A CONSCIOUS UNIVERSE

Philip Goff

Grounding by Subsumption

Conscious subjects are irreducible (unanalysable in more fundamental terms).

- Hence, constitutive grounding of conscious subjects by analysis is impossible [220].

Goff suggests an alternative – constitutive grounding by subsumption:

- Entity X grounds by subsumption entity Y iff (i) X grounds Y, and (ii) X is a unity of

which Y is an aspect [221].

Goff illuminates the notion of subsumptive grounding with the following examples:

i) Ostensibly, experience has ‘parts’, and the totality of our experience equals the

sum of its composite parts (i.e., that ‘partial’ experience is fundamental). But what

if total experience was fundamental? On this view, the total experience is a unity

of which the experiential parts are aspects [221].

o Partial experiences as being subsumptively grounded in total experiences.

ii) One may define a specific shade of orange, ‘orange 7’, as consisting of a

particular mix of primary hues and saturation. Alternatively, it may be defined as a

unified property of which these constituents are aspects [221].

o Instances of hue/saturation as being sub. grounded in instances of colour.

iii) How shall we define the relationship between an object and its properties? Either

we postulate both objects and properties as fundamental, or we start with the

 “unity of the fact” by postulating objects-having properties as fundamental. When

God created the fact that fire is hot, He didn’t create fire, then heat, and then glue

them together. Rather, He created the state of affairs ‘fire-having-heat’. Hence, the

state of affairs ‘fire-having-heat’ is a fundamental unity, of which fire and heat are

aspects [222].

o Objects and their properties as being sub. grounded in states of affairs.

iv) In the philosophy of space, substantivalists believe that space itself is fundamental

(contra the relationist’s claim that facts about space are just facts about

fundamental concrete entities and the relationships between them). We might ask

the substantivalist: Are very small regions of space the fundamental building

blocks of space as a whole, or is the whole of space a fundamental unity, of which

these ‘micro-regions’ are aspects [‘holistic substantivalism’]? [223]

o Regions of space as being sub. grounded in the whole of space.

Holistic Supersubstantivalism & Priority Monism

Super-substantivalism: Space is an entity in its own right, and material objects are identical

to regions of space [224].

- The bearer of properties is the region of space itself, not some distinct object within

the region.

Holistic substantivalism + super-substantivalism = holistic supersubstantivalism [224].

- HSS: Material objects are identical with regions of space, and regions of space are

aspects of space as a whole. Therefore, all being is ultimately derived from the

fundamental unity that is space considered as a whole.

 o This is a form of priority monism, the view that there is only one fundamental

individual.

What are the properties of this singular fundamental object? Goff suggests distributional

properties (which concern how an object is spatially ‘filled in’) [224].

- We don’t tend to think of distributional properties as fundamental. Instead, we say

they are grounded in the properties of the object’s parts.

o E.g., the fact that a carpet is red polka-dotted is grounded in the fact that little

circular parts of it are coloured red.

- But what if we assigned the distributional properties ontological priority instead?

o E.g., the fact that little circular parts of the carpet are coloured red is grounded

in the fact that the carpet is red-polka dotted.

- So rather than saying that the universe has the distributional properties that it does in

virtue of having mass-instantiated regions arranged in the way that they are, we might

say that i) space is a fundamental unity with the fundamental distributional property

of having mass-instantiating regions arranged in the way they are, and ii) these mass-

instantiating regions are aspects of this fundamental unity.

o I.e., regions of space and their properties are subsumptively grounded in the

whole of space and its distributional properties [225].

What Is an Aspect?

So long as a fundamental entity is structured (rather than atomic) it will involve various

constituents [i.e., aspects] which:

 i) May be considered in isolation from the whole, but

ii) Are dependent for their existence on the whole [225].

Aspects may be complete or incomplete. If it is incomplete, we cannot capture its essence

without reference to its whole. If it is complete, we can.

Two Morals From the Above Discussion

i) Cases of subsumptive grounding involve an ontological ‘free lunch’:1

definitionally, an aspect is nothing over and above the unity of which it is an

aspect [226].

o E.g., if region R is an aspect of the whole of space S, then R is nothing over

and above S.

ii) Securing this ontological free lunch is possible even if the grounded entities (i.e.,

the aspects) are irreducible and therefore do not admit of analysis [226-7].

o The aspect is irreducibly subsumed into the whole.

Subject-Subsumption

Grounding by analysis can’t deal with conscious subjects because of their irreducibility. Sub.

grounding might be able to help, as it does not require the grounded entities to be reducible.

- Subject-Subsumption: Each state of affairs of a particular o-conscious2 subject

bearing certain experiential properties is subsumptively ground in some more

expansive unity [227].

