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A secondary role of armor-ianics as a rtille ry

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Armored School,* _Apr ¿>
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This ‘Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
,1 : ■ m j WBM- ARCHIVES SECTION ,
LIBRARY SERVICES
■ 'r tf' J l ß FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. _ COPY* NO. _ L

CGSC Form 160 Arm^-y-GGSC—P3-1966—20 Mar 53—5M 1

13 Mar 61

iftf MMKt
A RESEARCH REPORT
1f Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky
1952-1953
 SECURITY INFORMATION

A SECONDARY ROLE CF ARMOR

TANKS AS ARTILIERY

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY
COMMITTEE 10, ARMOR OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
1952 - 1953
CAPTAIN ALEXANDER M, HAIG, JR..
CAPTAIN SIDNEY-C ACHEE
CAPTAIN JOHN T. HARACELING
CAPTAIN CHENEY L. BERTHOLF, JR.
CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ADDISON

Fort Knax, Kentucky

• April 1953

’t INTERVALS}
AiTKH12VKAHS.
X>OD DIR 5200.10
 PREFACE
I t is during the years between wars that m ilitary doctrine
should be developed to insure success in future co n flicts. Basi­
cally th is doctrine must be evolved from a dual source. The f ir s t
is experience of past wars. The second, of far more diversified
origin, is the objective and judicious evaluation of arms develop­
ment, national resources and a constant up-to-date appraisal of
potential enemies and theaters of operation. These two sources
should be soundly merged, resulting in a doctrine which by its
very nature w ill be subject to frequent modification.
Doctrine for the u tiliz a tio n of armor i s perhaps the most
d iffic u lt to evolve due to the youth of the branch and the in ­
herent complexities of mechanization. This d ifficu lty frequently
resu lts in differences of opinion as to the soundness of current
doctrine. These differences of opinion insure in turn a healthy
stimulus to the essen tial review of the factors on which our doc­
trin e is based. However, any reappraisal which f a ils to include
a l l the cornerstones of sound doctrine w ill cement distortions
in the doctrine i ts e lf . These distortions are most serious since
they are seldom apparent u n til the costly t r i a l of combat.
In the following study an effo rt w ill be made to include
a l l the data essential for a reappraisal of our current doctrine
with respect to the use of tanks in the indirect fire support ro le.
This e ffo rt would not have been possible without the cooperation
and support of the Army War College, Army Field Forces Board
Number 2, and the many coxan&nders of armor in the field«

ii
 TABLE of contents

Chapter pac*r
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................ .....................
2 HISTORICAL EXAMPLES WORLD WAR I I ...................... ... . 3
Operations in Ita ly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Operations in France and Germany . . . . . . . . . 7
Operations in the Pacific. . ..................................... 8
Opinions on the Postwar Array . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Lessons. . . . . . . ..................... 10
3 INDIRECT FIRE EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN KOREA . . . . . 13
Views of Commanding General x C orps,., . . . . . . 13
Views of Commanding General I Corps. . . . . . . . ^7
, Views of Armored O fficer, Headquarters I Corps . . 17
Unit Action Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Summary. ..................................... ... . .......................... 20
4 ' MAJOR TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL ASPECTS . . . . . . . . 23
Tube ÿfear. . ...................... 23
Dispersion and Accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
External B a llistic C haracteristics, Range, and
Trajectory .................. 30
Rate of Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Ammunition Effects on Target ............... . . . . . . 33
Logistical Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Conclusions. 35

5 TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Current Sources of Training. . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Solutions to problem of Artillery-Type Indirect
F ire Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
The Role o f A rtillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6 SUMMARY. .................................... 44
Doctrine . . .................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Technical Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Training and Techniques. . ................... . . . . . 45
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . ............... . . . . 45
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................... 47
v UNOLÂSSI
APPENDICES...................... 50
4>
I? I Corps and Division Orders. . . . . . . . . . 50
Summary of Questionnaires on Indirect Pire . . 55
I I . Training Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Extracts from PM 1 7 -1 2 .................. 57
Comparison of ATP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A rtille ry School Questionnaire . . . . . . . . 60

iv
V

INTRODUCTION
. ^*e discussion th a t follows, an understanding of the
teim^"indirect fire " is essen tial. For the purpose of th is study
indirect fire'» is to be interpreted to indicate a r tille r y type
fire s which may or may not be observed and are surveyed and con­
tro lle d through fire direction centers. The subject discussion
is frequently misdirected to include normal defilade tank f ire
directed by an observer. The la tte r is an essen tial subject in
tank training and an accepted employment for tank armament.
Prior to entering the discussion i t would be well to
examine our current indirect fire doctrine. ' Paragraph 1A1
FK 17-33 "Tank Battalion" sta tes: *
Under exceptional conditions tanks may employ indirect
f ir e to support the attack; however, because o f the f la t tr a ­
jectory, high muzzle velocity and small bursting radius of
tank p ro jectiles, and the excessive wear on the tube, th is is
an abnormal mission. When such a mission is assigned to tanks,
special provisions must be made for maintaining the basic am­
munition load.
FM 17-12 "Tank Gunnery" does not cover indirect fire except for
normal defilade procedures. This in effect represents our current
indirect fire doctrine as i t is available to armored units in the
Ixela*

. The question of the fe a s ib ility of u tiliz in g tanks in the

indirect f ir e role arose during World War II and again during the
Korean co n flic t. I t also was subject to discussion in the plan-
nlng of the defense o f_Western Europe. In some cases armored
o ificers f e lt th at their units were being misemployed when re­
quired to fire indirect missions. In other cases, p articularly
in lower echelons, the ciy was, "I am not being trained for th is
m ission.»

, The goal of th is study is to determine whether our current

doctrine is sound and i f our current training supports th is doc­
trin e .

In accomplishing th is the study w ill discuss the h is to ri­

cal employment of tanks in the a r tille r y role in World War I I and
the Korean c o n flic t. Applications of indirect fire w ill be pre­
sented with a view to establishing doctrinal precedents and
rcrriowiiig r e a c t s achieved. This M il be followed br a
axscussxon of the physical and technical aspects of indirect
ixre to include: ^ present fire control devices, tube wear, b al-
lastxc ch aracteristics of high explosive ammunition, and fin ally
the logietxcal problem of ammunition supply. The study is con­
cluded by a review of current train in g , possible additions to
luture train in g and a review of current and future doctrine,
Research on th is subject has been limited in the past.
Inxs committee found only two related effo rts to resolve th is
question. The f i r s t was a s ta ff study by a board of officers
conducted a t the Armored School on 30 January 1951. The second
was a research study on indirect fire in the Korean Conflict
completed by commxttee 10, the Advanced Class of the Armored
chool, completed in June 1952. Both studies provided valu­
able assxstanee to the effo rts of th is committee. .
Because of the limited research done in thè past on in -
dxrect fire by tanks, extensive investigation was demanded. Unit
.after Ac^i°n Reports, and Intelligence Summaries of both
Viorld bar II and the Korean conflict provide h isto ric a l te s t i -
* I n audxtion, questionnaires were sent to armor commanders
hroughout the aruy and .the nature of the replies a tte s ts to the
pertinence of the study.

I t is hoped th at the reader w ill find in th is study an

unbiased presentation of a l l the factors involved. The con­
clusions agreed upon by th is committee are the resu lt of an
evaluation of the data examined and can provide a solution to
thxs pressing problem.

i 8&
 CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL EXAAiPIES — W3RLD MR II

The tank is defined as a track-laying vehicle with suf­
ficie n t armor to protect the crew from small arms* a r tille r y
fragments and some high~velocity projectiles* and possessing a
cannon and one or more machine guns as armament. These three
ch aracteristics: mobility, armor protection and firepower* when
properly exploited* produce the shock action for which tanks were
built# H istorically, the tank has been able to influence the
battle most when armored commanders have gone ‘^ e ll-b e n t1* for
th e ir objectives* thereby getting the most out of the mobility
b u ilt into the tank. On other occasions* in certain tank-*versus-
tank actio n s, the side whose tanks had the heaviest armor plate
won the b a ttle . In either case* the s k illfu l tank crew always
fire s a l l weapons which could help in the accomplishment of the
mission, whether i t be exploitation or a slugging match. As
tanks and tank guns have become larger, the ranges have increased,
thereby permitting the tank to rely less on i t s defensive armor*
and more on i t s offensive gun. This does not imply th at suc­
cessful commanders of armor have neglected the f u ll development
and use of mobility on the battlefield#
a s a re su lt of the ta c tic a l situ atio n , there have been
many occasions when, for any one of a number of possible reasons,
tank forces were not, and indeed, could not be used in th eir
primaiy role. As a matter of fa c t, by November 1943* W Training
Circular 125 had been published for the guidance of our armored
units in the fie ld . This circu lar outlined methods of employment
of tanks as a r tille r y , and its provisions had been effected in
most units by the end of the year#
Operations in Italy
One of the e a rlie s t documented examples of tanks or tank
destroyers used in an a r tille r y role is th at recorded in a report
from the A rtillery Section, Headquarters VI Corps* dated 15
October 1943* The 776th T. D. Battalion was assigned to Division
a r tille r y , 34th Infantry Division, on the basis of one company of
twelve 3fT guns to each lig h t battalion. The commanding general
of 34th Division A rtillery was very well satisfied with the re­
sults obtained# Provisions were made for the massing of fire s
from a l l thirty-^six guns on c a ll. The positions occupied were
such that the battalion could have been massed for employment in
i t s primary ro
 5» -np W W jg&i *SSR-

29th of November, 1943, a G-3

Training Board from Army Ground Forces headed by Colonel Stovall,
v isited the 1st Armored Division for the purpose of interviewing’
officers on the subject of Armored Command a c tiv itie s . Major
General Ernest N. Harmon, then commanding the 1st Armored Division
stated in an interview th a t:
Greater emphasis must be placed on indirect fire from
tanks. Tanks must have the necessary instruments and be
trained to fire indirect fire effectively. In the 1st Armored
Division we have placed a l l platoons, a ll companies, a l l bat­
talio n s, in the f ir e direction centers of the a r tille r y bat­
talions and of the division a r tille r y . In many cases when
tanks could pot be used as such we have used them as a r t i l ­
lery to help infantry over ground impassable for tanks.2
But, s t i l l according to General Harmon, "tankers must be imbued
with the idea of fighting d ir e c t-f ir e »3 and "tanks must fire
direct fire and be capable of indirect f ir e . The a r tille r y must
_fire indirect f ir e and be capable of direct f ir e . "4-
.mother of the officers interviewed on th is occasion was
Brigadier^General, then Colonel, Hamilton H* Howze, commanding
the 13th armored Regiment. I t was Colonel Howze1s opinion that
a l l mediim tanks should be equipped fo r indirect f ir e . The tanks
in his regiment Were so equipped by placing on improvised brackets
the machine gun panoramic sig h t.5

On December 24th of the same year, the 701st Tank Destroyer

Battalion was attached to 1st Armored Division A rtillery . Each
tank destroyer battalion had an organic survey section, but in
essence i t was not much different otherwise from the tank bat­
ta lio n . On the date mentioned, the companies of the 701st operated
from the A rtillery Fire Direction Center by means of telephones.
For observed f ir e , the battalion reconnaissance platoon provided
forward observers. The organic loads of ammunition were le f t
in ta c t, so th at the battalion was prepared to move out in i t s
primary ro le. Since there had not been many opportunities for
the battalion to operate in i t s primary ro le, the men f e l t that
xt had been of great benefit to them to be able to fire in the
secondary ro le. They f e lt th at they learned a great deal by being
so employed, and i t gave them confidence in th e ir a b ility to meet
any situation th a t might a r i s e .'

During December 1943, another Army Ground Forces Board

headed by Colonel Devore v isited ground forces units in contact
with the enemy, aipong which was the 751st Tank Battalion, The
ideas on tanks used in a secondary role of th is b attalion com­
mander d iffe r from those previously outlined.
 This battalion has fire d some indirect fire missions
along the lin es as mentioned in War Department Circular 125,
That was when the battalion was in support of the 36th Di­
vision at ALTAVILLA near PAESTUM. used the same system
that is used for mortar fire by lining on stakes. However,
the a rtille ry asked me to get my battalion out of the way
as i t was drawing enemy fire on th e ir positions. I do not
believe in teaching a r tille r y methods of indirect fire as
the times th at the tanks can be used for such missions are
very few.

