 in 2015-16 to 3 in 2019-20. While the proportion of the older
population is growing, the growth is slow and steady, averting a demographic cliff.
Nonetheless, the proportion of households in India that limit themselves to a single child is
growing steadily. In 2015-16, 18 states and UTs had a TFR of less than 2. Moreover, my
research with Alaka Basu using data from the India Human Development Survey conducted
in 2011-12 by the University of Maryland and NCAER shows that close to one-fourth of
college-educated women have a single child.
This suggests that our population policy may want to move beyond the language of the past
that restricts maternity leave and election eligibility for a third child and beyond. A wiser
course for supporting fertility decline among families and areas where the TFR is high
without leading to extremely low fertility would be to help families plan childbearing at times
that are most convenient to them. This is likely to be particularly important for young,
educated women who contend with the burden of intensive parenting in a highly competitive
educational environment along with the unequal burden of domestic responsibilities.
Encouraging male participation in housework, improving their ability to combine work and
family, and improving family planning services will generate an environment where our TFR
would stabilise around 1.7, a level that would avoid the demographic cliff facing China.
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Make room for women in the new normal
Written by Sonalde Desai
When we tell our children and grandchildren about 2020, we will talk about a time when we
shut ourselves in our homes to keep the world and the pandemic out. Our only contact with
friends and relatives was via the telephone, and we only ventured out for essential activities,
that too during daylight. We covered our faces and passed people on the street, refusing to
make eye contact.
Men will talk about this as a year out of time, but perhaps many women will say, this is how
we lived anyway. The pandemic was the first time it was recognised as a problem. As we
think of emerging from this isolation and resuming our social lives, can we make sure both
men and women reclaim public spaces and that the new normal for women does not look like
the old normal?
Statistics on women’s lack of access to public spaces are sobering. The India Human
Development Survey of 2012 (IHDS), conducted by the University of Maryland and National
Council of Applied Economic Research, revealed that 18 % of women respondents do not go
to a kirana shop. A further 19 % would not go alone. A third of households relied only on
men or children to do any grocery shopping. Only 11 % of rural women had ever attended a
gram sabha. Barely 18 % had ever visited a metropolitan city, and an equal proportion had
ventured outside their state.
Even before mask-wearing limited our ability to connect with the external world, it was
commonplace for 60 % of Indian women who practise either the ghunghat or purdah. The
telephone was already the lifeline connecting women to their support network — about a
quarter of women respondents were unable to visit their natal families more than once a year.
Part of this isolation may be because it is difficult for women to travel unless someone
accompanies them; among the IHDS respondents, only half of them felt able to travel alone.
Perhaps the pandemic-enforced isolation will increase our empathy for the substantial
proportion of Indian women who have found themselves confined to their homes during the
normal course of life. The challenge, however, lies in understanding what has caused this
isolation and finding ways to address it.
A large number of studies have documented that women face sexual harassment as they
venture outside the home. Fear of sexual harassment has negative societal consequences in
many areas of life. In a research paper (using IHDS data), economist Tanika Chakraborty
found that women are less likely to work away from home in areas where perceived sexual
harassment of girls is higher. World Bank economist Girija Borker in a highly innovative
study, found that despite having high marks, girls in Delhi University choose to attend lower-
quality colleges to avoid sexual harassment while traveling to college.
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What can be done to enhance women’s feeling of safety and to ensure their full participation
in public life? Some of these are relatively simple — like improving lighting around roads,
buses, and train stations. However, we also need to look to more creative solutions to create a
critical mass of women in public spaces so that women don’t feel isolated and see safety in
numbers. This may involve hiring women drivers and bus conductors, emulating Lahore’s
pink buses, and expanding spaces allocated to women vendors in markets.
It also involves creating an environment where the whole society collaborates to welcome
women into public life. This is not a one-way street, benefitting women alone. The Indian
Independence movement offers an inspirational example of the synergy between the
women’s movement and the nationalist movement. This intertwining won freedom for the
nation while creating an obligation for an Independent India to deliver gender justice,
resulting in the Hindu Code Bill that provided for monogamy, divorce, and inheritance rights
for women. My research shows that MGNREGA, with equal pay for men and women, has
played an important role in bringing women, who used to work only on family farms in the
past, into paid work. Finding opportunities for women to participate in creating public goods,
whether through special programmes designed for women or structuring existing programmes
in a way that allows for enhanced participation by women can only be a win-win situation.
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With BJP in Delhi, states must find ways to regain autonomy

Written by Suhas Palshikar
Recent assembly elections threw up three strong state governments that can alter Centre-state
relations. Besides having fairly strong majorities, these governments, in contrast to some
others, are politically and ideologically awake to the idea of the state’s autonomy. How will
this affect the prospects of India’s federalism?
The Indian case for federalism is strong, but the Indian practice of federalism is weak. This is
less due to a centralising constitutional architecture and more because of the lack of
appreciation about what federal practice can do for democracy and unity. Ironically, federal
practice becomes weaker particularly when it is required more. When parts of the country are
restless over their identities, policy response tends to turn more into a hardline non-federal
approach. When national leadership emerges as larger-than-life, federal practices are
eclipsed.
The new regime brought in by the BJP did invoke the federal principle during its 2014
campaign; however, it was quickly banished from practice not just because the regime is
sceptical of states’ powers but also because, by its very character, it has been averse to
sharing of power. Historically, federal practice has coincided with the rise of state parties.
They have usually adopted a federalist stand for pragmatic reasons. If the federalism of state
parties appears opportunistic, the federalism of the Congress under the UPA was more out of
compromise and helplessness. This background helps us understand the expectations of
federalisation amid the current wave of centralisation.
While one important aspect of India’s federalism, the special provision for Jammu &
Kashmir, was done away with after the second victory of 2019, the regime had already begun
corroding federal practices by destabilising non-BJP state governments. The pandemic
became the most effective legitimation of centralisation so far. It was a test of India’s federal
dynamics in that it required both central initiative and autonomy of state-specific responses.
Instead, it saw centralisation where not required and abdication by the Centre when required
the most.
This resulted in states asking the Centre to take up responsibilities, allowing the Centre to
become more overbearing. Politically, the central government has been more or less
successful in ensuring that citizens will now blame their respective state governments and the
Centre would be free to claim credit for relief measures, provisioning of medical facilities
and coordinating vaccination.
How can the states retrieve their autonomy? One can imagine four routes to a return to a
semblance of federal politics — fiscal strength, governance, political strength and regional
identity. As India’s economy declines and faces crises, it is unlikely that the Centre would
agree to more resources to states. Nor would states have the skills to genuinely exercise fiscal
autonomy. With every cyclone and flood, the clamour will be for more “aid”, making states
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severely dependent on a vengeful Centre. The most effective terrain where states can assert
autonomy and compete with the Centre is that of governance. But the record of states here is
not very attractive. Kerala may claim a decent handling of the pandemic or West Bengal
seems to have delivered better on some welfare schemes, but overall, both the Congress and
non-Congress/non-BJP governments cannot advertise themselves in matters of governance
nor claim a better record on democratic practice.
As far as political autonomy is concerned, it would be difficult for the states to reclaim that
territory with the unprecedented interference in state administrations and the fear instilled
among state bureaucracies. Besides, non-BJP parties are themselves centralised as much as
the BJP. State parties are probably even more so and hence averse to the principle of power
sharing. They thus become weak political sources for demanding autonomy. Slogans of
autonomy may be good for grandstanding, but the autonomy of a Jaganmohan Reddy or a
KCR or a Mamata Banerjee would produce neither federalisation nor democratisation.
Thus, states can only go back to emotional platforms of regional pride — something the
Trinamool Congress did during the elections. Punjab and Maharashtra have been tamely
attempting to ride this platform for a while. As the instances of Punjab of the 1980s, Tamil
Nadu, J&K or Nagaland would show, regionalist platforms require political skills, else
regionalism becomes counterproductive. Instead of strengthening regional autonomy, it
becomes a tool for more centralisation and repression. The current federal deadlock,
however, leaves little room for states except the route of regionalism in spite of the
challenges and risks.
While the newly elected Tamil Nadu government is indeed making efforts to steer the debate
to economic issues, the politics of federalism is bound to remain confined to regional identity
issues. Interfering governors, central deputations to favoured officers, personal slights against
state leadership, or the impatient emphasis on Hindi, would be the flashpoints which states
will appropriate for consolidating regional pride.
If we roughly distribute states on the twin axes of the politics of regionalism and federal
confrontations with the Centre, we shall find more states located high on the former than
states engaged in the latter. The majority of states today are marked by low intensity
regionalism and low intensity federal confrontation. If states now move from there to high
intensity regionalism, then regionalism will be an issue that the Centre will have to negotiate.
This pathway might not in itself consolidate federal politics but it has the potential of driving
politics toward federalisation — even BJP-ruled states are not averse to regional sentiments,
as in Karnataka or Haryana and probably Bihar.
This new possible wave of the politics of regionalism faces two critical hurdles. One is that
the politics of regional identity is isolationist by nature. Each region gets entangled more into
its separate existential and imaginary glory rather than coordinating with other regions vis-à-
vis an intrusive Centre. In the last seven years, non-BJP parties and governments have
consistently failed in evolving a durable or impactful forum or even casual conversation on
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Centre-state relations. The second hurdle is the political savvy of the BJP. The BJP has been
selling a pan-Hindutva with regional variations. Long ago, it experimented with this route by
first enlarging the issue of Gujarati asmita and then conflating it with Hindutva. That is
exactly what the party experimented with successfully in Assam but failed to implement in
West Bengal. So, an imminent rise of regionalist sentiment is nevertheless not a guarantee of
federal consolidation or a Centre-state equilibrium.
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The purposes of tradition
Khaps are a cover for the crisis of patriarchal authority in northwest India
Written by Surinder S Jodhka
Khaps are a cover for the crisis of patriarchal authority in northwest India
Middle-class Indians generally have an ambivalent attitude towards tradition while they like
to be seen as modern,they are reluctant to make a decisive break with custom.
Perhaps the starting point of the problem is the very binary of traditional and modern. Since
the years of the colonial enlightenment project,middle-class Indians have been educated to
believe that cultures,economies and social relations can be classified into two categories,the
modernsignifying the kind of society that the West became after the industrial revolution.
While community,caste and joint family were examples of traditional social life,modern
societies were organised around individualism and based on rationality. The idea of
modernity also carried with it a theory of history. Modernity was not only a culture of the
West,it was also our future,desirable and inevitable.
Notwithstanding its power and influence across the world,the idea of modernity has been
contested and critiqued. And yet,it is surprising that we have barely interrogated the idea of
tradition,which is simply assumed to be the baggage of the past. While some practices had to
be discarded with time,other traditions could/ should be retained and constantly revitalised.
As the social reformers of the 19th century would have it,sati and purdah were
badtraditions,while Indian family values were goodand must be preserved.
Though we have a come a long way from the impulses of the 19th century in other ways,the
modern-traditional binary has endured in a fundamental way as a commonsenseframing
metaphor. The problem with this approach to our past and present is that it blocks us from
engaging with questions of power and politics of personal relations and the contemporary
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dynamics of institutions like caste,kinship and family. For example,there is indeed an element
of tradition in institutions like the caste system and kinship relations. However,they are not
frozen in time. They have their own dynamics,their politics and possibilities.
It is in this context that we need to understand the connection that khap leaders have tried to
suggest between rape and some notion of tradition and family. Rape is simply a criminal act.
No civilised society would treat it otherwise. How could anyone even think of providing an
apology or explanation for rape? The attempt of khap leaders to connect it with the age of
marriage of girls seems shocking as an attempt to justify a criminal act and project the rapist
as a victim of circumstances.
The khap leaders were obviously not contemplating a legal change only for the dominant
caste community they represent,but their primary concern is kinship,the boys and girls of
their own caste. The current khap activism around the question of the age at which girls
marry is closely connected to what they have been pushing for over the last several
years,their move to restrict intra-gotra marriages and their positions on honour killings. The
underlying purpose is the reassertion of patriarchal authority and control over the sexuality of
their women.
The decline of patriarchal authority must seen in the context of our recent history. The green
revolution of the 1970s significantly increased the economic might and political power of the
landowning dominant castes in northwest India. As has been shown by empirical studies,it
was from these dominant caste communities that a new breed of regional elites emerged
during the post-Independence period. Their power in regional politics came directly from
their control over the local agrarian economy and the local social order of caste.
However,economic development also opened up the village to larger national narratives. As

the poor began to move out of village for more dignified employment,the rich invested part of
their surplus on education of their children. Initially it was only the boys who went on to
study in the towns and universities outside the village. By the late 1990s,as urban life
appeared more attractive,even daughters were allowed to pursue higher studies,which would
help them find urban grooms. However,once educated, these women wished to exercise their
agency in shaping their lives. It is this urge among the upwardly mobile from amongst the
dominant caste communities to move beyond the village that creates a crisis of authority
within the families,which makes the older patriarchs simply irrelevant. However,they are
unwilling to forgo their traditional authority. The khap provides them a legitimate platform to
reassert their authority,even if it implies finding excuses for heinous crimes like rape in the
name of tradition.
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One Above the Other
Book: Caste Matters, by Suraj Yengde

Book Review by Surinder S Jodhka
Caste matters. Why and how does it matter? How long will it continue to matter? Though
more than two-thirds of India still lives in rural settlements, Indians are no longer bound by
their past traditions. Even those who wish to do so find it hard to keep up with the demands
of a traditional social order and the accompanying lifestyles. More importantly, the caste
system is about relational structures, ritual hierarchies and jajmani ties of patronage and
dependence. Scholars researching the rural economy and its social structure have been
reporting on its steady disintegration since the 1970s. The rural, agrarian economy no longer
functions around relations of reciprocity which distributed produce across communities
according to their contribution to the village economy, and the calling of their caste. Jajmani
ties have disintegrated even in the relatively less developed regions of India. Markets have
penetrated everywhere and democratic political institutions have shaken the older orders of
power and patronage, despite some continuity.
Suraj Yengde is not interested in these generic questions emanating from sociological frames
of understanding and explaining caste. He does not even refer to traditional rural realities or
popular theories of the caste system. His book begins with an autobiographical and
experiential explication of caste while growing up in an urban slum or hamlet in Maharashtra.
His narrative is thus woven around the oppressive aspect of caste. He talks of poverty and
lack of resources, and particularly of the cramped homes that he grew up in. The indignity of
being a Dalit bothered him much more than the poverty of his early years.
The category of caste provides him with an explanatory system and a political frame to make
sense of his deprivation and the violence that he encountered, which is commonplace even in
cities, far away from the rural landscapes of traditional life. Even in metropolitan India, the
Brahminical order remains robust and shapes almost everything for those at the lower end of
the system, the Dalits. However, Yengde did not grow up in a passive community on the
margin with a self-perpetuating ‘culture of poverty’. Pioneering work done by BR Ambedkar
has already changed all that. He tells us about his family’s active political engagement with
local Dalit movements and their identification with the personal and political philosophy of
Ambedkar.
The substantive part for the book is not autobiographical. It is primarily a critique, not only of
the persistent realities of caste but also of the prevailing state of Dalit politics. Yengde’s
language is sharp, often sounding excessive and loaded with high moral expectations,
particularly when he criticises fellow Dalits and their social and political activities. He finds
almost everyone to be compromising with the larger question of Dalit emancipation. He
attributes this largely to the Dalit leadership’s dependence on the state system and individual
largess. For example, he describes the “salaried Dalits in the bureaucracy” as “shameless
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creatures…trapped in the alienating caste system,” despite being highly talented. A rather
simplistic and homogeneous view of Dalits underlies his lament.
Presumably for him, Dalits are all those who have experienced untouchability, a cluster of
jatis and caste groups, mostly Scheduled Castes. The experience of untouchability makes
them an ethnic formation, with a specific distinctive history and an essentialised character.
However, ‘Dalit’ is not simply a descriptive category or a pan-Indian caste collective. It is
primarily a political construct produced by the social movements of former untouchables for
dignity and citizenship rights. The colonial and postcolonial nation-state, through its
enumerative and classificatory strategies, actively enabled a pan-Indian imagination of the
caste system. In other words, Dalit-ness is less about being and more about becoming, and
there could be no singular way of becoming Dalit. Factors such as regional histories, political
and economic contexts, the nature of leadership, its ideological moorings and mobilisational
strategies all work together towards the making and the imagining of Dalitness. They also
shape their political concerns and strategies for change.
There are substantive chapters on the Dalit middle class and Dalit entrepreneurship, again
with a sharp critical edge. Through evidence and argument, Yengde shows how
discrimination against Dalits is a perennial reality and has implications for the making of a
middle class among them. It is hard to find a Dalit in the judiciary or the electronic media.
Yengde is not enamoured by celebratory accounts of Dalit capitalism. Capitalism, for him, is
not the solution but a problem, which works “in tandem with the deeply rooted oppression of
caste”. Despite a few success stories, market realities like access to credit actively
discriminate against Dalits trying to enter business. Capitalism in India, he argues, is
structured around the logic of caste.
Another interesting chapter is on Brahmins against Brahminism, where he counts a few cases
where individuals gave up privileges and joined the struggle against the caste system.
However, more important is his criticism of Brahmins, and he puts the entire burden of
manufacturing and sustaining caste on them. Even though Yengde does not engage with
sociological theorisations, in his narrative, the Dalit and the Brahmin are the two polar
opposites of the caste system. The Brahmin is the bearer and benefactor of the caste ideology
and the Dalit, its victim.
Such a framing does have purchase but also simplifies the complex dynamics of caste,
presents it as a binary system with little or no scope for regional diversity and historical
specificities. Just as it essentialises the Brahmin, so it does the Dalit. Such a notion also
reinforces the conventional view of its timeless continuity. However, this has not been the
reality of what we have come to understand as caste. Caste is about hierarchy, a system that
grades social groups and working people in a continuum, “one above the other”, as
Ambedkar put it. Like other social institutions, relational structures of caste have been
changing. The challenge is to explore and expose the nature of their change while noting that
change per se does not imply dismantling or even weakening of caste, a point that is well
made by Yengde.
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Free shots for all: This must be India’s vaccination strategy
It is bad enough that we depend on just two suppliers. What is baffling is that the government
has now allowed them to set their own prices.
Written by Jean Dreze
At a time when fair and speedy COVID-19 vaccination is of the essence, the Indian
government has done a great job of putting us at the mercy of vaccine manufacturers. It is bad
enough that we depend, as of now, on just two suppliers — the Serum Institute of India (SII)
and Bharat Biotech. What is baffling is that the government has now allowed them to set their
own prices — “whatever you want in terms of being reasonable and fair”, as SII chief Adar
Poonawalla candidly explained in a recent interview to CNBC. For good measure, suppliers
are also allowed to set different prices for different buyers (the Centre, states and private
hospitals), enabling them to charge what different segments of the market can bear. This is
the polar opposite of the “single-payer model” in healthcare, where the government tries to
get the best possible deal from drug manufacturers by acting as the single buyer.
In the single-payer approach, the central government would order all the vaccines and then
distribute them equitably between states, and possibly some private healthcare providers.
This was, more or less, the situation in the first phase of the COVID-19 vaccination
programme, when most of the vaccines were sold to the central government at a negotiated
price of Rs 150 per dose. However, a radical change occurred on April 21 with the release of
the central government’s policy note on “Liberalised Pricing and Accelerated National
COVID-19 Vaccination Strategy”.
It is important to read the fine print of that policy, effective from May 1. The stated intention
was clearly to supplement central procurement (limited to 50 % of vaccine supplies from then
on) with a vaccine market where each manufacturer would charge one transparently declared
price to all buyers other than the central government, that is, states and private hospitals. That
intention, however, was defeated the very same day by SII, which announced different prices
for states and private hospitals, with a much higher price (Rs 600 per dose) for the latter. And
if suppliers can get a higher price from private hospitals, why would they take interest in
selling to the states?
The danger of states being squeezed out was made worse by another aspect of the Centre’s
new policy: It allows private hospitals to set their own prices for vaccination. Their prices
will be “monitored”, but not controlled. In practice, monitoring is likely to be symbolic,
giving private hospitals a free hand. In short, the stage has been set for a thriving vaccine
market where private hospitals charge hefty prices for vaccination and manufacturers make
money by selling a good portion of their supplies to private hospitals at inflated prices.
The central government’s policy note makes a virtue of “liberalised” pricing on the grounds
that it will incentivise vaccine production. But production can equally be incentivised in the
single-payer system by paying an adequate price — it’s just that the central government
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would have to foot the bill. So, the real function of this pricing policy is to save the central
government some money. Why not tax the rich instead and foot the vaccine bill? It’s not a
lot: Even if the price paid by the central government were to be raised from Rs 150 to (say)
Rs 300 per dose, buying two doses for two-thirds of India’s adult population of 850 million
or so would cost Rs 34,000 crore — less than what has already been allocated for COVID-19
vaccination in the 2021-22 Budget. Further, in a single-payer framework, the government
would probably be able to negotiate a much lower price than Rs 300 per dose (perhaps even
lower than Rs 150) without undermining production incentives.
Leaving the financial aspects aside, why would we prefer central procurement to
“liberalisation”? The main reason is that it would lead to a more equitable distribution of
vaccines in the population. Today, India is facing an acute shortage of COVID-19 vaccines.
In the public sector, there is (or was, until now) a reasonably equitable system where
vaccination is provided free of charge to everyone in expanding priority categories such as
health workers, the elderly, everyone above age 45, and so on. In the private market, on the
other hand, scarce vaccines are distributed according to their ability to pay: The poor are
excluded as the rich jump the queue. The problem gets worse when private provision
degenerates into an extortionate black market, as might happen in a situation of vaccine
scarcity (much as with oxygen and COVID-19 medicines today).
If it were the case that expanded vaccination is held up by the government’s lack of capacity
to vaccinate, rather than by a shortage of vaccines, there might still be an argument for
promoting private provision: It would augment vaccination capacity. But the main constraint
today is a shortage of vaccines. India’s public sector is perfectly capable of vaccinating en
masse, if vaccines are available. This has been well demonstrated in earlier vaccination
programmes, including some that involved 100 million shots in a single day.
As argued earlier, liberalisation does not really ease the shortage of vaccines, it just shifts
some of the financial burden from the central government to private buyers. But the savings
are at least partly illusory, since liberalisation also enhances the bargaining power of
manufacturers in public procurement negotiations. In any case, trimming the vaccination
budget is hardly a priority when COVID-19 threatens to sink the economy.
The central government’s vaccine policy is an extension of liberalisation to a domain where it

