College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

University of Chicago Press

Jiang Zemin's Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for Limited
Effectiveness
Author(s): Lucian W. Pye
Source: The China Journal, No. 45 (Jan., 2001), pp. 45-51
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of the College of Asia and the Pacific, The
Australian National University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182366
Accessed: 28-10-2015 13:17 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University and University of Chicago Press are
collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The China Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 JIANG ZEMIN'S STYLE OF RULE:
GO FOR STABILITY, MONOPOLIZEPOWER
AND SETTLE FOR LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS

Lucian W. Pye

It is a peculiarityof political systems that usually it is easy to characterizepast

systems but hard to generalize about current ones. The internationalsystem
duringthe Cold Warcan now be easily described,but we have troubleexplaining
post-Cold War world politics. So it is with China:the essence of Mao's China
was clearlythe sovereigntyof ideology, Deng's Chinais capturedby the concepts
of pragmatism,reformand opening, but it is not easy to find the rightfew words
to characterize elite politics in Jiang Zemin's China. There are too many
contradictorytrends,and it is hardto tell which will be the historicallydecisive
ones and which ephemeral.
As a start, however, we can certainlysay thatpolitical stabilityhas been the
overridingobjective of JiangZemin's leadershipcircle. Their guidingprincipleis
the belief that preservingthe Party's monopoly on power is in China's highest
nationalinterest;and needless to say, they also agree that preservingthe Party's
dominationis also in their own best personal interest.Operationallythis means
thatthe leaders want governingto be a normal,routinematter-nothing dramatic
or extreme.They want governmentto be just the practiceof management,not of
politics, for that would involve contendingover values. In contrastto the constant
dramaand excitement over new departuresthat characterizedthe Mao and Deng
eras,public affairsunderJianghas become a prosaic,almostcolorless activity.
This quality of dullness seems to matchJiang's public persona,a technocrat
who, on becoming the Partychief just afterTiananmen,was scornfullycalled the
"Flowerpot"because of his "penchantfor standingaroundand looking pleasantly
idle".' Chinese political gossip has been filled with deprecatingjokes about

Bruce Gilley, "Jiang Zemin: The Great Autopilot", International Herald Tribune, 27
September2000.

THE CHINA JOURNAL,NO. 45, JANUARY 2001

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
46 THECHINAJOURNAL

Jiang's presumedlimited abilities. The truth,however,is that as a privateperson

Jiang Zemin is remarkablylively and talentedfor a Communistcadre:he speaks
excellent Russian and workable English, German and Romanian-he likes to
quote from Shakespeare and Goethe. He grew up in a scholar's household,
surroundedby books, paintingsandmusic;he plays the piano and enjoys listening
to Mozartand Beethoven.2Culturally,he is probablythe most sophisticatedof all
of China's Communistleaders.
In a peculiar way, this contradictionbetween Jiangthe public man and Jiang
the privateman parallelsthe contradictionbetweenthe dullnessof official politics
underJiang and the lively pockets of activity in the privatesectorsof the Chinese
economy and even more dramaticallyin some intellectualspheres,especially in
China'sthink tanksand artsand culturalcommunities.UrbanChinaaboundswith
activitiesthat seem to contradictthe repressivespiritof official politics.
The leadership'soverridingconcernfor stabilityand for holding onto power
has inhibited bold initiatives. The prosaic goal of just managinga government
would seem easy enough to achieve, especially when coupled with a willingness
to use repressive means. China has all the essential institutions of a moder
government,and there is no shortageof technocratsto staff the various offices.
Moreover, the Chinese public is strongly supportiveof stability, for as we all
know a key featureof the Chinesepoliticalcultureis a deep-seatedfear of luan or
chaos. Governingon automaticpilot thereforeshouldbe easy.
Yet, it turns out that effective, routine government has in fact been
surprisinglydifficult to achieve. The elaborate and well-defined structuresthat
make up the Chinese state and Partybureaucraciesfail somehow to provide the
leadershipwith the necessarytools for maintainingBeijing's control in all fields.
Throughoutthe maze of offices, all staffed with reasonablyskilled personnel,
there seems to be a huge gap betweenpolicy and performance,between purpose
and accomplishment, and between intentions and results. In some areas state
policies are effectively enforced,but in many fields the leadership'swill does not
command.
It is, of course, true that Mao was constantlyfrustratedby his inability to
make the state and Partybureaucraciesoperateaccordingto his wishes, and under
Deng the lack of coordinationin what was manifestlyan authoritarian system led
KennethLieberthal,Michel Oksenbergand David Lamptonto characterizeChina
as having a "fragmentedauthoritarian" government.3The offices, bureaus and
departments that Deng's leadership circle controlled were supposedly quite
preparedto make decisions on command,but in practicethe variousxitongs or
hierarchiesof commandoften failed to work togetherto producecoordinatedrule.

