G.

ESTAFA
G.R. No. L-17021             February 23, 1921
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC DOMINGUEZ, defendant-appellant.
Pablo, Guzman & Lucero for appellant.
Attorney-General Feria for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

The fact which gave rise to the present appeal is described in the information as follows:

That on or about 19th day of January, 1920, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused who
was a salesman at the Philippine Education Co., Inc. did then and there receive the sum of seven pesos and
fifty centavos (pesos 750) from one Lamberto Garcia as payment for five copies of Sam's "Practical
Business Letters" bought from the store of the said company, which amount should have been turned over
and delivered by him (accused) to the company's cashier or his authorized representative therein; that
instead of delivering the said amount to the said cashier or his representative therein, which he knew it was
his obligation to do, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally misappropriate
and convert it to his own personal use to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Education Co., Inc.
in the sum of seven pesos and fifty centavos (pesos 7.50) equivalent to 37 ½ pesetas.

At the close of the trial the court found the accused guilty of the crime of estafa of the sum of pesos 7.50 and
sentenced him to be imprisoned for two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessories provided by law,
and costs.

Appeal having been taken to this to this Supreme Court, the counsel for the accused assigns, as error committed by
the court, its finding that the accused is guilty of the crime charged and its action in imposing upon him the penalty
corresponding to a principal in the crime of estafa.

It is proved that the accused, as salesman of the bookstore "Philippine Education Co., Inc." sold on the morning of
January 19, 1920, five copies of Sams' "Practical Business Letters," of the value of seven pesos and fifty centavos
(pesos 7.50), which the accused should have immediately delivered to the cashier but which he did not deliver, until
after it was discovered that he had sold the books and received their value without delivering it to the cashier, as
was his duty.

The accused alleges that he did not deliver the money immediately after the sale, because the cash boys were very
busy as well as the cashier, while he had to go to the toilet for some necessity, and upon coming out, the cashier
caught him by the arm and asked him for the money, and then he delivered the sum of pesos 7.50 to him; and that it
was not his intention to make use of said money. Such claim, nevertheless, does not exempt him from the criminal
responsibility which he had incurred, for the evidence before us shows clearly that he attempted to defraud the
"Philippine Education Co., Inc." Upon being asked for the money, he first said that a woman, whom he did not know,
bought books, without having paid, for the reason that she was, according to herself, in a hurry; and, latter, he went
out of the store to talk to a friend who was employed in the Pacific Mail Steamship Co. to tell him that if anyone
should ask him if he (the employee of the Pacific Mail Steamship Co.) bought books that morning in the store of the
"Philippine Education Company" he should answer affirmatively. Furthermore, he had also declared to the manager
of the bookstore that he used part of the money in purchasing postage stamps.

There can be no doubt as to the injury which the accused would have caused to the interests of the company in
retaining for himself the proceeds of the sale in question.

But the question of law to be decided is whether the fact that the accused retained in his possession the proceeds of
the sale, delivering them to the cashier only after the deceit had been discovered, constitutes a consummated
offense or merely a frustrated offense of estafa.

Should the fact that the accused attempted to get certain bundles of merchandise at the station, by means of the
presentation of the tag sent to the consignee in a letter which must have been taken from the mail, it not having
been proven by whom or how it came to the accused, who did not attain their object, because the bundles had been
withdrawn two or three days before by the consignee, be considered as an attempted or frustrated offense? The
supreme court of Spain in its decision of January 3, 1876, in deciding the appeal taken by the accused, who alleged
that the act constituted only an attempt and not a frustrated estafa, declared that the appeal was not well taken, on
the ground that the offense is frustrated when the accused performs all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime, and, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the actor,
and that in said case the appellant, together with his coaccused attempted to take possession of the two bundles
which they believed were at the station, by going there and presenting the tag, and they did not succeed because
these bundles had already been taken, which constitutes the frustrated crime.