1
This is David Armstrong’s term for an entity that is nothing over and above already postulated facts.
2
‘O-consciousness’ is Goff’s term for the kind of consciousness we associate with humans and other animals.
 - Subject-Subsumption Scenario: {subject BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and

experiencing red} grounds by subsumption {subject LITTLE1 feeling pain}, {LITTLE2

feeling anxious}, and {LITTLE3 experiencing red} [228].

o BIG’s experiential state of affairs is a fundamental unity of which the LITTLE

subjects and their experiential states of affairs are aspects.

The Decombination Problem

One objection to the coherence of the Subject-Subsumption Scenario [228]:

- LITTLE1’s POV is a matter of its having pain-to-the-exclusion-of-all-else; this POV is

not an aspect of BIG’s POV, as the latter experiences pain co-consciously with anxiety

and redness.

Goff’s rebuttal [229]… The following is clearly not a good argument:

- ‘Y has 2 grams of mass and no more; hence, Y cannot be a constituent of X, as X has

more than 2 grams of mass’. What’s any different with the S-S scenario?

A more worrying threat… the conceivability decombination problem [229]:

P1. “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtains in the absence of

{LITTLE1 feeling pain}” is conceivably true.

P2. If BIG and X are conceived of as pure subjects, “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and

experiencing red} obtains in the absence of {LITTLE1 feeling pain}” is a transparent

sentence.

P3. If a transparent sentence is conceivably true, then it’s possibly true [Transparency

Conceivability Princriple].
 C1. Therefore, “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtains in the

absence of {LITTLE1 feeling pain}” is possibly true.

P4. If fact/entity X grounds Y, then necessarily if X exists/obtains, then Y

exists/obtains.

C2. Therefore, it’s not the case that “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing

red} grounds {LITTLE1 feeling pain}”.

Goff’s Solution to the Conceivability Decombination Problem – ‘Consciousness+’

We need to admit some nature beyond consciousness into the grounding base (i.e., the

fundamental entity) [230].

- However, by adding some intrinsic nature over and above its consciousness, the

fundamental entity will become an impure subject.

Consciousness+ [230]:

- Consciousness is one aspect of a more expansive property, of which we only have a

partial understanding. This property, consciousness+, unifies both experiential and

non-experiential aspects.

If BIG instantiates consciousness+, then to conceive of it as merely a bearer of consciousness

is not to conceive of its complete [impure] nature [230].

- If this is true, P2 of the conceivability decombination problem [‘If BIG is conceived

of as a pure subject, “{BIG feeling pain, anxiety, and experiencing red} obtains in the

absence of {LITTLE1 feeling pain}” is a transparent sentence’] does not hold.

o Hence, the move from conceivability to possibility is blocked.

Consciousness+ Subject-Subsumption

C+ Subject-Subsumption: {Subject X bearing such and such consciousness+ properties}

grounds by subsumption {Subject Y bearing such and such experiential properties} [230].

- Goff says it himself: “This proposal entails a significant degree of noumenalism3

about fundamental reality”.

o On this view, we lack a general understanding of the deep nature of matter.

Goff briefly considers panprotopsychist subject-subsumption as an alternative [231]:

- Panproto. S-S: {subject X bearing such and such protophenomenal properties}

grounds by subsumption {subject Y bearing such and such experiential properties}.

o But this is incoherent, given subject irreducibility.

So we’re left with consciousness+ subject-subsumption as the only coherent way to make

sense of subsumptively grounding conscious subjects, despite its noumenalism.

Another Reason to Endorse Consciousness+

Later in CFR, Goff argues for power realism, the view that laws of nature are grounded in the

causal power of objects.

- However, the categorical nature of a conscious state does not seem to involve causal

power (because epiphenomenalism is coherent) [231].

Perhaps consciousness+ can help us avoid the conclusion that our conscious states are

epiphenomenal…

3
‘Noumena’: an object that exists independently of the senses (contrast with ‘phenomenon’).
 - We could just say that although consciousness itself doesn’t ground causal power, it is

an aspect of consciousness+ that does [232].

o Potential objection: if consciousness+ is doing all the causal work, isn’t

consciousness itself just being dragged along as an epiphenomenal dead

weight?

Constitutive Cosmopsychism

Smallism: the fundamental building blocks of reality exist at the micro-level [233].

- This fits well with constitutive grounding by analysis. But, as we know, this runs into

trouble with the grounding of conscious subjects.

Alternatively… priority monism: the one and only fundamental entity is the cosmos [233].

- Holistic supersubstantivalism is a type of priority monism.

- PM fits well with subsumptive constitutive grounding.

o On this view, the universe is a fundamental unified whole, of which material

entities are aspects.

