INDO-PAK WAR 1965 (01 Sep – 22 Sep 1965)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

1. PM, India Lal Bahadur Shastri
2. President, Pakistan Ayub Khan
3. Commander in Chief, Pak Army Gen Muhammad Musa
4. Commander in Chief, PAF Air Mshl Nur Khan
5. COAS, Indian Army Gen JN Chaudhuri
6. CAS, IAF ACM Arjan Singh

Introduction

1. The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial ever since coming into being of
Pakistan in 1947. The two countries have been involved in two major conflicts in 1965 and 1971 and a
minor skirmish in 1965 in Rann of Kutch besides the initial confrontation in 1947. The ‘22 days War’
between India and Pakistan marks a watershed in the history of sub-continent. Pakistan had strong backing
from USA in terms of military aid and donations, and had strong relations with China after 1962 Indo-china
conflict. After 1962 debacle, the Indian Armed Forces were being re-equipped and re-organised and this
process was estimated to be completed by 1966-67. Pakistan wanted to use this opportunity. Thus,
encouraged by the newfound military power and plagued by the internal problems, the Pakistani General
decided to try and wrest Kashmir from India by force, so as to appease the public opinion.

Background

2. Having failed in its attempts to capture Kashmir through Op Grand Design, when desperate
Pakistani Army threatened the vital Akhnur Bridge and the Jammu - Poonch Road through Chhamb
Offensive on 01 Sep 1965 through Op Grand Slam, the go-ahead was given to the IAF to swing into action.
It was to help stem the unexpected threat of Pakistani armour which had crossed IB in Jammu later
extending into strategic bombing deep into Pakistan.

Force Levels

3. The force levels on both the sides were as given below:-

(a) PAF. PAF had a well equipped and highly trained force of 17 Sqns- 02 Sqns of B-57
bombers, 01 Sqn of F-104 Star fighters, 04 Sqns of F-86 Sabres, 01 Sqn of SA-16 Albatross
amphibious aircraft, __________ helicopters for MR, 02 Tpt Sqns of C-130 Hercules, 01 Sqn of RB-
57 High Altitude Recce aircraft and 02 Sqns of T-69, T-33 and T-37 trainers used for Recce and
Ground Attack.

(b) IAF. IAF had 26 Fighter, 04 Bomber Sqns, 13 Sqns of Tpt aircraft and 02 Helicopter Sqns.
Out of these there was 01 Sqn of Mig-21s, 08 Sqns of Hunters, 05 Sqns of Gnats, 05 Sqns of
Mysteres, 06 Sqns of Vampires,__________

IAF Roles

4. The IAF was tasked with the following roles during the operations:-

(a) CAO against the Pakistani airfields and targets.

(b) BAS in support of ground forces.

(c) BAI.

(d) Air Tpt Operations.

Air Operations

While the armies battled on the ground, the Air Forces of both countries fought for mastery of the air. As a
result, lAF had definitely established a favourable air situation. The aims of the IAF were:
(a) To attain general air superiority over own and enemy air space

(b) To support the ground forces and facilitate their operations in the battlefield.

To attain the above aims, the following operations were carried out:-

Bombing Attacks

18. Bombing Policy. The bombing policy formulated by Government of India was to strike at the military
targets of strategic and tactical importance only. All centres of population including the public utility services
were excluded from target list; so much so that some of the military targets which were likely to cause
damage to civilian life and property were deliberately taken off the list. This explains why the IAF restricted
the offensive strikes to military airfields and radar units only.

19. Both the countries did not possess any long-range heavy bombers. Only medium bombers formed the
strike force. The strength and performance of both the air forces were almost matching. IAF had three
operational squadrons of Canberra aircraft, out of which two were deployed in Western Sector and one was
kept in Eastern Sector. In comparison, Pakistan possessed two Squadrons of RB-57 aircraft.

20. IAF carried out bombing missions against Pakistan airfields at Peshawar, Sargodha, Kohat, Chaklala,
Jhumra and Badin between 5th and 22nd September, 1965. IAF also carried out strike missions against
Pakistan radar units especially at Sargodha and Badin.

21. Pakistan too had a similar bombing policy. PAF B-57s directed their attacks mainly against the IAF
bases at Halwara, Adampur, Ambala, Pathankot, Jammu & Jodhpur and against IAF radar units particularly
at Amritsar and Ambala. However, their bombing results proved to be very poor. The glaring examples of
this could be seen at Ambala, Jodhpur and Amritsar where they succeeded in demolishing a Church,
Central Jail and suburb of Amritsar.

23. A feature of these bombing missions was the failure of conventional bombs against runways. Despite of
heavy and continuous bombing raids over Sargodha and Chaklala etc. by IAF and like wise over Adampur
and Jodhpur by PAF, none of these airfields could be put out of action for more than a few hours at a time.

Tactical Air Operations

24. IAF used Gnats, Mysteres, Hunters, and Vampires in Tactical Air operations. To gain Air Superiority in
own as well as enemy skies Indian Air Force aircraft operated from Pathankot, Halwara, Adampur and
Ambala. These mainly comprised Gnats, Hunters and Mysteres. The aircraft undertook sorties to destroy
tanks, armoured vehicles and enemy’s guns from the very first day of the war. In the course of war, as
many as 190 tanks were destroyed by Indian Air Force. The fighter aircraft flew continuous sorties to assist
the Army in her three prong and two-prong initial attacks in Lahore and Sialkot Sectors. Tactical
reconnaissance reports by our fighter pilots proved to be of immense value to the Army especially when
troops were being transported from Chhamb area to other theatres of war.

27. In interdiction role, constant attacks were made by IAF aircraft rendering Jhelum- Gujarat section of
West Pakistan Railway unserviceable. Lyallpur-Lahore Railways line was also damaged to a considerable
extent by Hunters, not to mention about the road supply lines that were literally destroyed.

Air Defence

31. India’s air defence was a major task. It had many facets, that is, detection, recognition and destruction
of hostile aircraft by using interceptors, SAMs and anti-aircraft guns. Gnats and MIG-21s were exclusively
used for interception role. These aircraft were deployed at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara overlooking
the theatres of war.

32. First interception was carried out by Gnats over Chhamb sector on 3rd September 1965 and it was on
this day that India claimed the first kill, in the air. On subsequent days, more interceptions were carried out
and a total of 17 aircraft were shot down besides 26 claimed by anti-aircraft guns. Pakistan Air Force has
claimed to have shot down, 15 aircraft with their air defence operations.
Air Operations in the East

8. Limited operations were carried out in the Eastern Sector. Canberras carried out Recce sorties to
Chittagong to see Pakistani air activity and if so to neutralise them on ground, they dropped bombs on the
runway. This was followed by Vampire strikes on Jessore, Toofanis striking Lalmunhat while Hunters
carried out fighter sweeps over Dacca. The lone PAF F-86 Sqn in East Pakistan attacked Kalaikunda on 07
Sep and destroyed 02 Canberras and 04 fully armed Vampires on ground. In subsequent strike msns IAF
could manage to shoot down 04 x F-86 aircraft only. When the war stopped on 23 Sep 1965, PAF losses
stood at 73 aircraft while IAF losses were 35 aircraft.

Shortcomings

10. CAO against PAF bases were hampered by lack of Intelligence and low ROA of IAF aircraft.

(a) BAS was also haphazard because it was following an untried procedure. Only one formation,
Adv HQ WAC, was coordinating these operations for the entire gamut of Army Operations. The
demands for BAS kept piling up at Adv HQ without being actioned frustrating the Army Formations.

(b) Co-ordination and communication problems predominated.

Lessons Learnt (65 war was SHARP JOINt)

11. The 1965 Operations brought out many inadequacies which can be described as lessons learnt,
these are:-

(a) Joint Planning. Need for joint inter-service planning.

(b) Intelligence. Reasonably accurate and current Intelligence and target information.

(c) Recce. Need for PR/ FR capability to assess damage. This was centralized at Army and
Air HQ, resulting in delay in information from this source. Limited requests were entertained and
developed copies arrived too late to be of any tactical use.

(d) Strike Aircraft. Need for long range strike aircraft.

(e) Operational Bases. More operational bases along border to cover full theatre of
operations.

(f) AD Assets. Need for PAD/GD, AD assets and blast pens.

(g) Need for Adv HQ. Effective links for BAS between Air Force and Army and provision of
streamlined process for processing BAS demands.

(h) Helicopters. Helicopters proved invaluable in the mountainous terrain of J&K. The
various roles carried out by them were, the move of urgently required defence stores and
ammunition during critical operations, Casevac from inaccessible areas, speedy recce and use as
air observation posts.

(j) Political Hesitation. Political hesitation delayed the decision on employment of air power
in the Chhamb sector until it was all but too late, even the IAF’s own half hearted participation
before the desperate reaction of PAF led to the air war.

Conclusion

12. The 1965 War gave the IAF a chance to test its ability and efficiency. The enthusiasm with ‘which all
ranks of the IAF worked and the long and tiring hours they put in for the entire duration of hostilities was
unparalleled. The credit for the brilliant success, the IAF achieved in these operations does not rest only
with those few who actually took part in the operation but to all members of the Service, all airmen, officers
and civilians who put in their best and utmost towards achieving this aim.
 INDO-PAK WAR 1971 (03 Dec – 16 Dec 1971)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

1. PM, India Indira Gandhi
2. President, Pakistan
Gen Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
3. Commander in Chief, Pak Army
4. Commander in Chief, PAF Air Mshl Abdul Rahim Khan
5. COAS, Indian Army Field Mshl SHFJ Manekshaw
6. CAS, IAF ACM PC Lal

Introduction

1. The 1971 Indo-Pak war saw major operations being undertaken by the Indian Air Force both in
Eastern and Western sectors. The air operations had a profound effect on war and the IAF was allowed to
operate in an uninhibited fashion. Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan had been built up from the time
of elections to the national assembly in 1969. In those elections Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his Awami
League Party (ALP) had captured 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan as against Mr ZA Bhutto’s Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) which won 88 of the 144 seats in West Pakistan. The Awami League and its Bengali
supporters anxiously awaited their turn to rule Pakistan. This was not to be and on 25 Mar, Gen Agha
Mohammed Yahya Khan ordered a military backed put down of the Bengali resistance. By July, substantial
number of refugees streaming into India started straining the economy. The refugees raised an army of
volunteers, the Mukti Bahini, to liberate the Bengalis from West Pakistan. With training and help from the
Indian Army, Mukti Bahini soon proved itself to be a major pressure on the Pakistani armed forces. On 31
Jul 1971, Gen Yahya Khan warned India that war was very near. On 03 Dec 1971, between 1740-1745
hrs aircraft of PAF mounted simultaneous attacks on seven IAF airfields under Operation Chenghiz Khan.

(90, 000 - 93, 000 Pak troops were taken as PsOW)

(20, 00, 000 – 30, 00, 000 Bangladeshi civilians died)
(4, 00, 000 women raped by Pak Armed Forces)
(80, 00, 000 – 1, 00, 00, 000 fled Bangladesh to take refuge in India)

Objectives

2. The objectives as laid down by the GOI were:-

(a) Eastern Sector.

(i) Gain as much ground as possible in the east.

(ii) Neutralise Pakistani forces in the east to the extent possible.

(iii) To establish base for state of Bangladesh.

(b) Western Sector.

(i) To hold Pakistani forces at border.

Operational Priorities of IAF in 1971

3. Early in 1969, the IAF decided that the operational priorities had to change and these were decided
as:-

(a) AD of Indian airspace.

(b) Support to Army and Navy.

(c) Strategic Bombing.

(d) Other Operations.

4. CAC was given the task of looking after the bomber squadrons, transport squadrons and providing
support to the navy.
WAC and EAC took on the AD of their areas. EAC’s area of responsibility was increased to cover the same
area as EC of army.
Adv HQs were established with Army HQ and TACs at various Corps HQs to streamline Close Air Support
(CAS) demands.
Tactical support in specific areas was made the responsibility of respective bases.

Operations in Eastern Sector

5. The “Liberation of Bangladesh” in 1971 owes a lot to air operations. The action started when an
alert AD system shot down three intruding Sabre aircraft on 22 Nov 1971, before the declared
commencement of hostilities. Once the hostilities started on 03 Dec 71 Eastern Air Command went on the
offensive and attained total air superiority within 48 hrs. Thereafter, the Indian Army and Navy were able to
operate unhindered by any Pakistani air activity.

6. Forces. The IAF had a comparatively much larger force of 10 squadrons of Mig-21, Hunter, Gnat
and S-22 aircraft. This was complemented by some Canberra, helicopter and transport sorties. The PAF
had 20 x F-86 Sabre aircraft and a few other assorted aircraft of no special significance.

7. Offensive Operations. On 04 Dec 1971, Hunters and Mig-21’s, attacked major airfields in
erstwhile East Pakistan. Mig-21s carried out steep dive bombing attacks successfully. Within 24 hrs, a
Favourable Air Situation (FAS) was achieved, and, thereafter, airfields were periodically attacked to keep
them out of operation.

8. Close Air Support. Operations were launched from Kalaikunda, Panagarh, Hashimara,
Bagdogra, Tezpur, Guwahati and Jorhat. The aircraft serviceability was high and good moonlight conditions
helped night bombing. This favoured unrestricted flying. CAS operations were also conducted close to
Dacca from the IAF dett at Jessore.

9. Air Transport Operations. The air transport operations were most successful and well planned.
The following operations were carried out:-

(a) Supply of Stores and Ammunition. This was well coordinated and the demands of the
ground forces were well met.

(b) Psy War. Transport aircraft carried out the dropping of leaflets. This is believed to have
had the desired effect.

(c) Tangail Para-Drop. For the first time in the history of the IAF, airborne assault operations
were carried out dropping 800 men and 85 tonnes of equipment. Dakota, Packet and AN-12 aircraft
were used. This helped in cutting off Pakistani forces that could be used for the defence of Dacca.