does not belong. The way it came about, as Adar Poonawalla revealed in the CNBC
interview, is that the private sector “lobbied” (sic) for it. As far as the public interest is
concerned, free vaccination at public health centres is a much better strategy. Any proposed
departure from it should be examined “not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most
suspicious attention” as Adam Smith wisely advised us to consider business-sponsored
proposals many years ago.
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There is an urgent need for safeguards against unfair discontinuation of social benefits
Written by Jean Dreze
The Covid crisis has enhanced the dependence of poor people on social security schemes
such as the public distribution system (PDS). Many of them, unfortunately, continue to have
difficulties in accessing these schemes due to Aadhaar-related problems.
Startling findings on Aadhaar-related denial of foodgrain rations were reported a few days
ago by Shreyas Sardesai, based on a recent Lokniti-CSDS survey. The survey, conducted in
2019, covered more than 12,000 electors across the country. Those who had a ration card
(about four-fifths of all respondents) were asked whether it had ever happened that they were
deprived of their foodgrain rations for lack of Aadhaar, or due to other Aadhaar-related
problems such as biometric authentication glitches or failure to link their ration card with
Aadhaar. The proportion of affirmative responses was as high as 28 % at the all-India level,
rising to 39 % among low-income households and 40 % in the erstwhile BIMARU states.
The fact that Aadhaar-related problems often lead to denial of food rations from PDS is well
known. What is new here is that they have affected so many people. This may seem puzzling,
because most people have an Aadhaar card, and biometric authentication failures also tend to
affect a relatively small proportion of PDS users. How, then, does one explain these
staggering figures?
One plausible answer is that they reflect widespread use of the “ultimatum method” to
enforce the mandatory linking of ration cards with Aadhaar. This consists of setting a
deadline for Aadhaar linking, and then telling people that unless they meet the deadline their
benefits — in this case food rations — will be suspended. This method has been widely
applied in many states to link Aadhaar not only with ration cards but also with job cards,
social security pensions, bank accounts, PAN cards, and so on. It is used mainly on poor
people — the middle class tends to get softer treatment.
Jharkhand’s experience sheds some light on the risks of this approach. The ultimatum method
was vigorously used there in 2017, in an effort to link all ration cards with Aadhaar. On
March 27, 2017, the chief secretary stated that “all the ration cards which have not been
linked with Aadhaar number will become null and void on April 5”. On September 22, 2017,
the government of Jharkhand boasted of having cancelled lakhs of “fake ration cards” [sic].
Later on, however, it turned out that most of these ration cards belonged to people who were
alive and eligible. Among them was the family of Santoshi Kumari, an 11-year-old Dalit girl
who succumbed to prolonged hunger on September 28, 2017.
This entire process is objectionable in many ways. Linking a ration card with Aadhaar is not
always easy for poor people: They may not know what to do, where to go or how to rectify
incorrect details on their Aadhaar card. Assistance and safeguards are scarce. There is no
verification before cancellation, the victims are not informed, they have no right to appeal,
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and the list of cancelled cards is not in the public domain. To this day, the Jharkhand
government has failed to disclose the list, despite repeated appeals for transparency.
Quite likely, similar methods have been used across the country in the last few years to
achieve near-universal linkage of ration cards with Aadhaar. Basically, people were
threatened with denial of food rations or even cancellation of ration cards if they failed to link
their card with Aadhaar in good time. The threat was acted on from time to time, as it must be
if people are to believe it. This is one plausible reason why so many people report having
been denied food rations due to Aadhaar-related problems at some point. In addition, of
course, many people have been affected by other Aadhaar-related problems such as biometric
authentication glitches and also connectivity failures — one of the major vulnerabilities of
Aadhaar-based biometric authentication in the last few years.
Temporary denial of food rations is one thing, cancellation of ration cards is far more serious.
How many cards have been cancelled for lack of Aadhaar linkage? No one really knows. In
the case of Jharkhand, three lakh ration cards (about 6 % of all ration cards) is a plausible
guess, based on official statements as well as independent evidence from a recent study by
Karthik Muralidharan and his colleagues. For India as a whole, the food ministry stated
recently in Rajya Sabha that 2.06 crore ration cards had been cancelled since 2017, but it is
anyone’s guess how many of them were cancelled for lack of Aadhaar linkage. This matter is
now under the Supreme Court’s scanner, following a petition by Santoshi Kumari’s family.
All this is just one part of the story. As I said, the ultimatum method has also been used in
connection with other social benefits. In many states, it has led to mass cancellation of job
cards, discontinuation of social security pensions, and freezing of bank accounts. This is not
to deny that there are cases when cancelling a ration card or freezing a bank account may be
justified. But this should be done in a fair and transparent manner. Depriving poor people of
social benefits without any sort of due process (prior warning, verification, intimation, right
of appeal, full disclosure, and so on) is patently unfair.
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From panopticon to Pegasus, how ideas about surveillance have evolved
There is uproar following the revelations of the Pegasus Project, but surveillance as a
method of control has existed since Jeremy Bentham’s age. How it evolved into its current
digital form and what the future could look like are questions that need greater discussion.
The situation must be placed in a historical context should be understood as being derived
from the chain of ideas originating from Bentham’s panopticon.
The panopticon was theorised as a system of control and surveillance by Bentham in the 18th
century. The idea behind the structure was to allow prisoners in their cells to be observed by a
single guard, without them being able to tell whether they are being observed. The key
difference between this idea and the current form of digital surveillance is that of tangibility.
The relative intangibility of data surveillance risks its normalisation. While with Bentham’s
panopticon there is a sense of physical exposure before authority, the same cannot be felt
when we are navigating data in our private spaces. Emphasis on national security concerns
also contributed to the normalisation of surveillance.
In the long history of surveillance, the state has always played a central role. The first
breakthrough event at the intersection of privacy, technology and surveillance was the 1844
postal espionage crisis in Britain. Rowland Hill’s invention of the Penny Post was aimed at
promoting cheap and secure communication. It was when Italian republican Giuseppe
Mazzini discovered that his postal correspondences were being subjected to state
interception, that a “privacy panic” was unleashed. However, no significant step was taken in
this regard until, in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis provided the foundation for a
conception of privacy that can be equated to control over information about oneself.
As argued by sociologist David Lyon, the spread of technology within societies will lead to
their increased surveillance and subsequent lack of privacy. In the late 20th century, the
internet was invented as a Cold War communication network. This led to the creation of the
Internet of Things [IoT] which allowed surveillance to be embedded in all objects, from
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fridges to cars. Data began to be “skimmed off” from everyday practices such as shopping.
The resurgence of neoliberalism in the 20th century meant that public-private partnerships
which had only been developing since the 1980s became commonplace. Thus, a new player
of commercial corporations was added to the existing relationship between the state and
surveillance. This is mirrored perfectly in the current context of Pegasus. Developed by a
private company, it has become a favourite tool for state surveillance.
Privacy expert Daniel Solove recognised that new technologies can lead to a panoply of new
privacy harms. Pegasus too is a by-product of the advancing technology and seriously
intrudes upon one’s private affairs. As William Prosser stated, protection against such
intrusion is a facet of privacy. It is only in the recent legal context that privacy began to be
increasingly viewed as a constitutional right. In fact, various international treaties and
conventions explicitly embody this right. Due to the relatively nascent nature of this right, the
tendency to not view privacy as intrinsic to one’s person remains. Oftentimes, we do not
expressly feel violated without an explicit sense of physical exposure. Perhaps such notions
ultimately fuelled the rise of the large network of state-controlled digital surveillance that
exists worldwide today.
Michel Foucault described the prisoner of a panopticon as being at the receiving end of
asymmetrical surveillance: “He is seen, but he does not see; he is an object of information,
never a subject in communication”. Essentially, he believed that the prisoner is seen
constantly and information about him is always available without any communication.
Historic panopticism is reflected in the example of the establishment of colonial rule in 19th
century Egypt. Panoptic modalities of power were enforced at all levels of society, with
individuality stripped away. The villages were centralised and that made it simple for the
government officials to track the activities of the people. Here, the gaze was a very physical
and tangible one. However, Foucault states that acquiring such control does not require
physical domination, but thrives on the possibility of observation. It is in this context that he
theorised the concept of panopticism, where the “watcher” ceases to be external to the
“watched”. The constant gaze of the watcher becomes internalised to an extent where every
prisoner becomes their own guard. Foucault argued that this phenomenon could lead to the
possibility of the state carefully fabricating the behaviour of the individuals. At the dawn of
the Industrial Revolution, Foucaulist ideas were used by factory owners to encourage self-
surveillance amongst the workforce. This reduced costs as the workers would constantly
correct their own behaviour to fit their prescribed functions. As George Orwell wrote in 1984,
“The hypnotic eyes [of Big Brother] gazed into his own. It was as though some huge force
were pressing down upon you — something that penetrated inside your skull, battering
against your brain, frightening you out of your beliefs, persuading you, almost, to deny the
evidence of your senses.”
To Foucault, knowledge is a form of power and thus, knowledge about a person gives us
power over that person. The personal data collected by the state is capable of moulding and
affecting our decision-making processes and behaviour. This can then be used as a tool of
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oppression and control and the rise of a “Big Brother” State, as Orwell puts it. A potential
implication could be a stultifying effect on the expression of dissent and difference of
opinion, which no democracy can accommodate.
Looking at the enormous backlash against the Pegasus Project from across the world, it can
be said that there is a growing push for what can be termed as “bottom-up surveillance”. With
powerful entities exercising control over individuals’ personal data, individuals may argue
that they too can watch back. The demands of these people are based on the fact that one’s
privacy and freedom cannot be taken for granted and that democracy cannot sleep while
surveillance flourishes. This leads to the creation of an inverse panopticon.
This leads us to Thomas Mathiesen’s synopticon. He used this concept to refer to mass media
initially and it is the reverse of the panopticon, in that the many watch the few. A shift from
“Big Brother is Watching You” towards “Big Brother is you, watching” is inevitable. Today,
we see that powerful groups such as politicians fear the media’s surveillance of them.
Together, the panoptical and synoptical processes place us in a viewer society in a two-way
and double sense. The rapid rise of the synoptical side of this society can create a neutralising
effect on panopticism. Scholars view such a potential rise as a method of resistance to digital
surveillance and dataveillance. For now, both the top-down and bottom-up surveillance
mechanisms seem to be coexisting. Whether one will prevail over the other or both will find
their own balance is a question only time will answer.
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Twitter altruism in Covid second wave gives us hope for social media
The Covid-19 pandemic has given us several painful images in the last two years. During the
first wave, the image that stayed with us was of migrant workers walking inhuman distances
in the wake of an arbitrary national lockdown.
During the second wave, the enduring image has been that of our social media feeds awash
with desperate calls for help. Yet, amidst the shortage of critical medical equipment and the
overflowing of cremation grounds, one cannot help but be struck by the great altruism and
activism of thousands of regular social media users.
People have collated resources and connected patients to hospital beds, stepping in to fill the
gaping hole left by the Indian state’s ineptitude. It has been a little bit of a miracle.
But how has Twitter (and the larger social media ecosystem), which at the best of times
appears to bring out the worst in people, managed to incentivise strangers to go out of their
way to help each other? How have the same platforms that often feel fundamentally inhuman
become the great beacon of humanity?
There are two possible explanations for this. The first has to do with the fundamental nature
of human beings, which, contrary to popular belief, drives them to be altruistic in the face of
crisis instead of being exploitative. This is the premise of Humankind: A Hope History, a
fascinating new book by Rutger Bregman. The second has to do with the “orality” of Twitter.
Orality refers to the quality of specific kinds of verbal expression. Used in sociology to
describe communication patterns in cultures where writing is unfamiliar or limited in use, the
concept also has significant implications in communication studies and politics. It helps us
understand that the medium of communication (oral/written) has psychological and social
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consequences, incentivising certain behaviours and values over others, eventually creating a
“culture” that embodies these values.
The work of cultural historian Walter J Ong, media theorist Marshall McLuhan and
sociologist Zeynep Tufekci helps us identify the defining characteristics of oral and written
cultures. Before the invention of mass print technologies, writing was a rare skill, and almost
everything of value was retained in human memory. Thus, oral communication, by definition
immediate and transient, had to be “memorable”.
Techniques employed to enhance memorability, such as rhythm, repetition, wit and rhetoric,
became deeply entrenched in the larger culture. Even today, despite the proliferation of print
and electronic technologies all around, great oratory continues to arrest us. Invariably, great
orators use the techniques noted above.
Given the close link between emotions and memory, a culture of orality tends to be
conversational and interpersonal. It enables the creation of a shared sense of community
between listeners and speakers and is better suited for the communication of emotions than
complex ideas. On the flip side, the inherent need to be memorable means that oral
communication tends to be antagonistic and simplistic, rarely dwelling in details (because
then it begins to become monotonous) and often lacks nuance.
Meanwhile, written and print communication is less dependent on memorability, given that it
exists on literal or metaphorical (like the internet) “paper”, which can always be referred back
to. Unlike oral communication, writing is not immediate and ephemeral. It enables complex
ideas to be communicated effectively without reducing them to their most emotional and
simplistic form.
There is more “room” for nuance in writing, as one can afford not to be rhetorical. Thus, the
spread of writing and print culture has more fundamental effects on the human psyche by
incentivising particular cognitive abilities over others. The work of media theorist Neil
Postman helps us better understand how this might be so.
In Amusing Ourselves to Death, he writes, “almost all of the characteristics we associate with
the mature discourse were amplified by typography, which has the strongest possible bias
toward exposition: a sophisticated ability to think conceptually, deductively, and sequentially;
a high valuation of reason and order; and abhorrence of contradiction; a large capacity for
detachment and objectivity; and a tolerance for delayed response.”
Despite its virtues, written communication is somewhat unnatural. Mass print culture and the
universality of writing are relatively recent phenomena in the history of humankind. It is
orality that comes most naturally to human beings. Yet, writing has become ubiquitous
because it solves the fundamental hurdle of scale in human communication.
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Given its transient nature, oral communication cannot reach many people and is effective in
communicating emotional content to a small number of people. Broadcast technologies like
radio provide speech with a much larger reach, but only by compromising real-time
interactivity, characteristic of orality.
Indeed, what makes oral communication memorable and powerful is the high degree of
listener participation and interactivity. In this regard, radio is a lot more like writing (little
real-time interactivity) than regular speech. Walter Ong calls this secondary orality.
Consequently, while the radio is a lot less effortful to consume than a book, the passivity of
the medium means that it is not as powerful a medium for creating intimacy or antagonism as
can be expected from an oral medium. For the longest time, the tradeoff between interactivity
and reach thus seemed inevitable. And then social media was born.
Consider Twitter. Despite being a text-first microblogging platform, it displays all the
fundamental characteristics of orality. As pointed out by Zeynep Tufekci, the immediate,
ephemeral nature of interaction on social media closely resembles oral communication.
Remember that oral communication, especially in preliterate cultures, was simplistic and
rhetorical in its subject matter because of the inherent need for memorability. On Twitter,
meanwhile, the creation of simplistic and rhetorical content is incentivised by the character
limit of tweets and the sheer volume of content on one’s feed. The slow, careful process
central to creating a written work is absent on Twitter, with people using the medium as a
public record of their stream of consciousness.
This framework helps explain why polarising content is rewarded by Twitter’s algorithm
while also explaining how it can become a powerful lifeline at times of crisis. The orality of
the platform facilitates the communication of emotional content, thus incentivising users to
post angry, antagonistic, and, at times, panic-inducing tweets. Much of Twitter is full of
sentences that would be at home in a private, oral argument before one has had the time or
energy to process information slowly and allow nuance to take hold.
But this very incentive structure is valuable in times of crisis. The cascading of panic-
inducing tweets that are generally harmful can save lives. Similarly, the psychological
consequences of orality also tell us that antagonism and vileness is only a part of the whole
picture. Like in-person oral communication, social media is adept at creating a sense of
community and shared identity.
Within the larger cesspools of fake news and hate speech, countless communities thrive on
social media, often held together by strong emotional reactions to certain sociopolitical and
interpersonal events. The power, and many of its challenges, stem from its ability to marry
the intimacy and interactivity of orality to the scalability of print and broadcast
communication (and then multiply it manifold).
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How historical caste privilege became modern-day ‘merit’

