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PropertyLand Law - Co-Ownership Severance - SC
PropertyLand Law - Co-Ownership Severance - SC
PropertyLand Law - Co-Ownership Severance - SC
ownership – Severance
(Adapted from Modern Land Law 11th edn, Martin Dixon; Land Law, Ben McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins
& Sarah Nield; Textbook on Land Law, Judith-Anne Mackenzie & Mary Phillips; Elements of Land Law,
Gray & Gray; UOL Subject Guide)
Introduction
o Co-Ownership arises in a situation where Two or more people are entitled to simultaneous /
concurrent enjoyment of the land. Two or more people have the rights to ownership over the
same piece of land at the same time.
o Anytime property is held by 2 or more people where will be an Automatic / Statutory Trust that
will be imposed over the property – Section 1 Trust of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act
1996 – TOLATA 1996
o The property will then be divided into the Legal Title and the Beneficial Ownership
Beneficial Ownership
JOINT TENANCY
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Hammersmith LBC v Monk “In property law, a transfer of land to two
or more persons jointly operates so as to make them, vis-à-vis the outside world, one single
owner”.
Property
The FOUR Unities: PITT
Property
1. Unity of Possession
Ann – Ben-
2. Unity of Interest 10% 20%
3. Unity of Time
Trustees Beneficiaries
A. Legal Title
• Will always (ONLY) be held as Joint Tenants and never as Tenants In Common – Section 1(6)
LPA 1925, Section 36(2) LPA 1925
• The law does not recognize the Legal Title as TIC – Sec 1(6), Sec 34, Sec 36(2) LPA 1925
• Sec 34 LPA 1925 & Sec 34 Trustees Act 1925 - only a max of 4 people can hold the legal title
Express Declaration
If the property was expressly conveyed to them as Beneficial Joint Tenants, this express
declaration will now mean that the Beneficial Interest is held as Joint Tenancy - Goodman v
Gallant (1986).
b. Business properties
Malayan Credit v Jack Chia (1986)
LAND
severs
Beneficial Interest
Joint Tenants
- Written Notice MUST state an immediate intention to sever the joint tenancy & not some
time in the future – Harris v Goddard
o Notice Must contain clear and unequivocal intention to sever – Harris v Goddard
o No prescribed form of notice required – Marshall v Marshall (1998)
o Notice need not be signed- Re Draper’s Conveyance (1969)
Section 196(3) LPA 1925 ~ so long as it has been delivered / left at the last place of business
or abode.
Registered Post
Section 196(4) LPA 1925 ~ a notice is deemed to have been served if “it is sent by post in a
registered letter” and the letter is not returned to the post office undelivered
Fantini v Scrutton & Ors. (2020) = A notice sent by registered post is deemed to have
arrived on the day it would have done in the normal course of posting unless returned
undelivered:
The notice Does Not actually have to be read by the Joint Tenants & he does not even need
to be aware of the notice
The moment the notice arrives (delivered), it is deemed that the notice is served - Irrelevant
if there is a later change of mind and the notice / letter is revoked or destroyed = the
severance is already effective – Kinch v Bullard
- Joint Tenant sells their share (to a Third Party or one of the other JT) – Bedson v Bedson
- Joint Tenant mortgages their share – First National Securities v Hegerty (1984)
- The ACT must be a Valid act. There must be a VALID sale or mortgage that has taken place –
compliance of all formalities. The act must be Final and Irrevocable.
