Memorial Defence

TEAM CODE: 113
5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
Reply filed on behalf of Respondent to the to the Writ Petition filed under
Article 32 of Indiana Constitution
WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020
SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI DEFENDANT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022
STATE OF DEVBHOOMI
PROSECUTION
V.
MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS DEFENCE
Most respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Chief Justice and companion
Judges of Supreme Court of Indiana.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT
5th AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................
TABLE OF CASES.......................................................................................................................
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................................
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................
STATEMENT OF ISSUES...........................................................................................................
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.................................................................................................XII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.........................................................................................................
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE
UNDER SECTION 498A, 304 READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860..............................................................................................................................1
1.1 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE U/S 4 OF DOWRY
PROHIBITION ACT 1961......................................................................................................
1.2 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE U/S 498A, IPC.........................
1.3 THAT THE DECEASED WAS ALSO SUBJECTED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
8
CONTENTION 2: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE UNDER
SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860......................................................8
2.1 THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CERTAINLY POINT OUT AT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED..........................................................................................
2.1 THAT MENS REA OF MURDER IS ESTABLISHED.................................................
2.2 THAT ACTUS REUS OF MURDER IS ESTABLISHED.............................................
CONTENTION 3: THAT IT WAS A HOMICIDAL DEATH NOT A SUICIDAL
DEATH...................................................................................................................................12
CONTENTION 4: THAT THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF SUSPICION OF A THIRD
PARTY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CRIME SCENE.........................................................13
CONTENTION 5: THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE OF
CONCLUSIVE NATURE AND IS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.........................14
PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

LIST OF WITNESSES................................................................................................................XII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXTENSION
& And
s. Section
¶ Paragraph
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Anr. Another
u/s Under Section
Cr. Criminal
v. Versus
ed. Edition
etc. Etcetera
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e. that is
Govt. Government
No. Number
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
 The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Act 2 of 1974).

 The Indian Evidence Act,1872 (Act 1 of 1872).
 The Indian Penal Code,1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
BOOKS AND DIGESTS

 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 25th Ed.).
 Stedman, Stedman's Medical Dictionary 967 (Wolters Kluwer, 28th ed.).
DICTIONARIES, ONLINE DATABASES & WEBSITES

 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co, 8th ed.).
 SCC Online
 LexisNexis
 P Ramanatha Aiyar and Shakil Ahmad Khan, The Law Lexicon (Lexis Nexis, 2nd ed).

TABLE OF CASES
S. Pg
CASE TITLE CITATION
No. No.
1. Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal AIR 2010 SC 773 12
2. Austice Dilawar v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi) 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8148 1
3. B. Venkat Swamy v. Vijaya Nehru (2008) 10 SCC 260 4
4. Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 2
5. Brij Bhushan Sharma v. State of U. P 2001 CriLJ 1384 15
6. Brij Mohan v. State 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2312 2
7. C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 9
8. Chattar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 14 SCC 667 9
9. Chhotanney v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 2013 15
10. Firoz Khan v. Union of India AIR 2007 Ori 81 5
11. Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516 14
12. Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619 4
13. Gopi Nath v. State of U. P (2001) 6 SCC 620 7
14. Govindaswamy v. State of Kerala (2016) 16 SCC 295 10
15. Gurubasappa v. Gurulingappa 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 106 11
16. Ilayaraja v. State 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14207 4

17. Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik (1986) Cr.LJ 1510 3
18. Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083 7
19. Jasmeet Kaur Talwar v. Gurjit Singh Talwar 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6576 2
20. Jatinder Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2020 SC 161 3
21. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 5
22. John Indiculla v. State 2005 Cr LJ 2925 (Ker.) 7
23. Joseph v. State of Kerala (2000) 5 SCC 197 9
24. Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat (2013) 15 SCC(Cri) 688 3
Kanna Alias Mahalakshmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami

25. AIR 1972 Mad 247 6
Achari
26. Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa AIR1987 SC 1507 12
27. Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 4
28. Krishna Mahadev Chavan v. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 191 12
29. Kundala Bala Subranayam v. State of AP 1993 Cr.LJ 1635 15
30. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P (2010) 2 SCC 748 9
31. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 6
32. Narendra v. State of Karnataka (2009) 6 SCC 61 4
33. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1657 5
34. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766 11
35. Pachipala Laxmaiah v. State of A.P 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1166 5

36. Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P (1991) SCC (Cri) 407 9
37. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 2
38. Prakash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 65 8
39. Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram AIR 1959 Mad 323 10
40. Rajammal v. State of T. N 1993 Cr.LJ 3029 (Mad.) 14
41. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 3
42. Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43 9
43. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat (2011) 11 SCC 111 14
44. Ran Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 4 SCC 70 4
45. Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharashtra 2008 Bom CR (Cr) 185) 7
46. Rawal v. State of Gujarat 2013 AIR (SCW) 5219 5
47. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199 1
48. S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1996 SCC (4) 596 2
49. Sachin Jana v. State of West Bengal (2008) 3 SCC 390 7
50. Salome v. Dr.Prince D.Immanuel 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 1651 5
51. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 5
52. Sangeetha v. Jitendra Bhandari 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 16858 6
53. Saraswathy v. Babu 2014 (3) SCC 712 8
54. Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371 1

55. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 9
56. Shiv Prasad Chuni Lal Jain v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 264 7
57. Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy 1988 SCC (Cri) 60 5
58. Smt. Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad (2007) 3 SCC 136 6
59. Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy AIR 1989 C 121 5
60. State of A.P. v. Raj Gopal Asawa AIR 2004 SC 1993 2
61. State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Narayan Dandalwar (2000) 9 SCC 257 4
62. State of Maharashtra v. Shivaji Anandrao 2002 Cr.LJ 4198 (Bom) 15
63. State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh 989 Cr. L.J, (NOC) 13 (P&H) 14
64. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (2014) 9 SCC 632 7
65. State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86 7
66 State of UP v. Randhir AIR 1959 All 727 14
67. Subedar Tewari v. State of U.P. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 91 10
68. Surender Chauhan v. State of M.P (2000) 4 SCC 110 7
69. U Suvetha v. State (2009) 6 SCC 757 4
70. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 33 5
71. Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 462 8
72. Vijeta Gajra v. State of NCT of Delhi (2010) 11 SCC 618 7
73. Wasim v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 7 SCC 435 4

74. XXXXX v. XXXXX 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2327 5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondents humbly submit to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under
Article 32 of the Indiana Constitution
ART. 32: REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THIS

PART (PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION)
1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. BRIEF SKETCH OF HISTORY

