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Robert Hieger

Patrick Linden

PHILO 10400 Intro to Ethics

16 December 2009

Hobbes’ State of Nature and the Nature of the State—

State of Nature Theory and Its Inherent Contradictions

Thomas Hobbes, an early proponent and architect of contract theory, asserts that, absent

the presence of a Sovereign or, transplanted to the 21st Century world, a centralized government,

we would all exist in a state of nature, which he equates with a state of total war, in which we

find “every man against every man” (185). Because of this state of nature, and the reasonable

desire of human beings to avoid it, there arise “Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn

to agreement” (188).

Set against the backdrop of scarcity of resources and the state of nature Hobbes paints,

arrival at the so-called Articles of Peace would, at least on first glance, seem a desirable goal.

However, whether Hobbes’ Articles of Peace are desirable bears careful scrutiny, as does the

narrow definition of peace derived there from.

The purpose of the current study is to evaluate Hobbes’ state of nature theory, allowing

for its historical context, and to expose some of its inherent contradictions when evaluated as a

universal theory applied to the 21st Century world. The intention here is not ad hominem attack

on Thomas Hobbes, whose theories are understandably a product of their historic context; rather

the intention is to open a vista to possibilities that lie beyond the implied dichotomy between

state of nature and Sovereign (whether monarch or commonwealth). Further, the intention is to

throw much-needed light on the secret-in-plain-view, so to speak, that despite wide adherence,
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throughout the world, to the Articles of Peace (made possible ostensibly by the presence of a

Sovereign), we still live in a Hobbesian state of nature. Indeed, seeking peace by surrendering all

of our rights to a Sovereign or commonwealth legislative body charged with setting the limits of

those rights, may very well, quite ironically, perpetuate the very state of nature we wish to

escape through allegiance to the Sovereign. Stated plainly, the state of nature (war) is affirmed

and even accelerated by the presence of the Sovereign.

To more clearly understand the heart of Hobbes’ thinking, focus is now given, in

greater depth, to the two major components of his theory examined in this paper—state of

nature and the Sovereign.

In describing the state of nature, Hobbes writes

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that

though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or quicker

in mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference…is not so

considerable…For as to the strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough

to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others,

that are in the same danger with himselfe.

…From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in attaining of our Ends.

And therefore if any two men desire the same thing…they become enemies; and

in the way to their End…endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. (183-184)

Implicit in attaining the ends of which Hobbes speaks is the concept of the appetites.

What are the appetites? What is their wellspring? Even more importantly, how do they relate to

the state of nature?

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On the one hand, the whole of human nature, according to Hobbes, can be summed up

in natural physical phenomena akin to the laws of physics. Thus, for example, a body (in this

case a human body) that is in motion will tend to stay in motion, just as in the case of an

inanimate chunk of space junk. Humans are also subject to physical laws of attraction and

repulsion, as in the case of like poles of a magnet that repulse one another, and conversely,

opposite poles that attract. On the other hand, rather than reducing human beings to

biomechanical machines subject only to these natural laws, Hobbes attributes to them two

differentiated forms of motion that make them human—one which he calls “Vitall” (vital),

comprised of those motions impelled by the autonomic functions of the brain and nervous

system; the other, “Animall motion” or “Voluntary motion,” which speaks of volition and

depends on the independent and rational thought of the individual for its initiation (118).

From these laws of attraction and repulsion is drawn the parallel that acts of volition are

related to human endeavor which, when directed toward an end, are called appetites, or more

clearly, desires; when the act is directed away from an end, it is called aversion. Hobbes later

equates these opposing forces with love and hate or good and evil, respectively (119-120).

The implication of the equation of love, hate, good and evil with desire and aversion is

profound because it implies that despite the acknowledged rational nature of humanity (the

capacity to reason), the impelling force, according to Hobbes, is not reason, but motion toward

object of desire or retreat from object of aversion. Thus the stage is set for a culture of fear and

competition, for in the state of nature, “nothing can be Unjust…there [can] be no Propriety, no

Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get, and for so long as he

can keep it” (188).

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Given the confines of this definition, which will be challenged shortly, this deplorable

state is definitely akin to war, but not merely war of every person against every person.

Steven B. Smith observes quite correctly the symmetrical struggle inherent in war—that the

outward Hobbesian state of war is reflected inward, asserting that “Each of us…contains these

two warring…elements within us—both self-assertion and fear of the consequence of self-

assertion. The question is, for Hobbes, how do we…tame these passions?” (The Sovereign

State, Hobbes, Leviathan Lecture 13 of 24).