While a public health crisis grips the nation, the recent incident at IIT Kharagpur where a
professor named Seema Singh at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences allegedly
made casteist slurs during a class meant for students from the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes and persons with disabilities must have raised eyebrows.
This shouldn’t have been the case since IITs have a long history of systematically othering
students belonging to marginalised caste groups. Current students and alumni coming out on
social media after the incident, with their own stories of experiencing this kind of prejudice,
show the rampant casteism prevalent across IIT campuses in the nation.
Historically, technical knowledge was the domain of lower-caste artisans. It was later
embraced by upper castes. In independent India, IITs were established as “institutions of
national importance” that would form the uppermost tier of a stratified structure of
postcolonial technical training to produce an elite cadre of nation-builders.
Education is a great equaliser — an instrument of upward social mobility. However, technical

education in the name of promoting an objective and politically neutral form of knowledge
has obscured the role of caste stratification and caste distinction in shaping access to and
experiences of engineering education. This raises a fundamental question about the big IIT
story: How did historical advantage become modern-day “merit”?
Merit is often seen as a neutral term and is measured through various examinations to
measure an individual’s ability. In a nation where access to education remains a fundamental
issue, with wide disparities in curricula, the “merit” we all talk about is just another form of
discrimination and exclusion since the performance of an individual in any given
examination, such as the JEE, depends largely on their access to various resources which are
largely shaped by their caste, socio-economic status, schooling and upbringing.
Since upper castes had better access to resources, they were able to transform their inherited
capital into a claim to merit and refashioned themselves as contemporary meritocratic
subjects. As a result, soon, they began dominating these elite spaces, where they further
promoted and reinforced their own cultural capital.
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To quote sociologist Satish Deshpande: “By transforming their caste capital into modern
capital, upper castes can now claim to be casteless and accuse the lower castes of being
illegitimate purveyors of caste.”
Then came exam coaching and reservations that challenged such groups’ dominance, so they
asserted their claim to merit through new languages of distinction and strategies of
discrimination, as argued by Prof Ajantha Subramanian. Exam coaching has created a
distinction between the gifted and the coached.
In contrast, reservations in institutions like the IITs have given rise to the distinction between
the “general” and the “reserved” categories and the stigmatisation of students who gain
admission through reserved quotas. In this way, lower-caste groups are often victimised
through casteist slurs and humiliation. The recent incident at IIT Kharagpur is one such
instance.
Anti-reservation “merit” is just another myth. Such discrimination and institutional

harassment in the name of neutrality of merit show that people are blindfolded by their caste
privilege. They refuse to believe that merit doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The very idea that
upper castes are inherently “talented”, while reserved category students are meritless is as
void as it is casteist.
This kind of hatred, fostered in young minds, would eventually lead them to perpetuate caste
hierarchy through the subsequent generations. We should understand that without
reservations these people would continue to be peripheral groups as they would be unable to
achieve social mobility in their lives.
In recent times, we have seen a positive trend — lower-caste mobilisations inside the IITs,
like the Ambedkar Periyar Phule Study Circle at IIT Bombay, the Ambedkar Periyar Phule
Study Circle at IIT Gandhinagar, Chintabar at IIT Madras, Freedom and Democracy at IIT
Delhi, Students for Change at IIT BHU, the Science Education Group at IIT Kharagpur, and
IIT Delhi for Justice.
Since IITs are primarily apolitical spaces where student councils play a minimal role, such
groups have a significant role in ensuring social justice.
“Turn in any direction you like, caste is the monster that crosses your path,” Ambedkar
wrote. This remains true even after 74 years of Independence. It’s high time policy
practitioners look into this issue so that institutions like the IITs shed their sacred thread and
create an inclusive space embracing everyone in their fold.
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Women as temple priests: An idea whose time has come

Written by Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Minister PK Sekar Babu’s remark
that women could be appointed priests in the 35,000-odd temples in the state is long overdue.
This transformative idea must be emulated in temples across the country. There are, properly
speaking, no religious obstacles for doing so. What stands in the way is the dead hand of
convention, the power of patriarchy, and politics.
The term “priest” denotes a vast range of social, ritual and redemptory functions: From
purohits to pandas, to being a medium of divine power. Women have performed many of
these. These functions are also embedded differently in different Hindu traditions: Sakta,
Saivism, and Vaishnavism, Smarta etc. There are several examples in Tamil Nadu,
Maharashtra where women perform all rituals. Often, priesthood was an inherited office. In
Raj Kali Kuer vs Ram Rattan Pandey 1955, the Supreme Court held that women have the
right to succeed to religious office. It ruefully noted that standard codifications like Digest of
Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions: With a commentary by Jagannatha
Tercapanchanana, disqualified women from performing certain ritual functions. But it held
that this disqualification was not sufficient grounds to deny them priestly office. This
judgment notes that many priestly offices in Indian temples were hereditary, and “hereditary
is not a principle of competence.” In many temples, priestly office-holders subcontracted
particular ritual functions when needed. So even if women could not participate in particular
rituals, that could not be grounds for denying them priestly authority.
But despite these precedents, participation of women in temple authority structures or ritual
processes is shockingly rare. There are two obstacles: The fear of women coming in contact
with men, and notions of purity and pollution, especially associated with menstruation.
Again, there is a complexity. The social bases of the temples matter. This principle also
operates differently in what are called Agamic or Shastric temples, versus non-Agamic
temples. In temples with Tantric traditions, both Kashmiri and South Indian, women can
perform forms of worship prohibited elsewhere, even though there are some restrictions. But
historically, the Shaligram Shila Puja was the lakshman rekha that could not be crossed; even
non-menstruating women could not touch the Shila. Overcoming this taboo is a tall order, as
we just saw in the Sabarimala case. But the taboo must go.
The purpose of opening up ritual functions to women cannot just be social engineering; there
are good religious grounds for opening all ritual functions to women. The textual tradition
always leaves room for ambiguity; whether there were prohibitions in Vedic texts is debated.
Some foreground Bhakti inflected verses, like Srimad Bhagvad, 11.27, 3-4, where Brahma
tells Bhrigu that worshipping in deity form is the most beneficial of all spiritual practices, for
women and Sudras. They argue that this sentiment should override other prohibitions. But the
basic point is this. The authority of men, or of Brahmins, to conduct rituals is not literally
vested in their bodies. This authority is created through a liturgy of signs and symbolic
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substitutions. They are not pure or worthy. They are made pure or worthy through ritual.
There is no reason why anyone cannot be made worthy in this sense.
The single biggest achievement of the Bhakti movement was to marginalise ritual
conformism, and exalt the dignity of the emotion of the bhakt. Why should dignity be
marginalised by the constraints of the body or the conformism of the ritual? Opening up all
modes of worship, including the inner sanctum ritual to all people is completing the Bhakti
revolution that has been resisted by the last vestiges of social Brahmanism.
Finally, there is a metaphysical point that can be best illustrated by invoking the most
significant moment in the Mahabharata: The Janaka-Sulabha samvad. That dialogue is often
read as Sulabha, the great yogini, puncturing King Janaka’s pretensions to have attained
moksha. In the process, she also questions the binary of gender distinctions. But the most
significant point is that Janaka’s being in thrall to the distinction between man and woman is
a reflection of his kaama desire. The fact that he sees the world in gendered terms is a sign of
his attachment, his failure. Let the temple rituals not socially enact our failures, our
attachments, our being limited by our bodies or birth, if they are to be the true gateways to
something higher.
The politics around a large-scale transformation of temple authorities is fraught. It will

disrupt the existing franchises over ritual power that have been monopolised. There is the
tricky question of whether the state should interfere with temple rituals. Some Hindu circles
murmur that it is an atheistic DMK reforming temples. This is to misunderstand the historical
role DMK has performed in saving Hinduism. This issue is compounded by the fact that any
reform process is hostage to communal politics. Why should Hindu practices be interfered
with if no equivalent obligations are being put on other religions — on Catholicism, for
ordaining women priests, for example? Why should the authority of the state be
asymmetrically applied? But remember, this is not about a secular state interfering in
religious practices. It is about Hindus reforming their own practice, through their own
institutions which, in southern states, happen to be things like endowments departments. One
hopes that all other religions also, through their institutions, liberate religion from patriarchy.
But it is nonsense to say that a community is being victimised if it chooses to reform, or that
reform has to wait for every community to rouse itself.
In the use of “Sulabha” are two big cosmic jokes in the Indian context. One, mundanely, is in
the context of toilets, where Sulabha Shauchalaya was a reminder of just how rare access to
the conditions of a dignified discharge of a natural function is in India. The other is Vyas,
naming the single most accomplished yogini in the Indian tradition, Sulabha. Sulabha is the
one who has truly transcended the prison house of the body, of attachment and of ignorance.
There is nothing Sulabha about attaining this state. Hinduism will do itself a favour by
emulating Sulabha and throwing off the needless restrictions that divide and exclude. Giving
women full rights on all temple rituals is an idea whose time has come.
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Why civil rights and protecting the planet go hand-in-hand for environmental justice
When disasters strike, those already discriminated against can be hit hardest, but they can set
a model for resilience.
As the global ecological crisis impacts ever-more lives, it is becoming clearer that we cannot
talk about cimate change, pollution or biodiversity loss without talking about inequality —
whether that's determined by gender, race, class, sexual orientation or disability. As Thenjiwe
McHarris, a leading Black Lives Matter activist and co-founder of Blackbird, an organization
that helps build political movements, says: "There is no climate justice without racial justice.
There's no climate justice without gender justice. There's no climate justice without queer
justice."
In decades past, environmentalism was often cast as an elite concern — a cause for those
with the luxury not to worry about more immediate problems like putting food on the table or
resisting violence and discrimination. But increasingly, it isn't enough to talk about "saving
the planet" or "protecting nature" as if these aims were distinct from addressing social
inequality.
Environmental justice movement takes on environmental racism:
Environmental campaigns against deforestation, waste dumping or open-pit mining have
often been led by — or joined forces with — Indigenous peoples defending their land rights
or communities fighting for the right to clean air, water and the health of their children.
Robert Bullard, a professor of urban planning and environmental policy, was among the first
to use the term "environmental justice" back in the 1970s. He showed how entrenched
patterns of racial injustice meant communities of color were more likely to live in the shadow
of polluting power plants or garbage dumps, and more likely to suffer ill health from poor air
quality.
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Today, Americans of color are still exposed to average nitrous oxide emissions 38 % higher
than white Americans, and are 75 % more likely to live in communities that are next to oil,
gas facilities or other polluting industries, according to a 2017 study by the Clean Air Task
Force and civil rights group The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People.
Earlier this year, U.S. President Joe Biden acknowledged "the disproportionate health,
environmental, economic, and climate impacts on disadvantaged communities" when he
signed an executive order vowing to "secure environmental justice."
But environmental racism certainly isn't an issue specific to the United States. Deep-rooted
prejudice against the Roma, for example, has allowed authorities to push communities
belonging to Europe's largest ethnic minority into hazardous environments — treating them,
in the words of one Roma activist, as "human garbage."
Climate injustice on a global scale:
On a global scale, we're all living through a climate crisis — but we're not all in it together.
Rich countries in the global north are responsible for 92 % of the historical emissions that
have been driving up global average temperatures since the industrial revolution. Even China
is only just using up its carbon budget.
Meanwhile, those countries that have benefited least from fossil-fueled economic growth —
and therefore have less money to spend on adapting to a warmer world — are seeing the most
damage. And when ecological disasters hit — whether it's climate-change-induced
hurricanes, flooding, drought or the loss of fertile soils, forests or fish stocks — those already
at a disadvantage because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, class
or income level tend to be hit hardest.
Ecological crisis exacerbates inequality:
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina prompted many Americans to question whether climate change
was now threatening its own coastal cities. But this wasn't the only difficult question it raised.
As Black communities for evacuation and aid — and those scavenging the wreckage for food
and basic necessities were branded looters — many wondered if the authorities' response
would have been different if New Orleans had been a majority white city. Meanwhile, local
media reported that some emergency shelters turned trans people away.
One of the iconic images of Hurricane Katrina was that of the wheelchair-bound body of
Ethel Freeman, a 91-year-old woman who died dehydrated in the sweltering heat outside the
convention center where flood escapees congregated. The American Association of Retired
Persons later found that 73 % of those who died as a result of the Hurricane were over 60,
and the majority of these individuals had a medical condition or disability.
These inequalities haven't gone away, and nor are they confined to the U.S. More recently,
elderly and disabled people died after flood evacuations failed in Germany and Japan. And
then there is the half of the world's population who do the majority of the world's unpaid
work — such as care of children, the elderly and infirm, and water collection, as well as
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much subsistence agriculture. These burdens further increase in times of scarcity and disaster
— when wells dry up, crops fail, and human health deteriorates.
At the same time, women tend to have fewer financial resources to fall back on than men.
They are often the first to lose educational and job opportunities and are more likely to be
pushed into early marriage. Female climate refugees, meanwhile, are at increased risk of
sexual abuse and trafficking. But looking at ecological collapse from an intersectional
perspective doesn't just point to our collective failures — it also points to solutions.
Civil rights activists build resilience:
Black communities fighting to hold companies accountable for pollution dumped on their
doorsteps were on the frontlines of the fight for environmental justice long before the term
became a buzzword in mainstream political debate. And many of their tactics — sit-ins, for
example, and school strikes — have their roots in the civil rights movement.
LGBTQ+ people, denied support from family, community, or public services, have many
decades experience of grassroots political organizing, community building and providing
alternative networks to look after and heal one another — as well as fighting successful
campaigns for legal change. And while some activists with disabilities have found themselves
excluded by environmental movements that have failed to be inclusive, they have also got
creative and experimented with alternative ways of communicating a message of change.
Meanwhile, women-led groups are finding that organizing to protect their rights to economic
independence, freedom from violence and a safe environment to raise their children go hand-
in-hand with protecting ecology. Ecofeminism equates the exploitation of women's labor and
bodies with exploitation of natural resources. And it is often the same systems and attitudes
that treat ecology as disposable that put just as little value on some sectors of human life.
In the search for alternatives, it is precisely those with a long history of resisting these
systems and developing alternatives who might lead the way to a different future.
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Caste based census in India
Why in News:
There is a demand for a caste based census to evaluate the developmental conditions of
various castes inthe Indian society. States like Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra expressed
willingness to conduct caste based census.
History of Caste census:
The First Census conducted in 1871 included questions about caste and the data released led
to antiBrahminic protestsacross India.
The post independent India conducted census data on the regular basis without releasing
information about various castes, except the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
Even the Socio-Economic Caste Census(SECC) of 2011only details the economic conditions
of the people in rural and urban households without releasing caste data in the public domain.
Benefits of the caste census:
It would be the best way to rationalize reservations and will help in evidence-based policy
making. This will ensure rationality in state action. For example, the notion that only Dalits
perform manual scavenging can be questioned.
It will bring forward a large number of issues like caste based social exclusions, deprivation,
poverty etc. For example, the higher caste groups are also facing discrimination.
It will break the myth that there is no relevance of caste based discrimination in India due to
Democracy.
It will also be possible to assess the socio-economic and educational status of the weaker
sections of the society effectively.
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Drawbacks of the caste census:
The phenomenon of elitism among the castes will be developed because the states might
favour elites among castes. So the concept of dominant caste(Srinivas) will again gain
relevance.
There may be the cases of protests or movements for reservations. For example,Patels,
Gujjars, Jats and other castes may demand more reservations on the basis of data.
It may enhance the notion of purity and pollution due to rise ofcaste consciousness in the
society.
It might disturb social solidarity and castes as structural inequalities may get strengthened.
There are multiple castes in India and hence, it is a difficult task to collect the data on every
caste. So both the validity and the reliability of data could be questioned.
Data on castes may help the states and others analyze the socio-economic conditions of the
people for sound policy making. However, if the castes become the basis to engage inpost
truth politics for short term goals, then caste based census will not benefit the society.
Indians are living and juggling between both traditional and modern identities so it is
important to make a balance between these identities through value based education.
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Beti Bachao Beti Padhao scheme

Why in news:
BBBP program has completed its 6 years in 2021 and PM Modi acknowledged the
achievements of BBBP on National Girl Child Day.
The central government talked about the 16 points improvements in sex ratio due to BBBP
which was launched in 2015.
About BBBP:
• BBBP scheme is a tri-ministerial effort of Ministries of Women and Child

Development, Health and Family Welfare and Human Resource Development, and
addresses the declining child sex ratio (CSR).
• BBBP was launched in Panipat, Haryana
• It focuses on districts with worst child sex ratio as per the 2011 census.
• BBBPS is a centrally sponsored scheme that provides 100% financial assistance to
state governments to encourage girl child education.
Why is this initiative important for the Indian society:
Here, the state has become an agency of social change and brought a remarkable
improvement in sex ratio. For example, The sex ratio of Haryana state has increased from
871(2014) to 923(2019).
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There is a rise in the collective consciousness about gender equality and this is happening due
to awareness campaign under BBBP.It may result in decreasedinstances of child marriages
and social evils like dowry.
The educational attainment of girls can be improved due to more number of enrollments in
schools and colleges.It brings behavioral changes among the people by countering the
stereotype of meta son preferences.It also prevents female foeticide due to registration of
pregnancies and increased institutional deliveries.
But some issues are:
• There is poor reliability in the official statistics. As per the CAG reports, in various
districts of Haryana and Punjab, the sex ratio has worsened.
• The diversion of funds allotted for this scheme is seen due to corruptions and lack of
monitoring.
• There is a lack of anonymous online complaint portal and hence, the practice of
female infanticide and foeticide is remains rampant.
• A drop in the number of women will cause a decline in population, increase in crimes
against women and an increase in human trafficking. With the use of internet and
communication technology, the implementation of BBBP can be made more effective.
The low sex ratio is an issue ofpatriarchal mindset.Hence,there is a need to create
awareness among the people against discriminatory attitude and behavior towards
women.
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Inclusion of LGBTQ and women in India’s new science policy
Why in News: Recently, the Department of Science and Technology (DST), proposed a draft
National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) which talks about equal
opportunities for women and marginalized communities in science.
Provisions: This policy encourages 30% representation of women in selection/evaluation

committees and decision-making groups. Similarly, LGBTQ community will be included in
gender equity conversations with special provisions to safeguard their rights and promote
their representation in STI.
Analysis: Both LGBTQ and women communities are suffering from sexual division of
labour. Such division of labour is justified by some in the name of emotional and expressive
behaviour of these sections of the society.
The structural inequalities and gender based social stratification are not allowing women and
LGBTQ groups to go for upward mobility. Besides, patriarchy and patriarchal bargain have
further deteriorated the conditions of these groups. Due to education and increased
opportunities, LGBTQ communities and women have challenged the existing male
dominated discriminatory systems.
The state has become an agent of social change and formulated Science, Technology and
Innovation Policy (STIP) to promote inclusion of socially excluded groups.The state by this
policy is trying to increase labour force participation(LFP) of these sections of the society and
ensure a better living standards for them.
However, gender inequality is an issue of narrow mindset which does not allow non male
members of the society to think beyond their traditional roles.The society is still not ready to
adopt the needs of women and LGBTQ communities. For example, more than one third of
Kochi metro’s transgender employees resigned from their jobs ,citing reasons of
discrimination due to social prejudice.
The lack of law and order also affects the participation of women and LGBTQ communities
in STI.So the government needs to address every aspect of these social groups to ensure
gender equity in STI.
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Religious Fundamentalism
Why in news:
Taliban forces have disturbed the political stability and taken control of Afghanistan.Taliban
has been using religious fundamentalism as a medium for political gains.
What is Religious Fundamentalism:
It refers to the belief of an individual or a group of individuals in the absolute authority of a

sacred religious text or teachings of a particular religious leader or God.Every religion has
some elements of fundamentalism and the fundamentalists believe that their own religion is
beyond any fault and thus, should be forced on others.
Some characteristics of Religious fundamentalism:
A literal interpretation of religious texts is preferred and every information given in the texts
is infallible and there is little room for flexibility. All areas of social life are seen as sacred
and the views of fundamentalists are imposed on others in the society. The day to day
activities are driven by the norms or rules mentioned the religious texts.
There is a lack of tolerance for other religions in the society. The fundamentalist leaders
believe that their religion is superior to other religions. These leaders may prosecute the
people to maintain this superiority.
The fundamentalists have conservative beliefs. Generally, traditional roles are accepted and
liberalism is questioned. For example, the sexual division of labour is validated. Women are
commoditised and domesticated under a patriarchal mindset.
The overall impacts of Religious Fundamentalism:
• The communal and racial conflicts are seen in the society. E.g.ethnic cleansing of
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and Tamils in Sri Lanka.
• The phenomena of modernisation and secularization gets retarded. The society moves
backward to adopt the traditional selective practices and beliefs. For example,
imposing Shariya laws and Manusmriti on others in the society.
• The social mobility of the people based on modern and progressive values are
restricted.
• The religious fundamentalism undermines women’s and girls’ rights and they are
treated as objects without subjective conscience. For example,the education of girls is
considered threatening by religious fundamentalists.
• The states driven by Religious fundamentalists disturb the harmony and peace of the
rest of the global society.
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Losing Faith in Democracy
Why in news:
As per Cambridge University’s report on Democracy, the younger citizens are “losing
faith in the ability of democracy to deliver,” especially in the wake of COVID -19.
What is Democracy: It is a form of government in which the common people hold political
power and can rule either directly or through elected representatives.Democracyconsists of
some key elements such aselected representatives, civil liberties,rule of lawindependent
judiciary and organized opposition.
Reasons for losing faith in Democracy:
The elements of authoritarianism are present in the democracy. For instance, allowing racial
attacks and mob lynching for vote banks. Pareto’s views on Democracy are valid here where
people’s interests are not entertained by the ruling elites.
The minority voices are not represented in the government because democracy is nothing but
a majoritarianism based government. A leader getting the vote percentage of 50% or less
can win the election.
There is a belief that one vote can not change the election results. So there is a poor
participation of voters in the elections. For example, the voter turnout of 2020 US presidential
election was just 66.8%. Also, even the NOTA of EVM in India has not been able to change
the election result.
The phenomenon of criminalisation of politics is increasing. As per Association of