(d) Helicopter Operations. 57 Div of IV Corps was able to cross rivers by using helicopters
as an “Air Bridge”. This helped in rapid advance towards Dacca and achieved surprise. These
operations were possible because the opposition was weak and the local population was
sympathetic to the Indians.

(e) Use of Civil Air Resources. Civil airlines were used for airlift of troops and cargo. They
worked in an integrated fashion with the IAF.

Operations in the West

10. As compared to the Eastern sector, the PAF was more potent in this sector. It was more organized
and had more resources. On 03 Dec 1971, the PAF carried out 24 sorties. Srinagar, Pathankot, Avantipur,
Ambala, Utarlai, Jodhpur and Agra were attacked. These pre-emptive strikes had little or no effect. The IAF
retaliated at night with Canberra sorties. On 04 Dec 1971 full scale operations began. WAC carried out
about 500 sorties per day. More than 50% of these were offensive missions and the remaining was divided
into AD, transport and communication sorties.
11. The Army’s requirements were fully met. The major achievements/ highlights were as follows:-

(a) Attacks on Pakistan airfields put the PAF on the defensive.

(b) Attack on Karachi harbour oil tanks led to diversion of resources from Punjab to Karachi
sector.

(c) Deep penetration attacks were carried out on enemy oil refineries and storage tanks.

(d) Interdiction mission of enemy railway lines was carried out frequently.

(e) Massive support was given to the Army in the Chhamb and Fazilka sector.

(f) Successful anti-armour operations were carried out at Longewala in Jaisalmer sector.

(g) Use of AN-12 for bombing in the Poonch sector and the plains.

Reasons for Success of Air Operations

12. The various reasons for the success of the operations were: - (I ACA UPA BJP - I am ACA UPA
BJP 1971)

(a) Political Non-Interference. There was no political interference in the functioning of the
armed forces. The political aim was clearly defined and thereafter the rest was left to the
professionals.

(b) Air Strategy. In a limited conflict the aim was to carry out CAO, AD, CAS and BAI in the
same priority.

(c) Air Superiority. The CAO was an absolute success in east. Achievement of air
superiority in the east allowed absolute and total use of air power against ground forces without any
fear of aerial retaliation.

(d) Centres of Gravity. “Energy Tgts” identified and attacked by the IAF included Karachi Oil
Depot, Sui Gas Plant, Attock Oil Refinery and Mangla Hydro Electric Dam.

(e) Use of Helicopters. Helicopters were used effectively in increasing mobility of 4 Corps by
utilising them to rapidly cross rivers in the east.

(f) Air Transport Support Operations. The para drop at Tangail utilising transport assets
resulted in cutting off Pakistani forces which could have been used for the defence of Dacca,
thereby bringing an early surrender in the east.

(g) Joint Support. Establishment of Adv HQs along with Army Commands for specific joint
support requirements and earmarking of squadrons/air assets for giving air support to the army in a
specific area.

(h) BAI. Effective BAI was undertaken by attacking and destroying rail tracks and road heads
thereby cutting off/delaying reinforcements and supplies.

(j) Planning. Contingent planning was done for all the operations.

(k) Innovation. Innovation was displayed in the effective use of AN-12 and Caribou aircraft
as carpet bombers in support of the Indian Army.

Lessons Learnt (ICT – 1971 mein Integrated Combat Training)

13. The various lessons learnt from this conflict were:-

 (a) Intelligence. Intelligence was piecemeal and disjointed. Without adequate intelligence
precious resources were diverted to East Pakistan when they could have been gainfully employed in
West Pakistan.
(b) Communication. Communication needs improvement thru dedicated land lines between
bases and TACs.

(c) Training. Training and efficiency of FACs and MOPs being rather low, there was
confusion and wasted effort which could have been avoided.

Conclusion

14. Both in the Western and Eastern sectors, the IAF carried out the traditional roles of the Air Force. In
addition, it achieved surprise in Chhamb sector, Tangail Para drop and the helicopter crossing of the rivers
by the Indian Army in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh the PAF activity was limited to meagre logistic support. In
the Western sector the PAF started with a bang but ended with a whimper. The IAF took the initiative away
from the PAF in the initial stages and thereafter the IAF consolidated its position giving victory to India. The
air operations were a great boost for our forces on the ground.
 BATTLE OF BRITAIN (‘Operation Sea Lion’) (01 Aug – 15 Sep 1940)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

1. British Commander Hugh Dowding
2. Luftwaffe Commander Hermann Gorring

Introduction

1. Strategic defence implies much more than mere self defence as in retreat. It roughly means going
out half way to meet an offensive. To be successful, defence must be pre-meditated and executed without
allowing the enemy to be within an effective distance from the target. Aircraft used purely defensively i.e.
within its base area, is always at a disadvantage. To be effective, it must act in the offensive to exploit its
initiative and the characteristics of flexibility, concentration and penetration.

2. After emerging victorious in the Polish, Norwegian and French campaigns, Hitler decided that the
British had to be knocked out of the war and the decision was taken to invade Britain. In order that the
invasion succeed, it was necessary that the RAF be neutralized so that it does not pose a threat to the
invasion forces. Hence on 01 Aug 1940, Hitler issued a directive ordering the Luftwaffe to crush the RAF.
At the start of the Battle of Britain, Luftwaffe had a total of approx 2600 aircraft consisting of bombers,
single/ twin engine fighters and dive bombers and greatly outnumbering the RAF which had approx 900
single engine fighters only. It however failed to suppress the RAF which resulted in repeated and indefinite
postponement of “Op Sea Lion”.

Strategies Employed

3. German Strategy. The German strategy was based on gaining command of air over at least
southern England long enough to permit the landing of ground forces. The lack of command at sea was to
be substituted by supremacy in air. The Germans believed that the RAF estimated to having lost up to 1000
aircraft, was nearly out of business and that they would be able to eliminate them within a short time. Also,
the Luftwaffe was basically a tactical air force in thinking and structure.

4. British Strategy. On the other hand, the RAF had been preparing for years for the war that was
to be fought in their skies. They knew that no invasion was possible without the Germans having command
of the air. The RAF had over the years developed a well integrated Air Defence System consisting of radar,
search lights, listening posts, AA guns and interceptors. Therefore, they opted for a Defensive Counter Air
and Forward Interception Strategy. They concentrated on intercepting incoming raids, disrupting them or
destroying as many bombers as possible to preclude Luftwaffe from gaining their strategic objectives and at
the same time avoiding engagement with their escorts. By fighting in a purely defensive mode they
optimized the technological advantage of the radar system and reduced their losses of aircraft and pilots.

Phases of Battle of Britain

5. The German air campaign was planned in three phases which are as follows:-

(a) Phase I. Blockade of English channel ports, shipping and attacks on coastal airfields &
radar stations.

(b) Phase II. Attacks on RAF airfields, aircraft, military installations, aircraft industries and
strategic command centres.

(c) Phase III. Attacking all industries supporting war effort and population centres so as to
break the will of British people to wage war.

The First Phase

6. The aim of the first phase was to interdict British sea borne commerce and attack RAF radar
installations along coast. The shipping strikes caused limited damage while the attacks on radar stations
were fruitless as the systems were intact and operating even at the end of first phase. German plan of
drawing out the British fighters and inflicting heavy casualties failed to achieve the desired results and in
fact the total RAF fighter strength actually increased with the loss being more than offset by production.
The Second Phase

7. The second phase started with heavy attacks on airfields and radar stations and some of them were
put out of action. The most damaging raids and most intensive air battles occurred in this phase. Fighter
production was falling behind attrition rates, the output of pilots from training schools had fallen behind
casualty rates and the RAF was now also feeling the loss of experienced pilots. The strategy of destroying
fighter command by a combination of air to air battle, destruction of fighter aircraft and attacks on aircraft
manufacturing facilities was working but Luftwaffe could not find clear evidence and German commanders
could not agree amongst themselves to persist in their strategy. At this stage, Luftwaffe decided to shift
strategy and the second phase of the Battle of Britain came to an abrupt end. During this phase, RAF
Fighter command was pushed absolutely to limits of its pilots, aircraft and operational abilities and survived
only by a narrow margin.

The Third Phase

8. The objective in this phase was to attack London day and night with an eye to shatter morale and to
draw out and destroy the RAF’s remaining fighters but the RAF did not give the slightest signs of yielding to
the Luftwaffe. Luftwaffe losses were prohibitive and on 17 Sep, Hitler realizing that the invasion would not
succeed postponed it indefinitely.

Factors leading to Luftwaffe failure

9. The main factors that led to the failure of the German air strategy can be divided into four factors:-

(a) Strategic Considerations.

(b) Organizational Factors.

(c) Tactical Considerations.

(d) Technical Factors/ Morale.

10. Strategic Considerations. (FDFC TDI– HDFC ka chhota bhai TDI mall gaya)

(a) Flawed Strategy. Britain was solely dependent on the seas for its supplies, blocking off
the sea routes would have hurt her very badly and forced her into submission. However, the
Germans believed in “War of Annihilation” whereas they should have gone for the “War of
Exhaustion”.

(b) Douhet’s Theory. The Germans believed in Douhet’s theory of air supremacy which was
founded on a fallacy that wars can be won by bombardments. History has shown that unless
bombardment is immediately followed up by assault or occupation, demoralization it produces is
only temporary.

(c) Force Structure Miscalculations. German strategy was flawed by substantial RAF force
structure miscalculations.

(d) Choice of Objectives. No objective was maintained long enough and even while they
concentrated on one area they wasted effort on secondary targets. The time available for each
phase was not enough as Hitler was pressing the German high command for early results. The
objectives set out for the third phase were not in consonance with the achievement of aim.

(e) Time. After fall of France, Germans delayed their air offensive thus giving Britain enough
time to prepare for defending its skies and helped replace losses to a great extent.

(f) Deployment. The Luftwaffe had a vast area to cover which resulted in maintenance and
servicing problems and difficulty in co-ordination between units in time and space. Due to this there
was a delay in TRS and hence less number of sorties. The Luftwaffe operated over unknown sea
and aerial territory while RAF fighters were under radar cover in friendly territory.
 (g) Intelligence. The Germans failed to realise importance of British radar and AD network
and hence were giving away element of surprise in all their raids. Inadequate intelligence on effect
of operations led Germans to frequently change their objectives; RAF which had reached breaking
point was thus given a desperately needed breather and was able to survive.

11. Organizational Factors (RLL – Rand Low Level Wx)

(a) RAF AD Network. The integrated nature of RAF AD system was not fully appreciated by
Germans. The RAF AD network was well organised and integrated with AD radars, Observer Corps,
AAA guns, Communication links, Balloon barrages, Fighter aircraft which operated very successfully
and resulted in inflicting heavy losses on the Luftwaffe. Therefore, the British, in spite of their
numerical inferiority, could generally concentrate a superiority of forces at the decisive point.

(b) Lack of Strategic Organisation. The Luftwaffe was basically a tactical air force created
to support the Army.

(c) Lack of Leadership. Most of the Commanders were transferred from Army who lacked
experience in AD and Strategic Air Operations and tended to confine their Air Force to tactical roles
only using it as long range artillery.

12. Tactical Considerations (SLF CUT WN – Sri Lankan Fighters CUT Western Navy)

(a) Surprise. The Germans could not achieve any surprise due to the good AD network of
the RAF.

(b) Limited Range. The Luftwaffe lacked bombers with adequate range, bomb load and
defensive firepower and they lacked an effective escort fighter with the range of the bomber.

(c) Fighter Aircraft. The top of the line Hurricane and Spitfire fighter aircraft of the RAF were
superior to German fighters (Me109).

(d) Concentration of Force. The principles of war were disregarded by the Germans;
nothing should have stood in the way of destruction of British radars as they allowed the numerically
inferior RAF to concentrate in time and space.

(e) Use of Fighters as Escorts. With heavy attrition rate of German bomber fleet, the
fighters were being increasingly employed as tied escorts thus reducing their combat capability and
actual role as interceptors.

(f) Training. RAF trained for AD role while the Luftwaffe trained for CAS.

(g) Weather. Adverse met conditions frequently hampered German air operations. Poor
visibility made identification of targets quite difficult and bombing became inaccurate.

(h) Night Attacks. Night bombing missions increased the harassment value due to further
inaccuracies in bombing.

13. Maintenance/ Technical Factors. The Luftwaffe was deployed over a very large area and this
led to poor replenishing/repair/servicing compared to the RAF, which was fast and quick due to planning
and advantage of operating from and over their homeland.

14. Morale. The RAF were fighting over their homeland and many downed aircraft and pilots survived
to fight again while the downed Germans became POWs. With limited success and heavy losses in various
phases the Luftwaffe forces morale depleted while early success and confidence in their leaders helped in
sustaining the morale of the British.

Lessons Learnt in the Indian Context

15. The various lessons learnt in the Indian context are: - (TIPSI BLOC MTT – TIPSI BLOCked MTT)
 (a) Adherence to Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

(b) Targetting.

(c) Planning.

(d) Integrated AD network.

(e) BDA.

(f) Intelligence.

(g) Organisation.

(h) Leadership to be professional and have the knowledge for correct employment of air power.

(j) Concentration of Force.

(k) Multi role aircraft due to scarce resources.

(l) Training and Morale build up are quite essential.

(m) Tactical Lessons - SEAD, AAR (long range), technological edge, ECM, all weather
capability, free escorts instead of tied escorts.

