Case Digest Compilation: MLAW 125 - Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics

CASE DIGEST COMPILATION
MLAW 125 - Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics
Submitted to:
Atty. Joy Ivee Ong-Ibanez
Submitted by:
Sienes, Danny
Sitoy, Jimwell I.
Ursal, Jones Bradley A.
Villamor, Ma. Mila Niña T.
Viscara, Jay Bert C.
J.D. Non-Thesis
1L – M5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Case 1........................................................................................................................................... 6
Re: Letter of Tony -Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building
in Quezon City......................................................................................................................... 6
(A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)....................................................................................6
Case 2........................................................................................................................................... 7
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu...........................................................7
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, November 22, 2016)........................................................................ 7
Case 3........................................................................................................................................... 9
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu...........................................................9
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)............................................................................... 9
Case 4......................................................................................................................................... 10
Garcia vs. Judge De la Peña................................................................................................. 10
(A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, 129 SCRA 767, February 9, 1994)...................................................10
Case 5......................................................................................................................................... 12
Lazo vs. Judge Tiong.............................................................................................................12
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998).......................................................................12
Case 6......................................................................................................................................... 13
Tan vs. Judge Rosete............................................................................................................ 13
(A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004)....................................................................... 13
Case 7......................................................................................................................................... 14
Spelmans vs. Judge Ocampo................................................................................................14
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010)............................................................................. 14
Case 8......................................................................................................................................... 15
Retired Judge Martonino Marcos vs. Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller.......................................15
(A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017)...........................................................................15
Case 9......................................................................................................................................... 17
Florita Palma and Filipina Mercado vs. Judge George Omelio, et al.....................................17
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017)............................................................................ 17
Case 10....................................................................................................................................... 18
Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order vs. Judge Calibo..................................................18
(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621, September 27, 2007)...................................................................... 18
Case 11....................................................................................................................................... 19
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011)................................................................. 19
Case 12....................................................................................................................................... 20
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty..................... 20
(A.M. No. 2007-22-SC, February 1, 2011)............................................................................. 20
Case 13....................................................................................................................................... 22
Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute.............................................................................22
(A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011)....................................................................................... 22
Case 14....................................................................................................................................... 23
Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan vs. Ernesto C. Quitorio.......................................................... 23
(A.M. No. P-11-2919, May 31, 2011)..................................................................................... 23
Case 15....................................................................................................................................... 24
Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria................................................................................................. 24
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014).................................................................................. 24
Case 16....................................................................................................................................... 27
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,.......................... 27
Bad
2
Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan..................................................................................27
(A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, 639 SCRA 254, January 12, 2011)............................................... 27
Case 17....................................................................................................................................... 29
Gacad vs. Judge Clapis.........................................................................................................29
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)................................................................................. 29
Case 18....................................................................................................................................... 30
Tobias vs. Judge Limsiaco.....................................................................................................30
(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011).......................................................................... 30
Case 19....................................................................................................................................... 31
Chan vs. Judge Madajucon................................................................................................... 31
(A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, October 15, 2003)...........................................................................31
Case 20....................................................................................................................................... 32
Dawa vs. Judge De Asa........................................................................................................ 32
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998)................................................................................. 32
Case 21....................................................................................................................................... 34
Anonymous vs. Judge Achas................................................................................................ 34
(A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013)......................................................................... 34
Case 22....................................................................................................................................... 35
Spouses Causin vs. Judge Demecillo................................................................................... 35
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1860, September 8, 2004)........................................................................ 35
Case 23....................................................................................................................................... 36
Seludo vs. Judge Fineza....................................................................................................... 36
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004)....................................................................... 36
Case 24....................................................................................................................................... 37
Dr. Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga.....................................................................................37
(A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, August 17, 2015)............................................................................ 37
Case 25....................................................................................................................................... 39
Castillo, et al. vs. Judge Juan................................................................................................ 39
(62 SCRA 124, January 28, 1975).........................................................................................39
Case 26....................................................................................................................................... 40
Oktubre vs. Judge Velasco.................................................................................................... 40
(A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, 434 SCRA 636, July 22, 2004).......................................................40
Case 27....................................................................................................................................... 41
Judge Tabora vs. Judge Carbonell........................................................................................ 41
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145, June 18, 2010)................................................................................41
Case 28....................................................................................................................................... 42
Hilado, et al. vs. Judge Reyes............................................................................................... 42
(G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006).......................................................................................... 42
Borromeo-Garcia vs. Judge Pagayatan.................................................................................43
Case 30....................................................................................................................................... 44
Sy vs. Judge Dinopol............................................................................................................. 44
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011)........................................................................... 44
Case 31....................................................................................................................................... 46
Catbagan vs. Judge Barte..................................................................................................... 46
(A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, April 6, 2005)..................................................................................46
Case 32....................................................................................................................................... 47
Atty. Conrado B. Gandeza, Jr. vs. Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin........................................... 47
(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, July 25, 2011)................................................................................. 47
Case 33....................................................................................................................................... 48
Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al........................................................... 48
(A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010)............................................................................... 48
Case 34....................................................................................................................................... 50
Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila vs. Judge Veneracion.................................................... 50
(A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, 488 SCRA 285, April 26, 2006)...................................................... 50
Case 35....................................................................................................................................... 52
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SAN and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary (A.M. No.
09-86-SC, 672 SCRA 27, June 13, 2012)............................................................................. 52
Case 36....................................................................................................................................... 53
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al............................. 53
(A.M. No. MTJ 07-1691, April 2, 2013).................................................................................. 53
Case 37....................................................................................................................................... 55
Jill M. Tormis vs. Judge Paredes........................................................................................... 55
(A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015)........................................................................... 55
Case 38....................................................................................................................................... 56
Atty. Santos vs. Judge Bernardo........................................................................................... 56
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1670, 559 SCRA 310, July 23, 2008).......................................................56
Case 39....................................................................................................................................... 57
Capuno, et al. vs. Judge Jaramillo.........................................................................................57
(A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, 234 SCRA 212, July 20, 1994)......................................................... 57
Case 40....................................................................................................................................... 59
Benancillo vs. Judge Amila....................................................................................................59
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011)................................................................................59
Case 41....................................................................................................................................... 60
Liwanag vs. Judge Lustre...................................................................................................... 60
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, April 21, 1999)................................................................................ 60
Case 42....................................................................................................................................... 61
Wilfredo F. Tuvillo vs. Judge Henry Laron............................................................................. 61
(A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016).......................................................................... 61
Case 43....................................................................................................................................... 63
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Edmundo 'T. Acua...............................................63
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28,2005).................................................................................. 63
Case 44....................................................................................................................................... 64
King vs. Judge Hontanosas................................................................................................... 64
Case 45....................................................................................................................................... 65
Heirs of the Late Aspiras vs. Judge Ganay........................................................................... 65
Case 46....................................................................................................................................... 67
Belen vs. Judge Belen........................................................................................................... 67
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2139, August 9, 2010).............................................................................. 67
Case 47....................................................................................................................................... 68
Tan vs. Judge Pacuribot........................................................................................................ 68
Case 48....................................................................................................................................... 69
Atty. Veloso, et al. vs. Judge Caminade................................................................................ 69
(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655, July 8, 2004)................................................................................... 69
Case 49....................................................................................................................................... 71
Perfecto vs. Judge Desales-Esidera......................................................................................71
(A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270, 642 SCRA 1, January 31, 2011)..................................................... 71
Case 50....................................................................................................................................... 72
Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (A.M.
No. 08-8-11-CA, 564 SCRA 365, September 9, 2008).......................................................... 72
Case 51....................................................................................................................................... 73
Uy vs. Judge Javellana..........................................................................................................73
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012)....................................................................... 73
Case 52....................................................................................................................................... 75
Salazar vs. Judge Marigomen............................................................................................... 75
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004, October 19, 2007)...........................................................................75
Case 53....................................................................................................................................... 76
Correa vs. Judge Belen......................................................................................................... 76
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010).............................................................................. 76
Case 54....................................................................................................................................... 77
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili vs. Judge Rasad G. Balindong......................................................... 77
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011)........................................................................ 77
Case 55....................................................................................................................................... 79
Atty. Balayon vs. Judge Dinopol............................................................................................ 79
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969, 490 SCRA 547, June 15, 2006)......................................................79
Case 56....................................................................................................................................... 80
Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) vs. Judge Carretas.............................80
(A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 532 SCRA 218, September 5, 2007).............................................. 80
Case 57....................................................................................................................................... 82
Angeles vs. Judge Sempio Diy.............................................................................................. 82
Case 58....................................................................................................................................... 83
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Mantua.............................................................. 83
(A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8, 2012)........................................................................... 83
Case 59....................................................................................................................................... 84
Dagudag vs. Judge Paderanga............................................................................................. 84
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008)................................................................................84
Case 60....................................................................................................................................... 86
Edgar A. Abiog vs. Hon. Evelyn C. Cañete........................................................................... 86
(A.M. No. MTJ-18-1917, October 8, 2018)............................................................................ 86
Case 61....................................................................................................................................... 87
Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor................................... 87
(A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012)....................................................................................87
Case 62....................................................................................................................................... 88
Benigno B. Reas vs. Carlos M. Relacion...............................................................................88
(A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011)............................................................................... 88
Case 63....................................................................................................................................... 90
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al..................................................................... 90
(A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011)...................................................................................90
Case 64....................................................................................................................................... 91
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Joselito Villarosa............................................... 91
(A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578, January 28, 2020)...........................................................................91
Case 65....................................................................................................................................... 92
Reynaldo Ngo vs. Atty. Renato Frades..................................................................................92
(A.M. No. P-21-026, November 9, 2021)............................................................................... 92
Case 1
Re: Letter of Tony -Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of
Justice Building in Quezon City
(A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
FACTS:
This case is regarding a series of letters sent by Valenciano to then CJ Puno
detailing that the Hall of Justice of Quezon City have been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel; which Valenciano alleged as a violation of the constitutional mandate
of the separation of church and State as enshrined in the Constitution. Essentially, the
letters were attended by various RTC and MeTC judges but the point of their contention
in holding the mass is that it is not the conduct of masses in public places which the
Constitution prohibited, but the passage of laws or the use of public funds for the
purpose of establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The judges
who attended to the letters sent by Valenciano conveyed the fact that no law or rule had
been passed and that no public funds had been appropriated or used to support the
celebration of masses and that the holding of Catholic masses did not mean that
Catholics had better chances of obtaining favorable resolutions from the court. The
Office of the Court Administrator thereafter held that the letters of Valencia were
unfounded stating that there was nothing constitutionally abhorrent in allowing the
continuation of the masses. The case then went for the resolution of the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: WON holding of religious rituals at the Hall of Justice building in Quezon City is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the holding of religious rituals at the Hall of Justice building in Quezon City is
constitutional. The Constitution provides that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed; which simply provides the non-establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court held that
in order to limit the right of an individual in the exercise of his/her religion, which in this
case are the employees of the judiciary in the Hall of Justice of Quezon City, it is
necessary that there must be a compelling state interest. Here, the letters containing the
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contention of Valenciano are not sufficient in alleging that there is violation of the
non-establishment clause and that there is a compelling state interest in order to stop
the conduct of masses in the Hall of Justice in Quezon City. To successfully invoke
compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of
Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees
in the performance of their official functions.
It is clear herein that the masses conducted are held only for 30 minutes during
the lunch break which does not affect the operations of the Hall of Justice of Quezon
City, more so in the delivery of public service. With regard to the non-establishment
clause, it is clear in this case that there is no law, ordinance, or circular which expressly
mandates the judiciary employees to attend the catholic masses and that conduct of the
mass is not violative of the constitutional prohibition on establishing or favoring one
religion over another. The holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice
may offend non-Catholic, but there is no reason to proscribe it. The Constitution
ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who
seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. Wherefore, in
resolving the case, the Court instead of prohibiting the conduct of masses, directed the
Executive Judges of Quezon City to regulate and monitor the holding of masses and
religious practices within Quezon City Hall of Justice.
Case 2
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, November 22, 2016)
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated administrative case against Judge Eliza Yu (Judge
Yu) for charges of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination,
oppression, and conduct unbecoming of a judge in her stint as a presiding Judge in a
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). It was alleged in the respective cases that Judge Yu
was non-compliant with A.O. No. 19-2011 regarding the establishment of night courts,
that she refused to honor the appointment of a court personnel because she (Judge Yu)
she has a preferred candidate, that she issued a show-cause order against fellow
Judges and court personnel, showed disrespectful attitude towards SC officers, that
Judge Yu ordered the presentation of ex parte evidence before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) who was not a member of the Bar, that she refuse to sign the
application for leave of absence of an employee despite presentation of a valid
8
evidence of the employee’s medical condition, that Judge Yu sent inappropriate