In his commentaries on the Penal Code Viada asks the following questions: "Is immediate return by the accused of
the thing he intended to convert, as soon as the injured party found out the fraud committed, sufficient to divest the
act of its consummated character and to place it within the limits of a mere frustrated offense?" "The religious
society of Santa Clara deposited, in the year 1868, with D. Manuel Nuñez an oil painting on copper, but when they
demanded it a few years afterwards, the latter delivered to them the same frame but with merely a copy of the
original painting, which, upon his order, a painter had made for the sum of 40 pesetas. The substitution having been
afterwards noted, the society protested and Nuñez returned the original, valued at 125 pesetas, and in turn obtained
the copy referred to. But, in the meantime a criminal action having been instituted upon this fact and prosecuted to
trial, the Madrid court, holding that Nuñez had defrauded and injured the society in the amount of the difference in
the value of the paintings, sentenced him, as principal in the consummated crime of estafa, defined in number 5 of
article 548 of the Code, to the penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor, together with the accessories,
and costs. An appeal having been taken from said judgment, on the ground that it violated among others, article 3 of
the Code, the Supreme Court, declaring that the appeal was well taken, held that the estafa committed was mere
frustrated estafa. 'Considering that while the acts of D. Manuel Nuñez appear to have been actuated by the desire to
convert the painting to his own use and the consequent injury of its owner, and that to that end he performed all the
acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, nevertheless, the injury and the appropriation were not
realized, and therefore the crime was not consummated because of a cause independent of his will, which was the
discovery of the substitution of the plate, after which the owner obtained what belonged to him without the objection
of the depositary and without any delay juridically appreciable — therefore, the trial court in holding as
consummated an offense that was frustrated, violated, in failing to apply it, article 3 of the Code.' " (1 Viada, 65.)

The same author puts and solves the following question: "Where a person appointed Commissioner to make
collection of debts due to the public treasury for real estate taxes owing by a mining company goes to a store and
acts of the owner thereof a certain sum in order that he might not file a complaint by virtue of which the owner might
have to pay a big fine because the establishment was not registered in the corresponding class, and the owner pays
him part of the sum demanded, but he is in the act caught by agents of the authority who were detailed for the
purpose, is he guilty of the consummated or simply frustrated crime of estafa? The criminal branch of the court of
Seville found him guilty of the former and sentenced him to the penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
But, appeal having been taken from the judgment on the ground that the fact constituted only an attempt to
commit estafa, the Supreme Court, while not of the same opinion, however, held that the crime committed was
merely frustrated: 'Considering that while the acts executed by the appellant should be qualified, not merely as an
attempt, as claimed by the appellant, inasmuch as he did not limit himself to commencing the acts of execution of
the crime, but as a frustrated crime because the accused performed all the acts of execution which should produce
the crime as a result, such s the obtaining of the money exacted, in this manner apparently realizing his object, but
which acts nevertheless did not produce the crime by reason of a cause independent of his will, which cause in this
case was the appearance of agents of the authority at the place, as a consequence of the complaint filed by Da.
Candelaria Polanco to the treasury deputy, a fact which prevented the consummation of the crime prosecuted,
which would have consisted in completely divesting the owner of his money, a result prevented by the vigilance of
the authorities: Considering that in not so holding the trial court erred on a point of law, as claimed, and violated the
articles of the Penal Code to which the appeal refers, etc., etc.' " (Viada, Suppl. 1887-1889, p. 8.)

Applying the doctrine, established by the supreme court of Spain in the decisions cited, to the case at bar, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that the appellant is guilty of the frustrated offense of estafa of 37 ½ pesetas, inasmuch as
he performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence, but which, by reason of
causes independent of his will, did not produce it, no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended
party, such damage being one of the essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts
prosecuted.
From what has been said, it results that the judgment appealed from should, as it is hereby, modified, and the
accused is sentenced to pay a find of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs of the trial. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Streets and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

H.BRIBERY
G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Macario C. Ofilada, Jr. for petitioner.
Gil Venerando R. Racho collaborating counsel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUERRERO, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

In an Information dated July 22, 1980 and filed with the City Court of Angeles City, Branch I, docketed thereat as
Criminal Case No. CAT-326, petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines, was
charged with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official, allegedly committed as follows:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an applicant for probation
after he was convicted of an offense by a competent court, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of
P100.00 in a paper bill with Serial Nos. BC530309, under circumstances that would make the said
City Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo liable for bribery.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said information and, after trial, the City Court inits decision of
May 15, 1981 found the petitioner guilty of the crime of corruption of a public official, the dispositive portion of which
reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Gregory Pozar guilty of the offense of Corruption of a
Public Official as charged in the Information, and the Court pursuant to Article 212, in relation to
Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused Gregory James Pozar to an
imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor, and hereby censures him for his
actuation in this matter, with costs against the accused.