2
Lee Kuan Yew, From Third Worldto First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (New York:
HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 63-7.
3 Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision
Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1992).

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 JIANGZEMIN'SSTYLEOFRULE 47

Under Jiang Zemin the erosion of authorityhas become considerablymore

serious.People occupying what the formalorganizationalchartsdesignate as the
pinnaclesof power can issue ster orders,but the responsesare often surprisingly
limited.Those who are supposedto have high authoritycannotalways command
the actions of those who ultimately implement state policies. Much actual
authorityin China now seems to operatein violation of the laws of hierarchyin
that the devolution of power to the lower levels of the bureaucracyand to local
officials has made them the organs of effective power. At times, and in certain
areas, the will of the centre can prevail, but not always; hence power is
"fragmented"and governingis erratic.
This process of devolution was startedunder Deng Xiaoping, and it was
initially greeted as a healthy developmentbecause the system he inheritedwas
overly centralized, with too much power in the hands of his predecessor, the
fabledHelmsman.With JiangZemin, however,power has flowed downwardand
out from Beijing to such an extent that the centre has increasinglyless control
over the initiatives of local authorities, even in such critical areas as tax
collection.
Under both Mao and Deng, there were ongoing debates and factional
divisions because the decisions at the centre were sovereign commands. With
Mao the stakes in the factionalclashes were extremelyhigh, often life and death
matters. Under Deng's rule the tensions in elite relations were significantly
reduced,and losers did not always suffer any severe punishment.The topmost
officials were, however, still operatingin terms of their factional alignments,
which continuedto define how powerwas distributedwithinthe elite.
UnderJiang the standardsof civility have been raisedeven further.But more
importantly,there has been a significantchange in the structureof the factions.
Instead of factions being defined by the personal relationshipsamong the top
leaders,the devolutionof powerto the localitieshas shiftedthe alignmentsso that
the figures at the centre are associatedwith differentgeographicallocations. We
now have the Shanghaior the Sichuanor otherprovincialcliques. UnderMao and
Deng, those at the capital had command of the resources that were used to
consolidatethe differentfactions. With Jiangthose who are closer to the ground
level arethe ones who hold commandover resources,andthus geographycounts.
The informal guanxi ties that hold the factions together, however, do not
necessarily follow the bureaucraticlines of authority,as they will often jump
from one xitong to another,therebyexaggeratingthe "fragmented"characterof
politics. Even when the linkages are institutionallyclear, the supposed "clients"
down the line will often ignore the wishes of their"patrons"because the powers
of the centreare so manifestlylimited.In contrast,underMao the intense bonding
within the factions meant that a few cryptic code words would be enough to
galvanize all the membersinto concertedaction.This shift in the structureof the
factionalbases of informalpolitics has exposed the limits of Beijing's authority
over the entire country.Those who occupy the topmostpositions can continue to
pretendthat they are all powerful, but increasinglythey have to hold back on
issuing demands and ordersfor fear of exposing their own impotence. Those at

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
48 THE CHINA JOURNAL

the lower levels who now find that they commandeffective power are content to
leave undisturbedthe pretensionsof theirhonouredsuperiorsat the centre.
What has happened is that China has reverted to its great tradition of
government by feigned compliance. Imperial China possessed impressive
bureaucraticstructuresfor governing, but in practicethe emperornever had the
total power he pretendedto have as the Son of Heaven. He and his ministers
could issue their imperial decrees, and all below would pretendto tremble and
obey, but, at the operatinglevel, local authoritieswould do what made sense. No
overt challenges needed to be made, for everyonesimply hailed the greatnessof
the emperorandpretendedto be in compliance,and therebystabilitywas ensured.
That system worked well over the centuries,but it will not do today. With
modernization,China's economy and society have become more complex, with
ever greaterfunctional specializationand social differentiationcreatingan ever-
richer diversity of interests. The traditionalChinese social order was relatively
simple and could be held togetherby the bondingspirit of Confucianism.Social
gradationsexisted, but they were easily legitimized by the moral authorityof
Confucian orthodoxy. Now, however, the advancement of specialization in
moder China has resultedin the emergenceof increasingnumbersof strongand
competingspecial interests.
In this critical realm of interest formation,social change has outstripped
changes in political attitudes. The political instincts of the elite are still those
appropriateto a traditionaland highly homogeneoussociety. The leadersstill feel
thatby statingwhat they view as best for China,they have articulatedthe interests
of everyone. They do not know what to makeof the emergenceof such a diverse
rangeof special interests.Historically,in Chinesecultureany assertionof private
interest was seen as dishonourableand inherentlyimmoral.To articulateone's
own interestsopenly was seen as a displayof crassselfishness.
Today, the elite still believe that once they have defined the collective good,
everyone should suppress their different interests and accept what the leaders
have judged to be for the good of the whole country. Jiang Zemin's main
contributionto the Party's ideological thought,the Three Representations,holds
that the Party should "represent"the interestsof the "whole people". Thus, the
leadership continues to ignore the reality that coastal China has significantly
different interests from interiorChina, that urbaninterests are not those of the
countryside,and that economic progress is producingan increasingdivision of
interests.Right now the leadershiphas decidedthat it would be a good thing for
China to join the World Trade Organization,for membershipwould give the
countrydignity and statusin the eyes of the world,but they have only slowly been
forced to face the fact that membershipwill, in the short run,producea host of
losers and complaints.
The persistenceof traditionalculturalattitudesabout the treatmentof private
interests, when combined with the devolution of power to the localities, has
contributedto the shocking spread of corruptionunder Jiang. Traditionally,the
Chinese imperial system operated under the principle that the law-making
processes of governmentwere the sole preserveof the elite-the emperorand his
ministers.As the wisest people in the realm,they should be totallyfree to design

