Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad
Jihad & Muslim Masculinities:
Explaining The Recruitment Of Young
Men To Radical Salafist Groups & Jiha-
dism In Tunisia Through Socio-Economic
Factors And Gender Performativity
Linn Marie Ulvestad
I. Introduction
While Tunisia is the only Arab country un-
dergoing a successful democratic transition fol-
lowing the Arab Uprisings, it has also become
home to an emergent Salafi-jihadi movement
following the ousting of former president Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 20111. Democratic
institutions were set up in Tunisia after the 2014
elections; however, the consolidation of demo-
cracy depends on the involvement of women
and young people in public and socio-econo-
mic life, and studies and election surveys attest
to a serious disengagement, especially among
young people2 . This participation is even weaker
at the local level because of the marginalisation
of certain regions, favouring phenomena such
as radicalisation, jihad, and smuggling, thus de-
veloping areas of lawlessness. The radical Sala-
fists have been able to establish themselves in
certain regions, overcoming the lack of public
services, both politically and socioeconomically.
Tunisia has sent more foreign fighters
abroad to join the ranks of Islamic State than
any other country in the world. Ben Ali’s mo-
nopolisation of the religious sphere and ne-
glect of socioeconomic issues, which arguably
made radical movements attractive to disillu-
sioned youth, have led to intensifying violence
in Tunisia and the export of foreign fighters to
Syria, Iraq, and Libya3. I want to examine how
the radicalisation process relates to questions
of identity with new rigorous forms of religio-
sity and Islamic challenges gradually attrac-
ting more and more young people. The iden-
tity of young men4 who have been radicalised
are shaped by gender constructs and prac-
tices, along with other contextual elements.
I will examine how gender performativity re-
lates to extremism and the desire of finding a
way out of difficult socio-economic conditions
using empirical data provided by ADD’s stu-
dy on the major factors leading to youth ra-
dicalisation in Douar Hicher and Zarzouna5.
Research questions:
My research questions are therefore
the following: How can we explain the rise of
Salafist jihadist movements in the aftermath
of the popular uprisings of 2011 in Tunisia? Is
it linked to the democratisation process, so-
cio-economic factors, or could it be explained
by gender theory? What are the motivations
of young people joining radical Salafist move-
ments, is it based on religious conviction, pre-
carious economic situations or identity politics?
II. Theoretical Framework
Radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism
While radicalisation and extremism are
often used interchangeably in political discourse
and the press, it is important to distinguish po-
pular understanding from legal and academic
definitions. According to the European Com-
mission, radicalisation seeks to change the exis-
ting political and social structure but is not ne-
cessarily violent. Extremism, on the other hand,
is considered to be the adoption of a particu-
lar ideology with the intention to use violence
263
 Affaires internationales / International Affairs

to remove the state or ruling structure and its

cases, terrorism may become ‘ideologically
elites6. They thus provide the following defi-
embedded10’. It could be argued that this is
nition of radicalisation « embracing opinions,
the case with Al-Qaeda and the notion of ter-
views, and ideas which could lead to acts of
rorism and political violence as a religious duty.
terrorism »7. Defining terrorism has however
Richards argues that terrorism is not something
proved more difficult, given that there exists
inherent to any particular non-violent ideology;
no universal legally binding definition. The
it is a method of violence that has at some time
European Union’s Framework Decision on or other been perpetrated in the cause of doc-
Combating Terrorism provided the following
trines within all of these categories. Therefore,
legal definition of terrorism nevertheless:
terrorism should be understood and concep-
tualised as a particular method of violence, re-
“An intentional act which may se- gardless of the ideological cause of the ones
riously damage a country or an in- deploying it. Terrorism should thus be ‘defined
by the nature of the act, not by the identity of
ternational organisation, committed
the perpetrators or the nature of their cause’11.
with the aim of seriously intimidating
a population, unduly compelling a When it comes to “religious radicalism”
Government or an international or- within political Islam or Islamism, understood
ganisation to perform or abstain from as both ideology and movement, we find Sa-
performing any act, seriously desta- lafist groups which are non-violent. It should
be emphasised that religious radicalism uses
bilising or destroying fundamental
various strategies that may include political
political, constitutional, economic and reformist actions, cultural struggle and the
or social structures by means of at- strengthening of the community of believers
tacks…”8 through missionary work12. Most definitions of
Salafism in the academic literature underline
According to Anthony Richards, the that the term derives from the expression al-sa-
merging of ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘ex- laf al-salih (the pious ancestors) and that Sala-
tremism’ into a single discursive framework fists consider that the Qur’an and the hadith
contributes to the blurring of the important dis- (Prophetic tradition) are the only legitimate
tinction between ‘extremism’ of thought and ources of religious conduct and reasoning13.
‘extremism’ of method9. Terrorism has often Generally, Salafists are considered to represent
been classified according to the ideology or a more literalist and puritan approach to Islamic
belief-system of its perpetrators. There are be- doctrine and practice. There is only one specific
lief-systems to which violence is integral, and interpretation of Salafism which focuses on the
ideologies may be interpreted or distorted to use of violence to bring about radical change,
explicitly justify the use of terrorism. In such commonly known as Salafist Jihadism14.

