ROSA LIM 

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2000)

G.R. No. 130038 • September 18, 2000

hoc quidem perquam durum est sed ita lex scripta est
– The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written

FACTS:

On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth

P300, 000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with
the same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on
Metrobank and gave the check to Seguan.

The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased
jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable
to “cash” dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount
of P241,668.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain
Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The
checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in
the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon
demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two
dishonored checks, but she never did.

On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the

RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for
violations of BP No. 22.

After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a
decision in the two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to
the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996
Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lim violated B.P. No. 22.

RULING:

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: “(1) The making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; “(2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and “(3) The
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.” The
gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.
And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make
arrangement for its payment within five banking days from notice of
dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to
guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the
check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the
issuance of the checks, are irrelevant in determining culpability. Under
BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment
of an obligation, or that there was damage. It was ruled in United
States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has
the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita –“it is
not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal
intent. In many crimes, the intention of the person who commits the
crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is a perfect example of an act
mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are
admittedly present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris
tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to
sustain a conviction. To escape liability, she must prove that the
second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption
and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement
for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice of
dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam
durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but
so the law is written. However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must
be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was
held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P.
No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to
prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. The
prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted, and imposed on
them only a fine double the amount of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted.
The two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to
P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral
damages and order to pay attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of
sufficient basis.

ALFREDO S. LIM v. FELIPE G. PACQUING, GR No. 115044, 1995-01-27

Facts:
Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case... directing Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development
Corporation (ADC).
The order... was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment...
which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate
the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No.

7065.

petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, Jr. to hold in abeyance the
grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority,... to
Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila...
respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court... against petitioner
Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong... seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing
the provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC.
the RTC... issued a... temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from withdrawing ADC's
provisional authority.
ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila
pursuant to its delegated powers under its charter, Republic Act No. 409.
ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal
protection and... non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for
ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to
determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the
power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is
argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises
issued... by Congress.
On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act No. 409 (Manila Charter) gives
legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No.
954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress,
Issues:
whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise
to maintain and operate the jai-alai... whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction... whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila
Ruling:
The Charter of the City of Manila
Section 18 thereof provides:
"Section 18. Legislative Powers. - The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:... x x x
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on boxing, sipa,
bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any
sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this...
purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary."
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act To Prohibit Certain Activities In
Connection With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe
Penalties For Its Violation".
however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled
"An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development
Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila,... Under
Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes."
Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos.
in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.
Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the
Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to
"grant exclusive rights to establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila
City Mayor to "allow and permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the
City of Manila.
It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power
"to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to
franchise".
What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with... respect to
wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means
that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity,
such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something... meaningful
UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national
government to so operate.
The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is
in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to
operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City
Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the results of
jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense punishable under
Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or... special law
had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the
inherent police power of the State.
The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the
State. It is based on the ancient doctrine - salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.)
"The police power of the State x x x is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the... comfort,
safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary
rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes
of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public... welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public
morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the objectives of national
productivity and self-reliance.
It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work.
It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can
subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications
of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with... the
national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771
ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. And
yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus,... all franchises then
existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government
upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.

ARIS INC. v. NLRC, GR No. 90501, 1991-08-05

Facts:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442, as
amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a
labor... arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC
Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same.  It also questions the
validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.
"SEC. 12.  Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:
'ART. 223.  Appeal.
xxx
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal.  The employee shall either be... admitted back to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.  The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement... provided therein.'"
Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending
The Labor Code", which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8
August 1989, provide as follows:
"Section 2.  Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond.  - In so far as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed... or separated
employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal.  The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation, or,... at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the
payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
Section 17.  Transitory provision.  - Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the
effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as
may be... directed by the Commission."
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by
management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings
which had become detrimental and hazardous,... requested for a grievance conference.  As
none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together
after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the
management's office... to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.
On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private
respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active
participants in the "rally",... requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated
from the service for their conduct.  Despite their explanation, private respondents were
dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of... the
provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or
concerted actions
Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region,
Manila, which was docketed therein as
NLRC-NCR-00-04-01630-88.
After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a
decision[1] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia
M. Perez,... Marieta Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Besmonte,
Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho,... Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala
to their former respective positions or any substantially equivalent positions if already filled
up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months
except... complainant Leodegario de Guzman.
On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a
Writ of Execution[2] pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No.

6715.