1. Devbhoomi located in the heart of Indiana is a ‘Developed State’. After elections in
March 2019, Kranti Party formed Government in Devbhoomi. Infrastructural and
industrial development followed in the state. It was the era when progress of
Devbhoomi was on boost. In 2019, Mr. Rajendra Singh Ambata was sworn in as the
Chief Minister of Devbhoomi.
2. The rapid rate of development started attracting people of other States as it offered
them better standards of living. The natives expressed their resentment over this
ongoing practice, as the benefits of the state’s development were going to the
outsiders and not to them. The issue of reservation for the natives was on rise and
turned into a revolution. After long protest and widespread media coverage, Kranti
Party decided to accommodate the demand of the natives and on 1st April 2020,
Devbhoomi Legislature passed the ‘Devbhoomi State Employment Local Candidates
Bill, 2020.’
II. ISSUES INVOLVED
3. After the commencement of this Act, the outsiders and the private employers opposed
the Act being violative of their Fundamental Rights. They organized protests and
marches for revocation of the Act. An NGO named ‘Satat Vikas Sangh’ approached
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana through a Writ Petition demanding that the
alleged Act be declared unconstitutional. After the enactment of the Act, hostility
among groups increased.
4. While this was a burning issue, two women were brutally raped and murdered. This
incident further disturbed the law-and-order situation in Uchihar. Keeping in mind the
disturbed aesthetics the Chief Minister (CM) was to address the people of Uchihar at
Patel Maidan at 12 Noon on 24th May. Post this announcement, thousands of outsiders
blocked the roads to prevent the CM’s visit.
5. Subsequently, in the morning around on 24 May 2020, Mr. Teja Singh along with his
25 armed personnel started their journey to Uchihar. Near Negi Gaon, the convoy of
Mr. Teja Singh saw that around 300 protestors have blocked the road ahead and are
shouting under provocation.

6. Mr. S.P. Pandey (D.S.P., Uchihar) insisted Mr. Teja Singh upon returning but Mr.
Teja Singh reasoned that it his paramount responsibility as an MLA to ensure
everything happens peacefully and he proceeded further. Seeing the convoy of Mr.
Teja approaching, around 200 people started running towards the convoy, started
shouting and raising their ‘lathis’ asserted, “Today we will give a life lesson to Teja
for what he and his father have done to us.” During a heated argument one
unidentified person threw a handmade petrol bomb on Kalia’s vehicle, and the vehicle
caught fire.
7. Mr. Kalia and 5 others came out from the vehicle and warned the protestors to step
back or else people could be harmed. On the perception of immediate threat, Mr. Teja
asked his associates to rush towards Patel Maidan. Noticing this, the protestors started
hitting the vehicle with Lathis and began pelting stones. Thereupon, Mr. Teja directed
his driver Mr. Vibhuti Singh to accelerate the vehicle at maximum speed and not to
stop even if stones were pelted on them.
8. In this clash, various protestors were severely injured. Three protestors died by
voluntarily coming in front of Mr. Teja’s vehicle in hopes of stopping it. After the
accident, Mr. Vibhuti lost control of the vehicle and the car crashed on road divider.
Mr. Teja, Mr. Vibhuti and three others stepped out of the car with licensed arms and
open fired warning shots at the protestors who came running towards him with their
lathis and iron rods. After this incident, the protestors found Mr. Prashant Tamde,
news reporter of ABC News who died due to a gunshot. Subsequently, on 30 th May
2020, the Government of Indiana ordered CBI inquiry.
III. SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
9. CBI arrested Mr. Teja, Mr. Kalia, Mr. Vibhuti, Mr. Ranga and 7 others and charged
them u/s147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B and 34 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860.
The matter was then tried by the CBI Court and it found all the accused Guilty of the
above-mentioned charges. Aggrieved by this, the accused appealed against this
judgement before the High Court of Devbhoomi. The High Court reversed the
Judgment pronounced by the CBI Court and acquitted all the accused persons.
IV. PRESENT STATUS
10. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court of Devbhoomi, the Respondents
appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana, in January 2022, and the Hon’ble Court
has admitted the Appeal. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court being satisfied that the
Writ Petition filed by the SVS involves substantial question of law, listed it for final

hearing in the month of May 2022. Realizing that the incident of Uchihar is the
outcome of the Act passed by the Legislature of Devbhoomi, the Chief Justice of
Indiana clubbed them and placed them before the appropriate Bench for final hearing
in May 2022.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ANY SPECIFIC

POWERT TO MAKE LAW/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATIONS AND
IF YES, THEN TO WHAT EXTENT?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO DIRECT THE

EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL
CANDIDATES?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES

ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149, 302,
307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES

HAVE SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED
RESERVATION.. TO WHAT EXTENT
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the State legislature of Devbhoomi does
not have any specific power to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservation. Article
16(3) enables only the Parliament to make laws in a special case prescribing any requirement
as to residence within a State or Union territory as a condition of employment in the State or
Union territory. Under article 35(a) this power is conferred upon Parliament but is denied to
the legislatures of the States, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution. Also, such power
if allowed would be a threat to the unity and integrity of the nation by fostering and
strengthening narrow parochial loyalties based on residence within a state.
CONTENTION 2: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE POWER TO

DIRECT THE EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR
LOCAL CANDIDATES
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the state government do not have the
power to direct the employers of private sector to reserve jobs for local candidates. The
constitution does not have any provision for domicile-based reservations in employment for
the private sector. Even Article 16(3) talks about domicile-based reservations but limits them
to the public sector under the exclusive discretion of the parliament. Furthermore, under
Article 19(1)(g), all citizens have a fundamental right to practice any profession, or to carry
on any occupation, trade or business as a fundamental right. Mandating private institutions to
employ a certain set of candidates would constrict their right to carry on their occupation
freely.
CONTENTION 3: THAT THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL

CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that The Devbhoomi State Employment of
Local Candidates Act, 2020 is in excess of legislative competence and its provisions offend

Constitutional restrictions. The Act is ultra vires as the state legislature is not the competent
authority to enact the said act. Further it also contravenes Article 14, 16, 19 (1)(g), 19 (1)(e)
and 21 of the Indiana Constitution. It is also contended that the provisions in the Act are
vague, unreasonable and overboard.
CONTENTION 4: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S

147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
AND THE HIGH COURT OF DEVBHOOMI HAS NOT ERRED IN ACQUITTING
THEM
It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty u/s 147, 148 and 149 of the Indiana
Penal Code (herein referred to as IPC) as the accused armed with deadly weapons consisted
of an unlawful assembly that used force and violence in persecution of a common object.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the accused are guilty u/s 120B of the IPC since there
existed a pre-mediated plan of the accused to instigate violence amongst the protestors and
stifle the protests against the Act. The accused person’s act of mowing down three protestors
under their vehicle, causing death of Prashant Tamde and furthermore causing grievous hurt
to other protestors make them all liable u/s 302, 307 and 326 respectively read with section
32 of IPC.

