Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

Author(s): Khurram AbbasSource: Policy Perspectives , Vol. 16, No. 2 (2019), pp. 41-57
Published by: Pluto Journals

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.16.2.0041

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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom
Struggle Through Nonviolent Means
Khurram Abbas

Abstract

Since 1947, Kashmiris are demanding freedom from Indian occupation. They have
adopted numerous approaches to gain independence from Indian subjugation,
including nonviolent resistance, election boycotts and international arbitration.
Various new trends in the Kashmiri freedom struggle have been observed since
2008 including a signature campaign ‘Safr-e-Azadi’ (journey for freedom) in 2008,
‘Muzaffarabad Chalo’ (Got to Muzaffarabad) march of 2008 and sit-ins of 2010
which have significantly changed the nature of Kashmir struggle. This paper
explores emerging trends of strategic nonviolent Kashmiri struggle and practical
future options to strategize the former through the prism of Gene Sharp’s Theory
of Nonviolence. This study assumes that strategic nonviolent movement in IOJ&K
has highlighted the Kashmir cause across the world. It has challenged the Indian
occupation through staging mass protests and employing new forms of strategic
methods, which will likely put India under pressure in the future. If organized,
well-coordinated and strategically planned, this struggle can be successful. In the
wake of the Indian government’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A and illegal
annexation of IOJ&K on August 5, 2019, the need for devising a well-calibrated,
inclusive and comprehensive strategy and employing all viable options for
peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute further increases.

Keywords: Kashmir Dispute, Strategic Nonviolence, Collective Action,

Sit-ins, Long March; Abrogation of Article 370 and 35A.

Introduction

The Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IOJ&K) dispute is the bone of
contention between Pakistan and India since 1947. It is commonly known
as ‘unfinished business of the partition.’ After the Indian invasion in
IOJ&K on October 27, 1947, Kashmiris of the Indian Occupied Kashmir
started their liberation struggle. For the past seven decades, it has faced
numerous ups and downs. During this time period, the Kashmiri people
including political leadership and general public adopted several
approaches to win their freedom movement. Since 1990, their freedom
struggle assumed unprecedented pace against increasing Indian
atrocities. Unlike popular scholarly notion that democracies do not use

PhD scholar, Centre of International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University
of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad; Research Officer, Islamabad Policy
Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan.

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

repressive measures to suppress political dissent, 1 India has been

employing every oppressive method to quell Kashmiri freedom struggle.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) Director, South Asia, Menakhsi
Ganguly, India has deployed additional troops in the occupied Valley and
curbed all basic human rights of the Kashmiri public.2 In this regard, it
has sought to change the demographics of IOJ&K to prolong its
occupation. In 1947, there were 79 percent Muslims in IOJ&K, but by
2016, due to Hindu settlements in the held Valley the ratio of the Muslims
has reduced to 68 percent.3 Moreover, India has deployed more than
900,000 troops and enforced numerous inhuman draconian laws to
suffocate the political environment in Kashmir.4 The number of murders,
rapes, tortures and forced disappearances is growing to alarming levels.5
Despite these state-led atrocities, there is an undeniable and persistent
nonviolent resistance struggle carried out by different segments of
society such as students, civil servents, and general public. Since 2008,
the Kashmiri people have adopted numerous nonviolent methods to show
their dissent and register their protest against illegal Indian occupation.
In this regard, Kashmiri struggle has witnessed three intensive

1
Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough are Democracies: Reassessing
Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 9-51;
David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political
Science Review 86, no. 1 (1992): 24-37, https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013; and Dan
Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002), 28-33. See also, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, “War and
the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political
Accountability,” The American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 841-845
(852), https://doi.org/10.2307/2082512; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair
Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 215-263.
2
Meenakshi Ganguly, “India Wants to Avoid Internatinal Intervention but Needs to
Address Human Rights in Kashmir,” Wire, August 17, 2019.
3
“Ayaz Urges PUIC to Demand Indepdent Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of
Pakistan, October 18, 2016, https://www.app.com.pk/ayaz-urges-puic-to-demand-
indepdent-genocide-probe-in-iok/; and Khurram Abbas, “The Kashmir Dispute and
Perceptions of Pakistan’s Youth: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Current Affairs 2,
no. 1 (2017): 95-115.
4
The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990, No. 21 (1990),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/Armed%20Forces
.pdf; and “India Imposes Tough New Restrictions in Occupied Kashmir,” Express
Tribune, September 28, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2066752/3-india-
imposes-tough-new-restrictions-occupied-kashmir/.
5
Zia Sarhadi, “Pakistan’s Young Parliamentarians Focus on Kashmir,” Crescent
International 45, no. 11 (2017), https://crescent.icit-digital.org/articles/pakistan-s-
young-parliamentarians-focus-on-kashmir; “Ayaz Urges PUIC to Demand Indepdent
Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of Pakistan; and Mirza Waheed, “India’s
Crackdown in Kashmir: Is This the World’s First Mass Blinding?” Guardian, November
8, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/08/india-crackdown-in-
kashmir-is-this-worlds-first-mass-blinding.