On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal

On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal.[4]
On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal
On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition[6] to the motion for execution alleging
that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot... be applied
retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly
provide that it shall be given retroactive effect[7] and to give retroactive effect to Section 12
thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation
on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the
consequences... of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment.
filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that
R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to
be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act.  The said law took
effect on
21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.
On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[10] granting the motion for
execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution "as far as reinstatement of herein...
complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules
particularly the last sentence thereof."... the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17
of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:
"Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21,
1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the
requirements as therein set forth (Section 2) or as may be directed by the
Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March 21, 1989.  With
more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case since the decision
hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter."
Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October
1989[12] raising the issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision under the
following assignment of errors:
Issues:
"A.   THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION
2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION
SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715
IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS - IT BEING
OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.
B.   GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN (SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING
APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL
ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY
APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES."
Ruling:
Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20
November 1989.[13] Meeting squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the
provision concerning the mandatory and automatic... reinstatement of an employee whose
dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of
the state and the contested provision "is then a police legislation."
As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in
nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one
can claim a vested right in a rule of procedure. 
Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional provision on protection to labor.
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances... the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the workingman.
in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution,[20] which principally
directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to... human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and... promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance... with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living
wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers... and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes.
As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. 
Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to
regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory
that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of... the State, that is more
vital than the preservation of corporate profits... pursuant to the same power, the State may
authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a...
dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although
temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or
danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated... employee and his
family.
The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of
attention.  The reference to it in the Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was
unnecessary since the procedure of the appeal... proper is not involved in this case. 
Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can
validly be given retroactive effect.  They are... procedural or remedial in character,
promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended.  Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be... given
retroactive effect.[29] There are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[30] A remedial
statute... may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Principles:
in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution,[20] which principally
directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to... human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and... promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance... with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living
wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers... and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes.
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy
for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social
and economic force, which the
Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity.[22] Labor is an indispensable partner
for the nation's progress and stability.
GR No. 173017, Mar 17, 2009 ]

FELIMON BIGORNIA v. CA +

600 Phil. 693

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Resolutions dated July 22, 2004[1] and
April 3, 2006[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73091. The
appellate court dismissed petitioners' appeal and denied their motion for
reconsideration.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Melchor Aroma filed an action for replevin with

damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao
del Norte. Petitioners allegedly detained Aroma's fishing vessel for 14 days
after it was seized in a seaborne patrol.

On August 28, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision [3] in favor of respondent.
It ordered petitioners to pay jointly and severally the sums of P350,000 by
way of actual and compensatory damages; P100,000 as moral and
exemplary damages; attorney's fees of P20,000; and the costs of suit.

Petitioners appealed. On January 19, 2004, the office of Atty. Arthur L.

Abundiente, counsel for petitioners, received notice requiring petitioners to
file an appellants' brief within 45 days or until March 4, 2004. Petitioners
however, filed their brief only on March 18, 2004, 14 days beyond the
deadline. On July 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued the challenged
Resolution. Its fallo states:

Having been unjustifiably filed out of time, the Appellant[s'] Brief

is ORDERED EXPUNGED FROM/STRICKEN OFF THE
RECORDS. This instant appeal is accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure for appellants'
failure to file their Brief within the time provided for under the Rules.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated April 3, 2006, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, the instant petition which presents the single issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE 23RD DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ADMITTING THE
APPELLANTS' BRIEF, AND IN ORDERING THAT THE SAME BE
EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORD.[6]
Stated simply, the lone issue for our consideration is whether the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal.

Petitioners explain that their counsel was unable to file the brief on time
because he was busy campaigning as candidate for Vice Governor of Lanao
del Norte.[7] Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving notice to file
brief only two years after they appealed.[8] They claim that they could have
immediately submitted a brief had notice been sent earlier.

Petitioners contend that dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(e), [9] Rule

50 of the Rules of Court is directory, not mandatory. They cite the case
of United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Munsingwear Creation
Manufacturing Company,[10] where a lapsed appeal was allowed by the
Court in the interest of substantial justice. According to them, a lesser
offense of delay in filing of brief should merit the same consideration.
Petitioners argue that rules of procedure should be liberally construed so
that cases may be resolved on the merits, and not on technicalities.

Private respondent counters that technical rules of procedure were

designed to effect expediency. Thus, a party seeking liberal application of
the rules must adequately explain his failure to abide by them. Respondent
believes that petitioners failed in this respect.

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the
appellant to file the appellants' brief on time. But, the dismissal
is directory, not mandatory. Hence, the court has discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.
The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.[11]

Petitioners had 45 days or until March 4, 2004 to file an appellants' brief.

Unfortunately, petitioners could not be located as some of them retired
while the rest were assigned to other places. It was their counsel who took
the liberty of filing a brief in their behalf, but 14 days late and without a
motion for leave of court for its admission. Nonetheless, the more pressing
consideration of substantial justice compels this Court to heed the plea of
petitioners. The amount of damages involved in this case is relatively
substantial. Petitioners are police officers, and government employees who
receive meager salaries for risking life and limb. It is but fair that they be
heard on the merits of their case before being made to pay damages, for
what could be, a faithful performance of duty.

The circulars of this Court prescribing technical and other procedural

requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions
that clog the docket and waste the time of the courts. These technical and
procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial
justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to
attain their prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of courts.[12] Thus, in a considerable number of
cases,[13] the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a
particular case from its strict operation where the appellant failed to perfect
his appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in the appellate court's
failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With more reason, there should
be wider latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural rules
when the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the
appealed case and, as in this case, petitioners failed to file the appellants'
brief[14] on time.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of substantial justice, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 22, 2004 and April 3, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No 73091 are SET ASIDE; petitioners'
appeal is reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.