The Islamic State Expands Its Influence in Asia

You might also like

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 8

ihs.

com

TERRORISM & INSURGENCY, Brunei

Date Posted: 28-Jan-2015

Jane's Intelligence Review

The Islamic State expands its influence in


Asia
With pledges of support from Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, the Islamic State is
expanding its network of jihadists keen to build a caliphate. Animesh Roul examines
divisions and co-operation among the militants, and security implications for the
region.

Key Points

 Al-Qaeda's formerly dominant brand of extremist Islamism is under threat from the rise of
the Islamic State in southeast Asia, with several groups pledging loyalty to the 'caliphate'.
 Nevertheless, some Islamist militants in the region pose an obstacle to the Islamic State's
expansion, led by groups such as Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS).
 Syria returnees pose an increasing threat of terrorist attack and sectarian division, with the
risk compounded by the lack of a coherent trans-regional counter-terrorism strategy.

The Islamic State's announcement of the creation of its caliphate in late June 2014 and the
group's rise under the leadership of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, its self-proclaimed Caliph, has marked
a shift in radical Islamist discourse in Southeast Asia, formerly dominated by the Al-Qaeda brand
of transnational jihad. While the threat emanating from Al-Qaeda or its splinters and ideologically
interwoven groups remain unchanged, the Islamic State has begun to strategically position itself in
the region, aiming to bring predominantly Muslim regions under its ideological control, far beyond
its immediate focus and operation in the Levant region.
With this aim of acquiring geographical and ideological domination, the Islamic State has begun
outreach efforts for recruitment and support within Muslim communities across countries in the
Malay archipelago - primarily in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Several hundred
Indonesians, Malaysians, and Filipinos, and a smaller number of Muslim youths from neighbouring
countries such as Singapore, have travelled to fight under an Islamic State banner in the Iraqi and
Syrian theatres. Governments and security agencies in the region have expressed serious
concerns over this exodus and the Islamic State's efforts to lure foot soldiers.

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 1 of 8
ihs.com

Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia (©2015 IHS)


1518807
Since June 2014, the call has not only resonated within the region's established jihadist groups
and their ideologues, but it has also reached fringe homegrown radical elements and influenced
individuals, mostly through propaganda disseminated on social media.
The violent emergence and ascendance of the Islamic State on the transnational jihadist
landscape appears to have infused momentum into some of the most violent and ideologically
driven extremist groups in the region. In the process it has created a rift within the region's
Islamist fraternity by dividing them into Al-Qaeda loyalists and Islamic State followers.
Natural bedfellows?
Baghdadi's call has received substantial support in Indonesia, even from groups formerly affiliated
to Al-Qaeda such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was responsible for the Bali nightclub
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks of 2002, and its most recent incarnation, Jamaah
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). After some hesitation, the former spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Baasyir,
pledged his allegiance to Baghdadi from his high-security prison cell on Nusa Kambangan island
(Central Java province) in mid-July 2014, along with 20 other Islamist detainees. Other fringe
Islamist groups such as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and its fugitive commander Santoso
(alias Abu Wardah) also pledged support to the Islamic State the same month, shortly after the
declaration of the caliphate. MIT was one of the first group's outside the Middle East to pledge
allegiance to the Islamic State.
On 22 July, an audiovisual statement released by the Islamic State's foreign-language media wing,
Al-Hayat ('The Life'), confirmed the arrival and participation of Indonesian nationals in the ongoing
conflict in Iraq and Syria. "We are your brothers from Indonesia who have come to the Islamic
State […] for the sake of hijra [exodus] and jihad in the path of Allah", declared the video, entitled
'Join the Ranks'. It featured Abu Muhamad al-Indonesi (alias Bahrumsyah), who urged
Indonesians to join the Islamic State and swear allegiance to Baghdadi. A video also surfaced in
August 2014 on jihadist websites that contained footage of an event held at the Syarif
Hidayatullah State Islamic University (also known as the Universitas Islam Negeri: UIN) in Jakarta,
showing numerous individuals swearing allegiance to Baghdadi.