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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

movements in 2008, 20106 and 2016. Overall, the Kashmiri movement

has specifically employed 12 methods 7 out of 198 methods of Gene
Sharp’s strategic nonviolent struggle including staging protests,
boycotts, noncooperation/ disobedience, drum beats with anti-India
slogans, creating songs of freedom, chanting slogans by using
loudspeakers of mosques, raising slogans during the night, limited
marches within the occupied Valley, celebrating Pakistan’s independence
day and observing Indian independence day as a ‘Black Day’,
resignations of government employees, cultural protests and graffiti
movement. Since 2016, new trends have been emerging in the
nonviolent struggle, which further highlight the Kashmir dispute at the
international arena. Nevertheless, there are various other practical and
viable options available for the future nonviolent freedom movement.

Historically, Kashmir’s accession to Indian territory was based on

Aticle 370 of the Indian Constitution in 1949, which provided freedom to
Kashmiri lawmakers to formulate local laws.8 On August 5, 2019, India
unilateraly abrogated Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constituion to
end the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. This unilateral and illegal
move was widely condemned and rejected by people of IOJ&K who are
still locked in their houses since August 5, 2019. At the same time, this
act of Indian government also presents an opportunity to Kashmiri
nonviolent freedom struggle to gain international attention and
arbitration.9 For the first time in 54 years, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) gathered to discuss the prevailing situation in Kashmir
post-August 5.10 It was a major diplomatic and moral victory of Kashmiris
and Pakistan over India as New Delhi had tried to stop holding this
meeting. Likewise, the lockdown in the Valley of Kashmir has garnered
attention of the international media which is now highlighting the
deteriorating situation in IOJ&K through documentaries, news reports
and analysis on both print and electronic media. New Delhi has often
tried to confuse the freedom struggle with allegations of terrorism,
militancy and Islamic fundamentalism. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

6
Arundhati Roy, “Land and Freedom,” Guardian, August 22, 2008,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india; and Sanjay Kak,
“What are the Kashmir’s Stone Pelters Saying to Us?” Economic and Political Weekly
XLV, no. 37 (2013).
7
Author estimated this number for this study.
8
“Kashmir Special Status Explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?” Al Jazeera,
August 5, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmir-special-status-
explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html.
9
Khurram Minhas, “BJP’s Castle in the Air,” Express Tribune, August 7, 2019,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2029715/6-bjps-castle-air/.
10
Richard Roth, “UN Security Council has its First Meeting on Kashmir in Decades--
and Fails to Agree on a Statement,” CNN, August 16, 2019,
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/16/asia/un-security-council-kashmir-intl/
index.html.
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

government’s act of August 5 has exposed the Indian propaganda about

the true nature of Kashmiri freedom struggle. BJP’s illegal annexation of
IOJ&K is likely to provide a renewed impetus to the nonviolent freedom
struggle in the IOKJ&K in coming days.

The aim of this study is to understand the strategic nonviolent

struggle in the occupied Valley of Kashmir, organize and broaden the
scope of Kashmiri freedom movement by employing the best
international strategic nonviolent practices. Throughout history, regime
change, freedom and political concessions were acquired through
strategic nonviolent struggle. This study attempts to find a relationship
between Gene Sharp’s theory of Nonviolence and nonviolent struggle in
the IOJ&K. Therefore, it is based on primary and secondary data. In this
regard, the study adopts a two-pronged approach. Firstly, it discusses
the existing scholarship on the strategic nonviolent struggle in general
and Gene Sharp’s theory in particular. Secondly, through interviews with
the political activists of Kashmiri origin based in Islamabad,11 it attempts
to find emerging trends of Kashmiri struggle in recent years and
applicable strategic options, which can both enhance the momentum of
the freedom struggle and internationalize it across the world.

Nonviolence and Military Strategy

M.K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela are popularly
known as proponents of nonviolent resistance movements. They
dedicated their lives for bringing social and political change in their
societies. In any case, their battle was generally misunderstood by many,
while nonviolent strategies were often perceived as a ‘weapon of the
weak’ and proponents of nonviolence as cowards against the powerful.12
Sometimes it has been linked with religious connotations by many
scholars most notably Ira Chernus and Caron Gentry. Contrary to the
proponents of nonviolent resistance, military personnel still prefer to
follow famous strategists such as, Machiavelli, Liddell Hart and
Clausewitz. Strategists and proponents of nonviolence have
misconceptions about each other’s ideologies. Strategists view
nonviolence as a strategy of avoiding conflict, while a nonviolent school
of thought considers military strategty as ruthless.