In r e s P°nse to a le tte r t o u n it commanders from Army Ground

¿orces co n ce rn in g tanks and ta n k d e s tr o y e r s used as a r tille r y , th e
Ï Î Headquarters> 2d Armored Group, stated that
ooth the 755th and the 757th Tank Battalions had been too busy re ­
organizing to undertake train in g in th e ir secondary role. However
in January 1944, the 755th had sent several officers and en listed -
S L Î 0 Î? artxllev?i Ch°o1 at 6th Field A rtillery Group; and the
757th, in February of th at year, received one week of instruction
fj' L .^ artil le r y officer in indirect fire methods. Each company
dfy on the ranSe> firin g as a r tille r y . All concerned ^
f e lt that i t was beneficial to both crews and observers.9 In
train in g , excellent results were obtained by means of welding
machine gun panoramic sights to the tops of the tu r re ts . 10
General Harmon, who, as has been indicated, had strong
views on th is subject, further stated in July 1944 th a t:
, TKe °f tanfc and tank destroyer units on a secondary
mission to reinforce a r tille r y has been effectively used in
past operations while in sta tic positions both for observed
and^ unobserved f ire , Experience has proven the soundnc-ss of
tn e ir use in th is manner and the d e sira b ility of giving
adequate training in th is type of f i r e .1 1
The general continued with the recommendation for the issue of one
Command Post and Fire Direction Set #1, and one Survey Set as i s -
sue o F ield Arfi-Hery Battalions, to each tank and tank de­
stroyer b attalion headquarters.^

, Lieutenant Colonel J.. R. Pritchard, commanding the 68th

ermored F ield ,A rtillery Battalion in July 1944, was also in te r­
viewed on the subject of tanks and tank destroyers used as a r t i l -
le ry . Based on his experience, he advised th at tanks should be
placed in position as a platoon, with.each platoon acting as a
-ring b attery , with battery executive and five gun sections.
The platoon should reg ister on a common base point and numerous
check points. Tank fire , in Colonel P ritchard's opinion, should
be used for reinforcing a r tille r y f ir e , deepening a r tille r y fire
 âïTd for harass there should be
4 a direct wire the a r tille r y
battalion fire direction center. The company commander should be
on a party lin e to his platoons, and the platoon commander on a
party lin e to his tanks. The tank crew members should then be
using headsets only, in order to free th e ir hands and ensure an
uninterrupted flow of information«53
A combat lessons report from Headquarters 2d Armored Group
in October 1944 contains some very in terestin g notations on methods
and procedures. In July 1944, the medium tank companies of the
751st Tank fiattalion were divided,iintra-company, into two Combat
elements. Two platoons were employed as a r tille r y under the
direction of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion during an oper­
ation in support of an AAA brigade, which had been given an
infantry mission in a defensive sector. The 2d Armored Group was
to furnish armor support to the brigade. Since, prior to th is ,
there had not been much need for th is unit to be used as a r t i l ­
le ry , train in g had been neglected, and the personnel were inex­
perienced in a r tille r y techniques. Necessary training was given
to the crews while on the line by a r tille r y o fficers. Each tank
was dug in by "means of a tank-dozer, so that the maximum range of
75 mm gun was 12,000 yards, and maximum depression cleared the
minimum range. The observation posts and the fire direction center
were manned by personnel from the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
and wire was used between each tank and the f ir e direction center.
Ample ammunition was on hand. As an example, in the la st ten days
of July, the 751st Tank Battalion fired 13,158 rounds of HEj 1400
rounds of APCj 700 rounds of WP. H ost often, the ranges varied
from 7,000 to 10,000 yards. On occasion, TOT missions were fired
with great effectiveness. The a r tille r y tanks were le f t in place
and the personnel from the re st of the company were rotated. This
procedure dispensed with relaying the guns every few days. How­
ever, arrangements were made fo r the a r tille r y tanks to revert to
th eir primary mission of close support of the infantry whenever
necessary.-^
The use of tanks as a r tille r y was not confined to the United
States Arny. As an example of such use by our Commonwealth A llies,
th is excerpt from a report by the 18th New Zealand Armoured Regi­
ment is cited :
.. .early' December 1944» when 8th Anny was held up before
FAENZA and R. LALICNE, tank units were frequently employed for
days a t a time in indirect fire ro le s. This account deals
■ed Regiment—the
lathe resu lts achieved»^

6
 The f i r s t tin e th is regiment was so employed, they laid
down a barrage across the Sangro to support another regiment. Be­
fore Faetiza, "C" Squadron was given a mission of harassing the
eneny,- and they were assigned a number of targets in th e ir area.
Each target was to receive one round every two minutes during the
entire night, each tank firin g in turn on its assigned targ et.
F ifty rounds per gun per night was the ammunition allotment. Cn
one occasion, when the daylight target was an enemy occupied house
at a range of over 5,000 yards, one of the tank guns placed three
rounds in succession through the doorway of the h o u s e . D u r i n g
a two week period, "Cu Squadron fire d about 6,000 rounds. Quite
frequently, they engaged targ ets a t ranges in excess of 10,000
yards. The conclusions drawn bjr the author of the report, Ilajor
General H. 1. Birks, RA.C, are: 1'
1. Tanks must be level and near a supply route
2. They must have alternate positions, since two days of
unmolested fire is the maximum
3# On f la t country, observation and correction must be
made from the a ir
4. Approximately four tames the »contact* rate of am­
munition is used
5. Tanks are not a r tille r y , and th e ir use as such is
ju stifie d only by the resu lts
Operations in France and Germany
By the time of the Normandy invasion, the practice of using
tanks and tank destroyers in an a r tille r y role when the occasion
arose, was already well established.
Late in September 1944» VII Corps had crossed into Germany
in the v icinity of Aachen, and was in front of the Seigfried Line,
VII Corps included the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, the 3rd
Armored Division, and the 4th Cavalry Group, In addition, the
634th , 635th, and 899th Tank Destroyer Battalions were firin g in
support of Corps A rtillery .1®
From 29 December 1944 to 4 January 1945, Company A, 781st
Tank Battalion was attached to the 753rd Tank Battalion for oper­
ations. Each platoon was employed as an a r tille r y b a tte ry to
a s s is t the fire s of the task force a r tille r y . At the time, the
tanks were attached to the 79th Infantry Division, which was with­
drawing from the vicinity of Strassburg. On 5 January 1945, Company
A moved to Hoerdt for indirect fire missions which were coordinated
through the 935th Field A rtillery Battalion. This company had some
tanks with 75’s and some with 76*s. The 75*s were surveyed in and
given fire missionsj the 76*s were surveyed in, but on th is oc­
casion, had no fire missions.
 - nru-u ^ th is time, the 781st Tank Battalion was attached to the
i tu V InfantryDivision and was being held in divisio n
_ Larch, the 3rd Platoon of Company A, a platoon of Company
B, a platoon of Company C, and the Assault Gun Platoon fired in ­
direct fire missions in support of the 374th Field A rtille iy Bat­
talion* The 1st Platoon of Company C and the Assault Gun Platoon
continued on the indirect fire mission through the 13 th of 1,larch.
The 2d Platoon of Company D moved to Bitch on 16 March to
fire in support of Battery D, 926th Field A rtillery Battalion,
During the re st of March and A pril, the 781st Tank Battalion sup-
ported the advance of the 100th and the 1033 Infant^--D ivisions,
ending at Garmisch-Partenkirchen on 30 April 1945»’*-*
These examples were selected from a number of sim ilar re­
ports, inasmuch as they are typical of the tank and tank destroyer
operations in France and Germany.
Operations in the Pacific
Opportunities for the use of armor in mass were highly
lim ited in the war in the P acific. No land masses with suitable
maneuver room were involved during the various island campaigns
that were fought by our forces engaged against the Japanese. Our-
a llie s were as interested as we were in a ll ta c tic a l developments,
and th e ir observers and inspectors v isited our forces for the pur­
pose of reporting to th e ir own governments on th e la te st innovations.
In 1945, Major John B. Robinson, Royal Canadian Armoured
Corps, submitted a report to his superiors.entitled, "Report on US
Armour in The Ryukyus (Okinawa) Cam paign.^ in th is report, Major
Robinson outlined the technique th a t had been developed on Leyte.
Since the Japanese had retreated into the rugged h ill country, the
tanks could not be used in th e ir primary mission of infantry sup­
port. Consequently, the tank units were organized into tank-
a r tille r y battalions under division a r til le i y control for the
purpose of reinforcing a r tille r y f ire s . Each platoon was organized
as a four-gun firin g b attery , with the f if th tank held in reserve.
Each company then became the equivalent of a b attalio n , and was
attached to a fie ld a r tille r y b attalion.- The a rtille ry was re­
sponsible for the selection of positions, survey, and a l l f ir e
direction. Two-way communication was provided by means of radio
and wire, and a ll fire s were observed and corrected by the fie ld
a r tille r y forward observers-. Targets assigned to the ta n k -a rtille ry
units were as distant as 11,000 yards. Each tank retained i t s basic
load of ammunition in ta c t, except in case of grave emergency,

3
 Once again we see that the tank gun represented too much
fire power to be allowed to remain id le .
On Okinawa, tanks saw l i t t l e use as a r tille r y , because the
infantry did not outrun th e ir a rtille ry support, and there rvere
opportunities for tank units to be maneuvered. 22
I t would seem th at Major Robinson and our own after-action
reports differed on the number of times that tanks on Okinawa were
employed as a r tille r y . In th e ir report dated 2 August 1945, the
20th Armored Group mentions occasions when i t was necessary for the
amphibious tanks to act as supporting a r tille r y from defiladed
positions until-the fie ld a rtille ry battalions were landed.23 In
the same report, but on another page, there is mention made of
medium tanks used in an a rtille ry ro le.
Indirect fire by tanks was employed on many occasions with
uniformly excellent re s u lts . th is method» massed fire s are
easily delivered and easily shifted as desired. Direct f ire
from tu rre t dbfilade with an observer near the crest was also
e ffe c tiv e ." 1-
I t is of in te re st to note that at various times during the
Okinawa campaign, the 20th Armored Group contained the following
units, which were placed in support of or attached to various
infantry divisions as the situation changed:*2
Amphibious Tractor Battalions Amphibious Tank Battalions
536th 708th
715th 776th
718th 780th
728th
773rd Medium Tank Battalions
788th
193rd
706th
‘ 711th
763rd
On the basis of the units assigned, and missions performed,
the 20th Armored Group certainly qualifies as an authoritative
source.
Opinions on the Postwar Army
Towards the end of the fighting in Europe, the Army War -
Collegs sent form le tte rs to various fie ld commanders at th eater,
army, corps and division level, requesting opinions on the
composition of the postwar arm y. 26 One of the questions dealt
with the status of tank and tank destroyer units in that am y.
I t is an h isto ric a l fact th a t the tank destroyer branch was die—
solved, and its missions were given to the armor branch. P articular
attention should be given to the emphasis placed by a-number of
higher commanders on the cap ab ilities which the postwar armor
oranch must have. Two officers who had a great deal of command
experience during World War II made remarks which were fa irly
typical of the answers received by the-Army War College, Lieu­
tenant General Lucien K. Truscott, J r . , Commanding General of F ifth
United States Army, said, "Both tanks and tank destroyers should be
trained as a r tille r y . They must be equipped and trained for use as
a r tille r y as a secondary r o le ,"27 Major General W illis D, C ritten -
berger, Commanding General of IV Corps, said, 'The gunners of Armor
and the Tank-Destroyers should be thoroughly trained in a rtille r y
firin g methods.

The resu lts of the conferences held a fte r the war are known
to a l l . We now have one Armor branch which incorporates the experi­
ences and ideas concerning organization of a l l our armored com­
manders into a homogeneous body, which is prepared to perform a
wide variety of missions*
lessons
The conclusions to be drawn from our experiences in World
War II with regard to tanks used in an a r tille r y role are obvious,
No commander of a tank unit has ever advocated that tanks are mobile
a rtx p e jy pieces. Most are in agreement th at the proper primary
mission for the tank is one which w ill exploit to the fu lle st "its
mobility, permitting the armor protection and the immense f i r e ­
power to a s s is t in the accomplishment of that mission. This is
what is meant by "shock action«», and is the only ju stific a tio n for
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars for each vehicle. But,
fo r th a t very reason—the one of high cost—i t is very unprofitable
for the tanks and tankers to remain idle simply because the s itu -
ation prevents th e ir "proper1* employment. This is the conclusion
reached by the many commanders who used th e ir tanks to reinforce
a r tille r y when the occasion demanded or permitted. In addition
i t was common practice fo r the tanks, and tank destroyers, to be
so located th a t they could be readily massed for employment as
armor., .