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 PAGE NO. 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES

NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR
DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION
It is humbly submitted that the state legislature of Devbhoomi doesn’t have any specific
powers to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservations.
1.1 THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16(3):
1. Under article 16(3) of the Indian Constitution, the Parliament has the sole power to make
laws in a special case prescribing any requirement as to residence within a State or Union
territory prior to appointment, as a condition of employment in the State or Union
territory. Under article 35(a) this power is conferred upon Parliament but is denied to the
legislatures of the States, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution.
2. Confirming the same reasoning, Justice M Hidyatullah, in the case of AVS Narasimha
Rao & ors vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors1 said, “the legislative powers to create
residential qualification for employment is thus exclusively conferred on the Parliament
and can make laws regarding the same.” The implementation of this power of the
parliament under Article 16(3) was witnessed when the Parliament enacted the Public
Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 19572 aimed at abolishing all existing
residence requirements in the states and enacting exceptions only in the case of the
special instances of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh.
3. It is humbly submitted that domicile-based reservations though are allowed in educational
institutions but they carry the rationale of giving back to the state. First, since the state
finances these colleges from taxpayers, the taxpayers deserve a reciprocal benefit.
Second, there is a high possibility that the majority of the talent generated in the state will
be retained within the state leading to its development. But such considerations do not
translate into matters of private employment. No taxpayer money is involved in the
private firms, business etc. Furthermore, there is no surety of people employed under the
private sector to remain in the same place forever and thus the same rationale can not be
applied to the private sector.
1
2
Act no

4. Furthermore, in 1995, the Supreme Court, in the case of Sunanda Reddy v state of
Andhra Pradesh3, upheld the decision in Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India and struck
down the policy that allowed an extra 5% weightage in marks for candidates with Telugu
as a medium of their instruction. In this judgement, the Supreme Court quoted from the
Pradeep Jain judgement: “Now if India is one nation and there is only one citizenship,
namely, citizenship of India, and every citizen has a right to move freely throughout the
territory of India and to reside and settle in any part of India…. it is difficult to see how a
citizen having his permanent home in Tamil Nadu or speaking Tamil language can be
regarded as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh. To regard him as an outsider would be to deny
him his constitutional rights and to derecognize the essential unity and integrity of the
country by treating it as if it were a mere conglomeration of independent States.”
1.2 THAT SUCH POWERS IF ALLOWED TO EXIST WOULD BE AGAINST THE

FOUNDATION OF INDIANA
5. It is humbly submitted that the Preamble of the Constitution of Indiana was framed with
great care and deliberation so that it reflects the high purpose and objective of the
Constitution makers. At a time when caste and religious centered controversies are
ubiquitous to Indiana and communal riots due to religion, caste, creed, region etc. are
common in the nation, giving such promotion to regional loyalty at the expense of
national integrity serves as a blow to the philosophy of our constitution.
6. It is humbly submitted that Article 1 of the Constitution proceeds to declare that Indiana
shall be a Union of States but emphasizes that though a Union of States, it is still one
nation with one citizenship. Part II recognizes only Indian citizenship; it does not
recognise the citizenship of any State forming a part of the Union.
7. In State of Karnataka v Union of India & Another 4, the court stated that the Central
Government has the power to give direction to the State Government, doing so not
because of geographical or territorial unit reason but because they are constitutionally or
legally empowered to do so. Similarly, in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Union of
India5, the Supreme Court held that the Indian constitution does not promote a principle
of absolute federalism and that “the central government is the final authority for any
issue. The political power distributed between both union and state government with
greater weight given to the union government.”
3

8. In State of Rajasthan v Union of India6, 1977 former Chief Justice Beg, stated that if our
constitution creates a central government which is amphibian in the sense that it can be
either federal or unitary according to the need of the situation and the circumstance of the
case.
9. Furthermore, it is submitted that the if such domicile-based discrimination is allowed,
then a contradicting paradigm would be created wherein the outsiders of a particular
domicile who have been vested the fundamental rights by virtue their citizenship could be
deprived of it because of the state-created domicile-based discrimination. As mentioned
earlier, the states do not possess such power to create state specific domiciles as doing so
will result in creating a parallel citizenship to the citizenship of Indiana since it threatens
the foundational structure of cooperative federalism on which Indiana is based upon.
CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES HAVE THE POWER
TO DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR
LOCAL CANDIDATES
10. It is humbly submitted that there is no constitutional provision that restricts state from
making domicile-based reservation in private jobs. Article 16 clearly talks about public
employment. Further, The Constitution has divided the power of the parliament and
legislative giving each of them a sphere of legislative capacity. There are mainly three
lists under schedule VII mainly List I, List II and List III commonly known as union list,
state list and concurrent list respectively.
11. In order to determine the question of competence on the part of the legislature, the law
takes into consideration the fact that whether or not the Constitution empowers that
specific legislature to enact laws on a particular subject. So, a state legislature is
competent to make laws on the subject matter given in List II and III. In Hans Muller v.
Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta7 it was held that the ‘widest possible’ and
‘most liberal’ construction be put on each entry.
12. In the present case, the prima facie objective of the act is employment in pursuance of
which the act targets industries, cooperative societies, companies, partnership firms,
7
AIR 1955 SC 367 : (1955) 1 SCR 1284 [LNIND 1955 SC 14] ; Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commr. of Income-
tax, Bombay , AIR 1955 SC 58 : (1955) 1 SCR 829 [LNIND 1954 SC 153] ; See also Welfare Assn. ARP v.
Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 [LNIND 2003 SC 218] : AIR 2003 SC 126

trusts, factories to ensure social security and employment for its populace, all of which
incidentally fall within the ambit of Entry 24 and Entry 32 of State list and Entry 7, Entry
10, Entry 20, Entry 21, Entry 23 and Entry 36 of the Concurrent list.
13. Further, for many socio-economic services, the Centre has no direct responsibility as
these lies within the exclusive legislative sphere of the States. In the present case, since
the state is providing socio–economic services, it lies within the legislative sphere of the
Devbhoomi. Thus, The Act introduced by the Devbhoomi Government is within the
ambit of the state’s entries which are the state and concurrent list.
3.1 THAT REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ARE MAINTAINED
14. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservations in the private sector
does not violates Article 19 (1) (G) as it comes under the ambit of reasonable restrictions.
The restriction employed on the employer is in best interest of people and is according to
guidelines laid down in DSP as it imposes a duty on state to provide livelihood.
3.2 THAT THE RESERVATIONS ARE SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND
VIABLE
15. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservations are in consonance with
the interests of the natives of state, the outsiders as well as of the nation. Such
reservations are socially and economically sound and viable.
16. Such reservation is to facilitate employment opportunities for the poor in lower-wage
jobs. A large number of migrants come from other states to Devbhoomi. These migrants
compete with the locals for limited employment opportunities. It makes it more
competitive for the locals to get a job in their home state and most of them remain
unemployed as they are less skilled and educated. Influx of migrants also acts as a strain
to the infrastructure of the state. It leads to the proliferation of slums and this in turn
creates a pressure on the local residents and the local government to maintain their
resources.
17. As a socialistic measure and a vision of welfare, the Act is definitely a measure for
ensuring social and economic security of the citizens of the state. Reservations in private
employment can also help with the rising unemployment levels among natives. It will
also improve the infrastructure of state and would also lead to the mitigation of slums as
there no longer will be influx of migrants for low paying job.