- If the transaction has not yet been carried into effect, severance will still occur if the Joint
Tenant entered into a specifically enforceable valid contract for sale or contract to mortgage
– Gould v Kemp. It must satisfies all the formalities - section 2 LP(MP)A 1989
- ALL the Joint Tenants must have mutually agreed to sever the Joint Tenancy – Wright v
Gibbons (1949); Corin v Patton
The Joint Tenants by acting together may effectively agree inter se to sever their Joint
Tenancy – Re Knowlton & Bartlett (1985)
- The agreement need not be in any specific form and neither must it take the form of a
specifically enforceable contract. An informal agreement which shows intention to sever is
sufficient – Burgess v Rawnsley
An informal and flexible mode of severance
- There must be a finality of the agreement. The parties must have come up with a final
agreement to sever – Burgess v Rawnsley
- ALL the Joint Tenants have acted in such a way which shows that they regard themselves as
holding specific shares
- The severance may be effected “by any course of dealings sufficient to intimate that the
interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a TIC”. A course of dealings is
established to show that the parties are dealing with each other with the intention to sever
Hunter v Babbage (1994) – A pattern of dealings between all the Joint Tenants which
although falling short of an agreement to sever, nevertheless indicates an unambiguous
common intention that the JT should be severed
- Inconclusive Negotiations :
Burgess v Rawnsley – Lord Denning “even if there was not any firm agreement” between
the parties their negotiations amounted to a “course of dealings” which had evidenced a
sufficient intention to sever.
“a ‘course of dealings’ need not amount to an agreement, expressed or implied, for
severance. It is sufficient if there is a course of dealing in which one party makes clear to the
other that he desires that their share should no longer be held jointly but be held in
common”
Lord Denning found Mutual Conduct in the context of abortive negotiations for purchase.
But this is dependent upon the facts of each case and if one party negotiates with the other
JT to sever, then there will be the common intention for there to be severance by the
conduct even of the negotiations ultimately breakdown.
Gore & Snell v Carpenter (1990) Blackett-Ord J ~ mere negotiations alone are not the same
thing as “course of conduct”. The courts refused to infer the common intention necessary
for the finding of mutual conduct where there were simply negotiations and there was no
finality or mutuality.
Lord Denning’s view might be considered over-board.
a. Homicide – Re K
b. Bankruptcy – section 335A Insolvency Act 1986
TOLATA 1996. Since the property is held as co-owners, there will be a statutory / automatic trust of
land that would be imposed on the land. The Legal Owners will be holding the property as Trustees for
the Equitable Owners.
Section 12 – right to occupy the property if it is suitable and available for occupation
Section 14 – application can be made to the courts in the event there is a dispute with regards to the
sale by the trustee, beneficiary or persons of interest in the property. Court can make an order which it
‘thinks fit’
Section 15 – the relevant criteria / considerations that the courts will take into account when deciding
whether to order sale:
This is NOT exhaustive and not weighed or ranked in any order of precedence
The courts will look into all the circumstances of the case and consider whether or not in that particular
moment, in that particular circumstances that it is right and proper that an order for sale should be
made – Re Buchanan - Wollastan’s Conveyance
The courts will have to decide, whose voice in equity should prevail – Chhokar v Chhokar
Section 15(1)(a) TOLATA 1996 – Intention of the person who created the Trust
• The owner (Testator) of the bungalow left his bungalow on trust to be sold after his death
and the proceeds to be divided between 5 members of his family.
• One of the family members was allowed to stay in the property during the Testators lifetime
• He then refused to move out and opposed the sale
Held: the CA attached decisive significance to the Testators intention that the property was
meant to be sold. It was clear that the Testator wanted the house sold and the proceeds
distributed immediately
Section 15(1)(b) TOLATA 1996 – Purpose for which the land was held on trust
Family Homes
• Courts have refused sale or rarely allowed sale so long as the relevant family members
continue to live there in amity. No sale while the purpose remains substantially capable of
fulfilment
Chhokar v Chhokar
• Sale will only be sanctioned where the underlying residential purpose has clearly been
exhausted or frustrated
Jones v Challenger (1961)
The marriage had broken down and thus the order should be granted.