. Aidunition supply and communications were two more con­

siderations affecting the use of tanks in a s ta tic position. EacI
vehicle was le f t with its basic load of ammunition at a l l times,
except in enErg%r|^..a Mre was strung from tank to tank in order
to ensure rap id ftf accessary survey
was accomplished by people well qualified, eith er fie ld a r tille r y
or, in soae cases, tank destroyer personnel.
The question of morale is worth mentioning at this point.
A number of the commanders who have w ritten concerning the sub­
je c t, state th a t the feeling of the soldiers in th e ir units was
that they were glad to be contributing to the over-aH e ffo rt. Let
us not deny to the soldier the opportunity to destroy the enemy
whenever the situ atio n permits.
In summation, based on experience in World War II only, the
tank as we now know i t , represents fire power which must under a ll
circumstances be employed to further the accomplishment of missions
assigned, regardless of te rrain and weather, and the ta c tic a l situ ­
ation.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

XEmployment of 77o Tank Destroyer Battalion in an A rtille ry
Role During Recent Operations, Headquarters VI Corps, A rtillery ~"
Section, 15 October 1943, P 1. (SECRET)
2
^Interviews on Armored Command A ctivities with Officers of
1st Armored Division, AGF Board, G-3 Training Section, AFHQ, Novem­
ber, 1943, P 3. (RESTRICTED)
3Ibid, p 3.
4Ibid, p 3.
3Ibid. pp 13 , 14.
L
°Report of Colonel G. B. Devore, ACT1 Board, Based on Data
Obtained in Ita ly , 14-31 beceiriber 1943, AGF Board, AFHQ, 6 January
1944, p 22.

7Ibid, p 23.
%bid. p 1 5 .
Employment of Tanks'and Tank Destroyers as A rtille ry , AGF
Board L etter of 17 July 1944, AGF Board, G-3 Training Section,
AFHQ, 2 August 1944, p 1. (RESTRICTED)
1 QIb id , p 2.
Ib id , p i .

11
 1 2Ib id , p 1 .
^%!mployment of Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions as Rein­
forcing A rtillery . AGF Board, G-3 Training Section. AFHQ. 12 July
iy44, Annex, p 1. (RESTRICTED)
^ •Combat Lessons, Headquarters 2d Armored Group, AGF'Board,
North African Theater of Operations, 7 October 1944, pp 1-3, 5.
■^Major-General H. L, Birks, RAC, Armoured Operations in
I ta ly , Printing and Stationery Service, date unk, p 72. (SECRET)
l 6Ib id , p 72.
17Ibid, p 73.
18VII Corps Operations Report, Headquarters VII Corps, date
unk, passim.
^ Unit History, 781st Tank B attalion, Headquarters 781st
Tank Battalion, 16 February 1945, P 4,
ryr\
^Liajor John B, Robinson, RCAC, Report on US Armour in the
Ryukyus (Okinawa) Campaign, Royal Canadian Army, date unk, p 62.
^ I b id , pp 63, 64.
22Ib id , p 62»
2^20th Armored Group, Action Against the Energy Report,
Headquarters 20th Amored Group, 2 August 1945, P 23.
2^Ib id , p 12 .
25Ibid, p 23.
2^Status of Tank and Tank Destroyer Units in the Postwar
Amy, Headquarters AGF, Army MAr College, 8 May 1945, P 1. (SECRET)
27Ibid, p 51.
28Ib id , p 54.

J1!4fg$
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 SECURITY INFORMATION

CHAPTER 3
THE INDIRECT FIRE EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN KOREA
Frior to discussing indirect f ir e in the Korean campaign,
i t would be well to review the te rra in and the m ilitary situation
in general. The facts are known to a l l , but should be briefly
re-stated to insure an appreciation of the need for indirect f ir e .
Korean te rra in is rugged and mountainous. I ts road net­
work is poor at b e st, consisting of narrow d irt tr a ils which wind
precariously through the mountains and h ills or p a ra lle l the rice
paddies covering the v alley s’ flo o rs. Both rain and thaw frequently
leave the roads impassable. The te rra in in most areas, particu­
la rly the eastern section, w ill not support massed armor.
The enemy forces when on the offensive u tiliz e mass infan­
try assaults on a broad front which demand the highest degree of
friendly fire support. Prisoners of war and intelligence affirm
the fact that our most effective weapon is the quantity and *ac—
. curacy of a r tille r y f ir e s .
Alien- the United Nations became engaged in the Korean con­
f l i c t in June of 1950, both lig h t and medium a rtille ry were in
short supply. This condition existed u n til la te Spring 1951. I t
was during the period from June 1950 u n til late Spring of 1951
that tanks were frequently called upon to reinforce a r tille r y f ire s .
In th is chapter we shall present the high level commanders’
viewpoints on indirect fire as well as examples of small unit oper­
ations which were conducted on the basis of these viewpoints. I t
must be remembered th at the te rra in in the zone of operations played
a major part in the decision to use tanks to reinforce a r tille r y .
Views of Conmanding General, x Corps
The opinion of Lt, General Almond on th is subject can best
be illu s tra te d by a statement made by the General at Fort S ill,
Oklahoma, based on his experiences as commander of the U. S. X
Corps in Korea during 1950-51.■ Throughout th is period the X Corps
operated in the mountainous eastern section.
. . . The habitual use of tanks greatly extended, in effect,
our a r tille r y ranges to 19,500 yards, so you can readily ap­
preciate how th is permitted us to in te rd ict and harass roads
and t r a i l s being used by the enemy far beyond medium and lig h t
a r tille r y r a n g e ^

13
 During the same conference General Almond further ex­
pounded on the employment of tanks in indirect f ire :
..«To further thicken the a r tille r y support of infantry
un its, a r tille r y units instructed key personnel of the or*-»
ganic tank .organizations in the methods of indirect fire
These personnel then instructed the crews of th e ir own units '
in these methods. By constructing ramps or using embankments,
the tanks were emplaced on a slope of about 30 degrees. This
gave them additional range and also permitted them a trajectory
which would clear the many masks which confronted them. This
additional fire support consisted of 32 tank platoons or a
to ta l of about 160 tanks . . .
To graphically illu s tra te the f ir e cap ab ilities of the
afore-mentioned tanks as employed in Korea on 17 May 1951» see
figure 1 which was taken from a daily operation report of U, S.
X Corps. Figure Z* shows the same tank fire capabilities super­
imposed upon the a r tille r y dispositions during the b a ttle of the
Soyang, 17 May 1951. Note should be taken of the manner in which
the positioning of the tanks in conjunction with the fie ld a r t i l ­
lery units to obtain the maximum use of th e ir great fire power and
range contributed to the complete b a ttle front coverage by f ir e .
I t should be stated here th at th is operation represented
the largest single massed attack by Chinese and North Korean forces
in the Korean co n flict. During th is F ifth Phase Offensive, as i t
is commonly known, the Chinese forces directed th e ir assault at the
2nd U. S. Infantry Division and RDK units in the X Corps zone.
The defeat of th is e ffo rt represented a remarkable achievement in
effective coordination of a l l supporting weapons.
L t. General Almond’s ideas on the employment of tanks in
the indirect fire role can be further illu stra te d by a le tte r (see
Appendix I , le tte r X Corps) to the two U. S. divisions within U. S.
X Corps. Paragraph 1 of th is le tte r states: |lIn order to bring
the maximum number of guns to boar on the enemy, tanks habitually
w ill be used in indirect fire roles when not engaged on th e ir
primary m ission.11'*

The remainder of the le tte r concerns a suggested method

of training the tank units in order to accomplish th is task. A
resultant training memorandum, published by the D, S, 7th Infantry
Division upon receipt of General Almond's le tte r , is shown in Ap­
pendix I (Training Memorandum, U. 5, 7th Infantry Division).

U P! %\ \
l i l t il.il«
ECURITY INFORMATION
SECURITY INFORMATION
 SECURITY INFORMATI

Views of the Commanding General, U. S. I Corps, March 1951

A few days a fte r the Han River Crossing by the United
Nations Forces on the 6th and 7th of March 1951, an armor combat
lesson b u lletin was issued by the Commanding General of U. S.
I Corps. This b ulletin was issued a fte r a study was made of the
river crossing operation during which tanks were employed as
a r tille r y . A portion of th at b u lletin is quoted below:
. . . a . Tanks should not resort to indirect laying when
direct lay in g ,is permitted by the ta c tic a l situ atio n .
b. Tank guns and crews are not capable of the sustained
rate of fire of field a r tille r y .
c. The rela tiv ely short lif e of a tank gun tube precludes
sustained firin g except in an emergency.
d. A high sustained rate of fire over a long period de­
creases the normal lif e expectancy of a tube m aterially.
e. The use of tanks in an a r tille r y role must be pre­
ceded by ammunition planning to permit the increased expendi­
ture expected.
A study of the te rra in in the crossing area indicates
that armor was not restric ted , nor was the weather such that cross­
country mobility was poor. Further, armor doctrine visualizes
employment of tanks in a direct fire role overwatching riv er
crossing operations or in establishing the bridgehead i t s e l f .
The decision to use tanks in the indirect fire role can only be
made a fte r the commander is certain that they can not be employed
in th e ir primary ro le.
Views of the Armored O fficer, Headquarters I Corps, 1950
Some sta ff officers and commanders have been of the opinion
th at the employment of tanks in the a r tille r y role tends to cause
tankers to lose the s p irit of aggressiveness. The Armored O fficer
of Headquarters I Corps during 1950 concurred with th is opinion
a fte r observing the action of many of the tank units in Korea
during the early stages of the co n flic t. His views were expressed
in a le tte r to the Commanding General, TAC, Fort Knox, Kentucky,
a portion of which is quoted h ere:
...Back in mid-September i t was common practice to employ
a l l tanks in a supporting a rtille ry ro le . In the in i t i a l
stages of the Taegue perimeter breakout, i t became evident
very early th at high ranking commanders were not prepared to
makB fu ll use of the tanks at th e ir command, eith er for the
break-through or for exploitation. Operations were becoming
stalled and i t took an emphatic personal le tte r from the Corps
Commander to break loose the armor,. , •
 The aggressive s p ir it so essen tial to armored units is |§ f
fin a l analysis the commander’s responsibility. Leadership demands
that under a l l conditions th is s p irit be fostered and kindled. I t
is f e lt by the committee th at a loss of aggressiveness can be a t­
tributed to the unit commander himself and not to the nature of
the u n it’s duties. On the other hand, again i t must be emphasizefi
th a t the use of armor in the indirect fire role can never be a
primary employment.
Unit Action Reports
How did the above viewpoints, coupled with conditions of
terrain and the enemy situation', resu lt in the employment of ’
tanks in the indirect fire role in Korea? This question can best
be answered by reviewing actual combat reports from the units in
Korea th at u tilized th e ir tanks as a r til le r y . I t is worthy of
note th at a l l units mentioned below were operating either as an
organic tank b attalion with the infantry division, or as separate
regimental tank companies. In the majority of cases armor has
served in the infantry support role in Korea, the creation of
armor task forces being the only exception to th is ru le.
6th Medium Tank B attalion. On 5 September 1950, the 3d
Platoon, Company A, was attached to the 3d Battalion of the-19th
Infantry approximately 6 miles north of Kyongu, Korea. While en­
gaged in a blocking position they employed indirect f ir e methods,
firin g approximately 200 rounds of high explosive ammunition at
targets beyond a r tille r y ranges. The mission consisted of firin g '
neutralizing fire s u tiliz in g a r tille r y forward observers and f ire
direction center. Air OP reported excellent results were obtained.
On the 16th, 17th, and ISth of September.1950, Company B
set up indirect fire positions north of Taegu, Korea. At this
time the Company was attached to the 52d Field A rtillery B attal-
liop then in support of the 1st Cavalry Division during the Pusan
perimeter engagement. All laying, reg istratio n and observation
of the tank firin g was done under direction of the 52d Field A rtil­
lery Battalion. Targets were engaged at ranges from 3000 to 9000 ;
yards. During the three day period, th is unit was co— credited
with the destruction of one T-34 tank, some a r tille r y pieces, and
an ammunition dump.lu