18. Even Ratan Tata, chief of the Tata conglomerate, agrees with the objective of the act and
responded positively stating, “Tata Group certainly understands the social responsibility
that all industries should carry to bring social justice to SC/ST and other minority or
under- privileged sections of our community. We would be happy to support your
initiative”. Thus, it can quite clearly be seen such a step is being welcomed by employers.
19. Further, The Court reasoned that because the state incurs expenditure in imparting
education, it is only fair that the taxpayers and the state incur some benefit from it and so
a reservation in admissions to medical college for its residents to promote education
within the state is a reasonable classification. By the same rationale, a law which is to
promote employment within the state should also qualify as reasonable. Since the
government provides free land, tax ex-emption, credit from government-owned banks and
many other infrastructure facilities to private industries, it is morally entitled to ask in
return reservations for socially backward people.
20. Hence, it is humbly submitted that state is competent enough to enact domicile-based
reservation in private sector, as it stands both constitutional test and socio – economic
test.
CONTENTION 03: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL

CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
21. It is submitted that the Act is constitutionally valid therefore, not liable to be struck down.
It shall be proved by establishing that, [A] the legislation does not violate the right to
equality provided under Constitution of Indiana, [B] the legislation does not violate
Article 16 of the Constitution of Indiana [C] the legislation does not violate Article 19 of
the Constitution of Indiana.
3.1 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14
22. It is humbly submitted that the Act is in complete consonance of the principles embodied
under Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana. Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana
guarantees the right of equality and equal protection of laws to all the people. In Budhan
Choudhry v. State of Bihar 8, the court laid down that Article 14 forbids class legislation,
it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation 9. For a
9
mahendra pal singh, v.n. shukla’s constitution of india 52 (eastern book company 2017)

classification to be reasonable two tests must be fulfilled: the classification must be

founded on an intelligible differentia and the differentia must have a rational relation with
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question10.
The classification made is founded on an intelligible differentia

23. The term intelligible differentia distinguishes, reasonably, between persons or things that
are grouped together from those that are left out of the group.11 The state may take into
consideration different conditions of communities in order to create a distinction to ensure
equality.12 By equality, the intention is not to provide mathematical equality. 13 What is
reasonable may change according to the changing needs of time and societal exigencies
therefore, the state needs to make an informed decision about such classification. 14 State
has also a positive duty to be guided by the provisions of Articles 39(a) and 41 to ensure
livelihood to all.
24. In the instant case, a distinction is made between natives and non-native for providing
reservations in private jobs. Such a classification was necessary for the upliftment of
native people as they are being marginalized from a very long time because of them being
less educated and less skilled. It is submitted that this situation is prevailing in 80 out of
101 constituencies making this classification between native and non-native, an
intelligible differentia.
The classification made has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act
25. In Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal 15 it was held that the differentia must
have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question16.
26. In the present case, the objective behind enacting the Act is to provide employment to
natives which will lead to their upliftment. The old practice of migrant influx has made
the natives a marginalized section. As a result, they are not that educated and skilled and
the employers prefer outsiders over them. Therefore, to provide equal opportunity to all, it
10
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222, 10; Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC
251
11
D.S. Nakara and ors v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, Vajravellu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector
for Land Acquisition, AIR 1965 SC 1017,
12
ANWAR ALI, supra note 2, at ¶ 46; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68.
13
State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana, (1979) 1 SCC 580.
14
Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 366,
15
16
Prabhakar Rao H. Mawle v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1827

became imperative for the state to reserve jobs for the natives. Thus, there lies a rational
nexus of the classification made with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
27. In Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar17 it was declared that "Where a statute itself
makes the classification and the Court finds that the classification satisfies the test of
reasonable classification, the court will uphold the validity of the law and this read with
impugned act clearly shows that there is intelligible differentia and it falls under the
exception of reasonable classification and thus is valid.
28. Furthermore, it is submitted that the states provide several incentives to businesses,
including tax benefits, infrastructure facilities etc. If the state is spending its resources on
the private businesses, it is only reasonable to expect the benefits of such incentives to
come back to its own residents. These provisions are made in presumption that these local
residents will stay in the state and help reduce the inequalities and poverty. Thus, the
classification has reasonable relation to the subject – matter of the legislation.
That the quantum of reservation provided is not arbitrary

29. Horizontal and vertical reservations are different. Horizontal reservations cut across
vertical reservations.18 The limit of 50% on reservations laid down and reiterated in
several cases is only for the purposes of vertical reservation. 19 Thus domicile reservation
being horizontal in nature20 is not limited by the cap of 50%.21
30. In the present case, a horizontal reservation of 75% has been provided to the native in
private jobs. As per the factual matrix, out of 101, 80 constituency. has dismal state when
it comes to status of natives. This means natives are marginalized section in near about
79% of Devbhoomi. Therefore, it is only rational to provide a reservation of 75% to such
people in order to ensure their proper representation in the jobs.
3.2 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 16
31. The rule of interpretation that must be used for the interpretation of the Constitution is the
Literal Rule.22 Irrespective of the intention, the language used in the constitution has to be
17
18
Anil Kumar v. State of U.P, (1995) 5 SCC 173, ¶ 18; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp.(3) SCC
217, ¶ 812 [hereinafter Indra Sawhney].
19
INDRA SAWHNEY, supra note 32, at ¶ 93.
20
Balvinder Sangwan & Ors. vs State (Gnct) Of Delhi
21
Union of India v. The National Federation of Blind and Ors.
22
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1 [hereinafter Kuldip Nayar].

given full effect to.23 If the language of the Parliament is plain and simple, the judiciary
need not go into the intention of its provisions.24
32. Article 16 denies discrimination only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent,
place of birth, residence or any of them for public employment. 25 Where the
discrimination is not ‘only’ on such grounds mentioned under Article 16(2), the said
clause cannot be. attracted and the discrimination has to be judged on the basis of general
principles mentioned under Article 16(1).26 The basis on which a classification is made in
the present case is domicile. In Sham Roj vs Addl. Superintendent Of Police 27, it was
held that ordinarily resident and domicile being different jural concepts, the distinction
has to be maintained. Thus, domicile should not be loosely interpreted as resident, as in
the present case even migrants can be termed as residents whereas this act is solely for the
natives. Domicile is not mentioned as one of the grounds under Article 16 on the basis of
which making a classification is prohibited.
33. In addition, Article 16 denies discrimination on these ground in public employment, this
section is not applicable on the private employment which is the case in present case.
Further, Articles 14, 15 and 16 form the same thread ensuring the right to equality and
supplement each other.28 Article 16(1) is similar to the right of equality provided under
Article 14.29 Therefore a reasonable classification of citizens for employment is permitted
under Article 16 too.30 It has already been proven that the classification made is
reasonable in nature. Thus, the Act is not violative of Article 16.
3.4: THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 (1) (G)
34. It is submitted that the Act does not violate Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana as
the rights provided under Article 19 are not absolute and the restrictions imposed are
reasonable in nature.
The rights provided under article 19 are not absolute
23
Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister, 2021 SCC OnLine 362, ¶ 399 [hereinafter Laxmanrao].
24
LAXMANRAO, supra note 42, at ¶ 406; Karnataka State Financial Corporation. v. N. Narasimahaiah, (2008) 5
SCC 176, ¶ 42; Adams Express Company v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 238 US 190 (1915.
25
INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 2.
26
3, D.D. BASU, S.S. SUBRAMANI, D.D. BASU: COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 158/351 (Lexis
Nexis, 2021
27
28
State of Kerela v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490, ¶ 10.
29
MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, supra note 3, at 114.
30