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 2 of 8
ihs.com

According to the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme:


BNPT) commander Saud Usman Nasution, an estimated 514 Indonesians have travelled to Syria
and Iraq to fight alongside the Islamic State, of whom nearly half are students or migrant
workers. Illustrating the appeal of the Islamic State's call, an entire family, including a 10-year-old
child, was arrested with fake passports in late December 2014 at Jakarta's Soekarno-Hatta airport.
The parents subsequently admitted to investigators that they had wanted to carry out jihad in
Syria and Iraq and to be martyrs for the Islamic State.
Before the latest incarnation of the group as the Islamic State, there was an increasing trend of
local Islamists supporting the group in Malaysia, a country that was generally known for its
adherence to a 'moderate' form of Islam. In April 2014, Malaysian police unearthed a jihadist
network known as the Kuala Lumpur Cell and arrested 11 people, including two women. On 23
May 2014, three men and one woman were charged with plotting militant attacks in Malaysia and
promoting recruitment to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. By late January 2015, they remained
in custody awaiting further proceedings.
On 21 August 2014, a Malaysian official told Reuters that the members of this network had
confessed to planning attacks on several nightclubs in Kuala Lumpur, the Carlsberg beer factory in
Petaling Jaya, and on areas of Putrajaya. During the investigation, it emerged the cell was working
under the pretext of providing humanitarian assistance in war-ravaged Middle East countries such
as Syria.
In May 2014, news emerged from Iraq of the first recorded Malaysian suicide bomber, Ahmad
Tarmimi Maliki, who drove a vehicle into an Iraqi army barracks in Anbar province in a suicide
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack that killed 25 soldiers. Tarmimi Maliki
had travelled to the country via Turkey, in common with the route - confirmed by social media
postings - favoured by many youths headed for Iraq and Syria.
The Malaysian government estimates that at least 40 Malaysians have travelled to Syria to partake
in the conflict, including several well-known personalities such as Akel Zainal, a former rock star
who used his popularity on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter to entice Malaysian
youths to support the Islamic State. Following a series of crackdowns from August to October
2014, Malaysian security agencies unearthed Islamic State support groups that were helping to
recruit, finance, and facilitate travel to Syria for jihadist volunteers, including a government
engineer and a university teacher.
With the gradual leakage of information from the war zones in Iraq and Syria, it became clear that
militants from Indonesia and Malaysia had formed a dedicated military unit for Southeast Asian
fighters, named the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah (Malay Archipelago Unit for the
Islamic State), and continue to use it to expand the Islamic State's reach in the region. The unit
comprises approximately 22 members, according to the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis
of Conflict (IPAC), with headquarters in Al-Shadadi, in the Al-Hasakah province of Syria.
Similar developments relating to the expansion of the Islamic State can be traced in the
neighbouring Philippines, which has considerable experience in fighting Islamist militancy on the
southern island of Mindanao. In August 2014, the lesser-known militant group Jama'at Ansar al-
Khilafa (JAK) declared support for the Islamic State in a video message produced by the jihadist
media outlet Al-Battar. It declared the waging of jihad "until the sharia [Islamic law] rules the
world or we die for its sake." US media reports in mid-August 2014 quoting former Philippines

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 3 of 8
ihs.com

president Fidel Ramos (1992-98) suggested that up to 100 Filipino-Muslims affiliated to the JI
networks had entered Iraq and Syria.
Moreover, the Philippines government fears that entrenched militant groups currently or formerly
linked to Al-Qaeda, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), or other like-minded groups active in the
southern Philippines, will subscribe to the violent ideals of the Islamic State. Although some of
these groups have resisted the Islamic State's influence so far, a faction of the ASG loyal to its
operational commander Isnilon Hapilon, and the Christian convertees to Islam of the militant
Islamist Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) have also declared their support to the Islamic State
from prison.
Moreover, according to a Philippine Star report of 16 October 2014, Islamist preachers adhering
to Islamic State ideals had been trying since August 2014 to convince existing Islamist groups
such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) to accept Islamic State ideology. On 15
August 2014, BIFF spokesperson Abu Misry Mama confirmed to the AFP news agency the
authenticity of YouTube videos uploaded in early August in which the group's fighters pledged
support to the Islamic State.
A possible example of actual recruitment activity by the Islamic State emerged in November 2014,
when a student claimed that the group was actively recruiting members at the Western Mindanao
State University (WMSU) through monetary incentives and other benefits. However, WMSU
president Milabel Enriquez-Ho denied the reports.
Competing caliphates
A greater conundrum for the leading Islamists of the region is whether to support the Islamic
State or Al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, which is fighting government forces in Syria.
Amid this uncertainty, some groups have adopted independent positions.
Perhaps inspired by developments in the Middle East, some jihadists appear keen to establish a
regional Islamic caliphate in the Southeast Asia region. Quoting regional intelligence sources, the
New Straits Times reported in July 2014 that at least four lesser-known Islamist groups were
aiming for the establishment of a caliphate to be known as the 'Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara',
comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines, Singapore, and southern Thailand.
The splinter Islamist groups - identified by intelligence agencies only by the acronyms ADI, BAJ,
BKAW, and Dimzia - were reportedly active in the Malaysian states of Perak and Selangor. The
groups were derived from larger Islamist groups such as JI and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia
(KMM), but would operate independently despite a common ideological identification with the
Islamic State. To date, there has been no information about any oath of allegiance to the Islamic
State or Baghdadi.
Rifts are also apparent within the successor groups to JI, formerly the most influential jihadist
organisation in Southeast Asia, whose legitimacy and violent interpretation of Islam was
questioned by Islamists within the group. Baasyir's oath to the Islamic State in July 2014 appears
to have created ideological rifts, with the stiffest resistance coming from the jihadist veteran
Mochammad Achwan (also known as Muhammed Akhwan), formerly an operational commander
and caretaker of JAT. Baasyir's sons Abdul Rohim and Rosyid Ridho joined Achwan in protesting
against support for the Islamic State, and the three jihadists together left JAT to establish a new
group, Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS), on 11 August 2014, which continues to support Jabhat
Al-Nusra.