messages to a fellow judge, that Judge Yu allowed the conduct of criminal proceedings
without actual participation of a public prosecutor, and her way of disposing cases.
Upon investigation and inquiry, the OCA recommended that Judge Yu be dismissed
from service and referred the case to the Supreme Court for proper determination and
resolution.
ISSUE: WON Judge Yu should be dismissed from service for violating the Code of
Judicial Ethics
RULING:
Yes, Judge Yu should be dismissed from service. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges are entitled to
freedom of expression, but in the exercise of such right, they shall conduct themselves
in a manner that preserves the dignity if the judicial office; Section 8, Canon 4 also
provides that judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interest; and lastly, Section 1, Canon 4 further provides that judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. In this case,
it is clear that Judge Yu violated various canons and rules that constituted gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge. To elaborate, regarding the issue on the non-compliance with
AO No. 19-2011 on the establishment of night courts, the deliberate non-compliance of
Judge Yu of the order is a manifestation of insubordination towards the Courts and her
judicial officers and that it sows the seed of arrogance in others that can ultimately
destroy the faith and trust in the hierarchy of courts; and that although Judge Yu has the
right to express dissent over the order, does not mean that she does away or not
comply as she is bound to follow the order.
On the issue of the refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel, it was
not appropriate for Judge Yu to reject the appointment of Tejero-Lopez and Lagman
because their appointments had undergone scrutiny and processing and that the
pending administrative case against Lagman is only simple misconduct which does not
warrant termination or non-qualification for the position. In the issue regarding the
issuance of a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court personnel, Judge Yu
obviously gravely abused her authority in the issuance of the order and showed
arrogance in the exercise of her authority as a judicial officer; which constitutes gross
misconduct. In the refusal of Judge Yu to sign the application for leave of absence of a
particular court employee, she is guilty of oppression because the Court believed that
9
the reason for the refusal of signing the application was an additional hardship as a form
of retaliation towards that employee for joining the administrative case against her
(Judge Yu). On the issue of the order of presentation of ex parte evidence before the
OIC who was not a member of the Bar and in allowing criminal proceedings without
actual participation of the public prosecutor amounts to gross ignorance of the law
because the acts of Judge Yu was in disregard of the established rules provided by law
which she ought to know and follow. And lastly, Judge sending inappropriate messages
was unbecoming of a judicial officer. Essentially, the totality of the infractions committed
by Judge Yu are Gross Ignorance of the Law, Insubordination and Refusal to Perform
Official Functions, Gross Misconduct Amounting to Violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge,
underscores the fact that she is not fit to occupy the position of a judge. As such, she
should be dismissed from service.
Case 3
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)
FACTS:
Judge Yu was dismissed from the judiciary for gross ignorance of the law,
insubordination and refusal to perform official functions, gross misconduct amounting to
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave abuse of authority, oppression, and
conduct unbecoming a judge. She was then asked by the Supreme Court to show
cause as to why she should not be disbarred. This is different from the first case as this
is regarding the disbarment against her; while the first case was regarding her
infractions in the judiciary and her dismissal from the same. Here, Judge Yu just
repeatedly denied committing all the administrative offenses for which she was held
guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. To afford
Judge Yu of her right to due process, the Court once more reviewed her restated
arguments.
ISSUE: WON Judge Yu should be disbarred.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Yu should be disbarred. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
an attorney may be disbarred on the ground of gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. In this case, given her wanton
defiance of the Court's own directives, her open disrespect towards her fellow judges,
10
her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for
threatening the defenseless with legal actions to make them submit to her will, warrants
the imposition of the penalty of disbarment. Her moral and actual unfitness to remain as
a Judge, as determined in the previous case, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain
as a member of the Bar. In this case, it is apparent that Judge Yu committed gross
misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order
by the Court, which thereby warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
In this case, the Court reiterated that the penalty of disbarment does not equate
to stripping the source of livelihood. Disbarment is intended to protect the administration
of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent,
honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose
their confidence in them. And lastly, the Court expressed their disdain for judges and
attorneys who undeservedly think too highly of themselves, their personal and
professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of the nobility of the Law
Profession. In line with the foregoing, Judge Yu should be disbarred.
Case 4
Garcia vs. Judge De la Peña
(A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, 129 SCRA 767, February 9, 1994)
FACTS:
The administrative case stemmed from the incarceration of the wife of Garcia
(Petitioner) as she was charged with grave oral defamation by the brother of Judge De
la Pena. During the detention of the wife of Garcia, on the same day, Garcia posted the
cash bail bond in order for his wife to have provisional liberty but the Order of Release
was not secured on that day because Judge De la Pena was not around and the wife of
Garcia was only released the day after; which then prompted Garcia in filing the
administrative case against Judge De la Pena. Essentially, the administrative charges
against Judge De la Pena focused mainly on the fact of his taking cognizance of the
criminal case of grave oral defamation filed by his brother against Garcia’s wife, which
as a consequence, gave rise to the incidents narrated in the letter-complaint descriptive
of the perceived bias and partiality of respondent judge in the discharge of his official
functions.
In response, Judge De la Pena asserted that the case against the wife of Garcia
does not require certification from the Lupon Tagapayapa (LT) because the imposable
11
penalty for the crime of oral defamation is not within the coverage of the LT; that
although the private complainant in the case against his wife is his brother, he need not
to inhibit himself because the case has been deferred for a long time due to the
absence of the incumbent judge; that there is no room for bias or partiality in the
issuance of the warrant because there was probable cause; and that to show his
neutrality, he in fact issued an inhibition order.
ISSUE: WON Judge De la Pena is qualified to take or handle the case of his brother
against the wife of Garcia
RULING:
No, Judge De la Pena is not qualified to take or handle the case of his brother
against the wife of Garcia. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, no judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree xxx A
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. The rule on
compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where the judge is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent.
In this case, the fact that Judge De la Pena took cognizance of the criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of consanguinity to
private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of the rule on compulsory
disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The reason of Judge De la Pena that the case
has been dragging for some time already will not justify the violation of a well-settled
rule on compulsory disqualification of judges to hear a case. Not only that, the violation
of Judge De la Pena was aggrieved when he issued a warrant of arrest and on the
same day, left for Cebu, thus depriving the accused of the opportunity to secure an
order for her provisional liberty upon proper posting of a bail bond. The excuse given by
Judge De la Pena that he left the signed order of release with his wife instead of the
Clerk of Court before he went to Cebu exposed his disregard, indifference, or even
ignorance of the procedure prescribed by law. Such act or conduct by Judge De la Pena
is prejudicial to the rights of the accused. In line with the foregoing, Judge De la Pena is
not qualified to take or handle the case of his brother against the wife of Garcia and is
therefore dismissed from service.
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Case 5
Lazo vs. Judge Tiong
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998)
FACTS:
Carlitos Lazo is a private complainant in a particular criminal case which was
assigned to Judge Tiong. In the complaint of Lazo, he alleged that Judge Tiong
scheduled the arraignment of the accused in the said criminal case on a thursday
despite knowledge that the assigned prosecutor to the sala of Judge Tiong was
available only on fridays; Lazo further alleged that because of the cancellation of the
arraignment, his time and efforts were wasted; that the warrant of arrest was not served;
and Judge Tiong did not inhibit consider that him and the accused in the criminal case
are related within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife of the accused being the first
cousin of Judge Tiong. Judge Tiong, in response, disputed the allegations imputed
against him. The matter was thereafter referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
which recommended that Judge Tiong be absolved of any liability as to the charges
except on the charge that he failed to timely inhibit himself from the criminal case.
ISSUE: WON respondent should have disqualified himself in deciding on the said case.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Tiong should have disqualified himself in deciding or resolving the
case. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides that a judge who is related
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to party in a case is disqualified from
sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expected in writing signed by them,
and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge
hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by
resolving motions and issuing orders as the respondent judge has done in the subject
criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest
but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge.
In this case, Judge Tiong took charge of the criminal case for roughly a period of
2-3 months. He inhibited himself from the case only on a later date, despite the fact that
Lazo filed a motion seeking his inhibition on an earlier part of the case. Judge Tiong
justified his failure to inhibit himself on the ground that he was hoping that he could
make the complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably. But after a
13
reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and
using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited himself
from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity. As such, the Court
explained that reprimand would be a suitable punishment because there is no evidence
that respondent's failure to recuse himself from the case within a reasonable amount of
time was motivated by malice or any other corrupt motive.
Case 6
Tan vs. Judge Rosete
(A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004)
FACTS:
In this case, what essentially happened is that there are two opposing versions of
the story. On one side, Tan claims that Judge Rosete, through his staff, required her to
pay a certain amount for him to render a judgment in her favor, regarding the two
criminal cases she filed against a particular Alfonso Sy. Judge Rosete on the other hand
denied the allegation and asserted that it was in fact Tan, who attempted to bribe him by
offering to pay for the downpayment of a car he (Judge Rosete) was planning to buy,
and that Tan sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to
persuade him (Judge Rosete) to rule in favor of her (Tan). But upon the determination of
the Court, the version of the complainant, in consideration of the documentary evidence
presented, was considered to be more reliable and trustworthy. This therefore begs the
question as to whether the acts committed by Judge Rosete amounted to gross
misconduct.
ISSUE: WON the conduct of Judge Rosete should subject him for discipline.
RULING:
Yes, the conduct of Judge Rosete should subject him for discipline. Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides for the discipline of the members of the judiciary on
the ground for gross misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial conduct.
In this case, the act of Judge Rosete sending a member of his staff to talk with
complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants
outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct
required to be observed by members of the Bench. It is clear that it would be impossible
for Tan to obtain a copy of the draft decision of the judge , it being highly confidential; if
not through the judge himself or the people from his office. Further, an ordinary
14
employee of a court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of the disposition of a case if
not assured by the judge who drafted the decision. Also, it appeared that the two
testimonies of Judge Roset’s witness contradict each other whereby one confirmed that
Tan met Judge Repose in a particular restaurant whereas the other swore that he never
went out with Judge Rosete in non-officer functions; essentially there is inconsistency
with the statements of the witnesses of Judge Rosete.
The Court explained that it has repeatedly admonished judges to adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct as they are the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also
on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is
therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. Thus, Judge Roset violated the standards of judicial conduct and thereby
warrants his suspension in the service.
Case 7
Spelmans vs. Judge Ocampo
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010)
FACTS:
Complainant, Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans, a Belgian, filed a complaint
for theft and graft and corruption against respondent Municipal Trial Court Judge
Gaydifredo Ocampo of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans alleged in his affidavit
that in 2002 his wife, Annalyn Villan, filed a complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio
and his wife from whom Spelmans rented a house in Polomolok, South Cotabato which
he claimed that this was a scheme for his wife to take the properties inside the house.
The judge together with the parties held an inspection of the rented house but during
the inspection the judge took some of the items inside the house claiming that it was the
complainant’s wife who gave it to him for safekeeping on that said case but later on
dismissed it. Sometime in 2006, Spelmans filed a complaint for theft and graft and
15
corruption against respondent, in which according to Judge Ocampo, when he received

a copy of Spelmans’ complaint for grave misconduct did he learn of the couple’s
separation and his unwitting part in their legal battles. Judge Ocampo also said that
instead of hurling baseless accusations at him, Spelmans should have thanked him
because he kept his personal properties in good condition.
ISSUE: WON, the respondent’s taking and keeping of the personal items belonging to
Spelmans constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent’s taking and keeping of the personal items belonging to the
complainant constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically,
Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and Section 1 of Canon 4. Canon 1
Section 6 states: “Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in
relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.” Canon 2
Section 1: “Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.” Canon 4 Section 1: “Judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.”
In the case at bar, respondent’s acts were motivated by malice. He was not a
warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have
kept Spelmans' properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. Judge
Ocampo returned the items only after four years when Spelmans already filed a
complaint against him. He makes no claim that he made a previous effort to return
those supposedly entrusted items either to Villan or to Spelmans. His years of
possession obviously went beyond mere safekeeping, showing that respondent was
guilty of covetousness. His act affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the
court and tainted the judiciary's integrity. Thus, Judge Ocampo is guilty of violating the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Case 8
Retired Judge Martonino Marcos vs. Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
(A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017)
FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc
Andrei Marcos, during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fraternitas (Lex Leonum).
16
Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused in the said case,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued an order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and,
at the sametime, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the
accused. However, ten days later, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another order directing
the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused which she claimed were issued
inadvertently. Respondent judge issues the Omnibus Order quashing, lifting and setting
aside the warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them
for lack of probable cause. The order of dismissal prompted the complainant to file this
administrative case against Judge Cabrera-Faller.
ISSUE: WON, Judge Cabrera-Faller is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Cabrera-Faller is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Rule 1.01 and Rule 3. 01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Rule 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain
the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. Canon 3 - A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, respondent demonstrated lack of knowledge and

understanding of the basic rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.
Respondent’s utter disregard of the laws and rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate
archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall of the warrant of arrest which she
claimed were issued inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the case displayed her
lack of competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of
authority. Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments
rendered in good faith, such defense in situations of infallible discretion adheres only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues
are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond
permissible margins of error. Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
17
Case 9
Florita Palma and Filipina Mercado vs. Judge George Omelio, et al.
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017)
FACTS:
A certain Mercado sent an electronic mail to pio@supremecourt.gov.ph alleging
a "marriage scam" in Davao City perpetrated by Judges George E. Omelio and and
Rufino Ferraris. On a different date, a certain Florita Palma (Palma) also sent an e-mail
to the same recipient complaining about the alleged dishonorable conduct of
respondents Judge Omelio and his wife, Clerk of Court Ma. Florida C. Omelio, relative
to the solemnization of the marriage of a certain "Echeverria." Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) dispatched an investigating team and discovered that there is a
record of marriage between Julius Regor M. Echevvaria and Khristine Marie D. Duo to
the Local Civil Registrar and it was solemnized by Judge Virgilio G. Murcia and not of
Judge George Omelio.
In response, respondent judge Omelio denied the allegations of Palma and

Mercado, with regards to marriage of the Echevarrias, he explained that said wedding
was re-enacted for those we were not able to attend and for the purpose of picture
taking and posterity; and that he did not demand any amount from the Echevarrias. CoC
Omelia claimed that her husband did nothing wrong as well as her whose only
participation was accompanying her husband during the party where the re-enacted
took place, whereas Judge Murcia insisted that his name was never mentioned in the
complaint and affirmed he solemnized the wedding in his courtroom with parties and
witnesses including the complete documents and receipts.
ISSUE: WON, the judges should be held liable for their acts.
RULING:
Yes, respondents Judge George E. Omelio and Judge Virgilio G. Murcia should
be held liable for their acts amounted to gross misconduct constituting violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Both respondents violated AO 125-2007, which provided for
the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary and
laid down the rules "to enable the solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to secure and
safeguard the sanctity of marriage as a social institution." Although they were clothed
with authority to solemnize marriages, they overstepped the bound of their authority. "A
judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing officer." Both
Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio were remiss in this regard.
18
In the case at bar, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage Contract of
Julius and Khristine without actually solemnizing their marriage. It was established that
by signing the Certificate of Marriage, Judge Murcia made it appear that he solemnized
the marriage of Julius and Khristine without the contracting parties and their witnesses
personally appearing before him and sans payment of the solemnization fee. Whereas,
Jude Omelio was found to be the one that solemnized the marriage, in which being a
duly-authorized solemnizing officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know that marriage
should not be trifled with, and its sanctity and inviolability should never be undermined.
Thus, both respondents are administratively liable.
Case 10
Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order vs. Judge Calibo
(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621, September 27, 2007)
FACTS:
An anonymous complaint was filed by "Concerned Boholanos for Law and
Order," Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., is charged with conduct unbecoming a judge and
highly unethical act for "publicly speaking on radio and in public fora regarding his bias
and parochial views on certain controversial issues against public personalities and
public officials." Respondent states that a very questionable and controversial project
was being pursued by the Provincial Governor which was to sell the two major
performing assets of the Province of Bohol, the Provincial Electrical System and the
Provincial Waterworks System of the Provincial Utilities Division, without consulting its
customers in Tagbilaran and Dauis, Bohol, which are the places served by these two
utilities. Respondent Judge narrates that he had distanced himself from the media but
when it became apparent that the Governor was ignoring the legitimate issues
presented by the people, he decided to take part in the debate, joined the oppositors
and admitted to having gone on the air. Although the Governor did not do anything to
stop him, other provincial officials tried to suppress respondent's revelations on the air
reasoning that being a Judge, respondent should not involve himself in controversy. The
respondent also called Judge Melicor, presiding Judge of the injunction petition filed by
concerned consumers, in an attempt to influence him.
ISSUE: WON, respondent Judge Calibo violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
19
Yes, respondent Judge Calibo violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1,
Section 3 states: "Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."
In the case at bar, the respondent had two telephone calls to Judge Achilles L.
Melicor who was presiding the court where the petition to stop the governor was
pending. Clearly, the inappropriateness of the calls made by respondent Judge to
another Judge who was presiding the Court where the case was being heard is a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Case 11
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano
C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011)
FACTS:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of
the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive
Department requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers
who established the comfort women stations, but have been declined, saying that
petitioners' individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan. The Court rendered judgment dismissing
petitioners' action, wherein Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision. The
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced that his clients
would file a supplemental petition, wherein accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest
intellectual theft and outright plagiarism" when he wrote the decision for the Court and of
"twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources . . . to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment" passages from three foreign articles. Petitioners claim that the
integrity of the Court's deliberations in the case has been put into question by Justice
Del Castillo's fraud.
ISSUE: WON, in writing the opinion for the Court in theVinuya case, Justice Del Castillo
plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
RULING:
No, Justice Del Castillo did not plagiarize the published works of the mentioned
authors in the case. Plagiarism means the theft of another person's language, thoughts,
20
or ideas. The passing off of the work of another as one's own is thus an indispensable
element of plagiarism. In the case at bar, Justice Del Castillo's researcher showed the
Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the
passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper
attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning
up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions. The Court adopts the
Committee's finding that the researcher's explanation regarding the accidental removal
of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of
the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to
sources of research materials is not remote.
Also, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which
encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their
decisions. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a
court of law. Stare decisis, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same. A
judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge
of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts
published in a legal periodical or language from a party's brief are used without giving
attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to
resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to
judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a
literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As
a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
Case 12
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty
(A.M. No. 2007-22-SC, February 1, 2011)
FACTS:
This case is an Anonymous Complaint for Dishonesty against Ms. Hermogena F.
Bayani, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services
(OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The Anonymous complainant alleged
that Bayani, during her application for promotion to her present position as SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer of the Leave Division, OAS-OCA, failed to disclose in her Personal
21
Data Sheet (PDS) that she was previously charged in an administrative case in 1995.
Complainant adds that Bayani's failure to disclose said information misled the Court's
Selection and Promotion Board (SPB) in evaluating her application for promotion which
is tantamount to dishonesty. In respondent’s defense, in her PDS, she answered in the
negative to questions 25 (Do you have any pending administrative case?) and 27 (Have
you ever been convicted of any administrative offense?), since the administrative case
against her was already decided in 1995, and before she accomplished her PDS in
1999, for the former, and due to her understanding that there was no conviction on the
administrative case against her, because she was merely admonished and warned
therein, for the latter. Bayani averred that if her act was indeed wrong, she, however, did
not intend to defraud the government, or prejudice anyone.
ISSUE: WON, Bayani is guilty of Dishonesty through falsification of official documents.
RULING:
No, Bayani is not guilty of Dishonesty through falsification of official documents.
Dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion." In ascertaining the intention of a person
accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his
state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree
of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
In the instant case, Bayani made an erroneous judgment in choosing not to

