#8 3. UST Lecture 8d Component Reliability Programme - Final

Hong Kong Airworthiness Course
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

MSc in Aeronautical Engineering
AESF571O
Lecture 8d
Component Reliability Programme
By Ir WC Cheung
Maintenance and Reliability Reporting

Ir. WC Cheung
20 -31 May 2019
Component Reliability Programme
Topics:
• Purpose of fleet reliability
• Applicability of the reliability programme
• Operator’s responsibilities
• Programme control committee
• Programme control document
• Type of information collected
• Display and reporting of information
• Analysis, interpretation of the information
• Corrective actions
• Quality management
• Summary of the Reliability Programme
• Supplementary Information for Weibull Analysis
Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 1
Purpose of fleet reliability
• The primary objectives of the reliability programme are:
• to ensure the current maintenance programme is effective and
maintenance intervals are adequate
• to identify any need for corrective action
• to establish what corrective action is needed
• to determine the effectiveness of that action
• Reliability Programme output must drive development of the Maintenance
Programme, e.g. to facilitate maintenance task selection and frequency as
well as, if applicable, subsequent optimisation of the maintenance
programme

Applicability of the reliability programme
Applicability:
• As per HKAR-1 Section 1.6 Sub-section1.6-2 MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT, a reliability

programme is part of the aircraft’s ‘ Maintenance Programme’ when the latter is
developed based on reliability centre maintenance (RCM) logic process.
• It is also required when specified by the manufacturer's Maintenance Planning

Document or a Maintenance Review Board Report.

Operator’s responsibilities
According to HKAR-1 sub-section 1.6-2 Appendix 1, the Operators need to put in place
the following for its reliability programme:
• Establish a programme control committee ( usually known as the Reliability Control

Committee), with clear accountabilities of all committee members, and a programme
control document
• Establish appropriate in-house reliability expertise and appoint a programme manager
• Formally link the aircraft maintenance programme to the reliability programme
• Document all decisions and rationales, in particular, when not implementing a
proposed corrective action
• Include the reliability programme within the quality assurance management system

Operator’s responsibilities
Presentation of Reliability Information to CAD
The format and type of reliability information to be presented to CAD will have to be
agreed with the latter. The documentations should define the following:-
(a) The format and content of the reports
(b) The time scale for the production of reports together with their distribution

Programme control committee
Organisation of the Reliability Control Committee:
• Comprises typically managers from Quality Assurance, Maintenance, Engineering

and Engineers from Reliability or Production
• Normally headed by the Quality Manager or Engineering Manager
• It will be beneficial to invite representatives from the operator’s contracted MRO
too.

Programme control committee
Responsibilities of the Programme Control Committee:
• Responsible for implementation, decision making and overall running of the

reliability programme
• Establishes close co-operation between all relevant departments and other
personnel within Operator’s own Organisation
• Ensures liaison with contracted maintenance organisations
• Carries out management oversight of sub-contracted tasks, i.e. ITM service
provider
• Meets regularly, usually monthly, to review the programme summary and
ascertains corrective actions and timescales
• Holds formal review meetings with the regulatory authority at agreed intervals
(usually monthly or quarterly, depending on operators’ fleet size) to assess the
effectiveness of the programme and, if necessary, consider any changes to it.

Programme Control Document
Purposes of Programme Control Document:
• Describes (in the Maintenance Management Exposition (MME) or Engineering Procedures

manual (EPM)) how the relevant regulatory requirements, i.e. HKAR-1 and CAD418 (Condition
Monitored Maintenance Handbook), are met
• Clearly defines the objectives of the programme
• States the items or systems to which the programme is applicable
• Cross references the off-wing engine maintenance programme
• Lists the type of information needed to meet the objectives of the programme
• Lists the sources of this information
• Develops and details the transmission of the information from various sources
• Includes procedures for the collection and receipt of the information
• Describes the statistical reliability, normal behaviour levels and analysing functions
• Establishes when and how any necessary corrective action will be taken
• Method of amending the Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP) and Engine Maintenance
Programme (EMP)
• Describes procedures for approvals of AMP and EMP amendments

Programme Control Document
Purposes of Programme Control Document: (Cont’d)
• Describes method of amending maintenance/flight manuals

• Describes corrective action follow-up
• Identifies person responsible for management of the document
• Shows relationship between concerned departments and groups
• Describes the quality management process

Type of information collected
A Reliability Programme should at least consist of the following basic elements:
• Data Sources and Collection

• An alerting system
• Data displays
• Data analysis
• Corrective actions
• Continual monitoring
• Reliability report

Basic requirements for data to be collected:
• Should be related to the objectives of the programme

• Should allow any adverse defect rate, trend or apparent reduction in failure resistance,
to be quickly identified for attention, either to prevent recurrence or to control the
failure rates
• Should enable an overall assessment of the reliability trend
• Sources of information and collection/retrieval methods should be listed and the
associated procedures defined in MME/Exposition documents or MP. This should then
be audited to ensure effective collection of such data.