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 4 of 8
ihs.com

JAS, which also aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, therefore presents a major hurdle
for the Islamic State. In an interview with an Australian news channel in November 2014, Achwan
said, "Al-Baghdadi is not good enough to represent all of Islam and they [the Islamic State], are
not good enough to be our leaders." Plausibly, Achwan - by challenging the authority of Baasyir
and defying Baghdadi as the caliph - has positioned himself in the league of radical militant
figureheads who have the potential to change Islamist discourse in the region in the near future.
Moreover, opposition to the presence or outreach of the Islamic State has also been expressed by
the Council of Indonesian Mujahideens (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: MMI) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI). Although the MMI has declared that the Islamic State is deviant due to its
adherence to Takfiri ideals (the practice of excommunication), the HTI has accused the Islamic
State of criminalising the concept of the caliphate and sharia. The HTI, which is considered to be a
long-standing proponent of an Islamic caliphate, maintains that the methods adopted by the
Islamic State conflict with Islamic tenets.

An Indonesian government worker paints over an Islamic State flag on a wall in Surakarta City,
central Java. Jihadists in the region are split over support for the Islamic State and Jabhat al-
Nusra. (PA)
1629111
Distant war
There are numerous identifiable motivations for followers of the Islamic State to either join the
group or respond to its call to support its brand of jihad, but the cause remains too geographically
distant for many Southeast Asian Muslims. According to a regional public policy expert speaking to
IHS Jane's , "There are young Muslims who joined ISIS or expressed support because they
believe in its ideology and the cause it fights for in the Middle Eastern war zone." The observer

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 5 of 8
ihs.com

added that many genuinely concerned people travel to Syria to help fellow Muslims, but a
combination of their experiences and other circumstances may lead them to gravitate towards the
Islamic State
The term of 'freelance jihadist' could also be apt for many students and expatriates in Middle
Eastern countries who have joined the Islamic State without any previous experience of militancy
or extremism. Students from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Imam Hatip school in Kayseri,
Turkey who have joined the Islamic State fit this mould. A Malaysian Islamic scholar told IHS
Jane's that, discounting ideological or religious motivations, many youths have travelled to the
battlefields from Southeast Asia and elsewhere for "a sense of Islamic adventure" and to gain
"social network [followers] for their acts, comments, and pictures".
However, in the Indonesian or Malaysian context, Islamic State propaganda remains appealing
because of the actual 'establishment' of the caliphate, fulfilling an aspiration for many Muslims in
the region. Regional Islamist scholars such as Professor Joseph Chinyong Liow feel that JAT's
support and Baaysir's pledge have focused attention on the Islamic State, with its "millenarian
perspective" of apocalypse and annihilation attracting many radical regional figureheads. Another
appealing aspect could be the violent sectarianism espoused by the Islamic State, since
sectarianism within Southeast Asia - in particular anti-Shia discourse in Indonesia and Malaysia -
has risen in tandem with the ascent of groups such as the Islamic State.
Outlook
There is immense potential for the Islamic State in the Southeast Asia region. With the visible
absence of a regional counter-terrorism strategy targeting the imminent threat from the Islamic
State, coupled with the group's inchoate penetration of the region, there is an increasing risk of
the emergence of violent jihad that would recall previous large-scale terrorist attacks, such as
those in Bali in 2002 and 2005, and the 2009 Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel IED attacks in
Jakarta.
The Islamic State's emergence could also herald a rise in sectarian violence in the region, primarily
against Shia minorities and people practising other religions. The emergence of sharia movements
and the overground caliphate movement could also be given an impetus by the arrival of the
Islamic State. Moreover, regional governments and security strategists fear that the 'Afghan
scenario' of the 1980s - in which foreign mujahideen and Islamist fighters returned to their
respective countries after battling the Soviet army and threatened their own governments - might
repeat itself once the Syrian conflict is over.
There is an imminent risk that battle-hardened returnees from the Iraq and Syria wars will return
to the region indoctrinated with ideologies and jihadist experience that will pose a heightened
threat. Even if this is a long-term challenge, unlike the Afghan scenario, this is likely to be further
complicated by the propagation on social media of jihadist tenets and a flourishing literature of
jihad.
A Singapore-based academic nevertheless claimed to IHS Jane's that, unlike the post-Soviet
period in Afghanistan, the region's security agencies are more sophisticated, better equipped, and
enjoy improved interoperability, leaving them better prepared to handle the emerging threat. With
its historical experience in managing the Islamist threat, Indonesia would be well-placed to lead
from the front in any regional coalition against the Islamic State and its proxies.