However, an intriguing blend of the two hypotheses, i.e.,

nonviolence and strategy has been proposed by Gene Sharp who named

11
Although the author tried to contact many Kashmiri activists within the Valley, due
to lockdown and internet shutdown it was difficult to reach those activists.
12
“Gandhi’s Philosophy of Nonviolence” (Mumbai: Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal - Gandhi
Book Centre, n.d.), accessed December 17, 2019, https://www.mkgandhi.org/
africaneedsgandhi/gandhis_philosophy_of_nonviolence.htm.
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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

it as ‘strategic nonviolent struggle’. Afterwards many researchers,

including Peter Ackerman, Richard Kluger, Robert Helvey, Marshall Ganz
additionally characterized Sharp’s hypothesis of strategic nonviolent
struggle as a significant alternative to violent resistance. This broad
consolidated assertion has significantly contributed to characterizing
strategic nonviolence. Gene Sharp, also called ‘the Clausewitz of
nonviolent warfare,’ devised 198 methods of nonviolent action and
advised activists of these movements to select appropriate methods
according to nature of conflict and local circumstances.13 He suggests
that setting the ground for a nonviolent struggle is crucial. Gene Sharp
theorizes that a popular nonviolent struggle requires legitimate reason
to protest. For him, fear is the largest obstacle to converting a movement
into a success.14 He has coined the term ‘cause-consciousness’, by which
he means, publicizing the facts, issues and arguments advanced by a
nonviolent struggle group through public meetings, media, publishing of
white papers, songs to stir and strengthen the conscious and will of the
public against the oppressors, slogans of better hopes and plans for the
future.15

These strategies are vital for creating a favorable environment

for nonviolent struggle. In Sharp’s opinion, the next step is planning the
strategy for possible struggle. He emphasizes the importance of
investigation, which is largely known in academia as an assessment of
the surrounding environment. 16 He has divided the process of
formulation of grand strategy into two phases: first, to determine the
causes of conflict, list the grievances, formulate desired changes and give
the widest possible publicity to causes, facts and goals; 17 second, to
investigate the opponents, including their objectives, beliefs,
background, strengths, weaknesses, supporting institutions and the
reason of their support, sources of power, decisionmaking process, allies
and foes etc. 18 These steps are important in formulating a grand
strategy. Lack of strategic assessment and lack of knowledge regarding
the weaknesses and strengths of the opponents could lead to the failure
of a nonviolent struggle.

13
“Dr Gene Sharp: 1928-2018” (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, n.d.),
accessed December 17, 2019, https://www.aeinstein.org/dr-gene-sharp/; and Gene
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action
(Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), 365.
14
Ibid., 364.
15
Ibid., 366.
16
Ibid., 365.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

Robert Helvey, a renowned scholar on nonviolent resistance

elaborates Sharp’s theory of strategic nonviolent struggle by
comparatively analyzing it with classical strategists’ approaches, such as
Machiavelli’s and Liddell Hart’s.19 According to Helvey, there is a clear
linkage between Machiavelli’s strategies and Sharp’s thinking. Machiavelli
emphasized the changing nature of artillery as it was the best form of
technology at his time. The same is the case with a nonviolent struggle,
since Sharp postulates that in the 21st century computers, social media,
mobile apps, and television discussions are considered the major
weapons of nonviolent struggle.20 The nexus of technology and war was
considered inevitable by many strategists in general and Machiavelli in
particular. The proponents of strategic nonviolent struggle also have the
same approach and believe that the use of modern technology will help
in providing the desired results.

For Machiavelli, a battle must be quick and sharp, which is also

an important point of the strategic nonviolent struggle as defined by
Gene Sharp. Although, strategic nonviolent struggle can be decades-
long, Sharp advises leaders of nonviolent struggle to adopt the strategy
of annihilation21 during their struggle against the status quo. The basic
logic behind the quick and sharp result of a battle is that the state has
indefinite resources while the participants in the nonviolent movement
have finite endurance and limited sources. Therefore, it is better to
achieve results in a short span of time, otherwise, the morale of the
nonviolent activists as well as resources will be depleted. Helvey also
endorses Machiavelli and Sharp’s strategy and believes that planning,
coordination and struggle should be directed towards a decisive battle
against the pillars of support of the opponent.22 This debate concedes
that delay can add to complexities in the struggle, including demoralizing
participants and potential supporters as well as stalemate which will
provide ample time to the government to formulate a counter-strategy
against the struggle.

Likewise, Robert Helvey consents with Basil Liddell Hart’s concept

of ‘indirect approach’ to counter the enemy’s power. It is a similar

19
Robert L. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals
(Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 89.
20
Ibid.
21
It is also known as direct approach as defined by Clausewitz. This approach employs
targeting center of gravity of the opponent. However, this form of strategy is risky in
nature, as if the opponent survives from the first decisive battle, it can become further
difficult to remove the status quo. Hence, adoption of this strategy requires more in -
depth and well-coordinated analysis of available resources, weaknesses and strengths
of the opponent.
22
Ibid., 91.