Q9th Ifedium Tank B attalion. Company A, while supporting

the 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, fired indirect
f ir e missions between 3000 and 9000 yards. This action took place
in September 1950, near Oasu, Korea, The personnel of Company A
placed th e ir tanks and guns in pogj-tiiga ia sv isu a l inspection be*»
cause a i m i n g | c | A | ( | | v | r A c P ^ j i p . | p m time. Missions
11 M l I I l X ^ T n l B i k B
 fired were reported as successful and no evidence of excessive
tube wear was experienced by the u n it. 1 1

Because of an a rtille ry shortage resultant from losses

incurred during the i n i t i a l withdrawal from the invading North
G°mpan? B, composed of Li-26 tanks, was attached to the
25th Infantry Division A rtillery in August 1950.

n , In °ne action in support of the 24th Infantry Regiment,

the tanks of Company B were dug in on slopes to obtain maximum
t i l guns :and were f ired at targ ets ranging between
1*:,000 and 14,000 yards. Over 600 rounds of high explosive am­
munition were fire d by the company during a one and one half hour
period at three concentrations. The success of th is firin g was
substantiated by a North Korean Colonel captured during th is action.
. . . k/hen^interrogated, he stated th at he commanded the NKA
Regiment which attempted to attack through three defiles along
the fro n t of the 24th Infantry. The colonel said th a t because
of a rapid and heavy f ir e , he was unable to gain depth to his
attack and suffered a loss of momentum. One of these three
defiles was covered only by fire s of Company
,,, ¿4th Heavy Tank Battalion. A platoon from Company B of
th is^u n it, in a four hour period, fired approximately 900 rounds
°1 high explosive ammunition in indirect fire . This Was in sup­
port of the 24th Regimental Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division,
during the Han River crossing in March of 1951. Results of th is
par icu ar firin g were not reported; however, upon completion of
th is firin g the barrels were too hot to touch even a fte r an hour
tlUne t f e la st roundhad been fired . An inspec t
• tubes revealed th at two of them required replacement.
During th is same operation another platoon composed of
only four M-26 tanks fired 840 rounds of high explosive ammunition
wo hours and f if ty minutes. This amounted to a rate of fire of
in f T t T - 6’ Al o tal of i ?00 *«*nds of HE were expended
of S S r i L i 1! ! during a three day Period from the 7th to the 9th
Targets engaged by th is unit were interdictory
l 6^ v S raSSi ng ln, nature»W Tired at ranges between 8,000 and
15,000 yards. Observation and adjustment of fire was conducted
iindicated
n d i c t th a t some of3e the main routes of withdrawal
l ? aat7
D ivisi°n
fo r the A rtille ry /a n d
C nese Forces had been cut. Numerous eneny casualties were
also reported as a direct re su lt of the tank f i r e . 15

months aTtl r
m s situated i n »vawi.BJBiQioy
m f «»x^msTwaTig
j i k ifPSCoj
eai *±ie
^ sout
“ "Lhv/est
310?
corner of the "Iron Triangle." This was the beginning of tho
present positional warfare in Korea which found a ll units en­
gaged in maintaining defensive positions.
The 1st Platoon of Company C was attached to the 77th
Field A rtillery Battalion for employment in the indirect fire
role. This combined unit was assigned the mission of supporting
the 7th Cavalry Regiment a t the time. The targ ets assigned to
th is platoon of -tanks consisted of supply points and assembly
areas located a t ranges between 8,000 and 12,000 yards. They
also received a counterbattery mission to fire at a range of
9,000 yards, which resulted in the silencing of the enemy piece.
All survey, reg istratio n , and observation for th is platoon was
conducted by the personnel of the 77th Field A rtillery Battalion
to which they were attached.
73rd Medium Tank B attalion. In order to establish a
c r ite ria for the training of the personnel within the battalion
in the accomplishment of indirect f ir e , one platoon underwent an
intense training program. Upon completion of the five-day training
period, the platoon was employed in firin g indirect fire at enemy
targets at ranges of 10,000 to 14,000 yards. The b attalion a e ria l
observer was utilized in the adjustment of the f ir e s . Firing was
accomplished near. Yonchon, Korea, on the 9th and 10th of December
1952. The resu lts obtained were satisfactory enough to warrant
the establishment of a training program for the remainder of the
battalion. Lt, Col, John H* Gibson, the Battalion Commander of
the 73d, f e lt th at while the indirect fire role was a secondary
role for the tanks, the proficiency gained by the crew members in
using the fire control instruments was reflected in more accurate
direct fire gunnery«-^
Although the unit action reports of the employment of tanks
in the indirect f ir e role in Korea lis te d previously are by no
means the.only examples of such employment, they do represent
ty p ical circumstances and conditions surrounding th e ir use in
such a ro le. As to the actual experiences of o fficers who served
•in tank organizations in Korea during 1950 and 1951, attention is
directed to Appendix I (summary of Questionnaires, 1951-52).
SUMMARY
In summarizing the reasons for and effects of indirect
fire in the Korean co n flict, the following conclusions can be
drawn:
_oniy when the com-
tlized for normal
The roads were many
times hazardous due to snow and ice, This frequently lim ited
the use of tanks in th e ir primary ro le . Naturally mistakes in
judgment were made ty both infantry and armor commanders re la ­
tive to the question of how tanks should be best employed. How­
ever, th is question of jo in t appreciation by tank and infantry
commanders is d istin ct from the question of indirect fire fe a si­
b ility .
2, Prisoners of war and intelligence supported the fact
th a t our most effective weapon during enemy offensives was the
quantity and accuracy of our a r tille r y f ir e . Until la te Spring
of 1951, our forces were undergunned and the need for u tilizin g
every available weapon a t a ll times was essen tial. The enemy’s
superior n u m b e r s *made the in flic tin g of casualties prior to
ta c t of prime importance. To accurately assess the casualties
in flic te d by indirect tank fire would be impossiblej however, the
fact that necessary additional long range f ir e , which otherwise
would have been unobtainable, was added, qualifie-s the wisdom of
this employment,
3, The additional range of the tank gun increased i t s
value. I t must be remembered that the occasions for such employ­
ment were lim ited$ that i s , only when tlx; enemy were massing for
assaults or withdrawing from contact and when the terrain pre­
cluded the use of tanks in th e ir primary' ro le,

NOTES F® CHAPTER 3
^"Lt, General Edward M. Almond, Battle Employment of A rtil­
lery in Korea, a conference presented before the Faculty and Ad-
vanced Class, The A rtillery Center, Fort S ill, Oklahoma, on 11
February 1952, p li.
^Ibid, p 6.
3Ib id , p 18,
4Ib id , p 19.
3"U tilization of Tanks in Indirect Fire Role," a le tte r
order to The Commanding Generals of the U. S. 2d and 7th Infantry
Divisions (Korea: Headquarters X Corps, 5 March 1951).
£
U tilization of Tanks in Indirect Fire Role, a Training
Memorandum to the units of U. S. 7th Infantry Division (Korea:
17 March 1951),
U llp i I
 ^Armor Combat Lesson Bulletin Nr 9, (Korea: Headquarters
I Corps, n Marcfi 19514 p 1*
^Comments on Action In Korea, a le tte r to a l l concerned
(Fort Knox, The Armored School, 15 December 1950), p 1.
^The Employment of Armor in Korea, Vol X, a report on
Armor in Korea (Headquarters Far East Command: Operations Research
Office, 8 August 1951), p. 131.

F irs t Lieutenant Arthur Griza, »Research Questionnaire"

(Fort Knox, Kentucky:. Research and Evaluation Committee $3.0, 1952).
^ Should Tank Units B>e Trained in Indirect Fire?, a research
report prepared at The Armored School (Fort Knox, Kentucky: 1952),
p 41.
^%he Employment of Amor in Korea, Vol, H , a report on
Armor in Korea (Headquarters Far East Command: Operations Research
Office, 8 August 1951), p 304,
•^E xtracts of Combat Information, an extract from the Command
Report of 3d Infantry Division A rtillery, Marcia 1951, (Fort Monroe,
Virginia: Office, Chief of Army Field Forces), p 8.
^Op c i t , Should Tank Units Be Trained in Indirect Fire?.
P 37. . ......... ....... ...................................................................
•^Ibid, p 39.
^•^Lieutenant Colonel John H, Gibson, "Research Questionnaire"
(Fort Knox, Kentucky: Research and Evaluation Committee $10, 1952).

1 Si II -M
 CHAPTER 4
MAJOR TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL ASPECTS
The use of armored units in the secondary role presents
problems which d iffe r considerably from those confronted in the
normal direct fire mission. There are many s tr ic tly technical
problems presented by the-m ateriel used which affect, eith er ad­
vantageously or adversely, indirect firin g of tanks. The authors
feel that there are six primary factors into which the various
technical problems can be resolved. These are: tube wear, d is­
persion and accuracy, external b a llis tic ch aracteristics of high
velocity tank guns (range and accuracy), rate of f ir e , le th a l
effects of the anmunition, and lo g is tic a l support.
In studying these problems the committee has found that
there is very l i t t l e w ritten on the matter* Manuals, a fte r action
reports, summaries and studies of tank combat, and other pertinent
publications and documents, although mentioning indirect f ir e mis­
sions, have not discussed to a su fficien t extent the technical
problems.
In referring to the »tank gun" in th is chapter, the 90 mm
gun M3 and M3A1 is used unless otherwise stated. The development
of the T119 and T139 tank guns is s t i l l in rela tiv e infancy, and
data concerning these weapons is not yet sufficiently accurate or
complete to include in th is report.
Tube yjbar
A major argument against the use of armor in the indirect
f ir e role has always been tube wear. Tankers rig h tfu lly fear the
loss in accuracy resulting from excessive tube wear and the sub­
sequent failu re to get the desired f i r s t or second round h it in
the tank versus tank engagement.
This natural desire to have a weapon in top-notch condition
may have operated in the past to the tanker*s detriment as evidenced
by the following:
When personnel of the using aim find i t d iffic u lt to strik e
a ta rg e t, they usually place the blame on the cannon tube des­
pite the fact th at the e rra tic performance of the weapon may
have been caused by any of a number of other facto rs. An ord­
nance man faced with the job of inspecting such a cannon must
be able to check a l l possible expIdrfett.ibhSi
 ÆSBâ&Ê^ÈzMÈËÈ
SECURITY INFORMAT!!

boliiviour• I t w ill take fa c ts —plus diplomacy—to convince

tne gun crew th a t the weapon is s t i l l serviceable,-^
The only true way to determine the actual wear of a gun tube is In­
accurate measurements of the bore with special instruments couoled
x^xth visual inspection. Only i f these duties are performed by*
quaiiiled ordnance personnel can a true picture of the lif e of the
tube in the future be ascertained, However, i t is interesting to
no e ere th at in many cases crews believe th e ir gun is "worn out",
when actually the fa u lt lie s in common crew, errors of mixing lo t -
numbers of ammunition, faulty ramming of rounds into the chamber,
incorrect sight alignment by the gunner, improper boresighting,
mladjustment of sighting equipment, or faulty zeroing,2 The fact
th at a tank gun does not fire accurately does not necessarily mean
excessive tube wear and since th is is tru e, careful consideration
ty the tank unit commander is certainly in order before condemning
the weapon.