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ZEMIN'S
JIANG STYLE
OFRULE 49

policies and laws. If elements of society had any problems with the resulting
laws, they should seek redressat the law-enforcementlevel. Rules should not be
so rigid as to cause undue difficulties, and interestscould come to the enforcing
magistratesandseek a special dispensationon the groundsthat while they agreed
that the emperor'srules were wise andjust, maybein theirown particularcase an
exception might be made. And to compensatethe official for his trouble, there
was often a "smallgift".
In contrast,in modem societies the legitimaterealmfor the political play of
interest groups is precisely the law-makingprocess-the belief that if the law
damages one's interest,one should seek to change the law. Underthe rule of law
there is an absolute taboo against tamperingwith the law-enforcementprocess,
for to do so is by definitioncorruption.The currentChineseleadershipis happyto
preserve the traditionalChinese view that it is taboo to try to influence the law-
making authority,for thatis the domainthatthey aremost anxiousto preservefor
themselves. In the less differentiated,more simply structuredtraditionalChinese
society there were not enough variationsof intereststo overload the pressures
applied to the law-enforcement processes. But with the emerging, modem
Chinese socioeconomic system, the pressures seeking exceptions has grown
exponentially,and so has the feeling thatcorruptionis runningrampant.
The persistence of other traditionalChinese attitudestoward authorityhas
also greatly weakened the capabilities of the central bureaucracy.The current
leadership still operates with the notion that authorityshould be able to issue
orders and expect nothing less than docile obedience. Modem governance,
however, requires authority figures to engage in all manner of entreating,
appealing, soliciting and imploringin order to win over others. In the Chinese
tradition, such beggar-likebehaviourwas seen as inconsistentwith the dignity
associated with authority.China did not have a traditionof chivalry, of gallant
knights winning fair ladies, and thus there is no basis for honouringthe arts of
courting and beseeching. Hence cajoling and winning over others has been seen
as inconsistentwith the requirementsof dignitythatlie at the heartof the Chinese
notion of authority.
In a government with limited capabilities and limited ambitions beyond
maintainingstabilityand encouragingthe economy to grow, relationsamong the
topmost figures have been more tranquilthan at any time in the history of the
PRC. Jianghas been able to preserveelite consensusby speakingin generalterms
in supportof the economic reformsand, when necessary,mouthinga bit of leftist
rhetoric to pacify those with lingering memories of revolutionaryglory. The
leaders are awarethat thereis a need for some politicalreforms,but no-one in the
inner circle has wanted to rock the boat by calling for the degree of radical
political reformthat would shakeup the system,andprobablybenefitthe country,
but might also bring an end to Communism.To a man, the leaders agree that
Gorbachevhad been foolish, and that they would never allow what happenedto
the Soviet Union to happen in China. They deeply believed that Milosevic in
Yugoslavia was their soul-mate who knew how to hold firmly onto power, so
when he recentlycrashedthey must have felt shocked. The elite are more than