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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

approach to the strategy of exhaustion.23 Liddell Hart believes that the

strategy of limited aim is about waiting for a change in the balance of
force. 24 He posits that targeting the weakest line of the opponent’s
defence can provide a strategic advantage.25 A selection of limited aims
and avoiding confrontation with the strong pillars of power of the
opponent can help in exhausting resources of the status quo. Both Liddell
Hart and Robert Helvey agree that this strategy can deplete the
economic and military resources of the state, hence making it vulnerable
for a decisive battle.26 He further articulates this point and says that
initially nonviolent movements do not gain momentum; hence, they do
not have the resources to wage a decisive battle. Therefore, it is
important to employ the strategy of exhaustion in the early stage of the
movement, which can be changed when the momentum is set for the
strategy of annihilation.

Furthermore, Robert Helvey argues that strategy alone is nothing

without actions and campaigns. In this regard, tactical superiority is also
very important during the nonviolent struggle.27 Hence, the raw material
of strategy and tactics must be organized and well synchronized for
achieving desired results. For the importance of tactics, the strategic
nonviolence theory has also direct relevance with Clausewitz’s concept of
the rapidly changing nature of tactics, and the adoption of new tactics in
order to win the battle. Both Sharp and Helvey believe that during the
nonviolent struggle leaders must accept changes in the environment
which largely influence the desired results, hence by giving due
importance to influencing factors during the struggle, leaders must adopt
new tactics to win the freedom struggle.28

Likewise, realists such as Machiavelli, Liddell Hart and Clausewitz,

attach great importance to forming new alliances before and during an
armed conflict in order to gain maximum resources as well as to deter
the opponent. During a strategic nonviolent struggle, Sharp also
suggests that the leaders can expand cooperation within territorial lines
but beyond ethnic, religious and nationalist groups. Expansion of

23
Contrary to strategy of annihilation, this form of strategy employs battle through a
variety of means, such as territorial occupation, destruction of crops, blockade, etc.
The basic objective of this strategy is to socially and economically compel the opponent
to surrender. In this form of strategy, soldiers are prepared for long term and for
numerous small battles against the adversary. This concept of economic damage of
the enemy plays a key role. It is also known as ‘British way of warfare’.
24
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 3rd ed. (London: Faber
and Faber, 1954), 335.
25
Ibid.
26
Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals, 93.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 92; and Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: The Methods of
Nonviolent Action.
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

cooperation beyond territorial lines, on the other hand, can be counter

productive as it would provide an excuse to those upholding the status
quo that the anti-government protests are launched not for the people
but for the protection of interests of other countries. In this globalized
world, however, it is next to impossible that multinational corporations,
nongovernmental organizations and universal or regional organizations
do not interfere or play their role in the nonviolent struggle. Therefore,
it can be argued that seeking political international allies can be
counterproductive, but non-political, noncontroversial entities and
international nongovernmental organizations can be made allies, which
can effectively contribute to a nonviolent struggle.

Emerging Trends in the Nonviolent Freedom Struggle of Kashmir

Intensification of Struggle

There are competing narratives related to the origin and intensity of the
struggle in the Valley of Kashmir. An Indian source believes that earlier
protests were largely ‘urbanized’ , while the rural population was less
inclined to the freedom struggle. 29 However, political activists from
IOJ&K— such as Altaf Hussain Wani and Abdul Rasheed—reject this
notion and claim that there is no disparity between the urban and rural
population in terms of the freedom struggle.30 The extensive literature
review and observations during interviews with two political activists
from held Kashmir Valley suggest that the intensity of the freedom
struggle kept changing based on different issues and situations. For
instance, an extrajudicial killing or a rape incident would intensify the
struggle in that particular district. However, the current uprising after
Burhan Wani’s extra-judicial killing in July 2016 has given intensification
and new impetus to the struggle, both in urban and rural areas.
According to a study by Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir Police, 2250
incidents of protests took place in 110 days after Burhan Wani’s killing.
Among these 2250 incidents, 1566 incidents took place in the rural areas
while 651 were recorded from urban centers.31 If one accepts the earlier
argument that Kashmiri struggle is primarily urbanized, then this
quantitative study annuls this claim and explains that the Kashmiri

29
Shashank Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India’” Interpreter, August
15, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kashmir-uprising-threatens-
idea-india.
30
Altaf Hussain Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations,
Islamabad), in discussion with the author, February, 2019; and Abdul Rasheed
(Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)),
in discussion with the author, January, 2018.
31
Naseer Ganai, “J-K Police Study Says after Violent Summer, Kashmir not Far from
Normalcy,” India Today, October 29, 2016, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/jammu-
and-kashmir/story/kashmir-unrest-burhan-muzaffer-wani-curfew-in-valley-349152-
2016-10-29.
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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

struggle is equally intensified in rural and urban areas. However, due to

the demographics of different districts the participation can vary from
district to district.