Ordnance has determined a c r itic a l point to which the muz­

zle velocity must decrease in order to condemn the tank gun.
'»¿hen using a worn tube, to obtain the same amount -of armor
penetration th at can be obtained when using a new tube, the '
target must be engaged at closer range, At the condemnation
point, established as a drop of 8.7 per cent or 243 feet per
second, the effect on armor penetration (based on TM 9-1907)
is as follows: When firin g from a range of 2000 yards at a
target having homogeneous armor a t 30 degrees obliquity, the
penetration obtained with a muzzle velocity of 2800 feet per
second is 4.15 inches. To obtain the same penetration of th is
target when the muzzle velocity has dropped to 2557 feet per
second, the targ et must be engaged at a range of 1120 yards.
The pro jectile having a muzzle velocity of 2557 feet per
second w ill penetrate only 3.63 inches of amor at 2000 yards.3
Considering muzzle velocity alone, th is actually resu lts in a d if­
ference of penetration of only .52 inches less at 2000 yards range
between a flew gun and a gun which has reached the condemnation
point. This in a b ility to defeat one-half inch of armor plate seems
rather minor when so many other factors are involved on the fie ld
01 b a ttle . Is there ju stific a tio n for condemnation of a tank gun
when i t s a b ility to defeat enemy amor (as fa r as penetration is
concerned) is lessened by 12 per cent? The conmittee thinks not.
Muzzle velocity also affects the a b ility of the gunner to ac­
curately lay on the ta rg e t. Fire control equipment, i f properly
zeroed, should adequately compensate for the decrease in velocity
resulting from tube wear. When successive rounds become erratic
tho tube should be condemned*

ft S H I I I 1 1
u iiJ ilii l i i
a.
 ft I A B ifi i

Recent developments have given our Army a tank gun in

which the tube can be changed in a very short period of time by
a -well trained ordnance crew. This change-over time may be as
l i t t l e as th irty minutes. This factor alone w ill m aterially
a s sist in the employment of tanks in the secondary role since
tube wear effects w ill be further minimized. The actual time
the tank w ill be unavailable to the unit commander w ill be much
less than at present.
The present cost of a 90mm gun tube for* the M3 90mm Gun
is about .$3000.00. The price of the estimated 1600 rounds of
HE ammunition which would cause condemnation of the tube is about
$50,000.00. Therefore, the cost of the tube is approximately 6
of the cost of the ammunition which, when fired through i t , can
cause i t to be condemned. Considering re la tiv e values, the price
of the tube is not great compared to the ammunition fire d through
i t . Considering the purely economic standpoint, i t is believed
th at the cost to the taxpayer of the tube is insignificant com­
pared to the results we might obtain from the firin g of 1600
rounds of HE ammunition. Figures are not presently available on
the price of the newer gun tubes for our tanks, but the committee
assumes th a t a sim ilar comparison may be made whoa such figures
become available.
An interesting combat example of tube wear occurred in
the Korean Campaign and is related below:
‘From 0615 to 1020 hours the platoon fired in excess of
900 rounds of 90mm ammunition. The canvas gun mantlet cover
of one tank was burned and the paint was stripped from all
four b arrels. One hour a fte r the la s t round had been fire d ,
the barrels were s t i l l too hot to touch. An Ordnance in ­
spection of the four guns several, days la te r revealed that
two of the gun tubes had been burned out, necessitating re­
placement of the tubes. Since th is work can be done only at
PUSAN, the battalion w ill be short of these two tanks fo r
over a month, (For short periods the 90mm gun is capable of
firin g 8 rounds per minute . . . . The lif e of a 9Cbm gun
tube is only about 1600 rounds a fte r which accuracy is
sacrificed due to Wear of the bore. This wear does not a l­
ways depend entirely upon the number of rounds fired ;
contributing factors are also amount of sustained fire and
the care given the bore in cleaning. A high sustained rate
of f ir e over a long period w ill decrease the l if e of the tube
by 25% over a normal rate of f ir e . These four gun tubes
actually fired YJ% of th e ir lif e expectancy in four hours.
How much wear was incurred by prior firin g in th is example is
not known. There may have been considerable tube wear prior to
th is p articu lar mission. Prolonged rapid firin g w ill increase
the deterioration rate of any weapon. The loss of the tanks for
one month in this case would have been obviated ty the newer
type tubes wit h th e ir quick-change features,
, Dispersion and Accuracy
Before discussing accuracy, the authors fe e l th a t the
reader must divorce himself from ideas of "pin-point" accuracy
so common in direct fire tank missions. The B ritish Tank Arma­
ment Research states th a t:
-The necessity for high accuracy in indirect engagements
is probably ra re . The targ ets most commonly engaged are areas
which c a ll fo r neutralization by HI shell rather than a direct
h it with AP shot. Moreover,•tanks which are firin g from be­
hind a crest are under cover, at ary rate from the fire of
th e ir ta rg e t. This means th at a h it with the f i r s t or second
round is by no means a necessity and th a t accuracy is d esir­
able mainly in order to save ammunition.5*^
Devices currently used to lay the tank gun for elevation
in indirect f i r e are the Ml Gunnder's Quadrant, the M9 Elevation
Quadrant, and the T21 Elevation Quadrant. The IQ. and 119 are
b attle -te ste d devices and are su fficien tly accurate for measuring
v e rtic a l angles i f u tilized and maintained properly. Suffice i t
to say th at in view of the accuracy requirements, these instru­
ments are satisfactory for the job of laying the gun for elevation.
The only instrument available on the tank to lay the gun
for deflection or direction is the azimuth indicator, also a
b a ttle —
tested device. There has been trouble in the past with
the slipping of the pointers and in backlash of the gear tra in
which tie s the azimuth indicator in with the tu rre t ring.
Properly trained gunners can avoid appreciable deviations due
to these causes, Tests conducted with the Sherman tank by the
B ritish indicate the azimuth indicator appears to have a mean
deviation of about .0,7 minutes (0.2 mils) for each individual
lay of the weapon. This error would produce a mean deviation
in lin ear measure at ten thousand yards of range of only 2 yards
rig h t or le f t of the ta rg e t, which is certainly within the lim its
of the desired accuracy.

Errors in accuracy due to cant or pitch of the tank are

considerable and must be considered in the indirect fire ro le .
That large angles of cant or pitch do occur in b attle is extremely
probable. Korea certainly offers te rrain in which th is might
present a considerable problem. Factors affecting the magnitude
of error caused by cant and pitch a r e :
1; The angle of site to the aiming point used.
2. The angular horizontal s h ift from aiming point to
ta rg e t.
3» The quadrant elevation to be la id on the gun.
4* The amount of cant and p itc h .'
Actually, the elimination of the fourth factor w ill auto­
matically eliminate the other three. Errors in accuracy due to
cant or pitch can be avoided by proper training methods and by
in s tillin g in each tank commander an understanding of the neces­
sity fo r positioning his tank, whenever possible, in such a manner
th a t the tu rre t ring w ill be level. Sometimes i t is necessary to
pitch the tank in ten tio n ally . For instance, the maximum elevation
of the TH9 gun with respect to the tank is about 340 m ils. This
elevation vri.ll give a range of about 15,000 yards* I f contem­
plated targets are near to or beyond th is range i t is necessary
to run the tank up on seme sort of an incline in.order to gain
su fficien t elevation to engage the ta rg e t successfully. Tank
dozers, logs, ravines, and the reverse slopes of h ills may be
used for th is purpose. Whenever th is is done, pitch is in tro ­
duced in to the tu rre t ring which complicates the gunnery prob­
lem as fa r as accuracy is concerned. In order to minimize
possible errors encountered because of th is pitch, the tank
should be driven into i t s position squarely so th a t no cant w ill
be caused, and so th at the tank i t s e l f w ill be aimed squarely
a t the center of the sector of fire . This w ill reduce the
magnitude of subsequent sh ifts for direction to such an extent
that i n i t i a l rounds w ill f a ll well within the normal area of
observation of the forward observer. I f sh ifts in direction
are such th at the pitch introduces considerable error i t w ill
be necessary to fire observed fire s fo r adjustment on the t a r ­
get, I t would probably be d iffic u lt to fire unobserved fire s
in th is case without additional data to compensate for the
specific pitch of the tu rre t ring. However, sh ifts in deflection
a t extreme ranges of over 15,000 yards are usually small since a
small sh ift w ill move the burst a rela tiv ely large distance right
or l e f t .
The committee feels th a t the factors discussed above are
well within the accuracy requirements of indirect fire with ex­
ceptions as noted, and that the problems presented by fire con­
tr o l instruments, cant and pitch, are su fficien tly minor to war­
rant no further consideration.
 SECURITY INFORMA'

Accuracy of a high velocity tank gun is best presented

by the following tables which make a comparison with the w ell-
known. 105mm howitzer, M4.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF PROBABLE ERRORS FOR RANGE AND DEFLECTION

Range Probable error Probable error in

(yds) in range (yds) deflection (yds)
90mm 105mm 90ram 105mn
5000 32 32 (Charge, 4) 1 2 (Charge 4)
8000 39 43 (Charge’5) 2 6 (Charge 5)
11000 50 36 (Charge 7) * 3 5 (Charge 7)
14000 67 — 4 *¥
17000 88 6 —
19560 (MStx m ) 124 8 —

Table is taken from firin g tables FT-90-C-3 and FT 105-H-4.

The charges in the above table selected for the 105mm Htowitzer
are typical correct charges for low-angle f ir e fo r the range
noted. High angle fire a t the ranges shown would have even
greater dispersion than indicated in the tab le. Ey comparison
i t is believed th a t the dispersion of the tank gun in th is case
is not at too great a variance to be considered inaccurate fo r
th is reason.
The tab le below indicates the number of rounds necessary
to have a 90 per cent’probability of a t le a st one h it on a target
8 feet high and 10 feet wide at the ranges shown. I t must be re­
membered th a t here the guns are la id on a v ertical target and the
angle of f a l l must be considered. The 9Chimtank gun has an angle
of f a l l much less than the lower velocity 105mm howitzer, thereby
increasing the chances of the tank weapon in obtaining target
hits on a v e rtic a l ta rg e t,^

P I ■ \ \ i r i i r t, i
pr
i m i s i &#•■*It#

fiS&iT.VS'„7" ì¿-I i.
28
 SECURITY INFOB
« | | bI I
f illili
TABLE f# * «***«»* lu ll ILp
NUMBER OF ROUNDS NECESSARY TO HAVE 90 PERCENT PROBABILITY
OF AT LEAST ONE HIT ON A TARGET 8 FEET HIGH AND
10 FEET W IIE

Range (yds) 90mm Gun 105mm Howitzer

5000 10 25
8000 70 I 50
10000 170 400

Table is taken from TM 9-1907llB allistic Performance of Ammunition^»

Table 3 indicates the accuracy of the tank gun when a t­
tacking in indirect fire at short ranges the number of rounds
required for a 90 per cent probability of a t least one effective
h it against enemy a r tille r y . The »enemy a rtille ry " considered
was a weapon about the size of the German 88mm gun. All 105mm
Howitzer rounds noted in th is table were fire d with Charge 7,
the most accurate charge, u

TABUS 3
NUMBER OF ROUNDS NECESSARY FOR A 90 PER CENT PROBABILITY
OF AT LEAST ONE EFFECTIVE HIT AGAINST ENEMY ARTILLERY

Range Number of rounds necessary fo r 9 0%probability

Impact fuze Time ¡fuze
90mm 105mm. 90mm 105mm
2000 3 6 260 270
5000 42 91 360 450
10000 770 1400

Table is taken from TM 9-1907, "B allistic Performance of Ammunit:

Tables 2 and 3, although not indicating extreme range of

the tank gun, do give a reasonable indication of i t s accuracy as
fa r as dispersion is concerned. Tank guns are designed fo r extreme
accuracy a t ranges of less than 5,000 yards, but available data
indicates th a t the primary armament of our present tanks is ad­
mirably suited fo r firin g in d irect fire s at g reater ranges than
5,000 yards, IIE sa iI1i 1 S' 1 1 m m
1
nùò if Iti?
 External B allistic C haracteristics,
Range and Trajectory
Compared to other cannon, the tank gun possesses an ex­
tremely high muzzle velocity, usually in the neighborhood of
3,000 fe e t per second, as contrasted with the maximum obtainable
muzzle velocity of the 105mm howitzer of about 1,500 feet per
second. As a re s u lt of th is high speed p ro je c tile , the tank
gun is a f l a t trajectory weapon, and a t ranges up to about 10,000
yards, the trajecto ry is so f la t and the maximum ordinate so .«¡mgjl
th at, unless the te rra in over which the fire is placed were actually
level, there would be a strong probability th at the tank gun could
not be sa tisfac to rily employed as an indirect fire weapon. How­
ever, with the higher traje cto rie s at ranges greater than 10,000
yards, there is a great chance th at the tank gun would seldom be
masked by any te rra in except extreme mountainous te rrain provided
there was proper selection of the firin g position. Figure 3 on the
next page is a scale drawing in both v e rtic a l and horizontal d is­
tances of the flig h t paths of both 9Ctam and 105mm p ro jectiles a t
various selected ranges. This diagram is unique in th a t most
sim ilar charts have an exaggerated v ertical scale in order to
more effectively portray the maximum ordinate and other heights
above the ground level along the path of the p ro jec tile , In
studying the effect of terrain masking a p ro jectile of the 90mm
gun th is chart is most useful.
Note the maximum ordinate a t 5,000 yards is only 210 fe e t.
Consider a t th is range th a t the maximum ordinate is reached a fte r
the pro jectile has travelled about 3,300 horizontal yards. The
elevation for 5,000 yards range is 47»3 m ils. Now, in approxi­
mating the flig h t path, assume th a t, a t a point 1,000 yards from
the gun, the p ro jectile would be 80 feet above the ground, further
assuming lev el ground between gun and ta rg e t. At 3,000 yards
range i t would be safe to say th a t the sh ell would be about 180
feet up, and probably 200 feet up a t 4,000 yards. Certainly,
these measurements, although approximations, indicate th a t the
tank gun is quite incapable of normal indirect fire pissions at
a range of 5,000 yards. In combat, very special conditions might
be created where i t would be possible, but in normal combat te r ­
rain, the weapons would be so effectively masked by small heights
eith er to th e ir immediate front or near the ta rg e t, th a t indirect
fire s would be outside the realm of p ractica l m ilitary effectiveness.
At 8,000 yards range, the situation is b etter for indirect fire
with the maximum ordinate of 794 fe e t, but the trajecto ry is s t i l l
too near the ground. However, when a range of about 11,000 yards
is reached, the elevation set into the piece is 189 mils and the
maximum ordinate is 2,301 feet, A greater curvature of trajectory
becomes pronounced around th is range, and the flig h t path begins
to take on some of the characteristics of standard indirect f ire
 A Ct? PAiilSt ?tTFÏGAL
V ' T”ÛJ 3Ti-*USS U*' IC te EO‘.m & t 1.3 AID
msGïïiTi 3
SO