Conclusion

16. The Battle of Britain is remembered for the RAF’s air defence operations. The planned
developments in the methods employed both in air tactics and the network of sector and group
organizations and the immense fighting spirit of ground defences and the people contributed to the overall
victory of defence over the air offensive of a superior air force. It made the Germans postpone “Operation
Sea Lion” indefinitely. The Luftwaffe chose the wrong target systems at the wrong times and Hitler believed
that the war could be won purely by bombing, and that too mainly of civilian areas. That this is a fallacy was
proved once again in the carpet bombing of Germany by the Allies and in the massive bombing of Vietnam
by the Americans.
 BEKKA VALLEY OPS (09 Jun 82)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

7. IAF Commander David Ivry
8. Minister of Defense Syria Mustafa Tlass

Introduction

1. The Bekka valley ops are considered as a triumph of EW and the first comprehensive use of RPVs
as a force multiplier. The IAF utilized their EW resources to assess the Syrian threat and analysed that,
application of EW concepts would form an ideal solution. They then worked out the classical solutions of
EW i.e. ESM, ECM and ECCM using both hard kill and soft kill options to record a triumph of EW. The
lessons learnt from the Yom Kippur War (1973) had been put to good use by the Israelis and they had a
distinctive technological edge over the Syrian forces.

Background

2. In May 1982 Israel carried out an attack against PLO guerilla camps in Lebanon. In response, Syria
deployed two armoured divisions along with an air defence umbrella with one of them in Bekka valley. The
reinforcement of the existing SA-6 missile emplacements by the Syrians was considered as a threat by the
Israelis.

Preparatory Stage

3. The IAF had two options. Either to carry out a pre-emptive strike and accept diplomatic
consequences or to accept long term military disadvantages, they chose the former. Extensive rehearsals
were carried out against simulated targets in Negev desert and the IAF pilots built up an excellent threat
picture and were experienced and well prepared for the job. A tactical suite tailored precisely to operational
scenario was also ready. The target consisted of 19 x SA-6 SAM batteries deployed in the Bekka valley.

Attack Phase

4. The Israelis worked out accurate and detailed threat analysis and worked out the solution through
intelligent & effective use of EW concepts. The action by IAF demonstrated classical steps of EW i.e. ESM,
ECM and ECCM; technological superiority enjoyed and innovative ideas formulated by the IAF. The
application of EW was carried out in the following manner:-

(a) ESM. The ops had been planned almost a year in advance and this gave Israelis time to
gather tactical intelligence. RPVs were used to monitor Syrian frequencies and location of SAM
batteries. To put pressure on Syrians and tempt them to give away their operational frequencies,
fighter ac carried out low level high speed runs. An ELINT Boeing 707 orbiting over the coast of
Lebanon was used to monitor the accurate site location of tgt, frequencies of SAMs and MGRs,
early warning and surveillance radar frequencies, fighter ac R/T frequencies & data link frequencies
between ac and GCIs. The Israelis also used E2C Hawkeye AWACS in this role by passive
detection system and ESM equipment to gather ELINT before and during the ops. Israelis were
therefore able to gather enemy’s “Electronic Order of Battle” and were now well prepared for attack
phase.

(b) ECM. The F-15s and F-16s were the mainstay of the IAF fighter fleet and both were
fitted with RWRs and Missile Launch Warning Devices (MAWS) which were linked to automated
chaff and IR flare dispensers. The ac had active jamming systems which determined the highest
relative threat, measured the frequency and jammed it.

(c) ECM Ops. These ops were conducted in three phases:-

(i) Deception. This phase involved periodic incursion into enemy territory by RPVs
with the aim of exerting pressure on the SAM crews. The RPVs relayed real time data both
photo and electronic which was used to program ARMs and for targeting PGMs, for use by
strike ac. The RPVs were also fitted with radar reflectors which increased RCS thereby
 simulating as attacking ac. This phase lasted for several hours and the Syrians launched
several SAMs on the RPVs, thus depleting their stocks.

(ii) Degradation. This was achieved by simultaneous jamming of early warning

radars, fighter to fighter and fighter to GCI data link and R/T frequencies by means of high
powered ground based jammers and airborne jammers aboard CH-53 heptrs. The
convertible Boeing 707 ac was used effectively in the role of SOJ (Stand Off Jammer). The
powerful multiple jammers were employed to carry out spot and barrage jamming to screen
the strike ac. The SOJ was found to be extremely effective against Syrian ac, AI radars and
V/UHF communication that the Syrian pilots had to depend purely on visual search to
identify and locate tgts.

(iii) Destruction. Once the SAM sites had been located and their radar signatures
obtained, the Israelis exercised both the options of hard kill and soft kill. SAM radars based
in the southern part of valley were attacked by artillery and SSMs while those in the north by
F-4s carrying ARMs & PGMs. The remaining SAM radars were jammed while F-16s and F-
4s carried out multi-directional attacks using area weapons to destroy missile launchers. The
efficacy of the ARMs proved manifold since it could be launched from outside the firing
envelope of the SAMs thus keeping the strike ac safe. The Israelis also used surface to
surface ARMs if the SAM battery was within 40 kms. The Israelis were able to destroy 19 out
of 20 SAM batteries.

(d) Support Ops. SAF fighter ac taking off from their bases were detected by E2C AWACS
and IAF fighters were vectored to them and simultaneously R/T jamming was initiated to cut off
communication between SAF fighters. Boeing 707 ELINT ac gathered info and CH-53 airborne
jammers acted in conjunction with ground based jammers. Effective air space management can be
gauged from the fact that at times more than 100 combat ac and RPVs were operating in a very
small area of 20x50 kms, yet it did not lead to any fratricide or collision except for two armed heptrs.
The technology of the Israelis was far superior to the Syrians. EW employment and technological
advance proved one of the major contributing factors in gaining air supremacy over the Bekka
Valley.

Utilisation of RPVs by IAF

5. The Israelis possessed five types of RPVs:- (DT SSM)

(a) Teledyne BQM-34.

(b) Scout.

(c) Mastiff.

(d) Samson.

(e) Delilah.

6. The design of these RPVs were tailored to meet the requirements of the Israelis for intelligence
gathering. They were superior to the fighters in these roles because of lower costs, smaller RCS and higher
maneuverability. The RPVs were put into use in the following manner:-

(a) Intelligence gathering. The BQM-34, Scout and Mastiff were extensively used for Photo
Recce and ELINT using real time TV picture transmission and IR sensors.

(b) Decoys. The Samson and Delilah RPVs with their higher speeds were used to trick the
Syrians into believing that fighters had been launched, in order to induce them to activate their
tracking radars. This provided their ARMs the info for tgt tracking radars.

(c) Tgt Designation. The modified Mastiff had a TV and photo camera, a laser range finder
and tgt designator. Four to six RPVs were used as battlefield recce systems. Tgts could be selected
 by grd crew through data linked pictures and the same was provided to fighter ac carrying LGBs.
The RPVs designated tgts by their laser tgt markers while the LGBs were released by fighter ac.

(d) BDA. RPVs were used extensively for post strike damage assessment of tgts and the
need if any for repeat strikes.

(e) Communication Relays. RPVs were also used as communication relays between troops
in battlefield and Israeli Command and Control Centres.

Reasons for Israeli success

8. The various reasons for the success of the Israeli forces are: -
(PTI FIC AH – PTI ne FIC mein Attack Heptr bheja)

(a) Planning. The planning for the ops was done to the minutest detail possible integrating
the EW aspects flawlessly.

(b) Training. Practise attacks were carried out by pilots in Negev Desert on mock SA-6 sites.
Comprehensive and meticulous trg was carried out between crew of fighter and EW ac.

(c) Intelligence. Int gathered about the disposition of the Syrian forces was accurate and
exploited fully by the Israelis.

(d) Force Multipliers. EW, AEW and RPVs were effectively used as force multipliers, thereby
giving the Israelis a decisive edge.

(e) Innovative Tactical Planning. Innovation in use of RPVs and EW in tactical planning to
make the Syrian acquisition radars to open up, giving away its frequency of op and location, thereby
allowing the use of ARMs against them.

(f) Communication. Secure commn allowed the Israeli cdrs to have the real time picture of
the battle available at all times.

(g) AEW. Employment of the AEW assets to gather ELINT and carry out communication and
radar jamming ensured victory for the IAF.

(h) High Sortie Rate. Quick TRS and rearming of the ac by the Israeli grd crew ensured a
very high sortie rate with the available resources.

Lessons Learnt (ASCER C SGT P A CCS – ASCERtain if Crook SGT Pappu Arsoned CCS)

7. The various lessons that can be drawn out of this conflict with reference to our context are as
follows:-

(a) Air Superiority. The foremost lesson that emerges is that air superiority is an achievable
concept as long as an air force is equipped and trained to achieve it.
(b) Selection and Maintenance of Aim. Aim was to gain air supremacy over Bekka Valley &
IAF was tasked accordingly. No attempt was made to carry out interdiction or airfield attacks till
control of air was established over Bekka Valley. Any deviation would have affected achievement of
aim. Air supremacy and control of air is possible if an air force plans, equips and trains for it with
adequate tactical innovations.

(c) Concentration of Force. Almost entire might of Israeli Defence Forces and IAF was
employed in a limited area, due to narrow topographical limits, with striking results.

(d) EW Dominance. The need to conquer the fourth dimension i.e. EW and C3I, as a pre-
requisite to achieve air superiority was proved beyond doubt. The importance of a sound Electronic
Emission Policy and its right implementation proved to be vital, which the Syrians ignored
completely.
 (e) RPVs. The pivotal and ingenious use of RPVs as force multipliers for various roles as
ELINT platforms, Decoys, Tgt Designators and for damage assessment.

(f) Centralised and Integrated Command and Control. A large number of assets were
used during the ops resulting in the increased density of ac and RPVs over a small tactical area.
Well coordinated and strict command and control is required to prevent fratricide and achieve high
success rate of missions. Meticulous planning and live rehearsals preceding the actual ops led to
their success. This brought out that highly centralised and integrated employment of command and
control for electronic forces is essential.

(g) SEAD. The ops involved the concept of suppression of enemy air defence. The means
are many and the Israelis showed that strike ac with PGMs, RPVs, air-surface and surface-surface
ARMs and ECM, when judiciously integrated can deliver substantial results.

(h) Grd Based AD Systems. Excessive reliance on SAMs alone is dangerous as they are
vulnerable to ECM in an EW environment. Therefore, AD must be based on the concept of “Defence
in Depth” which includes fighter ac, SAMs and AD guns etc.

(j) Training. Realistic trg of the crew of the IAF for the mission enabled them to use their
wpns platform to the maximum.

(k) Past Lessons. The importance of learning their lessons from history by the Israelis who
had learnt from the devastation caused by SAMs in the Yom Kippur war.

(l) AWACS. The use of E2C AWACS and Boeing 707 ELINT ac as force multipliers.

(m) Commn. A secure and jam resistant commn network enabled real time ops in air or on
grd. Real time debriefs on R/T had an effect of being a force multiplier.

(n) Close Combat Missiles. In spite of the introduction of BVR missiles, close engagements
between air forces will tend to rely on the close combat msl. The Python-3 AAM of the IAF proved
its mettle in this war.

(o) Strategic Thinking. The decision not to accept a long term military disadvantage and
carry out pre-emptive air strikes to take out the missile batteries and accept the diplomatic
consequences.

Conclusion

8. Electronic supremacy led to air supremacy in the Bekka Valley which subsequently paved the way
for the success of the grd ops. The ops proved the effectiveness of the coordinated use of electronically
controlled arms with the necessary EW back ups. The op also provided the first example of warfare in real
time, warfare in which air recce, the distribution of its results to the attacking forces and the attack itself
were carried out in rapid succession, closely coordinated with the extensive use of EW systems. The
outstanding results achieved by the Israelis shows that the new concept of “real time” warfare supported by
accurate planning of EW actions was the real key to their success.
 FALKLANDS WAR

Introduction

1. The Falklands War was fought between April and June 1982 between Britain and Argentina over a
150 year old dispute about sovereignty over the South Atlantic Islands of East and West Falkland, South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland crisis developed in Apr 82 with an Argentine
invasion and occupation. The British reacted by sending an expeditionary force for the recapture of the
Falklands. The Falkland Islands are 8000 miles from the UK, there are no British bases in the vicinity and
the Antarctic winter was approaching. The nearest British territory of Ascension Island was 3800 miles from
Falklands and 4200 miles from Britain.

The Opposing Forces

2. Argentina. The AAF was active over the islands operating from bases on the mainland. On the
islands itself only some light ac and heptrs were based. Port Stanley, the major city of the Falklands had
some SAMs, AA guns and surveillance radars. Therefore, the AD set up at the islands was meagre.

3. Britain. The British expeditionary force had 28 Sea Harriers and 06 Harriers on board two ac
carriers, the HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. There were also a large number of heptrs which included
Chinook, Sea King and Lynx.

Air Ops

4. A favourable air situation was necessary to protect and support the landings and the ships of the
task force. The Argentinean Navy had both submarines and ships and hence added protection would have
to be given to the fleet.

5. Maritime Strikes. When the battle started HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile and the
vulnerability of ships became evident. The ac carriers which were placed between the islands and the
mainland were relocated 400 kms east of the islands. The AAF used Mirage V and A-4 ac which gave them
limited time over the target. They attacked the British forces with bombs, rockets, guns and Exocet missiles
and in order to extend the range of the ac in-flight refueling was carried out by the AAF. The Argentinean ac
were forced to operate at the extreme of their ROA, with no margin for tactical routing and virtually no fuel
for combat reserves also their stock of stand off Exocet missiles was just 05. Low level attacks were carried
out using conventional armament like iron bombs. These did not prove very effective and the AAF suffered
heavy losses in these attacks, not withstanding this they were able to sink as many as five ships. If all the
iron bombs had exploded the British would have suffered crippling losses. Some of the missile attacks
against the ships were foiled using rapid bloom chaff.