264
 Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad

the Islamic Tendency Movement (ancestor of

Jihad in Islam Ennahda) in the 1980s on the issue of demo-
cratic procedures and elections. Some militants
Jihad is a central concept in Islam, which left the party and created the Tunisian Islamic
literally means “exertion” or “effort”. On one Front (Front Islamique Tunisien - FIT) in 1986,
hand, it refers to efforts made by Muslims to the first Salafist group in the country. FIT was
improve the situation of religion and relations severely repressed from 1990 and dissolved
between men by reflection and prayer15. On because of the dispersion of its militants; some
the other hand, it refers to the different modes were exiled, others imprisoned, while the most
of expanding religion. While Jihad is often used radical left to fight in the Afghan and Bosnian
in the media as a synonym for terrorism, the jihad18. As they returned or were liberated after
original meaning goes far beyond this unders- the 2011 revolution, some of the activists struc-
tanding. In Sunni Fiqh, there has traditionally tured the Salafist movement into associations
been a distinction between Jihad al-talab (of- and political parties19. However, this effort met
fensive jihad) and jihad al-daf’ (defensive jihad). several obstacles, pertaining to the different
Offensive jihad is generally perceived to provi- objectives of the factions. The apolitical quietist
de a religious cover to the military expansion Salafist movement who was allowed to operate
of the Islamic world through conquest, while in Tunisia under Ben Ali did not wish to insti-
defensive jihad is the individual duty (fard ayn) tutionalise Salafism, while a new generation of
of every Muslim to defend the “homeland un- young Salafists was less inclined to participate
der threat” in the name of the Ulama (Islamic in politics, but also more likely to be radicalised.
religious establishment). While the former takes
place within the realm of political authority, and
With the uprisings and ousting of Ben
is carried out by soldiers and volunteers, the Ali on January 14, 2011, the Salafist move-
second calls on all believers and takes prece- ment benefitted from a new era marked by in-
dence over all other social values and obliga- dividual liberties and freedom of expression.
tions. Jihad al-daf’ requires all Muslims to parti-
The religious field, hitherto monopolised and
cipate in a manner appropriate to their means, controlled by the State, saw the appearance
by arms, if not with funds, and at the very least
of new religious actors, which capitalised on
by prayer, to ensure the survival of the commu- the collapse of the legitimacy of the official
nity of believers16. However, as Kepel points imams. Salafist sheiks gained influence, espe-
out, the supreme arm of Islam can be a two- cially in the most disadvantaged inner regions
edged sword; if the control over jihad slips outby offering religious and social services20. In
of the hands of the Ulama, it endangers the the time following the revolution there appears
established order and can lead to chaos17. The to be a generational separation within the Sa-
jihad of defence was proclaimed immediately lafist movement; the elders seek to integrate
after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red institutional politics, while young people focus
Army in December 1979 and was about de- on “street politics21”. In Tunisia, the regime
fending the Islamic land of Afghanistan from change results in a renewal of the vocabulary
the Soviet infidels. The jihadists that fought employed to talk about politics. Some Salafists
there later moved on to other Muslim lands begin to use the terms nation (watan) and ci-
that were being occupied by foreign powers. tizens (muwātinūn) where the notions of com-
munity (umma) and subjects (ra’aya) were tradi-
The Salafist movement in Tunisia tionally used. The claim of fundamental rights
(al-huqūq al-asāsiyya) and general freedoms
Salafism in Tunisia is generally consi- (al-hurriyyāt al-’āmma) also became a part
dered to be imported from Saudi Arabia and of their discourse following the revolution22.
completely foreign to traditional local Islam.
From a genealogical point of view, Tunisian Sa-
lafism is the product of a disagreement within