Democratic Reforms (ADR),around 44% of elected representatives in 2019 Lok Sabha
election of India have criminal backgrounds.
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There are many instances where crony capitalism can be seen and state acts as a tool in the
hand of bourgeoisie for the interests of capitalism. The industrialization based forced
displacement of the weaker sections of the society is one good example of this.
The governments other than democracies also seem to be performing well. Cuba’s
Communist government is a role model for a robust health system in the world. Similarly,
during COVID19 lockdown, the national governments of Communist and authoritarian
governments took strong actions against Corona virus spread.
The elections in democratic polities are not fought on the basis of modern and progressive
values. The white Americans affect the presidential election of USA and similarly, the caste
and religion identities are important to win elections in India.
Every political system has some flaws which need to be corrected. The forms of government
depend upon the social, economic and political fabrics of the countries. Democracy has done
well by providing space for dissent, opposition and protest. The people know their rights and
hence, they can exercise these rights.
As per A. Beteille,"Existence of dissent and opposition and their acceptance as legitimate is the
indispensable feature of democracy.” Democracy is based on the idea of liberty, equality and
Fraternity. Hence, some countries may be in a transitional phase but a matured Democracy
protects the rights of every individual in the society.
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Fake News
Why in News:
India has emerged as the biggest source of COVID misinformation as per the report released by
the University of Alberta(Canada).India recorded a massive 214 percent rise in cases related
to misinformation and rumours in 2020, a three-fold rise over 2019, according to the latest
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data.The cases of fake news increased after the
defeat of Afghan government against Taliban.
Fake news:
Fake news is specifically designed to plant a seed of mistrust and exacerbate the existing
social and cultural dynamics by misusing political, regional and religious undercurrents.It
creates the false consciousness among the masses and hence, the truth is presented and
shaped as per the convenience.
It deliberately persuades consumers to accept false beliefs that are shared to forward specific
agendas.It may act as a tool to disturb the harmony of the society or restrict the social
change.It can be used to malign the image of a company like there was a rumour in 2016 that
McDonald's uses ground worm filler in burgers but it was laterdebunked.
Reasons behind the rise in the cases of fake news:
• The democratization of information due to social media has created the chances of
spreading fake news without any authenticity.
• The misuse of technology is seen in the spread of propaganda. For instance, anyone
can change the contents of images or videos through Photoshop like software.
• The rise in “fake news” may be a natural byproduct of faster news cycles and
increasing consumer demand for shorter form content.
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• There are multiple sources of information and hence, this increases the chances of
individual interpretations. Due to illiteracy and lack of tolerance among the masses, a
particular fake news is promoted.
How can sociology help in understanding fake news?
The fake news can be a state conditioning device to justify the discrimination and inequalities
in the society and preventssocial change. So, contents and intents of every fake news must be
analysed.
The sociological imagination is an intellectual tool to make sense of personal and social
reality in general and in specific facets of our lives.The logic and reasons can be used to
assess the authenticity and utility of fake news.According to C.W.Mills,the sociological
imagination is the ability to see personal troubles as public issues and to consider the impact
of broader social and historical contexts on personal situations.
The concept of post-truth can also be used to evaluate the information sources because the
post-truth mentality encompasses the sentiment that all truth is relative.Fake news promotes
ideologies among the masses and for this, the ideas of critical sociologists can be essential
because according to them, maintainingideology is the principal obstacle to human liberation.
Hence, the cultural assumptions and structural conditions present in the society to enslave the
people’s minds can be countered.
The modernization theories celebrated the arrival of technology but it acted as a double-
edged sword. Although, technology provided freedom to the people but at the same time, it is
also affecting the social solidarity among them. To act against fake news, content creators
and content consumers must be regulated and educated respectively. There must be some
form of accreditation system for content creators along with a digital literacy drive among the
masses.
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After Zomato IPO, Can We Have a More Honest Discussion on Gig Labour?
Public markets push listed entities towards greater accountability, a development that is
needed for the labour force that powers Zomato and its competitors.
A little over a week ago, food logistics company Zomato made a dream debut on Indian
stock exchanges. Its initial public offering worth Rs 9,375 crore was oversubscribed 38.25
times, and its shares had listing gains of over 70%, giving it a market capitalisation of over
1 lakh crore.
Just weeks earlier, its primary competitor Swiggy raised Rs 9,300 crore from a clutch of
private investors. Investors remain untroubled by the fact these food logistics companies
(FLCs) have racked up astronomical losses since inception, secure in the belief that
restaurant delivery services will grow to a $110 billion industry by 2025.
Also integral to their optimism is the assumption that these FLCs will continue to enjoy
access to the underpaid labour of a highly vulnerable segment of Indian workers.
Consider a bit of historical context. Engorged with vast foreign funding, FLCs entered our
labour market less than a decade ago with the much-marketed lure of massive earnings for
anyone with a motorbike. FLCs ran advertising campaigns promising monthly incomes of
over Rs.40,000, and aggressive driver onboarding teams were set up to sell this
proposition across the country. Lakhs of workers signed on, many of whom took on loans
to purchase vehicles, as the expected remuneration dwarfed the EMIs. And for a while, the
system worked, albeit unfairly; FLC workers could potentially earn the advertised
amounts, provided they put in back-breaking shifts that often extended beyond 12 hours.
The scenario today is vastly different. Payouts for FLC workers have been unilaterally
revised, resulting in remuneration as low as Rs.15 per order. The additional incentives
were reduced/eliminated and complex penalties introduced, often resulting in earnings
lower than fuel expenses. They have none of the standard employee benefits, including
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overtime compensation, or leave; on the contrary, Zomato’s website discloses that the FLC
workers are actually charged a platform fee for being onboarded.
For FLC workers, quitting is not an option, given the loans and other obligations that
would have arisen since they first started. This state of affairs has led to several protests
and strikes by FLC worker groups across the country since 2020 – though this yielded
little respite; after all, as one FLC worker put it: ‘how do you protest against an app?’ So,
they’re invariably forced to continue.
These workers are an integral part of the business of the FLCs, without whom the FLC
cannot exist. Yet, by labelling them ‘gig workers’, ‘independent contractors’, ‘delivery
partners’, even ‘driver entrepreneurs’, and substituting the typical workplace with a mobile
app, FLCs evade the responsibilities of an ordinary employer under the law. The FLCs
claim that its workers are self-employed, and they can choose when and how long they
wish to work; thereby skirting legal restrictions on excessive work hours and the
obligation to ensure other benefits.
Globally, there is no consensus over whether FLC workers qualify as employees, though
foreign judicial decisions are increasingly finding in favour of labour rights. In 2021, the
UK Supreme Court ruled that Uber’s drivers were entitled to employee benefits; in 2018,
the California Supreme Court specified a test for determining an employer-employee
relationship, which effectively designated gig workers are employees (although the impact
of this judgement on the transportation sector was subsequently undone). There are,
however, no judicial tailwinds in India in support of the rights of FLC workers, and the
Central government has even statutorily segregated FLC workers from “employees”.
Yet, the fundamental nature of an employer-employee relationship cannot be denied in the

FLC-worker equation. The FLCs exert pervasive control over FLC workers, determining
which delivery jobs are allocated to them, how much they get paid, how fast they need to
complete the job, how they interact with customers, what they wear, what equipment they
use, etc. While the FLC workers can choose to decline a specific job or go offline for
extended periods, these choices result in penalties or de-prioritization, which make a huge
difference in earnings. Thus, the choice of the FLC workers is illusory, and the control
exercised by FLCs undeniable.
It is arguable that the treatment of FLC workers may amount to forced labour, which is
prohibited under Article 23 of the Indian constitution. While a plain reading of Article 23
would suggest that it extends only to traditional forms of forced labour (like the begar
bonded labour system) and does not cover instances of underpaid labour compelled
through economic circumstances, a 1982 Supreme Court judgement makes it clear that
such an interpretation would be narrow, incorrect, and unconstitutional.
In PUDR vs Union of India , while hearing a PIL against the exploitation of construction
workers, the Supreme Court held that “there is no reason why the word “forced” should be
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read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to physical or legal

“force”… Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him
to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as “force” and if labour
or service is compelled as a result of such “force”, it would be “forced labour”.”
In effect, the court found that where compulsion of economic circumstances left no
alternatives to a person and compelled her to provide labour at remuneration lower than
minimum wage, the mandate of Article 23 would be violated. In case of FLC workers,
especially those who have taken loans – often with assistance from the FLC itself – the
economic circumstances compelling them to continue to work at highly underpaid rates are
attributable, at least partially, to the FLC. Thus, it is arguable that FLCs have violated
Article 23; a fundamental right that is enforceable against private parties. Unfortunately, as
lawyer Gautam Bhatia writes in his book The Transformative Constitution ‘the judgement
in PUDR is a signpost to a road not yet taken’, as several subsequent judgements have
ignored the principles set out therein while dealing with labour rights.
Newly minted shareholders of Zomato might argue that such practices are a result of
market forces and free consent, and not unique to FLCs. However, the scenario
fundamentally changes when an FLC is listed, since the State is effectively supporting
their exploitative business model by facilitating their access to funds from the public.
Instead of remedying the situation by providing legal protections, the Government

introduced four new labour codes that entrench the problem. The Code on Social Security
2020 (CSS) slots FLC workers into 2 amorphous definitions – ‘gig workers’ and ‘platform
workers’ – which places them outside the traditional employer-employee relationship. The
CSS further stipulates that the Central Government may provide certain (vague and
indeterminate) benefits like ‘old age protection’, ‘creche’, ‘life and disability cover’, and
‘health and maternity benefits’ to such workers – without any explanation of what, when,
and how the benefits will be provided. The only responsibility placed on the FLC is that of
a possible monetary contribution towards these schemes, capped at a paltry 5% of the total
amount the FLC pays to its gig & platform workers. Thus, the only result is a tax on FLCs
resulting in the creation of another fund that may remain unutilised or diverted, like so
many others before it (Nirbhaya Fund, and Building and Construction Workers fund).
The Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) even eased the listing requirements for
companies using innovative technologies, thereby paving the way for Zomato to list earlier
on the “Innovators Growth Platform”. How FLCs qualify as innovative technology
companies is a puzzle; in Douglas O’Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc. (2015), the US
District Court of Northern California observed that Uber was no more a technology
company than a manufacturer of lawnmowers that used computers and robots to produce
the lawnmowers; instead, a company should be defined by what it does, rather than the
mechanics used to do it.
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It is important that public markets push listed entities towards greater accountability;
however, few meaningful examples exist. In April 2021, Adani Ports was removed from
the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices due to “relationship with Myanmar’s military, who
are alleged to have committed serious human rights abuses under international law”,
though this was seemingly on account of the commercial risks to the stock price.
SEBI’s business responsibility and sustainability reporting requirements (BRSR) are a step
forward. Applicable to the top 1000 listed entities, Principle 5 requires disclosures on
measures taken to “respect and promote human rights”. A guidance note in the BRSR even
defines “forced or involuntary labour” as “all work or service that is extracted under the
menace of penalty…includes any labour for which worker receives less than the
government stipulated minimum wage”; an unexpected reference to PUDR principles.
Cheerleaders of Zomato’s IPO have marketed the “gig economy”, predicted to touch 90
million jobs by the end of the decade, as the panacea to India’s unemployment problem,
blind to the alienation of labour and the estrangement of justice that this will cause. One of
the few sources of hope on the horizon is the ongoing litigation by EPFO, Gurgaon, which
seeks to hold Zomato responsible for not treating its delivery personnel as employees.
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Richer, and poorer: Inequality will continue to scar the economy long after Covid leaves us
When Covid goes away, hopefully soon enough, it will leave behind a more unequal world. This
is contrary to historical experience because pandemics, as Thomas Piketty notes in his widely
acclaimed book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, have been great levellers.
Mass deaths reduced the size of the labour force, and labour scarcity post-pandemic led to higher
wages. As wages rose disproportionately more than profits, inequality declined.
The Covid story will run differently because thanks to modern medicine, the death toll, although
tragic, has not been so devastating as to decimate populations. And thanks to modern
technologies, the rich have been able to not just cope with the crisis but even prosper because of
it even as the poor have lost their incomes, savings, jobs and purchasing power.
While a rise in inequality triggered by Covid is a worldwide problem, it hurts much more in a
poor country like ours. Evidence of sharpening inequality is all over. Mercedes recorded the
highest monthly sales of its super luxury SUV in June in the midst of the ferocious second wave
when millions of poor were gasping for oxygen outside hospitals.
Last year when the economy went through its biggest contraction since independence, the
number of billionaires in the country increased from 102 to 140. This, even as 75 million people
retreated into poverty, accounting for 60% of the global increase in poverty, as per Pew
Research.
The stock market is booming with indices at record highs even as the daily earnings of 230
million people, as per a study by Azim Premji University, slipped below the national minimum
wage threshold of Rs 320.
Despite the stringent lockdown of last year, profits of listed companies as a proportion of GDP
hit a ten year high of 2.6% even as CMIE data showed that the unemployment rate had shot up
to 23.5% at the peak of the lockdown.
Sharpening of inequalities came from many sources and many directions. Start with the burden
of disease. People living in urban slums and other crowded areas were obviously more
vulnerable to the virus and were forced to run down their savings for treatment and subsistence.
Worse, the morbidity on account of the disease will continue to eat into their earning power long
after they are cured of the virus. The better-off could protect themselves, or if they contracted the
virus, had the means to afford treatment, isolation, rest and recuperation.
Much of the inequality came from the trade-offs in public policy choices. Importantly, how
governments decided on the lives vs livelihoods balance affected different income classes
differently.
Poorer people, typically employed in contact-based sectors such as restaurants, hospitality, travel
and tourism, had seen hits to their jobs and incomes because of the lockdowns. But those with
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white-collar jobs could comfortably settle into remote working, have their incomes protected,
and in fact use the lockdown as an opportunity to build up savings.
Thanks to GST and other measures, India’s fragmented economy was already consolidating, and
the pandemic has accelerated the process. Large firms were able to take advantage of low
interest rates and raw material costs and they also cut jobs ruthlessly while small firms and
micro enterprises in the informal sector were forced to shut down. Business migrated from small
to large firms and this may largely be irreversible.
The Reserve Bank of India, like other central banks, slashed interest rates and injected an
extraordinary amount of liquidity to preserve financial stability and keep the economy’s wheels
rolling.
But all that money, instead of flowing into productive activity via credit, has gone into the stock
market and fuelled an asset price boom. Meanwhile, inflation at over 6%, above the upper limit
of the target band, has hit the poor hard.
Managing the tension between maintaining financial stability, keeping inflation low and
supporting recovery has been a difficult policy choice for RBI. Nevertheless, the net result of the
easy money regime has been that the rich have seen their wealth grow via higher asset prices
even as the poor have seen a decline in their real incomes because of inflation.
The biggest worry though is that the scars of this sharpened inequality will persist long after
Covid has left us.
Online schooling, for example, has deepened an already deep digital divide. The Annual Status
of Education Report (ASER) revealed that only under a third of the children were able to access
online classes.
The quality of learning of even that lucky third is doubtful given that virtual teaching is a new
experience for both teachers and children, raising concerns that achievement levels in school
education, already disturbingly low, could be further eroded by school closures.
World Bank Research shows that in poor societies education has been the route for upward
mobility across generations. If additional efforts are not made to neutralise the learning
disadvantages contracted during the lockdown, an entire cohort of children may forfeit the
opportunity to move up the income ladder.
Inequalities are morally wrong and politically corrosive. They are also bad economics. The huge
consumption base of the bottom half of our population is our biggest growth driver. If they earn
more, they will spend more, which will in turn spur more production, more jobs and higher
growth.
It is this virtuous cycle that we must target.
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Democratising higher education with ABC
The Academic Bank of Credits (ABC) brings student centricity to the higher education
system, and enables students to choose courses and institutions, facilitating learning from a
wide range of course coordinators and institutions. For instance, a student can be enrolled for
a programme in one institution and simultaneously be enrolled for courses of his choice in
multiple institutions for earning credits in the physical and/or online mode.
Raghavendra P Tiwari
VC, Central University of Punjab
The National Education Policy-2020 (NEP-2020) is committed to creating new opportunities