The one hundred peso bill is hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals (now In termediate Appellate Court) and subsequently, the
appellate court affirmed the same in toto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 19, 1982
and on December 21, 1982, petitioner filed the instant petition for review of the decision of the respondent court,
relying on the constitutional precept that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved." (Article IV, Sec. 19), and that the State, having the burden of establishing all the elements of
the crime with which the accused is charged, must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, has
failed to present and establish the required quantum of proof against the accused petitioner, hence he is entitled to
an acquittal. .

The evidence for the prosecution are stated in the decision of the respondent court, thus:  têñ.£îhqwâ£
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco and Mr.
Danilo Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed on the witness stand appellant himself
and his counsel Atty. Reynaldo Suarez.

Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he started working at
the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know appellant because the latter had gone to
said office in connection with his application for probation; that at about noontime of December 17,
1979, appellant came to the office looking for Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo and since the latter
was out at the time, appellant gave him a closed envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery
to the latter; that two days later, he gave the envelope to Ocampo who opened the same in his
presence; that the envelope contained some official papers connected with appellant's application
for probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso bill; that Ocampo then remarked: 'This s
something bad that the opening of the envelope was done on December 19, 1979; that Ocampo
kept the envelope and its contents, including the one hundred peso bill, but within a week's time
gave them to him with instructions to give the same to appellant but the latter never came to the
office and so he returned them to Ocampo; that although he later saw appellant about two weeks
after December 17, 1979, when the latter came to the office to sign some papers, he never
mentioned to appellant the one hundred peso bill (pp. 2-16, t.s.n., September 16, 1980)

Manalo further declared that at the nine the envelope with the one hundred peso bill was given to
him by appellant for delivery to Ocampo, he already had an inkling or knowledge that the Probation
Office will recommend for the grant of appellant's application for probation because he was the one
who makes the final typing of a post, sentence investigation report and before said final typing
Ocampo usually talks to him, so that he knows whether the recommendation was for a grant or
denial of an application (pp. 16-19, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).

Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation Office, declared
that she knows appellant because the latter was one of the applicants for probation in 1979 and she
was the one assigned to investigate appellant's case; that as Assistant Probation Officer in the
Investigation of applications for probation and in the case of appellant, she requested him to submit
certain pertinent documents required by their office, such as barangay, police and court clearances,
residence certificate, etc.; that she prepared appellant's post-sentence Investigation Report (Exhs.
"B" to "B-5") that she first saw appellant on December 7, 1979, when she interviewed him on his
social and personal history and his version of the offense, among others; that she gave the list of
documents which are to be submitted to the office; that the second time she saw appellant was on
December 21, 1979 but appellant was out at the time and when she saw that he was in his car that
broke down in front of the Pampaguena she tried to can him but the car left as she was about to
reach the place (pp. 2-21, tsn, January 26, 1981).

Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21, 1979, the latter
was asking person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with Probation Officer, Mr.
Ocampo, anent the matter; that she then prepared a draft of the Post-Sentence Investigation report
and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo who told him not to delete the bribery incident from
the report; that it was first from Manalo and later from Ocampo that she became aware of the bribery
or more accurately corruption of a public official committed by appellant (pp. 21-25, t.s.n., January
26, 1981).

The third prosecution witness was complaint himself Danilo Ocampo, who declared that he has been
the Probation Officer of an Angeles City, Probation Office since 1977 and that his employees thereat
were Ricardo Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and Ramon de Leon; that at about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of December 19, 1979, he received a closed letter envelope from his clerk. Manalo, at the
Probation Office at Merlan Building, Angeles City, Manalo informing him that the same came from
appellant; that he opened the envelope on the presence of Manalo and found that the same
contained xerox copies of the passport (Exh. "D") and visa (Exh. "D-1") of appellant and inserted
with said documents. was a hundred peso bill with Serial No. BC530309 (Exh. "A-l"); that the
envelope given him by Manalo was addressed to him Mr. Danilo Ocampo, Probation Officer, in
handwritten for that he could not, however, produce said envelope the same having been misplaced
that he kept the one hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence against appellant; that when he
 met Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, appellant's counsel at the Angeles City Court on January 14, 1980, he
told the latter about the envelope received from appellant containing the passport, visa and the one
hundred peso bill inserted with said documents and intimated to the lawyer that the client should not
have inserted said one hundred peso bill (pp. 46-57, t.s.n. September 16, 1980).

Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was prepared by Mrs.
Francisco who conducted the investigation; that the first time he saw appellant was on December
10, 1979, when the latter was seeking permission to go to Baguio City and being a foreigner, he
required him to submit to his office copies of the latter's passport and visa; that the second time he
met appellant was in March, 1980, when the hearing of appellant's application for probation was
conducted at Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required appellant to give money, so
that when he saw the one hundred peso bill (Exh. "A") in the envelope handed him by Manalo, he
was very much surprised; that he intended to confront appellant but was unable to do so but was
able to inform Atty. Suarez, appellant's lawyer, about the matter when he met him at the City Court;
that at the time the envelope containing the documents and money was handed to him on,
December 19, 1979, the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was not yet finished and that the same
was submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on February 5, 1980; that the fact that appellant
enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope was mentioned in said report (pp. 60-73, t.s.n.,
September 16, 1980).

Ocampo further testified that at the time of the hearing of appellant's application or petition for
probation, the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the City Court held a conference in the court's chamber
with appellant's counsel the trial fiscal and himself, during which they discussed the bribery incident
mentioned in the report; that the presiding judge of Branch I, after some clarifications regarding the
incident in question, suggested that coplainant should lodge a complaint against appellant and the
all should conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
a prima facie case (pp. 75-76, 82-86, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).

Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-Sentence Investigation Report recommending
the granting of appellant's application for probation, notwithstanding the bribery or corruption incident
mentioned in said report, because appellant's act was not yet a disqualification under the law, as he
was still presumed innocent until he is found guilty by the court (pp. 90-91, t.s.n. December 8, 1980).

The appealed decision tersely cited the evidence for the defense in the following manner:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the
envelope delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in
the xerox copying or reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office. (p. 7,
CA Decision).

Considering that the findings of fact in the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the decision of the trial
court, do not mention nor indicate the circumstances surrounding the incident and the filing of the information
against the petitioner other than the admitted fact that the one hundred peso bill was placed in the envelope
together with the visa and passport of the petitioner which he handed on December 17, 1979 to Mr. Ricardo Manalo
and which the latter in turn handed on December 19, 1979 to Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo, in fairness to the
petitioner, We quote hereunder the decision of the trial court which recited the said circumstances that led to the
filing of the Information against the petitioner, to wit: 
têñ.£îhqwâ£