265

Gender performativity and Jihadism
Maleeha Aslam argues that Muslim
leadership in post-colonial societies has failed
to deliver within locally “modified” Western
frameworks of governance. The leadership
has failed to provide an innovative “vision”
and “agenda” for growth and prosperity to
its people. As a consequence, the political
agency of Muslim social capital, consisting
of many troubled but energetic young men,
has been absorbed in Islamist and terrorist
networks23. Aslam argues that Muslim men
participate in militant-jihadist Islamism as an
act of gender performativity; thus, gender
constructs and practices, along with other
contextual elements, play an important role in
influencing and propelling young men towar-
ds militant-jihadist Islamism and terrorism24.
Aslam uses Judith Butler’s gender performa-
tivity25 and Raewyn Connell’s notion of multi-
ple masculinities26 to explore militant-jihadist
Islamism and terrorism among Muslim men.
Inspired by Beauvoir, Butler considers
gender to be “styles of flesh”. The styles may
have occurred because of historical contexts
as well as other factors, and thus cultural his-
tories and processes need to be considered
in understanding variations in styles of the
flesh27. Gender is understood by Butler as
a “corporeal style, an act” that may be in-
tentional and performative, which indicates
a contingent construction of meaning28.
Connell’s theory of multiple masculinities ac-
centuates the significance of social structures
and cultural, political and socio-economic
contexts within which Muslim masculinities
are being defined, shaped and manifested.
The context of British and French colonialism
in the Muslim world is used to “historicize”
Muslim masculinities29. According to this ar-
gument, postcolonial Muslim men share a
collective sentiment of being marginalised in
their own countries and in the global society.
The marginalisation is not limited to economic
deprivation but may also include social isola-
tion at the edge of politics, race and religion30.
While Aslam provides a pilot study of Pakista-
ni Muslim masculinities, I will use a similar ap-
Affaires internationales / International Affairs
proach to examine the Tunisian case through the
empirical data provided by ADD’s study on the
major factors leading to youth radicalisation31.
III. Analysis: the rise of Salafist extremism in
Tunisia post-Arab uprisings
III.I. Democratic transition and the rise of jiha-
dism: a paradox?
Tunisia is often portrayed by Western
media as «a breeding ground for global terro-
rism»32, while at the same time being presented
as the success story of the so-called Arab Spring
with the following democratization process.
This begs the question of whether there is a link
between the two. According to a 2015 study by
the Soufan Group, between 6000 and 7000 Tu-
nisian jihadists have left for conflict zones, most
of them to Syria33. This is the highest contribu-
tion by any of the more than 100 countries who
have provided a total of estimably 30.000 forei-
gn fighters to Syria34. Meddeb suggests that to
understand this « paradox » we must go back
to the 2000-2010 decade which was marked by
an important mobilisation of Tunisian youth in
a severe confrontation with the Ben Ali regime.
This period was characterised by the high poli-
ticization of Tunisian youth with the Palestinian
intifada in 2002, invasion of Iraq in 2003, the
confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in
2006 and the clash between Israel and Hamas
in 2008. These moments played out against
the backdrop of acute social crisis: rising unem-
ployment hit university graduates leading the
first actions of the movement of unemployed
graduates in 2005 paired with the hardening
of Ben Ali’s regime and the repression of pro-
test35. Meddeb believes that jihadism bene-
fited from the acute crisis, and that repression
only filled the ranks of the radicals and turned
prisons into veritable incubators for jihadists36.
According to a study carried out by the
Tunisian National Observatory for Youth37, 1 out
of 3 young men and 1 out of 2 young women
between the age of 15 and 29 are NEET (not in
education, nor in employment, nor in training)38.
67,3% of these young people are located in the
southern or the interior regions of Tunisia39. Ac-
266

cording to Meddeb, the border economy of
Tunisia (el khat), which includes smuggling and
fraud, is an important social factor that has not
been spared by the political upheavals in Tuni-
sia since 201140. Rather, the marginalisation of
the border regions and the lack of development
policies for decades have turned these frau-
dulent activities into a true «economy of neces-
sity” and incarnates a form of « development by
substitution» of impoverished territories41. The
democratic process has not changed anything
from this point of view since the economic situa-
tion has only worsened further. The collective
hope of change provided by the revolution has
disappeared and has given way to economic
disenchantment. There is no mobilizing project
and no political or religious institution is able to
supervise young people. As an understanding
of Islam based on the centrality of the struggle,
jihadism is a formidable provider of meaning
for a generation that feels forced into battle42.
Another important factor was the total
lack of reflections on the economic model to
adapt after the revolution. The first develop-
ment plan came in 2016, the Tunisia 2016-2020
project. This only goes to show that economic
question wasn’t a priority after the fall of Ben
Ali. Consecutive governments since 2011 were
incapable of making important social and eco-
nomic decisions for fear of alienating three es-
sential forces in the country: the UGTT (Union
Générale Tunisienne du Travail); the administra-
tion - perceived by successive governments to
be a remnant of the former regime and to be
capable of blocking their decisions -; and bu-
sinessmen, who form an important and influen-
tial interest group in the media and who have
tried to protect their wallets and privileges in
a new and uncertain context43. According to
Meddeb, it is time to review economic priori-
ties and above all escape the Ben Ali regime’s
political economy which was centered on the
creation and protection of different kinds of
revenues, on the clientelist management of
the social groups who benefit from them and
on the perversion of the rule of law44. Thus,
people’s demand for economic and social in-
clusion should be responded to with “more
state but in other ways”45. This means rein-
Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad
venting the state in Tunisia, beginning with
the long-delayed decentralization process.
III.II. Salafist youth: a product of Ben Ali’s re-
gime?
It has been argued that the emergence
of Salafist youth movements is a product of
the Ben Ali regime, based on an authorita-
rian state with an economy favoring the elites,
and leaving out the working classes, who in
turn experienced a deprivation in living stan-
dard46. According to Meddeb, the poorly edu-
cated and disadvantaged youth suffers from a
double crisis of future and meaning, with the
lack of prospects going hand in hand with the
quest for a new spirituality47. Fabio Merone and
Francesco Cavatorta go even further and argue
that “Islam provides these young people with
points of reference to explain their marginal
socio-economic condition and a way out”48.
Ben Ali’s firm control over the religious sphere
meant there were few religious groups to fill the
void after the fall of the regime, which in turn
made it possible for radical groups to preach
their ideas and convert new supporters among
the marginalised youth. Ennahda focused on
constitution building and political struggles
after the revolution and was not able to strike
a reasonable balance between politics and re-
ligion. Furthermore, their failure to break with
the past political system opened the door for
social and political contestation49. J. P. Filiu ar-
gues that the way of governing by The Arab
ruling elite building up to the 2011 uprisings
slowly turned the remnants of the colonial go-
verning model into a dystopian system. This
model of governing which looks solely after
the elites’ interests and uses all the tools of a
police state to stay in power and loot the eco-
nomy have conjured into existence an even
more evil twin, namely, the Islamic jihadist50.
Violent radicalisation in Tunisia has a si-
gnificant generational dimension: according to
the figures of the Tunisian Center for Research
and Studies on Terrorism, 80% of the detainees
in the context of terrorism cases belong to
the category 18-34 years old51. The study also
showed that about 40% of a sample of 1,000
267