for lifelong learning through a flexible, facilitative, interactive and democratic educational
ecosystem, replacing the prevailing restrictive, demotivating and colonising one. The
provision of the innovative Academic Bank of Credits (ABC) in NEP-2020, besides the
multidisciplinary graduate attributes, learning outcomes, skill-based dynamic and flexible
curricular structure, multiple-entry-multiple-exit option and experiential learning pedagogies,
will help actualise this commitment.
It is imperative to understand how the ABC will work and democratise our learning system.
The ABC will digitally store academic credits earned from select institutions to award a
degree/ diploma/PG diploma/certificate upon accumulating credits essential for the
completion of these. It will ensure a seamless mobility of learners among various disciplines
and institutions for earning credits through courses/combination of courses of their choice for
degree/diploma/certificate/course work.
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As such, the ABC will facilitate a seamless integration of the campuses and a distributed and
blended learning environment by creating opportunities for students’ mobility amongst the
institutions.
The ABC will perform the functions of a commercial bank, with the facility for students to
hold accounts. The bank will be responsible for the opening, validation and closure of these
accounts. It will facilitate verification, accumulation, transfer/redemption of credits and
degree authentication for the academic account holders. It will also verify the credits required
for the authentication of degrees.
Higher education institutions having Grade A from the National Assessment and
Accreditation Council (NAAC) or the top 100 institutions in the National Institutional
Ranking Framework (NIRF) or institutions with a minimum score of 675 from the National
Board of Accreditation (NBA) for at least three programmes shall be eligible for registration
in the ABC.
The credits earned by the students may be verified by the bank’s educational transcript. The
transcript will showcase specific credits earned by the students and the level of learning
outcomes they have achieved in a particular learning module, as well as for the overall
course/programme. These transcripts shall be recognised by all institutions that are a part of
the consortium on the ABC.
The ABC may also allow non-science students, e.g. from the arts and commerce streams, to
take up courses in the science stream after pursuing a bridge course. The ABC will offer
multiple-entry-multiple-exit options to the students and ensure that the learning space is
available to them for anytime, anywhere, any type, any amount and at any level of learning.
The ABC may also help integrate skills into a choice-based credit system by providing wide-
ranging options for choosing courses from several institutions. Through the ABC, students
can plan for learning objectives and pursue courses to satisfy their learning needs.
Programme- and course-wise graduate attributes/learning outcomes, respectively, will help
students select institutions and courses of their choice for earning credits.
The ABC, thus, brings student centricity to the higher education system, and enables students
to choose courses and institutions, facilitating learning from a wide range of course
coordinators and institutions. For instance, a student can be enrolled for a programme in one
institution (parent institution) and simultaneously be enrolled for courses of her/his choice in
multiple institutions (sister institutions) for earning credits in the physical and/or online
mode.
Thus, the ABC allows students to choose their preferred direction and pace of learning, and
multiple-entry-multiple-exit options to complete degrees through informed choices.
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Additionally, this ensures an enhanced integration of institutions for conducting academic

activities and facilitates lifelong learning opportunities. An added advantage is that the
learners have the option to either learn formally and/or informally in full-time and/or part-
time modes, and go for any credit course (theory/practical/project etc), excepting the core
courses.
Consequently, the ABC will promote the much sought-after quality, flexibility and
collaboration, alongside access and equity to improve the efficacy of the higher education
system endowed with global competencies and life skills.
The responsibility of implementing the ABC should be entrusted to the General Education
Council, the fourth vertical under the Higher Education Commission of India.
The UGC, in the regulation on the ABC, makes it mandatory that the students earn 50 per
cent of credits assigned to the programme from the institutions enrolled for the
degree/diploma/certificate. This implies that credits assigned for the core courses have to be
mandatorily earned from the parent institution. This ceiling may vary in the future upon
bridging the digital divide for scaling up and leveraging the benefits of the ABC optimally.
Another catch point is the seven-year validity period for credit redemption. It is essential as
the curricular framework and course module will undergo drastic changes after seven years.
Regular updation of the curricular framework and course modules is a must and healthy
practice for ensuring dynamism in the programme and infusing newer concepts and
developments in the domain knowledge.
On the first anniversary of NEP on July 29, 2021, the rollout of the ABC for implementation
from the next academic session has paved the way for revolutionising and democratising the
higher education system.
Now, it is the responsibility of the higher education institutions to help actualise the ABC to
the ground realities to leverage its optimal benefits for the learners. The very idea and
concept of educational institutions is founded and grounded on the premise of satisfying the
ever-evolving learning needs of the youth and empowering them with the global
competencies and skills and enabling them to become socially and economically relevant.
This is the only road that will lead us to Atmanirbhar Bharat.
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The spiritual lessons from Covid-19
Pandemic has exposed the limits of modernity. It is time to reflect on the illusory character of
our inflated egos, the way we live.
Written by Avijit Pathak
I am large, I contain multitudes

— Walt Whitman
It seems we are all broken and wounded. As we pass through psychic bewilderment,
existential uncertainty and fear of death, a question confronts us: How do we live? Is there
nothing more in living than following a set of Covid-appropriate guidelines — wearing
masks, using sanitisers, avoiding large gatherings and getting ourselves vaccinated as early as
we can? Moreover, our basic survival issues as well as immense financial and economic
anxiety continue to haunt us. Yet, despite these practical constraints, there are moments when
we begin to reflect on the very purpose of living as each of us has seen our loved ones dying,
our “taken-for-granted” world crumbling, and even our privileges — medical insurances and
social capital — proving to be illusory amid chaotic hospitals and unmanageable
crematoriums. Yes, we will take the vaccines; and possibly, economists and policymakers
will assure us and promise a “better” future with enhanced growth rates and GDP.
But, the psychic /existential/spiritual questions that the pandemic has posed will continue to
bother us. Doctors, pharmaceutical companies, or even psychiatric drugs cannot provide a
meaningful answer to these questions; nor can celebrity babas give us instant capsules of
redemption. Possibly, the pandemic is conveying a message. We ought to redefine ourselves
as seekers and wanderers — not narcissistic conquerors.
The tremendous vital energy that modernity generates tends to make us think that we are the
masters of the world. With science, we can know, predict and control. With technology, we
can shape the world the way we want. And with the remarkable growth in medical sciences
and diagnostic technologies, we can postpone death. Well, who can negate the success stories
of modernity? Yet, amid this glitz of modernity, we tend to forget the reality of
impermanence, or the inherent uncertainty of existence. A beauty queen, despite the miracle
of plastic surgery and anti-ageing devices, will become a skeleton; a sudden cardiac attack
might deprive the most “efficient” corporate executive of his “productivity”; and not
everything can be predicted, the way the meteorology department predicts whether this
afternoon there will be rains in south Delhi. Yet, quite often, because of our modernist
indulgence with “certainty”, “productivity”, ceaseless “growth” and limitless consumption,
we forget that nothing is permanent, and the next moment cannot be predicted. It is sad that
we needed a pandemic of this kind to make us see the reality of impermanence and
uncertainty so vividly.
Think of it. Can we see beyond the illusory optimism of modernity and life-negating despair
that is affecting many of us at this moment? Possibly, as we acknowledge the reality of
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impermanence and uncertainty, we begin to value the worth of mindfulness — the nuanced
art of living at this very moment. Yes, our “tomorrow” is beyond prediction; neither a doctor
nor an astrologer can predict whether we will be lucky to see yet another sunrise tomorrow.
However, we can live — and live deeply, intensely and mindfully — at this very moment.
Why do we negate the aliveness of this moment in the name of controlling or fearing the
“future”? When we are really alive and experience this very moment, a sense of gratitude
envelops us. Life acquires a meaning. Only then is it possible to echo with Tagore, and sing:
“I have seen, have heard, have lived/In the depth of the known have felt/The truth that
exceeds all knowledge/Which fills my heart with wonder and I sing.”
Possibly, this is also the time to reflect on the illusory character of our inflated egos. See the
way we live. We erect huge walls of separation. While urban centresnormalise anonymity,
and workplaces transform us into strangers or competitors, we tend to think that money can
buy everything, or we begin to see ourselves in the statistics of Facebook/Instagram/Twitter
followers and subscribers. Or, for that matter, when the technologies of surveillance have
taught us to suspect everybody, where is the possibility of a life-affirming human
relationship, or a living community with a soul? Furthermore, even today we have not
succeeded in becoming free from the practice of ghettoisation and untouchability.
Yes, it is the irony of our times that we needed a pandemic to make us see the hollowness of
this egotistic pride. Is there anybody who has not felt the acute pain of being lonely — the
fear of being stigmatised and insulated as the virus becomes irresistible, the fear of a lonely
death at the ICU of a hospital, or the fear of one’s dead body being thrown into the “sacred”
river? Each of us has felt the need to be loved, touched and listened to; each of us has realised
that money cannot buy everything; and each of us has felt that nothing matters more in life
than the ecstasy of love. Love conquers fear; love makes death meaningful; love is more
powerful than the vaccine. Possibly, the pandemic is compelling us to ask this pertinent
question: Can we prioritise love over the power of money? Can we attach more importance to
the spontaneity of human relationships rather than the hyper-reality of media simulations?
The pandemic is catastrophic. For the survivors, the world will no longer be the same.
Yet, all attempts will be made — particularly, by the brigade of techno-capitalists and
narcissistic political bosses — to convince the new generation that life must go on as usual
with the same greed, violence and loneliness. However, if you and I are willing to be
introspective, contemplative and reflective, we are bound to realise that we must alter the
rhythm of life, and learn to live with humility, gratitude and love. Only then is it possible to
realise the depths in Thich Nhat Hanh’s prophetic vision: “When we identify with the life of
all that exists, we realise that birth and death are minor fluctuations in an ever-changing
cosmos.”
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Remembering Birsa Munda, the Social Reformer and Revolutionary Leader
For the Hindutva movement, Birsa Munda is an icon only because he and his followers
attacked missionaries and the church. But this is a deliberate misreading of history and a
willful deception.
The Hindutva narrative paints Birsa Munda as a saviour of ‘Hindus’ and ‘Hindu culture’
against attack from the Christian missionaries. For the Hindutva movement, Birsa Munda
is an icon only because he and his followers attacked missionaries and the church. But this
is not only a deliberate misreading of history but also a willful deception on the part of
Hindutva politics with a dual objective of denying the tribal communities of their distinct
identity and also attacking the right to choose religion.
It is true that Birsa Munda attacked Christian missionaries. But these attacks had nothing
to do with safeguarding or protecting Hinduism. On the contrary, the attacks – both verbal
and physical – signified the emergence of a distinct identity consciousness among the
Mundas of Chhotanagpur plateau and other tribal communities who were facing
continuous attacks from outsiders, including the Christian missionaries. Just like the
‘upper caste’ Hindu reformers of the 19th century responded to the evangelical attack upon
Hindu religious beliefs and cultural practices through various socio-religious movements
and reinterpreted Hindu religious beliefs in light of Western-Christian philosophical-
theological precepts and ideas of rationality, Birsa Munda did the same for tribal
communities of what is now Jharkhand. Moreover, in a period when the term ‘Hindu’ had
a very limited meaning, known only to the elite upper caste reformers and had not found
any wider currency, it would be preposterous to claim that the Mundas and other tribal
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communities who lived far away from the so-called mainstream society were fighting to
defend it!
Remarkably, Birsa Munda took elements from Vaishnavism, Christianity and Mundari
religion to propound his own ‘religion’, which at the same time was distinct from all the
three. In this way, Birsa should be seen as an organic intellectual who initiated a social
reform movement among the Adivasi communities.
But, Birsa Munda was more than a social reformer. He was also a revolutionary.
Birsa’s revolution: Ulgulan
The Birsaite rebellion was preceded by a series of tribal uprisings in the Chotanagpur
plateau and adjoining areas like the Kol insurrection (1830-33), Santhal rebellion (1855)
among others, against encroachment of land, labour and livelihood of tribal communities
by British imperialists as well as native Indian rulers.
The primary reason for these uprisings was the imposition of the Permanent Settlement
Act (1793) which had alienated the tribal communities from the land which they
cultivated. This introduction of zamindari had also brought the hitherto unknown practices
like forced labour and several arbitrary taxes and rents levied upon the tribal peasantry.
Coupled with this, the influx of Mahajans and Thekedars in the tribal regions, mostly
belonging to the so-called upper castes, had introduced the practice of usury in the former
moralistic economy of tribal communities, causing immense economic exploitation and
hardships for them. The tribal communities had a distinctive label for these outside
exploiters or diku. In fact, dikus became the central oppositional figure in all tribal
rebellion movements.
The immediate precursor of the Birsaite rebellion was the Sardari movement, whose basic
philosophy was “the Adivasis were the first people to clear the lands of Chotanagpur and
as such they had an inalienable rights to free access to Chotanagpur land”. The sardars or
leaders of the tribal communities primarily adopted a peaceful method of petitioning their
grievances to several British government officials demanding the restoration of their rights
over the land bypassing the dikus.
From 1858 to 1895, the sardars repeatedly submitted petitions to the highest officials,
including the Viceroy of India and even the secretary of state for India in London. In this
‘protest within the bounds of law’, the sardars were helped by Christian missionaries, who
they identified with the British race. In fact, a huge segment of the tribal population
adopted Christianity not forcefully or anticipating financial rewards, (as the Hindutva
forces propagate) but as a political tactic, and also because the missionaries brought with
themselves schools and new agricultural technology.
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The petitioning mode was only met with disappointment as it brought absolutely no
change in the socio-economic condition of the tribal communities. This disappointment
with the British government also changed the relationship between sardars and
missionaries, as the sardars began to file court suits against the missionaries and Christian
Adivasis who had appeared in court on behalf of the British. It was in the backdrop of this
failure and resentment against all agents of oppression (the British government,
missionaries, their native acolytes and dikus) that Birsa Munda emerged as a social
reformer and revolutionary leader who radicalised the sardari movement.
Born on November 15, 1874 to a family of sharecroppers in a village named Chalkad,

Birsa received his initial education in a missionary school and also came in contact with a
Vaishnava preacher, who had a significant influence on him. It must be pointed out that
the region of Chhotanagpur which lay between Bengal and Orissa had come under the
influence of the Vaishnava movement launched by Chaitanya in the 16th century. The
seemingly and relatively anti-caste and egalitarian elements of the movement had been
able to make inroads among the religious beliefs and practices of the tribal communities.
This folk Vaishnavism became a part of the socio-cultural life of tribal communities but
the cosmology-theology of Adivasi communities remained the same as before. When Birsa
adopted few strains from Vaishnavism, he did not do it because it was “superior” but only
because they already were a part of pre-colonial, pre-missionary Adivasi life.
In 1893-94, Birsa participated in a local movement to protest against the takeover of

village wasteland by the forest department. In 1895, when the sardar movement was on the
decline, Birsa claimed to have seen a vision of god, and he proclaimed himself a prophet.
Sociologist Max Weber famously theorised that ‘prophets’ emerge during a social crisis.
The tribal society of the 19th century, if anything, was undergoing a massive socio-
economic-cultural crisis with the imposition of a new agrarian and political system,
missionaries’ critique of indigenous tribal culture and the huge influx of dikus disturbing
the economic and cultural world of the tribal communities.
In such a society, the prophetic claims and radical message of Birsa attracted a huge
number of followers. He criticised many archaic customs, beliefs and practices and called
upon his people to remove superstition, give up intoxication and animal sacrifice,
prohibited begging and asked people to worship one god. The aim was to diminish the
differences that existed between different Adivasi communities and bring them together;
first under a single religious movement and later into a single political community.
Friedrich Engels in his study of the German Peasant War (1594-95) has shown that
religion, though largely a conservative force, can also play a revolutionary role,
particularly when it articulates the discontentment of any oppressed class. When Birsa
Munda proclaimed himself a prophet of a new religion with the mission of liberating his
community from the yoke of British imperialism and their lackeys, he gave a voice to the
economic and cultural dislocations faced by the tribal communities.
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After Birsa proclaimed his new religion, people from all tribal communities gathered
around him, mostly impressed by his alleged magical and healing powers. Birsa declared
himself as the prophet-king who had come back to establish his long lost kingdom. He
famously declared: “Let the kingdom of the queen end and our kingdom be established”
and asked the peasants and sharecroppers not to pay rents and other taxes. But soon he was
arrested by the colonial police and sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment.
After being released in January 1898, Birsa began to reorganise his movement and was
soon able to gather a significant number of followers behind him once more. This time, the
missionaries emerged as the biggest enemy of Birsa as he proved to be a major roadblock
in their activities. As missionaries increased their attacks upon Birsaites, the Birsaites
decided to strike back.
The ulgulan (rebellion/tumult) began on December 24, 1899. Almost 7,000 Birsaites, both
men and women armed with traditional weapons, first attacked ChristianisedMundas,
missionaries, the Church, shopkeepers and the local police station. The movement spread
from Khunti to several districts of what is now Jharkhand. In Ranchi, the rebels even
attacked the deputy commissioner of police. The attack against ChristianisedMundas was
not random or general but specific; only those native Christians were attacked who were
believed to be “supporters or agents” of Europeans, missionaries and the British
Government.
As the British colonial government mobilised forces, the Birsaites retreated to the nearby
Sail Rakab hill, Dombari from where they engaged in a guerrilla war with the colonial
police. On January 9, 1900, a bitter battle ensued between the two, which led to the death
of twenty Birsaites while Birsa Munda escaped deep into the forest. The colonial
government put a reward of Rs 500 on him and he was finally arrested on March 3. Birsa
passed away on June 9 in prison due to his deteriorating health.
After his death and in the wake of his rebellion, the colonial government passed the
Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, a lasting legacy of the Munda revolt. Hence, Birsa Munda
should be remembered not only as a social reformer but also a revolutionary who
challenged the triumvirate of the colonial state, missionaries and landlords, which makes
him a source of inspiration for the present-day struggles of tribal communities against the
new triumvirate of the neoliberal state, Hindutva and multinational corporations.
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Five big ways in which the covid crisis might change us as people
We could see greater distrust but truer friendships, more religiosity and perhaps a kinder
worldcoronavirus, COVID-19, covid-19 pandemic, coronavirus outbreak, masks, mortality,
health workers, humanity, social distancing, physical proximity, work from home
What sort of a society will we inherit from the covid-19 pandemic? On the surface, it would
possibly look more or less the same—after all, we are not going to go around wearing masks
for the rest of our lives, and it is highly unlikely that even families that can afford it will all
invest in another home specifically so that spouses can take a break from each other
whenever prolonged physical proximity gets a bit hard to handle. But there will certainly be
deeper and more subtle changes, and we probably won’t even notice, till some alert
sociologists start pointing them out a few years from now, and their TED talks go viral. So, as
someone who has been mostly working from home for 10 years, with a limited social life, let
me make five predictions.
One, we will emerge a society with a much higher level of distrust. Today, the suddenly-
awakened fear of mortality is leading people to keep a close watch on one another.
Neighbours are calling the police to report on families not strictly following behavioural
guidelines. For many of us, the spectre of inevitable—and massive—job losses has increased
insecurity more than at any time in our lives. Most people will possibly carry that distrust,
suspicion and insecurity—at a conscious or subconscious level—with them as long as they
live. We will trust everyone less, whether it’s people or institutions. This leads me to the next
prediction.
Fear exposes the core personas of people. Our interactions with friends and acquaintances
during this period, even if they are just on WhatsApp groups, would give us rare insights into
their real selves—how selfish or altruistic they are, how fragile or tough, how narrow-minded
or unbiased, how courageous or cowardly, and how reliable. Without doubt, we will have a
much better sense of whom we can count on in times of need, and who our true friends are. A
crisis is always a sieve—it separates the greedy and self-obsessed from the kind and
generous. A harsh lockdown reveals whom we want to talk to, whose company we miss, and
whose we don’t. We also now know who the people are that fecklessly lie about their travel
histories, or ostracize health workers and airline crew members, or see a disease as a stigma.
We will recalibrate our relationships based on insights gained under a looming threat. Many
of us will end up with fewer friends, but they will all be real friends.
Three, we have all suddenly been exposed to the randomness of the universe, what
philosopher-writer Albert Camus called the “absurdity of existence". A direct result of this
will be more religiosity. More than ever, a lot of us would want something to lean on, and I
certainly will not be surprised if displays of religious devotion become more frequent and
widespread.
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Just count the number of messages on your phone over the last few weeks that mention
prayer and praying. When we finally come out of all this, some people—including former
non-believers—will want to thank Gods fervently for letting them come through unscathed,
and the less fortunate will also find solace in acknowledging and surrendering to the higher
powers. The number of people who prefer “spirituality" to religion will also see a jump.
Four, for those of us who employ domestic helps, nothing has woken us up quite like covid-
19 to the importance of the services we have been taking for granted in our daily lives. Once
the lockdown lifts and our helps return to our homes again, we will respect them much more.
The same for sanitation workers and other people whom many of us rarely paid attention to.
This will be something very positive to come out of this crisis and could have long-term
implications, especially in a class-ridden society like India. At the same time, many of us
would have been working to get more autonomy over the daily mundane tasks of our lives.
This is also good. And by the way, a litmus test of whom we should consider worthy of our
friendship should be whether someone who can afford to has been paying their domestic help
when he/she is unable to come to work.
Five, we mayactually emerge as a kinder and gentler society. After all, if we fail to notice that
a virus does not distinguish between a Hollywood star and a slum dweller, and if that has not
made us slightly more humble, then we may have failed as a species. If we haven’t been
delighted by the sight of dolphins playing in the waters off Marine Drive in Mumbai or
peacocks perched on parked cars in concrete jungles, we are truly irredeemable creatures.
We have seen heroes emerge during this crisis, ordinary people rising to the occasion and
doing whatever is within their powers to alleviate suffering, out of genuine compassion and
with nothing to gain. Perhaps this crisis will make us more responsible and thoughtful beings.
We certainly have the brains to be so.
I have friends who believe that this chaos will give birth to a new age of healing and
harmony. I do not suffer from such wishful thinking, but I know that this pandemic is a huge
reality check for humanity. And reality checks are generally beneficial.
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Sunderlal Bahuguna-
Gandhian pioneer of Indian environmentalism, spirit behind Chipko
Sunderlal Bahuguna, the Gandhian who was the driving force behind the legendary Chipko
movement against deforestation that marked a key milestone in Indian environmentalism,
succumbed to Covid at the AIIMS in Rishikesh. He was 94.
Bahuguna was admitted to the hospital on May 8, and was on life support. A statement from
AIIMS-Rishikesh said he had comorbidities, including diabetes and hypertension, and had
contracted Covid pneumonia.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi described Bahuguna’s demise as a “monumental loss” for the
nation. “He manifested our centuries old ethos of living in harmony with nature. His
simplicity and spirit of compassion will never be forgotten,” he posted on Twitter.
President Ram Nath Kovind described Bahuguna as “a legend in his own right” who “made
conservation a people’s movement”.
Born on January 9, 1927 in Maroda village in Tehri — now a district in Uttarakhand —