Enter the Sovereign as Hobbes’ answer to this question. Building on the foundation of

these warring elements external and internal, he concludes that “The Passions that encline men to

Peace, are the Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and

a Hope by their Industry to obtain them” (Hobbes 188). To this end, Articles of Peace, can be

agreed upon by subjects, and drafted, based upon two laws of nature, the first of which states

“That every man, ought to Endeavour Peace, as farre as he has the hope of obtaining it; and when

he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre” (190). The

second law is that one ought to be willing to lay down all one’s rights to the extent which one’s

fellow humans are willing to do the same (190). And to whom does Hobbes suggest these rights

be laid down? Pursuant to the Articles of Peace, “Hobbes wants us to abstain from politics by

agreeing to be ruled by this artificial man, as he calls it, this artificial person…that he gives the

name ‘the Sovereign’” (The Sovereign State, Hobbes, Leviathan Lecture 12 of 24).

The Sovereign is a kind of intellectual construct that can take the form of a monarch as it did

in Hobbes’ time, or a representative republic, as was the case with the emerging commonwealth of

his day. This Sovereign is invested with absolute “power over all the institutions of civilian and

ecclesiastical life, holding sway over a peaceable kind of kingdom” (The Sovereign State, Hobbes
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Leviathan Lecture 12 of 24). In plain terms, these absolute rights of the Sovereign are “Power of

Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the

Necessities of the Commonwealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when as much as in his own

conscience he shall judge necessary” (Hobbes 377). These are but a few of the rights accorded to

the Sovereign. Perhaps the most significant right, however, is “appointing Teachers, and examining

what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people” (377).

Hobbes would propose that balance is expressed in the agreement of each person to the

other to lay down all rights (a kind of metaphoric ceasefire), and defer to an authority to which all

entrust the definition of the boundaries of individual rights. Major objections can be raised with the

theory as expressed so far.

To begin with the state of nature, by definition there is only fear of theft of one’s

livelihood, fear of death at the hands of an enemy or of the likelihood that such enemy will carry

out the theft or murder. Arguably, this statement can be questioned as follows:

1. Though nature is far from a friendly construct, with predator and prey throughout the

animal kingdom, there is yet acknowledged, even in scientific circles, the

considerable cooperative side of nature that cannot be reduced to the minimal equality

of each person with another that Hobbes expresses when he says that we are all equal

in our ability to kill one another. Evolution itself is at least partly a happy coincidence

of many cooperating factors and, in many instances, species, without which an

ecosystem cannot develop. And though predator and prey exist, they do not comprise

the totality of the picture.

2. As for physical strength and the ability to carry out violent acts, Hobbes suggests that

it reigns supreme, overshadowing the fact that one person might be quicker of wit
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than another—an omission which seems a bit hard to justify. By virtue of wit, one

can, on the negative side, outsmart another and cause her or him harm before she or

he causes harm to you. But even more importantly, by virtue of wit one can also

arrive at an amicable agreement.

3. Hobbes draws the conclusion that whenever two people seek the same end (or thing),

they become mortal adversaries. Though this is a possible outcome of such an

exchange and has been borne out by numerous historical examples, is it necessarily

true that two such people must become enemies? Given that the cost of possession as

here narrowly defined is too great, these “enemies” might as easily find a means to

share or to seek more of the commodity together.

Such reasoning as shown above is considered by Hobbes to be beyond the reach of

ordinary people, and must thus be referred to the Sovereign, the answer to the state of nature,

whose rights are derived by covenant with the subjects. Here several objections might be raised:

1. The Sovereign is subject to the same state of nature as the subjects in its own absence of

authority. What makes the Sovereign uniquely more qualified than the subject to

determine what shall make a good law, or what is just or unjust?

2. The Sovereign is arguably an analog to the modern State. Yet an uneasy mirror exists

between it and the state of nature it seeks to set in order. Consider the fact that Hobbes

indicates that it is fear of death that leads humanity to peace. Hobbes invests the

Sovereign with the power of war, and also the power of punishment which by virtue of

the fear it instills in the subject, promotes what he would call peace. Notice, however,

what happens here. The Sovereign is meant to lead to peace between subjects, yet what is

maintained could be described very much like the doctrine of mutually assured
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destruction that existed between the former Soviet Union and the United States—namely

that either nation had the ability and resolve to destroy the other in absence of an

agreement not to do so. Can it reasonably be stated that this is an escape from the state of

nature? In a state of war, according to Hobbes, there is “every man against every man,”

but also the constant threat of the ability and/or willingness and resolve to carry out such

actions. History further bears out numerous examples of state rising up against

neighboring states, and it is far from true that in every instance, this was an act of defense

of life and limb, as accorded by Hobbes’ natural rights. Thus, the State becomes a kind of

mirror image to the very state of nature it seeks to escape.