disclose her previous infraction, she cannot be blamed for believing that such was
irrelevant to: (1) question no. 25 — for this incident had long been resolved and no
longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 — for clearly being admonished and warned for
being remiss in the performance for her duties do not necessarily equate to conviction
as question no. 27 seeks to determine. Suffice it to say that while her defense of good
faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a state of mind,
erroneous judgment on the part of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote the
existence of bad faith, malice, or an intention to defraud. While erroneous judgment
does not equate to bad faith or dishonesty, Bayani, should likewise know that prudence
demands that she should disclose such information no matter how irrelevant it may
appear to her. Thus, Bayani still deserves disciplinary sanction, in which the Court held
that she is admonished and warned.
22
Case 13
Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute
(A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011)
FACTS:
Respondent, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Paranas, Samar, courted the complainant and professed his undying love for her.
Relying on respondent's promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him.
She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought
her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she
did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became
depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the
humiliation that she suffered. Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and
claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and fabricated, and were
intended to harass him and destroy his reputation.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be held liable for sexual relations between him and a
woman, both consenting and unmarried adults.
RULING:
No, respondent can not be held liable. The Court defined immoral conduct as
conduct that is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension
or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
In this case, the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or

grossly immoral conduct. It is evident that the sexual relations between the complainant
and the respondent were consensual; they met at the Singles for Christ, started dating
and subsequently became sweethearts; the respondent frequently visited the
complainant at her boarding house and at her parents' residence; the complainant
voluntarily yielded to the respondent; they eventually lived together as husband and wife
in a rented room near the respondent's office; and, continued their relationship even
after the complainant had suffered a miscarriage. The Court has repeatedly held that
voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are
not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor
an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.
23
Case 14
Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan vs. Ernesto C. Quitorio
(A.M. No. P-11-2919, May 31, 2011)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct filed against respondent Ernesto
Quitorio (Quitorio), then the Legal Researcher of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court,
Borongan, Eastern Samar (RTC Branch 2), for drafting a resolution of a motion to
dismiss in a case which was not assigned to him and for informing the favored movant
of the submission of the draft to her, with instructions to follow it up with her. Quitorio
denied having about the draft resolution but he, however, admitted that he conveyed
that he had already submitted the draft resolution to Judge Tan, and "it was up for them
to do whatever they desired under the circumstances” and "to just follow it up with the
judge in her sala in Balangiga, Eastern Samar.” Quitorio also contended that contrary to
due process and the confidentiality required of a proper investigation, Judge Tan
berated, verbally abused, insulted, and grievously humiliated him in the presence of his
officemates and the Executive Judge, and was not afforded the opportunity to explain
himself.
In her reply to Quitorio's comment, Judge Tan countered that the real reason why
Quitorio had not been reporting for work was not his optional retirement but his
suspension from office for three months without pay and with stern warning after having
been found guilty of simple misconduct in an en banc decision. Judge Tan stated that it
was not her practice to confront court employees in front of other people, but in
Quitorio's case she did so to ensure that their conversation would be witnessed by
others because of his propensity for lying and twisting the truth.
ISSUE: WON respondent Legal Researcher of a RTC is guilty of Grave Misconduct for
(1) preparing a draft resolution in a pending case which was not assigned to him, and
(2) informing the respondent in said case about the draft resolution and its submission
with the further advice to follow it up with her.
RULING:
No, respondent is not guilty of Grave Misconduct but his acts constitute Simple
Misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which
24
must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a

charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.
In this case, the Court is hardly convinced that Quitorio prepared the draft
resolution of the motion knowing that the case was not assigned to him. Although both
Judge Tan and Atty. Tavera insist that only special proceedings and appealed cases
were assigned to Quitorio, the evidence, nonetheless, is nebulous. The affidavits of Atty.
Tavera do not categorically state that Civil Case No. 4052 was not assigned to Quitorio.
Neither was there a detailed list of cases assigned to him. The affidavits of Atty. Tavera
only stated that in accordance with the verbal orders of Judge Tan, he assigned to
Quitorio several special proceeding cases and appealed cases from the MTC. Absent
any evidence of corruption, the Court is inclined to believe that the case in question was
inadvertently assigned to Quitorio, and that he believed in good faith that it was indeed
assigned to him for research and drafting. Under the circumstances, this particular act
of Quitorio cannot be considered a misconduct, either grave or simple, as it is not
violative of any established and definite rule of action. On the other hand, Quitorio's
admission that he informed Dadulla about the submission of his draft resolution with
advice to follow it up with Judge Tan in her sala is violative of the confidentiality required
of court personnel in Section 1, Canon II of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Court
Personnel. Quitorio disclosed that a draft resolution had been prepared and submitted,
but did not specify the contents thereof. Furthermore, it was highly improper for Quitorio
to advise Dadulla to personally follow up the draft resolution with Judge Tan at her sala
in Balangiga. Judge Tan could not have taken any action on the case because she was
no longer the Acting Presiding Judge at the time.
Case 15
Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)
FACTS:
Administrative complaints were filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant)
against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2,
Batangas City for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross
Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias
25
and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to

Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the complaint, respondent judge allegedly: (1) appointed a certain lawyer as

rehabilitation receiver despite serious conflict of interest, said lawyer is also a partner of
the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.; (2) conducted informal meetings in
places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e. , a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club
facilities in Metro Manila); (3) the modified rehabilitation plan submitted by the appointed
lawyer is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him; (4) the respondent ordered
that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no
record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB); (5) the respondent had secret
meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge
and presence of SCP and its creditors; (6) the respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas
(Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza's financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial
adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan at
SCP's expense, Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty.
Gabionza's law firm; (7) the respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or
accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB's filing of a motion to create a management
committee; (8) when requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a
subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB's witnesses to prove the allegation that
there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied
SCP's requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute; (9) at the
hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP's counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks; (10) the
respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules), approved the rehabilitation plan beyond
the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the
period from the Supreme Court (SC); (11) interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of
the Rules (the court's power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it; and (12) committed an act of impropriety when she
displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted
her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible
partner, posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
26
ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of: grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality; and lack of circumspection; grave bias
and partiality; grave incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; conduct unbecoming
of a judge; and impropriety.
RULING:
Respondent judge is found guilty of grave incompetence and gross ignorance of
the law, conduct unbecoming of a judge, and impropriety; whereas she is found not
guilty of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and
partiality, and lack of circumspection, grave bias and partiality, and failure to observe the
reglementary period.
(1) The allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of

duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because
the complainant failed to establish the respondent's bad faith, malice or ill will. Unless
the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases. In this case, the complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not
sufficient to prove the accusations. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. (2) As to grave bias and partiality, the Court finds that it cannot be determined
by simply relying on the complainant's verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and
rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough. In the present case, aside from being speculative
and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on
mere opinion and surmises. (3) To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough
that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties
is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that
it amounted to bad faith. In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error
in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare
accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof.
Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened
27
when none was actually proven. (4) As to the conduct unbecoming of a judge, a judge
should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole.
Section 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges shall maintain order
and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous
in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. In this case, the respondent's unnecessary bickering with SCP's legal
counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses,
her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court
cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code
abhors. (5) On the complaint of impropriety, Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary. This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of
their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives.
In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities: Section 1,
judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities;
Section 2, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Based on this provision, the respondent
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted
Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made
this available for public viewing.
Case 16
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan
(A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, 639 SCRA 254, January 12, 2011)
FACTS:
This is a case against Judge Costales and his Branch Clerk of Court for
inefficient management of their court records and caseload. The OCA conducted a
judicial audit of the caseload in view of the compulsory retirement of Judge Costales.
The judicial audit team reported that RTC Branch 45's caseload totaled 465 cases (i.e. ,
28
197 civil cases and 268 criminal cases). Respondent judge also did nothing on the issue
where only two of his court personnels were present on a particular day of the judicial
audit. In the findings of the judicial audit, the OCA found irregularities in the respondent
judge’s case records.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge can be held liable for the inefficient management of his
court records and caseload.
RULING:
Yes, respondent judge is liable for the inefficient management of his court
records and caseload. Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges
shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations. An
orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious
disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of
courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court
records, which will be the bases for rendering the judgments and dispositions, and the
review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete,
updated, and current.
In this case, the mismanagement included the following, to wit: (a) some case
records bore no dates of receipt by the branch; (b) several case records did not contain
the latest court actions and court processes taken; (c) action had not been taken in
some cases from the time of their filing; (d) the case record of Criminal Case No.
U-12848 had not been immediately transmitted to the Office of the Prosecutor, despite
the transmittal having been ordered as early as January 19, 2005; (e) some cases had
not been set for further hearing, or had had no further actions taken on them; (f) the
issuances of summonses and alias summonses by the Branch Clerk of Court had been
delayed despite the corresponding orders for that purpose; (g) action had not been
taken on cases set for ex parte reception of evidence; and (h) Criminal Case No.
U-13095 had been set for trial with respect to one of the accused who had not been
arraigned.
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Case 17
Gacad vs. Judge Clapis
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Criselda C. Gacad against Judge Clapis for Grave
Misconduct among others. Judge Clapis allegedly received ₱50,000 as bribe to deny
the Motion for Reinvestigation made by a particular lawyer in a criminal case. Further,
Judge Clapis borrowed ₱50,000 from complainant but the latter failed to produce the
₱50,000. From then on, Judge Clapis began to "play different hideous schemes" to
prejudice their case i.e., set hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010, and 1
March 2010 however, the Notices for Hearings were mailed only on 1 March 2010 and
were received by Gacad only on 3 March 2010. To bolster her case of corruption
against Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted her previous encounter with Judge Clapis and
Arafol (provincial prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 6251 against her brother. According
to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they give Judge Clapis the ₱80,000 cash bond posted
in the case so that her brother's case could be dismissed; after conceding to Arafol's
proposal, Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite the strong evidence against
her brother.
ISSUE: WON the act of meeting a litigant in a case pending before the judge’s sala
constitute gross misconduct in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, the act of meeting a litigant in a case pending before the judge’s sala
constitute gross misconduct in violation of Section 1 and 2 of Canon 2, Section 2 and 4
of Canon 3, and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior in connection with one's performance of official functions and duties. For grave
or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired
by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
Judge Clapis' wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by
the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to Gacad only
after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an
application for bail and granted bail without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary
30
conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of
speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to
his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order
and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge's
responsibility. Therefore, Judge Hilarion P. Clapis is rightfully dismissed from service for
Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Case 18
Tobias vs. Judge Limsiaco
(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011)
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Florenda V. Tobias against respondent Judge Manuel
Q. Limsiaco, Jr., for alleged corruption by offering "package deals" to litigants who plan
to file cases in his court. She stated that court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero
allegedly proposed that for the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would provide the
lawyer, prepare the necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the
ejectment case which they contemplated to file. It was made clear that they would not
get any judicial relief from their squatter problem unless they accepted the package
deal. During the investigation, complainant admitted that respondent did not personally
receive from her the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the alleged package deal,
and respondent did not ask from her an additional P10,000.00. Nevertheless,
Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged offer of package deals by
respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to
prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases and
respondent's act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo
to be improper and unethical.
ISSUE: WON the acts of talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a
lawyer to the litigant, and preparing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for a particular
lawyer constitutes acts unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, the acts committed by the judge is violative of Section 1 of Canon 2
(Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The acts of respondent
31
constitute gross misconduct. "Misconduct" means a transgression of some established

and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. "Gross" has
been defined as "out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
conduct as is not to be excused."
In the case at bar, respondent's act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw the
Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so doing,
respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his
court, considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala and was acted upon by
him. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a
serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 11, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, the sanctions against a respondent guilty of a serious charge
may be Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00. Judge Limsiaco is fined in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00)
Case 19
Chan vs. Judge Madajucon
(A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, October 15, 2003)
FACTS:
These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and inefficiency
filed against respondent Jose S. Majaducon. Respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon
was accused by a "concerned citizen" in an undated letter of "not wearing a black robe
during court sessions, and of being habitually late." Eugenio K. Chan, the complainant
in a different complaint accused the respondent judge of engaging in "acts of
improprieties and irregularities," and according to the complainant, the respondent
judge begins his sessions at 10:00 in the morning and 2:30–3:00 in the afternoon; does
not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court; entertains lawyers in
his sala even while the opposing attorney is not there; continued to hear cases despite
appearing to be unbiased; despite the fact that her daughter works at the defendant
bank, he insists on hearing the case; and already received a reprimand from the
Honorable Supreme Court, and he is the subject of unfavorable press coverage. The
Respondent Judge then asserts that the Complainant may have sought to retaliate
32
against him for his reluctance to inhibit himself from a case. Additionally, the respondent
judge has reason to believe that the complainant's Attorney, Atty. Fontanilla, is the
"concerned citizen" who made the anonymous complaint against him.
ISSUE: WON the judge violated the Rule on Judicial Conduct, particularly Canon 2,
Rules 1.01 and 2.01.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Jose S. Majaducon is guilty of violating Canon 2, Rules 1.01 and 2.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2, Rules 1.01 and 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, and behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Administrative Circular No. 25 mandates that all
Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of their
respective Courts.
The respondent judge is seeking exculpation from administrative liability for his
non-compliance with Circular No. 25 due to his illness. However, the wearing of robes
by judges during official proceedings, which dates back to the 14th century, is not an
idle ceremony. It serves two purposes: to heighten public consciousness on the
solemnity of judicial proceedings and to impress upon the judge the exacting obligations
of his office. Therefore, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals
of competence and integrity his robe represents, but also to wear one in the first place.
Case 20
Dawa vs. Judge De Asa
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998)
FACTS:
Respondent, Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting
executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged with
"sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-complaint filed by Floride
Dawa, Feminina Lazaro-Barreto, and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Floride alleged that while on
her way to the ladies toilet, she had seen respondent talking with a man at the backdoor
of his chamber and when she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her
shoulder and led her into his chamber. Another complainant, from Jorgensen, who was
a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office
33
of the Clerk of Court, MeTC, Caloocan City, alleged that she had gone to the office of
the respondent for the purpose of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges
wherein, upon entering the respondent's office, the latter approached her and suddenly
kissed her on the cheek. The third complainant, named Feminina Lazaro-Barreto, a
thirty-year-old married woman, alleged that while bringing a final draft of a case to the
respondent’s office to get his signature, Judge de Asa held her chin and kissed her, then
kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying, "Sigue na, Nina. Okay na."
ISSUE: WON Judge Armando C. De Asa violated Canon 2, of the Code of Judicial
Ethics.
RULING:
Yes. Judge Armando C. De Asa violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics,
which states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are
required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. It is essential that a
judge's personal behavior be free from the appearance of impropriety to be beyond
reproach.
In the case at bar, the Court found the temerity of the respondent judge in
subjecting complainants to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness
unacceptable. His abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
constitute sexual harassment resulting in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employees. The respondent has moral ascendancy and authority
over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. The
Court concluded with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency,
morality, and propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, his gross
misconduct warrants his removal from office.
34
Case 21
Anonymous vs. Judge Achas
(A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013)
FACTS:
The case herein involves an anonymous letter-complaint which alleges
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against Judge Rio C. Achas, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental. The
letter calls on the Court to investigate the morality of Judge Achas, alleging that he is
living with a woman who is not his wife, living beyond his means, engaging in illegal
activities, coming to court untidy and dirty, making decisions unfairly in exchange for
material and monetary consideration, and engaging in cockfighting and gambling.
Judge Achas denied all the allegations against him and claimed that they were hatched
to harass him, pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local candidates
who lost during the May 2010 elections. Respondent however, admitted later on that he
was married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he
reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his
forefathers.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Rio C. Achas is guilty of immorality and conducts
unbecoming of a Judge.
RULING:
Yes, the respondent Judge is guilty of immorality and conduct unbecoming of a
judge. However, due to insufficiency of evidence, he is only reprimanded, admonished
not to socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts, and fined. Under Section 1 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they
must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Thus, for anonymous
complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with
the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is
sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The

complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth during the
investigation. However, for going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas
has clearly failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Whereas regarding his involvement in cockfighting, he
35
reared fighting cocks for leisure, having inherited the practice from his forefathers. While
gamecocks are bred and kept primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he goes to
cockpits and gambles. However, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a
judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. Thus, there
being no sufficient proof, respondent is sternly warned that repetition of the same acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Case 22
Spouses Causin vs. Judge Demecillo
FACTS:
Florencio and Esther Causin filed an administrative complaint against Regional
Trial Court Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo, Branch 24 of Cagayan de Oro City, for bias
and partiality, violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision. The plaintiffs claim that Judge Lim attended the hearings in the case,
cross-examined the witnesses, interposed objections, chose the hearing dates, and
delivered oral arguments without special authority from the Court. The respondent judge
extended unwarranted consideration to the plaintiffs by waiting for the arrival of Judge
Lim in court, transferring a scheduled hearing in the morning to the afternoon, and
setting the hearings based solely on the convenience of Judge Lim. Demecillo argued
that he allowed Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs as he presumed they
had sought prior authority from the Court and that under Section 21, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly
Canon 2, rules 2.01 and 2.03
RULING:
Yes, the respondent judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01 states that a judge should behave at all times to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Rule 2.03
states that a judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence
36
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used to advance
the private interests of others.
The case at the bar revealed that the respondent judge allowed Judge Lim to
actively participate and intervene in the case for quieting of title, without authority from
the Court. Under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to
be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. Therefore, the
respondent Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo has meted the penalty of a fine in the amount
of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Rule 2.03 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, with a stern warning that a repetition of similar infractions
shall be dealt with more severely.
Case 23
Seludo vs. Judge Fineza
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004)
FACTS:
In a complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Antonio
D. Seludo, the complainant, charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza, respondent, with
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct alleging that the
respondent judge filed a complaint for revocation of notarial commission against him,
and during a hearing, the respondent judge uttered "vulgar and insulting words" against
him. The respondent judge admitted to uttering derogatory words but explained that he
had been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes causing him anxiety and pain. The
incident was precipitated by the conduct of the complainant and the Executive Judge.
The complainant was unkind and impolite to the respondent, interrupting him and
laughing at him. When the respondent asked the Executive Judge to cite the
complainant in contempt of court, the complainant acted in a menacing manner.
Respondent admitted in his answer that there is no justification for his use of improper
language, and is sincerely contrite and penitent. He expected the complainant to
respect him, treat him with politeness, dignity, and courtesy, and give him his due as a
magistrate.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge Antonio J. Fineza violated Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
37
Yes, the respondent Judge violated: Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that a judge should uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary; and rule 1.01 of Canon 1 which states that a judge should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence. In Fidel vs. Caraos, the Court held that
although the respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty,
his noble position on the bench still demands courteous speech in and out of the court.
The respondent judge's behavior was incompatible with the judicial temperament
expected of him, and he was discourteous, not only to the complainant but also to the
trial judge. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of official duties but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid","if he knows how to read

English" and "putang ina mo" to the complainant during the proceeding before the
Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming of a magistrate. The
remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent was
suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the
assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. As correctly observed
by the Court Administrator, his disgraceful behavior tainted the good image of the
judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.” Respondent judge's behavior is
incompatible with the judicial temperament expected of him. He was discourteous, not
only to the complainant, but also to the trial judge. His actuation constitutes a palpable
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Case 24
Dr. Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga
(A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, August 17, 2015)
FACTS:
Complainants and Respondent Judge are siblings of full blood being the children
of the late Narciso and Rosario Paderanga in the following order: Complainant Dulce;
Complainant Dra. Amor; Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr. (Narciso Jr.); Respondent Judge;
and Complainant Carmen. Corazon. Dra. Corazon alleges that the Respondent Judge
38
took advantage of his powerful position and unjustly enriched himself by encroaching on
Lot 12910 and that she and the Respondent Judge agreed to share equally on Lot
9817, with his share designated as Lot 12910-B and her shares designated as Lots
12910 and 12912. According to the Subdivision Sketch Plan, Lot 12910 belongs to her,
but the Respondent Judge fence and introduced improvements without her consent or
approval. The Respondent judge denies that he advised, coached, and sided with
Narciso, Jr. in filing cases against his sisters, and that he did not settle or mediate the
disputes between his siblings. Narciso, Jr. claims to have personally gone to his brother
Narciso, Jr. in Cagayan de Oro to dissuade him from pursuing the cases he filed against
Dra. Corazon and discuss a possible settlement; witness Narciso, Jr. confirmed that the
latter went to his house in Cagayan de Oro and asked him to drop the cases he filed
against complainant Dra. Corazon.
ISSUE: WON the following acts of the respondent judge Rustico Paderanga violated
Canon 3, Section 5, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING:
Yes, the respondent violated Canon 3, Section 5, of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Conduct
unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, is penalized by a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00, or censure, or reprimand, or admonition with a warning.
Based on the findings of Justice Del Castillo, the appropriation of Lot 12910 by
the respondent was really prejudicial to Dra. Corazon because he erected a fence
around the property and introduced improvements thereon without the conformity of the
latter. He did so at a time when he was still an active member of the Bench, and despite
knowing that he was expected to uphold the legal rights of others in their exclusive
property, whether the rights were under litigation in his court or elsewhere. Such
conduct on his part was unbecoming of any judge like him. He thereby disregarded the
sworn obligation of every judge to observe respect for the rights of others at all times if
he expected others to respect the courts and its judges, as well as the Judiciary as an
institution. His failure in this regard merited him the condign administrative penalty.
39
Case 25
Castillo, et al. vs. Judge Juan
(62 SCRA 124, January 28, 1975)
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are two young maidens who were victims in 2 separate rape
cases. They assail the actuations of Judge Juan and seek his disqualification on the
ground of bias and prejudice. According to the petitioners, in 2 separate occasions, in
the secrecy of his chambers he informed petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the
likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that
it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to
have such accused indemnify them. These conversations, to which according to him as
an act of “charity,” took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its
evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge’s act of giving advice constitute violation of the
requirement of cold neutrality of an impartial judge
RULING:
Yes, the respondent Judge acted inappropriately and should thus be desisted
from further conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape. Gutierrez v. Santos
held cold neutrality of an impartial judge as follows: the due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge; thus, it must be obvious to
the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication
requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of
reaching an unjust decision at a minimum.
Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did because any monetary
settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their straitened financial
circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that, according to his best
lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct
cannot be said to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Even before they had been fully heard, they were told that their cases
were weak. They could very well conclude then that there was a prejudgment. Thus,
after the conferences, the offended parties could not longer be expected to have faith in
his impartiality.
40
Case 26
Oktubre vs. Judge Velasco
(A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, 434 SCRA 636, July 22, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and
Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Jordan P. Oktubre against Judge Ramon P. Velasco
(respondent Judge) wherein Oktubre is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise DArcy
who is the widow of Abraham Paler (Abraham),Judge Velasco is Abraham’s nephew.
Right after the death of Abraham, he left his four-storey commercial and residential
building in Maasin City unsettled; herewith, DArcy assumed the administration of the
said building together with the respondent who owns a room reserved for the family of
Abraham and so respondent judge wanted to extend his stay in the said room, however,
DArcy declined such proposal.
According to Oktubre, DArcy’s refusal to grant extension to Judge Velasco’s stay

triggered the respondent to act improperly, one of which is when Judge Velasco sent a
strongly worded letter to DArcy with the purpose of intimidating the latter. The letter
contains: (1) categorical declarations that he is taking over possession of the building,
(2) misrepresentation among others of Judge Velasco that he did it in collaboration with
his other relatives, (3) legal arguments, and (4) mostly intimidating words coming from a
Judge-Lawyer and worse; he used his offices (MTC) letterhead for this personal but
threatening letter. After the attempt of the parties to mediate, Oktubre narrated that a
Chief of Police confronted him with a warrant of arrest showing that he was charged
with Robbery in relation to the wheel he removed from the jeep and it was issued/signed
by Judge Velasco.
ISSUE: WON Judge Velasco is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Grave Abuse of Authority which is a violation to several Canons in the Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes, Rule 3.12 of the Code (Rule 3.12), which is substantially similar to Rule 137,
Section 1 (Rule 137, Section 1) of the 1964 Rules of Court, mandates that a judge
should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. More so, Canon 2, Rule 2.03 (Rule 2.03) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Code) provides: a judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment
41
Considering that respondent Judge is the complainant of the cases, his issuance
of the warrant of arrest is in violation of Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Sec.
37 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. Having resorted to such act, he acted as the private
complainant, xxx judge and executioner. It was also noted that in the letters sent to the
tenants of the Paler Building and to Dr. [DArcy], respondent Judge used the letter head
of his Office Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte and signed the same as its
Presiding Judge. This constitutes undue influence. Thus, he is liable for grave
misconduct and grave abuse of authority.
Case 27
Judge Tabora vs. Judge Carbonell
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145, June 18, 2010)
FACTS:
The complainant herein Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora was supposed to render a
decision for Civil Case No.6840, however, due to her prolonged absence due to serious
illness, Tabilusa (plaintiff of the Civil Case) filed a motion for the respondent, Judge
Carbonell, to handle her case, hence the respondent took over the case and handled
the hearing. Later on, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by
Judge Carbonell so she requested for a copy of the decision, but, despite several
requests, refused upon the alleged instruction of Judge Tabora, who at that time had
already reported back to work.
Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse to Tabisula which made
the latter to file this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and deliberately
changing, altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a court of equal and
concurrent jurisdiction.
In her comment, Judge Tabora stated that she carefully studied the entire records
of the case and found out that Judge Carbonell’s decision was not in accordance with
the facts of the case and the applicable law and appeared to have unjustly favored
Tabisula and that the OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of
Judge Carbonell since he overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge for
Branch 26 and has shown unusual interest in the disposition of Civil Case No. 6840.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is guilty of the violation of Canon 3 of Code of Judicial
Conduct.
RULING:
42
Yes, respondent is guilty of the violation of Section 2 Canon 3 of Code of Judicial

Conduct which provides that: impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the
judicial office, it applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made; judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the
conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a matter of
judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by reasoning that
the act of filing a decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of
judgment or promulgation. We find this explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had
no authority to render a decision on the subject civil case. As clearly laid down in
Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge shall take cognizance of all cases until the
assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and
performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have rendered
a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.
Case 28
Hilado, et al. vs. Judge Reyes
(G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006)
FACTS:
Julita Campos Benedicto (Julita), the surviving spouse of Roberto S. Benidicto
(Roberto) petitioned for the issuing of letters of administration for the latter’s Intestate
Estate, to the respondent judge, Judge Amor Reyes (Reyes), whose court granted such
a motion. Herein petitioners, had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed two complaints
for damages or collection of sums of money, against Roberto Benedicto et al.
Petitioners’ counsel requested to allow Atty Paredes, an associate of the petitioner’s
counsel to personally check the records of the case, but was denied upon instruction of
the judge that only parties or those with authority from parties are allowed to inquire and
verify the status of the case.
ISSUE: WON the denial of access to the records by the judge constitute dereliction of
duty and manifest partiality in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING:
Yes, the denial of access to the records by the judge constitutes dereliction of
duty and manifest partiality in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. As long as
43
any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records
and pays court fees, a court may not deny access to such records. Petitioners' stated
main purpose for accessing the records - to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g. The
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of
an annual accounting - appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum
of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome of
the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec.
2 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being
"interested persons" who have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records
of the case. Public respondent is ordered to allow petitioners to access, examine, and
obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the records of Special Proceeding.
Case 29
Borromeo-Garcia vs. Judge Pagayatan
FACTS:
Complaint herein Cita Borromeo-Garcia claims that, among all else, respondent
keeps a mistress, Elsa Aguirre (Elsa), Borromeo, Jr.’s former wife, which could explain
the swift decision in favor of Borromeo, Jr in a land dispute. Elsa wielded power in the
RTC, as acting clerk of court and sheriff, even though she is not a lawyer together with
Asst. Prosecutor Luduvico Salcedo, also acted as respondent’s bagman.
The accusations that Elsa is a mistress was dismissed due to it being a mere
hearsay, however, when asked during the investigation why Elsa, who is the ex-wife of
the petitioner therein, Borromeo, Jr., was designated to receive evidence ex parte in SP
No. R-936, when she was not the acting Branch Clerk of Court, but the acting Clerk of
Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court(OCC), respondent only answered that it had
been their practice to refer ex parte proceedings to the acting clerk of court of the OCC
and not to the acting branch clerk of court, because such proceedings were simple.
According to him, the branch clerk of court had too much work, while those in the OCC
had lesser load; and the respondent also said that he didn’t see any conflict with the fact
that Elsa was the ex-wife of petitioner in S.P. No. R-936, Borromeo, Jr.
44
ISSUE: WON respondent judge violated several Canons in New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary
RULING:
Yes, respondent judge violated several Canons in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary, particularly Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, and Section 1.
Canon 3, Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Lower court judges, such as respondents, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the
people’s faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial
branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do
business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them.
Respondent judge explained that his OIC Branch Clerk of Court Asuncion
Pabellano was busy, hence, unable to conduct the ex parte reception of evidence.
Under the circumstances what respondent judge should have done was to dispense
with the ex parte reception of evidence and to conduct the hearing himself instead of
appointing the OIC Clerk of Court. This would have avoided any appearance of
partiality. All other accusations of the complainant were dismissed due to lack of
competent evidence, however, he is guilty for violating the aforementioned canons.
Case 30
Sy vs. Judge Dinopol
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011)
FACTS:
This is involving a matter wherein Judge Oscar E. Dinopol should have inhibited
himself from further acting on the case on the ground that he received a call, on April
12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf
of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003) from a ranking personnel of the
OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs; that he claimed that he wanted to avoid being
charged with partiality, but, either way he acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed
mortgage against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts,
45
Inc., and/or Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas,
docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24; assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City,
presided by Judge Dinopol in which he granted the petition and thereafter issued the
Writ of Possession.
Moreso, when Sy found out that Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No.
1440-24, a matter closely intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24, hence, the former
claimed that in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in
Judge Dinopol's sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of
construction materials to be used in the construction of the judge’s house and aside
from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from him on various
occasions including the judge borrowing his multi cab.
Judge Dinopol admitted the commodity loans for his house's construction
supplies, but stated that it was before the matter was on his sala and also rejected the
financial loans and the use of the multicab.
ISSUE: WON Judge Oscar E. Dinopol is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming a Member of