The fearlessness among youth is another important factor which

has intensified the Kashmiri struggle. The educated youth and majority
of them from wealthy backgrounds are joining street protests. Their
participation on one hand is revitalizing the Kashmiri struggle, while on
the other hand, it is invalidating Indian claim that it is due to lack of
employment opportunities that Kashmiri youth tends to take part in the
freedom struggle. According to experts on Kashmir there is fearlessness
and the nonviolent tendency among Kashmiri youth, which has
overwhelmed their freedom struggle. They tear off their shirts and invite
Indian forces to shoot them, which shows unprecedented bravery. 32
Many Indian scholars, like Shashank Joshi, have accepted this new trend
in Kashmir freedom struggle, which can significantly dent the Indian
strategy of indiscriminate oppression.33

Role of Social Media

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, social media has been playing a dominant
role in shaping people’s movements. Often neglected or portrayed as a
violent movement by print and electronic media, the Kashmir struggle
could not deliver the widespread message and attract world’s attention
to the grave situation in the occupied Kashmir Valley. However, the social
media has provided an unprecedented opportunity to Kashmiri political
activists to spread not only oppressive measures of the Indian
government against unarmed civilians but also the true nature of the
Kashmiri struggle for freedom. It is due to social media that the world is
constantly reminded that the Kashmiri struggle is indigenous and widely
popular. The spread of mobile phone videos through several social media
outlets including Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp is the most popular
trend in Kashmiri struggle during the past few years.34 According to one
of the Kashmiri political activists, Altaf Hussain Wani, the youth in IOJ&K
consider it a moral responsibility to spread the message of ‘freedom’ at
national and international level.35

32
Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad); and
Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC)).
33
Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India’.”
34
Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC)).
35
Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad).

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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

Social media campaigns for highlighting Indian atrocities in IOJ&K

have severely dented the ‘perceived’ Indian legitimacy domestically and
internationally. The ‘I Protest’ movement lauched by a Kashmiri singer
MC Kash in 2010 is one of the best examples of social media’s strength.
According to Altaf Hussain Wani, these were the Kashmiris who used
social media as a means to convey the message for protest venues and
reporting human rights abuses by the Indian authorities. 36 ‘I Protest’
movement virtually triggered a series of protests in Srinagar during those
weeks.37 The images of pellet gun attacks against nonviolent Kashmiri
protestors were captured and spread through social media across the
world. The innovative idea of editing images of Indian celebrities and
stars– from Bollywood and Cricket – as pellet gun victims led to severe
criticism within India against the state’s strategy of suppression of the
nonviolent freedom struggle. Hence, the Indian government was ruffled
by the social media onslaught. Consequently, even before the events of
August 5, the Indian authorities often resorted to shutting down internet
services and imposing bans on IOJ&K government employees for posting
material on social media which may be ‘prejudical to government.’ 38
Despite internet shutdown and lockdown, these new trends and effective
use of social media by the IOJ&K citizens has helped in maintaining the
momentum of nonviolent resistance in the Ocuppied Kashmir Valley. The
trend is likely to remain a vital factor in internationalizing and highlighting
the freedom struggle.

Active Participation of Youth

Since 2008, even before the killing of Burhan Wani, the Kashmiri freedom
struggle witnessed new enthusiasm and inclusiveness of all segments of
society in nonviolent protests. Unlike Indian propaganda, the Kashmiri
youth, especially undergraduates and graduates from reputed
universities have been participating in the struggle. Alhough Indian
scholars suggest that the lack of employment opportunities has
compelled them to protest against the Indian government, this argument
seems void because most of the young protesters are either students or

36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Rifat Fareed, “Kashmir: Social Media Gag on Government Workers Slammed,” Al
Jazeera, December 27, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/kashmir-
social-media-gag-government-workers-slammed-171227124240342.html; Aijaz
Hussain, “India Bans 22 Social Media Sites over Alleged Abuse Videos,” Independent,
April 27, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-bans-social-
media-sites-22-kashmir-alleged-abuse-videos-inidan-forces-soldiers-residents-
a7705766.html; and Sheikh Zaffar Iqbal, “Anger in Kashmir Valley after Blackout on
Social Media,” NDTV, April 28, 2017, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/anger-in-
kashmir-valley-after-blackout-on-social-media-1686935.

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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

belong to wealthy families/backgrounds.39 Moreover, in 2016 out of more

than 130 government employees, who had participated in freedom
rallies/protests organized by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC),
12 were sacked later by the Indian occupying authorities. 40 However,
according to Abdul Rasheed, the APHC representative, the figure of
government employees who participated in the protests is almost four
times more than the figure often reported by the Indian government.41

The overwhelming participation of youth in the freedom struggle

carries a lot of significance. More than 30 percent population in IOJ&K is
between 15 to 30 years, who can carry the hope of freedom for the next
few decades. This indicates that the freedom struggle can be prolonged
and sustained for a very long time. Contributing factors include use of
social media, glorification of those martyred and persistent inhuman
behavior by the Indian state which compel the youth to resist against the
Indian oppression and demand freedom. 42 The youth has not only
intensified the Kashmiri freedom movement, but they have also devised
innovative strategies to carry on the existing struggle. For instance, the
creation of social media groups, collective defiance of the curfew,
creation of new slogans vis-à-vis element of entertainment during
protests, not only attracts the public to join in protests but also depicts
the true nature of the nonviolent struggle. Moreover, the ‘Go India - Go
back’ drive was one of the nonviolent movements conceived and initiated
by young Kashmiri artists to critize India for its illegal occupation of
IOJ&K. In a very short time, it went viral and ordinary people started
writing this slogan in their graffitis on currency notes, street walls and
trees. It was an example of innovative protests against the Indian
authorities.