35. It is humbly submitted that article 19(1) provides six different fundamental rights
provided to the citizens of India31. Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to freedom of
trade and occupation to the citizens of Indiana. It provides a right to each citizen to
practice any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation. 32 The rights
guaranteed under Article 19 are not absolute in nature. 33 Thus, both these rights are
subject to restrictions as provided under clauses (2) to (6) of the Constitution of Indiana.34
The restrictions imposed are reasonable in nature
36. The rights mentioned under Article 19 may be abridged by future laws to the extent of the
restrictions mentioned under clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of Sapota.
The state is allowed to impose reasonable restrictions on the said rights.35 The exact
definition of what is reasonable is not laid down and the test varies from case to case as
well as on a right-to-right basis.36 While determining the reasonableness of a provision,
Directive Principles of State Policy, nexus of the restriction with the object sought to be
achieved by it and the interest of the general public has to be taken into consideration.37
There is a nexus of the restriction with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation
37. In a case where there is a nexus of the restriction imposed with the object sought to be
achieved by the legislation, the constitutionality of said Act is presumed in a stronger
sense.38 In the present case, the restriction placed is to declare the number of native
working in every private organization.39 The object sought to be achieved by the
legislation is to provide livelihood to the natives for their upliftment and protect them
from being swamped by outsiders. Thus, there is a reasonable nexus of the restriction
with the object sought to be achieved by the restriction imposed.
The restriction imposed are in the interest of general public
38. Whether the restrictions are reasonable or not is to be judged from the standpoint of the
interests of the general public.40 The restrictions imposed must strike a balance between
31
32
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 1988, 28; State of Bombay v. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699, 41; Unnikrishnan J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645, 55; T.M.A. Pai
Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481, 18.
33
DD.BASU, supra note 45, at 105/480.
34
35
36
State of Madras. v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196, 18; Gujarat Water Supply v. Unique Electro (Gujarat),
(1989) 1 SCC 532.
37
38
M.C.V.S Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300, 5; V.G. ROW, supra note 56, at 16.
39
THE ACT, supra note 21, § 45.
40
ARUNACHALA, supra note 58, at 5; M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 S.C. 731, 18.

the rights conferred by the constitution and the social control as provided under clause (2)
to (6) of Article 19.41 While judging the validity of law, social factors42 and the urgency of
the evil sought to be remedied has to be taken into consideration 43 and must be as per the
requirement of the general public44 which change from time to time and the restrictions
must be adjudged based on such changes 45 thereby absorbing the current socio-economic
conditions.46
39. In the present case, the restrictions imposed on the right to trade, occupation and business
of the private organizations as conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana, are
with an objective to uplift the natives and provide them livelihood. In the absence of any
efforts made by the government to this effect, the natives will suffer poorly at the hand of
migrants and unemployment. Providing jobs shall promote the upliftment of people and
will ensure equal opportunity to all, and thus it can safely be said that such restriction is in
the interest of public.
The restrictions further the Directive Principles of State Policy
40. The courts while interpreting the reasonability of a provision have to keep in mind the
directive principles of state policy.47 If a restriction is imposed in order to further the
Directive Principles of State Policy, the restriction is considered to be a reasonable one.48
Article 38 (2) states that state shall strive to minimize the inequalities in opportunities.
Further Article 39 and 41 empowers state to make effective provision for providing
adequate livelihood to all. In addition, Article 46 states that state shall promote the
economic interests of the weaker section.
41. In the present case, the state aims to provide equal opportunity to all by reserving low
paid jobs in order to minimize the inequality. Further the said provision aims at providing
livelihood to the natives, which they earlier found difficult to achieve because of them
being less skilled and educated than outsiders. Thus, the state, by providing reservations
to the native is promoting the economic interests of weaker section. Since the action of
the state furthers the Directive Principles of State Policy cast upon the state, the
41
42
Pathumma v. State of Kerela, AIR 1978 SC 771 14; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1971 1 SCC 712 8.
43
Union of India v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan, AIR 2012 SC 2453, 23; Assam Roller Flour Mills Association v.
Union of India, AIR 1998 Gau 119 16; Ivory Traders & Manufacturers Association v. Union of India, 2 (1997)
CLT 273 30.
44
45
Jyoti Pershad v. UT of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 24.
46
47
48
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318, 46; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab
Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534, 46.

restrictions imposed by the state on the rights conferred under Article 19 are reasonable in
nature.
42. Therefore, it is submitted that the Act does not infringe the rights of the citizens conferred
by Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana.
CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S
147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
AND THE HIGH COURT OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the acquittal of the accused persons by
the Hon’ble HC is justified as the acts of the accused persons were not unlawful and thus,
they shouldn’t be punished u/s 147,148,149,302,307,326,120B and 34 of the Indiana Penal
Code.
4.1: THE ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF OFFENSES U/S 147, 148 AND 149 OF IPC
43. It is submitted before the bench that since the essentials u/s 146 are not being fulfilled, the
accused cannot be held guilty u/s 147. It is contended that there was no unlawful
assembly and the force used was lawful as it was in prosecution of private defence.
44. THERE WAS NO UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY: To constitute an 'unlawful assembly', it
should be established that there was an unlawful assembly of five or more persons 49, who
have a common object among50 the five specified u/s 14651. In the present case, Mr. Teja
Singh was accompanied by 25 armed personnel to Uchihar. However, those 25-armed
personals were a part of the security detail provided to an MLA, and thus they cannot be
termed as assembly of 5 or more persons.
45. It is submitted that the common object has to be essentially inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, manner of
executing the common object and so on52. Acts and conduct of the accused also operate as
guiding factors53. It can clearly be ascertained that the only objective that Mr. Teja Singh
had was to reach his constituency to overlook the arrangements and welcome the Chief
Minister. It was his constitutional duty to reach at the designated place and voice the
49
Khajah Noorul Hossein v C Fabre-Tonnerre, 24 WR 26, p 27; Masalti v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC
202 [LNIND 1964 SC 173] , p 211 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 226 ; State v Banamali Maharana, 25 Cut LT 433; State of
Kerala v KJ Thomas, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 661 : (1961) Mad LJ (Cr) 45; Upendra Nath v State, (1968) Cut LT 226;
50
Amar Singh v state of Punjab -pg 397
51
Sheik yusuf
52
53

concerns on behalf of the constituents. Further it is his duty to handle constituent’s