6. Heptr Ops. The British would have to transport troops to the islands by ships, land them on the
islands and support them; heptrs were to provide logistics support to the army. A large number of heptrs
were lost when HMS Atlantic Conveyor was sunk. This deprived the land forces of much of the planned
logistic support and air mobility. The Chinook heavy lift heptr gave a commendable performance. A fair
amount of effort was also devoted to anti submarine ops.

7. Air Defence. The British deployed two ac carriers with an AD and GA version of the Harrier to
protect the fleet and support the landings. CAP sorties were mounted and several AAF ac were shot down
with the use of the AIM 9 L missiles. Once the British ships were positioned east of the Falklands the
Argentineans attempted medium level attacks, however Harriers scrambled from ac carriers caused heavy
attrition. Thereafter the AAF persisted in low level ops only which resulted in inadequate warning for
Harriers to be scrambled and forced them to maintain an almost continuous CAP.

8. Counter Air Ops and CAS. Vulcan ac operating from Ascension Island using in flight refueling
were used for counter air ops, however these ops did not prove to be very effective due to the absence of
runway penetration bombs. Harriers were used in CAS role very effectively. The AAF accorded low priority
to CAS due to their preoccupation with strikes against the fleet.
9. Losses. The AAF ac did not have any night capability or EW support, therefore their losses were
heavy. The AAF lost approx 100 ac including 26 Mirage V and 31 A-4. The British lost 06 Sea Harriers and
approx 25 heptrs.

Reasons for Argentine Defeat

10. The various reasons for the Argentine defeat were:-

(a) Strategic Miscalculation. This was the basic and fundamental reason. The Argentine
junta was certain that the British would not go to war over some remote island territory and this led
to some notable failures.

(b) Lack of Planning. No effort was made to increase the length of the runway at Port
Stanley and fighters were not moved from the mainland to the Falklands and this led to a range
disadvantage to the AAF.

(c) Lack of Foresight. They failed to exploit the disadvantages of the British Task Force.
With the Antarctic winter approaching had the Argentineans been able to impose delays probably
the outcome would have been different.

(d) Technology. The Argentineans suffered from a technological disadvantage. Lack of ECM
and other EW eqpt was a contributory factor.

(e) Eqpt. Had adequate supplies of essential armament like Exocet missiles been available
the AAF would have played havoc with the British forces.

(f) Inter-Service Co-Operation. The Argentineans had very little co-ordination between their
ground, naval and other forces. While the AAF fought gallantly the Argentine Navy hardly ventured
out of their coastal waters. A determined naval action would have posed serious threat to the British
Task Force.

(g) Leadership and Trg. The men of the British Task Force were one of the most powerful,
and certainly best trained forces that Britain had ever sent to war. On the other hand the Argentine
forces had little training or mental preparation and were ill-equipped for war. The leadership of the
Argentineans also left a lot to be desired. The AAF pilots lacked in trg and the bombs released by
them were generally below the minimum release height and hence the fuse did not arm and the
bombs did not explode.

(c) AAR. In flight refueling is an important aspect and a force multiplier. The AAF had no such
capability for their Mirages, which resulted in loss of many ac due to fuel starvation, as they were
invariably operating at the far end of their endurance.

Lessons Learnt

11. The various lessons learnt from the conflict are as follows:-

(a) Vulnerability of Surface Ships. Ships are very vulnerable to an air attack which has
further increased dramatically with the threat from stand-off weapons like the Exocet missile.

(b) AEW. An early warning system is mandatory for the protection of the fleet to not only
provide reaction time but also to effect an interception of ac carrying stand off weapons. As a result
RAF Harriers had to mount day long CAP. AEW ac would have enabled earlier interception of
Exocet carrying AAF ac.

(d) Adm and Logistics. The cost of conducting Ops thousands of kms away is enormous.
The tempo of Air Ops must continue unabated till the objective is achieved. Hence, adequate
reserves must be maintained and calls for good adm and lgs support.
 (e) Need for Quick Reaction Missiles. The need to have quick reaction missiles to protect a
ship against missile attacks from stand off wpns like the Exocet. The capabilities of such wpns are
likely to increase in the future and this would call for effective point defence wpns.

(h) Anti Submarine Ops. The air effort for round the clock anti submarine ops by heptrs is
prohibitive and cannot be sustained indefinitely.

(k) Heptrs. For heptrs the need for protection against hand held msls and improved night
flying and poor weather capability.

(l) Improvisation. Importance of the ability to improvise in a short time, the British were able
to modify ac like the Vulcan and Harriers for in flight refuelling, Harriers were also modified to carry
AIM-9L Sidewinder msls, both these proved extremely useful in this conflict.

(m) Night Strikes. Lacking good radar, the Sea Harriers were largely ineffective during night.
However the AAF had no night attack abilities to take advantage of.

(n) EW. The AAF ac had no EW eqpt on board and their pilots had no EW trg. The AIM-9L
msls decimated the AAF ac and the RAF scored 24 hits from 27 launched msls.

Conclusion

12. The short Falklands War was important in terms of the lessons it brought. These are quite relevant
to India which has the Andaman and the Lakshadweep Islands to defend. The neighbouring Cocco group
of Islands, north of Andaman is an electronic surveillance base of China. To safeguard the integrity of these
islands India should be prepared to undertake Maritime Ops and Air Ops effectively taking lessons from the
Falkland War. India should think in terms of preparedness for:-
(a) Naval/AF bases at either islands.

(b) Alternate diversionary airfield to Carnic Island and an airfield in Lakshadweep Islands.

(c) ESM measures.

(d) Strengthen blue water cap of Indian Navy, and have a full fledged strategic fleet with SLBMs.

(e) AAR capability for our maritime strike ac.

(f) Maritime strike ac with Sea Eagle/Exocet anti-shipping msls.

(g) AD radar stations at both islands.

(h) Ac for strategic bombing role.

(j) Amphibious assault ops.

Introduction, reason for attacking Iraq, coalition/Iraqi troops strength and aircraft, new
weaponary, operations, lesson learnt and conclusion.

GULF WAR – II
Introduction
1. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq began on March 20 comprising United States and United Kingdom
forces (98%), and few other nations. The 2003 Iraq invasion marked the beginning of what is
commonly referred to as the Iraq War; however the USnever actually declared war on Iraq, which
can only be done by Congress. Baghdad fell on April 9th, 2003. On May 1, 2003, U.S. president
George W. Bush declared, on an aircraft carrier under the sign "Mission Accomplished", the end of
major combat operations terminating the Ba'ath Party's rule and removing Iraqi president Saddam
Hussein from office. Coalition forces ultimately captured Saddam Hussein on Dec
14, 2003. A transitional period began thereafter.

Political and Diplomatic Aspects

2. In his 17 Mar 03 address to the nation, US President George W. Bush demanded that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour
deadline. This demand was reportedly rejected. Since the invasion was without explicit approval of
the UN Security Council, some legal authorities regard it as a violation of the UN charter. UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan said in Sep 2004: "From our point of view and the UN charter point
of view, it was illegal." There have been no formal charges under international law.

Military Aspects
3. US military operations were conducted under the codename Operation Iraqi Freedom, as
quoted by George W. Bush on April 3, 2003. The United Kingdom military operation was named
Operation Telic, and Australia's as Operation Falconer. Approximately 100,000 United States
troops and 45,000 British, and smaller forces from other nations, collectively called the "Coalition
of the willing," entered Iraq primarily through a staging area in Kuwait. Plans for opening a second
front in the north were abandoned when Turkey officially refused the use of its territory for such
purposes. Forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of
50,000. The number of Iraqi military personnel prior to the war was uncertain, but was believed to
have been poorly-equipped. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the armed
forces to number 389,000 (army 350,000, navy 2,000, air force 20,000 and air defence 17,000),
the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam 44,000, and reserves 650,000. Other estimates number the
army and Republican Guard between 280,000 to 350,000 and 50,000 to 80,000, respectively, and
the paramilitary between 20,000 and 40,000. There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions,
ten mechanized and armoured divisions, as well as some Special Forces units. The Iraqi Air Force
and Navy played a negligible role in the conflict.

The main reasons the US had for the invasion were:

(a) Hussein's regime was in violation of United Nations demands for weapons inspections. The
first reason was obviated by the Bush administration, who set a deadline while inspectors were
active in Iraq.

(b) The Hussein regime allegedly produced and possessed stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction and posed a grave threat.

(c) Hussein had failed to comply with 19 UN resolutions requiring a full accounting of its
weapons of mass destruction and full cooperation with UN inspections.

(d) The Hussein regime had ties to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that posed a
threat to international safety and security.

(e) Promoting democratic self-governments in the entire autocratic Arab Middle East.
INVASION
8. Prior to invasion, the United States and other coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, enforcing Iraqi no-fly zones. Iraqi air-
defence installations were engaged on a fairly regular basis after repeatedly targeting American
and British air patrols. In mid-2002, the U.S. began to change its response strategy, more carefully
selecting targets in the southern part of the country in order to disrupt the military command
structure in Iraq. A change in enforcement tactics was acknowledged at the time, but it was not
made public that this was part of a plan known as Operation Southern Focus. The tonnage of
bombs dropped increased from 0 in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 7 and 14 tons
per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September. The September
attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defence site in western Iraq.
This was located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone. It was destroyed, not
because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied Special Forces operating from Jordan to
enter Iraq undetected.

OPERATIONS
9. This operation witnessed a genuinely combined air campaign, with RAF and USAF assets
closely integrated. Coalition air assets were used to great effect by combining resources to
support both the effects-based precision campaign against deep Iraqi targets and the concurrent
close land battle. Air supremacy was quickly achieved due to the technical and numerical
superiority of the coalition air forces, the Iraqi regime’s failure to deploy an air force, and because
Iraqi ground-based air defences, although used extensively, proved largely ineffective. Further, 12
years of UK/US operations to enforce the UN no-fly zones over Iraq had familiarised coalition
forces with the area and restricted the regeneration of Iraqi air force and air defence capabilities.
The use of coalition air power created the conditions that allowed land forces to achieve high rates
of manoeuvre and tempo in response to enemy activity. In particular, the coalition air component
significantly reduced the ability of Iraqi forces to use tactical and operational manoeuvre; indeed,
after the war, captured senior Iraqi General Staff officers reported that the fighting effectiveness of
the Republican Guard Divisions had been largely destroyed by air strikes.

10. Coalition attack aircraft were flexible in supporting both the strategic bombing campaign and
the coalition land battle. Lessons from Kosovo in 1999 had led to the procurement of Maverick
missiles and enhanced Paveway munitions. For this operation these weapons were
complemented by submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles as well as new capabilities such
as the Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which could attack heavily protected, hardened facilities
from a distance of over 230 km. Although fewer aircraft were fielded than in the 1991 Gulf Conflict,
increased use of precision weapons allowed multi national forces to deliver greater effect, whilst
minimising collateral damage.

TARGETING.
Over 900 potential coalition targets were developed to overwhelm the Saddam Hussein regime
and its security forces and to degrade the command and control capability of the Iraqi Armed
Forces. These targets included key military installations, weapon sites, command and control
centres, notable regime targets and communications networks. The targeting plan was determined
with precise military effects in mind, utilising the minimum proportionate force necessary for each
target, and seeking as far as possible to avoid civilian casualties or damage to Iraqi infrastructure.

WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS

12. The extensive use of precision weapons was vital in delivering an overwhelming, high tempo
and effects-based air campaign. Around 85% of RAF munitions used was precision guided, either
by Global Positioning Systems (GPS) or by laser or both, with just 138 unguided bombs being
used. This demonstrates a huge leap forward in capability since the 1991conflict, when the
proportion of precision guided munitions was around 18%, improving to 25% for the Kosovo
campaign in 1999. Not all of this capability was delivered from aircraft. The submarine-launched
strategic Tomahawk cruise missile again demonstrated its usefulness, providing a long-range
precision capability to project combat power from the sea. This weapon was highly accurate and
has both strategic and tactical utility. The Storm Shadow cruise missile was employed against
high-value, heavily fortified targets such as communications bunkers. This air-launched cruise
missile proved to be highly accurate, providing the stand-off capability against hardened targets.

The enhanced Paveway II and III bombs demonstrated the advantages of using smart, all-
weather capable weapons to minimise collateral damage. These weapons offered the flexibility to
re-programme new target positions whilst airborne. This proved vital in the fast moving battle that
took place, where time sensitive targeting has become increasingly important. Moreover, their
dual-mode guidance system meant that they could be delivered through laser guidance if accurate
target co-ordinates were not available. Evidence gathered from Iraq since the end of hostilities has
shown that both the enhanced Paveway II and III worked well.

The Maverick anti-armour missile was also used for the first time on this operation and proved its
utility for rapid attacks on mobile targets. The standard infra-red guided Maverick was
supplemented by the 'TV' guided version. The TV Maverick's enhanced resolution of the image
displayed in the cockpit improves a pilot's ability to destroy small tactical, mobile targets. As a
consequence, during the favourable daylight hours, TV Maverick could be fired at greater ranges
from the target, reducing the risk to the pilot from enemy air defence systems.

OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY LAND FORCES

A relatively new feature of this operation was the requirement for air assets to conduct Close Air
Support (CAS) in an urban environment. The use of weapons with a large explosive yield on CAS
missions was often not possible owing to the risk of collateral damage. The lack of smaller
precision-guided weapons prevented the RAF from providing full support to land forces in urban
areas. Although RAF aircraft delivered inert 1000lb bombs to minimise collateral damage, these
often did not create the desired effect.

The CAS effort was also hampered by the inability to provide sufficiently accurate co-ordinates for
mobile targets. The majority of land forces plot target positions on maps, rather than using GPS
equipment. Further, GPS information on mobile targets provided by land forces was sometimes
quickly out of date, underlining the need for pilots to reconfirm mobile targets by sight before
committing to an attack. In order to conduct this type of ‘seek and destroy’ mission, additional
aircraft were fitted with target designation systems - the Thermal Imaging and Airborne Laser
Designation (TIALD) pods. The TIALD pod was also used extensively during the campaign as a
‘non-traditional’ surveillance and reconnaissance tool in order to monitor potential Iraqi SCUD sites
and tank positions.