Extensive Use of Art, Music and Literature

Music, art and literature are primarily regarded recreational activities,

which are often nurtured during the times of peace and development in
any society. However, history indicates that these activities have also
played a vital role in resisting oppressive governments and colonial
powers. Music, art and literature often help in preserving the momentum
of the movement through awakening cause-conscience. In relation to
Kashmir, many writers and poets tried to depict Indian atrocities while

39
Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad); and
Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC)); Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India’.”
40
Muhammad Tahir, “Youth Protests in Kashmir,” Asia Dialogue, July 24, 2017,
https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/07/24/youth-protests-in-kashmir/.
41
Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and Representative, All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC)).
42
Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad).
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

keeping the desire of freedom alive in Kashmiris to transmit to the next

generations. Agha Shahid Ali, Basharat Peer and Mirza Waheed are some
of the writers and journalists who tried to pass on the history of the
Kashmiri struggle to the next generation by preserving it through
literature.

The youth has devised various new methods to highlight the

Kashmiri freedom struggle. In this regard, many new poets, writers,
musicians, artists have emerged on the international arena who
portrayed a true picture of Kashmiri struggle. Kashmiri singer popularly
known as MC Kash who initiated ‘I Protest’ movement, which became
highly popular is one of them. Another music band ALIF (formerly known
as HIGHWAY 61) and MC Kash have produced songs depicting freedom
struggle and Indian atrocities. Their music shows rich history and culture
of Kashmir.43 Songs such as ‘Take it in Blood,’ ‘Valley of Saints,’ ‘Listen
My Brother,’ ‘One Young Kashmir,’ ‘Why We Rebels,’ ‘Beneath the Sky’
are famous among the youth.44 Likewise, many young filmmakers such
as Musa Saeed, Aamir Bashir, MC Kash, and Iffat Fatima have produced
famous documentaries and songs on Kashmir struggle. These
documentaries include Harud (2010) Valley of Saints (2012), Take it in
Blood (2013), Khoon Diy Baarav (2015) and Abishek Majumdar’s play
Djinns of Eidgah (2013). Likewise, the trend of writing has been
developing in recent years. Famous writers such as Basharat Peer who
wrote Curfewed Night in 2008, The Collaborator by Mirza Waheed (2011),
and The Half Mother by Shahnaz Bashir in 2014, have been recording
history through their books which not only sum up the intensity of the
Kashmiri freedom struggle but also highlight Indian oppression in IOJ&K.
These emerging trends have not only counterbalanced Indian
propaganda but also spread the message of Kashmiri freedom movement
by authors of IOJ&K origin, which lends further authoroity and credibility
to their message nullifying Indian propaganda about the occupied
region, all across the world.45

Future Protest Activities

Long March

Undertaking a ‘long march’ is not only a symbol of showing dissent, but

it is also a method of mass mobilization and public awareness against the
oppressor. Gene Sharp considers the long march to be one of the most

43
“MC Kash Raps for Kashmir Protest Victims,” BBC News, December 20, 2010,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11928968.
44
Ibid.
45
Bina Shah, “Kashmir in Words,” Dawn, August 18, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1500053.
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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

significant methods of instituting regime change which offers massive

social mobilization; for instance, Gandhi’s long march known as
Satyagarah (Salt March) from March 12 to April 6, 1930 against Britsh
Raj. This method has also been employed in IOJ&K by the people of
Kashmir. In the past, two major instances had hinted that the political
leadership of the Kashmir struggle had called for long marches. First, in
1990, almost 1.5 million people including men, women and children
attempted to march towards the United Nations Military Observer’s
group office in Sonwar Bagh in Srinagar and submitted a memorandum
of their demand for the end of the Indian state’s repression and
independence from India.46 Second, 18 years later in 2008 another long
march was organized, when the APHC leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz led about
one million people to march from Baramulla in IOJ&K to Muzaffarabad in
Azad Jammu & Kashmir, which was stopped by the Indian forces with
brutal force. These two attempts present two major findings about the
Kashmir struggle: one, the long march is not an unknown phenomenon
in Kashmiri freedom movement; two, the Kashmiri people have gone
through an extensive cause-conscience phase, which has been discussed
in the theoretical framework of this study. Therefore, massive public
participation in these two long marches indicate that any new long march
in future will likely witness similar kind of positive response from the
public.