Tunisian terrorists were university graduates.
Young people were expecting a lot from the
democratic transition, but the socio-econo-
mic situation that followed was not conducive
for them to realize their dreams. These young
people, weakened by the economic crisis, felt
more and more marginalised in society. This
marginalisation has created an ideal environ-
ment for the proliferation of radical ideas.
Added to this are the failures of successive go-
vernments to put in place sustainable strate-
gies to deal with the difficulties experienced
by these young people52. Violent engagement
contributes to legitimising this rejection of a
corrupt and unjust society and to glorifying the
victimisation of individuals who have not been
given an opportunity to escape. Jihadism has,
therefore, become a particularly important
discourse of rupture for many young men.
III.III. Religion as mobilisation & gender as
justification
Popovski illustrates the significance of
religion as a mobilizing tool and emphasizes:
“religions do not produce conflict directly, but
they can easily be employed as . . . a propa-
ganda strategy to mobilize more fighters”53.
If religion “mobilizes” individuals, Aslam ar-
gues that gender “justifies” for individuals
their combative and confrontational actions54.
She aims to shift the discussion on counterter-
rorism from religion to gender, by examining
how socially prescribed and idealized norms
for the male gender make men willing to ex-
periment with militant-jihadist Islamism, and
even terrorism. These acts carried out with
the goal of alleviating financial hardships and
social inadequacies or seeking adventure and
the lifestyle of a « hero » is a way of confirming
their « manliness »55. This explains why men
indulge in risky behaviors and displays of phy-
sical force either to assert or regain their (lost)
“honor”. ADD believes that misery, academic
failure, the feeling of humiliation and neglect
made young people in the two ghettoized
areas examined favorable to the preaching
of radical Islam linked to the jihadist groups.
The transformation of feelings of frustration
and denigration into hatred of the society
Affaires internationales / International Affairs
preached by a ‘rigorous Islam’ in an explicit
and sacred normative framework thus allows
radicalised social actors and actresses to build
a new imaginary identity exalting the eleva-
tion, the heroism and the norms of the sacred56.
Aslam’s theory is also interesting
seen together with ADDs analysis of young
people’s reasoning for joining radical Salafist
movements. ADD argues that the radicalisa-
tion of these groups takes place within the
question of ‘identity’ with new rigorous forms
of religiosity and ‘Islamic’ challenges gradual-
ly attracting more and more young people.
Radical discourse, often presented by influen-
tial sheikhs, could be said to offer a ‘virtual’
identity, promoting the “ready to consume”
way of life, based on the hatred of the other
and the current world whose primary goal is
self-confirmation within an ideal world that
places radicalised people in a ‘divine’ mis-
sion57. In this way, religion provides refuge
for the expectations of young people and
generally leads to changes in attitudes, which
makes it possible to escape a hard-to-change
reality. This is coherent with Aslam argument
that “wartime roles” which are assigned to
men, are manifestations by which existing
cultural and psychological understandings of
gender roles are further authenticated and
made relevant to current political contexts58.
Therefore, it becomes apparent that it
does not suffice to explain youth radicalisa-
tion by religious, political and socio-economic
factors alone. In line with Olivier Roy, ADD
argues that “violent radicalisation is not the
consequence of religious radicalisation, even
though it often borrows its paths and para-
digms”59. The study carried out in the delega-
tions of Zarzouna and Douar Hicher sustains
this observation and showed that the process
of radicalisation, is complex to the extent that
there is no predictable standard path of the ra-
dicalised individual. On the other hand, there
is a set of subjective factors that act mutually
to lead to the pronounced risk of radicalisa-
tion. While 90.3% of those surveyed are reluc-
tant to engage in radical groups, 7% are sym-
pathetic to these movements because of the
268