1 * ] jbajn ordi'-atos ar shown o n traje cto rie s*

2 * lOSmn Hovritzor c h a r ts trere selected, as normal for each range and ar: high-angle fire only.
3* Vertical and h r ia c e ta l distances a r e to same scale*
4* Data fo r th is fig u re taken Aram F irin g Tables 90-C-3 and-10S-H-4

SECURITY INFORMA I I I“
 m&m
SECURITY iNFOK-iATlONl I f i l l

teespens. At 14,000 yards range the angle of elevation is 312

mils and the maximum ordinate over 5,000 fe e t. This is beyond
the range of the 105mm Howitzer and within the province of the
medium a r tille r y weapons, the 155mm. Howitzer and 155mm Qun. - A
further study of the.diagram w ill shed more lig h t on the flig h t
paths of the sh ell at greater ranges. Whereas the masking of
the p ro jectile by terrain was the rule at lesser ranges, at these
greater ranges i t becomes the exception. The tank gun is ouite
suitable fo r employment as an indirect fire weapon as far as the
exterior b a llis tic properties of the projectile are concerned.
Results of answers to committee questionnaires indicated
that the tank gun was fired in Korea at ranges varying from 9,000
yards out to the maximum range of 19,560 yards, a l l in indirect
f ir e m issio n s.^ Considering terrain in Korea, i t seems th a t
missions assigned were such th at the te rrain did not affect the
accomplishment of the mission as fa r as masking of the target was
concerned. No doubt th is was due to the fact that the tank guns
were employed at the longer ranges.
Rate of Fire
The maximum rate of fire of the tank gun is dependent upon
(1) the a b ility of the tube to withstand overheating and (2) the
a b ility of the crew to service the piece properly and lay the
piece accurately. Indirect fire necessitates greater*angles of
quadrant elevation which in turn depress the breech and make i t
more d iffic u lt for the loader to ram the rounds into the chamber •
rapidly or for sustained periods. Furthermore, in many instances,
the gunner is required to observe, both the azimuth indicator for
measuring his horizontal s h if t, and the elevation quadrant and i t s
bubble for the v ertical s h if t, a t the same time manipulating the
elevating and traversing mechanisms. This slows down the rate of
f ir e .
On page 25 reference was made to the consequences of
firin g the 90mm tank gun at an extremely high rate of f ire . In
th is same combat situ atio n (a 4-tank platoon firin g an indirect
fire mission in Korea) the following was noted:
■The i n i t i a l fire missions assigned by Division A rtillery
called for 30 rounds every three minutes. This was la te r modi­
fied to 30 rounds every four minutes. By mid-morning about two
hours a fte r firin g commenced the platoon was 50 minutes behind
the schedule th at had been s e t. (Cognizance must be taken of
the fact that the M46 has a crew of only five and th at ser­
vicing the gun is not as rapid nor can i t be at as sustained
a rate as an a r tille r y piece. After the 20 rounds in the
ready racks have been fired , time mus% jbs* aMjCWeriftfat? g f m,„... :J.
plenishment of the racks. I
$‘iflSJf®s« &f tm %”C**Ii . ’flto
If ISi 'fsi**

32
This combat example, delineates the d iffic u lty of high rate s of
f ir e with the tank gun.
Table 4 below shows the re la tiv e rates of fire of the' tank
gun and the 105mm howitzer. 3

TABLE 4
COMPARISON CF RATES OF FIRE OF THE 9Ctam GUN
AND THE 105mm HOWITZER

Maximum rate of fire ,' Sustained rate of f ire

(rounds per minute) (rounds per minute)
90mm 8 4 *
105mm 4**
* Four rounds per minute based on crew c a p ab ilitie s. Gun can
fire 1.1 rounds per minute indefinitely without exceeding
allowable temperature.
** For 10 minutes
■5HHS- prolonged
Table taken from »Reference Data, Infantry Regiment", The Infantry
School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
I t is safe to assume th a t the 105mm howitzer can fire sustained
rates about twice as fast as the tank gun. This may indicate
th a t the tank gun is very lim ited in its a b ility to maintain the
tremendous volume of firepower desired in the a rtille ry support
of, for instance, an offensive action. Due to its inherent
c h a ra cte ristic s, i t is believed inadvisable to fire the weapon
a t a high rate of f ir e , but th at a lower rate sim ilar to th at re­
quired in a r tille r y harassing and interdiction missions is feasible
and consistent with the indications noted in the discussion of
range and trajecto ry in the preceding section, and in the d is­
cussion of tube wear a t the beginning of th is chapter.
Ammunition Effects on Target
The committee believes th at th e b e s t approach to the actual
k illin g power of the 90mm projectile (HE) is through a comparison
basis. Most commonly, the tank gun is compared with i t s closest
companion cannon, the 105mm howitzer, s i n c e ! ***#$**
l i t t l e difference in th e ir calib ers.
 Table 5 below indicates b riefly one basis of comparison
by showing the number of rounds from each weapon which must Lo
fire d in order to produce a given number of casualties in an are a
of given siae at various ranges* Ground bursts with point-
detonating superquiek fuze are shown.•*-*
TABLE 5
NUI'iBER OF ROUNDS NECESSARY TO PRODUCE AGWEN NUMBER
CF CASUALTIES IN AN AREA OF GIVEN SIZE

Range 90mm rounds necessary *105mm rounds necessary

5000 75 (Charge 3)
8000 186 73 (Charge 5)
11000 185 52 (charge 7)
14000 166

* High angle fire only*

Table taken from TK 9-1907, »Ballistic Performance of Ammunition"
I t is interesting to note in the table above th at the number of
required rounds decreases as the range increases due to the b etter
fragmentation effect gained by increased angle of fall* This
table indicates th a t i t is necessary to employ about three times
as many 90mm rounds to gain sim ilar casualty— producing effects
in the target area.

Fragmentation of the 90mm shell upon impact is not ex­

ceptional when compared to the 105mm sh ell as shown in table 6
below. Values used are the average fo r a considerable number of
bursts,-1-?

TABLE 6
EFFECTIVE FRAGMENTS FER S<3JARE FOOT AT VARIOUS
DISTANCES FROM THE POINT OF IMPACT

Distance from Effective fragments per square foot

point of impact 9Ctam 105mA
*20 f t .134 .201
50 f t .0163 .0312
80 f t .00537 .0112
At a distance of 20 feet from the point of impact there are
672 90mm fragments and over 1,000 105mm fragments.
Table taken from TM 9~1907, "B allistic' Berformahce of Aitoisrfcit&bn i
"""........" 1'L 1«yfo- " Mr»*"¥>' mI
 MK
SECURITY B#ÔRIfATllM i I 1 1 ||f
2 i f il 1
J l i l f l S *J?ls s If fi f
, •-'** 1 %#:||,4ΧS
The effective bursting area of the 90mm she XL is 40x12 ÿaras, •**
and of the 105mm sh e ll, 50x15 yards.16
Logistical Support
In considering the secondary role of armor, we should as­
sume th a t tho basic load of the tank must not be depleted unless
the situation is extremely unusual arri c r itic a l. Armor must a l­
ways be ready to enter in to i t s primary direct f ir e mission.
Two rounds of 90mm ammunition, packed for overseas ship­
ment, and as received a t overseas ammunition supply points weigh,
with container, 129 pounds.^7 In firin g indirect fire s(as in ,
for instance, reinforcing a r tille r y fire s in a combat situation)
expenditure of ammunition w ill probably far exceed the normal
expenditure rates for a direct fire mission. Assuming 70 rounds
in the basic load of each tank, the to ta l weight of the basic
load ammunition, in containers, is about As tons. In the c r i t i ­
cal situ atio n where tanks may be called upon to provide indirect
|| f ir e , we might assume th at the average tank w ill fire 100 rounds
per day. This would necessitate daily resupply of tons of
ammunition per tank per day, In terms of only one tank company
of 1? tanks a resupply of 110 tons of ammunition per day would
be necessitated fo r as long a period as the use of 100 rounds
per gun per day was deemed necessary. I f Army ASP were 10 miles
t from position areas of tanks, 17-2-| ton trucks could resupply
with two round-strips daily per truck. I t is doubtful th at
organic tank battalion supply vehicles could maintain th is ef­
fo rt i f the entire b attalio n were engaged in th is type of fire
mission. However, i t is noteworthy th at vehicles normally used
for Class I I I supplies could be channelled into the ammunition
resupply e ffo rt, since the demand fo r fuel would be almost n il.
I t is d iffic u lt to determine accurately the effect of the
lo g is tic a l support of such an operation by a small tank unit,
and i t would probably be a fallacy to consider a unit larger
than battalion size being engaged in th is type of operation.
However, there is no doubt that the ammunition supply problem
would be great, and commanders concerned would have to consider
additional cargo transportation support from higher un its.
Conclusions
Tube Vfear: Tube wear is the most d iffic u lt obstacle to
overcome when using tanks in the indirect ro le; however, the ad­
vent of now types of quick change tubes w ill m aterially decrease
the disadvantage of th is problem. Present type weapons wear
rapidly, and the u tiliz a tio n of large amounts of ammunition over
short periods of time is iradvisa§l|b!|,
* s *jj 1 1 j a ** ** * ffiL 8 i p ■

35
 ■

employing tank guns in harassing and interdiction fire s which

use relativ ely less ammunition.
Dispersion and Accuracy: Tank guns are designed for ex­
treme aecv raicy atran g e^ ^ than 5,000 yards, but available
data indicates th a t, as fa r as accuracy and dispersion are con-
cerned, our present tanks are admirably suited for firin g indirect
f ir e at ranges greater than 5,000 yards, te rrain permitting.
External B a llistic Characteris tic s . Range, and Tra.iectorv:
At ranges up to about 10,000 yards, the trajectory of the tank gun
is so f la t that indirect fire s w ill be masked by most te rra in . At
greater ranges, the gun is wen suited for indirect fire s out to
the maximum range of 19,560 yards.
ifete of F ire : Tank guns are incapable of maintaining a
high sustained rate of f ir e , They are capable of maintaining
lower ra te s of f ir e almost in d efin itely . Feasible rates of fire
are those sim ilar to the requirements of interdictory and haras-
i sing f ir e s .

Ammunition Effects on Target; Angles of f a l l at ranges

of 5,000 yards ana less are such th a t the bursting area is
limited* However, at greater ranges the resulting increase in
the angle of f a ll in turn increases the effect of the shell*
Fragmentation and overall le th a l effect of the 90mm p rojectile
is rela tiv ely less than conventional a rtille ry weapons.
L-°gistical Support; Ammunition supply problems cannot
be handled by transportation organic to the tank u n it. Ad­
ditio n al transportation must be obtained from outside sources.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

^•’In s tru c to r’s Guide #1, A rtille ry , OS, APG, Md.,» The
Ordnance School, Aberdeen proving Ground, Maryland, 24 Julv 1945
p 6. - »

E b id , P 7.
Evaluation of Erosion and Damage *in Cannon Bores. Depart­
ment oi> the Arny Technical Bulletin TB 9-1860-2,""1^5, p 25.
^Armor Combat lesson Bulletin Number 9, HQs I US Gorps,
APO 358, San Francisco, 11 March 1951.