the Judiciary for serious impropriety.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming a Member
of the Judiciary for serious impropriety. Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in
relation to a judge’s impartiality provides, inter alia, as follows: judges shall ensure that
his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the
judiciary.
In the case at bar, Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received
accommodations from Sy for the building materials he needed for the construction of his
house. He compromised his position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family
had business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the businessman,
he should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The
sphere of Sy’s business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA
aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court
with the complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and financial
dealings with the complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in
deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court.
46
Case 31
Catbagan vs. Judge Barte
(A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, April 6, 2005)
FACTS:
Editha Catbagan filed an administrative complaint against Respondent Judge
Barte for alleged grave and serious misconduct. The case essentially stemmed from the
failure of Judge Barte to honor their verbal agreement about the share of commissions
regarding the sale of certain properties. Instead of pursuing the claim of Catbagan
through a civil suit, she instead pursued an administrative case against Judge Barte.
Judge Barte denied the charge against him and asked for the dismissal of the
administrative case. Judge Barte argued that there was ambiguity in the charge of grave
and serious misconduct in the complaint and conduct unbecoming of a judge and
because of this confusion, he was deprived of his right to be informed of the real charge
against him and Judge Barte further contended that the allegations were baseless and
designed merely to harass and dishonor him. In its report, the OCA found Judge Barte
not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct; additionally, the OCA also noted another administrative case filed
against Judge Barte involving the same transaction as the one in the complaint filed by
Catbagan.
ISSUE: WON Judge Barte violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and should be held
administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Barte violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and should be held
administratively liable. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should
manage investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases
giving grounds for disqualification. In this case, by allowing himself (Judge Barte) to act
as an agent in the sale of the properties, Judge Barte increased the possibility of his
disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of sale arose.
Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale might have appeared before his
court was not remote and his business dealings with them would have then created
doubt about his fairness and impartiality.
47
In this case, the Court explained that although every office in the government is a
public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness
of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice. In consideration of the other administrative case against Judge Barte, the Court
is compelled to impose a heavier penalty of suspension instead of a fine as
recommended by the OCA.
Case 32
Atty. Conrado B. Gandeza, Jr. vs. Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin
(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, July 25, 2011)
FACTS:
Atty. Conrado Gandeza filed an administrative case against Judge Tabin for
gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge. The complaint stemmed from a
car collision between the car owned by the wife of Atty. Gandeza and the car of the
nephew of Judge Tabin. Complainant alleged that Judge Tabin acted inappropriately
during the time of the accident especially when the result of the alcoholic breath
examination of the driver of Atty. Gandeza turned out to be negative by asking for
another test which then resulted to positive, and attendance of Judge Tabin in the
scheduled mediation of the criminal case filed against the driver of Atty. Gandeza. In his
defense, Judge Tabin disputed and denied the allegations of Atty. Gandeza.
ISSUE: WON Judge Tabin violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Tabin violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 4, Section of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. In this case, it was inappropriate for
Judge Tabin to direct that a second test be conducted on Atty Gandeza's driver when
the first test resulted in a "negative." As a result of her interference, Atty. Gandeza
suspected that Judge Tabin was influencing the outcome of the investigation as
evidenced by the alleged statement of Atty. Gandeza: "Itong ospital na ito, pwede
palang impluwensyahan ng huwes." Even assuming that respondent Judge did not
make public her position as a judge to the examining doctor or the investigating
policeman, the fact that she knew that said police officer and the complainant had
48
knowledge of her being a judge should have refrained her from further interfering in the
investigation. She should have kept herself free from any appearance of impropriety
and endeavored to distance herself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum.
Judge Tabin's act of borrowing court records and accompanying her sister at the
PMC under the guise of extending assistance to her sister, manifested not only lack of
maturity as a judge, but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial
dispenser of justice. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but
sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to
unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical examination
as well as the investigation in their favor. Although Judge Tabin has concern over the
safety of her nephew and the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she
should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity
of the court. The Court teaches here that concern for family members is deeply
ingrained in the Filipino culture, Judge Tabin should bear in mind that he is also called
upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Judge
Tabin, therefore, violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and is guilty of impropriety.
Case 33
Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al.
(A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010)
FACTS:
Jasmani-Rodriguez, complainant herein, is an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in
the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the Office of the Ombudsman. She filed an
affidavit-complaint to charge the Respondent, who are Justices of the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan with (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public
documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and
gross ignorance of the law. Jasmani-Rodriguez alleged that by not acting as a collegial
body, Respondent Justices not only contravened the procedure required by law, but
also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it appear that
they had all been present during the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.
Also, Jasmani-Rodriguez alleged that Respondent Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
made intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings as they asked lawyers
from which law schools they had graduated, and that Justice Ong inquired whether the
49
law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated
was better than his alma mater; and at one time, Justice Hernandez discourteously
shouted at a who was observing a trial from the gallery. Although admitting that they
tried the cases for hearing among themselves, they emphasized that they had
nonetheless ensured that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three members of the
Division were present in the same courtroom or venue, thereby preserving the collegial
nature of the Division as required by law; second, the members of the Division were
within hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily
confer with each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases
separately being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the
arrangement, and thus could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given
their full assent, based on the equitable principle of estoppel.
ISSUE: WON Respondent Justices are guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
RULING:
Yes, Respondent Justices are guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. The
Supreme Court teaches that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court and that in a
collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule, which call
for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a
quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings. Further, Section 6, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges
shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. In this case, the exclusion or absence of any
member of a Division from the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings
negates the existence of a quorum and precludes collegiality. It is simply not enough
that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight,
because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. However,
although the Court takes cognizance of the flaw in the procedural requirement
mandated by law, the Court did not consider the signing of the orders issued during the
flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty.
On the second allegation or issue, the Court explained that publicizing

professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain
law schools, no matter how prestigious, revealed on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Such conduct is contrary to their
50
duty to avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their courts. With regard to the issue of impartiality,
the Court dismissed the case. Finally the Court reminds that judges, in performing their
judicial duties, should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any
person or group on irrelevant grounds. Public confidence in the judicial system and in
the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern
democratic society; hence, it is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and
maintain confidence in the judicial system. In line with the foregoing, the Justices were
found guilty of improper or unbecoming conduct and were fined, warned, and
admonished respectively.
Case 34
Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila vs. Judge Veneracion
(A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, 488 SCRA 285, April 26, 2006)
FACTS:
Complainant trial lawyers herein filed an administrative case against Judge
Veneracion for alleged misconduct and tardiness as presiding judge in an RTC in
Manila. The trial lawyers alleged that: (1) Judge Veneracion is reluctant in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage despite the merit of the case and instead
lecture litigants in open court that the declaration of nullity of marriage was not the
proper remedy; (2) Lawyers were often embarrassed by his emphasis on legal
technicalities allegedly designed to prevent them from presenting evidence in favor of
their clients; (3) that Complainants were often harassed whenever respondent would
force them to read and interpret verses from the Bible; (4) The fact that a number of
cases for declaration of nullity of marriage assigned to respondent judge's sala were
later withdrawn allegedly proved their claim; and (5) they assailed that respondent
judge's habitual tardiness caused the delay in the disposition of cases assigned to him.
In his reply, Judge Veneracion denied the allegation and asked the Court to allow him to
avail of optional retirement in case it is found that his actuation violated his
responsibilities as a judge. Judge Veneracion argued that his branch was designated to
try family, tax, and heinous cases hence there was a lot of cases misfiled due to lack of
personnel; (2) that he suffered mild stroke which affected his handwriting and could not
take notes while hearing the cases; (3) and that the reading of Bible verses was meant
to share the word of God with those who came before his court.
51
ISSUE: WON Judge Veneracion be held administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Veneracion should be held administratively liable. Section 5, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that Judges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness and that Section 6, Canon 4 of the same provides that Judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly,
but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as
to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary. In this case, the fact that no additional personnel were assigned to the branch
of Judge Veneracion despite its additional assignments does not justify misfiling of case
records.Respondent judge was expected to keep his own record of cases so that he
could act thereon without undue delay. He ought to have devised an efficient recording
and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness could affect the flow of cases and
their speedy disposition; because proper and efficient court management was his
responsibility. With regard to his medical condition, had Judge Veneracion filed with the
Court proper application to grant him additional time to decide the cases beyond the
three-month period, the Court would have granted it. But Judge Veneracion failed to do
so; hence, he should be held accountable for that.
In the issue of Judge Veneracion’s practice of reading Bible verses, the Court
explained judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as long as it does not
interfere with their judicial functions and Judge Veneracion's practice of reading verses
from the Bible during hearings was an exercise of his religious freedom. Here was no
compulsion involved whenever Judge Veneracion asked the litigants whether they read
the Bible or not. He did not impose his religious convictions on them but merely
suggested the benefits of reading the Bible and that practice alone is not sufficient to
hold Judge Veneracion guilty of misconduct. Although Judge Veneracion already retired,
it did not render the case moot and academic. In line with the foregoing, Judge
Veneracion is held administratively liable only for gross inefficiency.
52
Case 35
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SAN and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae
of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary
(A.M. No. 09-86-SC, 672 SCRA 27, June 13, 2012)
FACTS:
Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ and Karol Ilagan, a
researcher-writer of PCIJ also, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of this Court
for the year 2008 andalso for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the
Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their
database of information on government officials. The two requests were thereafter
consolidated and a special committee was created to review the request.
ISSUE: WON the SALN and PDS of justices be accessed and be disclosed.
RULING:
Yes, the SALN and PDS of justices can be accessed and be disclosed. Section
7, Article 3 of the Constitution provides for the right of the people to information and
such right with its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While
providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the people’s right to
know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. In this case, the Court explained that jurisprudence has
provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters;
and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information
officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made
available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet
meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. This means that while no prohibition could stand
against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to
regulation. The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the
possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal
information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not
concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking
access to the records.
Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis-à-vis the various requests made, the
Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of
the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the
53
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and
regulations, and in the guidelines set forth. The guidelines are the following: (1) all
requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts,
with the Office of the Court Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their
respective heads of offices; (2) requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN,
PDS and CV of the members, officials and employees of the Judiciary, and may cover
only previous records if so specifically requested and considered as justified, as
determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of these
guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713; (3) in the
case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose
shall be made by the Court En Banc; (4) every request shall explain the requesting
party’s specific purpose and their individual interests sought to be served; shall state the
commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and shall be
submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use
of the information secured shall only be for the stated purpose; (5) in the case of
requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go
beyond pure or mere curiosity; (6) in the case of the members of the media, the request
shall additionally be supported by proof under oath of their media affiliation and by a
similar certification of the accreditation of their respective organizations as legitimate
media practitioners; and (7) the requesting party, whether as individuals or as members
of the media, must have no derogatory record of having misused any requested
information previously furnished to them.
Case 36
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al.
(A.M. No. MTJ 07-1691, April 2, 2013)
FACTS:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a memorandum of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). According to information obtained, certain package fees
were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages,
prompting the judicial audit team established by the OCA to make a report on the
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.
Thereafter, in order to confirm, a female and male lawyer of the audit team went
54
undercover as a couple looking to get married and they went to the Palace of Justice
whereby they were directed by the guard on-duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a
certain "Meloy"; and inside, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the
female lawyer. After which, the female lawyer made an inquiry about expediting the
marriage ceremony and Helen said that it may be performed immediately the next day,
but the marriage certificate wouldn't be dated until the day the marriage license
becomes available; provided that the expedited process is in consideration for the
amount of P3,000.00. After the investigation of the judicial audit team, the OCA
conducted its investigation and recommended the dismissal, suspension and
admonishment of some of the respondents, respectively.
ISSUE: WON the judges of the MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, judges of the MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the law ,
gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct. The Canon 2 and 6 of
the Code of Judicial Ethics provide that integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges and that
competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. In
this case, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the
requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character
because most of the documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. The
marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing[ or payment by batches was made for
marriages performed on different dates. Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also
solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners
submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the
certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in
scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance and any
irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract
marriage.
Also, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross
ignorance of the law with respect to the marriages they solemnized wherein legal
55
impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. And
that there were positive testimonies that were given regarding the solemnization of
marriages of some couples where no marriage license was previously issued or
acquired by the contracting parties and that they were made to fill up the application for
a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized. All of these conduct shows
that the Respondent Judges are in disregard of the requirements of the law and did
grossly immoral conduct which taints the image and confidence of the judiciary towards
the public. As a consequence therewith, the Respondent judges are found guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed
from service.
Case 37
Jill M. Tormis vs. Judge Paredes
(A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015)
FACTS:
Jill Tormis charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct alleging that when she
was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Review at Southwestern University in Cebu
City, Judge Paredes included her mother Judge Rosabella Tormis, who was involved in
the marriage scams in Cebu City and her brother in a class discussion. In this case, it
must be noted that at the time of the statement of Judge Paredes, the case regarding
the marriage scams were still pending; which Jill raised as a violation of the subjudice
rule on the part of Judge Paredes. Judge Paredes denied the accusations and alleged
that the complaint was just a way of Judge Tormis, using Jill, to get back at him. Jill
refuted the accusation of Judge Paredes.
ISSUE: WON Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is
before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect
the fair trial of any person or issue. The same code also provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. In this case, the
Court first clarified that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and
Francis, made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, cannot be considered as
56
“misconduct” as they are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave
misconduct.
On the other hand, Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when Judge
Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision
on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could
not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. The publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained
license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes in using
intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, shows that he failed to observe the
propriety required by the Code and when Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and
included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances which had no relevance
to the topic that was then being discussed in class strongly indicate his intention to taint
their reputations. In line with the foregoing, Judge Paredes is guilty and administratively
liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge.
Case 38
Atty. Santos vs. Judge Bernardo
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1670, 559 SCRA 310, July 23, 2008)
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against respondent MTC Judge Lauro Bernardo
for his alleged impropriety, manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion, and
gross ignorance of the law/procedure relative to Criminal Case No. 06-004.
Complainant alleges, in regards to Impropriety: Respondent is using government
resources in the discharge of his functions for his personal pleasure and convenience;
for Manifest Bias and Partiality: Respondent committed manifest bias and partiality
when he allowed the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-004 for Grave Coercion against the
complainants because it was his chance to get back at Atty. Santos against whom he is
harboring a grudge after the latter moved for his inhibition in Criminal Case Nos. 04-430
and 04-572; For Grave Abuse of Discretion and Unfaithfulness to the Law: Respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion when instead of conducting a preliminary
investigation after the filing of the complaint to find probable cause to hold complainants
herein for trial, respondent immediately signed the criminal complaint upon its filing and
57
ordered that the case be set for "preliminary hearing." Respondent filed his Comment
arguing in the main that the charges against him are hearsay, without factual and legal
basis, and are a malicious imputation upon his person; and that the acts stated in the
complaint were based solely on the bare allegations of the complainants as no
corroborative statements of witnesses were presented to prove the same.
ISSUE: WON respondent complied with the procedural rules so elementary that to
digress from them amounts to ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and basic rules of
procedure. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is
expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. In order for liability to attach
for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but most importantly it
must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like
motive.
In the case at bar, there is no merit in respondent's supposition that Grave