socio-economic services undertaken by these
groups60. Given that the majority of the young
people interviewed by ADD did not have any
fixed income of their own this shouldn’t come
as a surprise. One of the most salient obser-
vations in the case study, however, is how the
lack of places of leisure favors the apathy of
young people, which in turn make them resort
to other existing places, such as the Internet
and the mosque (including those beyond the
control of the state). This, in turn, becomes a
space of socialization on the margins of so-
ciety and a fertile ground for the recruitment of
young people to radical Salafist movements61.
IV. Discussion: explaining youth recruitment
to extremism and jihadism in Tunisia
Throughout this paper, we have seen
how jihadism has become a global phenome-
non, facilitated by the interconnectedness of
modern times with the internet and extensive
travelling. In this context the traditional ideas
of nation states and borders become inept.
Therefore, the framing of Tunisia as a «jihadist
breeding ground» seems utterly out of touch
with contemporary time. Rather, violent radica-
lisation must be understood as a complex glo-
bal phenomenon where boundaries no longer
make sense. As an example, the radicalisation
of both Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the Ber-
lin bombing, and that of Mohamed Lahouij, the
perpetrator of the attack in Nice, took place on
European soil62. Nevertheless, the recruitment
of young men to extremist and terrorist groups
in Tunisia should not be disregarded. According
to the Tunisian Minister of Interior, Hédi Me-
jdoub, no less than 27,371 people have been
prevented from leaving the territory since 2013,
suspected of trying to join the ranks of Islamic
State63. This astoundingly high number indi-
cates that the Tunisian state is failing to integrate
its youth and giving them viable alternatives.
Leila Talani argues that the crisis of the
Arab state within globalisation seems to pro-
duce an increasing radicalisation of society,
with all it implies in terms of further marginali-
sation. She sees globalisation an “a sort of vir-
tuous circle that once activated produces more
Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad
and more integration”64. Therefore, societies
that are unable to keep up with this constant
updating are doomed to become more and
more marginalised and worse off from globa-
lisation. According to Talani, the Arab world
has experienced the crisis of the nation-state
as a consequence of globalisation and the lack
of a regional integration project in the MENA,
which has been accompanied by a progressive
re-Islamization of civil society, reflected in the
emergence of a distinct Islamic social capital65.
As a consequence of the extremely repressive
nature of the Tunisian regime in more recent
years, the Islamist movements could not be
actively involved in social and charity activities
on the ground, nevertheless, the re-Islamiza-
tion of the Tunisian society was a reality for at
least a decade before the uprising of 201166.
When we look at ADDs study on fac-
tors conducing to youth radicalisation in Tuni-
sia, it is apparent that the state is considered
responsible for youth recruitment to jihadist
groups because of its inability to reduce unem-
ployment and poverty and to establish an in-
clusive education system. It must be noted that
the majority of those interviewed by ADD were
unemployed and did not have any source of
income which naturally leads to anguish. This,
in turn, explains the fact that socio-economic
factors have gained the upper hand when it
comes to analysing the factors of radicalisa-
tion of young people67. When it comes to reli-
gious conviction, the study indicates that 75%
of those surveyed are practicing Muslims, the
majority of whom pray at the mosque on a re-
gular basis (60%)68. This indicates that while
religion certainly is an important part of their
lives, it seems to gain importance in times of
hardship, and cannot be understood as the
sole reason for joining radical Salafist groups.
Aslam suggests that a predominance of
men as terrorists and suicide bombers is sug-
gestive of an upheaval in practices of Muslim
masculinities69. Muslim masculinity based on
class resentment must be understood within
contexts of marginalised existences and protest
expressions. In this sense, the oppression and
occupation of Muslim populations and lands
269
 Affaires internationales / International Affairs

intrude upon the basic dignity of manhood

which creates a crisis for young men. When
we look at the construction of Tunisian mas-
culinity, it becomes evident that the crisis of
youth unemployment and lack of opportuni-
ties more generally have put young Tunisian
men in a difficult situation where they feel like
they have little or no options. Radical Salafist
groups are able to recruit these young men
in spaces such as mosques that are not su-
pervised by the state because it often beco-
mes the only meeting place in disadvantaged
areas. The radical Salafist groups have suc-
ceeded in adapting their cause by including
words like fundamental rights and general
freedoms in their discourse to fit the visions
of young men who were disappointed by
the result of the popular uprisings. The lack
of decent alternative makes jihad appealing
in the eyes of troubled young men; they are
offered a noble cause giving them meaning
and the economic means to obtain their in-
dependence and respect from those around
them. In that sense, these young men young
men could be said to regain the “honor” they
have lost as a result of being unemployed
and suffering from the economic crisis.

Aslam sees the relationship between

gender performativity and politics as one of
the most critical elements to be considered
for successfully narrowing down militant and
terrorist tendencies among huge populations
of men across the Muslim world. This leads
us to the question of how tangible this dis-
ruption in the practice of global masculinity
is, and whether it can be reversed? Connell
is optimistic and argues the crisis may strike
a peculiar system, where masculinity is only
a configuration of certain practices within this
larger system of gender relations70. In other
words, attempts can be made at transforming
certain practices that characterise masculinity,
which in turn is promising for the understan-
ding of masculinity and deradicalisation71.