Bahuguna’s life was dedicated to social causes, activism, and writing. He participated in the
Independence movement and was subsequently a part of Vinoba Bhave’s Sarvodaya
movement.
Over the decades, his name became closely associated with environmental issues — in
particular, the Chipko movement and protests against the building of the Tehri dam from the
1980s to 2004. Bahuguna’s Gandhian methods of protest and hunger strikes against the dam
defined the Tehri movement for over two decades.
“After the Chipko movement in the 1970s, he gave the message across the globe that ecology
and ecosystem are more important. He was of the opinion that ecology and economy should
go together. He was also a follower of Gandhian values in food, attire, and behaviour and
celebrated January 26 and August 15 as festivals. He observed a fast on Shaheed Diwas,”
Dehradun-based environmentalist Anil Prakash Joshi said.
Joshi, who is a Padma Bhushan awardee, had worked closely with Bahuguna in his final
years. Bahuguna himself was awarded the Padma Vibhushan in 2009. In 1981, he had refused
to accept the Padma Shri over the government’s refusal to cancel the Tehri dam project
despite his protests.
Historian Dr Shekhar Pathak, founder of People’s Association for Himalaya Area Research
and author of the recently released The Chipko Movement — a People’s History, said he first
met Bahuguna in 1974. Four years earlier, a flood along Alakananda river had triggered
discussions on mass tree-felling, and Chipko movement started spreading across the state.
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“At that time, Sunderlalji had started a four-month long padayatra through Tehri, Chamoli,
Uttarkashi, Almora. I was an MA student at the time living in Almora. In the winter of 1974,
he arrived in Chamoli. He sought us — young students and activists — out. He told us he felt
that we would work for the betterment of people,’’ Pathak said.
Pathak joined the padayatra along with many others — journalists, students, teachers, & local
villagers. “There was one big message that he gave us — it was impossible to truly know a
region just by reading books. While as students we read widely, it was during our travels
through remotest areas that we began understanding the issues of communities,” he said.
“His second message was inter-dependence of human communities and nature — how
intricately human lives were intertwined with forests, rivers and the wilderness. We trekked
from Nepal to the Himachal border. The 1974 padayatra was life-changing for all who
participated — it shaped what we would go on to do,’’ Pathak said.
At this time, while Bahuguna worked on environmental issues, his main focus was on the
menace of alcoholism in the hills and empowerment of Dalits. It was Bahuguna’s work that
led to the entry of Dalits in temples in Tehri district. He went on to establish an ashram for
Dalits, in particular women.
Veteran environmentalist Chandi Prasad Bhatt, who was among those who led the Chipko
movement in Chamoli, said the anti-liquor movement from 1968 led to the state government
banning the sale of alcohol in 1971.The Chipko movement came to a halt during the
Emergency, but when it resurfaced in 1977, Bahuguna emerged as one of its tallest leaders.
“Chipko movement was a string of peasant movements centred around livelihood, which was
intimately dependent on forests. Sunderlalji understood this and maintained that our
movements need to be critically aligned with our needs. He was a strong communicator and
the high and mighty listened to him. He carried the discourse of environment, forests and
ecology to the rest of the country and placed it on an international stage,’’ Dr Ravi Chopra,
director, People’s Science Institute, Dehradun, said.
According to historian and environmentalist Lokesh Ohri, the Chipko movement was started
as an agitation against trees being felled by forest contractors. The protesters felt that the
forests and its resources belonged to them and they should get a share of the revenue
generated. “The movement took a different turn under him (Bahuguna). He emphasised that
protection of trees should not be seen in financial terms,” Ohri said.
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Falling sick together: Covid-19 pandemic has immensely boosted the case for Universal
Healthcare
By Dipankar Gupta
Universal Healthcare never quite got the attention it needed from India’s policy planners. There
were always other subsidies cooking and those had to be served first. This pushed healthcare
investment out of the back burner and onto the kitchen floor. As a result, India’s governmental
health spend is just 1% of its GDP, among the lowest in the world.
The main reason why it is always difficult to run a campaign for Universal Healthcare is because
we fall sick singly and alone. When we are ill all we can think about is getting well. But when
we are well, we don’t give illness a thought. An epidemic changes all that for illness now no
longer strikes randomly and uniquely.
Covid-19, as we have seen, has linked whole masses together, the sick and the worried non-sick,
like partisans in a movement. In this collective fight for life, corporate health tailored to suit
individual capacity to pay, just doesn’t work. If it did, the US, the peer leader of privatised
medicine, would not have also led the world in the number of Covid-19 deaths. Over 59,000
have already gone and even New York, the vibrant Big Apple, lies desolate and forlorn.
Italy’s Lombardy region was the most devastated by Covid-19 in all of Europe. It is no
coincidence that from 1997, Lombardy began to aggressively privatise its erstwhile public health
system. This even brought Arnold Schwarzenegger, then California governor, to visit Lombardy
and publicly acclaim its officials for making this move.
Bergamo district in Lombardy was far ahead of others in this drive and, unfortunately, the death
rate there was also disproportionately high. Cumulatively, this meant that Lombardy – with only
16% of Italy’s population – ended up with 66% of Covid-19 deaths in the country. If anything,
this should introduce a serious rethink on privatised medical care.
Current Covid-19 mortality rates in the US show that Blacks and Hispanics have proportionately
higher death rates than white Americans. In Milwaukee County, home to Wisconsin’s largest
city, Blacks account for 70% of Covid-19 deaths, though they form only 26% of the population.
The same picture emerges, with identical brush strokes, when we look at the fatality figures for
Louisiana and Detroit.
This was to be expected. Blacks and Hispanics are the poorest ethnic groups in America and a
large percentage of them cannot afford private insurance. They are the ones who try self-
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medicating for as long as they can, fearing medical bills. When they cannot take it any longer
and go to a hospital, it is often too late.
While about 70% of white Americans have private insurance, only around 50% of Blacks have
that kind of backup. In New York City, Hispanics comprise 29% of the population but 34% of
deaths. In the larger New York area, Blacks make up only 9% of the population, but 18% of
deaths.
Americans have generally been quite wary of state run healthcare, but their experience with
Covid-19 may bring about a difference. Independents, who tilt the scales in any major US policy
issue, have gradually moved in favour of public healthcare. In 2013, only 41% of them were for
state funded healthcare, but today this number has jumped to 62%. Also, Gallup poll reports the
startling fact that a growing number of Republicans are beginning to turn their backs on
privatised medicine.
In Britain, the government run National Health Service (NHS) was always very popular. A 2015
survey showed that as many as 89% of British people were strongly in its favour. However,
many influential British Conservatives never supported the NHS.
In 2002, Boris Johnson tore into the NHS and called it “monolithic”, “monopolistic” and
“unimprovable”. In his book ‘Friends, Voters, Countrymen’, he went on to suggest that “We
need to think of new ways of getting private money into NHS.” In 2015 Jeremy Hunt,
Conservative government secretary of health, even made a deal with Bain Capital (partly owned
by Mitt Romney) for supplying blood plasma in the UK.
Over the years, cuts in NHS funding crippled its functioning. The state grant it received was just
about enough for running costs with little left over for infrastructural upgrading, training and
recruiting professionals. Fortunately, that attitude is all set to change; PM Johnson today is
willing to rush into a burning building to save NHS. Why?
Well, it was the NHS that nursed Johnson to health after Covid-19 struck him. Which is why he
is now a changed man, forever grateful to this state run service. If anything, this pandemic has
shown that the rich and poor can be laid low equally. Consequently, those who once demonised
public health delivery are ready to switch sides.
We see the ravages of Covid-19 in India as well. Once again, the overwhelming number of
health professionals taking a bullet for us – doctors, nurses, ambulance drivers and paramedics –
are public servants. Some years back a Universal Health cover proposal went out to the last UPA
government, but that never quite got a foot in the door. One is often tempted to read left or right
wing politics in healthcare, but really it is primarily, if not only, about citizenship.
Pandemics extract a terrible price but they teach us a fundamental lesson. When we fall sick
together we realise the true value of staying connected.
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Greed triggers gross vaccine inequality

The rich need to understand they cannot remain safely isolated from the virus till the poor too
have got the protective shield. Instead of pushing for a speedier vaccination drive globally, a
handful of vaccine makers are using patent protection granted under the TRIPs Agreement of
WTO to hold the world literally to ransom. Not only the Big Pharma, but also some of the
developed countries have been hoarding the vaccines.
Written By Devinder Sharma, Food & Agriculture Specialist
This is disturbing. With only one-in-500 among the low-income countries having received
the vaccine shot against one-in-four among the high-income countries, gross vaccine
inequality has been at play. As per the World Health Organisation (WHO), poor countries
have received only 0.2 per cent of the vaccine doses while the rich countries have walked
away with a share of 87 per cent.
So far, only 32 per cent in America, 27 per cent in the UK, 2 per cent in India and 0.3 per
cent of the population in the Philippines have received both doses. At this rate, it may take
years before the world can emerge out of the pandemic. The rich need to understand they
cannot remain safely isolated from the deadly virus till the poor too have got the protective
shield.
What is coming in the way is the greed for more profits over public health. Instead of pushing
for a speedier vaccination drive globally, a handful of vaccine manufacturers are actually
using patent protection granted under the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to hold the world literally to ransom.
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Not only the Big Pharma, but also some of the developed countries have been hoarding the
vaccines and oppose any move to temporarily lift the patent protection. The US was hoarding
60 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which it has now decided to share with other
countries. Notably, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had not approved the
AstraZeneca vaccines (called Covishield in India) for domestic use, and, therefore, it made
little sense to withhold it anymore.
Although India, South Africa and some other developing countries have petitioned the WTO
to allow a waiver on patent protection for the Covid-19 vaccines, the rich trading bloc — the
US, UK, EU, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Brazil and Australia — are averse to any
such move, thereby denying these countries the access to technology to go in for large-scale
production of the vaccines.
The pressure to oppose the IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) waiver comes from the
pharmaceutical giants (and lobbyists) who have in a signed letter to the US President
appealed to disregard the joint proposal put forward by India and South Africa, stating that it
was without any evidence. It also urged the US Administration to continue to ‘oppose the
TRIPs intellectual property waiver’. Hollywood, too, is siding with the pharmaceutical
industry. The TRIPs Agreement provides for a patent monopoly for 20 years.
Although there exists a clause in the TRIPs Agreement that allows the developing countries
the option of using compulsory licensing, enabling the governments at times of national
emergencies to permit local manufacturers to use the patented technology without worrying
about the patent monopoly, developing countries are reluctant to use the option, fearing trade
retaliation. No wonder, despite even the Supreme Court mentioning the option of using
Section 92 of the Indian Patents Act under which compulsory licences can be issued to
manufacture a patented drug, there has not been any visible movement on that front.
Pfizer’s latest proposal says it has offered its vaccines to India at a ‘not-for-profit' price, but is
quiet on the patent issue. It needs to be known that it was in February that TV channel WION
had reported how the pharmaceutical giant was asking some Latin American countries for
military bases and sovereign assets as a guarantee in exchange for supplying vaccines. It
struck deals with seven countries, and was in negotiation with Argentina and Brazil.
To Argentina, it asked for putting its bank reserves, military bases and embassy buildings as
collateral. It asked Brazil for military bases, sovereign assets and an international fund to
write off any expenses arising from probable law suits. The deals fell through.
Even at that time, Pfizer Chairman Albert Bourla had in a press release claimed how the
company was committed to providing equitable and affordable vaccines to people around the
globe. It shows the double face of the pharmaceutical industry.
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Moreover, it is not that the Covid-19 vaccines were produced with the company's own
financial resources and inhouse research. These vaccines were, in fact, developed with public
money support. For instance, the US, through its Operation Warp Speed, spent $12 billion to
finance research, production and delivery of vaccines produced by a handful of companies.
The UK Government had provided 84 million pounds for manufacturing support to the
University of Oxford and Imperial College, London. As we all know, Oxford University later
carved out a global licensing agreement with AstraZeneca. The German Government had
given Pfizer’s German partner BioNTech close to $445 million.
Further, writing in Project Syndicate, economist Jeffrey D Sachs says: “The Intellectual
Property held by Moderna, BioNTech-Pfizer, and others is not mainly the result of those
companies' innovations, but rather of academic research funded by the US Government,
especially the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The private companies are claiming the
exclusive right to IP that was produced largely with public funding and academic science.”
Billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates, too, has received brickbats for his recent statement
opposing any move to transfer the vaccine technology to developing countries. To say that
developing countries do not have the capability to effectively use the technology transfer is
not true. There are a number of companies in India, Canada, South Africa and Brazil, among
others, which have the potential to ramp up production. The IPR waiver can easily expedite
the mass production of generics, making them cheaply available. That’s what the world needs
at this critical juncture.
Well, Pfizer alone is expected to swell its vaccine profits this year by $15 billion. This comes
at a time when a horrible surge in virus infections is likely to push hundreds of millions of
people in Global South at risk for want of vaccines and that too cheap.
Let’s not forget, 3.22 million people have already perished worldwide from Covid-19. While
the patent debate rages on, the big question is how the world can allow a handful of vaccine
companies to profit over human lives.
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The price of pandemic is being paid by women

Nearly two-thirds of India’s working women lost their jobs in April 2020. Very few had
returned by August.
If a large chunk of a young nation’s population doesn’t participate in economically

productive wage-earning work, collective prosperity and growth become that much harder
It has been a long wait for Archana Kushwaha. In late-March, the private school where
Kushwaha taught math and science shut down following a stringent lockdown to contain
the covid-19 pandemic. Seven months later, the school in Atarra town of Uttar Pradesh
remains shut. Online classes are not an option for the rural families who sent their children to
the Ambedkar Shikha Niketan in the chronically poor Bundelkhand region. Since April, all
five teachers, including 27-year-old Kushwaha, have been out of job.
“I am struggling to run my family now," said Kushwaha, a mother of two, who used to
earn ₹6,000 per month from her job and had to pull her daughter out of school. Her husband,
an occasional migrant who used to work in textile units in Gujarat, now labours as a casual
farm worker, the only source of income for the family. “Even if the school reopens, families
may not send their children to save on expenses," she said.
While the pandemic has resulted in widespread job losses across multiple sectors (including
21 million salaried formal sector jobs as per one estimate), women whose participation in the
workforce was already on the slide have been particularly hit. As the economy slowly
recovers, whether they return to work in adequate numbers will be one of the key factors that
will determine India’s long-term economic health.
If a large chunk of a young nation’s population doesn’t participate in economically

productive wage-earning work, collective prosperity and growth becomes that much harder.
Women stepping out of homes to work in large numbers is a critical factor behind
Bangladesh’s economic miracle.
But in India, according to ongoing research at the centre for sustainable employment at
the Azim Premji University (APU), work participation rate for women (WPR)—a measure of
the proportion of adults who work—fell from an already low 9.15% in December 2019 to just
5.8% in August this year. In comparison, WPR for men declined from 67% to 47% during
this period, indicating a higher relative fall for women workers.
The study also looked at a panel of individuals who were employed in December 2019 and
tracked those same people in April and August 2020. In April, 62% of the men who were
working in December continued to be employed. For women, only 32% of those who were
employed in December still had a job. So, nearly two-third of India’s working women were
out of work in April. Very few had returned to work by August.
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Work opportunities for men rebounded strongly, but not for women, said Amit Basole, a
labour economist at APU. “Women are engaged in precarious work and they often respond
(to shocks) by withdrawing from the labour force."
Thus, for now, the pandemic seems to have sharpened the prevalent gender divide in the
workforce. The fact that sectors such as education, retail and services like domestic work
have been especially hit have made matters worse. With household finances stretched, ground
reports already suggest a spike in child marriages and trafficking, coupled with a rise in
domestic violence.
The pandemic, in effect, could set India back by eroding gender equity parameters within a
family—and as women move back to unpaid household labour, poorer families may neglect
the importance of investing in the girl child. Some form of government intervention may be
urgently required—a so-called gender stimulus. But will it come?
Women aren’t returning