It is hard to organize, coordinate and sustain long march, yet the

impact of such long marches is equally high. The long march in 2008 was
perhaps the most dangerous in the history of IOJ&K. The participants
aimed to cross the Line of Control (LoC), which shows the determination
of the Kashmiri people for their resistance and freedom. However,
crossing the LoC includes certain dangers, including firing by the Indian
troops, and landmine explosions. Therefore, in future, the Kashmiri
leadership needs to change their direction of long marches. A long march
from Baramulla to Srinagar and from Srinagar to New Delhi could be an
effective future option to enable Kashmiri political activists to intensify
their struggle against what they consider to be an illegitimate rule. The
distance between Baramulla to Srinagar is 73.6 km, while the distance
between Srinagar to New Delhi is 827.7 km.

The above mentioned distances are less than the distance of Mao
Zedong’s long march i.e., 6000 miles and its related hardships.47 The

46
Waseem Ahmad Shah, “Kashmir Movement: A Transition from Armed Conflict to
Peaceful Resistance” (Masters diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and
Management, Sikkim University, Gangtok, 2014), 82-89.
47
Jocelyn and McEwen, “The Long March: The True Story Behind the Legendary
Journey that Made Mao’s China,” 320. Some 80,000 men, women and children left
their homes to walk with Mao into the unknown. One year, 4,000 miles and countless
battles later, fewer than 4,000 were left.
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

strategic reason for a long march starting from Baramulla is that

throughout the history of Kashmir freedom movement, Baramulla has
been the epicenter of Kashmiri nonviolent struggle and it can provide
enough manpower due to social awareness and their history of active
participation in protests to march towards Srinagar. Also, the Kashmiri
leadership must keep in mind the time and weather. Perhaps, the
summer is the most appropriate time to organize a long march. There
would also be a financial cost of such a long march. However, if a long
march could be organized, it might not only break the stalemate, but it
would also put pressure on the Indian authorities from the civil society.
Such long marches are too important to be ignored in the international
arena. There are three schools of opinion to be influenced in India: BJP,
the Congress Party and the ordinary people. Whereas the BJP has
adopted a hardline attitude to the Kashmir dispute, Congress believes in
negotiations while almost 40 percent of the general population is
unaware of the Kashmir dispute.48 A long march could also serve as a
general awareness campaign. All these factors have the potential to
bring pressure on the Indian government to seek the peaceful and
political solution of the Kashmir dispute.

Non-cooperation Movement and Strategic Boycotts

Non-cooperation and civil disobedience have been used in the past as

tools of resistance and inflicting economic harm against colonial and
oppressive powers. There are numerous examples of civil disobedience;
the most prominent among all these movements was M.K. Gandhi’s civil
disobedience movement, commonly known as the Salt March, which
took place in March-April 1930, protesting against the British rule in
India. In 1990 Kashmiri activists used this lethal weapon of protest,
when major economic actors in Kashmir including trade unions,
government employees, lawyers, teachers, workers, students, labourers,
transporters and doctors went on strike for 72 days.49 A well-coordinated
civil disobedience of such significant socioeconomic actors virtually
paralyzed the state government, consequently the government had to
resign and President’s rule was imposed in Kashmir under Governor
Jagmohan Malhotra.50 A similar movement was launched in 1991 when
the majority of government employees and police officers resigned from
their posts.51 This movement lasted for 42 days. However, it severely

48
Asghar Ali Shad (former research fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute,
Islamabad), in discussion with the author,February, 2019.
49
Rahul K. Bhonsle, India's National Security: The Asymmetrical Challenges (New
Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2004), 76.
50
V. Krishna Ananth, India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics, 1st
ed. (Delhi: Pearson Education, 2010), 353.
51
Shaheen Akhtar, “Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu & Kashmir,” Regional Studies, 9,
no. 2 (1991).
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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

hampered the state of Jammu and Kashmir’s governance. During this

movement, the political activists had set the time, which is normally half
an hour in advance, according to Pakistan Standard Time (PST). This
action was another innovative and symbolic way of protest.

These two successful instances of strikes and civil disobedience

are two examples of what can be achieved in relation to the Kashmir
struggle. Firstly, Kashmiris are cooperative and would most likely
respond positively to another massive strike or boycott against the Indian
administration. Secondly, Kashmiris are used to civil or military curfews
in the region, therefore, they would be willing to organize such strikes.
In such an environment, a well-coordinated strike by all socioeconomic
actors together with a massive civil disobedience movement could be a
strategic option for Kashmiris in the future. A general refusal to pay
electricity bills, and taxes could create severe pressure on the
government. In this regard, labourers, students, teachers, doctors,
transporters, government officials, trade unions, could join in so that
their participation would sustain the cost of strikes and boycotts.