V. Conclusion

This paper has shown that the rise of

radical Salafist movements and jihadism in the

270

aftermath of the popular uprisings of 2011 in
Tunisia cannot be explained by socioeconomic
factors or religion alone. To frame it as a «new
phenomenon» linked to the democratisation
process after 2011 also appears short-sighted,
given the Islamisation of society and youth mo-
bilisation that took place in the first decade
of the 2000s. Rather, I argue that we must un-
derstand the precarious economic situation
experienced by the majority of young people
in rural areas, paired with the deception of the
democratic transition in interplay with gender
relations. I thus agree with Aslam’s view of reli-
gion as mobilisation and gender as justification.
Young women suffer from the same socio-eco-
nomic context as their male counterparts, and
yet the large majority of young people who be-
come radicalised and join jihadist movements
are men. Therefore, it is evident that the gen-
der component and constructions of Muslim
masculinities must be considered to produce
effective deradicalisation measures. Gender
performances are temporal and there is always
an opening for introducing or rejecting cer-
tain practices of the masculine gender. In the
context of preventing youth recruitment to jiha-
dist groups in Tunisia, there is, therefore, reason
to be hopeful if the state implements a strategy
that prioritizes prevention and tackles the roots
of radicalisation. However, in order to succeed,
it must focus on both the socioeconomic fac-
tors and how gender relations shape ideas of
masculinity and the motivations of young men.
References:
Books:
Aslam, Maleeha (2012) Gender-based ex-
plosions: the nexus between Muslim masculinities,
jihadist Islamism, and terrorism, Tokyo; New York;
Paris: United Nations University press
Butler, Judith (2007). Gender Trouble: Femi-
nism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and
London: Routledge, pp 1-305.
Connell, Raewyn (2005). Masculinities. Se-
cond Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press. [History and
critique of theories of masculinity, with the life-his-
tory study of contrasting groups of Australian men.]
pp. 1-349.
Filiu, J.P. (2016) From Deep State to Islamic
State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi
Legacy, (CERI Series in Comparative Politics and
Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad
International Studies, Oxford University Press, pp
1-224.
Hashmi, Taj (2014) “Chapter 5: Global Jihad:
Philosophies and Flashpoints” in Global Jihad and
America: The Hundred-Year War Beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan, pp. 164-206.
Hegghammer, Thomas (2009) «Jihadi Salafis
or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the
Study of Islamist Militancy», in R Meijer (ed), Global
Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, (Lon-
don/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press,
2009), pp. 244-266.
Jenkins, Brian (1981) “The study of terro-
rism: definitional problems”, in Yonah Alexander
and J. M. Gleason, eds, Behavioural and quanti-
tative perspectives on terrorism, New York: Perga-
mon, pp. 1-396.
Meddeb, Hamza (2015) “Rente frontalière et
injustice sociale en Tunisie” (Chapter 2) in L’État
d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie. Paris:
Éditions Karthala ; Centre de recherches internatio-
nales, pp. 63-98.
Popovski, Vesselin (2009) “Religion and
War”, in V. Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Tur-
ner (eds) World Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, pp. 1-372.
Roy, Olivier (2016) Le djihad et la mort, Paris,
Seuil, pp. 1-176.
Academic articles:
Anderson, Lisa (October 1987) “The State
in the Middle East and North Africa”, Comparative
Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-18.
Gilles Kepel (2003) “The origins and deve-
lopment of the Jihadist movement: from anti-com-
munism to terrorism”, Asian Affairs, 34:2, pp. 91-
108.
Meddeb, Hamza & Fahmi, Georges (Octo-
ber 2015) “Market for Jihad. Radicalisation in Tuni-
sia”, Carnegie Middle East Center, pp. 1-30.
Meijer, Roel (January 2017) « Salafisme : de
l’observation doctrinale à l’engagement politique »,
in Salafisme: Un islam mondialisé ?, Moyen-Orient
n° 33, pp. 28-33.
Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco
(17.08.2012) “The emergence of Salafism in Tu-
nisia”, Jadaliyya, available: http://www.jadaliyya.
com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence-of-sala-
fism-in-tunisia [Accessed 25 April 2018].
Merone , Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco
(2012) “Salafist mouvance and sheikh-ism in the
Tunisian democratic transition”, Working Papers in
International Studies, Centre for International Stu-
dies, Dublin City University, n°7/2012, pp. 1-19.
Munt, Harry (June 2015) ““No two reli-
271