- Cosmopsychism [234]: The universe is a fundamental unified subject, a bearer of

consciousness+, and states of affairs involving o-subjects having such and such states

of consciousness+ are aspects of states of affairs of the universe having such and such

states of consciousness+.

- Constitutive Cosmopsychism [235]: The universe is a material entity, as are the o-

subjects it subsumes [this is a form of constitutive Russelian monism].

Objection to Cosmopsychism: Brute Law Complexity

Pautz: constitutive cosmopyshicsm is enormously complex. Not at all parsimonious [235].

- The constitutive cosmopsychist has to explain the grounding relationships between

BIG and LITTLE subjects/material entities in terms of brute big-to-small grounding

laws.

o An enormous number of these laws will be required at any given moment, as

they must explain the relationship between every determinate state of the

cosmos and every determinate state of every subject/material entity. Moreover,

these laws will have to ‘refresh’ from moment to moment [235-6].

Goff’s reply: we don’t actually need these laws in the first place [236].

- According to constitutive cosmopsychism, the fundamental properties of the universe

have rich structure – although the cosmos itself is fundamentally unified, it subsumes

a huge number of dependent parts as aspects.

o Therefore, there is no need to add brute grounding laws to get from the

cosmos’ state of affairs to any given subject/material entity’s state of affairs;

the latter is already contained within the former.

Constitutive Cosmopsychism vs. Emergentism – Parsimony

However, constitutive cosmopsychism seems no more parsimonious than emergentism [237].

- CC: o-subjects are not fundamental; the cosmos is. But the cosmos involves o-

subjects as irreducible constituents. Committing to a fundamental entity that contains

o-subjects as irreducible aspects is just as expensive as committing to fundamental o-

subjects.
 o Therefore, CC is much more expensive than a view according to which o-

subjects can be analysed away.

o However, o-subjects cannot be analysed away… “they must be paid for

handsomely”.

The Revelation Argument Against Constitutive Cosmopsychism

Although CC is not necessarily committed to there being micro-level conscious subjects, it

seems (for other reasons) that it would be a good idea to think so [238]. Hence, Goff thinks

that working out the details of CC will involve a commitment to there being micro-level

conscious subjects [239].

- But what about our commitment to Phenomenal Transparency?

The Revelation Argument: If I have a complete grasp of the nature of my conscious states,

shouldn’t it be immediately apparent to me that they involve many micro-level properties?

Goff’s Solution – Vertical vs. Horizontal Aspects

Vertical Aspects: proper parts that are aspects of the whole of which they are proper parts.

Horizontal Aspects: An aspect of a vertical aspect that abstracts away from its structure

[239].

- E.g., a brain is a vertical aspect of the cosmos. If you abstract away from its structure

and conceive of it only in terms of its computational properties, you have in mind a

horizontal aspect of the vertical aspect of the cosmos that is the brain.
Previously, we conceptualised LITTLE subjects/experiences as vertical aspects of BIG

subjects/experiences [240].

- But what if some subjects/experiences are horizontal aspects of other

subjects/experiences?

o We can’t imagine such a relationship between subjects/experiences, but there

is nothing incoherent in the idea of it.

Hence, the constitutive cosmopsychist should identify o-subjects not with brains, but with

horizontal aspects of brains. O-conscious states are not brain states, but horizontal aspects of

brain states.

- This solves the problem posed by the revelation argument [241].

o “Just as you can know the computational properties of a system without

knowing its determinate physical properties … so I can have revelatory access

to the nature of my consciousness without [access] to the nature of my brain’s

consciousness”.

Sharing Thoughts with the Cosmos

If my conscious states are a horizontal aspect of a vertical aspect of the cosmos, then it

follows that my conscious states are an aspect of the cosmos, which suggests that the cosmos

shares my conscious states [241].

- Albahari suggests that this is incoherent [241-2]:

o If Fiona experiences a mind-dominating fear and Fred simultaneously

experiences a mind-dominating excitement, Goff’s cosmic subject must

experience both these mental states. But how could each of these emotions
 retain its defining characterisation as mind-dominating if both are experienced

at once?

o Furthermore, how could the cosmic subject experience the “mass of

everyone’s contradicting beliefs and identities”?

Goff’s reply:

- ‘Mind dominating nature’ seems to refer to the fact that Fiona has fear and nothing

much else in her consciousness.

o If so, the ‘mind dominating nature’ is not a conscious state that the cosmos

must share. It is merely describing how much of this or that conscious state is

experienced in relation to all other conscious states. The cosmos needn’t also

experience the fear as mind-dominating (i.e., to this particular

degree/ratio/magnitude).

- What about the implication that the cosmos’ cognition will involve completely

contradictory content?

o So what? The constitutive cosmopsychist isn’t required to maintain that the

cosmos is a superintelligent rational agent. Most likely, it’s a mess.