3. Hobbes asserts that in the absence of an authority of which we are in awe—we would

descend into the dreaded state of nature. Thus a dichotomy between state of nature and

deference to a Sovereign is set up. Arguably this is a false dichotomy, as there is any

number of other possibilities between the two, and to suggest otherwise indicates an

extremely reductive argument.

If Hobbes’ narrowly-defined notion of peace—ceasefire, agreement not to kill one

another, and fear that failure to comply will meet with punishment—is not truly peace, then what

defines a state of peace?

In keeping with the promise not to engage in ad hominem attack on Thomas Hobbes, it is

important to recognize the historic context in which he wrote. Leviathan was published on the

heels of the English Civil War which took place in 1642-1651. Hobbes wrote much of the material

contained therein while in self-imposed exile in France, as he left with much of the royalty and

bourgeoisie at the beginning of the conflict. Nonetheless, he was witness, albeit from some

distance, to a blood bath in England consisting of “100,000 people…from war-related disease and
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84,830 from the wars themselves…[for a total of]…190,000” (English Civil War-Wikipedia). In

Scotland this number was approximately 60,000. In Ireland, horrifically, “112,000 Protestants were

killed through plague, war and famine, and…504,000 Catholics…giving an estimated total of

618,000 dead” (English Civil War-Wikipedia). With an aggregate total of roughly 808,000 people

consumed in the bloodbath (and possibly more for which there is no historical data), one can easily

appreciate Thomas Hobbes’ view on the state of nature. After all, this staggering number surpasses

all those killed in the American Civil War. His dim view of the ability of humanity to climb out

from under the rock of natural law might lead him to an arguably cynical view of human nature.

Add to this the fact that “To the churchman, [Hobbes] was a godless atheist, to the

republicans, he was tainted with monarchy…and to the monarchists, he was a dangerous skeptic

and free thinker” (The Sovereign State: Hobbes, Leviathan Lecture 12 of 24). There was ample

reason for Hobbes to see the nature of humanity as “every man against every man.”

Nonetheless, it is important to realize that it was primarily the ministrations of Cromwell,

an arm of the Sovereign, from whom much of the military plunder originated, not from the

subjects. This contradiction was obvious to Hobbes and he even acknowledged it. However, it

seems he did not fully address the inconsistency evident in this fact.

Still lingering is the question of peace, however. Is peace facilitated by allegiance to a

power of which we are in awe, as Hobbes would suggest? If one considers the fact that the State

greatly resembles the state of nature, as earlier discussed, and weds that with the fact that Hobbes

seems to advocate censorship, control over what is taught to the subjects, control of the curriculum

of university, it is hard to see that this paints a picture of peace. If one’s ability to question

authority is forfeit, so is the ability to better the nature of the state. It is also important to point out

that questioning authority is by no means the same thing as overthrowing it. Thus, with an enforced
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state of peace in which there is merely the absence of war, and a delicate truce based on fear of

reprisal, one cannot infer that this power of which we are in awe is facilitating peace at all.

A final question to consider is the nature of peace itself. Can peace be defined merely as the

absence of war? Though much of the word’s etymological derivation suggests that peace is the

absence of war and covenant between formerly-warring sides, perhaps this definition is far too

narrow. Let us not forget the fact that the outward state of war is reflected inward as discussed

earlier. One cannot possibly have an inner truce when operating on the basis of fear, as is the case

in deferral to the Sovereign. Peace, therefore, cannot be based on a fear that ensues on the absence

of war. Perhaps a definition of peace must start with the audacity to suggest that trust be the driving

factor of peace, rather than fear.

The foregoing pages have examined at some depth the state of nature, and the Sovereign,

Hobbes’ answer to that state. This exploration has revealed that though there might be a state of

war inherent within natural law, this is only one part of a vastly more intricate puzzle. Also

revealed are some of the inherent contradictions of the notion of the Sovereign as an answer to

the state of nature. The Sovereign is revealed to be equally as vulnerable to the state of nature as

the subjects over whom it presides. Finally, the question of a more optimistic, and less cynical

view of humanity in which trust holds sway, might facilitate a better antidote to the ills of the

state of nature.
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Works Cited

“English Civil War-Wikipedia”. Wikipedia. November 2001. 14 December 2009.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Civil_War>.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651. Ed. Macpherson, C.B. New York: Penguin Books, 1984.

Smith, Steven B. “The Sovereign State: Hobbes, Leviathan Lecture 12 of 24”. Video. Academic

Earth. Yale/Political Science. 8 December 2009. < http://academicearth.org/lectures/the-

sovereign-state-hobbes-leviathan-1>.

Smith, Steven B. “The Sovereign State: Hobbes, Leviathan Lecture 13 of 24”. Video. Academic

Earth. Yale/Political Science. 9 December 2009. <http://academicearth.org/lectures/the-

sovereign-state-hobbes-leviathan-2>.