A range of factors explain the plunge in women’s WPR. For instance, when jobs are in short
supply, it often goes to men in the family instead of women. There is already anecdotal
evidence of this in textile hubs like Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, where the wife, instead of going
back to work, is saddled with additional domestic responsibilities. The garment industry in
Tiruppur used to employ around 800,000 workers before the pandemic hit, of which, 45%
were women.
“Currently, the workforce is down by half. And among inter-state migrants, it’s mostly men
who have returned while entire families used to work in the textile units earlier. This is also
because factories are not working at full steam," said Viyakula Mary, executive director of
the non-profit SAVE, which works on labour rights and gender empowerment. Mary lists
several factors behind why women haven’t joined back—from an uncertain job environment
and lack of transport facilities to taking care of children at home since schools are closed.
Over the last decade, despite falling fertility rates and significant improvement in education
levels among women, female labour force participation rate fell sharply from 31% in 2011-12
to 23% in 2017-18—largely driven by a drop in rural women withdrawing from the
workforce, shows data from the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) of the NSS.
One reason for this is sticky social and gender norms coupled with the higher burden of
household work for women, said Hema Swaminathan, associate professor at the centre for
public policy at IIM Bangalore. “Due to these norms, women tend to withdraw from the
workforce as income levels rise. On the demand side, there aren’t enough jobs available,
particularly those which allow women to balance household responsibilities or jobs which are
closer home."
And, at times, jobs which are available are hazardous. For instance, 96% of the 4.4 million
beedi rollers in India are home-based and women account for about 84% of these workers
who receive a paltry wage of ₹130 a day, according to a recent study by AF Development
Care, a Delhi-based research consultancy. A majority of women beedi workers want to move
to safer livelihoods but they can’t due to a lack of skills.
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Home-based work of beedi rolling is now at 10-15% of pre-pandemic volumes, which has
severely impacted women workers and their families, said Abdul Gaffar Ali, secretary of the
Karnataka association of beedi workers. “Women who are illiterate prefer to do this work
despite low wages since it allows them to stay at home and manage domestic responsibilities.
Before the pandemic, we had trained over 200 women (from Bengaluru) as tailors but less
than 30 of them could find work in garment units," Ali said.
Marriage penalty
A conversation with Mansi Gupta, 23, an experienced beautician from Noida, Uttar Pradesh,
shows the impact of the pandemic on working women that goes beyond job losses and salary
cuts. Between March and August, the beauty parlour which employed Gupta was shut. She
rejoined in September but was offered ₹7,000 per month, less than half of what she used to
earn before for a ten-hour shift. For someone who started off at a young age of 17, the
economic shock is resetting her life. Gupta’s family has persuaded her to get married this
December.
“I will take a year off. Then, it depends on my in-laws and husband if they allow me to
work," said Gupta. She may have to give up on a career on which she invested six years of
her life—nothing short of “marriage penalty"—and join the ranks of millions of women
toiling within the house without pay. A recent time use survey by the government showed
that women still spend 84% of their working hours in unpaid activities like domestic work,
while men spend 80% of working hours on paid work.
Like Gupta, the pandemic pushed Bilasi Biswas out of her job. A domestic help, Biswas’ last
job was as an attendant at a hospital in Kolkata, West Bengal. Every day, Biswas took a local
train to reach her workplace from Bangaon, a small-town bordering Bangladesh. Despite
being employed in an essential service, Biswas was forced to give up on the job as trains
stopped plying during the lockdown. Local train services are likely to resume soon but the
hospital has put a condition. For now, they will only employ those who can stay overnight
and not those who commute daily in crowded public transport to minimize the risk of
infection.
“I have three young children and cannot stay the night out of my house," Biswas said. To tide
over the money crunch, she took ₹40,000 in two microfinance loans.
Between 40-50% of domestic helps working in Kolkata have lost their jobs and those who
have work are earning a fraction of their usual salary as families are refusing to employ
women who work in more than one house (to minimize the risk of infection), said Swapna
Tripathi, a member of the Paschim Banga GrihaParicharika Samiti, a state-level workers
union.
According to Tripathi, thousands of women who took the local train to reach Kolkata from
nearby towns and villages are now in a precarious situation. “They are not enrolled under the
rural jobs scheme. Most do not have ration cards (for availing subsidized food). Many of
them have fallen sick due to sheer lack of nutrition," Tripathi added.
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Apart from impacting workforce participation, the pandemic is also eroding hard earned
gains in gender equality.
“On the ground, we are witnessing a spike in cases of early and forced marriages as well as
trafficking in impoverished regions like the Sunderbans delta which is battling the twin blows
of the pandemic and the Amphan cyclone," said Rishi Kant from the non-profit Shakti
Vahini. “Girls as young as 14 are going missing overnight... as trains start plying, these girls
will land up in brothels in cities like Mumbai and Delhi."
Nearly 200,000 more girls are at the risk of child marriage in South Asia in 2020, Save the
Children said in its latest Global Girlhood report.
“We are deeply concerned about the impacts of covid-19. An increasing number of children
falling into poverty as a result of the pandemic will mean more girls... at risk of early or
forced marriage," Gabrielle Szabo, senior gender policy adviser at Save the Children, told
The Lancet magazine in a recent interview.
The months ahead

Beyond the immediate impact in the next few months, the pandemic might also worsen the
inter-generational equity parameters, cautions Swaminathan from IIM Bangalore.
If a family which is caught up in severe economic distress has to choose between sending a
boy and a girl to school, it may opt to bet on the boy.
In such a situation, revising the age at marriage for girls may bring some positive changes by
delaying childbirth and allowing girls to stay longer at school. The government will soon take
a decision on increasing the age at which girls can legally marry (currently at 18 years),
Prime Minister Narendra Modi said last month.
But to bring back women into the workforce, the government needs to do more, said Sandeep
Chachra, executive director of the non-profit Action Aid India. “Starting from beedi rollers
and domestic helps to unpaid farm labourers and sex workers, India needs to recognize and
register women workers formally, reduce the gender pay gap and expand the scope of
childcare support in the informal sector (by revamping the ICDS scheme)."
“The contribution of women as primary caregivers during a pandemic was absolutely critical
to our survival as a society. It’s time we recognize and celebrate it.
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'Time Poverty' Is a Real Issue For Women Everywhere, Says Melinda Gates
Have you ever wished there were more hours in the day? More time to stay on top of your to-
do list, pursue your hobbies, connect with friends, maybe even get to the gym? You’re not
alone.
Women across the world are suffering from “time poverty.” Melinda Gates addressed the
issue in the annual letter that she published with her husband, Microsoft co-founder
Bill Gates. Specifically, Melinda calls out the gender disparity in time spent doing “unpaid
work,” work like childcare, grocery shopping, making doctor appointments for family
members, and ensuring that household systems are maintained. These kinds of tasks are the
behind-the-scenes functions that keep people alive, keep people healthy, and enable society to
function.
Worldwide, women spend an average of 4.5 hours per day on unpaid work—more than
double the amount of time men spend. It is work that is historically undervalued and often
taken for granted.
In developing nations, the increased hours that women spend doing unpaid work translates
to fewer available hours to pursue education, healthcare, and paid work that might help
support their families. Many of the tasks that comprise unpaid work—caring for small
children, overseeing a home structure, and masterminding myriad schedules of people and
animals, for example—are 24/7 responsibilities, requiring an on-call attendant at all times. In
more developed countries, including America, the disparity of time spent doing unpaid work
is less pronounced, but still carries a meaningful impact on how women and men live.
One area where we see a noticeable gender gap in the U.S. is in time spent engaged in
leisure activities. According to the Department of Labor, over the course of one year the
average American man will spend 73 more hours than his female counterpart participating in
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sports, exercise, or recreation. He’s not just getting more fit than her, though, somehow he’s
also vegging out more than her, too. He’ll spend 36.5 more hours watching television, and
another 36.5 more hours participating in other leisure activities, including travel, than she
will. Across all the categories for which the Department of Labor gathered data, men will
spend over 255 additional hours per year engaged in leisure activities than women will.
I can’t help but wonder how this data correlates with overall quality of life between
genders. Women are twice as likely as men to suffer from depression, and twice as likely to
suffer from sleep disorders as well. While both conditions can have biological components
the sufferer has no control over, research has also overwhelmingly demonstrated that leisure
activities are a potent antidote.
Researchers Iso-Ahola and Coleman argued that the social nature of leisure activities and
the opportunities for friendship and support—as well as the opportunity for feelings
of competence—can help with protecting against stress. Those who are able to tap into
personal and social resources available through leisure activities may protect themselves
from depression or reduce the severity of preexisting depression. A 2005 study in the Journal
of Occupational Health also found that “engagement in social leisure activities is associated
with better sleep quality and consequently better general well-being,” noting that study
participants who engaged in voluntary activities were less likely to have poor sleep quality.
The irony is that while time poverty isn’t severe enough for most American women to have
to forego necessary medical treatment, which Melinda Gates points out as a real concern
for women in third world countries, it’s actually creating conditions that necessitate
medical intervention, like for depression. When paid and unpaid working hours are
combined, American women actually spend slightly more time working than American men.
We are, it appears, working ourselves to death.
Gates asserts that the solution to reducing the gender gap in unpaid work lies in reducing
the amount of time that unpaid work demands, recognizing the hidden assumptions that we
all make about how women and men should spend their time, and redistributing the workload
of tasks like laundry and childcare. In poorer countries, this might entail better access to
electricity and clean water, increased education about and access to birth control, and
challenging cultural or religious norms surrounding gender roles.
I assert that in America, it also entails making engagement in fulfilling personal activities
a priority for all women. While our culture has blurred the lines between unpaid work and
leisure activities in many ways, turning school lunch preparation into an art form and laundry
into an opportunity for home decor, these chores are increasingly done alone instead of
amongst a village of women, and they are increasingly used as ammo in the mommy
wars that do so much more harm than good. As the unpaid work of managing a household has
become increasingly isolated and individualized, it's also become a divisive form of
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competition for some women. Whether you choose to stay home or work, cook your own
meals or save time with take-out, buy budget-conscious laundry soap or demand a pricier all-
natural version, you can easily be vilified for unknowingly undermining another woman's
priorities. For many women, the time they spend on unpaid work is decidedly un-leisurely, no
matter how many yoga pant parodies the Internet comes up with.
Women don’t just deserve to pursue their individual interests and relationships,
they need to. While the fight for equal opportunity and pay in the workplace rages on, we
can’t forget about the fight for equal play, too. It makes us happier. It makes us healthier. It’s
about time.
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Only 7% of India’s police force is women. This hurts investigations into gender violence
Ninety nine percent of sexual assaults in the country go unreported.
Women make up only 7.28% of India’s police force. Of these women, 90% are constables,
while less than 1% hold supervisory positions, according to the recently released “Status of
Policing in India Report, 2019”. The numbers are low despite 20 states having reservations
for women in the police.
This skewed ration is “leading to impediments in effective implementation of the legislations

on crimes against women”, noted a Ministry of Home Affairs circular in 2015.
Even after they make it to the police force, women run into hurdles. They are likely to face
gender bias and report high levels of job dissatisfaction, according to the policing report
released by Common Cause, a civil society organisation that advocates for human rights, and
the LoknitiProgramme of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, a research
institute supported by the Ministry of Human Resources and Development.
The researchers surveyed nearly 12,000 police personnel, across 21 states. More than 2,000
of these police personnel were female, about 20% of those surveyed. This was deliberately
higher than the representative 7% so the researchers could have enough responses from
female personnel to analyse separately.
The study is a companion to the 2018 Status of Policing Report, which surveyed more than
15,000 respondents in an attempt to understand citizens’ perceptions of the police.
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The two reports taken together paint a clear picture of the status of women in the police force,
the attitudes towards them, and how this affects policing.
Why are women police important?

“Data from 39 countries show that the presence of women police officers correlates
positively with reporting of sexual assault, which confirms that recruiting women is an
important component of a gender-responsive justice system,” noted a United Nations Women
report in 2011-’12 titled “Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice”.
Approaching male police officers can be difficult for women, the report said. In fact, both
male and female victims of sexual violence expressed a preference for reporting to women
police.
In India, the National Family Health Survey of 2015-’16 said that 99% of sexual assault cases
go unreported.
A rise in the number of policewomen has been correlated with a decline in rates of domestic
abuse and intimate partner crime.
Policewomen are less likely to have allegations of excessive force against them, and their
presence can reduce the use of force by other police officers, according to the Status of
Policing 2019 report.
Why are there so few women in the force?

“There is a strong belief that combat, by nature, is a male occupation; that the police force is
a male domain and therefore unsuitable to the female physique and temperament,” says the
2018 report on citizens’ attitudes towards the police. These sentiments mean that most
women do not even apply for jobs in the police, believing themselves unsuitable or because
of family pressure against such a career.
One in two of respondents told researchers that women were unsuitable for police work
because they lack the physical strength to do so. About the same ratio of people also believed
that the inflexible working hours were a deterrent. Women were as likely to hold these
opinions as men, although younger women and city dwellers were more favourable to the
idea of women in the police.
Policing while female

The researchers found that female police personnel were more likely to do in-house tasks that
did not require them to leave the station. They maintain registers, file FIRs, deal with the
public and do other tasks while their male counterparts conduct investigations, patrol, and
provide VIP security.
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One in five women police personnel reported not having a separate toilet for women at their
station. In Bihar and Telangana, that ratio was three in five. A fourth of policewomen also
reported that there was no sexual harassment committee at their workplace, despite such a
committee being mandated by the Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act of
2013.
Policing has traditionally been considered a male job, and both men and women hold
patriarchal ideas about women’s capabilities in this field, the report said. Their views by-and-
large mirror the views held by citizens, although women in the police underestimate
themselves less. Bihar, Karnataka and West Bengal have the highest levels of bias against
women in the police force.
These attitudes carry over to policing, which is why nearly one in five personnel believe that
gender-based violence complaints are false and motivated to a very great extent. There is
some merit to the idea of false rape cases being lodged, for instance by the parents of girls
who have eloped, or in the case of a breach of promise to marry. But given the vast
prevalence and under-reporting of violence against women, the disbelief of police personnel
towards such complaints only discourages victims from seeking remedy.
Another important point the researchers make is about attitudes towards transgender people.
While the first transgender police officer – recruited in Tamil Nadu in 2017 – made
headlines, the police still has a long way to go in eliminating prejudice towards people
outside the male-female gender binary. Thirty five percent of police personnel said that
transgender people were very much or somewhat naturally prone to committing crimes.
The way forward

The researchers note that an increase in policewomen will also go a long way in making
police stations more accessible for women. Meeting reservation quotas for women would be a
first step towards creating a more equal police force.
Regular gender-sensitisation training for the police would also help undermine patriarchal
attitudes. The study found that only a third of police personnel had received such training
over the past two or three years.
A gender-inclusive force will be more representative of and responsive to the population they
police.
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Social Distancing and the Pandemic of Caste
Social distancing set in motion an illness whose vaccine we still have not been able to – or
wished to – discover. Caste, like a virus, has the virtue of self-duplication inherent in it.
According to the thesis on the origins of castes that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar put forth in his
remarkable essay Castes in India, it was the Brahmins who formed the first group of
people who “enclosed” themselves – or, socially distanced themselves, to use a current
phrase – from others around them.
“At some time in the history of the Hindus, the priestly class socially detached itself from
the rest of the body of people and through a closed-door policy became a caste by itself,”
Ambedkar notes in the essay.
That the castes were believed to be a part of a “graded hierarchy,” to use Ambedkar’s
term, was itself an effort to institutionalise and proclaim social distance. It was a social
distance which was inscribed in sacred texts and gradually in people’s minds and
practices.
His further description in the essay of the way castes spread and multiply eerily resembles
the propagation of some viral pandemic: “Now apply the same logic to the Hindu society
and you have another explanation of the ‘fissiparous’ character of caste, as a consequence
of the virtue of self-duplication that is inherent in it.”
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According to the thesis on the origins of castes that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar put forth in his
remarkable essay Castes in India, it was the Brahmins who formed the first group of
people who “enclosed” themselves – or, socially distanced themselves, to use a current
phrase – from others around them.
“At some time in the history of the Hindus, the priestly class socially detached itself from
the rest of the body of people and through a closed-door policy became a caste by itself,”
Ambedkar notes in the essay.
That the castes were believed to be a part of a “graded hierarchy,” to use Ambedkar’s
term, was itself an effort to institutionalise and proclaim social distance. It was a social
distance which was inscribed in sacred texts and gradually in people’s minds and
practices.
His further description in the essay of the way castes spread and multiply eerily resembles
the propagation of some viral pandemic: “Now apply the same logic to the Hindu society
and you have another explanation of the ‘fissiparous’ character of caste, as a consequence
of the virtue of self-duplication that is inherent in it.”
Caste, like a virus, has the “virtue of self-duplication…inherent in it,” according to

Ambedkar’s astute observations. The Brahmins instituted social distancing first, which it
seems, led to the (caste) pandemic – an order of things slightly different from the way
things are developing in the novel coronavirus pandemic.
At any rate, the social distancing established by the Brahmins resulted in very real
consequences, especially those of untouchability and even unseeability.
There were, for instance, concrete interdictions in certain places in India against even the
shadows of untouchables falling on the upper castes. So, between certain times of the day
when the shadows lengthen, the former were not allowed within certain cities in India.
This segregation implicit in the system of untouchability was characterised by Ambedkar

in a manner that resonates with the narrative around social distancing and the coronavirus
today. In his work Who Were The Untouchables, he states:
“It is not a case of social separation, a mere stoppage of social intercourse for a temporary
period. It is a case of territorial segregation and of a cordon sanitaire putting the impure
people inside a barbed wire into a sort of a cage. Every Hindu village has a ghetto. The
Hindus live in the village and the Untouchables in the ghetto.”
One must note the usage of the term cordon sanitaire employed by Babasaheb in
connection with caste untouchability – and mark its most recent usage in Time magazine’s
reference to the coronavirus outbreak:
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“When the Chinese government effectively cut off some 50 million people in Wuhan, the
location of the first outbreak, that was most aptly described as a cordon sanitaire. That
French term, which came into use following the flu pandemic of 1918, describes roping off
a whole community, which might contain sick and healthy people, and preventing anyone
from leaving in order to curb the spread of a disease.”
Dr. Ambedkar was spot on, employing a French term equivalent to something like a
quarantine but, characteristically, imparting it a stronger and more dire meaning than that
associated with a mere quarantine. In his words, it denoted a life-long segregation and a
“roping off” of an entire people as if they suffered from a disease.
The academic, Gopal Guru, in his essay The Archaeology of Untouchability, lists the
names given to the actual instances of social distancing and the segregation that occurs
throughout India to isolate the so-called untouchables into separate areas:
“Since the untouchable was a walking danger, there was a need to quarantine this danger
in an isolated place called the Chamrauti in Uttar Pradesh, Halgeri in Karnataka, Cherry in
Tamil Nadu and Mahar/Mangwad in Maharashtra.”
Guru too cannot stop himself from employing medical terms such as ‘quarantine’ to
describe the isolation of the ‘danger’ posed by the untouchables.
In the book The Cracked Mirror co-authored by him, Guru provides an interesting view on
how Mahatma Gandhi did not have to face issues of social distancing when he travelled
through India – and thus did not experience a socially discriminatory India – but
Ambedkar did:
“It is therefore no wonder that Gandhi does not discover India as ‘Bahishkrut’ because his
voyage makes him open up in a kind of sameness where he, by and large, finds himself in
the midst of peasantry but residing with the families of the feudal lords and the emergent
industrialist. Occasionally, as politics demanded, he also stayed for a brief while in the hut
of the scavenger. Gandhi thus had a choice to ‘transgress’ spaces vertically.
Ambedkar did not have this choice. He and his social constituency open up only
horizontally, moving from one dalitwada to another across the region.”
In fact as Dr. Ambedkar himself goes on to show in The Untouchables, there is the sense
of physical distance in some of the very terms used for those considered Untouchable,
such as antyaja and antyavasin: those people living at the anta or end of the village.
Even the term avarna or those without a varna only served to put the Untouchables
beyond the pale of the varna system – a metaphorical social distancing that consigned
fellow human beings farthest away in social hierarchy.
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Social distancing was also a key factor in denying the lower castes benefits of learning,
which initially took the form of Vedic learning. “For a Sudra is (like) a cemetery, therefore
the Veda is not to be read in the vicinity of a Sudra,” is a commonly found injunction in
several Brahminical law-books warning against the recitation of the Veda near a Sudra.
In his classic tract Annihilation of Caste (AoC), Ambedkar lays out his understanding of
an ideal society, centred around ideas of fraternity:
“In an ideal society there should be many interests consciously communicated and shared.
There should be varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. In other
words there must be social endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another name for
democracy. Democracy is not merely a form of government. It is primarily a mode of
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an attitude of
respect and reverence towards one’s fellow men.”
Ambedkar is convinced that Hinduism does not value fraternity. “The condition for the
growth of this sentiment of fraternity lies in sharing in the vital processes of life. It is
sharing in the joys and sorrows of birth, death, marriage and food…With a complete
refusal to share the joys and sorrows of life how can the sentiment of fraternity take
roots?” he observes.
A system built on notions of social distancing and social invisibilising cannot value
fraternity and horizontally-arrayed human relationships. It is, instead, based on selfishness,
on narrow interests and deeply entrenched ideas of othering.
The idea of the system of castes as a disease is to be frequently encountered