The capability of RAF Tornado GR4 (fitted with the new RAPTOR pod) and Canberra PR9 aircraft
to provide high quality imagery in near-real time was highly valued by the coalition. Another asset
used for ‘non-traditional’ surveillance and reconnaissance was the Nimrod MR2 (which is normally
used in the maritime arena). These aircraft supported operations in western Iraq, providing a radio
relay capability as well as surveillance and reconnaissance information.

Several RAF ac were employed in a combination of roles. For example, the Tornado GR4 and
Harrier GR7 were used to undertake both tactical reconnaissance and attack missions, including
missions in support of ground troops.

Extensive use of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) enabled the coalition to conduct unrelenting
operations, often in heavily defended areas such as those around Baghdad.
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS
A variety of helicopters, such as Chinook, Puma, Lynx, Gazelle and Sea King were provided by
the Joint Helicopter Command in support of operations. These helicopters were heavily tasked
throughout, working closely with a variety of coalition formations to ferry troops, equipment and
supplies forward into Iraq in addition to the roles of casualty repatriation and refugee
transportation. Their utility across a range of tasks showed that a mix of medium and heavy lift
helicopters enhances operational flexibility. Owing partly to support from integrated intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance assets and other offensive platforms, no UK helicopters were lost
to enemy fire, even in intensive combat.

Despite the need to operate at a distance for self-protection, Royal Navy Lynx and Gazelle
helicopters provided effective armed support throughout the warfighting phase of the campaign in
the Al Faw Peninsula, firing 49 TOW missiles, destroying tanks, armoured personnel carriers and
bunkers. The potential utility of Apache helicopters in the provision of fire support was seen during
amphibious operations and across the battle space.

Opening attack on 20 Mar 03 took place at approximately 02:30 UTC or about 90 minutes after the
lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:30 local time. Explosions were heard in Baghdad; coinciding
with Australian Special Air Service Regiment personnel crossing the border into southern Iraq.
Many observers had expected a lengthy campaign of aerial bombing in advance of any ground
action, taking as examples the Gulf War or the US invasion of Afghanistan. In practice, US plans
envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraqi forces as fast as possible,
attempting to bypass Iraqi military units and cities in most cases. The assumption was that
superior US mobility and coordination would allow them to attack the heart of the Iraqi command
structure and destroy it in a short time, and that this would minimize civilian deaths and damage to
infrastructure. It was expected that the elimination of the leadership would lead to the collapse of
the army and the government, and that much of the population would support the invaders once
the government had been weakened. Occupation of cities and attacks on peripheral military units
were viewed as undesirable distractions. Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its
territory, the US was forced to abandon a planned simultaneous attack from north and south. So
the primary bases for the invasion were in Kuwait and other Persian Gulf nations. One result of
this was that one of the divisions intended for the invasion was forced to relocate and was unable
to take part in the invasion until well into the war.

The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about
three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time.

FALL OF BAGHDAD
Three weeks into the invasion, US forces moved into Baghdad. Initial plans were for armour units
to surround the city and a street-to-street battle to commence using airborne units. However, on 5
April a "Thunder Run" of US tanks was launched to test Iraqi defences, with about 30 tanks
rushing from a staging base to the Baghdad airport. They met heavy resistance, including many
suicidal attacks, but launched another run two days later into the Palaces of Saddam Hussein,
where they established a base. Within hours of the palace seizure, and television coverage of this
spreading through Iraq, the Iraqi resistance crumbled around the city. Iraqi government officials
had either disappeared or had conceded defeat. On 09 Apr 03, US forces formally secured
Baghdad and the power of Saddam Hussein was declared ended. Saddam had vanished, and his
whereabouts were unknown. Many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of Saddam by vandalizing the
many portraits and statues of him together with other pieces of his personality cult. One widely
publicized event was the dramatic toppling of a large statue of Saddam in central Baghdad by a
US tank, while a crowd of Iraqis cheered the Marines on. Gen Tommy Franks assumed control of
Iraq as the supreme commander of occupation forces.
SUMMARY OF THE INVASION
Coalition forces managed to topple the government and capture the key cities of a large nation in
only 28 days, taking minimal losses while also trying to avoid large civilian deaths and even high
numbers of Iraqi military losses. The invasion was, in a military context, a complete success, and
did not require the huge army build-up like the 1991 Gulf War, which numbered half a million Allied
troops. This did prove short-sighted, however, due to the requirement for a much larger force to
combat the irregular Iraqi forces in the aftermath of the war. The Saddam-built army had no
weapons that could stand up to Coalition forces, and managed only to stage a few ambushes that
gained a great deal of media attention but in reality did nothing to slow the Coalition advance.

More serious for the post-war state of Iraq was the looting of hundreds of thousands of tons of
heavy ordinance: artillery shells, aircraft bombs, mortars; all of which were then used to attack US
forces, Iraqi officials, and civilians by the insurgents and terrorists.

LESSONS LEARNT.
(a) The targeting authority delegated to commanders in theatre was significant and enabled them
to conduct operations responsively and flexibly.

(b) Effects-based operations require improved methods of accurately assessing the result of
attacks on targets.

(c) The precision attack capability has developed significantly since 1991 and made a major
contribution to the successful conduct of the coalition’s high-tempo operation. Investment in
precision guided munitions following the lessons from the Kosovo campaign was fully vindicated
during this operation.

(d) The Tomahawk cruise missile again demonstrated its utility as a longrange weapon capable of
creating tactical, operational and strategic effect. The new Storm Shadow stand-off precision
missile also proved to be highly accurate.

(e) Although support for land forces from the air worked well, there remain areas for improvement.
For example, the coalition process for planning and tasking aircraft for high-tempo operations
needs to be more flexible, and additional joint and combined land-air training is required. MOD has
initiated a study in to these issues.

(f) Coalition forces need a concept for urban operations that determines the role of Close Air
Support in that environment. Precision weapons with lower explosive yield would have increased
the contribution of UK aircraft to such operations.

(g) The operation underlined the value of multi-role aircraft such as the Tornado GR4 and Harrier
GR7.
(h) Coalition Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) offered versatile capabilities as surveillance,
reconnaissance and offensive platforms, and demonstrated that they will play a key role in the
future joint battle.

CONCLUSION
Gulf War II was the first of the major wars of the 21st century. The quantum leap in technology in
war fighting is an indication of how wars will be fought in the years to come. The military success
was unqualified and most military objectives were achieved. It is now evident that Post conflict
management/resolution is as important as the planning and prosecution of the war itself. Were the
larger political objectives met? Has the US been able to bring about democracy and sustainable
self government in Iraq? Has it brought peace to Iraq and in the Middle East? The last chapter in
this bloody conflict is yet to be written.
 OP SAFED SAGAR (Kargil War) (May – Jul 99)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

1. PM, India AB Vajpayee
2. President, Pakistan Muhammad Rafiq Tarar
3. COAS, Pak Army Gen Pervez Musharraf
4. CAS, PAF ACM Pervez Mehdi Qureshi
5. COAS, Indian Army Gen VP Malik
6. CAS, IAF ACM Anil Tipnis

Introduction

1. The issue of Kashmir dates back to 1947, it is the outcome of the two nation theory propagated by
the British. After Maharaja Hari Singh sought India’s help and signed instrument of accession, Kashmir has
always been a contentious issue. Since then India has fought three wars with Pakistan and the Shimla
agreement signed in 1972 has been the bedrock of all bilateral talks on the issue. With the historic visit by
the Indian PM, Mr A B Vajpayee, the Lahore peace process was initiated and a MoU signed between the
two countries.

2. In end Apr 1999, intruders were first reported to have occupied the heights 4-5 kms inside the LOC
along the Mushkoh, Drass, Kakhsar and Batalik sectors. The exact numbers were limited initially and kept
increasing as the operations continued.

Force Levels

3. The intruders consisted of the following:-

(a) Pakistani Army regulars.

(b) Mercenaries of Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, which was declared a terrorist organisation by the US

in Oct 1997.

(c) Mercenaries of Al-Badr, which consisted of Afghans.

(d) Members of Osama bin Laden’s Harkat-ul-jehad-al-Islam.

4. The Indian ground and air forces were as follows:-

(a) One Inf and one Mtn Div of 15 Corps. Later 3 Div moved to Kargil from Leh.

(b) (Total 10 and half squadrons) One sqn each of Mig-23, Mig-27, Mig-21 Type 96, additional
one sqn of Type 96 for PR, one sqn Mig-21 Bis for AD and half sqn of Mig-29 based at Srinagar
and Avantipur. These were later augmented by one sqn of Jaguars, two sqns of Mirage-2000s and
a sqn of Mig-29s.

(c) In addition two sqns of armed Mi-17s with IR and Chaff dispensers, one Flt of Cheetahs and
two Mi-35s for CI operations.

(d) No EW ac were deployed during the entire operations.

Aim

5. “Op Vijay” had a two fold objective:-

(a) To ensure that the Srinagar-Leh highway remains unbreached.

(b) To evict intruders from the Indian side of the LOC.

6. The AF part of the op named “Safed Sagar” was conducted to support army and achieve its
objectives.

Air Operations in Kargil

7. The air force not having envisaged an op in this sector and at these altitudes faced certain initial
problems of:-

(a) Non-availability of any firing range at these altitudes for aircrew training.

(b) No available data for bombing at these altitudes.

(c) Ground based support including parking, HAS and security of assets were never thought of.

(d) The true threat perception including number of targets, aerial picture of targets and their
defences were not available.

8. The air operations in “Op Safed Sagar” were conducted under difficult political constraints and can
be divided into:-

(a) Counter Air Operations. The required degree of control of air existed all throughout the
operations. Thus, only escort missions and AD operations were undertaken in CAO.

(i) Escorts. All strike packages of Mig-23 and Mig-27 were escorted by Mig-21s.

(ii) AD Operations. These operations included CAPs which were maintained by Mig-
29s over Srinagar airfield as no radar cover was available close to Kargil sector and the
perceived threat was from F-16s from Skardu airfield. SAM-4 and SAM-8 were deployed at
Srinagar and Avantipur airfield. L-70, ZSU-23 and Schilka AAA were deployed at Srinagar
airfield. Three P-18 radars were deployed in the sector but could not be used due to time
taken for deployment and communication links.

(b) Counter Surface Force Operations. These operations were carried out in conjunction
with surface forces to deter, contain and defeat enemy’s forces. They can be classified as:-

(i) BAS. These operations were undertaken in the initial half by Mig-23 and Mig-27
ac, with Mig-23 in lead for targeting and Mig-27 trailing to destroy target; however presence
of SAMs were not known. Since the attacks were planned assuming no msl threats, after
initial loss of two ac the tactics were changed to BAI.

(ii) BAI. In these operations, ML strikes were carried out and bombs were dropped on
GPS accuracy without visually acquiring the targets on enemy concentration camps. These
msns could not be undertaken for long as accuracy was low and collateral damage was
high. The tactics were further changed to attacks by Mirage-2000s using PGMs. This was
the most effective phase of the operations; however considering the cost of PGMs weapon-
target matching was overlooked.

(iii) Tactical Recce. The collection of info of enemy through medium heights was
conducted by Mig-21 Type 96 and Cheetahs visually which proved to be ineffective.
Thereafter, recce was conducted by Mig-21 Type 96 using hand held video cameras. ARC
Lear Jets escorted by Mirage 2000s and Canberras escorted by Mig-29s were also used;
however real time target info was not available.

(c) Combat Support Air Operations. “Op Safed Sagar” was a unique operations in this
regard considering the altitude and terrain involved. They were conducted under the following
heads:-

(i) Air Tpt Operations. IAF tpt ac carried out strategic and tactical airlift to induct tps
and equipment from various theatres to the area of operations. CAS EVAC operations were
undertaken by Cheetah heptrs.
 (ii) Search and Rescue. Undertaken by Cheetah heptrs.

(d) Combat Support Ground Operations. The PAD/ GD of all airfields was
conducted during the operations.

Gains for India

9. The various gains for India were:-

(a) National Integration.

(b) Global support for India.

(c) Closer relations with US.

(d) Military success.

(e) Expose of Pakistan’s proxy war.

(f) Exposure of intentions of Pakistan’s rulers.

(g) Edge over Pakistan in future conflicts.

Lessons Learnt

10. In view of no enemy air power interference total favorable air situation existed throughout the
operations. However, these operations brought out the following lessons:-

(a) Intelligence. This included both electronic and military intelligence. The army and civil
intelligence ignored the actual ground realities in view of the Lahore Process, thus ground realities
on intrusions were overlooked. The initial figure was 8-10 which kept increasing as the operations
progressed.

(b) Training and Planning. Armed forces should evolve tactics and train in peace time for
operations in such inhospitable terrain.

(c) Joint Operations. Any conflict in the present environment would require a high degree of
Jointmanship. Thus the three services require a dedicated command, control and communications
system.

(d) Employment of Air Power. The army needs to understand the limitations and
employability of air power.

(e) PGMs. This operation highlighted the importance of PGMs in such conditions and
situations and their abilities as a force multiplier, however looking at its price tag its employability in
mountainous terrain needs to be reviewed.

(f) Air Interdiction. Employability of Air Power in mountainous terrain will be restricted and
interdiction will be a better option than CAS as proved in the operations.

(g) Communications. Effective & secure communications would enhance air operations
especially AD and CAS, this proved to be a major drawback in the Kargil conflict.

(h) Political Constraints. Not crossing LOC was a constraint on air power. Had profound
effect; element of surprise was lost due to it.

(j) Night Operations. Acquisition of night operations capability, to ensure round the clock
operations towards achievement of an effective air force.
 (k) EW Support. Need felt for AWACS and a dedicated EW ac.

(l) Effective BDA. The need for RPVs for effective conduct of such msns was felt.

(m) Effectiveness of Heptrs. The effectiveness of heptrs especially in such altitudes and
terrain was realised.

(n) RPVs. Need was also felt for RPVs to carry out effective Recce, target designation and
BDA msns.

(o) Defence Satellites. A need was felt for dedicated defence satellites for effective
surveillance.

(p) Modernising of Defence Equipment. The need was felt for the technological up
gradation of equipment of all the three services.

(q) Revamp of Security Setup. As brought out by the review committee the national security
setup needs to be revamped and surveillance equipment of the three services needs to be
upgraded for effective intelligence and early warning.

Conclusion

11. Kargil operations were widely portrayed as a complete success of the armed forces. However in the
actual military sense, success of these operations in the absence of enemy air interference is debatable.
These operations have brought to light the limitations of Intelligence, Jointmanship, planning and tactics for
operations of this magnitude and at these altitudes. Analysis of Kargil operations should be carried out
considering the cost incurred. India spent a total of approx 10,000 crores to evict approx 600 intruders from
its own territory. Can a developing country like ours afford to undertake such costly operations to maintain
its territorial integrity?
 OP DESERT STORM

Introduction

1. The Multi National Forces (MNF) air offensive during the Gulf War has been unprecedented in the
history of air warfare, in terms of air effort within a specific time period and tonnage of weaponry used. It
served as a ground for providing combat ac capability, weapons systems and concepts. The MNF forces
directed a virtual air blitz against Iraq, and were able to achieve air supremacy over Iraqi air space. Iraqi
AD, missiles and communications were neutralized within the first four days of the war and then MNF air
attacks were directed towards Iraqi ground forces and fortifications. The onslaught on the Iraqi grd forces
and their lines of communication was so heavy that when the grd offensive by the MNF began, the Iraqis
surrendered without a fight.

Coalition Objectives and Strategy

2. The coalition’s final objective was the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait followed by restoration of a
legitimate Govt there. Wider objectives included the destruction of Iraqi NBC wpn producing capability as
well as its msl programme. The four phases of coalition objectives were:-

(a) Phase I. Strategic Air Offensive against Iraqi Command and Control Centres and NBC
assets.

(b) Phase II. Command of the air by destruction of the Iraqi Air Force.

(c) Phase III. BAI against Iraqi supply, commn network, NBC assets and Republican Guards.

(d) Phase IV. Offensive by grd forces to liberate Kuwait and destroy Iraqi grd forces.

3. The task given to the air force was based on the Warden Model concept of five strategic rings of
Centres of Gravity. These were:-

(a) Command and Control. Isolate Iraqi leadership.

(b) Industrial Infrastructure. Degrade key production facilities.

(c) Transportation Network. Disrupt Iraqi infrastructure by attacks on transportation system.

(d) Population Centres. Turn the population and tps against the regime.

(e) Fielded Military Forces. Destroy offensive and defensive capability of Iraq.

Iraqi Strategy

4. The overall strategy of the Iraqi Air Force seemed to be to:-

(a) Use the extensive AD network on grd to absorb the MNF air attacks.

(b) Conserve the ac resources to the maximum by dispersing them all over the specially
prepared airfields.

(c) Create nuisance value and attempt to increase the scope of the war by drawing Israel into
the conflict by Scud attacks.

(d) In the event of a grd war utilise the ac for BAS msns.
Phases of the Gulf War

5. The MNF air campaign in the Gulf War had five distinct phases and these were:-

(a) Phase I. This was the build up phase. Military might was projected at its daunting best
during the build up phase, via the medium of air. Op Desert Shield was ordered by President Bush
on 06 Aug 1990 which entailed the largest airlift transfer of forces in history.

(b) Phase II. The aim of Phase II of the air campaign of the MNF was to destroy Iraq’s vital
centres of gravity, which consisted of the following:-

(i) Iraq’s offensive and defensive capabilities, inclusive of its entire Air Force and its
integrated grd based AD system.

(ii) Communication centres and lines of communication.

(iii) NBC production and R&D capabilities, rail, roads, bridges and oil distribution
capabilities.

(c) Phase III & IV. The goal of Phase III & IV was to neutralize the Iraqis in the Kuwaiti
theater of ops by cutting bridges and lines of communications, by disrupting its logistics, destroying
its armour and artillery and killing and demoralizing the grd forces.

(d) Phase V. The aim of Phase V was to win the air/grd campaign by providing Int, massive
firepower and protective air cover for friendly forces.
Employment of Air Power

6. Phase I. The various facets of air power used in this phase were:-

(a) Tpt Airlift. As many as 120 sorties a day were flown during this period to build up the tps,
armament and logistics required for the ops. Eventually 2700 ac were available and prepared for the
ops.

(b) Recce. KH-II satellites provided tgt info and tp movement details. U-2R and TR-1 ac
provided photo and IR info. Adequate tgt data was thus available well before commencement of the
fire fight.

(c) EW. AWACS ac flew extensively to gather ELINT.

(d) Trg. Extensive integrated trg in terrain similar to that over Iraq was carried out by large
packages. This was both realistic and intensive, which paid rich dividends during actual ops over
Iraq.

7. Phase II. The air campaign began on 17 Jan 1991 with strikes against AD sites by Apache attack
heptrs, F-117A stealth fighters and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tomahawks reduced pilot exposure over
heavily defended tgts especially during daylight hours and the F-117A ac flew virtually undetected. Iraqi
airfields were struck using runway denial and precision guided weapons. Anti-radiation weapons were
employed against active sensors. In the first 14 hours of the campaign over1000 sorties were flown against
Iraqi early warning systems, command and control structures, communications, AD, Scud missile sites,
electrical power and other related tgts. 80% of the sorties were effective. The USAF and the RAF were the
backbone of the coalition air campaign. While the USAF utilizing their F-117s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, A-6s
and A-10 ac struck tgts as above, the RAF utilized their Tornados and Jaguars and carried out offensive
counter air/air interdiction ops. Within four days of the start of the war the counter air campaign had
neutralized the Iraqi Air Force, effectively destroyed its long and medium range AD system and thereby
ensured a favourable air situation for the MNF Air Forces.

8. Phase III & IV. These two phases ran concurrently and addressed the Iraqi tgts through
interdiction. Bridges and other point tgts like supply dumps, artillery, armour and Scud msl sites were hit
with PGMs. The elite Republican Guards were struck by about 300 sorties daily employing B-52 ac in
carpet bombing role as well as by other ac.

9. Phase V. This was the mopping up phase in which attack heptrs executed msns to destroy
artillery assets, bunkers in the forward defences and mobile tank reserves deployed in depth. After 6 weeks
of bombing, a mere 100 hours of combat on land was sufficient to bring about utter collapse of the Iraqi war
machine.

Other Air Ops

10. AWACS ac were flown round the clock and tasked with air space management, early warning and
as well as control of over 3000 daily msns. Joint Surveillance and Tactical Attack Radar System (JSTAR)
ac helped provide ground surveillance in the TBA. Satellites provided surveillance, weather data, navigation
support, threat warning of msl attack and timely and secure communications. The GPS proved invaluable in
guiding forces to tgt areas with an unprecedented accuracy.

Novel Features of the Air War

11. Some of the novel features as seen in this war were:-

(a) Reconnaissance. The use of US satellites to provide recce of the region was one of the
most notable feature of this war. These satellites provided real time int data using photo, thermal
and radar imaging means. Recce ac such as the U-2 and TR-1 were also utilized.

(b) Integration of all Air Assets under a Single Authority. During this op total air assets
were placed under a single Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). A single Air Task
Order (ATO), giving all relevant details such as tgt, TOTs, mission allotment, frequency codes etc
was prepared by the staff of the Air Commander. Consistency and unity in guidance reduce
coordination conflicts. Operating under one coordinated plan improves efficiency and lessens the
possibility of fratricide.

(c) Composite Wing Concept. In this concept different types of ac having different roles but
comprising a single force package were based on the same station under one commander. This
afforded various components of the package an opportunity to train together.

(d) Aircrew Trg. Realistic aircrew trg is a pre-requisite for good results. As a workup to Op
Desert Storm, Nellis tactical range was modified to include realistic tgts and replicas of Iraqi
airfields, Scud sites, POL depots and AD elements. Aircrew trg included flying in different
configurations, firing live armament, operating with composite force packages and in the likely ECM
environment.

(e) Use of PGMs. The successful use of PGMs during this war indicates that conventional
weapons may be totally replaced by “Smart” weapons in the near future. The extremely high degree
of accuracy and their capability to be fired even at night are the optimum features of these weapons.
These weapons are high cost weapons, yet they are cost effective due to their high accuracy.

(f) Stealth Ac. The Gulf War conclusively proved the effectiveness of the most modern
fighter ac of today, the F-117A “Stealth Fighter”, and proved it was worth its phenomenally high cost
per piece. Its stealth technology successfully conceals it from radar and even when deployed from
medium/high levels it remains virtually undetected.

(g) Avionics. Suites such as FLIR, LANTIRN and Thermal Imaging have proved highly
essential in modern warfare. Despite such sophisticated aids available to the pilots it is estimated
that around 75% of the iron bombs and 25% of the PGMs missed their tgts. Availability of such
avionics permitted MNF ac to operate in day and night including bad weather.

(h) Lethality of AD Weapons. Whilst the search radars and MGRs of the SAM systems were
virtually blinded due to heavy use of ECM, the extensively deployed LLAD guns continued to
provide lethal fire and maximum attrition was caused by AD guns, especially when attacks were at
 low level. Having neutralized radars/SAMs the USAF flew high above the range of the AA guns
however RAF was forced to fly low due its optimization of weapons in low level role.

(j) Logistics. The MNF employed a Logistics Support System known as “Desert Express”
which enabled spares and supplies to be flown in from any part of the globe within 48 hours.

(k) Spl Ops. The MNF employed Special Operation Forces (SOF) dropped by heptr to
perform deep recce msns, confirm bomb damage assessment and designate tgts for PGMs. The
use of SOF ensured that tgts were struck accurately and effectively put out of action.

(l) Space Based Assets. Satellites like KH-11, KH-12, Magnum and Vertex were used for
communication and passing of real time tgt info to strike ac through secured data links. Also high
resolution cameras on board these satellites were used for BDA without endangering any ac. The
GPS proved invaluable for the nav with a very high degree of accuracy.

(m) Ballistic Msl Defence System. One of the novel features of the Gulf War was the Patriot
Anti-Ballistic Msl system used to neutralize the Scud SSMs of Iraq. Patriots were fired to intercept
Scud msls fired by Iraq with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

(n) Tomahawk Msls. The msls provided the real stand off capability being fired 100s of miles
away with great accuracy and preventing collateral damage. The msl follows TERCOM (Terrain and
Contour Matching Area Correlation) and for the terminal phase of the attack uses DSMAC (Digital
Scene Matching Area Correlation) for accurate targeting. The msls were launched from B-52
bombers and from ships and submarines located in the Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean.
(o) AAR. The Gulf War has brought out in sharp focus the importance of tanker ac. The
USAF C-130 tanker version ac was used extensively to replenish ac operating beyond their ROA.
The F-16 and F-15 operating from Bahrain, a base about 600 nm from Baghdad used to carry out
sorties of about 8-9 hrs duration, and required mid-air refueling. These ac often carried 2x2000 lbs
LGBs and were refueled in order to enhance ROA. AAR therefore proved to be a force multiplier
during the Gulf War.

Lessons Learnt (PUT DAD PES^4T C)

12. The various lessons learnt from this conflict are as follows:-

(a) Traditional Belief. The first lesson is a reaffirmation of the traditional belief that good
leadership, trg, discipline and morale are vital to a war effort. The war underlined the importance of
rapidly gaining air superiority and ultimately air supremacy in a combat theatre.

(b) Political Freedom. At the political level the major lesson that emerges is the need to
correctly define the aim, leaving the method of execution to the commander in the field. Air Power
was given a free run within the frame work stipulated earlier and allowed to operate as per plans.

(c) Unity of Command. All air ops should be controlled by Joint Force Air Component Cdr, in
adherence to unity of command. Air Task Orders (ATO) were assigned to specific units and direct
the wpns used, ATO maximizes effectiveness.

(d) EW. The Iraqi AD system had a wide array of radars of Soviet and Western origin with
various SAM systems and radar controlled AA guns. To counter these systems, the MNF ac were
fitted with RWRs, chaff/IR flare dispensers and radar/IR jamming equipment. Specialist EW ac were
EA-68, EF-111, EC-130 C3I system jammers and the F-4G Wild Weasel defence suppression ac. A
wide range of ARMs were used and the attrition rate of 36 MNF ac lost was remarkably low. The air
war has confirmed the need for and the effectiveness of EW equipment in the present air
environment. About 50% of the air effort of the MNF was flown by support ac, which included EW
and decoy ac.

(e) AWACS. These are essential tools of Air Power, and played a pivotal role in neutralizing
Iraq’s air and grd based military elements. They performed the roles of ADC, GCI stations, early
warning, coordination of strike msns, coordination of rescue ops of downed aircrew and the data
 provided by the AWACS was sent through data links to other users in the air on grd and at sea. This
provided a real time picture of all activity in the theatre of ops.

(f) PGMs. Pre-planned selective use of PGMs is a cost effective option especially against
heavily fortified tgts. It takes fewer sorties to destroy the tgt and reduces exposure and therefore the
potential for ac losses. Their use against armour was devastating.