Re Holiday (A Bankrupt)
Where the relationship has broken down irretrievably
Leaving no minor children who still need the house as a base
Where the Parties Covenanted Not to Dispose off the Land unless there is the Agreement of all
the Parties
Even if the family relationship breaks down, the sale can be prolonged if minors need the house
for accommodation
- Cohabiting couple purchased home in Joint Names with a joint legal mortgage
- Parties later separated
- The lady and the children stayed in the house
Held: CA refused for the time being to order sale of the property:
Ormrod LJ – the underlying purpose of the trust had been to provide a home for the couple and
their 3 children for the indefinite future. This purpose was still capable of substantial fulfilment.
Ormrod LJ cited with approval what Lord Denning said in Williams v Williams – The court
“nowadays have great regard to the fact that the house is bought as a home in which the family
is to be brought up. It is not treated as a property to be sold, nor as an investment to be realized
for cash”. The modern view!
Ormrod LJ – Investment in a home is the least liquid investment that one can possibly make. It
cannot be converted into cash while the children are at home
Re Holliday (1981)
If the debt owned is very small and constituted only a fraction of the total market value for the
house, the courts would consider delaying the sale
Courts can have regard to other factors which legimately bear upon the sale of the property
Competing needs
1. Mayes v Mayes – co-owner who wants to retain the house is out of work
2. Jackson v Jackson – just and equitable to release the cash shares of an excessively large house,
which being occupied by a single co-owner who is resisting sale
3. Jones v Challenger – the refusal to order sale may severely prejudice the value of the
beneficiaries share or keep his share locked up in the land for an unduly lengthy or indefinite
period
4. Bernard v Josephs – housing shortage may mean that the sale has a disadvantage as the
property ceases to be available as a home for both parties.
5. Bank of Baroda v Dhillon – the existence of OI is irrelevant to the statutory discretion to order
sale.
Halifax Mortgages Services Ltd v Muirhead (1997) – the trust beneficiary will be entitled to first
payment from the sale
6. First National Bank v Achampong – ill-health or disability will lead to the postponement of sale
rather than refusal of sale
7. Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages v Bell (2001) – the hardship caused by being evicted can
often-times be off-set with the fact that they had enjoyed a prolonged period of rent and
mortgage free accommodation
8. Chun v Ho – the property was required until the occurrence of any event such as the completion
of the education of one of the co-owners. The sale can be postponed.
Note:
• The position of the courts could vary
• There is no Duty to sell under Trust of Land
• The co-owners must be properly advised before they purchase property
• Entering a Restriction
• Doctrine of Overreaching
• Under section 14 TOLATA 1996 the courts can re-visit previous application if circumstances
have changed before the sale actually takes place
Dear v Robinson (2001) – a previous order for sale was rescinded because circumstances
had changed and now the Beneficiary no longer wanted immediate sale
General
1. When a co-owner (either a legal or equitable co-owner) is made a bankrupt, their assets will
vest in a "Trustee in Bankruptcy". The job of the trustee is to administer the bankrupt’s assets
with the view of paying off all his creditors.
2. He will step into the shoes of the legal or equitable owner - to administer his estate.
3. The trustee will definitely want to sell of the property but naturally the other co-owner will
resist the sale as they would want to continue to stay in that property
4. If the sale is opposed, then the trustee can apply to the courts for a court order for sale and this
will be done under Sec 14 TOLATA 1996.
5. The list of factors in sec 15 TOLATA will not be applicable in this situation.
7. By virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, the action must be brought within 3 years of the
bankruptcy. Otherwise there is a risk that the property can return to the Bankrupt free from the
claims of the creditor.
(b) Where the application is made in respect of land which includes a dwelling house which is or has
been the home of the bankrupt or the [bankrupt’s spouse or civil partner or former spouse or former
civil partner]
(i) the conduct of the [spouse, civil partner, former spouse or former civil partner], so far as
contributing to the bankruptcy,
(ii) the needs and financial resources of the [spouse, civil partner, former spouse or former civil
partner], and
(c) All the circumstances of the case other than the needs of the bankrupt.