Sit-ins

Kashmiris in the valley are used to holding one or two-day strikes and
sit-ins. However, their protest is often called off at the end of the day or
two. These protests and sit-ins are often randomly organized, and lack
strategic planning. Often issue-based protests and sit-ins are organized,
which do not enhance the socioeconomic cost of the Indian rule. A well-
planned strategy for organizing sit-ins in front of the Civil Secretariat of
the IOJ&K in Srinagar can provide positive results, including regime
change in Kashmir or resignation of governor, which would further
internationalize the Kashmir dispute. The Civil Secretariat is responsible
for governing numerous issues of Kashmir on day to day basis. Shutting
down the Civil Secretariat of the IOJ&K through sit-ins would also
severely damage the Indian propaganda about the credibility and
legitimacy of the government in occupied J&K. In 2010, a call for sit-ins
in front of Indian checkposts all across Jammu & Kashmir especially in
the held Kashmir Valley was significant enough for it to be reported in
the international media.52

Strategic Blockade

A strategic blockade is one of the lethal nonviolent weapons which has

not been used so far by the Kashmiri leadership to inflict socioeconomic

52
Mukhtar Ahmad, “Separatist Leader Calls for Sit-ins at Indian Posts across Kashmir,”
CNN, September 17, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/09/16/
india.kashmir.violence/index.html.
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 Policy Perspectives Volume 16 Issue 2

harm on the Indian Union and the local government of held Jammu &
Kashmir. Since Kashmiri political activists have no experience of blocking
roads and railway lines, blocking major arteries and disconnecting 10
districts of Kashmir from India is perhaps the most difficult undertaking.
It remains, however, an effective option to increase the cost of what
they perceive to be illegitimate Indian rule in IOJ&K.

However, as Hardy Merriman posits, there are costs and risks

involved in nonviolent action, which often participants of the movement
face during their struggle.53 The cost may include economic loss due to
boycotts and risks including arrests and repression as well as loss of
lives.54 In the case of Indian held J&K, both risks and costs are likely to
be high, if the option of the blockade is used against Indian occupying
forces. It may include the shortage of food, arrests and indiscriminate
repression from Indian Security Forces (ISF). However, all these counter
measures of the Indian Army will further underscore the Kashmir dispute
at international forums. Therefore, the effectiveness of the blockade
could be considered greater than the costs and risks involved, especially
when Kashmiris in the held Valley have experienced severe state
repression and paid the cost of demanding freedom from India in past.

Since 1989, more than 100,000 people have been killed; over
10,000 women have been raped 107,000 Kashmiri children orphaned and
23,000 Kashmiri women widowed by ISF in IOJ&K.55 Since 2016, as part
of the Kashmiri freedom struggle, people have peacefully demonstrated
against the Indian atrocities and oppression in the held Kashmir Valley.56
However, ISF have used more than two million pellets to control street
protests in IOJ&K. In 2016, more than 17,000 adults and children were
injured, nearly five thousand were arrested, the entire population spent
the summer of 2016 under a long and strict curfew.57 Altough, Kashmiri
leadership has not used strategic blockade against ISF (while the latter
has used it against the former), the selective blockade has also been
used frequently against the Kashmiri public by ISF. In ‘selective
blockades’, Indian soldiers often block supplies of food and medicines to
the Kashmiri population while these supplies to ISF and the non-Muslim
communities in Jammu continue. The selective blockade of May 2008 was
the severest among all, which compelled the Kashmiri public to start the

53
Hardy Merriman, “Costs and Risks in Nonviolent Conflict,” webinar (Washington,
D.C.: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2010), https://www.nonviolent-
conflict.org/costs-and-risks-in-nonviolent-conflict/.
54
Ibid.
55
Sarhadi, Pakistan’s Young Parliamentarians Focus on Kashmir”; “Ayaz Urges PUIC to
Demand Indepdent Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of Pakistan; and Waheed,
“India’s Crackdown in Kashmir: Is This the World’s First Mass Blinding?”
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
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 Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

long march from Baramulla to Muzzafarabad. Hence, the time has come
for the nonviolent freedom activists to turn the tables in their favor and
use blockade as a strategy to inflict harm to India and emancipate IOJ&K
from illegal Indian Occupation. The above-mentioned incidents suggest
that the cost, which has been experienced in the last 70 years, is much
higher than the cost of blockade strategy.

Conclusion

This study found a strong linkage between Gene Sharp’s Theory of

Nonviolence and the Kashmiri nonviolent freedom struggle. It explored
that several options which might be applied in the Kashmiri domestic
environment to enhance the cost of India’s continued control over the
state, especially in the light of the creation of two new Union Territories:
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in the wake of abrogation of Article 370
and 35A by the Indian government and illegal annexation of IOJ&K. The
study suggests that the long march, sit-ins, blockades and other
collective nonviolent actions as means of protest could not only enhance
the cost of India’s occupation of the Kashmir Valley but would also help
in further mobilizing Kashmiri people internally. Overall, the
aforementioned strategies could unprecedentedly enhance the
momentum of the Kashmiri nonviolent struggle. Unifying emerging
trends and these strategic nonviolent options can effectively create
problems for Indian illegitimate rule and further challenge it in future.

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