36
 - '^MÊmmË;.
SECURITY INFORMATION
i l l i p l
5m,
TAR Repo|ff y Research (B ritish ),
1 September 1945, p 5.
6Ibid. p 7.
7Ibid, p 8.

f i r i n g Table 90-C-3 and Firing Tablé 105-H-4. Deoartment

of the Array, Washington 25, D. C., passim. '
^B allistic Performance o f Ammunition, Department of the
Army, Tecnnical Ilanuai TM 9-ï$07, July - l& ô /p 263.
1 0Ibid. p 264.
^Q uestionnaires, Committee #10, Armor O fficer Advanced
Class, The Armored School, 1952-53, passim.
^-^Op c i t . Armor Combat Lesson Bulletin Nuaber 9.
^Reference Data. Infantry Regiment. The Infantry School,
Fort Benning, Georgia, May 1751, passim,
I ^Op c i t , B a llistic Performance of Ammunition, p 159»
15Ibid. p 132 f .
^ S ta f f O fficers' Field Manual, F ' 101-10, Départirent of
the Array, Tlfeshington 25, D. C., August 1949, p 174.
17Ibid. p 261.

37
 SECURITY INFORMATION

CHAPTER 5
TRAINING
In examining the training aspects of indirect f i r e , the
rea er is reminded th a t only a r tille r y type fire s are in question.
Because of the sim ilarity in training conducted to orovido pro-
ficiency in defilade and a r tille r y type f ire s , both*will be
mentioned in th is chapter. However, the doctrine and current
training in defilade tank fire is considered by the authors to
be sound.

Current Sources of Training

Field Manual 17-12 »Tank Gunnery», November 1950 is the
current authority for tank gunnery train in g . Appendix V of th is
manual covers in d e ta il those subjects which must be mastered bv
tank crews prior to firin g th e ir tanks from defilade with an ob­
server on the gun target lin e. (See Appendix I I , extract of Ap­
pendix V FM 17-12). This manual w ill sa tisfy a l l needs and answer
a l l questions regarding defilade fire**-
. . ^ke other hand, should a tank unit commander be faced
with the Problem of conducting a r tille r y type indirect f i r e , there
is no specific technique presented in FK 17-12.
Prospectus of Training, The i'feapons Department. The
Armored School. The ?£apons ¡Department of The Armored School
includes in its prospectus, instruction which closely p arallels
th a t in FM 17-12 (see Table 7). I t does not teach, as such, the
techniques required to conduct a r tille r y type f i r e . 3
ATP 17-201. The fin a l source of training data available
units in the fie ld is the Army Training Program. A"P
17-201 is the current guide for the tank company. Examination
of the ATP chart in Appendix II indicates th a t again there is no
specific technique taught to accomplish indirect f ir e by tank
unros *

Solutions to Problem of A rtillery Type Indirect Fire Mission

• Assuming th a t a tank u nit is assigned an a r tille r y type
Tire mission, as has been frequently done in the past,
and disregarding the soundness of the doctrine involved, there
are two courses of action th a t might be followed to provide a
unit the "know-how" of accomplishing th is mission.
 TABLE 7
PARTIAL PROSPECTUS CF TRAINING
THE WEAPONS DEPARTMENT
THE ARMORED SCHOOL

Reconnaissance Leader
 The f i r s t solution would be to tra in and equip armored
units to conduct sustained indirect fire missions independently.
The second would be to u tiliz e existing a r tille r y survey and
fire direction f a c ilitie s to provide firin g data. Let us examine
each of these solutions in turn,

. T^nfc units t rained and equipped to fire a r tille r y missions

independently. Tfte P r im a r y m i s s i o n o f *.hP a c » „ u — mp-ny (nm
obsolete)^was to supply organic indirect f ir e for i t s parent
organization. In Appendix I I the ATP chart Compares Phases I I I
and IV of.ATP 17-300 (Tank B attalion)5 and ATP 17-201 (Tank
Company), currently in effe c t, with ATP 17-203 (Assault Gun
Company)7#

This chart clearly indicates those subjects common to

the tank and assault gun companies. Careful analysis of Phases
I I I ana IV training reveals that approximately 75%* of the sub—
ject matter is common to both types of companies. I t further
shows that 51 hours of additional training would be required by
the hank company to only p a rtia lly qualify i t for the mission of
indirect f ir e . Revision of ATP 17-201 to include the subjects
of fire direction center and survey teams, and modification of
present TG&E must necessarily be accomplished before th is company
might be considered fully trained and self-contained.
To adequately school and tra in officers to direct and
control tanks in the indirect f ir e ro le , i t w ill be neces­
sary to allocate as a minimum, 150 additional hours to
provide the basic instruction. Among the subjects included
flould be survey, firin g charts, f ir e direction procedure,
and related m aterial.^
In addition, an increase of some 50j£ in o fficer in­
stru cto r strength would be required to accomplish th is
program at The Armored School.10
^It would appear from the above discussion, th a t unless
we consider indirect f ir e as a primary mission for armored
un its, such a revision of programs would be im practical.
Tank un its u tiliz in g existing a r tille r y f a c ilitie s ( sur­
vey and f i re direction cen ter). The u tiliz a tio n of fVYng
ana survey from a r tille r y units has been the habitual solution
to indirect f ir e missions assigned tank u n its. Current armor
training in fo rm al defilade firin g techniques is sufficient to
accomplish indirect f ir e when th is data is supplied by an a r t i l ­
lery unit, with a minimum of training in the technique of employing

40
 In the teaching of gunnery to the tank cPews, they are
taught to lay the gun for both elevation and deflection by
the use of auxiliary fire control instruments. Thus the
tank crew can deliver indirect f ir e i f firin g data and sur­
vey can be furnished by the reinforced a r tille r y u n it»1 1
When the tanks are employed in th is ro le, each crew member
must be fam iliar with certain aspects of th is employment and w ill
function, generally, as follows:
Immediately a fte r the tanks are placed in firin g position,
the guns w ill be laid p arallel either on a known point or on a
given Y azimuth. As soon as a l l guns of the firin g unit are la id
p a ra lle l, the gunner w ill zero the azimuth indicator. At th is
point, the tank commander may cause aiming stakes to be put out
for the gun, for added insurance of azimuth indicator slippage or
possible night firin g . The gunner w ill now check and zero his
elevation quadrant* If extreme accuracy is desired, the a r t i l ­
lery may cause the gunner to use his Ml gunners* quadrant (OVM
to each tank), by sending elevation corrections in one-tenth mils
rather than one mil corrections. A thorough knowledge of the use
of the gunners' quadrant and the azimuth indicator is of para­
mount importance. After the i n i t i a l fire command has been
executed, the gunner v&ll simply make correction of elevation
and deflection by use of the elevation quadrant and/or ML gun­
ners' quadrant and the azimuth indicator.
Generally, the driver and bow-gunner vd.ll function as
ammunition handlers and the tank commander w ill act as chief of
section. The gunner and loader, of course, w ill function in
th e ir primary ro le.
The Role of A rtillery
I t is obvious from th is diseussion th a t armor an ticipates
the use of a rtille ry data in accomplishing indirect f ir e . The
a r tille r y its e lf is prepared to furnish th is data when called
upon to do so. Field Manual 6-20, Department of the Army, "Field
A rtillery Tactics and Techniques," paragraph 129-131» sta te s th a t
when armor is used in support of a r tille r y , the a rtille ry w ill be
responsible for designating general position areas, furnishing
necessary surveying, furnishing a ir observation and supplement-
ground observation as required} assigning missions and preparing.^
firin g data when applicable, and in stallin g wire communications. ^
This committee, feeling th a t further elaboration on the
fie ld a r tille r y 's concept was in order, requested i t by le tte r
to the A rtillery School. The questionnaire and reply are in­
cluded in Appendix I I , ;subject 5"Indirect Fire of Tanks", 20 Nov 52»

41
 fciÉSir£
flO T W Cp N M
M
Q |jg|ÉS^jg»

ff m WÉII gI

R&S Committee #10. Of particISar* xn-ferlsi f o^lre training

aspect of th is question was the following:

Question: Does the A rtillery School include in current

teaching methods for incorporating tank units into organic
a r tille r y f ir e direction centers?
Answer: Yes. The Department of Gunnery includes four
hours of instruction in the incorporation of tanks, heavy
mortars, and a n ti-a irc ra ft weapons within a rtille ry fire
direction techniques* 3

„ „ . H®?°e see t}» t the artillerym an is not only capable

tf re^u^re<^ data, but i s actually trained in the
technique of furnishing i t to armor.

, Armor, on the other hand, is capable of firin g the mis-

lon but is not trained in the techniques of u tilizin g data from
the a r tille r y ,

... P 1 sbort, there is no armored fie ld manual, training

publication, or in stru ctio n al m aterial at The Armored School
ich specific aU.y states th a t when armor is required to deliver
indirect f ir e , i t w ill u tiliz e data furnished by the a rtille r y
for th is purpose. J

Conclusions
, 4 m . Cu^r ®nt armor training is adequate to accomplish indirect
l i r e when data and survey are furnished by the a r tille r y , with a
minimum of additional training in technique.
Trainingthe technique of u tiliz in g a rtille ry data and
survey is lacking in current armor train in g publications. The
resp o n sib ilities of a r tille r y in th is respect are stated oaly in
ni?I+fr l hie4.ur i i S eryJ >?'eld manuals> however, armor personnel are
not taught th at the a r tille r y w ill furnish th is service for them.
.Ti^ authors are of the opinion th at due to the tremendous
value of the tank indirect f ir e support, a clear statement of the
doctrine, technique and responsibility must be published, dissemi-
nated and thoroughly digested i f f u ll u tiliz a tio n of th is potential
valuable fire i s to be realized.

NOTES FCR CHAPTER 5

•*|l.eld Manual 17-12 Tank Gunnery. November 1950, App. V.

1 1 ,41o I is 0 1 S i i * * i 1 *®»%
1
1 fmi li ll * 11 H1 ?%
•-.»a mB s*
is as
.P W : \ \ §8»* i s » 1 1

42
 ^Prospectu s of Training, Weapons Department. The Armored
School* '*"**- —...... j ■■*■'

^Army Training Program 17~201, Tank Company; passim.

Ariqy Training Program 17- 300, Tank Battalion, Med; nassini.
£
Arny Training Program 17-201, Tank Company: passim.
Tilrmy Training Program 17-203T Assault Gun Company: oassim.
g
Army Training Program 17-201, Tank Company: passim.
Angy Training Program 17-203. Assault thin Company î passim*
9
’Review and Recommendations of EUCOM Seminar Report on
Indirect F ire Instruction for Armor Personnel Fort Knox, Ken­
tucky, The Weapons Department, The Armored School (1 Feb 1950)
p 3, para 3b, '*
1 0Ibid, p 3, para 3c,
11
"Report of Board on Tanks in the Indirect Fire Support
Role", Fort Knox, Kentucky, Hqs, Academic Group, The Armored '
School (8 Feb 1951) p 3, Sec IV, para 3,
• 1?Field Manual 6-20, Field A rtillery Tactics and Techniques
May 1946, p 128, para 129-131. —— ----------------------- -----
^"Indirect Fire of Tanks", 20 Nov 52, a le tte r prepared
by Committee #10, Research and Evaluation Division, The Armored
School, sent to A rtillery School, Fort S ill, Okla,

43
 CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY
The measures which must be taken to eliminate the con­
troversy surrounding indirect fire are few indeed. However,
unless a d efin ite solution is arrived at by our current doctrine
and train in g , indirect f ir e w ill remain a point of controversy
with members' of the combined arms team.
Doctrine
The doctrine of u tiliz in g tanks as reinforcing a rtille ry
is sound. As a command decision i t must re fle c t in the prelimin­
ary estimate of the situation strong reasons for neglecting the
mobility and shock characteristics of am or.
In the past, te rra in , weather, and the ta c tic a l situation
have often limited the use of tanks to th e ir secondary ro le. I t
is possible th a t in the future lack of fuel could also be a factor.
Korea represents a new incentive fo r th is employment, fo r
there American Forces are faced by numerically superior eneay
forces. This condition w ill undoubtedly exist in future wars and
must be the paramount consideration in our planning. In short,
at no time can any potential fire be permitted to go unused.
Normal employment of a l l weapons may well be sacrificed i f i t
provides the destruction of the most enemy.
Technical .Aspects
When tanks are used as a r tille r y , the following technical
factors should govern:
1. Tube wear is a real problem. I t vd.ll vary with the
types of ammunition, rate of f ir e , to ta l rounds fire d , and care
of the weapon. The adoption of the duick change tube w ill le s ­
sen the consideration of tube wear as a deterrent,
2. Tanks are best employed as a r tille r y in harassing
and interdictory f i r e .
3« The tank gun is accurate up to and including maximum
range.