problems and be answerable to its people. Keeping into account all of this, it can clearly
be seen Teja Singh was just exercising his duty.
46. Furthermore, the common objective that the alleged accused had in present case does not
fall under any of the clauses mentioned under Section 141. In State of Bihar v. Nathu
Pandey54 it was held that Section 141 I.P.C. must be read with Sections 96 to 106 I.P.C.
An assembly whose common object is to defend property or body by use of force within
limits prescribed by law cannot be designated as unlawful assembly. Thus, in the present
case there was no unlawful assembly.
47. Further in order to establish the crime of rioting, an unlawful assembly must use force or
violence which should be in prosecution of common object. Common law has always
recognized the right of a person to protect himself from attack and to act in defence of
others. In this process, he can inflict violence on another, if necessary55. Furthermore, the
person who is about to be attacked does not have to wait for the assailant to attack first 56.
In the present case, Mr. Teja and his armed personnel even though used force and
violence, it was to repel the force and the imminent danger posed by the protestors 57.
Thus, the force used was lawful as it was in prosecution of private defence.
48. To constitute an offence under Section 148, In the present case, a person must be a
member of such an unlawful assembly which along with being guilty of the offence of
rioting under Section 146 is also armed with a deadly weapon. In the present case, it has
already been established that there was no unlawful assembly and they were not guilty of
rioting u/s 146. Furthermore, the weapons carried were for the security purposes. Thus,
no essential of Section 148 IPC is being met and the accused cannot be charged under the
same.
49. Furthermore, it was held in Sheo Poajan & Ors v State of Uttar Pradesh 58 If a rioter is
armed with a deadly weapon, he is punishable under s 148, IPC. It is not possible to find
him guilty both under s 147 and 148, because, however many weapons he may be armed
with, he commits only one offence of rioting in the course of the same riot.
54
AIR 1970 SC 27
55
JUSTICE K T THOMAS & M A RASHID, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.
553 (33RD ed. 2016).
56
Backwford v. Queen, (1988) 1 AC 130 PC per LORD GRIFFITHS at p. 144
57
58
(1998) Cr LJ 2864 (All) ; Mijajilal v State of UP, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 824, 2009 (3) All LJ 771 (All) (DB),Re
Nadimpalli Bangaruraju AIR 1942 Mad 58, p 62 ; Ram Lakhan v State of Rajasthan (1980) Cr LR 30 (Raj).

50. Section 149, IPC applies only where there is an unlawful assembly 59. However, in the
present case it has already been established that the accused did not form unlawful
assembly as their common object was to reach the Uchihar constituency and later on to
protect their body and property.
51. Further, while this section creates an offence a person cannot be tried and sentenced
under s 149, IPC alone because no punishment is provided by the section, but, by virtue
of this section, he is guilty of the substantive offence committed and is liable for
punishment provided for that offence60. There is, therefore, no meaning in charging a
person merely with s 14961.
52. In Md Ankoos v Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP62 it was held that where an
accused is charged under s 148, IPC and acquitted, conviction of such accused under s
302 read with s 149, IPC cannot be legally recorded. In Kishore Prasad v State of Bihar63
it was held that here the accused persons have a right of private defence of person or
property, they cannot be convicted under ss 147, 148 or 149, IPC. In the present case, all
the accused exercised their right of private defence against unlawful forces of the
protestors and thus cannot be convicted under ss 147, 148 or 149, IPC.
4.2 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 120B,326, 307 AND 302 READ WITH S.
34
53. The counsel humbly submits that the accused did not concord any conspiracy to do any
unlawful act, all the acts done by accused were in purport with private defence. On a bare
perusal of s.120A of the IPC, it is manifestly clear that for imputing a person as a
conspirator there has to be existence of an agreement between two or more persons 64
either to do an illegal act or to do a legal act through illegal means.
54. However, in the present case, accused’s only objective was to reach Uchihar to look after
arrangements, and but nowhere it could be asserted that the acts of the accused were to
59
State of Bihar v Nathu Pandey AIR 1970 SC 27 [LNIND 1969 SC 516], (1970) Cr LJ 5; Achhey Lal v State of
Uttar Pradesh 1978 SC 1233, p 1234, (1978) Cr LJ 1101 (Where the number of persons, participating in the
offence, is less than five, there is no unlawful assembly); Harwant Singh v State of Haryana AIR 1969 NOC 79
60
Re Theetumalai Gounder AIR 1925 Mad 1 (FB).
61
Bharosha Mistri v State of Bihar 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 55 (Pat) (DB) Sections 302 / 149, IPC.
62
2010 Cr LJ 861 (SC), 2009 AIR SCW 7132, AIR 2010 SC 566 [LNIND 2009 SC 1959], JT 2009 (14) SC 6
[LNIND 2009 SC 1959], 2009 (13) Scale 584, (2010) 1 SCC 94 [LNIND 2009 SC 1959].
63
(1969) Pat LJR 17 (SC) ; Sivapada v State AIR 1969 Cal 28 [LNIND 1968 CAL 32], p 31, (1969) Cr LJ 160;
State of Assam v Manohar Ali (1987) 1 Crimes 748 [LNIND 1986 GAU 40] (Gau) ; Brahim Pal v State (1979)
All Cr C 231.
64
72Madanlal vs State Of Punjab,1967 SCR (3) 439.3K.S. Narayan v. S. Gopinathan, 1982 CrLJ 1611 (Mad.)

plot any kind of conspiracy, as there was no agreement between them to do illegal things.
Furthermore, no illegal act took place or a legal act through illegal means. The accused
just exercised his right to private defence when their life was in peril.
55. It is a well settled proposition that an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have
been established on mere suspicion, surmises or inferences which are not supported by
cogent or acceptable.65 In State of Kerela v. P. Sugathan & Another 66 it was held that a
few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be
adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal
conspiracy. Hence, in the present case, there is no evidence that clearly establishes that
this whole act was pre planned, and thus they should be acquitted under the charge of
s.120 B.
56. The counsel humbly submits that all the accused are not guilty of voluntarily causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means to the protestors and thus should be
acquitted under Section 326 of IPC. In the present case all the essentials u/s 326 are not
being fulfilled. Grievous hurt is hurt of an aggravated form. However, in the present case,
the factual matrix clearly states that in clash protestors were severely injured 67. Nowhere
it is mentioned who caused this injury neither the type of injury: whether on vital or non-
vital parts of the body.
57. It is submitted that s. 326 illustrates what dangerous weapons as ‘instrument for shooting,
stabbing or cutting or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence is likely to cause
death’. In the present case, nowhere in the factual matrix it has been mentioned who
caused the injury and with the help of what instrument. The CBI investigation report
found two iron rods covered with blood on the scene 68, however it was the protestors who
carried the iron rod69. This creates a reasonable doubt in the mind regarding the actual
accused of such grievous hurt.
58. The acts of the accused do not amount to voluntarily causing grievous hurt and are
excusable as they were the outcome of private defence and accident. The counsel submits
that when the protestors threw petrol bomb on the car and pelted stones 70, the accused
accelerated the car in order to escape and prevent themselves from the impending harm.
65
In Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao
66
67
Source the factsheet
68
Source tehfactsheet
69
Source it
70
factsheet