From the evidence presented, the following facts appear to the court to be indubitable; That the
accused was convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical Injuries, and the crime of Oral
Defamation of the City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, and the said accused was sentenced to an
imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto Menor and to pay a fine of P50.00 and to pay the complaining
witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt damages. After he was sentenced, he, on
November 28, 1979 filed an Application for Probation. That after filing the application for Probation,
the accused, together with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to the Probation Office purposely
to inquire for the requirements need for his client's petition for probation. Unfortunately, Atty. Suarez
and his client did not reach the Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of
the Probation Office, whom they reached, and they were re. requested to come back to the office
 regarding their inquiry inasmuch as the Probation Officer was not in the office. Later, Atty. Suarez
called through the telephone the Probation Office, and, on that occasion he was able to talk with the
Probation Inspector, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco. He was inquiring from Mrs. Francisco the necessary
documents regarding the application for probation of his client and Mrs. Francisco suggested that he
would come over the office in order to give him all the necessary information. The lawyer just
instructed Mrs. Francisco to give a list of the requirements to Mr. Pozar, the accused, who was then
in the, Office of the Probation Officer, and accordingly, Mrs. Francisco handed to Mr. Pozar a list of
the documents needed in his probation (see Exhibit E for the prosecution, and Exhibit 3 for the
defense). It also appears that all the re. requirements listed in the list given by Mrs, Francisco were
given to Mrs. Francisco, and at times to Mr. Manalo. The person who conducted the investigation
was actually Mrs. Francisco. On December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see the Probation
Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and in that meeting, aside from the fact that he was asking permission
from the Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Probation Officer required him to furnish the
Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa, and his I.D. picture, inasmuch as it was explained to him
these were needed, he being a foreigner. On December 17, 1979 Mr. Pozar went to the Probation
Office looking for the Probation Officer, and when the Probation Officer was not there, he handed to
Mr. Manalo an envelope address to the Probation Of officer and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to
give the same to Mr. Ocampo. It was on December 19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the envelope
given by Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when Danilo Ocampo opened it in the presence of
Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope a xerox copy of the applicant's passport, xerox copy of
his visa, and attached also with the same document was a one hundred peso bill It would seem that
Mr. Ocampo asked Mr. Manalo to keep the one hundred peso bill and return it to Mr. Pozar, but
when Mr. Pozar did not arrive to the office, Mr. Manalo gave it back to Mr. Ocampo Mr. Danilo
Ocampo kept the one hundred peso bill but made it a point that this incident regarding the receiving
of the one hundred peso being be included in the post-sentence investigation report which was
being prepared by Mrs. Francisco. At that time when the one hundred peso bill was given, the post-
sentence investigation report was not yet finished. The record shows that the same was submitted to
the court only on February 8, 1980. At the hearing of the application for probation in March 1980,
when the Presiding Judge of City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, noted and saw from the report the
alleged incident of the accused's giving the one hundred peso bill he called for a conference and in
that conference, he suggested that the manner should be investigated by the Office of the City
F'iscal Acting upon such suggestion Danilo Ocampo formally filed an Information Sheet against the
accused Gregory Pozar (Exhibit 2). It is also a fact admitted by the defense that after the one
hundred peso bill was handed and the Probation Officer was not able to return the same, he
informed Atty. Suarez at the sala of City Court Branch II sometime on January 14, 1980. (pages 8-9)

As stated earlier, petitioner was found guilty of the offense of Corruption of Public Official as defined and penalized
in the Revised Penn Code as follows:  têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 212. Corruption of Public Officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted,
except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have
made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.

The preceding Articles of the Revised Penal Code are Articles 210 and 211 which define and penalize the offenses
of direct bribery and indirect bribery, and they provide as follows: 
têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who will agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shag suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the
value of the gift and not more than three times such value, in addition to the penalty corresponding
to the crime agreed upon, ff the same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph, and if said shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and
not more than twice such value,
 If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from
doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not less than the value of the gift and not more than
three times such value.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty
of special temporary disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors,
arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts, or any other persons performing public
duties.

Art. 211. Indirect Bribery. — The penalties of arresto mayor, suspension in its minimum and medium
periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered
to him by reason of his office.

It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public officer receives gift.
While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, in
indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exist. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act
or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer
should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by
reason of his office. (The Revised Penal Code by Luis P. Reyes, 1975 Ed., p. 332).

In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the petitioner charged that the accused "did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum
of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with serial No. BC530309, under circumstances that would make the
said City Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, liable for bribery.

The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as charged in the Information
and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced the accused to an
imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and public censure. This is erroneous. The trial
court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as consummated offense (which
is affirmed by the respondent appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both
decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one hundred
peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official. (See The Revised Penal Code by
Justice Ramon Aquino, 1976 Ed., Vol. II, p. 1168, citing the cases of Uy Matiao, 1 Phil. 487; Camacan 7 Phil. 329;
Tan Gee, 7 Phil. 738; SyGuikao 18 Phil. 482; Te Tong, 26 Phil. 453; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562; Ching, CA-G.R. No. 439-
R, July 31, 1947). Attempted corruption of a public official is punished with destierro and is cognizable by inferior
courts (See Revised Penal Code by justice Aquino, Vol. II, 1976 Ed., citing the cases of Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,
86 Phil. 617; Santos y Bautista, 87 PhiL 687; Dalao v. Geronimo, 92 Phil. 1942; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562).

Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the one
hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it will be used to defray expenses
in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the Probation Office in connection with petitioner's
application for probation then pending in said office.

The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive
Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information ( complaint) Court decision,
Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police, the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D.
pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and told to report once a week on Mondays. (Exhibit "E"). This was on
December 7, 1979.

Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10, 1979 when the latter
was asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. Mrs. Francisco to
testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for Baguio. And according to the petitioner,
"during all the time he was applying for probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to
report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times
that he went there unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various re. requirements he needed. During
all the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr.
Ocampo interviewed him He submitted all the requirements to the Probation Officer; at times, he submitted them
directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr. Ocampo. Other than those listed in the
list given by Mrs. Francisco, he was required to submit xerox copy of his passport, his visa and his pictures. He
explained that he gave the requirements to the person who was interviewing him, primarily Mrs. Francisco, of the
documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office xerox copy of the original He likewise submitted his two
passports, and later xerox copy of his passports. When Mrs. Francisco was asking for the original, which documents
are in the possession of his lawyer at his office, he had to return to get the originals." (Decision of Trial Court, p. 5).
Petitioner's travail is, therefore, quite evident.

From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation in
the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a
foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was
needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not
criminal.

In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense as against the
conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the
appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation
Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's
criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to
acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. There is not that moral certainty required to convict him. Even the complainant himself, the
Probation Officer, filed the complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding judge of the Angeles City Court during
the hearing on petitioner's application for probation, the complaint having been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on
June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED. The
accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

1. As stated by the Solicitor General the pretension of the petitioner that he was confused with respect to the
requirements and/or processing of his application for probation pending before the complaining witness Probation
Officer Danilo Ocampo of Angeles City, is incredible. As early as December 7, 1979, about ten (10) days before
December 17, 1979 (the delivery of the P100 peso bill inside a closed letter envelope petitioner was already
interviewed by Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Probation Office of Angeles City, who
gave him the list of documents to be submitted to the office. Hence, petitioner already knew then what papers were
required of hint

2. His claim that the P100 peso bill contained in the aforesaid closed letter envelope was for xerox copies of other
documents that may be required of him by the Probation Office, is belied by the aforesaid fact that as early as
December 7, 1979, Assistant Probation Officer Francisco already gave him the list of documents that he should
submit to the Probation Office, and that on December 10, 1979, Probation Officer Ocampo also required him to
submit xerox copies only of his passport and visa as he was a foreigner, in connection with his request for
permission to go to Baguio City.
3. If, as he alleged, the P100 bill was intended for xerox copies of other documents that may be required of him, he
should have, as stated by the Solicitor General in his comment and memorandum, given the same to the clerk
Ricardo Manalo of the Probation Office, with instructions that the same should cover whatever xerox copies of other
documents may be needed. Or he should have attached or clipped the P100 bill to a note addressed to Probation
Officer Ocampo that the said money is to cover expenses for xerox copies of other documents that may be required
of him.

4. Petitioner could have just given the P100 bill to his lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, with instructions that the same
should be paid for whatever xerox copies of other documents that may be required of him in connection with his
application for probation.

5. Petitioner saw Assistant Probation Officer Francisco on December 21, 1979; but on said date petitioner did not
bother to ask either Assistant Probation Officer Francisco on December 21, 1979; but on said date petitioner did not
bother to ask either Assistant Probation Officer Francisco or the Probation Clerk Ricardo Manalo, whether the P100
bill was spent for xerox copies of other documents. He went there that day, December 21, 1979, precisely to
reiterate his request for permission to leave for Baguio City and Assistant Probation Officer Francisco advised him to
talk to Probation Officer Ocampo whom he did not even try to see that day, December 21, 1979.

6. Petitioner could not presume that his application for probation would be favorably acted upon because he was still
then being subjected to an investigation by Assistant Probation petition Officer Francisco who submitted her post-
sentence report to the City Court only on February 5, 1980. Said report included the statement about the bribe
money. Probation Officer Ocampo had to recommend in March, 1980 approval of petitioner's application for
probation; because at that time he had not yet filed the complaint with the City Fiscal's Office for corruption of public
officer against petitioner who, as stressed by Probation Officer Ocampo, was presumed innocent until adjudged
guilty of such corruption,

Hence, the conviction of petitioner should be affirmed but only for attempted corruption of a public officer, because
Probation officer Ocampo did not accept the money; otherwise, said probation officer would be equally guilty as the
corruptor.

i. ARSON

G.R. No. L-31770 December 5, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONINO HERNANDEZ, defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

In the judgment appealed from the appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years and one
day presidio mayor, with the accessaries of law, and the costs.