Coercion is an offense not subject to preliminary investigation. The need for a
preliminary investigation under Sec. 1 in relation to Sec. 8 of Rule 112 of the Rules
depends upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged in the complaint or
information filed and not upon the imposable penalty for the offense which may be
found to have been committed by the accused after a preliminary investigation. Notably,
however, by the time the criminal complaint of Dr. Yanga against herein complainants
was filed, respondent was already without authority to conduct preliminary investigation
pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Also, his issuance of a subpoena directing
complainants to appear before the court was definitely out of order. At this point, it is
clear that respondent committed gross ignorance of an existing procedure which is
basic and elementary.
Case 39
Capuno, et al. vs. Judge Jaramillo
(A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, 234 SCRA 212, July 20, 1994)
FACTS:
58
The case herein involves two administrative complaints filed against respondent
Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr. with charges pertaining to various corrupt practices
detrimental to the administration of justice. In the first case, complainants Rizalia
Capuno and Thelma Villanueva, mother and daughter, alleged that Judge Jaramillo in
the guise of forging peace between the litigants, was actually demanding money from
one of the parties in exchange for a favorable decision; which was also attended by
Sheriff Ho. Whereas, the second case was for bribery in which Judge Jaramillo
demanded from the complainants to surrender, among other properties, a Mitsubishi
Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that after the car had been surrendered to the
court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation to
issue a resolution to have the luxury car at his disposal during weekends and to sue it
as he pleased; that the corporation appropriated the sum of P10,000.00 to pay for the
reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up of the engine of the car; that he also demanded
and received food, money, valuable properties (jewelries); and requested favor from
complainant in securing an exemption from the Gun Ban during the election period.
Judge Jaramillo denies the charges against him and maintains that the
complaints were filed out of pure harassment. He further averred that the times that he
used the car was only for maintenance purposes and insists, there was no instance that
he demanded money, food or valuables from complaint.
ISSUE: WON respondent is liable for gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is liable for gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct; specifically Canon 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of
committing a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713. As the visible
representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial
system. They are particularly mandated not only to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in their actions. However, in the case at bar, respondent judge carelessly
disregarded these stringent judicial norms.
For the first case, the act of respondent in meeting with complainants without the
presence of counsel, warning them not to tell anyone, and demanding money under the
guise of forging peace between her and the complainant in the case against her,
59
constitutes grave misconduct. The respondent’s act portrays a failure to uphold the
integrity of the judiciary and has undoubtedly diminished the faith of the people in the
administration of justice. As to the second case, the records sufficiently establish that
during the guardianship proceedings, respondent judge had no qualms in taking
advantage of the authority granted by complainant and the Board of Directors of PSM
Development Corporation for him to use the Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon on
weekends or as he pleased. Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the
pendency of the guardianship proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice.
Clearly, respondent was rightfully dismissed from the service.
Case 40
Benancillo vs. Judge Amila
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011)
FACTS:
The complainant, Benancillo, is the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, and
avers that Branch 1 of RTC Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran
City, issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul John
Belot (Belot), which included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal effects,
including properties in their diving business called the Underworld Diver's Panglao, Inc.
(Underworld). The complainant stated that when respondent Judge was designated as
the new Family Court in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No. 7268 was transferred to him
in which he denied both Belot's motion for reconsideration and Belot’s business partners
motion for intervention. The complainant, who was also a party in interest of possessing
the properties of Belot, claimed that the respondent judge called her and her counsel to
a meeting in his chambers but they did not proceed when they learned that the
intervenors were joining them. The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was
motivated by her "insatiable greed to have exclusive control and possession pending
trial of the case [of] all the properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of
respondent Paul John Belot." Respondent added that the "complainant . . . is only a
live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was branded repeatedly by
Belot as a 'prostitute' and one 'only after his money'."
ISSUE: WON Judge Amila violated the New Code of Judicial Ethics.
RULING:
Yes, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila violated the New Code of Judicial
Conduct specifically, Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4. Canon 4, Section 1 states: “Judges
60
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. While
Section 6 stipulates: “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.” The said provisions
clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts which
have the appearance of impropriety.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the
complainant and the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. This act of
respondent judge would logically create an impression to the complainant that the
meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his views pertaining to the Sp. Civil
Case No. 7268. The Comment of the respondent, also notably used derogatory and
irreverent language in relation to complainant, which in effect maliciously besmirched
the character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in partner of Belot" and
presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate relationship. The judge
also called her a prostitute. Clearly, respondent Judge Amila is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge and violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Case 41
Liwanag vs. Judge Lustre
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, April 21, 1999)
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed by Lualhati M. Liwanag praying that
respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from service for gross immorality and
grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession for sexually molesting her. Complainant
stated that her husband filed a case against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena
Chua for issuing bouncing checks which was presided over by Judge Paterno Lustre.
Overtime, after the hearings kept getting rescheduled, complainant went to see Judge
Lustre at his chamber, in which he told the complainant that he prepared an order for
the accused, and while he was giving her a copy of the order, he touched her shoulder,
down to her breast. Afterwhich, complainant no longer wished to see the respondent
but, sensing that the respondent was delaying the case, she decided to see him;
wherein the acts of molestation escalated from that moment on. As evidence,
complainant sent the Court 11 photographs showing her and respondent together in
61
various places, submitted a receipt from a resort she was allegedly taken to by the
respondent, and two transcripts of phone conversations that they had.
Respondent "strongly denied" the charges leveled against him and dismissed
them as "the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind and avers
that complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges against him
when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant demands
. . . to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short
period of time."
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. As a rule, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases; only substantial
evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence. Given this requirement, it is found that there is enough evidence on record to
sufficiently establish the complainant's case against respondent. Complainant may have
harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of
their B.P. 22 cases but it is notable that she would stand to gain nothing from the
exercise except that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.
In the case at bar, the respondent denies that the photographs were taken at the
resort stipulated in the receipt, he however does not deny that he is the one appearing
with complainant in the photographs. Respondent also could not offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a
private room. As such, respondent grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well.
Thus, respondent's disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already
retired.
Case 42
Wilfredo F. Tuvillo vs. Judge Henry Laron
(A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016)
FACTS:
62
The case herein is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron,
filed by husband and wife, Wilfredo Tuvillo and Melissa Tuvillo; the first case filed by
Wilfredo for immoral conduct, and the second case from Melissa for unexplained wealth
and immorality. Wilfred alleged that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for
the resolution of the cases filed against her; that, in turn, Judge Laron asked money
from Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it; that they lost all their
savings and their two houses and lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for
money from Melissa; that Judge Laron would physically hurt Melissa when she could
not produce the money he needed; and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and
besmirched the tranquility and sacredness of our marital union and family unity."
Whereas, Melissa asks for the respondent Judge to be investigated because based on
his salary as a judge, he could not have acquired their P9 million house, afforded to buy
several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive furniture, a Nissan
Patrol, and to send his three children to private schools. In both cases it is affirmed that
Melissa admits that she was the mistress of the respondent for three years.
In defense, Judge Laron comments: that he and his wife sold their townhouse,
obtained a P3.2M loan from Land Bank, borrowed from his father's retirement proceeds,
his children's tuition fees were covered by educational plans, and the other things that
Melissa mentioned were either gifts to them or from the commission of his wife as a
dealer in his relative’s furniture shop; he refuted the alleged sexual liaisons that
happened in his chambers by attaching affidavits of his staff who swore that the door to
his chambers was necessarily open for their access; he admitted that he was having an
affair with Melissa and that he had already confessed to his wife regarding the matter;
and he denied that he had asked Melissa for money or that she gave him money.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of the complaints against him.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is guilty of Immorality and Serious Misconduct but is not guilty of
unexplained wealth, as he was able to explain the source of his money. The Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety both in his professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of the court. As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's
personal behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should
be above suspicion. Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical
conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. Judges should
uplift the honor of the judiciary rather than bring it to disrepute.
63
In these case at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting
standard. By carrying an affair with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust
reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the members of the judiciary. The respondent’s admission to the
illicit affair he has with the complainant constitutes Immorality, which is a serious offense
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Judge Laron is also guilty of gross misconduct for
the illicit relationship started because Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with
respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he entertained the request
for assistance; which is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus,
respondent is clearly guilty of Immorality and Serious Misconduct.
Case 43
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Edmundo 'T. Acua
(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28,2005)
FACTS:
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a Letter from "Concerned
citizens of the lower court" reporting the alleged "practices" of Judge Edmundo T. Acuña
stating that respondent conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused
while on official leave from August 15, 2001 to September 15, 2001, along with a list of
the respondent's "dialogues," his "favorite expressions" during said trials, as follows:
Putris; Anak ng pating; Putang Ina; Pogi, beauty; Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na
hirap na ko; Mali ka na naman. In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers
of the letter were actuated by improper motive, and sent the letter with no other purpose
than to harass him, and that the allegations in the letter were fabricated, exaggerated,
or misquoted. Respondent also alleges he was not yet on leave from August 15, 2001
to August 21, 2001 because his application for a thirty-day leave was from August 21,
2001 to September 21, 2001. As such, respondent states that had the "right and duty to
come to court and conduct trials, sign orders and issue sentences." As to the alleged
humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge admitted having made
some of them while he was discussing the performance ratings of his staff but insisted
that he had been misquoted.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge is guilty of impropriety
RULING:
64
Yes, Judge Acua is guilty of impropriety. Judges are demanded to be always

temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. Propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Indeed, a judge's personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties,
must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice.
In the case at bar, having accepted the esteemed position of judge, the use of
"putris" and "putang ina" were unfit expressions for men of the robe. Considering that
the respondent is not an ordinary citizen, such intemperate language detracts from how
a judge should conduct himself. In having accepted the esteemed position of judge, the
respondent ought to have known that more is expected of him than an ordinary citizen.
Indeed, a judge's personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties,
must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice. Thus, in
conducting hearings and promulgation of decisions on the day when his official leave of
absence was to commence, the respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety.
Case 44
King vs. Judge Hontanosas
FACTS:
The case herein is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc.,
represented by its President, Richard L. King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.
Richard King and Rafael King are the President and Treasurer, respectively, of J. King
and Sons Co., Inc., the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending in the RTC and
presided by the respondent. Respondent had been a frequent visitor of the corporation's
music lounge where respondent would entertain himself, his guests and friends for free;
Rafael King would entertain respondent when he visited said music lounge; Rafael
received a telephone call from respondent, telling him to see him (respondent) at his
residence. Richard and Rafael King obliged and went to the respondent’s residence but
they were shocked when respondent asked them to equal the defendants' offer of
P250,000.00 so he would reconsider his order lifting the attachment, in relation to the
Civil Case mentioned.
In respondent’s defense, he vehemently denies soliciting money from the King

brothers. He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which cannot
accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to case of the
65
complainant were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial discretion in

accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of
justice and equity.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, the respondent Judge is guilty of two counts of gross misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon
2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states, “A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial
office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that
can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption. Hence, being in a position of such
grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in a
manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office which was not evident in respondent’s
act in the case herein.
In the case at bar, respondent judge demanded P250,000.00 from complainant

and used complainant's karaoke bar and entertaining litigants at his home. He should
have not frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering
that, as admitted by respondent, there are at least three cases filed by complainant
which are pending before his court. Thus, by entertaining a litigant in his home and
receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the
standards of judicial conduct.
Case 45
Heirs of the Late Aspiras vs. Judge Ganay
FACTS:
This is an administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint filed
by the heirs of the late Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras (complainants) on the alleged
abuse of authority of Judge Clifton U. Ganay (respondent). In the letter, the heirs of the
late Rev. Fr. Aspiras state that Judge Aspiras previously ordered to withdraw the
amount of P50,000 in his favor from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras for
him to purchase law books, among others. The OCA conducted a surprise investigation
66
and examination of the records to verify the irregularities allegedly committed by

respondent Judge Ganay and found, from the documents gathered, that respondent
Judge Ganay did receive money from said order. Further, the team discovered that
respondent judge issued numerous orders to draw checks for the purpose of purchasing
cellular phone prepaid cards and purchasing cellular phones. Respondent Judge
Ganay’s comment explained that the prepaid cell cards were purchased upon the
knowledge and approval of the property guardians.
ISSUE: WON Judge Ganay committed acts of impropriety and violated the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes. Judge Ganay violated Sections 13, 14, and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct which states that: judges and members of their families shall neither
ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial
duties; judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or
functions; subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may
receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made
provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended
to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.
In the case at bar, Judge Ganay’s acts of receiving lawbooks, cellular phones
and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev.
Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the Court
cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay's act of issuing Orders directing the manager of
the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the
account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects
the court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
67
Case 46
Belen vs. Judge Belen
(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2139, August 9, 2010)
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct
unbecoming a judge, filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen.
According to complainant, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against
complainant's father but was dismissed for lack of probable cause. Respondent judge
filed a complaint for disciplinary action against city prosecutor Sunega-Lagman who
dismissed the estafa case. Respondent judge, angry of the complainant’s allegation that
his accusations against the city prosecutor are false, allegedly started harassing and
threatening complainant with the filing of several cases against the latter. Thereafter,
complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery,
informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government
authorities and employees, requesting information on complainant's piggery and poultry
business; advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National
Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government
authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to
complainant's business establishment.
ISSUE: WON the use of the prestige of judicial position by writing several letters to local
government for personal interest constitute violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
RULING:
Yes. Respondent judge is guilty of violating Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
states that: judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment, the prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge; and judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Although, Judge Belen claimed that he did not use the court’s official stationery
or letterhead in his letters, he still used a letterhead indicating his position as the
presiding judge. The use of the same reflects respondent judge’s designation and
68
position in the judiciary. Undoubtedly, he was trying to use the prestige of his judicial
office for his own personal interest. He wrote letters to government authorities and
employees to secure public information regarding complainant's piggery and poultry
business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and
to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn
them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters,
respondent judge's use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the
presiding judge clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of
his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with
prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written.
Case 47
Tan vs. Judge Pacuribot
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of the complaints filed against Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot
(Judge Pacuribot) for: (1) sexual harassment against Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca; (2) he
has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual and contractual,
of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City; and (3) illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a
certain Sheryl Gamulo. In multiple instances, Judge Pacruibot took Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca, in separate occasions, to a motel and forced sexual intercourse with them
against their will. When they express their dissent, Judge Pacuribot would make threats
against their life resorting to his position as a judge. Judge Pacuribot, in his defense,
explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against him by Tan and
Villafranca were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio
commentator, to oust him from office.
ISSUE: WON charges of sexual harassment and acts in personal capacity by a judge
constitute gross misconduct and immorality in violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, charges of sexual harassment and acts in personal capacity by a judge
constitute gross misconduct and immorality in violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times
expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. The
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faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if
a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency.
In the present case, the Court found it totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge
Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates, to his unwelcome
sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently
solicited sexual favors from Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made
their working conditions so unbearable that Ms. Tan was eventually forced to transfer to
another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly, no judge has a
right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of loose
morals. Judge Pacuribot's conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and
immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of
the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of
society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to
women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees. He took advantage
of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. He was
the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. Thus, for gross
misconduct and immorality and in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge
Rexel M. Pacuribot is dismissed from the service.
Case 48
Atty. Veloso, et al. vs. Judge Caminade
(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655, July 8, 2004)
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for sexual harassment separately filed by Atty.
Grace Veloso and Ma. Joeylynn Quiñones against Judge Anacleto M. Caminade. Atty.
Veloso alleged in her affidavit that Judge Caminade suddenly placed his hand on her
right thigh and squeezed it while in his chamber discussing a case, and when she stood
up and headed towards the door leading to the staff room, he caught up with her and
placed his hand on her shoulder and told her "Kiss ko bi," wherein, before she opened
the door and went out of his chambers, Atty. Veloso retorted "Kalo-od nimo Judge uy.”
On the other hand, Joeylynn Quiñones, Clerk III in the office of Judge Caminade,
claimed that respondent judge would squeeze her hand whenever she gave him the
case records; that respondent asked her to open a jar of sugar and as Joeylynn entered
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the judge's chambers and handed him the jar, he greeted her "Happy Valentine's Day"
and asked "Asa mo gabii?" (Where did you go last night?), wherein she replied "Sa
balay" (At home) and to Joeylynn's surprise, he suddenly grabbed her right hand and
kissed her on the cheek.
In Judge Caminade defense, he explained that he had a tendency to tease and