Therefore, the accused exercised his right to private defence, as he had reasonable ground
for believing that his act was necessary to prevent themselves.
59. Furthermore, it is not even required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that his act was of
private defence71, since making out a prima facie case would suffice. The mens rea or the
criminal intention is absent and the actus rea is an outcome of acting in good faith. Thus,
it is pleaded that the accused should not be charged under grievous hurt.
60. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court of Session that accused have not
committed an offence u/s 307 IPC and shouldn’t be charged with attempt to murder. In
order to prove the crime u/s 307, analysis of different stages of crime is important. The
first stage is the intention to commit the crime, secondly, the preparation to commit the
crime; and thirdly, an attempt to commit it. It is essential that the act must be capable of
causing death72 and the existence of the intention of the offender to cause death 73 should
be present.
61. For a conviction under this section, it is not necessary that the accused should complete
every stage in the actual offence, except the final action. It is enough if in the attempt he
did an act towards the commission of the offence74.
62. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court in the case of Jodha v. St. of
Rajasthan75, the court ruled that in order for an offence to fall under the ambit of Sec 307,
the injury has to be caused on a vital part of the body. In Kaluram vs State of Assam76,
the court found that the accused had a dangerous weapon but he inflicted only minor
injuries on the victim, which clearly showed that he had no intention to murder and hence
he was not convicted under section 307 IPC.
63. Similarly in the present case, the act done by the accused of firing the shots were warning
shots for the 300 hundred protestors to back off as they were posing an imminent threat
and danger. In prosecution of this no injury was caused to anyone. (Prashant Tamde –
discuss late in murder).
71
Dharminder v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2002) 7 SCC 488,
72
St. of Maharastra v. Kashirao, (2003) 10 SCC 434
73
age Ram v. St. of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366
74
Raghunath alias Ram Singh, (1940) 16 Luck 194
75
1994 SCC OnLine Raj 161
76
Kaluram vs St. of Assam 1977 CR LJ 98

64. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the accused is not guilty for
committing the offence of murder under Sec 302 read with Sec 300, IPC, considering
that the accused was acting in private-defence. The defence humbly submits that the
circumstance u/s 100 IPC is fulfilled, private defence was warranted and reasonable force
was used in the instant matter.
65. CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER S.100 IS MADE OUT : Section 100 IPC enumerates that the
right to private defence of property can extend to causing death to causing in
circumstances which have been listed in the provisions of s.100. Assault that reasonably
cause apprehension of death (s. 100[1]) and grievous hurt (s. 100[2]) is mentioned in said
provision of the act. In the case at hand the protestors threw petrol bomb and blew off the
car, further even pelted stones on the accused77. They were carrying lathis, daratis, iron
rods which should be considered as dangerous weapons. Further the language of the
protestors – “we will teach a life lesson to Teja and his father” clearly shows their
criminal intent. It is pleaded that such circumstances fall under the ambit of private
defence.
66. PRIVATE DEFENCE IS WARRANTED: Every person has a right to private defence. To
plead a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must
show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending
that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him78.
A. It is submitted that in the case of Vidhya Singh versus the State of Madhya
Pradesh79, the Court observed that the right of self-defense is a very valuable right,
serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. The person facing a
reasonable apprehension of threat to himself cannot be probable to modulate his
defenses tier by tier, similar to a man in ordinary times or under normal
circumstances.
B. In the matter at hand, the above provisions of law can be used by virtue of the
protestors posing an imminent danger to the accused which have been proved above.
In prosecution to this, private defence was exercised by the accused at two moments.
One when he tried to escape the crowd and the protestors died by voluntarily coming
in front of the car. Second, after this accident when protestors started gathering
77
fcatsheet
78
State of Uttar Pradesh v Gajey Singh (2009) 11 SCC 414; Darshan Singh v State of Punjab AIR 2010 SC 1212
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chatur Singh (2005) 13 SCC 360,
79
1971

around Mr. Teja with criminal intent, the cautionary shots shoot by him and his
associates also come under the exception of private defence.
67.1 ACCIDENT: THE ACT OF ACCELERATING THE CAR: Under Sec 80, IPC,
a criminal act which is an accident is not punishable as it is excuses the accused from
punishment due to a lack of mens rea, and it for the prosecution to prove requisite
intention or knowledge in cases of murder80. The word ‘accident’ is something that
happens unexpectedly or happens unintentionally81. The purely accidental result of a
man’s voluntary conduct will not be imputed to him if he had no criminal intention or
knowledge, his conduct was lawful and his consequences were purely lawful.82
A. The amount of caution that is to be followed under this section is not that which is
of the highest order, but that which is a reasonable precaution when seeing the
facts of each case83 In the case at hand it could be seen that- imminent danger was
posed by the protestors, in effect of which the accused opted to escape instead of
retaliating and in the hope of this he accelerated the car.
B. However, it was the protestors who jumped in front of the car, which can clearly
be corroborated from the confession of PW (4) where he states that the protestors
tried to stop the car. The car was coming at high speed and it was the protestors
who jumped in front of it in the hope of car getting stopped, but any reasonable
and prudent man would be aware of the fact that one cannot stop the high speed
immediately. Thus, it can be inferred that the accused’s alleged criminal actions
were accidental ones and he had no mens rea to commit such a crime, and without
intent a conviction cannot be made against the accused.
67.2 DEATH OF A REPORTER U/S 106: It is a well-established fact that the
private defence is only available against the assailant, however Section 106 of IPC
lays down an exception. The law protects a man exercising the right of private
defense, if some innocent person is killed or injured in the exercise of such right. In
the case of Wassan Singh v. the State of Punjab84, the accused received nine injuries
and in exercising private defense, he shot at the assailants with his gun, which hit an
innocent woman bystander, causing her death. The SC held that the accused had the
right of private defence and hence was acquitted.
80
Chakru Sattiah v. State of AP AIR 1960 AP 153
81
I, Nelson R. A. Indian Penal Code, p. 528 (10th Ed. 2008)
82
Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 Punj 291
83
Cite thisssssssss
84
1995