On February 3, 1929, Miguel Dayrit, the offended party, was living with his children in his house situated in the
barrio of Duque, municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga. At a little past midnight on that date, and after
Miguel Dayrit had retired, he noticed that the thatched roof of his house was on fire. He got up to fetch some water
with which to extinguish the fire, when, looking out of the window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a
stick (Exhibit A). Miguel Dayrit shouted for help, and started to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a
small part of the roof had burned. In answer to his cries for help, Artemio Tanglao repaired to the place and saw the
defendant running away. Daniel Mallari also came, and on his way to the house met the defendant.

The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.

The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari, establishes beyond
all doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick which Miguel Dayrit saw in the
appellant's possession on that night was found leaning against the house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with
petroleum dangling from it. Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.

It should be noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel Dayrit, had some
disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was stealing his paddy piled up behind his
house. The offended party communicated his suspicions to the barrio lieutenant, who, together with the
complainant, went to the appellant's house, but the latter armed with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would
cut them to pieces, and that he recognized no authority. This characteristic violence on the part of the appellant was
also shown when, in pursuance of this information, he was arrested; for he refused to give himself up.

The trial court held that the crime committed was only frustrated arson. We agree with the Attorney-General that the
crime was consummated. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact
partially burned. With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was
afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not
depend upon the extent of the damage cause. This court has so held in the cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy
and Go Jancho (25 Phil., 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).

The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved, article 549 of the
Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena temporal to life imprisonment. And as the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as having been doubtless sought by the
appellant in order to insure the commission of the crime, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.

In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with article 549 of the
Penal Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a dwelling, knowing that within it were
the offended party and his children; and, considering one aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime,
the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessaries, and the costs.

The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the damage caused was
very slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the second paragraph of article 2 of the Penal
Code, these facts be explained to the Executive, for the exercise of his clemency to such an extent as he may deem
proper. The suggestion is accepted, and it is hereby ordered that the clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it
becomes final, to the Governor-General for consideration. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant.
Ariston Estrada for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court of First Instance of this
city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y Bunaladi, alias Hugo Navarro y Bunadia, with the
crime of arson, and, on the 20th of May of the present year, judgment was rendered whereby Severino or Faustino
Valdes u Guilgan was sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the costs. From
this judgment this defendant appealed. With respect to Hugo Labarro or Navarro, the proceedings were dismissed
with the other half of the costs de officio.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin was absent from the house in
which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street, San Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have
been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower
floor of the latter's house, for until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to
the fact she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he found, so asked with kerosene
oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which
were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while, the
other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called for the purpose by
telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement, Exhibit C, drawn up in the police station,
admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been
noticed on the date mentioned. and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said
house on previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo
Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were
friends, he acted as he did under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he should
start. 
lawphi1.net

The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the police station, although he
denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with kerosene, in the place where they were found, and
stated, that it was the servant Paulino who had done so. He alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had
set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in
the police station, to wit, that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the house.

For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the other defendant Hugo
Labarro.

Owing to the repeated attempts made for about a month past, since Severino Valdes Began to serve the Lewin
family, to burn the house above mentioned. occupied by the latter and in which this defendant was employed, some
policemen were watching the building and one of them, Antonio Garcia del Cid., one morning prior to the
commission of the crime, according to his testimony, saw the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the
warehouse behind the dwelling house, in which warehouse there was some straw that had previously been burned,
and that, when the defendant noticed the presence of the policeman, he desisted from climbing the wall and
entering the warehouse.

The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of the house
and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of
frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it.. This crime of
provided for and punished by article 549, in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and
the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for,
notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he
who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred in
said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though at the
trial he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and burning, and,
without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a pile of
dry leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his
mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to continue burning
until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was submitted to
substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same persons as the driver
Hugo Labarro.

The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended
was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said
inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of
sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have
started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with the commission of the
crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in degree to that specified in article 549 of
the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium degree.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the modification however, that the
penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be given eight years and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed in article 57 of the Code. The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.