in Annihilation of Caste. The Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal confessed that they invited Ambedkar
“because his diagnosis of the fatal disease of the Hindu community was the same as ours;
i.e., he too was of the opinion that the caste system was the root cause of the disruption
and downfall of the Hindus.”
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Why a strong law against human trafficking is necessary in post-Covid times
The Trafficking in Persons Bill, 2021 is well-intentioned, but it needs to be further

strengthened. Odisha has lessons to offer
Since early last year, humanity has been under siege. While globally several countries have
had their share of recoveries and relapses, the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly the second
wave, has put India under considerable strain. The pandemic exposed and exacerbated the
systemic and deeply entrenched socio-economic inequities in Indian society, thus increasing
manifold the consequential vulnerability and marginality. The disruption in economic
activities across sectors, massive rise in unemployment and sources of livelihood have put a
sizable population of India under desperate circumstances.
A study by Azim Premji University estimates that nearly 230 million Indians have fallen
below the poverty line since the pandemic. The vulnerable populace reeling under such
desperation makes the perfect recipe for exploitation. One such form of exploitation that we
need to be vigilant about is human trafficking. As many as 27 lakh distress calls were made to
the Ministry of Women and Child Development between March and August 2020. Between
April 2020 and June 2021, over 9,000 children were rescued from traffickers.
Human trafficking places vulnerable people in highly exploitative situations, stripping

victims of their freedom and choice. Besides, it is a highly lucrative organised crime that
amounts to a billion-dollar industry. Even today, India lacks an over-arching law on human
trafficking although there are a multitude of laws that deal with different forms of trafficking.
In such a context, the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill 2021
is both necessary and pertinent. The current Bill represents a significant departure from the
Trafficking in Persons 2018 Bill, which failed to take into consideration the plight of
trafficked victims. The 2018 Bill was criticised and failed to pass muster in Parliament.
In contrast, the new Bill is victim-centric and prioritises the dignity, care and rehabilitation of
trafficked victims. There are various welcome additions and changes to this Bill when
compared with the Trafficking of Persons Bill, 2018. These include: a) definitions of
“exploitation”, “sexual exploitation”, “rehabilitation”; b) defined responsibilities of the
national, state and district anti-human trafficking committees; c) measures to ensure dignity,
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care, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims; d) provision of interim relief and

rehabilitation not contingent on prosecution; e) free legal aid and support to victims to seek
compensation; f) placing the onus of filing the FIR on the investigating officer and; g) more
stringent punishment to offenders. This will ensure clarity for investigating agencies in
prosecution and for courts to interpret the law.
While the Bill defines rehabilitation and places emphasis on ensuring the same for survivors,
it does not specify a dedicated rehabilitation fund. A dedicated fund must be maintained for
relief, rehabilitation, victim compensation, and funds for inter and intra-state investigations.
Without these allocated funds, the institutions will not be able to carry out their
responsibilities in a timely and efficient manner.
Besides, rehabilitation is limited to shelter homes with no provision for reintegration and
community-based rehabilitation. Community-based rehabilitation, a model that provides
health services, legal aid, access to welfare schemes and income opportunities, is crucial for
ensuring the reintegration of victims back into their community and family. The risk of re-
trafficking is high unless the victims are provided economic support. The inclusion of job
training and skill development in the rehabilitation process will empower victims to be
financially independent and provide them with freedom and choice. This is particularly
imperative in the pandemic and post-pandemic context.
In addition, the Bill must provide greater agency to survivors to choose the duration of stay at
shelter homes. This is necessary to provide them with the freedom to leave the institution if
there is any exploitation and abuse, which are commonly reported. Equally important is to
have checks and balances in place to ensure that shelter homes are safe places for survivors.
Anti Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) are a central institution in the present anti-human
trafficking ecosystem. They have been responsible for the timely investigation of trafficking
cases and for ensuring the care and dignity of victims. However, the Bill does not mention
AHTUs except once, thus failing to both clarify their role as well as to strengthen their
functioning. Though various states have set up AHTUs, we do not have anything uniform
throughout the country that will make it mandatory that AHTUs investigate human
trafficking cases. Therefore, a law that would set out the procedures and clarify what will be
taken up by which body, is essential. Assigning this responsibility and accountability to one
body that is responsible solely for human trafficking will ensure speedy investigations and
aid to survivors.
Government of Odisha has been working to address the issue through various measures
including allocating Rs 9 crore for the strengthening of AHTUs, working toward efficient
inter-departmental coordination, creating various support systems for women and girls to help
combat vulnerabilities, setting up helplines among others. This model of strengthening
AHTUs has been successful in Odisha and should be extended to other states as well through
this law.
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How Saleem Kidwai brought Indian history of same-sex love to light
His mobilisation of LGBTQIA+ community into a movement for freedom, as well as his
literary achievements, especially in translating Urdu works, are admirable
I must admit I did not expect such a storm of news, obituaries and voices claiming friendship,
coming from all directions within minutes of Saleem Kidwai’s death. I knew him as a great
intellectual, a committed historian and a scholar with deep interest in Urdu Literature, and
someone, who despite his achievements remained humble. He was the one responsible, in
some ways, in mobilising the LGBTQIA+ community into a movement for “freedom”. He
was one of the first academics to come out openly as a member of the then-condemned
community. That required courage and honesty. He used his research-oriented brain and
scholarly patience to dive deep into two millennia of history to trace instances of same-sex
love, and together with Ruth Vanita, wrote a book which not only became an instant classic
but was responsible, to a great extent, for the removal of Section 377 from the Indian Penal
Code by the Supreme Court. That was no less an achievement. It brought a smile on the face
of the 21st century because it was an important social change for India.
Saleem studied and lived in Delhi from the age of 17. He also went to Montreal for his
undergraduate studies, and later taught Medieval History at Ramjas college till 1993. He
loved his profession as a teacher, but he also loved his independence. Urdu literature
interested him, too. His love for Urdu poetry attracted him towards Begum Akhtar’s ghazal
singing. He had great admiration for her.
He was influenced by his mother’s interest in Urdu fiction. He once told me, “one of the
authors my mother used to read was A R Khatoon,” a name which has escaped many an avid
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Urdu fiction reader’s memory today. Saleem was convinced that Urdu literature had a
treasure to offer, but the readership of that language having dwindled, many of the interested
lot are left deprived. He didn’t sit back and sulk, but started on his new mission of translating
the works of his favourite author, QurratulainHyder. That was no easy task. But he loved
taking challenges. He had earlier translated Malika Pukhraj’s memoir which he named, Song
Sung True. QurratulainHyder needs no introduction, but few know that she preferred to
translate her works herself, because she felt that no one else could do justice to them. Among
the works she left untranslated were Chandni Begum, her last novel, and Safina-e Gham-e-
Dil, her second novel, written in 1952. Both were translated by Saleem Kidwai and were
showered with critical acclaim. Safina-e-Gham-e-Dil, which he named Ship of Sorrows, was
a far greater feat of translation, because it is a novel where Hyder, influenced by European
Modernists, was at her experimental best. She was trying literary techniques which she would
later use in her magnum opus, her much-acclaimed Aag Ka Darya (River of Fire).Those who
have read the original Safina-e-Gham-e-Dil will appreciate that to translate it in English was
intensely difficult. Saleem did it with excellence. In the interval between the two novels by
Hyder, he translated Aaina-e-Hairat, a rare book of short stories about animals, written in the
early forties, by Syed Rafiq Hussain. He called it A Mirror of Wonders.
Coming back to his contribution to the “freedom struggle” of the LGBTQIA+ community, it
was the book Same-Sex Love in India: Readings from Literature and History, co-authored by
him and Vanita, which gave the movement strength, and a reason to the cause. In a frank
interview after Section 377 was struck down, Kidwai said that he had been taking notes and
preserving cuttings about same-sex love for a long time. When he got to know that Vanita
was involved in a similar exercise, they decided to exchange notes, and that’s when the
serious research for the book started. The book is based on strong empirical evidence from
early Puranic period about the celebration of same-sex love across India over the last two
millennia. In India, it was outlawed in 1861 by the British when they included Section 377 in
the IPC. The book busts the myth that same-sex relationships are a recent import from the
West. It was the British who came armed with their Victorian morality, and introduced the
Indian Penal Code in India.
In their own country, the British convicted some of the best brains for homosexuality. Oscar
Wilde was thrown into the horrible Reading Gaol, in the mid 1890s, and an unbearably cruel
punishment was meted out to Alan Turing, a top British mathematician and logician for the
same “crime” in 1952. Despite his many path-breaking contributions, Turing was given 12
months of hormone therapy, after which he met a mysterious end. At the beginning of the
21st century, the British government woke up to apologise for the “utterly unfair treatment”
to Turing.
Saleem Kidwai had realised early in life that he should not lead a clandestine life nor allow
friends who shared his leanings to nurse a guilt. He encouraged them to contact and find
members of their community, get together, and then ask for their rights. Individuals, by
themselves, have no say in any matter. To crown it all, he worked hard with someone, who
had the same cause, and produced a book which did wonders.
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Haryana government’s decision to ban the word ‘gorakhdhanda’ is an example of

policy that goes down the slipperiest of slopes
Banning words for political considerations — or, in fact, for almost any other reason — is
going down the slipperiest of slopes.
“Language,” the literary critic Terry Eagleton once wrote, “is the root of all identity. To
tamper with it is either poetry or treason.” The Manohar Lal Khattar government in Haryana,
though, does not seem constrained by these high-minded sentiments. In the most recent salvo
in the seemingly perpetual battle between free speech and “hurt sentiments”, it has decided to
go to bat in defence of the latter. According to a state government spokesperson, the chief
minister of Haryana has decreed that the use of the phrase “gorakhdhanda” be banned in the
state. “The expression cannot be used now in any context.” Gorakhdhanda is a colloquialism
used in large parts of north India to describe unethical practices. Reportedly, Khattar decided
to outlaw the phrase after meeting a delegation of the Gorakhnath community, who are
ostensibly offended by it.
Words, of course, are curious things. Language can enforce inequalities, jokes can
dehumanise people. On the other hand, language evolves and not every word and phrase —
particularly when it morphs into metaphor — is an insult. Banning words for political
considerations — or, in fact, for almost any other reason — is going down the slipperiest of
slopes. Are poor dancers the target of a saying like “naachnajaane, aangantedha”? Should
schoolchildren no longer hear the phrase “andhonmeinkaana raja”, lest it is deemed too
ableist? After all, taken literally, these terms can be seen as offensive to some class of people
or other.
In fact, by trying to prevent “hurt sentiments”, the government does a great disservice to the
people it claims to protect. It makes children of adults, thinking of them as being swayed by
the optics of banning words by an over-interfering father figure of the state. There are many
followers of Gorakhnath, an 11th-century religious figure, but to use their piety as a political
ploy to tamper with language is certainly not poetry.
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The Swachhta journey: New targets, new approaches

Swachh Bharat Mission focused on access to sanitation and therefore construction of toilets.
The new targets cover the entire sanitation value chain and focus on complete waste
treatment and safe disposal
In efforts towards realising the 6th SDG focused on clean water and sanitation, India has
unwaveringly implemented strategies to achieve universal access to safe sanitation like never
before. The government’s flagship sanitation scheme — the Swachh Bharat Mission — has
become the world’s biggest sanitation drive and enabled India to achieve its target of
eliminating open defecation. The toilet coverage in urban India has increased sharply with
more than seven million toilets constructed within a record six years.
While the achievement of ODF status was an important stepping stone in the journey, India is
now leapfrogging to achieve ODF+ and ODF++ status, which are the next set of targets
designed to address the country’s safe sanitation management conundrum. The movement to
attain ODF status under SBM primarily focused on access to sanitation and therefore
construction of toilets. Whereas, these new targets cover the entire sanitation value chain and
focus on complete waste treatment and safe disposal
The government has announced the Urban SBM 2.0 in the Budget 2021-22. With a total
financial allocation of over Rs 1.4 lakh crore, the mission will be an exemplar for the world,
and especially for South Asian countries working towards safely managed sanitation
facilities. The government aims to make all urban local bodies across the country ODF+ and
ODF++ certified by 2024-25. To accomplish this, we must leverage the exceptional
momentum achieved under the SBM’s first phase and give explicit focus to scientific
treatment of toilet waste (Faecal sludge).
Considering the importance of complete wastewater treatment, the AMRUT scheme of the
central government has been driving the rapid establishment of urban wastewater
infrastructure in the country, including the laying of the sewer network. The legacy of
sluggish growth in this sector has been effectively broken with SBM being the inflection
point. However, as sewer projects are cost and time-intensive, the pace of laying the sewer
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network could not be in tandem with such a rapid increase in toilet coverage as observed
under SBM 1.0. As a result, today, about 60 per cent of toilets in urban areas are attached to
non-sewered systems, also known as on-site sanitation systems (OSS). Unlike toilets attached
to sewer systems that transport wastewater from households to treatment plants, OSS systems
require periodic mechanical emptying and transportation of toilet waste collected in the on-
site containment units (septic tanks) attached to toilets. While establishing appropriate sewer
networks in cities remains the long-term goal of the government, dedicated strategies for
Faecal Sludge and Septage Management (FSSM) are crucial at this juncture.
Even though on-site sanitation systems have been prevalent in India since Independence, the
urban sanitation sector never received such dedicated attention as it got after the launch of
strategic National FSSM guidelines in 2017. Before SBM, many cities either dumped the
faecal sludge at an open ground in the city’s outskirts or into the nearest water body/drain,
leading to pollution of natural resources. With the government’s active efforts in the sector
and advocacy around the safe sanitation objectives, the situation has improved multifold.
About 950 cities have optimally addressed the concerns of faecal waste management and are
already certified as ODF++ cities.
Since the deployment of the National FSSM Policy 2017, many states have showcased
exemplary models of FSSM planning at the city level. The need for developing robust
business models, promoting private sector participation, leveraging latest technological
advancements, and bringing extensive mechanisation in operations of the FSSM sector is
well understood. States have leveraged funding from multiple sources, including SBM,
AMRUT and the 14th Finance Commission, and have also introduced various policies,
legislative frameworks, and guidelines. Non-budgetary sources, including CSR funds and
funds from philanthropic organisations, have also provided a significant push in this sector’s
development.
India’s first standalone Faecal Sludge Treatment Plant (FSTP) was constructed in 2015 at
Devanahalli, a municipality in Karnataka. Since then, many states have institutionalised
FSSM and realised significant achievements in this domain. The government of Uttar
Pradesh in partnership with National Mission for Clean Ganga has established an FSTP at
Chunar town to protect the river Ganga from faecal contamination. The states of Telangana
and Andhra Pradesh have worked on the Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM) of Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) for implementing cluster-based FSSM projects covering more than 100
ULBs cumulatively. In 2018, Maharashtra became the first state in the country to implement
a schedule desludging based septic tank emptying service through a Performance-Linked
Annuity Model (PLAM) in partnership with the private sector. Self Help Groups (SHGs) in
Odisha played a crucial role in successful operations of FSSM projects. The model emerged
as a well planned inclusive sanitation programme fostering women empowerment in the field
of sanitation.
The government’s multidimensional policy approach and massive push in this sector have led
to emergence of innovative and disruptive technologies in the last few years. Bandikoot, a
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robotic device, has been developed that cleans sewage from manholes and thus enables safe
working conditions for sanitation workers. The vacuum trucks transporting faecal waste are
now monitored on a realtime basis through GPS systems to ensure safe disposal.
FSSM initiatives also bring several positive externalities. In alignment with the circular
economy concepts, FSSM provides an opportunity to recycle wastewater and faecal sludge.
While recycled water can be utilised for local landscaping applications, treated sludge is a
nutrient-rich material and can be used as manure or soil conditioner for agricultural fields.
This area has emerged as a sunrise sector, with India producing increasing amounts of
manure from composting of solid and faecal sludge waste.
To ensure that efforts towards sanitation in an ever-expanding urban India are guided
appropriately, NITI Aayog also released a knowledge product on FSSM Service and business
models. The book is a repository of 27 best practices witnessed across the country, covering
implementation models for every component of the sanitation service chain and providing
lessons for ULBs nationwide. With the launch of Urban SBM 2.0, India is set to attain the
ODF++ status by having “safely managed sanitation systems” across the country. And this
would truly be a watershed moment for urban sanitation in India.
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Sociology: Ias Gurukul

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IAS GURUKUL

S. No. Topic Page

23. Government decision on non-caste based census 43

S. No. Topic Page

30. Huge numbers may be pushed into dire poverty or starvation…we 56

43. Why Dalit is no longer an empowering word for some marginalized 87

S. No. Topic Page

66. The spiritual lessons from Covid-19 138

69. Sunderlal Bahuguna: Gandhian pioneer of Indian environmentalism, 146

72. The price of pandemic is being paid by women 153

S. No. Topic Page

Women in Armed Forces

Women in Armed Forces: The Timeline

In 2008, a Permanent Commission was extended to women in streams of Judge Advocate

Arguments against induction of more women in the armed forces:

Child Marriage Prosecution in India Report

Findings of the Report:

Interpretation of the Report:

Case study on Child marriages:

Course corrections required:

POSCO needs to be amended to decriminalize consensual, non-coercive relations between

Afghan Refugee Crisis

Sociology of refugee crisis:

Report on religious freedom in India

The findings of the report:

Relatively few Indians (13%) had mixed friends circles.

Interpretation of the report:

It is more of a thali, which has a selection of separate dishes served on a platter.

Sociological Debates on Secularism and Religious tolerance:

Hard Hindu position includes the vision that problematizes secularism.

Report on United Information system for education plus 2019-2020

Findings of the report:

Gross Enrolment Ratio has improved at all levels of school education.

The Pupil-Teacher Ratio has improved at all levels of school education.

Enrolment of Divyang students have increased by 6.52% over 2018-2019.

Open Societies statement

The Open Societies statement:

Populism is an exclusionary form of identity politics that poses a danger to democracy as

Polyarchies have freedom of expression, alternative information, associational autonomy,

Sunderlal Bahugna dead

SunderlalBahugna helped bring the Chipko movement to prominence through a 5000

The Chipko movement/Environmental movements:

He believes that Chipko gradually diverged into three streams:

Wilderness Enthusiasts: who present moral arguments in favor of ‘species equality’;

Scientific conservation: who are concerned with efficiency and management.

Turkey exits Istanbul Convention on Violence against women

Istanbul convention on Violence against Women:

From the European Union, 34 countries signed this treaty.

Repercussions of the withdrawal:

Sociology of domestic violence:

Lokniti-CSDS Youth studies: Marriage trends

The Findings of the report:

Educational attainment is an important factor associated with decline in proportion of married

Interpretation of the report:

Hence, attitudes to marriage remain largely within boundaries of traditional thinking.

Sociology of Indian marriages:

State of Environment in Figures Report 2021: Farmer protests

Findings of the Report:

Sociology of Farmer’s protests:

Gail Omvedt died

Her works in the field of sociology:

Gail Omvedt’santi-caste writings have a unique influence on the Dalit-Bahujan movement in