A. Similarly in the present case the accused was just exercising his right of private
defence when he was shooting cautionary shots which hit an innocent reporter,
Prashant Tamde causing his death. Thus, the accused should not be charged with
murder of Prashant Tamde.
67. REASONABLE USE OF FORCE: It is well established that a person faced with imminent
peril of life and limb of himself or another is not expected to weigh in “golden scales 85”
the precise force needed to repel the danger. Even if he at the heat of the moment carries
his defence a little further then what would be necessary when calculated with precision
and exactitude by a cairn and unruffled mind, the law makes due allowance for it86.
68. In the present case, the accused could not be expected to measure his use of force on
golden scales as the situation was one which required urgency in thought and action, as
the protestors were in possession of petrol bombs and further used to blow up one car. In
addition to these 300 protestors gathered around their vehicles and started hitting those
vehicles with stones and lathis posing an imminent danger, therefore the accused’s use of
force was reasonable considering the circumstances at hand, and not excessive in any
manner.
69. FAULTY EVIDENCE: It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble court that the
conviction of the accused cannot be sustained upon improper investigation. When there
are material infirmities cause your improper investigation benefit of doubt should be
given to the accused87 in the present matter the investigation is faulty and benefit should
be given to the accused88.
70. In cases where injuries are caused by fire-arms, the opinion of the Ballistic Expert is of a
considerable importance where both the fire-arm and the crime cartridge are recovered
during the investigation to connect an accused with the crime. Failure to produce the
expert opinion before the trial court in such cases affects the creditworthiness of the
prosecution case to a great extent89. In the instant case, even though the death has been
caused by a firearm and nine bullet shells have been found on the crime scene and yet
prosecution has not relied on any ballistic evidence.
71. With no blood found on any of the bullets, there is a high ambiguity as to exactly what
bullet was fired, which gun was used and by whom. Even the bullet that stroked through
85
I, Nelson R. A. Indian Penal Code, p. 837 (10th Ed. 2008)
86
Mohd Remzani v. State of Delhi AIR 1980 SC 1341
87
State of Uttarakhand v. Jaimal Singh
88
Kailash Gaur v state of Assam
89
Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab

the heart of Prashant Tamade was not found and no investigation took place in
furtherance. Even the post mortem fails to mention the diameter of the wound which
could have helped to find the bullet that caused his death.
72. Further no guns of the accused have been tested through which it can substantially be
established whether the said gun was fired or not at the crime scene. Neither it has been
established that the nine bullet shells that have been found at the crime scene and the
bullet that killed Prashant Tamade, are shot by the accused or the protestors as there are
no eyewitness that can corroborate with the prosecution’s story regarding the same.
73. The Apex Court has held that in cases where there are a number of infirmaries in the
evidence of the eyewitnesses the benefit of the doubt is given to the accused 90, bearing in
mind that no witness had seen the accused commit the actus reus of shooting the shot that
killed Prashant Tamade. It would be thus be highly unsafe to convict the accused for the
crime.
74. Moreover, no injuries have been clearly specified that have been inflicted to another
protestors. Factual matrix clearly says in the clash protestors got severely injured. There
exists a strong possibility that during the clash, attack which the protestors wanted to
direct at the convoy of Mr. Teja and his associates hit their fellow protestors instead since
there was a heavy crowd of 300 agitated protestors. Furthermore, no injury has been
clearly specified for it to amount grievous hurt.
75. In light of all the aforementioned arguments, the accused humbly submits that the
prosecution’s arguments are leaning towards the fact that the crime ‘may have been
committed by the accused’ There exists reasonable doubt91 and hence all the accused
should be acquitted of the crime.
76. It is humbly submitted that s.34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. It does not create a distinct offence. It lays down a principle of
liability. Further, to constitute Section 34 two factors must be established: (i) common
intention, and (ii) participation of accused in the commission of an offence92.
77. However, in the present case, it has already been established that there was no criminal
act that took place and they all did not share any common intention to do an offence. The
accused persons peacefully wanted to reach Uchihar and any act that they did was in lieu
of private defence. In a murder case the accused persons had no plans for inflicting
90
91
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai Cr LJ 2004 Sc 36
92
Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana

assault on deceased and to cause his death. Hence essential ingredients of section 34 were
lacking93. Further In Fateh Chand v Emperor94, it was held that when assault on victims
is isolated and there is no common intention or object, s.34 does not apply. Similarly in
the present case, since there is no common intention present, Section 34 shouldn’t apply.
93
Sasthi Bagdi v State, 2007 Cr LJ 2600 (Cal)
94
Cite it

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsels on behalf of the Prosecution humbly pray before the Hon’ble Sessions Court at
angalore to kindly adjudge and declare that: -
a. That the state legislature of Devbhoomi does not have any specific power to make
laws/policies for domicile-based reservations.
b. That the state government do not have the power to direct the employers of private
sector to reserve jobs for local candidates.
c. That the Devbhoomi State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020 is
unconstitutional.
d. That the accused are guilty of the offence u/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120b and
34 of the indian penal code, 1860 and the high court of Devbhoomi has erred in
acquitting them.
AND/OR
Pass any other order which the bench deems fit in the best interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness the Counsels on behalf of the Prosecution as in
duty bound shall forever pray.
All of which is respectfully submitted

__________________________
SD/-
Counsels for Prosecution

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TEAM CODE: 113

5TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

WRIT PETITION NO. 351 OF 2020

SATAT VIKAS SANGH PETITIONER

STATE OF DEVBHOOMI DEFENDANT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2022

MR. TEJA SINGH & ORS DEFENCE

PRAYER FOR RELIEF................................................................................................................

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

SCC Supreme Court Cases

u/s Under Section

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Act 2 of 1974).

BOOKS AND DIGESTS

DICTIONARIES, ONLINE DATABASES & WEBSITES

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

1. Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal AIR 2010 SC 773 12

3. B. Venkat Swamy v. Vijaya Nehru (2008) 10 SCC 260 4

4. Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 2

5. Brij Bhushan Sharma v. State of U. P 2001 CriLJ 1384 15

6. Brij Mohan v. State 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2312 2

7. C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 9

8. Chattar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 14 SCC 667 9

9. Chhotanney v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 2013 15

10. Firoz Khan v. Union of India AIR 2007 Ori 81 5

11. Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516 14

12. Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619 4

13. Gopi Nath v. State of U. P (2001) 6 SCC 620 7

14. Govindaswamy v. State of Kerala (2016) 16 SCC 295 10

15. Gurubasappa v. Gurulingappa 1961 SCC OnLine Kar 106 11

16. Ilayaraja v. State 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14207 4

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

17. Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik (1986) Cr.LJ 1510 3

18. Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083 7

20. Jatinder Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2020 SC 161 3

21. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 5

22. John Indiculla v. State 2005 Cr LJ 2925 (Ker.) 7

23. Joseph v. State of Kerala (2000) 5 SCC 197 9

24. Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat (2013) 15 SCC(Cri) 688 3

Kanna Alias Mahalakshmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami

26. Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa AIR1987 SC 1507 12

27. Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 4

29. Kundala Bala Subranayam v. State of AP 1993 Cr.LJ 1635 15

30. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P (2010) 2 SCC 748 9

31. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 6

32. Narendra v. State of Karnataka (2009) 6 SCC 61 4

33. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli AIR 2006 SC 1657 5

34. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766 11

35. Pachipala Laxmaiah v. State of A.P 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1166 5

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

37. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 2

38. Prakash v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 65 8

39. Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram AIR 1959 Mad 323 10

40. Rajammal v. State of T. N 1993 Cr.LJ 3029 (Mad.) 14

41. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 3

42. Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43 9

43. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat (2011) 11 SCC 111 14