play pranks on his friends, both male and female, because of his congenial nature; In
fact, even before his appointment to the judiciary, it had been his natural way of
complimenting women for their physical attributes but he never had any malice or lustful
designs in his actuations.
ISSUE: WON the sexual harassment committed by Judge Caminade is a violation in the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Judge Caminade violated Canons 3 and 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct by committing sexual harassment. Every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts greater moral righteousness than a seat in
the judiciary. Performing as he does an exalted role in the administration of justice, a
judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
weather the most exacting scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice.
Judge Caminade’s penchant for teasing and showing unwelcome affection to

women indicates a certain moral depravity and lack of respect towards his female
employees. He acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality, and propriety. He failed
to meet the standard of conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. His abusive
and distasteful acts unmistakably constituted sexual harassment because they resulted
in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for his female subordinates. They
were his subordinates, and he should have treated them like his own children. Instead,
he took advantage of his superior position.
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Case 49
Perfecto vs. Judge Desales-Esidera
(A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270, 642 SCRA 1, January 31, 2011)
FACTS:
Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant) charges Judge Alma Consuelo Esidera
(respondent) of soliciting donations purportedly to defray expenses for a religious
celebration and barangay fiesta. Complainant also charges respondent with acts of
impropriety for scolding her staff in open court and treating in an "inhuman and hostile"
manner practitioners "who are not her friends." As to the solicitation, respondent
explains that when she went to the Prosecutor's office, she was merely following up a
pledge to donate a Sto. Niño image when Atty. Yruma, who had received a solicitation
letter countersigned by Father Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San Jose, overheard
her (respondent) and requested her to receive his donation of P1,000.00 through her.
Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of Prosecutor Ching who, she
opines, is of "dubious personality" and has a "narcissistic personality disorder," the
details of the bases of which she narrates in her Comment. As for the charge of
impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by complainant in his
complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a professional relationship with her
staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.
ISSUE: WON the act of soliciting donation for a religious purpose and the act of verbal
lashing by a judge against a prosecutor constitutes Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, the acts made by the judge constitutes Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct. Respondent's improprieties as manifested in, among other things, her lack of
discretion and the vicious attack upon the person of Prosecutor Ching as characterized
by her use of uncalled for offensive language prompts this Court to raise the fine to Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Respondent's
admission of having received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Yruma — albeit allegedly
as a mere accommodation to the latter, and her failure to disclaim the same act with
respect to Prosecutor Diaz, only confirms her lack of understanding of the notion of
propriety under which judges must be measured.
Respondent's act of proceeding to the Prosecutor's Office under the guise of

soliciting for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a
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lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high
esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It
spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure
Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into
donating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes. To stress how the
law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate's activities, it has
often been held that a judge must be like Caesar's wife — above suspicion and beyond
reproach. Respondent's act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of
his activities as a private individual.
Case 50
Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
(A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 564 SCRA 365, September 9, 2008)
FACTS:
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter of Court of Appeals
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this
Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety
among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
entitled "Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al." This
case is the controversy in the Court of Appeals where Justice Reyes, justice who was
on leave during the trial of the Meralco case which was raffled, ultimately, to Justice
Sabio, wrote a letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez that he faces "dilemma" as to the
chairmanship of the Meralco case. Despite ruling by Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the
Committee on Rules, in favor of Justice Reyes, Justice Sabio insisted that he would
preside over the hearing of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was
"junior" to Justice Sabio was no better than his own opinion. Throughout the course of
the conflict for chairmanship, Justice Sabio made telephone calls to his brother,
Chairman Sabio, as to the request for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of
Meralco; Chairman Sabio also called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness" of the
GSIS' cause and asked him "to help GSIS". Further, Justice Sabio made contact with a
certain Mr. De Borja discussing the details of the case where the latter attempted to
bribe Justice Sabio.
ISSUE: WON the indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding a case constitutes
violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
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Yes, the indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding a case constitutes

violation of Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that: judges shall exercise the judicial function independently free from
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason; judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment; judges shall not only be free from
inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches
of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Justice Sabio Jr.'s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was
highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in
conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that
covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity
and independence of the Court itself. The continued communications between Justice
Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latter's rejected bribery attempt is highly
inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have
acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he
belongs. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that Justice Sabio's indiscreet
and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De
Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute
simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals.
Case 51
Uy vs. Judge Javellana
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross
incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others, against Judge Erwin B. Javellana (Javellana). Complainants
allege that Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure for example: (a) in People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of
arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; (b) People v. Celeste, et al. , Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to
dismiss for noncompliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19 (a) of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited
pleading; (c) also in People v. Celeste, et al. , Judge Javellana refused to dismiss
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outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the
affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d)
in People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the
case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits,
which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
Further, complainants allege that Judge Javellana violated Section 6 (b), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without
propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine
the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. Judge Javellana
stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper
subject of an administrative complaint.
ISSUE: WON gross ignorance of the law constitutes a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, gross ignorance of the law constitutes a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than
that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Javellana
cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious intent as a defense. His
repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so
obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient
administration of justice, for which the Court hold him administratively liable.
In this case, the acts made of the judge such as: (1) not specifying the specific
time, date, and place in notices of hearing; (2)not informing the Clerk of Court that he is
unable to attend a hearing for any reason as soon as possible so that the latter can
already cancel the hearing and spare the parties, counsels, and witnesses from waiting;
and (3) not taking care in ascertaining the facts and according due process to the
parties concerned before levying charges of incompetence or indifference against the
PAO lawyers appearing before his court constitute gross ignorance of the law in
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violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct classified as serious charges under Rule 140,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11 (a)
of the same Rule. Judge Javellana is suspended from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day.
Case 52
Salazar vs. Judge Marigomen
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004, October 19, 2007)
FACTS:
By Complaint dated November 10, 2004, Doroteo M. Salazar (complainant)
charged Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 61,
Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu, with gross ignorance of the law, bias, conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service and rendering a decision violative of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution in
connection with Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789. Zenaida F. Salazar, a mayoralty
candidate in Madridejos, Cebu, filed an election protest against Lety Mancio in the
Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu, docketed as Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
The complainant claims that Judge Antonio Marigomen admitted uncertified
photocopies of the contested ballots and considered them exhibits for Mancio in
deciding the case. Salazar also claims that Marigomen's partiality was shown in other
instances, that he was acting as if he were the counsel for the protestee, and that he
was "too liberal and tolerant of the maneuverings and manipulations of the protestee" in
dragging the proceedings of the case by 2 years.
ISSUE: WON Judge Marigomen exhibited gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
YES. The respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias
and deliberate falsehood or dishonesty. He has violated Canons 3 and 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and failed to state in his decision why he invalidated 90 ballots in favor
of the protestant and specify the ballots being set aside. The OCA found the complaint
meritorious in light of the following evaluation: Administrative matter involves the
exercise of the Court's power to discipline judges and is undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. There is no private offended party in administrative
proceedings who may be entitled to judicial relief.
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The admission of uncertified or plain photocopies of the contested ballots by the

respondent Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This Rule states that as long as the original evidence can be had, the
court should not receive evidence that is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies,
in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court. In this case, the original copies of the contested ballots
have neither been lost nor destroyed, and had the respondent judge wanted to examine
them, he could have easily ordered the transfer of their custody to the court. This Court
finds respondent, Judge Antonio D. Marigomen, guilty of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure and is Fined in the amount of P25,000 Pesos, and manifest bias and
dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct and is Fined in the amount of P25,000.
Case 53
Correa vs. Judge Belen
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010)
FACTS:
Michael B. Belen filed an administrative complaint against Judge Medel Arnaldo
B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, for
grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. The respondent judge filed a
case against Nezer D. Belen, but it was dismissed due to lack of probable cause by
Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman.The respondent judge filed an
Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualification) to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging that Sunega-Lagman was absent during the
preliminary investigation. The respondent judge filed a complaint for disciplinary action
against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline. Sunega-Lagman submitted an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006 to refute the
allegations of the respondent judge in the CBD case.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge
RULING:
Yes, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba City, Branch 36, is guilty of violating Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Section 4 of Canon 1 states that Judges
77
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment, and the prestige of judicial office shall not be used to advance the private
interests of others. Section 1 of Canon 4 states that Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA
are well-taken and found that the respondent judge wrote letters to government
authorities and employees to secure public information regarding the complainant's
piggery and poultry business. The respondent violated Canon 4, Propriety, when he
used of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge
of the Calamba City, Branch 36, clearly manifests that the respondent judge was trying
to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees,
and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written.
The investigating justice and the OCA agreed that the respondent judge, Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch
36, Guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Case 54
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili vs. Judge Rasad G. Balindong
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili against Acting
Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City,
Branch 8 for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of
Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service.
Civil Case No. 06-2954 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC
against the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident
that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others. On
November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for
damages amounting to P2,726,189.90 and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan
City RTC decision, and the CA decision lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, an
Entry of Judgment was made which on March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued. The
Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution on behalf of MSU and
the Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU
responded by filing a petition with the Marawi City RTC for prohibition and mandamus
78
with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje and the petition was raffled to
the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by the respondent Judge and the respondent
Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from
MSU's LBP-Marawi City Branch account and on April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge
conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction and required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application, Sheriff
Gaje then moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge Rasad G. Balindong Is guilty with Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and or Grave Misconduct
RULING:
Yes. Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Marawi City, has been found guilty of gross ignorance of the Law. The
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a
co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice. The rationale
for the rule is based on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and overall its incidents, and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment. Violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions.
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because
Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the
enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court
(terceria), cited in the course of the Court’s deliberations, finds no application to this
case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the
judgment obligor or his agent. In this case, the petition for injunction was filed by MSU
itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his
authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a
motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision,
not from any other court, or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In
this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC, but upon denial,
proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the
respondent Judge. Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, has been found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
79
Case 55
Atty. Balayon vs. Judge Dinopol
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969, 490 SCRA 547, June 15, 2006)
FACTS:
Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon Jr. filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal City, Branch 24, for gross
ignorance of the Law regarding his issuance of Search Warrant No. 01-03. Filoteo B.
Arcallo, a public-school teacher, accused Tito Cantor of Illegal Possession of Firearms
on 6 January 2003. P/S Insp. Virgilio Carreon, Intelligence, and Investigation Officer of
the South Cotabato Police Provincial Office, filed an application for a search warrant
against Cantor, and on 13 January 2003, the respondent Judge issued the search
warrant. A team of policemen headed by P/Supt. Fred Juan Bartolome implemented a
search warrant in the evening of the same day. The complaint alleges that the search
warrant was issued in violation of Rule 126 and A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC. The respondent
Judge denied the charge of gross ignorance of the law and alleged that the complainant
was not the proper party to file the complaint. He also negated the fact that he issued
the search warrant based on the sworn statement of the complainant and the
application of P/S Insp. Carreon for the issuance thereof.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Koronadal City, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes, The respondent Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 24,
Koronadal City, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The Court upheld the OCA's
findings that the respondent Judge professed gross ignorance of the law for his failure
to reduce the examination in writing. Specifically, the respondent Judge failed to
conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. Competence is a mark of a good judge, and
when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's
confidence in the competence of our courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily
be the mainspring of injustice.
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The most important details in this text are that a judge is expected to be proficient
in the interpretation of our laws, and that observance of the law is required of every
judge. The Court held in Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., that observance of the law is
required of every judge. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the
judge should be studious in the principles of law, and Canon 18 mandates that a judge
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one from
compliance therewith. The respondent Judge displayed gross ignorance of the law in
failing to observe the requirements for issuing a search warrant. Under Rule 140,
Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, gross ignorance
of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge.
Case 56
Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) vs. Judge Carretas
(A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 532 SCRA 218, September 5, 2007)
FACTS:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la
Cruz," a concerned citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B.
Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9.
The letter complaint was filed against the respondent judge due to his behavior and
conduct which appears to be inconsiderate, discourteous, or uncivil to lawyers, litigants,
or witnesses and the respondent judge stated that while he may have used harsh
words, they were made out of exasperation and with the intention to right the wrong
committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. Judge Romeo S. Daas conducted a
discreet investigation into the complaint, interviewing lawyers who appeared in the sala
of the respondent judge and asking them to submit their comments on the judge's
decorum. The members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to
discuss assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of the respondent judge, raising their
concern about the judge's behavior and Prosecutor Eduardo B. Quinzon noted that the
judge had a sudden burst of temper, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of their
clients. The Presiding Judge agreed to request a prosecutor from the Department of
Justice to attend cases in his sala. However, City prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of
Legazpi City stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of the respondent judge did
not want to comment on the conduct of a respondent judge and suggested that
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members of an audit team be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and
feel the tension" charged atmosphere in the sala.
ISSUE: WON Judge Ruben B. Carretas is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
RULING:
Yes,Judge Ruben B. Carretas is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
According to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Sections 1
and 2, of Canon 2, and Section 1, of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary require judges to ensure that their conduct is above reproach
and that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer. Additionally, Section
6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. It is also reprehensible for a judge to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant, or witness, as it betrays a lack of patience, prudence, and
restraint.
The respondent judge appeared arrogant and boastful in his comments to the
anonymous complainant and lawyers in his sala. He also displayed a condescending
attitude towards lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they were "inferior" to
lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. The dispensation of justice
is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer, and they should co-exist in a spirit of
cooperation and mutual respect. The respondent judge antagonized the lawyers
appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks, which impaired
the administration of justice. He asked more questions than counsel and conducted
direct and cross-examination of witnesses. Judge Ruben B. Carretas was found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1,
Canon 4, and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. He was fined in the amount of P7,500 with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
He also violated Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which provides that judges must maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant, or witness, as it
betrays a lack of patience, prudence, and restraint.
82
Case 57
Angeles vs. Judge Sempio Diy
FACTS:
JComplainant Judge Angeles filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
and dismissal from judiciary service against respondent Judge Sempio Diy, stemming
from a consolidated criminal case. The complainant alleged that the rendering of the
decision and promulgation of judgment incur delay after a lapse of 90 days and six
months, respectively. The respondent judge belies the accusations and counters that
she decided the cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the
Supreme Court. The complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make
an assessment if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the image
of the judiciary. Respondent Judge Sempio Diy denies the material allegations in the
complaint and claims that the complainant’s charges are harsh, rash, and baseless,
calculated merely to harass and “destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the
profession.”
ISSUE: WON respondent judge violated Canon 6 Sec. 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Maria Luisa Sempio Diy violated Canon 6, Sec. 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the rendering of the decision and promulgation of judgment incur
delay after a lapse of 90 days and six months, respectively. This could have been
avoided had the respondent adopted an efficient system of record management and
organization of dockets to monitor the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of
the court’s business. Elementary court management practice requires her to keep her
own records or notes of cases pending before her sala, especially those that are
pending for more than 90 days. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording
and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and
their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her
responsibility as the proper discharge of her official functions.
83
The Court considers the factual milieu of each case, the offending acts, or
omissions of the judges, and previous transgressions, if any. In this case, there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive that could have compelled the
respondent to delay the resolution of the subject motion. The respondent resolved the
motion within thirty days from its submission date, which showed her effort to zealously
attend to her duties. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month or
more than three months or a fine of not more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. Therefore, Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in delay in
the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 are hereby
Admonished to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing
of motions.
Case 58
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Mantua
(A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8, 2012)
FACTS:
Five days after the respondent Judge Mantua’s retirement, Branch 17, of
RTC Polompon where he was the presiding judge, had a judicial audit. Upon
investigation, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230 criminal
cases and 126 civil cases to which they found out that there 20 criminal cases wherein
the court failed to take any action from the time of filing, 41 criminal cases without
further action,12 criminal cases with pending incidents or motions submitted for
resolution, and two criminal cases submitted for decision.
The judicial audit team recommended that Atty. Elmer P. Mape (Atty. Mape), as
Officer-in-Charge of Branch 17, be directed to, among all else, (1) inform the OCA within
15 days of the status of Branch 17’s caseload and submit a copy of the pertinent order,
resolution and notice of hearing issued; (2) apprise the Acting Presiding Judge from
time to time of cases submitted for resolution or decision and those cases that require
immediate action.
The OCA issued a Memorandum addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno which contains its findings and recommendations on the 14 January 2009 report
of the judicial audit team and Atty. Mape’s submissions dated 19 January 2009 and 27
84
April 2009, among all else, an administrative complaint against respondent for gross
incompetence and inefficiency.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge be guilty of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for undue delay in rendering a decision.
RULING:
No, respondent Judge is not guilty of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for undue delay in rendering a decision. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods." Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that "[a
judge] should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that
justice delayed is often justice denied.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA
Vilches five days after Judge Mantua’s retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their
Memorandum to CJ Puno on 12 May 2009, or a little over four months after Judge
Mantua’s retirement. During his incumbency, Judge Mantua was never given a chance
to explain the results of the judicial audit report. With the knowledge that the judicial
audit report will be submitted only after Judge Mantua’s retirement, the judicial audit
team’s recommendations were directed only to Atty. Mape, the Acting Clerk of Court
and Legal Researcher II of Branch 17, and Judge Maraya, Acting Presiding Judge of
Branch 17 at the time of the report’s submission. Wherefore, the complaint against
Judge Celso L. Mantua is dismissed. The Financial Management Office of the Office of
the Court Administrator is directed to release the retirement pay and other benefits due
Judge Mantua unless he is charged in some other administrative complaint or the same
is otherwise withheld for some other lawful cause.
Case 59
Dagudag vs. Judge Paderanga
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008)
FACTS:
The Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group
(PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc.
was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to
Cebu which they falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection
85
by the DENR; however, upon inspection, the crew of MV General Ricarte failed to
produce the Certificate of Origin and other pertinent transport documents covering the
forest products, as required by DAO No. 07-94.
After due notice, while the illegal forest products were in the government’s
possession, a certain Edma, who was not a part in interest filed a writ of replevin to the
judge respondent. During the hearing for the writ of replevin, Judge Paderanga showed
manifest partiality in favor of Edma.
According to the petitioner, Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the
wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies
available to him and Edma was not a party-in-interest. Gen. Dagudag filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator an affidavit-complaint charging Judge Paderanga with
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a judge not just for the
appearance of partiality but also for the his words during court proceeding such as
"SHUT UP", "THAT’S BALONEY" and “The problem with you people is you do not use
your heads.”
ISSUE: WON respondent judge’s acts constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
unbecoming of a judge
RULING:
Yes, respondent judge’s acts constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
unbecoming of a judge. Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in
relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that
judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They
should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts
for the litigants. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at
all times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34
They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous,
and civil to all persons who come to their court.
Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin,
repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that’s baloney," "how
dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and "the
problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very
unbecoming of a judge. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on
those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that
86
violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the
judicial system.
Case 60
Edgar A. Abiog vs. Hon. Evelyn C. Cañete
(A.M. No. MTJ-18-1917, October 8, 2018)
FACTS:
Respondent herein, Judge Evelyn Canete moved by personal gain, without
justifiable reason, in a scandalous manner, and in an act debasing the dignity of exalted
position of a Municipal Circuit Trial Court Presiding Judge, did then and there stayed
and resided at her chamber and extension of her chamber which was under her direct
supervision, utilizing the same as her living and residential quarters, and from time to
time her families’ and her visitors’ living and residential quarters with the Municipal
Government paying their electric bills and water bills thereby inviting public criticism and
criticism among the employees of the Judiciary.
She averred that since she normally rendered overtime work, it was "very
convenient and safe for her to stay at the quarters"; that prior to the filing of this
complaint, she again rented an apartment but "still utilized her quarters in the many
instances that [she had to work overtime.”
ISSUE: WON the use of the Halls of Justice for purposes other than its intended
purpose violates SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92
RULING:
Yes, the use of the Halls of Justice for purposes other than its intended purpose
violates SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92. Administrative Circular No. 3-92 provides:
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be
used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of
justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of
the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.
It is beyond cavil that the respondent judge occupied a portion of the Halls of
Justice at Brooke’s Point as her residential quarters. Moreover, the justifications
proffered by the respondent judge fail to persuade. For one, it is irrelevant whether or
not the living quarters she occupied was an extension of her chambers; the fact remains
that the same was inside and part of the Halls of Justice. The Court held in Bautista vs
Costelo Jr. that “prohibition against the use of the Halls of Justice for purposes other
than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity including
87
their grounds.” The Court found Judge Evelyn C.Cañete, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court-Brooke's Point-Espanola, Bataraza, Palawan, guilty of violating SC Administrative
Circular No. 3-92, to pay a FINE of P11,000.00, with a STERN WARNING.
Case 61
Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor
(A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012)
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that on January 24, 2012, she received a letter from the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) informing her that she was not included in the list of nominees
for RTC, Branch 2 or 4, Tagbilaran City; she attributes her disqualification to her
previous administrative record of gross inefficiency in 1999 and 2000 for belatedly filing
her motions for extension of time to resolve the following cases then pending before her
sala, to wit: Criminal Case No. 96-185 entitled "People v. Jaime Cutanda alias 'Jimmy'";
Civil Case No. 0020 entitled "Alejandro Tutor, et al. v. Benedicto Orevillo, et al.";
Criminal Case.
Section 5 Disqualification, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: (1) Those
with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; (2) Those with pending criminal
cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and (3) Those who have been convicted in any
criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine
of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency." Considering
petitioner's previous record, she is indeed disqualified from being further nominated for
appointment to any judicial post, unless she be accorded judicial clemency.
In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, thus: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation
xxx.
ISSUE: WON respondent judges be allowed in the JBC nomination
RULING:
Yes, respondent judges should be allowed in the JBC nomination. In A.M. No.
07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
88
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency),7 the Court laid down the following guidelines
in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: 1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation xxx. A review of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse
for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10) years ago. While she was
found to have belatedly filed her motions for additional time to resolve the aforecited
cases, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same within the extended period
sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her compliance beyond
the approved 45-day extended period.8 Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently
shown diligence in the performance of her duties and has not committed any similar act
or omission.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown
its high regard for petitioner per the letter of support11 signed by a number of its
members addressed to the IBP dated October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her
administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series of 200912 endorsing her
application for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City.Petitioner's dedicated
service of 23 years to the judiciary, having been first appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial
Court judge in 1989,13 merits compassion from the Court. It bears to note that petitioner
does not seek for promotion to a higher position but only a lateral transfer to a place of
work near her residence.
Case 62
Benigno B. Reas vs. Carlos M. Relacion
(A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011)
FACTS:
Benigno B. Reas (Reas), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 23
in Cebu City, charged Carlos M. Relacion (Relacion), Clerk III of the RTC Branch 15 in
Cebu City, with gross dishonesty and grave misconduct in which Reas alleged in his
complaint that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of Court of the RTC (COC) delivered to
the Cebu CFI Community Cooperative (Cooperative) the salary checks of court
personnel with outstanding obligations with the Cooperative to pay for their loans; that
his salary check for the period of September 1 to 15, 2004 in the amount of ₱4,280.00;
that when he asked for the receipt corresponding to his payment, the Cooperative
informed him that his salary check had been "inadvertently surrendered" to Relacion
after the latter had harassed the Cooperative "to a point of violence" to release his
(Relacion) own check for that period; that Relacion did not return the salary check to the
Cooperative despite repeated demands; that when he confronted Relacion, the latter
admitted taking his salary check.
89
In his answer, Relacion denied harassing or threatening the employees of the