(g) Air Superiority. The CAF during the outbreak of hostilities concentrated over gaining total
command of the air and virtually made the Iraqi Air Force non existent. The CAF carried out SEAD
and CAO relentlessly and gained air superiority within 4 days of the war. Subsequently the attrition
was fought with air cover on top and nil interference from the enemy.

(h) Flexibility in AD. Adequate flexibility must be built in to AD procedures to ensure effective
tackling of emerging situation. One of the major for Iraqi AD system failure was over centralization of
the Command and Control structure. Neutralization of vital communication links in such a system
can effectively immobilize it.

(j) Tactics. They should be adapted to changing situations. Having neutralized radars/SAMs
the USAF flew high above the range of the AA guns however RAF was forced to fly low due its
optimization of weapons in low level role.

(k) Air Force Doctrine. Although Iraq possessed the most modern ac including Mig-29 and
AEW system in the form of two IL-76 ac these were not exploited or were rendered ineffective.
Iraq’s entire war fighting ethos hinged on defensive ops forgetting that air forces essentially develop
their full potential only through Offensive action.

(l) Importance of Defence Satellites. Once the air campaign started Iraq had lost all air
recce capability and could not react to the changes in enemy re-deployment of grd forces. This
illustrates the vital importance of defence Satellites with Recce capabilities.

(m) Stealth. Stealth technology is worth every penny spent. The stealth ac does not need
extensive electronic combat support. This frees these assets to support other msns.

(n) Joint Trg. Forces which are likely to operate together must train together.

(o) Identification of Friendly Forces in TBA. Rapid battlefield movement requires systems
that will allow pilots attacking forces on the grd to quickly distinguish friend from foe.

(p) Secure Communications. A vast network of secure communication, minimum time delay
and strict adherence to emission control ensured that the “Fog of War” was virtually non existent.

(q) Use of Spl Op Forces. The coalition employed Spl Op Forces (SOF) dropped by heptr to
perform deep recce msns, confirm BDA and designate tgts including Scud msl launchers for air
dropped precision guided bombs. The use of SOF ensured that tgts were struck accurately and
effectively put out of action.

(r) Importance of C4I2. Each nation must curtail inter service rivalry and integrate national
assets within which all aspects of crisis management fall- at the diplomatic, strategic or tactical level.

Lessons Learnt in the Indian Context (TAJ PET LCB)

13. The easy victory for coalition forces was made possible only due to the overwhelming success of
the air campaign. IAF must learn from Op Desert storm a few lessons as listed below:-

(a) Joint Force Air Component Cdr. This component of unity of command for all air assets
needs to be implemented at the earliest

(b) Tactics. The poor performance of the Iraqi pilots who had been trained in the past by
Indian pilots was glaring. Evidently the type of air combat taught was ill suited and not in relation to
 the new and latest avionics and technology. IAF must analyse the tactics employed by the coalition
forces and should devise the means of minimising the technological disadvantage in our areas of
interest.

(c) EW. The following must be thought by IAF cdrs:-

(i) The importance of stealth ac.

(ii) Each IAF ac must have EW capability, either use of Jammers, Chaff or IR flares.

(iii) There is a need to look for ARMs to suppress electronic AD assets.

(iv) There is a need for the IAF to raise an EW Sqn along the lines of the “Wild Weasels”,
if it really wants to suppress the enemy’s electronic assets.

(v) It is better to have one AWACS ac than ten fighter ac without EW assets. India has to
seriously think about and acquire AWACS.

(d) Budget. In the last few years there has been a constant decrease in the defence budget
thereby compromising on the numbers and quality of the equipment. This trend needs to be
reversed at the earliest if we wish to maintain an edge over our enemies.

(e) Smart Msls and Bombs. Smart munitions ensure that pilots take no more risk than
absolutely necessary. Not only does this mean stand off modes of attack but also surgical precision.
Though some such munitions are available in the IAF inventory due to its cost the numbers are
limited, domestic production could help solve this problem.

(f) Commns. IAF suffers from the lack of this asset and its importance needs no elaboration,
this need to be procured at the earliest.

(g) Lgs Support. IAF lgs support is a neglected area and is restricted to ration and POL only.
Cdrs should analyse the novel idea of the “Desert Express” and come up with a similar system.

(h) Technology. High technology works, it may cost more but its benefits are numerous and
well worth the cost. Avionics upgrade of the Mig-21 and Mig-23 fleet is essential.

Conclusion

14. Operation Desert Storm validated the concept of a campaign in which air power, applied precisely
and nearly simultaneously against centers of gravity, significantly degraded enemy capabilities. Air power
degraded much of the Iraqi command structure, markedly reduced military production, made the Iraqi Air
Force ineffective, and significantly degraded the overall combat effectiveness of the Iraqi army. Technology
gave the coalition a decisive edge. Stealth, PGMs, SEAD, C31, AAR, recce and surveillance ac, space
systems, night-fighting capabilities, tactical ballistic msl defense systems, logistics systems, airlift and
sealift, cruise missiles, attack heptrs, UAVs, and flexible ac made major contributions. The revolutionary
combination of stealth ac and PGMs allowed nearly simultaneous attack against scores of tgts across the
theater. They enabled a relatively small number of offensive assets to attack effectively many more tgts
than would have been possible without stealth, which requires little airborne support, and PGMs which
require few munitions to achieve the desired effect. However one fact that has to be borne in mind is that
there was practically no opposition from Iraqi Air Force. Technological backwardness, disjoint doctrine and
planning a defensive approach were some factors that led to the Iraqi debacle. This has led to
revolutionizing air power, making it more technology intensive rather than manpower intensive. Future wars
will depend on the present employment of air power and exploiting its characteristics like lethality, long
range and tremendous fire power.
 OP MERCURY

Introduction

1. After capture of Greece in early 1941, capture of Crete promised many advantages to Germans. In
May 1941, Germans launched a major operation code named “Op Mercury” in which airborne forces were
landed on island of Crete located in Mediterranean Sea. This was only successful airborne assault
operation during WW II.

2. Possession of Crete was of great strategic importance. For British, it was to maintain naval
supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. Suda provided the Mediterranean Fleet with a forward base 420
miles forward of Alexandria. For Germans, the island of Crete would provide an ideal forward base in which
to conduct offensive air and naval operations and to support the ground offensive in Egypt. Its capture
would also deny Allied aircraft potential bases for striking Germany's Ploesti oil fields in Romania.

Objectives

3. The German objectives were as follows:-

(a) Denial of A/F. Deprive RAF of airbases from where they could launch attacks on tgts in
Romania and Southern Europe.

(b) Protection. Protect own shipping in the Mediterranean.

(c) Restriction. Restrict operations by the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean.

(d) Base near Egypt. To have a base close enough to attack tgts in Egypt.

(e) Blockade of Approaches. Close approaches to the Dardanelles and Black Sea ports of
Russia.

(f) Support of own Forces. It aimed at supporting the German-Italian forces in the ongoing
North African campaign.

Forces

4. British. After the fall of Greece many troops were evacuated to Crete. The British forces
consisted of 27,500 poorly armed tps, a mixed bag of British, Australian and New Zealanders under the
command of Maj Gen Freyberg. The major factors of deployment, support and limitations were:-

(a) The tps were divided into four garrisons at Herakilon, Maleme, Retimo and Suda Bay. Other
than Suda Bay, the other garrisons had airfields in their vicinity.

(b) Thousands of tps were unarmed with shortages of all kind of equipment.

(c) Tpt was in short supply hence the tps were in no way mutually supporting.

(d) British Air Support consisted of four sqns of Hurricanes and six naval fighters for the
protection of Suda Bay. These were also withdrawn on 19 May 1941 since maintaining them in
Crete became impossible.

(e) The nearest substantial air support was in Egypt. No assistance could be expected from the
ac in Egypt due to extreme range and general paucity of fighters.
 (f) German fighters constantly harassed the troops, making it necessary to hide by day and
move only by night.

5. German. German forces under the overall command of Field Marshal List consisted of 15750
airborne troops, 7000 sea borne troops, 300 bombers, 75 Recce ac, 300 fighters, 600 Tpt ac and approx 60
gliders. Crete was well within the range of German fighters based in Greece.

German Assault Plan

6. The German plan was based on dropping airborne tps with the objective of capturing airfields so
that they could be used to fly in additional troops. The plans envisaged induction of glider borne troops in
the vicinity of Maleme airfield at H hour, knock out AA defences and thus cover the descent of paratroopers
in relative safety. At H+5 hrs two para battalions were to be dropped which were to suppress any ground
resistance and capture the airfields. At H+8 hrs troops were to be dropped in the vicinity of Suda Bay,
Herakilon and Retimo airfields to silence AA defences, neutralize ground forces and secure airfields.

Operations

7. Air Operations. Air ops commenced on 01 May with German bombers attacking British shipping
in Suda Bay and Cretan waters. Attacks against airfields, support infrastructure and ac on ground
commenced from 13 May onwards in a bid to gain air superiority. The few RAF ac in Crete put up an
outstanding resistance but they were badly outnumbered, and thus ineffectual. As no replacements were
available even these ac were withdrawn on 19 May 41. This provided the Germans air supremacy over
Crete.

8. Airborne Assault. The airborne assault commenced on 20 May 41 at 0800 hrs with heavy
bombing attacks around the airfields. In the absence of any opposition, assault went planned and by night
all three airfields had been captured.

9. The Naval Battle. On the night of 21/22 May 41, the Royal Navy intercepted German Sea borne
force proceeding to Crete and inflicted severe casualties forcing a large complement to withdraw to Greece.
The Royal Navy however paid a heavy price the following morning when the fleet was exposed to the full
fury of German air attacks. Two cruisers and four destroyers were lost and many ships suffered extensive
damage. On 24 May 1941 Royal Navy withdraws from northern approaches of Crete.

10. Ground Operations. By 26 May, the situation had become critical. With the landing of 20,000
German troops at Suda Bay and Italian troops at Sitia the situation became untenable and therefore, on 28
May, Maj Gen Freyberg decided to withdraw his troops. Evacuation which commenced on night 28/29 May
had to be terminated on night of 31 May/01 Jun due to heavy naval losses.

11. Casualties. The British lost about 13,000 tps killed, wounded or captured. German losses were
estimated at 8000 wounded, 4000 killed and almost 170 ac lost.

Reasons for German Success (MATURE CLIV)

12. The reasons for the success of the Germans were as follows:-

(a) Effective Planning and Organisation. In spite of paucity of time the assault was planned
to the minutest of details and executed within a period of one month from the word go. It speaks
volumes of the German organizing and administrative ability.

(b) Inter-Service Co-operation. For success of an airborne operation, close co-operation

between the tactical air force and the ground force is essential. Concentration of force, detailed staff
planning and coordinated trg between Army and Air Force was demonstrated at every stage. On the
other hand, nil air support was available to British tps over land or sea.

(c) Air Superiority. The Germans had appreciated that without the neutralization of the RAF,
airborne operations of this magnitude would not be possible. The Luftwaffe concentrated on this
objective till it was attained.
 (d) Vulnerability of Naval Fleet. The naval fleet cannot operate without air cover which must
be provided by either land based or carrier borne ac. This was totally missing on the British side.

(e) Morale. The trg and equipment of Germans was superior and with a string of victories
behind them their morale was very high. The British forces on the other hand were a demoralized
force, poorly equipped and licking its wounds after evacuation from Greece.

(f) Threat Perception. The British had made no attempts to fortify Crete after its capture with
regard to the medium of air and were only looking out to the medium of sea for the invading force.

(g) Unity of Command. The British Army and RAF were under separate commanders and
hence operating in isolation. No attempts were made to counter-strike Greek airfields.

(h) Recce. Round the clock/ 24 hours recce was carried out by Luftwaffe Air Force over
Crete.

(j) Communication. A real time communication link was established between the Luftwaffe
pilots operating overhead and the forces on ground.

(k) Lack of Int. The assault by itself did not surprise British. What however surprised them
was the magnitude of assault. They did not expect the Germans to concentrate forces in such a
manner.

Lessons learnt (VU I FALC – VUlcan Interefered with FALCon)

13. The various lessons learnt from this operation are:-

(a) Vulnerability of Naval Fleet. This operation showed the vital need for ac carriers to
protect a fleet at sea as not even the most formidable fleet can operate within the radius of a
superior enemy air force for any length of time as was seen in the suspension of the British
evacuation.

(b) Unity of Command. RAF was separated from army, this lack of unity of command by
British, begotten of erroneous theory that strategic bombing is a thing in itself and unrelated to
immediate tactical requirements, cost them dearly.

(c) Inter-Services Co-operation. Close co-operation between the tactical air force and
ground forces, detailed staff planning and coordinated trg between the Army and the Air Force was
demonstrated at every stage by the Germans.

(d) Flexibility. The remarkable feat of lifting an army into the air and carrying out, not an air
attack but an airborne attack.

(e) Air Superiority. The devastating effect on sea and land forces by air power by having
total air superiority as was done by the Germans.

(f) Lack of Foresight. Complete surprise achieved by the Germans in following air route
while the British were only looking at the sea route.

(g) Cost. The most important lesson learnt was that in spite of all the mistakes made by the
British, the invasion of Crete still cost Germans very heavily in view of the number of lives lost. The
Germans thereafter never carried out any airborne assaults in the II WW.

Conclusion

14. Once German High Command had decided to occupy Crete, the German Army and Air Force
planners went about their task in a systematic manner so as to achieve joint planning and execution of an
airborne assault. The time period in which this operation was planned and executed showed good
coordination. The German losses were high and therefore they did not venture to undertake any other
airborne operation during WW II. In spite of the losses, “Op Mercury” was a success and upset the plans of
the Allies in the Mediterranean and Egypt. In sum, therefore, it can be called a success revealing a
revolutionary new dimension of Airpower i.e. “assault by air”.
THE SIX DAY WAR ’67 (5 Jun – 10 Jun 67)

S. No. Designation/ Country Name

9. Egypt President Gamel Abdel Nasser
10. Israel PM Levi Ishkol
11. Syria President Attasi

Background

1. The series of mistakes and misapprehensions leading directly to the 1967 war began in 1966. Raids
into Israel by Palestinian guerillas based in Syria were on the rise during the year 1966, putting at risk the
lives of Israeli citizens. Israel appealed to Soviet government to use its influence with the Syrians to
discourage these incursions, but the Soviet reply was that frontier incidents were being contrived by
Western intelligence agencies in order to provoke bigger conflicts. Israel’s position worsened when Egypt
and Syria made a new military agreement which appeared to strengthen the military capabilities of both
partners and to present a threat to Israel of a two front conflict.

2. President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt was passing through a period of relative unpopularity and
insecurity and was compelled to assert himself as the leader of progressive Arabs. Egypt moved troops into
the Sinai in reply to Israeli threats to invade Syria. By end of May 1967, a Jordanian-Egyptian military
agreement was reached and this made Israel’s survival beyond a few more weeks even more questionable.

Israel’s Aim

3. The aim of Israel was to deliver a decisive blow to Egyptians by attacking and annihilating EAF in
pre-emptive strikes and to occupy the Golan Heights to stop fidayeen attacks across the border from Syria.

Forces

4. Israel used approximately 1, 00, 000 men in Sinai front and up to 1, 50, 000 men on all fronts. Egypt
out of 150,000 troops used only 80,000, Syria out of 45,000 troops used only 15,000 and Jordan out of
56,000 troops used only 45,000. The acceptable ratio for attacker of 3:1 was achieved by Israel by
concentration of forces and massive air support preventing reinforcements from reaching Arab units under
attack. Also Israel did not attack on all three fronts at the same time, they first dealt with Egypt and later
with Jordan and Syria.

Israeli Strategy

5. The Israeli strategy was to attain Total Air Supremacy since in the open desert with no cover, it
would have a devastating effect on armour and mechanized elements and Israeli troops would be able to
achieve their objectives. To achieve this, it was planned to carry out a surprise attack on airfields and
aircraft on ground. Arabs could not do this due to political compulsions, which cost them the war.

6. The Israelis multiplied air assets by new acquisitions just before the war, getting accurate
information of Arab movements and deployment by aircraft recce and satellite recce, efficiency of ground
crew in turning round aircraft. Further, 60 jet trainers were used in ground attack role which was possible
only because air supremacy was achieved.

Air Campaign

7. The attack was planned at 0845 hrs Cairo Time on 05 Jun 1967, within 3 hours of the attack the fate
of Arab Armies was sealed as 2/3rd of the Egyptian aircraft were destroyed on ground. The time of the
attack was so chosen because:-

(a) If by 0800-0830 hrs no attack materializes, the guard is lowered, radars are switched off to
cool down and aircrew sits down to have breakfast.
 (b) Maximum sleep for Israeli aircrew and less for Egyptians.

(c) Maximum visibility as by 0830 hrs the mist over Nile Delta and Suez dissipates.

(d) All Egyptian high ranking officers were on their way to work and were caught in between.

8. Egyptian radars failed to pick up the Israelis as they were all looking east while the attacking aircraft
came from west. The IAF aircraft flew very low and made use of effective ECM to jam the radars.
Devastating damage was done to the Egyptian aircraft as there was no dispersion of aircraft to rear bases
out of reach of the IAF. Aircraft were parked in open in a single line in the dispersals and were not in
hardened shelters. SAM-2s were ineffective against low flying aircraft and all senior commanders of Army
and Air Force were on board an IL-14 aircraft and on course to visit Sinai for a conference. While the
airfields were being attacked they were circling overhead totally cut off.

9. A total lack of coordination between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq was due to rivalries and political
reasons. Their retaliation was not coordinated and ineffective. The SAF and JAF asked for more time to
attack Israel while at that time Israel was most vulnerable when its aircraft had gone to attack Egypt and
only 12 fighters were available for the defence of entire Israel. After dealing with the EAF the IAF
concentrated on the SAF and JAF, which were both almost destroyed by end of the first day. The IAF now
concentrated all its resources towards ground support as there was no air threat to Israeli airfields/cities.

The Ground War

10. After the air attacks of 05 Jun the ground war was a series of ground battles, the outcome
determined by IAF air supremacy. IAF carried out destructive air attacks on Egyptian formations but
prevented similar attacks on Israeli formations. Vital supplies and reinforcements were cut off to Egyptians
and the same were provided securely to the rapidly moving Israeli forces. The land war had 3 theatres viz
Sinai, Syria and Jordan. Once Egyptians had been dealt with, only then the Israelis opened up the other
fronts. Air Campaign against Syria was larger than in Sinai as Israel wanted to achieve its aim of capturing
the Golan Heights.

11. On 06 Jun at about noon the Egyptian High Command gave a panic call for general withdrawal,
even though a bulk of the Egyptian forces had not made contact with the enemy and were well dug in and
fortified. The total air supremacy of the Israelis was also not thought of and this proved disastrous as the
withdrawing Egyptian forces were decimated by the IAF.

Lessons Learnt (QM PISTAL DVD ICC - 6 day war mein QM ne PISTAL aur DVD ICC ko di)

12. The various lessons learnt from this conflict are as follows:-

(a) Planning. Since 1963, Op Moked had been planned meticulously for a pre-emptive strike
on the Arabs.

(b) Intelligence. Adequate int was gathered using aerial recce, photo recce, COMINT
methods, location of aircraft, ammunition, fuel supplies, data on runway thickness, flt control, radar
network and time of op, aircraft scrambling techniques etc.

(c) Surprise. The element of surprise as an effective and decisive principle of war was clearly
brought out in this war. Although the Arabs were on the alert, the Israeli air attack came as a total
surprise. The Arabs never recovered from the near total annihilation.

(d) Deception. In spite of training units being moved out, R/T was carried out as normal to
deceive eavesdropping by the Arabs.

(e) Training. The IAF had trained realistically for air combat versus the latest Soviet fighters;
also AD control through radar units was practised.

(f) Morale and Training. This vital aspect was closely monitored by Israeli commanders and
generally ignored by Arabs.
 (g) Air Superiority. The achievement of total air supremacy in first few hours of the war
ensured an Israeli victory.

(h) Vulnerability of Armour. The vulnerability of armour and ground forces to air attacks in
the absence of friendly air cover was proven beyond doubt, as was experienced by the Arabs.

(j) Concentration of Force. The maximum numbers of available aircraft were mobilized to
achieve the aim of air superiority. Efficient transfer of troops and equipment between the theatres of
war was resorted to by the Israelis to offset their numerical inferiority against the Arabs thereby
exhibiting concentration of forces.

(k) Communication. Communication lines were kept intact with Israeli commanders in direct
contact through the control centres with aircraft participating in ops. Poor communication from the
battlefield on the other hand led to Egyptian top brass passing wrong and panicky orders leading to
their defeat.

(l) Quality of Military Hardware. Whatever the Israelis lacked in quantity they made up in
superior quality of their US supplied aircraft and tanks.

(m) Leadership. The Israeli leadership throughout the war was impeccable. Aims were
realistic, execution and support elements well organized.

(n) Indecisiveness. False feeling of security by Arab Armies in their well dug fortifications
and their reluctance to venture out into open to engage the enemy, had they done so the
effectiveness of the IAF would have been reduced as there is a limit to which CAS can function. In
any case the loss to the Arabs would have been the same but they could have inflicted heavy
losses on the Israelis too.

(o) Defence of Air Bases. A multi-layered system of AD will prove to be the best, most of the
EAF airfields were only protected by AAA which allowed even conventional dive attacks to go
through.

Conclusion

13. The Six Day War as this conflict came to be known as, was won by Israel more due to Arab
incompetence and less due to their own excellence. A total lack of cooperation between Egypt, Jordan and
Syria and a lack of initiative and aggressive spirit on the part of the Arabs were the glaring features of this
war. Arab plans of battle were to engage the enemy in frontal defensive systems and hold back their
armour in reserve. All this while having no air cover was disastrous. Total annihilation of the Arab air forces
led to a catastrophic effect on their ground forces. The loss of equipment and human lives to Arabs was
large, but the effect on their morale was catastrophic.
 VIETNAM WAR

Introduction

1. The French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 set the stage for the total disengagement of the
French in Indo-China region and for the involvement of the US. The Americans were of the view that
trouble in this part of the world is no more than simple insurgency. This impression was soon proved wrong
when it became known that Russia, China and North Vietnam were involved deeply. In Vietnam, the war
was a prolonged one. Here airpower was used in a restricted area in almost all its classical roles. It was in
Vietnam that a superpower was pitted against a weak nation. War was never declared officially but many
new techniques were developed and used.
2. US military action commenced in 1961. In Aug 1964 air action was extended to North Vietnam.
Hanoi, Haiphong and the Chinese border were included although Haiphong harbour was not bombed.
South Vietnamese Air Force also took part but its role was limited.

Air Operations

3. Air ops in Vietnam can be classified as following:-

(a) Strategic Bombing. These operations were controlled by the Pentagon. Local commanders had
little say in decision making. In fact, tgt selection was done at the political level. As expected the controlling
authority failed to understand and exploit the weapons available. B-52 ac operating from bases in Guam
and Thailand were used extensively. The USA used ECM/ECCM equipment against missiles. The tgts
chosen were military airfields, oil reserves, storage depots and tp concentrations. These sorties did not
prove to be “cost-effective”.

(b) Interdiction. For these missions railways, highways, bridges, supply channels and waterways
were chosen. Defoliants were used in forest areas. For night attacks high intensity illuminants were used,
but because of their high recovery factor, maximum of 48 hrs, these attacks had to be given up.

(c) Close Air Support. For these operations Sky Raiders, F-4 Phantoms, F-105 and Sky Hawks
were used. The salient points that emerged were as follows:-

(i) Cost. For USA the cost of Ops was of no consideration.

(ii) Innovation. The Viet Cong had virtually no support other than tremendous innovation,
initiative, determination and resilience.
(iii) CAS. Close air support was provided by land based and carrier based ac.
(iv) Accuracy. USAF could deliver weapons up to 100 m from their own tps.
(v) PGMs. Precision guided munitions were designed and perfected. They used TV, Laser or
electronic guidance.
SEAD. SAM sites, AA guns and Radar defences were attacked.
(vi) FAC. The use of light ac such as Cessna and Bird Dog for FAC duties became a standard
procedure.

(d) Air Recce. The USAF attached great importance to these missions. Continuous air recce
missions were flown to obtain the latest air int. Satellites were used for collecting information. Extensive use
was made of Drones.

(e) Heptr Ops. There was complete air superiority which permitted extensive use of heptrs. The
following roles were performed:-

(i) Casualty Evacuation. The survival rate was as high as 985 out of 1000 casualties, and
heptrs were used extensively in this role.

(ii) Armed Air Support. They were used for all types of air assault and were usually referred
to as “airborne artillery”.
 (iii) Anti-Submarine Ops. Heptrs were employed for locating, tracking and attacking
submarines in the Gulf of Tonkin.

(iv) Air/Sea Search and Rescue. Successful ops were carried out thereby keeping the
morale of the fighter pilots high, who were sure of a recovery if downed in enemy land/waters.

(v) Tactical Mobility. Heptrs such as Chinook and Huey were used and they virtually
replaced the three ton trucks.

(vi) Tactical Recce. Singly flown these recce heptrs used search lights to scan the thick
jungle foliage at night and to detect boats and sampans used by Viet Cong to move supplies in the
rivers. These heptrs were armed and could attack detected tgts.

(vii) Logistic Support. Isolated posts were regularly supplied reinforcements by heptrs.

Lessons Learnt( SAM GFC)

4. In spite of the USAF carrying out massive scale ops against a weak enemy, the results were far
from encouraging. The main lessons learnt were:-

(a) Air Superiority. Air superiority is a mandatory requirement for Tpt and heptr ops.

(b) Morale. Heavy bombing of civilian tgts is useless, the fall in morale is temporary and military
gains are absent.

(c) Airpower vs Guerilla Warfare. Effectiveness of airpower against guerilla warfare is debatable.

(d) Air Support. Air support is vital against a fast moving battle.

(e) FAC. Airborne FAC helps in getting almost instant air support.

(f) AD. SAM’s proved not very effective against low flying ac, however AD arty was found to be
effective.

(g) Command and Control. Over centralization of control had a negative effect, delegation of
command and control is an important factor.

(h) Air Power in Offensive Role. Air power has to be employed in an offensive role without
restriction in order to have the desired effect. It was seen that when the self imposed restrictions were
temporarily lifted they had the following effect:-

(i) Attacks on harbours stopped the supplies for North Vietnam.

(ii) In one week 80% of power generation capacity was destroyed.
(iii) Guerilla hideouts and trails were extensively damaged.

Conclusion

5. The air war over Vietnam began as a small, localized campaign and ended as a furious all out
bombing campaign. New weapons and tactics were introduced onto the battlefield like never before in the
history of modern warfare. New smart weapons and ordnance was used and changed the way wars were
to be fought forever. The advent of the attack helicopter was one of the most significant new developments
of the Vietnam War, with the same tactics and doctrines still in use today. Political problems have no
military solution. This has always been learnt and then forgotten by people after the conflicts. Bombing has
hardly any effect on ideology, also strategic bombing will have the least impact on an underdeveloped
economy.

6. In Vietnam, one finds lessons as to how air power should be and should not be used. Air power was
used in all its facets, tpt and heptr ops were perfected and a very efficient system was sustained. Political
day to day interference prevents air power from giving desired results. To sum up, despite a combination of
superior equipment, superior numbers and superior technology use of air power was aimless, extravagant
and extremely costly against the grit and determination of the Viet Cong.