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 6 of 8
ihs.com

This positive observation notwithstanding, the experience of fighting with the Islamic State in the
Syrian jihad will definitely provide a continued incentive to returnees, even if they undergo
rehabilitation or de-radicalisation programmes at home. Moreover, in common with the 1980s
Afghan experience, the returnees will have networked trans-nationally. Such experienced fighters
will be positioned to take on roles as figureheads for radical Islamism in the region. Indeed, the
more ambitious among those returnees will be likely to form new coalitions and groups that will
again motivate a new generation of jihadists in Southeast Asia.

STATE COUNTERMEASURESIn Southeast Asia, which has traditionally been a stronghold of Al-
Qaeda, there is currently growing support for the Islamic State and its violent ideology. The
Islamic State threat in and to the region is still at a nascent stage, but is growing. However,
regional governments' countermeasures to date have been minimal, with no clear trans-regional
counter-strategy in place.
In early August 2014, the Indonesian government banned support for and endorsement of the
Islamic State, and blocked websites disseminating jihadist propaganda and audio-visual material.
Both the Indonesian and Malaysian governments appear to have approached the issue from a
political and security perspective, imposing restrictions on the Islamic State in their respective
countries, which allow the authorities to crack down on supporters irrespective of their affiliation.
This includes activities on social media, or fundraising for the Islamic State cause (fundraising for
or adhesion to a foreign Islamist group had previously been regarded as legitimate and was
openly practised in Indonesia).
However, the impending threat posed by the Islamic State has changed that practice, and the
Indonesian ban includes proselytising for the group. According to an assessment from former
head of the BNPT Ansyaad Mbai, the Islamic State is more dangerous than Al-Qaeda. He said Al-
Qaeda was "mostly intent on destroying the West", whereas "[the Islamic State] wants to combat
Muslim countries that do not apply the sharia in their own interpretation."
There has therefore been an increasing effort to co-ordinate responses to the Islamic State in
Southeast Asian countries since the group's foundation, most notably between the intelligence and
security agencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Malaysia's crackdown on those militants intending to volunteer their services for the Islamic State
forced recruiters to issue directives aimed at Indonesian volunteers or prospective fighters not to
use Malaysia as a transit point to Syria.
According to media reports, the Malaysian Special Branch's Counter-Terrorism Division (SB-CTD)
had by late January 2015 apprehended 65 people en route to Iraq and Syria, as well as returnees.
Security agencies fear that volunteers could use other porous transit points through Brunei, China,
or Hong Kong to reach Turkey, making their way onwards to their final destination in Syria.
Malaysia has also called for concerted Southeast Asian co-operation against the rising Islamic
State threat in the region. In mid-October 2014, Malaysian minister of defence Hussein
Hishammuddin claimed that the ongoing US-led coalition efforts against the Islamic State were
"ineffective", and urged regional co-operation to prevent the Islamic State from gaining ground in
Southeast Asia. He also called on neighbouring countries - including Brunei, Indonesia, and the
Philippines - to implement better border security and intelligence-sharing to counter the threat.

Related Articles
The Islamic State grows its grassroots network
Choosing sides - the Islamic State's influence in South Asia
Low-lying threat - Risk from domestic radicals rises in the Maldives

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 7 of 8
ihs.com

Author
Animesh Roul is a New Delhi-based public policy analyst specialising in counter-terrorism and
armed conflict.

Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2015

© Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.
Article 1 Page 8 of 8

You might also like