gions”: Non-Muslims in the early Islamic Hijaz”,
Bulletin of SOAS, Vol.78:2 pp. 249–269.
Popovski, V. (2009) “Religion and War”, in
V. Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds)
World Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, pp. 11–29.
Richards, Anthony (2015) ‘From terrorism
to ‘radicalisation’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism
imperative or loss of focus?’, International Affairs,
91(2), pp. 371-380.
Storm, Lise (2009) “The Persistence of A sessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria
thoritarianism as a Source of Radicalisation in Nor-
th Africa”, Royal Institute of International Affairs
1944, Vol. 85, No. 5, North Africa in Transition, pp.
997-1013.
Talani, Leila Simona (2017) «Women, Glo-
balisation and Civil Society in the MENA Area:
Between Marginalisation and Radicalisation»,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 19:5,
pp. 499-523, available: https://doi.org/10.1080/1
9448953.2017.1296258 [Accessed 27 April 2018].
Torelli, Stefano, Merone, Fabio & Cavator-
ta, Francesco (2012) “Salafism in Tunisia: Challen-
ges and Opportunities for Democratization”,
Middle East Policy, Volume 19 Issue 4 Winter, pp.
140–154.
Studies and reports:
Association pour la promotion du Droit à la
Différence (ADD) & ONU Femmes (2017) Le pla-
fond de verre : Etude basée sur l’Analyse en Com-
posante Principale (ACP) sur les processus des fac-
teurs majeurs de la radicalisation des jeunes des
deux sexes à Zarzouna et Douar Hicher en Tunisie,
[online], pp. 1-44, available: http://www2.unwo-
men.org/-/media/field%20office%20maghreb/
documents/publications/2017/07/etude%20
fr%20vf%2026%2007.pdf?la=fr&vs=4342 [Ac-
cessed 25 April 2018].
European Commission (March 2015) Reli-
gious fundamentalism and radicalisation [online],
pp. 1-8, available: http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551342/EPRS_
BRI(2015)551342_EN.pdf [Accessed 25 April
2018].
European Commission Expert Group on
Violent Radicalisation (March 2008) Radicalisation
processes leading to acts of terrorism, [online],
pp. 1-20, available: http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/
files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20
Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf [Ac-
cessed 25 April 2018].
European Council (13 June 2002) Coun-
cil Framework Decision on combating terrorism
(2002/475/JHA), [online], available: https://
Affaires internationales / International Affairs
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ce-
lex:32002F0475 [Accessed 25 April 2018].
International Crisis Group (22 June 2016)
“Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a
National Strategy”, Briefing N° 50 /Middle East and
North Africa, [online], available: https://www.crisis-
group.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/
tunisia/jihadist-violence-tunisia-urgent-need-natio-
nal-strategy [Accessed 26 April 2018].
The Soufan Group (2015), An Updated As-
and Iraq, [online], pp. 1-26, available: http://sou-
fangroup.com/wp-contentuploads/2015/12/TSG_
ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf [Accessed 25 April
2018].
Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on
Terrorism (2016) Le terrorisme en Tunisie à travers
les dossiers judiciaires, available: https://ftdes.net/
fr/terrorisme-tunisie-a-travers-dossiers-judiciaires/
[Accessed 25 April 2018].
Interviews and news articles:
Amghar, Samir (18.03.2012) «Qui sont les
salafistes tunisiens? », Kapitalis, available:http://
www.kapitalis.com/politique/8876-qui-sont-les-sa-
lafistes-tunisiens.html [Accessed 25 April 2018].
Lakhal, Malek & Szakal, Vanessa
(27.01.2018), “Interview with Hamza Meddeb:
“The system keeps youth at the margins of so-
ciety” , Nawaat, [online], available: https://nawaat.
org/portail/2018/01/27/interview-with-hamza-
meddeb-the-system-keeps-youth-at-the-margins-
of-society/ [Accessed 25 April 2018].
Portes, Thierry (23.12.2016) “La Tunisie,
ce vivier du terrorisme mondial», Le Figaro, [on-
line], available: http://www.lefigaro.fr/internatio-
nal/2016/12/22/01003-20161222ARTFIG00196-
la-tunsie-ce-vivier-du-terrorisme-mondial.php
[Accessed 25 April 2018].
Soudani, Seif (27.12.2016) “Tunisie. Ham-
za Meddeb: « La montée de la radicalisation n’est
pas liée à la démocratisation »”, Le Courrier d’Atlas
[online], available: https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.
com/tunisie-hamza-meddeb-«-la-montee-de-la-
radicalisation-n-est-pas-liee-a-la-democratisa-
tion-»--7021 [Accessed 25 April 2018].
T. H. (21.04.2017) “Qui a envoyé des jeunes
tunisiens combattre avec Daech : les premières ré-
vélations du ministre de l’Intérieur, Hédi Mejdoub”,
Leaders, [online], available:
http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/22145-qui-a-en-
voye-des-jeunes-tunisiens-combattre-avec-daech-
les-premieres-revelations-du-ministre-de-l-inte-
rieur-hedi-mejdoub [Accessed 25 April 2018].
272