It is only for
Spouse Civil
Partner
Needs of the bankrupt is not taken into account — Everitt v Budhram (2009)
The courts may then make such orders that it thinks just and reasonable
Time of application
A. Application made within 1 year of the bankruptcy
Courts likely to delay the sale. This is so as to give the innocent occupiers enough time to make
alternative arrangements
The interests of the creditors are deemed to outweigh the interests of the resisting co-owners,
unless there are "exceptional circumstances"
Thus highly likely that the courts will order sale in order to satisfy the creditors
a. The presumption is that the interest of creditors outweighs all other considerations and the
presence of Exceptional Circumstances is a necessary condition to displace this presumption.
But even if there is Exceptional Circumstances, the courts can still make an order for sale.
b. Exceptional circumstances , typically relate to the personal circumstances of the of joint owner
— mental or medical issues
d. The circumstances must truly be exceptional. It must be beyond what usually happens when you
are lacking money. Re Citro – it cannot be that you are losing your home.
e. It is not uncommon for partners and children to be faced with eviction or homelessness when
they do not have enough money to buy alternate housing. This will not be considered as
exceptional
f. The creditors can still ask for sale even if the entire proceeds will go towards the expenses of the
bankruptcy. The fact that the entire money will be swallowed up to pay the expenses will not
amount to Exceptional Circumstances.
Thus sec 335A favours the request of the trustee ie SALE if the application is made after 1 year.
Begum v Cockerton – person resisting sale bears the burden of proving Exceptional Circumstances
Claughton v Charalambous (1998) - bankrupt’s spouse is seriously & terminally ill and house
was modified to cater for her illness
Everitt v Budhram (2009) — mental state of the bankrupt's spouse was enough to postpone the
sale to another year but the house needed to be sold after the further one year had elapsed
Martin – Sklan v White (2007) – web of support by neighbours, relatives and school for the kids.
Sale postponed till kid was 18
Barca v Mears (2004) — argued for the sale to be postponed longer than a year due to the special
educational needs of the son. OTF the argument was not persuasive enough to postpone sale. But the
courts made the following observations:
a. Confirmed that Re Citro did assimilate the position of married and unmarried couples (even if
they stood in no relationship at all)
b. The pressure for sale by the trustee was virtually always overwhelming
c. Need to consider the Human Rights Act 1998 & Article 8 ECHR — respect for private and family
life.
Thus it should be that in the normal everyday' bankruptcy cases, the creditors interest would outweigh
all other interests. But Exceptional Circumstances must be given proper consideration without the
presumption of bias in favour of the creditors.
But the courts have not been too keen to defend the rights of the innocent co-owners
Donohoe v Ingram (2006) — the courts merely paid lip service to the convention and then decided that
there was no Exceptional Circumstances
Nicholls v Lan (2006) — courts found no incompatibility per se between the IA 1986 and the ECHR
At first, they used the cottage occasionally for weekend getaways and holidays. However in June 2018,
Dorothy had to move to a vocational school near the cottage and so she moved into the cottage. A few
months later her boyfriend, Tony also moved in with her when they discovered that she was pregnant.
In August 2018, Anne was posted abroad and she sold her interest in cottage to Cecil and moved out of
the country.
A few months after Anne left, Bertha started to get restless and wanted to travel the world. She wrote a
few letters to Cecil and Dorothy asking them if they were interested in buying her out and if they were
then they could sit down and come up with a reasonable amount for her interest in the property. Cecil
and Dorothy read the letters and intended to buy Bertha’s interest but never replied the letters and
never met to discuss the sale.
In December 2018, while on a skiing trip, Bertha sent a postcard to the cottage addressed to Dorothy
and Cecil saying, “I have decided to sell my share to someone else since you both are not interested!”
The day the postcard arrived at the cottage, a few hours later, Cecil was killed in a car crash. She had
made a will leaving her property to The Cancer Foundation.
Bertha has returned from her trip and now wants the property sold. Dorothy is refusing sale as she is
still studying and is intending to raise her child there.
Discuss.
If the property were sold, how will the proceeds of sale are divided?