• Pilot Reports (PIREPS) •Stores Issues / Reports
• Technical Logs / ADDs •Air Safety Reports / MORs

• Onboard system readouts
•Delay and Cancellation reports
• Maintenance findings
•Air-turn-backs/ In-flight Shutdowns
• Workshop reports
• Reports on function checks •TC Holder fleet safety data
• Reports on Special Inspections •Engine Health Monitoring

• EEI (MEDA) findings
•Other Operators’ Experience
Display and reporting of information
Purposes of Reliability reports:
• Indicate to the Operator and CAD on aircraft fleet reliability from which any corrective actions may be assessed
Types of reports:
• Fleet Reliability Summary
• Aircraft Technical Delays and Cancellations
• Engine Unscheduled Shut-downs per 1,000 cycles
• Engine Unscheduled Removals
• Pilot Reports (PIREPS)
• Component Unscheduled Removals and Confirmed Failures
• Total mandatory occurrence reports (MOR) in last 3 months
• Rogue Unit Report
• ADD Report
• Total no. of aborted takeoffs per 1,000 cycles
• etc.

Alert Levels
• To assist in the assessment/analysis of reliability, Alert levels are established for each of
the items to be controlled by the Programme so that any exceedances may be captured
for investigation
• For setting the Alert Level for the PIREPS, the most commonly used data and units of
measurement are PIREPS per 1,000 FHs or Component Removals/Failures per 1,000FHs
or Delays / Cancellations per 1,000 Departures
• For setting the Alert Level Components Unscheduled Removals Report, the calculation is
similar to that used in PIREPS : the unscheduled removal rate is calculated to a base of
1,000 FHs

Alert Levels
• Alert level is purely an indicator and it is not the minimum acceptable airworthiness
level
• Items whose unscheduled removal rate has exceeded the alert level does not
necessarily indicate a problem, more of a deviation from the norm
• These are the events that need to be considered for investigation to establish the root
cause
• Establishment of the standards for the event rates are based upon analysis of past
performance and subsequent deviations from those standards

Alert Levels
• The alert levels should be based upon a statistical analysis of historical data offset by at
least 3 months (3 months’ rolling average)
• Therefore accuracy of data collected is key as previous rates can affect current alert
levels
• Failure data will also have natural variability – to account for this in the analysis, we use
standard deviation which is a measure of the variability of data points around the mean

Alert Levels
• CAD 418 gives guidance on Alert Level calculation for unscheduled removal
• Alert levels should, where possible, be based on the number of events, which have
occurred during a representative period of safe operation of the aircraft fleet. They
should be up-dated periodically to reflect operating experience, product
improvement, changes in procedures, etc.
• When establishing alert levels based on operating experience, the normal period of
operation taken should be for one year at least, preferably more (2 – 3 years)
depending on the fleet size and utilisation.

Alert Levels
• Where there is insufficient operating experience, or when a program for a new aircraft
type is being established, the following approach may be used
• For a new aircraft type, during the first two years of operation all malfunctions should
be investigated and Programme data should be accumulated for future use.
• For an established aircraft type with a new operator, the experience of other operators
may be utilised until the new operator has accumulated a sufficient period of own
experience. Alternatively, experience gained from operation of a similar aircraft model
may be used.
• While setting alert levels for the latest aircraft designs, computed values based on the
degree of system and component in-service expected reliability assumed in the design
of the aircraft might also be used. These initial predictions should be replaced when
sufficient in-service experience has been accumulated.

Alert Levels
• There are several recognised methods of calculating alert levels as per CAD418 , any
one of which may be used provided that the method chosen is fully defined in the
operator’s program documentation.
Re-calculating the Alert Level
• The same method as that for the initial calculation applies when a significant change in
the reliability of an item is known to have been due to introduction of a known action.
• However all changes in Alert levels are normally required to be approved by CAD and
the procedures , periods and conditions for re-calculation are required to be defined in
each Programme.

• Formula for Calculating the Alert Level of:
• PIREPS: The Mean plus 3 standard deviation of the Mean

• URR: The Mean of the individual quarterly Component Unscheduled Removals (or
Failures) for the period of 8 quarters, plus 2 standard deviations of the Mean (see
example)
• However, before explaining the formulae, let’s review the relationship among
MTBUR,MTBR, MTBF and URR

MTBUR MTBUR and its relationship with MTBR,MTBF and NFF:
• MTBR: Mean Time Between

Removals
REMOVAL
• MTBUR: Mean Time Between
MTBR
Unscheduled Removals Unit removed from an
aircraft for a shop action
• MTBF: Mean Time Between
Failures
• NFF: No Fault Found UNSCHEDULED SCHEDULED REMOVAL
REMOVALS
MTBUR
Known or suspected To perform maintenance to
malfunction retain in a serviceable
condition
FAILURE/ FAULT UNJUSTIFIED REMOVAL

MTBF NFF
Failure / Fault Found No Failure / No Fault
Found

• MTBUR Formula
Total Aircraft Flight Hours x QPA

MTBUR = --------------------------------------------------------
No. of Unscheduled Removals
• The unit for the MTBUR is Component Flying Hours
Note: same formula is used for calculating MTBR and MTBF except the correct figure is
used for the denominator

• Unscheduled Removal Rate (URR)
No. of Unscheduled Removals x 1000

URR =
Total Aircraft Flight Hours
1
= × 1000
MTBUR
Note: URR= unscheduled removal rate per 1000 FHs

PIREPS - Alert Level
𝒏 σ 𝒙𝟐 − (σ 𝒙)𝟐
𝒔𝒅 =
𝒏(𝒏 − 𝟏)
σ𝒙
Alert level = + 3𝑠𝑑
𝑛
Where
n = Number of months (n = 24 Months)
𝑥 = PIREPS rate = No. of Pilot Reports x 1000/No. of Aircraft Departures
sd = Standard Deviation

Calculation of Alert Level of Component Unscheduled Removal Rate (URR)
𝒏 σ 𝒙𝟐 − (σ 𝒙)𝟐
𝒔𝒅 =
𝒏(𝒏 − 𝟏)
σ𝒙
Alert level = + 𝟐𝒔𝒅
𝒏
Where
n = Number of months (n = 24 Months)
x = Unscheduled Removal rate (URR)
sd = Standard Deviation (usually represented by the Greek letter Sigma (σ))

No. of unscheduled component removals is tracked monthly to obtain 3-mth URR rate for each component. Why?
To prompt investigation if URR exceeds baseline
Unscheduled
Removals Jan-15 Feb-15 Mar-15 Apr-15 May-15 Jun-15 July-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15
Monthly Total Removals 2 1 1 4 1 5 3 5 10 2

Total QPA 411 3 Monthly Total Removals 5 5 4 6 6 10 9 13 18 17
Monthly Total Removal Rate 0.0033 0.0014 0.0012 0.0051 0.0012 0.0054 0.0025 0.0042 0.0074 0.0017
Component 3 Monthly Total Removal Rate 0.0082 0.0038 0.0019 0.0026 0.0025 0.0040 0.0031 0.0040 0.0049 0.0046
FH 1490 1740 2008 1906 1986 2245 2863 2867 3285 2891
Reliability Analysis ATA PART NUMBER QPA DESCRIPTION
21 4100941D 6 9 INCH DIAMETER MULTI PURPOSE FAN 1
21 4100943D 3 MIXED FLOW 9 INCH DIAMETER 1
21 810204-4 4 DUCT INSTL PACK AIR SUPPLY 1 1
21 810206-5 4 RAM DOOR INLET/OUTLET 1
21 810214-2 4 VALVE-CONDENSER LOW LIMIT 1 1
Examples: 23
23
285W0029-4
5700-1-11
8
1
OVERHEAD ELECTRONICS UNIT
AUDIO MANAGEMENT UNIT 1 1
8410B1-204- FLIGHT DECK ENTRY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
1
23 105 3 SYSTEM (FDEVSS)
URR for Fleet (Jan 15) Monthly 23 8430J1-1 1 CAMERA INTERFACE UNIT EFB VIDEO SYSTEM 1
= 1000x2/(411x1490)=0.0033 27 488550-10-02 4 ACTUATOR CONTROL ELECTRONICS 1
27 49-177-30 3 PRIMARY FLIGHT COMPUTER 1
=1000/MTBUR 28 0330KPU03 1 FUEL QUANTITY PROCESSOR UNIT 1 1
30 90-0408-9 1 WINDSHIELD WIPER LH MOTOR CONVERTER 1
URR for Fleet (Mar 15) : 3-Monthly 31 C12349DA02 1 AIRBORNE PRINTER 1 1 1
=1000x4/(411x(1490+1740+2008)) 34 4088240-901 3 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 1
34 822-1821-002 3 ILS/GPS MULTI-MODE RECEIVER 1
=0.0019 TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE
1
34 822-2911-001 1 SYSTEM (TCAS) COMPUTER
SECONDARY ATTITUDE AIR DATA REFERENCE
2
34 HG2040AD03 1 UNIT
46 261690-101 2 ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAG DISPLAY UNIT 1
52 904800-01 10 FLIGHT LOCK 1 1
34 822-1710-311 1 1
AIR SUPPLY AND CABIN PRESSURE
1
36 1152972-5 2 CONTROLLER (ASCPC)
241-322-008- EVM SCU - ENGINE VIBRATION MONITOR (EVM)
1 1
77 022 2 SIGNAL CONDITIONING UNIT (SCU)
27 285W0023-3 2 MODULE ASSY - FLAP SLAT 1
26 2119835-7 2 CARGO SMOKE DETECTOR 2

Criteria for Triggering an Alert by part no. level:
1) Last 3 months URR rate is higher than the Alert level,
3-mth URR rate, computed from Alert level = L24M URR + 2 s.d
no. of unscheduled removals
ITM-
3 Month 12 Month Alert Removals
selected
ATA PART NUMBER QPA DESCRIPTION No. Rate No. Rate MTBUR Level Yes/No MTBUR Since EIS
Component 21
21
4100941D
4100943D
6 9 INCH DIAMETER MULTI PURPOSE FAN
3 MIXED FLOW 9 INCH DIAMETER
0
0
0.00
0.00
1
1
0.0072
0.0143
139686
69843
0.0124
0.0246
No
No
80,553
40,730
1
1
Reliability Analysis 21
21
21
810204-4
810206-5
810214-2
4 DUCT INSTL PACK AIR SUPPLY
4 RAM DOOR INLET/OUTLET
4 VALVE-CONDENSER LOW LIMIT
2
1
0
0.06
0.03
0.00
2
1
3
0.0215
0.0107
0.0322
46562
93124
31041
0.0394
0.0158
0.0188
No
No
No
25,374
63,434
53,100
2
1
3
23 285W0029-4 8 OVERHEAD ELECTRONICS UNIT 0 0.00 1 0.0054 186248 0.0034 No 297,637 1
23 5700-1-11 1 AUDIO MANAGEMENT UNIT 1 0.11 2 0.0859 11641 0.0384 No 26,073 2
FLIGHT DECK ENTRY VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
1 0.04 1 0.0143 69843 0.0500 No 1
23 8410B1-204-105 3 (FDEVSS) 20,000
23 8430J1-1 1 CAMERA INTERFACE UNIT EFB VIDEO SYSTEM 1 0.11 1 0.0430 23281 0.0500 No 20,000 1
27 488550-10-02 4 ACTUATOR CONTROL ELECTRONICS 0 0.00 1 0.0107 93124 0.0064 No 156,440 1
27 49-177-30 3 PRIMARY FLIGHT COMPUTER 1 0.04 1 0.0143 69843 0.0144 No 69,373 1
28 0330KPU03 1 FUEL QUANTITY PROCESSOR UNIT 0 0.00 2 0.0859 11641 0.0265 No 37,729 2
30 90-0408-9 1 WINDSHIELD WIPER LH MOTOR CONVERTER 1 0.11 1 0.0430 23281 0.0279 No 35,843 1
31 C12349DA02 1 AIRBORNE PRINTER 0 0.00 3 0.1289 7760 0.0502 No 19,930 3
34 4088240-901 3 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 1 0.04 2 0.0286 34922 0.0668 No 14,978 2
34 822-1821-002 3 ILS/GPS MULTI-MODE RECEIVER 1 0.04 1 0.0143 69843 0.0156 No 64,075 1
TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
0 0.00 1 0.0430 23281 0.0490 No 1
34 822-2911-001 1 (TCAS) COMPUTER 20,388
34 HG2040AD03 1 SECONDARY ATTITUDE AIR DATA REFERENCE UNIT 2 0.22 2 0.0859 11641 0.0446 No 22,402 2
46 261690-101 2 ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAG DISPLAY UNIT 0 0.00 1 0.0215 46562 0.0250 No 40,000 1
52 904800-01 10 FLIGHT LOCK 1 0.01 2 0.0086 116405 0.0141 No 70,815 2
34 822-1710-311 1 1 0.11 1 0.0430 23281 0.0200 No 50,000 1
AIR SUPPLY AND CABIN PRESSURE CONTROLLER
0 0.00 1 0.0215 46562 0.0307 No 1
36 1152972-5 2 (ASCPC) 32,584
EVM SCU - ENGINE VIBRATION MONITOR (EVM) SIGNAL
0 0.00 2 0.0430 23281 0.0134 No 2
77 241-322-008-022 2 CONDITIONING UNIT (SCU) 74,755
27 285W0023-3 2 MODULE ASSY - FLAP SLAT 1 0.06 1 0.0215 46562 0.0317 No 31,500 1
26 2119835-7 2 CARGO SMOKE DETECTOR 2 0.11 2 0.0430 23281 0.0262 No 38,126 2

Calculating the MTBUR/MTBF:
PN# 766xxx
Effect: 14 A/C
QPA: 2ea
L12M USR MTBUR

incl. NFF 20 5,842
L12M USR MTBF

x NFF 13 8,987

Period MTBUR URR (x) x² CAD418 has defined several methods of computing
Calculating the 2015-02 33557 0.030 0.001
component/pilot reports (PIREPS) alert level, “Calculation 4”
2015-03 0.031 0.001
Alert Level: 2015-04
32573
16420 0.061 0.004 has been adopted below to calculate component alert level:
2015-05 16892 0.059 0.004 Mean URR for a 24 months’ period plus 2 S.D.:
2015-06 16447 0.061 0.004
2015-07 10858 0.092 0.008
2015-08 8183 0.122 0.015
2015-09 5534 0.181 0.033
2015-10 6798 0.147 0.022
n
2015-11 5631 0.178 0.032
2015-12 4283 0.234 0.055
2016-01 2857 0.350 0.123
2016-02 3388 0.295 0.087
2016-03 5721 0.175 0.031
2016-04 8382 0.119 0.014
2016-05 8278 0.121 0.015
2016-06 7837 0.128 0.016
2016-07 6281 0.159 0.025
2016-08 3911 0.256 0.065
2016-09 3520 0.284 0.081
∑x 3.8478
2016-10 3922 0.255 0.065 ∑x² 0.7711
2016-11 6154 0.163 0.026
2016-12 5330 0.188 0.035 n 24
2017-01 4606 0.217 0.047 (∑x)² 14.805
Recall URR=1000/MTBUR sd 0.0818
Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O
Alert Level 0.3241 29
Graphical Presentation of URR,MTBUR and Alert Level:
Rolling 3 Months URR (Left Axis) & MTBUR (Right Axis)
0.400 40000
URR
ALT Lvl
0.350 MTBUR 35000
0.300 30000
0.250 25000
URR
0.200 20000
0.150 15000
0.100 10000
0.050 5000
0.000 0
2015-02 2015-03 2015-04 2015-05 2015-06 2015-07 2015-08 2015-09 2015-10 2015-11 2015-12 2016-01 2016-02 2016-03 2016-04 2016-05 2016-06 2016-07 2016-08 2016-09 2016-10 2016-11 2016-12 2017-01
Date
• Reliability data may be displayed in the form of Charts, Graphs, and/or Data Tables
• Graphs are commonly used to provide a pictorial display of, e.g. Performance by Fleet,
by System (ATA Chapter) or by Component Level
• Alert levels may be overlaid on the graph to allow instantaneous comparison between
system performance and alert level
• Displays are a ‘Management Tool’ intended to provide a snapshot view of Reliability
Information.

Presentation of Reliability Data –Example 1

Aircraft Fleet Utilization in each month:
= Total Flying Hours/Fleet Size/365
= Total Flying Hours/
Total Landings

Total no. of engine IFSD & RTO:

No. of engine unscheduled removal during the last xx months:
Basic - Caused by engine part limitation or failure

Non-Basic - Engine hardware is not primary cause of removal i.e. birdstrike, stagger, maintenance error etc.
Planned - Predicted removal due to part life limit constraint
Unplanned - Premature removal

MOR of last xx months:

Major Component Removals in the last xx months and Comparison of components ‘s
actual and OEM’s MTBUR

Presentation of Reliability Data –Example 2

An example of the Unscheduled Removal Rate Graph By Fleet (Fleet Reliability) - Related to all
aircraft of the same type in the fleet
NAME: OVERALL ATA: AC QPA: 905
COMPONENT UNSCHEDULED REMOVAL RATE PLOT

0.040
0.035 0.032
0.030 0.030 0.030
0.030 0.030
0.029 0.0290.029 0.029
0.030 0.027 0.028
URR PER 1000 FLT HRS
0.025
0.020 0.020
0.020 0.018
0.015 0.015
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q4 08Q1 08Q2 08Q3 08Q4 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1
B74 4 B77 7

An example of the Unscheduled Removal Rate Graph By ATA (ATA 32 in this case)-Related to the same
ATA of the same aircraft type in the fleet

An example of the Unscheduled Removal Rate Table By Component

Analysis, interpretation of information
• The procedures for analysis and interpretation of information should be such as to
enable the performance of the items controlled by the Programme to be measured
• They should also facilitate recognition, diagnosis and recording of significant problems.
• The whole process should be such as to enable a critical assessment to be made of the
effectiveness of the Programme as a total activity.

Analysis, interpretation of the information
Such a process may involve some of the following methodologies:
• Comparisons of operational reliability with established or allocated standards (in the
initial period these could be obtained from in-service experience of similar equipment
or aircraft types), e.g. comparing the actual MTBUR with that provided by the OEMs
• Analysis and interpretation of trends: seasonal issues or else?
• The evaluation of repetitive defects- due to trouble-shooting quality or TSM quality?
• Reliability predictions
• Other methods of assessment for components, e.g. using Weibull Analysis to confirm if
a particular component exhibits ageing characteristics [by calculating the Beta (ageing:
the tail of the bathtub curve) and Eta (the particular FHs for a given failure probability)]
using life data
• Note: For more detailed explanation of the Weibull distribution, refer to

“Supplementary Information for Weibull Analysis” at the end of this module.

Weibull Data Interpretation:

• In practice, conducting a Weibull analysis needs to rely on sufficient sample size of
component removals to identify the dominant failure modes (from the workshop
reports) as well as the on-wing time between fitment to and removal from aircraft.
• From the analysis one may estimate the important life characteristics of the product
such as reliability or probability of failure at a specific time, from which one may decide
to change the maintenance process from, for example, one of ‘On Condition’ to ‘Hard
Time’ before the component fails

Weibull Analysis-Weibull plot
(Unreliability)

Using the Beta and Eta values of each failure mode, plot the Weibull pdf, and overlay the Time Since
Repair (TSR) of the on wing items to identify the age distribution of the RMP

• The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be related to the
particular Programme and to the facilities available. However the analysis should take into
account:
• Flight defects and reductions in operational reliability
• Defects occurring on-line and at main base
• Deterioration observed during routine maintenance
• Workshop and overhaul facility findings
• Modification evaluations: is any VSB available to address the issue?
• Sampling programmes
• The adequacy of maintenance equipment and publications
• The effectiveness of maintenance procedures
• Staff training e.g. trouble shooting techniques of engineers)
• Service bulletins, technical instructions (clarity of TSM procedures) etc.
If the Operator relies upon contracted maintenance and/or overhaul facilities as input to the
Programme, the arrangements for availability and continuity of such information should be
established and details should be included.

• Items with deteriorating reliability should be placed ‘On Watch’ or ‘Under Monitoring’.
This highlights that it is under investigation and triggers any process that may now
follow
• Identified areas of unacceptably low reliability and/or deteriorating trends need to
prioritised for investigation dependent upon the risk they pose to safety, operations,
etc.
• Investigations must be methodical and objective. The analysis and investigation should
be free from any bias so any investigators must have an objective and systematic view

Corrective actions
• Corrective actions shall correct any reduction in reliability by addressing the root cause
established through objective investigation
• Some corrective actions may need the CAD approval before implementation (e.g. AMS
changes)
• The procedures for effecting changes to the Maintenance Programme should be
described, and the associated documentation (e.g. meeting records) should include a
planned completion date for each corrective action, where applicable
• What types of corrective action are available?

Corrective actions
Depending on the nature of the reliability issue, the corrective measures will take one of
the following forms:
• Changes to maintenance and/or operational procedures or techniques
• Scheduled task changes involving:
• inspection frequency and/or content, and/or
• function checks, and/or
• overhaul requirements and time limits.
• Amendments to approved manuals (e.g. maintenance manual, TSM, crew manual)
• Initiation of modifications
• Special inspections or fleet campaigns
• Spares provisioning
• Staff training (on trouble-shooting techniques etc.)
• Manpower and equipment planning
• Review repairer’s performance if low reliability is due to poor repair quality

Corrective actions
Monitoring effectiveness:
• All corrective and preventive actions taken should be verified for their effectiveness
over an appropriate period (anybody measures this?)
• Should the event rate not improve then further action shall be needed (this may involve
re-visiting the initial corrective action to ensure it has been/is being done (e.g. a
procedural change may have been ignored (root cause?))
• Any changes that require a campaign may take a while to impact the event rates so the
improvements need to be seen in context of any corrective actions taken.

Sample Reliability Investigation Case
• ATIMS - Air Traffic and Information Management System.
• ATIMS was developed to enable the DATALINK communication and exchange the
complex data between aircraft and the Ground centre ( HF voice back-up, automatic
reporting and specific airlines communication to improve airlines operational cost &
flexibility ).
• ATIMS is composed of: ATSU, DCDU, ATC MSG and Reset switch.
• ATSU is the main component of the ATIMS system. ATSU operates on 5 sets of software
which may be uploaded from a panel in the Avionics compartment
ATIMS - Air Traffic and Information Management System

DCDU - Datalink Control and Display Units
ATSU- Air Traffic Service Unit

Sample Reliability Investigation For an ATA 46 Component
12 Delays L12M with total 527 minutes
Root causes of Delay :

• Loading Software take time.
• Reloading software due to robbing unit from A330 with different software configurations (due to nil
spare sin warehouse hence robbery)
• Software disks corrupted
• Datalink ATSU fault: ATSU s/w loading retried find disk erroroneous & all 5 sets of software reloaded.
• ATSU ATC fault: ATSU replaced, during software loading find software transfer failed, ATSU replaced
again, software loaded satisfactory.
Fault Description :
• ACARS Fault.
• ATSU AOC menu keeps in “inflight page” ATSU.
• ATSU Fault
Action :
• ATSU re-seated and test carried out.
• ATSU replaced and started to download all the application & AOC software.
A320 / A330 REMOVALS
* L3M unscheduled removals ( Sep’14 – Nov’14 ) = 11 • Total Shop finding:

A320 = 9 and A330 = 2 NFF=8
Sept’14 = 3, Oct14 = 5, Nov14 = 3 FF=3
P/N Fleets Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14

A320 0 0 0 0
LA2T0G20503B040
A330 0 0 0 0
A320 0 0 2 0
LA2T0G20503B050
A330 1 1 0 0
A320 2 3 1 0
LA2T0G20705C070
A330 0 1 0 0
3 5 3 0
• * L12M - Unscheduled Removals ( Removal reason ) = 26 Removals
Removal Reason L12M Removals
CMC MSG - ACAR'S FAULT 5

Datalink ATSU Fault 9
Unable to load Software 6
ATSU unable to sent / received D-ATIS 6
Total: 26
56
Rolling L3M MTBUR
14000
7
4
12000
2
10000
8000
Rolling L3M MTBUR
A320
6000
4000
5
1
2000 6
3

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung
Rolling L3M URR
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0
2013-01
2013-02
2013-03
2013-04
2013-05
2013-06
2013-07
2013-08
2013-09
2013-10
2013-11
2013-12
2014-01
2014-02
2014-03
2014-04
2014-06
2014-07
2014-08
1
2014-09
2014-10
2
2014-11
2014-12
2015-01
2015-02
2015-03
2015-04
2015-05
3
2015-06
2015-07
Rolling L3M URR
2015-08
Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O
2015-09
2015-10
2015-11
2015-12
2016-01
5
2016-02
2016-03
2016-04
2016-05
2016-06
6
2016-07
2016-08
2016-09
2016-10
2016-11
2016-12
7
A320
A320 ALT
58
1)URR exceeded Alert level. Initial investigation showed that the driver was a high No
Fault Found (NFF) rate. NFF will affect MTBUR hence URR.
2)Escalated from preliminary investigation to an in-depth investigation (root cause
analysis together with mitigation plan development)
3)High NFF rate was found to be due to software loading issue. A newsletter was then
issued to alert front line engineers (MRO) of the proper software loading instruction.
4) Face-to-face briefing was also arranged for the engineers (MRO) to bring this issue to
their attention.
5) After all actions taken, the URR rate dropped below the alert level for 6 months. This
issue was then closed while being monitored via the normal reliability programme.
Note: It was not necessary to conduct a Weibull analysis as the problem was not related to ageing from the
preliminary investigation
Quality Management
• With the major issues of airworthiness and the resources involved, it is essential that
Quality Control should be applied as an overall control of the Maintenance Programme,
of which the Reliability Programme forms an inseparable part.
• Each Programme should have clearly defined managerial responsibilities and
procedures for continuous monitoring of the Programme at regular intervals so as to
assess the effectiveness of the Programme.
• Procedures audit against the programme control document
• Quality surveillance of the programme functional activities (e.g. by setting up and
stationing a Maintenance Standard Team in the MRO facilities) including any
subcontracted tasks such as workmanship, trouble-shooting quality etc.
• Management review by the programme control committee
• Major change proposals
• CAD’s oversight

Summary of the Reliability Programme
Data Collection
a. Line data
b. Shop data
c. Interruptions Measurement
(Ds & Cs)
d. Air Safety a. Report on regular
Reports basis
e. Air-turn-backs b. Trend monitoring Analysis
e. Data from outside c. Alert Exceedance
d. Presentation of a. Classic reliability
the Operator’s own
Significant items analysis tools
database
FMEA / Weibull Corrective Action
b. Availability of
Modification a. AMS amendment
c. Cost benefit b. Modification
evaluation accomplishment
c. Improved trouble-
shooting processes
or quality
d. TSM procedures
improvement
d. Etc. etc.
Continuous Feedback control through
fleet performance monitoring

61
Questions?
Supplementary Information for
Weibull Analysis
Weibull Analysis
Lifetime Distribution
• Four major distributions can be applied in LDA (Life Data Analysis) ,namely,
Exponential, Lognormal, Normal and Weibull. Each of them describes the different
behavior of failure rates as follows:
• Exponential: Failure rate is constant throughout the components’ life

• Lognormal: the failure rate increases with time initially but will decrease
asymptotically to zero
• Normal: the failure rate increases with time
• Weibull: the failure rate can increase, decrease or remain constant with time
• Because of the flexibility of Weibull distribution, and it is easier to draw a conclusion
particularly when one does not know the failure rate behaviour of the component,
Weibull is the best model to do life data analysis

Weibull Analysis
Weibull Distribution:
Weibull consists of 1-parameter, 2-parameter and 3-parameter distribution but 2-

parameter is most widely used for LDA. The 3-parameter and the 1-parameter Weibull
distribution are often used for detailed analysis.

Weibull Analysis
The generic probability density function (pdf) of a 3-P Weibull distribution is:
Where
f(T)≥ 0, T≥ 0 or γ, β ≥ 0, η≥ 0, -∞ < γ < +∞
and
β is the shape parameter (also known as the Weibull slope ) and it is a pure number without
dimension
η is the scale parameter and it has the same unit as T, i.e. hours, miles, cycles etc.
γ is the location parameter and it has the same unit as T (It is always zero for 2 parameter Weibull
distribution.)

Weibull Analysis
Setting γ=0 will give a 2-P Weibull pdf:

Weibull Analysis
The 1-P Weibull is obtained by again setting γ=0 and assuming β = Constant = C (a pre-
known value based on past experience on identical or similar products)
The only unknown parameter is the scale parameter, η

Weibull Analysis
• Effects of changing β, γ or η at a time while keeping the other two constant:
1) Changing the shape parameter β: this forces a change in the shape of the pdf curve
and it can take on a variety of forms based on the value of β.

Weibull Analysis
2) Changing the scale parameter η only: this has the same effect as changing the scale of
the x-axis. Increasing the η value will stretch out the pdf (note: the area under a pdf
curve is always = 1)

Weibull Analysis
3) Changing location parameter γ only : this ‘slides’ the distribution along the x-axis to
either the right (if γ > 0) or to the left (if γ < 0) without changing its shape or scale

Weibull Analysis
Weibull: the failure rate can increase, decrease or remain constant with time

Weibull Analysis
The above example has yielded Beta and Eta value to be 6.7 and 48,000 FHs respectively

#8 3. UST Lecture 8d Component Reliability Programme - Final

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#8 3. UST Lecture 8d Component Reliability Programme - Final

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Hong Kong Airworthiness Course

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Maintenance and Reliability Reporting

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 2

• As per HKAR-1 Section 1.6 Sub-section1.6-2 MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT, a reliability

• It is also required when specified by the manufacturer's Maintenance Planning

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 3

• Establish a programme control committee ( usually known as the Reliability Control

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 4

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 5

• Comprises typically managers from Quality Assurance, Maintenance, Engineering

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 6

• Responsible for implementation, decision making and overall running of the

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 7

• Describes (in the Maintenance Management Exposition (MME) or Engineering Procedures

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• Describes method of amending maintenance/flight manuals

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• Data Sources and Collection

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• Should be related to the objectives of the programme

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• Pilot Reports (PIREPS) •Stores Issues / Reports

• Technical Logs / ADDs •Air Safety Reports / MORs

• Reports on Special Inspections •Engine Health Monitoring

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Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 14

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Re-calculating the Alert Level

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• PIREPS: The Mean plus 3 standard deviation of the Mean

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• MTBR: Mean Time Between

FAILURE/ FAULT UNJUSTIFIED REMOVAL

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Total Aircraft Flight Hours x QPA

• The unit for the MTBUR is Component Flying Hours

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 22

No. of Unscheduled Removals x 1000

Note: URR= unscheduled removal rate per 1000 FHs

Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 23

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Monthly Total Removals 2 1 1 4 1 5 3 5 10 2

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L12M USR MTBUR

L12M USR MTBF

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Basic - Caused by engine part limitation or failure

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Copyright©2022 WC Cheung Hong Kong Airworthiness AESF571O 38

NAME: OVERALL ATA: AC QPA: 905

COMPONENT UNSCHEDULED REMOVAL RATE PLOT