Cooperative, explaining that on September 8, 2004, he went to the COC to get his own
salary check for the first half of September 2004; he expressed his intention to get his
own salary check because he needed the money; that the Cooperative’s representative
agreed to his request; and that after signing the payroll, the Cooperative’s
representative handed to him a salary check which later on he admitted taking salary
check of Reas
Upon recommendation of OCA, the parties had entered into a compromise
agreement calling for the dismissal of the administrative matter; and that the
compromise agreement had been reached after Relacion had apologized to Reas, and
paid the latter the amount of P100.00.
ISSUE: WON Relacion would still be guilty of simple misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, Relacion is guilty of simple misconduct. The Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel requires that the officials and employees of the Judiciary serve as sentinels
of justice, and declares that any act of impropriety on their part affects the dignity of the
Judiciary and the people's faith in the Judiciary. Thus, the court personnel must exhibit
the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of their official
duties, but also in their private dealings with their co-employees and with the public.
Their professional and personal conduct must be free from any whiff of impropriety.
In the case herein, there is no sufficient proof showing that Relacion intentionally
took Reas salary check from the Cooperative. Lucino Q. Garcia, an employee of the
Cooperative, admitted in his certification that he had inadvertently surrendered Reas’
salary check to Relacion when the latter had demanded his own salary check to a point
of violence. Even so, Relacion could not be exculpated because he did not immediately
return the salary check either to Reas or to the Cooperative upon realizing that the
salary check handed to him was not his. Moreover, Relacion’s excuse for not returning
Reas’ check was lame and implausible. Relacion’s failure to immediately return Reas’
salary check was improper and constituted misconduct. That Relacion did not
maliciously or deliberately take Reas’ salary check hence, the Court rendered him liable
only for simple misconduct.
90
Case 63
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.
(A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011)
FACTS:
This case is in relation to the “Maguindanao Massacre” which was touted as the
worst election-related violence wherein almost a year later on, the National Union of
Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA
Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities,
and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording
devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist
the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of device.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January
12, 2010 letter to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over
media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be
brought to the Court's attention through appropriate motion." Hence, the present
petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right
to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to
regulations to be issued by the Court.
ISSUE: WON the court may allow the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and
radio coverage of court proceedings.
RULING:
The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines. The possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality
of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there
must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
91
decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in
distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context.
Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that
need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the
various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
Case 64
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Joselito Villarosa
(A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578, January 28, 2020)
FACTS:
The Philippine Daily Inquirer published two articles written by Tulfo, first is
"What's Happening to Makati Judges?" allegedly, three Makati judges committed certain
irregularities in the discharge of their judicial functions, one of them is Judge Villarosa of
Branch 66,RTC, Makati City; and the other article is "Controversial Decisions,” which
he alleged that Judge Villarosa as having a "history of issuing decisions which were
eventually reversed or revoked by the Court of Appeals." According to the said article,
Judge Villarosa favored moneyed litigants in commercial cases, even if their cases are
unmeritorious, moreover, Tulfo further claimed that Judge Villarosa is part of a syndicate
composed of Makati judges who decide big commercial cases based on money and not
on the merits; hence, an investigation was conducted.
The Defendant submitted his explanation, one of it is the explanation as to the
transfer of cases for judicial dispute resolution (JDR) to Branch 149 - Judge Villarosa
averred that the transfer of cases to Branch 149 was brought about because Branch
149 was the lone commercial court that has jurisdiction over the said cases and that it
has been a practice to refer commercial cases to Branch 149 whenever JDR failed,
because of this, it was not entirely his fault to follow such practice.
ISSUE: WON judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation of
SupremeCourt rules, directives, and circulars.
92
RULING:
Yes, Judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. According to the Supreme Court the
transfer of cases for JDR to Branch 149, the Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to
Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and JDR
provides that the judge to whom the case has been originally raffled, or the JDR Judge,
shall preside over the first stage of the judicial proceedings, i.e., from the filing of a
complaint to the conduct of CAM and JDR during the pre-trial stage. Furthermore, in a
multiple sala court, "if the case is not resolved during JDR, it shall be raffled to another
branch for the pre-trial proper up to judgment." Thus, the court to which the case was
originally raffled is mandated to preside over the first stage of the proceedings, including
the JDR, and it is only upon the failure of the JDR that the said case should be raffled to
another branch. Here, Judge: Villarosa hastily transferred the cases to Branch 149
without the first stage· of the proceedings, which includes JDR, in clear violation of the
above mentioned guidelines.
In sum, the Court finds Judge Villarosa among all else the violation of A.M. No.
03-3-03-SC when he deliberately failed to transfer eight commercial cases to Branch
137; and (2) four counts of gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he
transferred cases for JDR to Branch 149 without conducting the first stage of judicial
proceedings, including JDR, in violation of the Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to
Implement the Expanded Coverage of CAM and JDR.
Case 65
Reynaldo Ngo vs. Atty. Renato Frades
(A.M. No. P-21-026, November 9, 2021)
FACTS:
In this administrative complaint, complainant Reynaldo M. Ngo (Ngo) charges

respondent Atty. Renato E. Frades (Frades), Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, with Falsification and violation of
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. In his sworn Complaint Ngo faults Frades for falsely
certifying a document submitted in evidence by the spouses Dominador and Guillerma
Anatalio (spouses Anatalio) in their appeal to the RTC, Branch 36 of Gapan City, the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), relating to an action for Unlawful
Detainer, in which the petitioner Ngo won.
93
The defendants therein appealed to the RTC, however it was denied and
accorded greater weight to the Ngos' title over the defendants' unregistered Deed of
Sale denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,” thus, complainant Ngo sought a certification
from respondent Clerk of Court to determine the existence of said document, but the
respondent did not respond to Ngo's letter-request.
In his Comment, respondent denied the charges and contended that he issued
the certification in his official capacity when it was referred to him for appropriate action.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be held liable for Serious Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent should be held liable for Serious Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive, or betray.
Based on the foregoing definitions, the comprehensive report of the Investigating
Judge, found by the OCA to be supported by evidence, is well-taken. Respondent's
actions made under the pretext of lawful performance of duty as clerk of court,
undermined the effective and efficient administration of justice. Respondent's false
certification per se may have constituted an innocuous mistake and would have at best
made him liable for simple neglect of duty which We have defined as the failure of an
employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. Regrettably however, respondent's misfeasance was
further exposed by the lie he propounded to the Investigating Judge that he was simply
performing his lawful duty and had been tasked to certify documents on record, a falsity
made more grievous by the fact that it was made to a judge no less.

Case Digest Compilation: MLAW 125 - Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics

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CASE DIGEST COMPILATION

MLAW 125 - Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu

(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, November 22, 2016)

evidence of the employee’s medical condition, that Judge Yu sent inappropriate

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu

(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)

ISSUE: WON Judge Yu should be disbarred.

Garcia vs. Judge De la Peña

(A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, 129 SCRA 767, February 9, 1994)

Lazo vs. Judge Tiong

(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998)

Tan vs. Judge Rosete

(A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004)

Spelmans vs. Judge Ocampo

(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010)

corruption against respondent, in which according to Judge Ocampo, when he received

Retired Judge Martonino Marcos vs. Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller

(A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017)

In the case at bar, respondent demonstrated lack of knowledge and

(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017)

In response, respondent judge Omelio denied the allegations of Palma and

Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order vs. Judge Calibo

(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621, September 27, 2007)

Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty

(A.M. No. 2007-22-SC, February 1, 2011)

ISSUE: WON, Bayani is guilty of Dishonesty through falsification of official documents.

In the instant case, Bayani made an erroneous judgment in choosing not to

Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute

(A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011)

In this case, the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or

Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan vs. Ernesto C. Quitorio

(A.M. No. P-11-2919, May 31, 2011)

must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a

Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria

(A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)

and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to

In the complaint, respondent judge allegedly: (1) appointed a certain lawyer as

(1) The allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of

Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan

(A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, 639 SCRA 254, January 12, 2011)

Gacad vs. Judge Clapis

(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)

Tobias vs. Judge Limsiaco

(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011)

constitute gross misconduct. "Misconduct" means a transgression of some established

Chan vs. Judge Madajucon

(A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, October 15, 2003)

Dawa vs. Judge De Asa

(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998)

Anonymous vs. Judge Achas

(A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013)

In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The

Spouses Causin vs. Judge Demecillo

(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1860, September 8, 2004)

Seludo vs. Judge Fineza

(A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004)

In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid","if he knows how to read

Dr. Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga

(A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, August 17, 2015)

Castillo, et al. vs. Judge Juan

(62 SCRA 124, January 28, 1975)