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
50 THE CHINA JOURNAL

ever committedto the propositionthat they must hang togetheror they will hang
separately.
None of Jiang's peers has the statureto challenge him. Zhu Rongji, the
recognized economic specialist, has been given thankless tasks in pushing the
transitionfrom central planning to a marketeconomy, and with the inevitable
difficulties, his reputationhas been a bit tarnished.But good soldier thathe is, he
loyally works on, content with his assigned role. Li Peng, supposedly Jiang's
nemesis, is enough of a realistto know that,even if he might wish it, thereis no
turning back the clock to more ideologically focused politics. So he seems
content with his role of headingthe NationalPeople's Congress.UnderMao and
also underDeng, leaders in the position of Zhu Rongji and Li Peng would have
had to seek securityby covertly building or strengtheninga factional base. With
Jiang, concerns about personalsecuritycan be taken care of by performingwell
one's assignedresponsibilities.
Moreover, the fragmentedcharacterof the governing structurealso means
that it is hard for anyone to build up a power base strong enough to challenge
Jiang. In 2002 Jiang is due to bow out as president,and probablyhopes to play
the role that Deng createdof "listeningto governmentfrom behind the curtain".
As of now it appearsunlikelythattherewill be a fight over the succession,for the
putative top spot is not all that attractive.Jiang will therefore probably be
replacedby Vice PresidentHu Jintao,a colourlessfigure whose advantageis that
he is 16 years Jiang'sjunior. Official leadershipwill not go to anyone of Jiang's
generationbecause he has proclaimedthatthe consensusof the leadershipis that
thereshouldbe no-one in the Politburoover 70, unless he is "indispensable".
In contrast to Jiang's cautious and placid approach to governing,
developmentsin the Chinese economy and society are turningincreasinglytense
and indeed potentiallyexplosive. Ruralunresthas been rising at an alarmingrate
as peasants rebel at paying the fees and taxes that the local authoritieskeep
raising.4Graftat the local level has also hurtBeijing, as the siphoningoff of tax
revenues is depleting the national treasury.The well-known problems with the
state-ownedenterprisesand the state bankingsystem continue to resist solution.
The list of problemsis much longer, but the concludingpoint is that everyone is
aware that the country's troublescould be a lot worse, and thus Jiang is seen as
somethingof a hero for stavingoff the easily imaginedworst-casescenarios.
As China's problemsaccumulateandintensify,the leaderswill naturallytend
to have differingviews as to what shouldbe done. In contrast,however,to Mao's
time and even Deng's, when policy "debates"drew the lines of combat between
the factions, now under Jiang's more restrainedgoverning style there is less
likelihood of disruptiveclashes, as the leadersare more inclined to deferto each
other's areasof competenceandresponsibilities.They have learnedto live and let
live over differencesaboutpolicy issues. UnderMao policy debates providedthe

4 Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, "Taxation without Representation:Peasants, the

Central and Local States in Reform China", The China Quarterly, No. 163 (September
2000), pp. 742-63.

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 JIANGZEMIN'SSTYLEOFRULE 51

pretextfor factional struggles,and thus it was usuallythe symbolismand not the

content of the policy issues that counted.Under Jiangthe substanceof the policy
issues matter, but since there are no easy solutions, the participantsare less
inclined to become passionate about alternatives.The overriding concern for
stabilityand for holdingonto power will probablybe enoughto hold in check any
drifttowarddisruptiveclashes.
JiangZemin's ultimateplace in historywill of coursedependon the outcome
of China's gropingtransitionfrom totalitarianism.It is likely that he will be able
to muddle throughthe remainderof his time in office, counting on the Chinese
tolerance for approximatesolutions, for chabuduooutcomes. More importantly,
the hundredyears of turmoilthe Chinese people have had to live through,from
the collapse of the Qing throughthe decadesof Mao's erraticand violent rule, has
left the nationalpsyche somewhattraumatized.5 Consequently,the Chinese public
is now highly risk adverse,and thus psychologicallyunpreparedto engage in the
confusion and clashes that would probablyaccompanyany nationaldebate over
what should be a new basis for nationalidentityand state legitimacy.The mood
of the countryis thus consistentwith going slow over any grandpolitical issues.
However, even if Jiang Zemin escapes disasteron his watch, there will be
many who in time will hold him accountablefor not having boldly pushed
through the political reforms that would have given China a new basis of
legitimacyto replacethe discreditedideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought.Thus, while Jiang's style of governinghas matchedthe nationalmood,
and has provided a popularlywelcomed period of political stability,history may
ultimatelyrendera morecriticaljudgmentof his role, by holdinghim accountable
for not having takenthe riskto undertakethe neededpoliticalreforms.
Yet, to be fair, Jiang has been caught in a predicament.He has been a
prisonerof the fact that his legitimacy as China's leader stemmeddirectly from
the suppressionfollowing the Tiananmenmassacre,andthus,even had he wished
to, he has not been in a good position to championsignificantpoliticalreforms.

5
Lucian W. Pye, 'Traumatized Political Cultures: The Aftereffects of Totalitarianismin
China and Russia",JapaneseJournal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 113-28.

This content downloaded from 140.119.232.8 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 13:17:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions