Richard Boyd (1988) “How to be a moral realist” • Moral intuitions seem to play an analogous role in ethics, but they
to play an analogous role in ethics, but they are far
• Formulates moral realism as the following doctrine:
o Moral statements are the sorts of statements which express
propositions which are true or false.
o The truth or falsity of moral statements is largely independent of
our moral opinions, theories, etc.
o Ordinary canons of moral reasoning - together with other canons
of reasoning - constitute, under many circumstances at least, a
reliable method for obtaining and improving moral knowledge.
• Argues developments in realist philosophy of science, philosophy of
language and epistemology support moral realism.
• Also argues Marxists ought to be moral realists (against a trend around
the time of writing).
1.2 scientific knowledge and moral skepticism
• Contrast between epistemology of ethics and science is a common
antirealist position.
• Properties of science like objectivity, value-neutrality, empirical testability
etc. absent/modified in ethics.
• Boyd notes two common strategies for conceiving a 'unified knowledge'
between the fields that minimises an epistemological contrast.
o Showing scientific beliefs/methods possess qualities of moral
beliefs/methods (e.g. Kuhn).
o Showing moral beliefs/methods possess qualities of scientific
beliefs/methods (what Boyd chooses).
2 some challenges to moral realism
(based on contrast between epistemology of ethics & science)
2.1 moral intuitions and empirical observations
• In science, observations provide a degree of objectivity.
more variable between individuals.
• What, in ethics, plays the role of observation in science?
• We need to establish this to reject the epistemological contrast.
2.2 reflective equilibrium in moral reasoning
• Rawls' description of reflective equilibrium describes how we essentially
balance between moral intuitions, general moral principles and moral
theories to reach a coherent position.
• Moral reasoning begins with presuppositions and negotiates between
conflicting ones.
• How could such a 'constructive' procedure involve the discovery of moral
facts?
2.3 moral progress and cultural variability
• If moral judgements = factual judgement, why do we not have moral
progress?
• Scientists from different cultural backgrounds also agree on assessment
of scientific evidence.
• If moral reasoning = reasoning about objective moral facts, what explains
lack of progress and agreement?
2.4 hard cases
• If goodness, fairness etc. are real objective properties, what should we
say about unsolvable hard cases in ethics?
• In science these hard questions are only temporarily unanswerable.
• The permanent unanswerability of some hard ethical cases + moral
realism = possibility that there are permanently inaccessible moral facts.
• This would be a significant epistemological difference between ethics and
science.
2.5 naturalism & naturalistic definitions
• If goodness is a real property, then wouldn't it be a natural property? (ie,
definable in terms of facts about the natural world)
 • Moral realism is committed to the claim that moral terms like 'good'
possess naturalistic definitions.
• Remember Moore on the naturalistic fallacy here.
2.6 moral motivation
• Factual judgements constrain rational choice because of antecedent
interests/desires.
• Moral realism holds moral judgements are factual judgements.
• How could this account for the commendatory force of moral judgements?
2.7 the semantics of moral terms
• Semantic meaning of moral concepts differs substantially between
individuals.
• How can we argue there is one concept of the good?
• Differences suggest noncognitivist or constructivist approach to
understanding semantics of ethical terms.
2.8 verificationism and anti-realism in ethics
• Verificationists would reject the existence of theoretical entities because
they are unobservable and therefore unverifiable in principle.
• Moral statements are meaningless because they are objectively
unverifiable (mechanisms like intuition or reflective equilibrium don't
provide enough/right sort of verification).
2.9* comments on the above
• Boyd notes 2.1-2.7 are indirect arguments against moral realism.
• They point to features of moral beliefs/reasoning that would be best
explained by rejecting moral realism.
• These arguments are not necessarily verificationist in nature.
• Boyd argues these arguments are closely analogous to Kuhn's objection
to scientific realism, which essentially argues there are features about
scientific progress that would be best explained by rejecting scientific
realism.
• Boyd aims to reject verificationism and logical positivism (as Kuhn does),
but also rebut constructivist/neo-Kantian considerations in Kuhn.
3 Realist philosophy of science
3.1 the primacy of reality
• This is just the doctrine that an external world exists independently of our
perception & conceptualisation of it.
• Scientific realism in philosophy
o methods of science are capable of providing knowledge of
unobservable entities, e.g. atoms
o also provide knowledge about the behaviour of observable
phenomenon.
o The properties of these & other entities are largely theory
independent.
• Non-realist positions fail to account for the way theory-dependent
revisions make a positive methodological contribution to science.
• By this Boyd means improving the precision of our measurement and
detection of unobservable entities.
• If there was no objective reality, it is unclear why science is able to
progress through making refinements to measurement and detection.
• (Note Boyd's idea of progress = improving instrumental reliability of
science. This is its reliability for producing knowledge that is applicable for
practical goals and purposes.)
3.2 objective knowledge from theory-dependent methods
• Two general features of scientific methodology on realist account:
o Conception of scientific research as cumulative by successive
approximations to the truth.
o Cumulative development possible because of dialectical
relationship between current theory and methodology for
improvement.
• So, all aspects of scientific methodology are theory-dependent.
• This theory-dependence reliably produces further knowledge because our
currently accepted theories are relevantly approximately true.
 • The approximate truth of current theories is merely a matter of
contingent empirical fact.
3.3 naturalism and radical contingency in epistemology
3.3.1 naturalism in epistemology
• Modern epistemology dominated by foundationalism
o Premise foundationalism = all knowledge justifiable from an a
priori specifiable core of foundational beliefs (possessing
qualities like 'self-warranting,' 'incorrigible,' etc.)
o Inference foundationalism = principles of justifiable inference are
ultimately reducible to inferential principles which are a priori
rational.
• Naturalistic considerations suggest no beliefs are epistemically privileged
in the ways required by foundationalism.
• Naturalism in epistemology + cumulative scientific knowledge +
evaluation of theories as an ongoing social process = crucial causal
notion in epistemology to be regulation of belief rather than production.
o I take this to mean epistemology is more involved in prescribing
what we should believe rather than describing what we do
actually know.
3.3.2 radical contingency in epistemology
• Because epistemology is prescriptive, the relevant conception of belief-
regulation must reflect the social & dialectical character of the growth of
scientific knowledge.
o I think this means the relevant concept of belief-regulation to
science must also include/account for social + dialectical
character?
• Social + psychological factors are thus relevant to causal mechanisms of
knowledge.
o Criticism, testing, acceptance, modification & transmission of
scientific theories & knowledge include these factors.
o Understanding the role of these factors is relevant for the
sociology, history & epistemology of science.
• This means epistemology of science is dependent on empirical
knowledge (presumably about these social, psychological factors).
3.3.3 radical contingency of scientific epistemology
• Methodological principles in science are theory-dependent.
• They are only a reliable guide to the truth because and to the extent that
the background theories determining their application are approximately
true.
• This is a matter of contingent historical fact.
• The rationality of (current) scientific principles of inference rests on this
contingent empirical fact.
• "we must think of [corpuscular theory of matter] as the beginning of
rational methodology… not as a consequence of it" (by chance basically).
• Scientific training (absorption/exposure to paradigmatic theory) can
sharpen scientific intuition, which is reliable insofar as it's grounded in
theoretical tradition that is relevantly approximately true.
3.5 non-Humean causation
• Rejects Humean causation by rejecting verificationism.
• Unreduced causal notions are relevant for naturalistic epistemology.
• I found this confusing but I think this section is arguing that from a
naturalistic perspective it's appropriate to talk about unreducible
epistemological causation.
3.6 natural definitions
• I think natural definitions here means definitions that happen to accord
accurately to hidden essences of things.
• Sound scientific explanation only possible when we use natural not
conventional definitions.
• A wide variety of scientific terms are defined in useful, applicable ways
rather than analytically/stipulatively.
3.7 reference & epistemic access 4 how to be a moral realist
• Naturalistic conception of reference provided by causal connection
between term and referent.
4.1 moral intuitions etc.
• Causal connections relevant to reference are those involved in reliable
• Constructs realist reply to 2.1, 2.2, 2.3
regulation of belief.
• Notes to make this reply, needs to be incorporated into broader
• Term T refers to kind K just in case there are casual mechanisms whose
conception of moral knowledge that meets strong constraints.
tendency brings about that what is predicated by T will be approximately
true of K.
4.2 constraints on realist conception of moral knowledge
• Mechanisms include:
o Procedures accurate for recognising instances of K • Must be possible to explain how moral reasoning started out with stock of
o Procedures that govern use of T relevantly approximately true moral beliefs.
o Social transmission of beliefs about K as claims about T. • Answer question of "what plays role analogous to scientific observations
o Deference to experts on K regarding use of T in ethics?"
• Explain why moral properties require natural definitions.
• In these cases, properties of K regulate use of T.
• Show ordinary use of moral terms promotes (imperfect) epistemic access
• What is said using T provides socially coordinated epistemic access to K.
to moral properties (goodness must regulate use of word 'good')
• Portray indeterminacy in extension of moral terms as rationally dictated
3.8 homoestatic property-cluster definitions
by nature of subject matter.
• Type of definition (of natural kinds) that does not provide
necessary/sufficient conditions.
4.3 homeostatic consequentialism
• Definition provided by possession of adequate number of sufficient
• Conception of morals/the 'good' that serves as a sample for argument on
properties.
plausibility of moral realism.
• Relevant properties is a conceptual matter.
• Important human goods are homeostatically clustered - they mutually
• Co-occurrence of properties is a result of a 'homeostatic' mechanism:
support one another, and some psychological & social mechanisms
some favour the presence of others, or there are underlying mechanisms
contribute to this homeostasis.
that tend to maintain presence.
• Moral goodness defined by HPC of goods.
• Relative importance of properties & mechanisms for determining if HPC
• Homeostatic unity & imperative to balance & strengthen homeostasis
term applies to an object is theoretical rather than conceptual issue.
constrains moral choice.
• No refinement of usage which replaces HPC term with less vague term
• Knowledge of goods & homeostasis = knowledge about human
would preserve the naturalness of the kind.
psychological & social potential.
• Can be obtained in way very analogous to scientific knowledge, through
experimental knowledge of political & social experiments (revealed
through psychology, history etc).
4.4 observations, intuitions and reflective equilibrium
• Anti-realist objects moral intuitions and reflective equilibrium dictate
constructivist interpretation of morals.
• Realist can respond as long as we can portray background beliefs an
judgements as:
o Relevantly approximately true
o There's an analogue to observation in science
• Argues human sciences like psychology, history, social sciences provide
observation relevant to moral inquiry.
• These sciences are subject to just the same theory-dependent influences.
• Regarding approximate truth of background beliefs - argues we have
good enough beliefs to be able to respond to new evidence & expand &
improve knowledge of needs.
• Therefore reflective equilibrium is possible & doesn't pose epistemological
problems.
• Also characterises moral intuitions as a species of trained judgement as a
result of being linked to reliable process of reflective equilibrium.
• Anti-realist objections
o Mistaken moral beliefs (e.g. Moral laws are God's laws) - Boyd
argues mistaken beliefs about this doesn't mean beliefs about
HPC of goods were wrong.
o Disanalogy between foundations of scientific and moral
knowledge - argues it is easier to explain how knowledge is
possible given evolutionary evidence that recognising
fundamental needs is important.
4.5 moral semantics
• I think this is responding to 2.5 and 2.7
• Realist rebuttal possible if:
o Good reasons to think moral terms have natural definitions.
o Good reason to think ordinary use provides epistemic access,
goodness regulates use of term 'good.'
• If 'good' is defined by HPC, this is a property whose essence is a natural
definition.
• If reflective equilibrium is defensible, use of the term good does provide
epistemic access.
o Tendency guaranteed by basic evolutionary & psychological
facts.
• Serious errors still possible as long as there is epistemically relevant
causal connection.
• Notes objection that determination of moral beliefs seems to often be
mediated by power (e.g. Class interests).
o Argues would no the possible to exploit moral terms if there were
no connection to real psychological phenomena.
4.6 hard cases & divergent views
• Responding to 2.4 and I think also 2.3 - anti-realist explains these
difficulties by denying common subject matter.
• Realist can emphasise failures of bivalence are predicted for HPC
properties.
• Realist can also emphasise complexity and controversiality of moral
issues.
• All that is needed for homeostatic consequentialism to be defensible is
idea that HPC goods epistemically regulate moral discourse to an
appreciable extent.
• Notes the similarity in evaluations across ethical schools could support
this claim.
4.7 morality, motivation & rationality
• Naturalistic moral realism must deny moral judgements necessarily
provide reasons for action and explain close connection another way.
• Boyd argues motivation to take care of well-being of others & capacity to
sympathise is evolutionarily programmed.
• Hence moral judgements, which involve pursuit of human needs 'the
good,' typically co-occur with motivation.
• Agents who can make moral judgements but do not feel motivation in fact
have a deficiency in sympathy on this view.
4.8 conclusion
• Defence of moral realism depends upon naturalistic & nonfoundational
aspects of realist philosophy of science.
• Support claim that philosophy is an empirical inquiry continuous with the
sciences.
• Arguments presented depend on optimistic empirical claims about unity of
human goods & possibility of reliable knowledge in human sciences.
• Philosophical examination of moral realism should also include
examination into empirical claims about human goods and capacity for
knowledge of ourselves.