Fatwas:
Al Qaeda (23 august 1996) “Declaration of
Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of
the Two Holy Mosques”, available: http://college.
cengage.com/history/primary_sources/world/two_
holy_mosques.htm
[Accessed 28 April 2018].
World Islamic Front (23 February 1998)
“World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad
Against Jews and Crusaders”, available: https://
fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm [Ac-
cessed 28 April 2018].
Endnotes:
1 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges (October
2015) “Market for Jihad. Radicalisation in Tunisia”,
Carnegie Middle East Center
2 See Association pour la promotion du Droit à la
Différence (ADD) & ONU Femmes (2017) Le plafond
de verre : Etude basée sur l’Analyse en Composante
Principale (ACP) sur les processus des facteurs ma-
jeurs de la radicalisation des jeunes des deux sexes
à Zarzouna et Douar Hicher en Tunisie
3 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges op. cit. (Octo-
ber 2015)
4 In ADD’s study, 450 young people were inter-
viewed. With the following definition of extremism;
“the willingness to accept recourse to violence,
without, necessarily turning to the exercise of vio-
lence”, they considered that 4,8 % were radicalised.
Men make up 90,90 % while women make up 9,09%
of radicalised individuals interviewed, which is why I
chose to focus on men. Droit à la Différence (ADD)
& ONU Femmes op. cit. (2017) pp. 22.
5 ADD & ONU Femmes op. cit. (2017).
6 European Commission (March 2015) “Religious
fundamentalism and radicalisation”, European Par-
liamentary Research Service, pp. 5.
7 Ibid
8 Council Framework Decision (13 June 2002) on
combating terrorism. (2002/475/JHA).
9 Richards, Anthony (2015) ‘From terrorism to ‘ra-
dicalisation’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism impe-
rative or loss of focus?’, International Affairs, 91(2),
pp. 375.
10 Richards, Anthony (2015) op. cit. pp. 375.
Jihad & Muslim Masculinities, Ulvestad
11 Jenkins, Brian (1981) “The study of terrorism:
definitional problems”, in Yonah Alexander and J.
M. Gleason, eds, Behavioural and quantitative pers-
pectives on terrorism, pp. 2–3.
12 European Commission op. cit. (March 2015) pp.
5.
13 Hegghammer, Thomas (2009) «Jihadi Salafis or
Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the Stu-
dy of Islamist Militancy», in R Meijer (ed), Global Sa-
lafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, pp. 248.
14 European Commission op. cit. (March 2015) pp.
6.
15 Gilles Kepel (2003) “The origins and develop-
ment of the Jihadist movement: from anti-commu-
nism to terrorism”, Asian Affairs, 34:2, pp. 92.
16 Gilles Kepel op. cit. (2003) pp.93.
17 Ibid.
18 Torelli, Stefano, Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta,
Francesco (2012) “Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges
and Opportunities for Democratization”, Middle
East Policy, pp. 141.
19 Amghar, Samir (18.03.2012) «Qui sont les sala-
fistes tunisiens?», Kapitalis.
20 Meddeb Hamza & Fahmi Georges op. cit. (Oc-
tober 2015).
21 Merone, Fabio &Cavatorta, Francesco
(17.08.2012) “The emergence of Salafism in Tuni-
sia”, Jadaliyya.
22 Meijer, Roel (January 2017) « Salafisme : de l’ob-
servation doctrinale à l’engagement politique », in
Salafisme: Un Islam mondialisé ?, Moyen-Orient n°
33, pp. 28-33.
23 Aslam, Maleeha (2012) Gender-based explo-
sions: the nexus between Muslim masculinities, ji-
hadist Islamism, and terrorism.
24 Ibid. pp. 3.
25 Butler, Judith (2007). Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity.
26 Connell, Raewyn (2005). Masculinities. Second
273

Edition.
27 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 80.
28 g Butler, Judith op. cit. (2007) pp. 190.
29 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 74.
30 Ibid
31 ADD & ONU Femmes op. cit. (2017).
32 See Portes, Thierry (23.12.2016) “La Tunisie, ce
vivier du terrorisme mondial», Le Figaro.
33 Soufan Group (2015) FOREIGN FIGHTERS: An
Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Figh-
ters into Syria and Iraq.
34 Ibid.
35 Soudani, Seif (27.12.2016) «Tunisie. Hamza
Meddeb: « La montée de la radicalisation n’est
pas liée à la démocratisation », Le Courrier d’At-
las.
36 Ibid.
37 Observatoire National de la Jeunesse (2017)
Surmonter les Obstacles à l’Inclusion des Jeunes.
38 Observatoire National de la Jeunesse op. cit.
(2017) pp. 24, in ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017)
pp. 8.
39 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 8.
40 Meddeb, Hamza (2015) «Rente frontalière et
injustice sociale en Tunisie» in L’État d’injustice au
Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie. pp. 63.
41 Ibid. pp. 64.
42 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016).
43 Lakhal, Malek & Szakal, Vanessa (27.01.2018),
“Interview with Hamza Meddeb: “The system
keeps youth at the margins of society”, Nawaat.
44 Ibid.
45 Philippe Aghion in Lakhal, Malek & Szakal,
Vanessa op. cit. (27.01.2018).
46 Merone , Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco (2012)
“Salafist mouvance and sheikh-ism in the Tunisian
democratic transition”, Working Papers in Interna-
tional Studies, n°7/2012.
Affaires internationales / International Affairs
47 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016).
48 Merone, Fabio & Cavatorta, Francesco op. cit.
(2012), pp. 7-8.
49 Hamza Meddeb & Georges Fahmi op. cit. (Octo-
ber 2015)
50 Filiu, J.P. op. cit. (2016) pp. 148-150.
51Tunisian Center for Research and Studies on Ter-
rorism (2016) “Le terrorisme en Tunisie à travers les
dossiers judiciaires”.
52 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 4.
53 Popovski, Vesselin (2009) “Religion and War”, in V.
Popovski, G. M. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds) World
Religions and Norms of War. Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, pp. 11–29.
54 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012).
55 Ibid
56 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 7.
57 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 5-6.
58 Aslam, Maleeha op. cit. (2012) pp. 4.
59 Olivier Roy (2016) Le djihad et la mort, Paris, Seuil,
pp. 18.
60 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 9.
61 Ibid. pp. 10.
62 Soudani, Seif op. cit. (27.12.2016).
63 T. H. (21.04.2017) «Qui a envoyé des jeunes tu-
nisiens combattre avec Daech : les premières révéla-
tions du ministre de l’Intérieur, Hédi Mejdoub», Lea-
ders.
64 Talani, Leila Simona (2017) «Women, Globalisation
and Civil Society in the MENA Area: Between Margi-
nalisation and Radicalisation»
65 Talani, Leila Simona op. cit. (2017)
66 Ibid
67 ADD & UN Women op. cit. (2017) pp. 24.
274