4* Except in special cases (desert, plains, and AixfcSddi»

te rrain masks w ill re s tr ic t indirect f ir e except at ranges over
10,000 yards.

44
 *F,.I
SECURITY INFORMATI®

5. Tanks are incapable of sustaining rates of f ir e

comparable to a r tille r y .

. ^• Tank guns are less effective than conventional

a r tille r y vdth respect to le th a l e ffe c t.
7* ^Basic loads should not be disturbed and additional
transportation w ill probably be required to sustain indirect fire .
Training and Techniques
Current armor training is sufficient to accomplish in­
direct fire when survey and data are supplied a r tille r y with
a minimum of additional training in technique.
Armor train in g does not estab lish or teach as such, the
technique of employing data furnished by a r tille r y . Amor f a ils
to sta te in training publications th at should an indirect f ir e
mission be assigned, a r tille r y w ill furnish the required survey
and firin g data.

A rtillery is prepared to furnish and trained in methods

of furnishing survey and firin g data to am or. In addition, i t
w ill provide the following:

. 3-* General position areas (these must not in terfere with

rapid movement to areas of primary mission).
2. Air observation and supplemental ground observation
as required.
3« Assignment of missions.
4. In sta lla tio n of wire communication.
A completely trained armored unit w ill by current standards
be capable of delivering efficie n t indirect f ir e . However, to
avoid confusion at c r itic a l times, armor commanders must under­
stand th at a r tille r y w ill provide the survey and firin g data*
further, they must know th a t th is data can immediately be applied
to the auxiliary fire control instruments.
Recommcndations
1. That current armor doctrine and training clearly
establish the responsibility of a r t i l l é jya ihtt^S-- JMffojNg.
mission. I § g * £| | f \ '% |f3T $^ 1 1
I J r %
 2. That current armor doctrine and train in g establish
a standard technique for employing artillery -su p p lied data in
the indirect fire mission.
3. That current armor doctrine and training establish
more clearly the lim itations of u tilizin g tanks in the indirect
fire ro le. These lim itations should also be liste d in current
A rtillery manuals.

k* The above recommendations should be accomplished by

the following measures:

a» Amendment of current armor manuals to include:

(1) Acceptance of the A rtillery fire -direction
and firin g data as the normal solution fo r
indirect f ir e .
(2) Procedures for u tilizin g a r tille iy data.
(3) Listing of physical and technical lim itations
of the tank in the a r tille r y ro le.
b. Amendment of current armor ATP»s to include:
(1) Procedures for u tilizin g a r tille r y data in
the advanced individual and basic unit
phases.
(2) An exercise in an indirect fire mission in
the advanced unit phase.
c. Amendment of The Armored School prospectus to in­
clude under weapons train in g an additional unit
of instruction on the technique of employing
a r tille r y fire direction and firin g data in the
indirect fire mission.
 SECURITY INFOK.|,^ | # | | a |l * * ||" f ,,r}
g v BIBLIO
—— GRAPHIY* i l a i l -:l i j ■t■ i l fmi wm
r lmmi^'
_. , Armor Combat Lesson Bulletin Mr 9, (Korea* Head­
quarters I Corps, 1 1 March ly ^ i, RESTRICTED)"'

in Tfaitr2*D ^ + ° r Genf ra l H* !*• Birks, RAC, Armoured Operations

—— ——J£> Printing and Stationery Services, ¿ate unk (SECRET)

Training Progranx 1 7-3Q° Tank Battalion Medium

-■r^ r ^raanang Program 17-201 Tank Company (RESTRICTED)

( RESTRICTED)"^ " Z S i S m . 17 ~2° 3 AsSault 0,1,1 Co°PanZ

, B a llistic Perfomance of Ammunition. TM 9-1907 De­

partment of the Army, July 1948, (RESTRICTED) *

A_4. , ^ 7\ Lt Generai BdVv’ard M. Almond, Battle Employment of

- ”7 ^ Korea, a conference presented“ before the faculty -
Center’ Port s iU * 0klahLa’

(Port ifnnv 2.og™

-en^s on action in Korea, a le tte r to a l l concerned
CrS trS tS )^ ntucky» The Armored School, 15 December 1950)

,■*- 10*- — CCt,1V- rioss of H1gh Explosive Fire from Tank -Mounted
W eapons, (Battle Memorial In s titu te , 14 September 1951)— *-------

1 « -. n ^ V . . g ^ ^ S ^ - 2 l . . . 776| Taqfe, Destroyer Battalion in an A rtil-

l ^ y Role During Roceirt Operations, Headquarters VT Corn*'
Section, 15 October 1943 (SECRET) P ^ruixieiy

Par ^ i 2p Employmcgit of Armor in Korea. Vol I . Headquarters

East Command, Research Office, 8 August 1951 (SECRET)

Par
ta r E^L3C ^.."~ 'fiTResearch
East Command, l0ymenL Office,
° f jAm0r,.iji
S A uKgcre
u s t a 1951
Voi (SECRET)
n , Headquarters

n ^ E m p lo y m en t of Tanks and Tank Destroyer* as A rtillery

a °ar *G-3 Training Section, 2 August 1944 (RESTRICTED) ^
n ^ 1 °VJaent -o f Tanks and Tank D e stro y e r R ^.+ .n iy ^o as
1944 (RESTRICTED) r,V;, AGF Board'%|0-3
t i l lT h|Ia |n
fW^m
S %m tm e i , %2
TW I¿illy
FI
I 0 | im| J 1| !.
 16» Evaluation of Erosion and Damage in Cannon Bores.
TB 9-1862-2, 1945. ' v...... ...... ............ — ------- "
17* Extracts of Combat Information, an extract from the
command report of the 3d Infantry Division A rtille iy , March 1951,
OCAFF, Fort Monroe, Va., (SECRET)
18. Firing Table 90*C—3. Ordnance Department, U. S.. Armv,
April 1944 (RESTRICTED)
19« Firing Table 90-F-2, Department of the Army, December
1950 (RESTRICTED) ------

20« Firing Table 105—

H~4» Ordnance Department, U. S. Arny,
December 1941 (RESTRICTED)
21. FM 6-20, Field A rtillery Tactics and Techniques. Mav
1948 (RESTRICTED) -----'------ — ------------------------- a----? *
22* FM 6-40, Field A rtille iy Gunnery, Januaiy 1950 (RE­
STRICTED)

23» FM 17-12, Tank Gunnery, November 1950 (RESTRICTED)

24. "Indirect Fire of Tanks", le tte r prepared by Research
Committee #L0, R and E Division, The Armored School, sent to the
A rtilleiy School, Fort S ill, Oklahoma, and reply thereto.
25• "Instructors Guide #1", (Maryland: The Ordnance
School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 24 July 1945)
26. Inspection of Ordnance Material in Hands of Troops.
TM 9-1100, October 1951 (RESTRICTED) f
27* Interviews on'Armored Command A ctivities with Officers
of F irs t Armored Division, AGF board. G-3.Training Section , Novem-
her 1943 (RESTRICT®)
28. Prospectus of Training, The Wbanons Department, The
Armored School (RESTRICTED^ ’— --------- ---- -------------
29» Reference Data fo r Armored U nits, The Armored School,
F °rt Knox, Kentucky, July 1952 (RESTRICTED)
30. Reference Data, Infantry Regiment. The Infantry School,
Fort Benning, Georgia, May 1951 (RESTRICTED)
31. Report of Colonel G. B. Devore, AGF Board, based on
jfeta Obtained in Ita ly , 14-31 December 1943," ACT1 Soard7 "6" January'
1944«

48
 » » 7- afcagwdte.
SECURITY INFORMATION

32. VII Corps Operations Report, Headquarters VII Cor-e;.

date unk.

33» Major John B. Robinson, RCAC, Report on U. S. Armor

in Ryukus Campaign. Royal Canadian Array, date unk,
34» 20th Armored Group, Action against the Eneray Report,
Headquarters, 20th Armored Group, 2 August 1945.
35» "Report @fl Board on Tanks in the Indirect Fire Support
Role», (Fort Knox, Kentucky, The Armored School, 8 February 1951)
36. ^ "Review of Recommendations of EUCOM Seminar Report on
Indirect Fire Instruction for Armor Personnel» (Fort Knox, Ken­
tucky, Weapons Department, The Armored School, 1 February 1950)
37. Should Tank Units Be Trained in Indirect F ire?, A
research report prepared a t The Armored ¿School, Port Kncx, Ken­
tucky, 1952 (RESTRICTED)
38• Staff Officers Field Manual, Organization, Technical,
and Logistical, Data, FM 101-10. August 1919 (RESTRICTED^
39» Status of Tank and Tank Destroyer Units in the Post­
war Army, Headquarters AGF, Army tear College,' S’May 1945 (SECRET)
AO. TAR Report Humber 38, Tank Armament Research (B ritish ),
1 September 1945 (SECRET)
41* Unit Histoqr, 781 Tank Battalion. 16 February 1945
42. "U tilization of Tanks in the In d ire c t Fire Role", a
le tte r order to the commanding generals of the 2d and 7th Infan­
tr y , (Korea; Headquarters X Corps, 5 March 19 5 1) (RESTRICTED)
43. U tilization of Tanks in the Indirect Fire Role, a
training memorandum to units of the 7th Infantry Division, (Korea;
17 March 1951) (RESTRICTED)
, 44. War Diary, Division A rtille ry , 24th Infantry Division,
(Korea; 1950J (SECRET) ' ' A™ ----- -------------------------
$

i APPENDIX I
HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
APO 909 US ARUT
AG 470.8 5 ;larch. 1951
SUBJECT: CG,
TO: U tilization of TanksDivision
2nd US Infantry in Indirect Fire Role
CG, 7th US Infantry Division

1, In order to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on

the eneny, tanks habitually w ill be used in indirect f ir e roles
when not engaged on their primary miss ion.
2, Training of division organic and attached armored units
in indirect f ir e roles w ill be the responsibility of division
commanders. A suggested method of training follows:
a. Two tank platoons to be used as a f ir e unit of 10 guns,
b. Selected personnel of one o ffic er and four enlisted
men from each of the regimental tank companies to be sent to th e-
a r tille r y battalion th a t directly supports the infantry regiment,
for duty and training as computers in the a rtille ry FDC.
c* An a r tille r y o fficer from the D/S a r tille r y b attalio n
to be designated as indirect fire unit commander of each two tank
platoons. He should command the tank fire during firin g of the
indirect fire u n til such time as the organic tank officers be­
come proficient in these duties,
d. The division tank battalion and attached tank units
can be sim ilarly trained through the organic medium a r tille r y
battalion or by u tilizin g personnel from division a rtille ry head­
quarters battery,
e. Survey control to tank units by a r tille r y .
f . A rtillery obseryatg-on-£a ba i|tiM^e^abQ^a(Must f ir e
fo r tank f ir e units. 1 § f | f f ‘ I J ! 4 T % § vL f l L
I%JSI
l i VP lSUaff |fel
SSL,ffl %iPW
r 8Sitf 81t

m
50
 AG 470.8 5 I'arch 1951
SUBJECT: U tilization of Tanks in Indirect Fire Role

g. Tank unit commanders to conduct indirect f ir e

training for a ll tank personnel with assistance of a rtille ry
fire unit commanders.

h* The control of a l l indirect fire to be from a r t i l —

lery FDC*S to tank f ir e u n its.

i . A rtillery to furnish necessary wire communications.

3. Report of progress of th is program w ill be forwarded
through channels to X Corps G-3 each Friday by 1800 hours.
BY CC!.£LAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALMOND:

/ s / C. L. ARRANTS
for / t / F. W. ROBERTS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

ST 470.8(5 Ear 51) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO 7, 10 Mar 51
TO: See D istribution
The requirement in paragraph 1, basic le tte r , w ill be imple­
mented upon receipt of training memorandum, th is headquarters,
subject, "U tilizatio n of Tanks in Indirect Fire R ole.1'
BY COMMA® OF MAJOR GENERAL.' FERENBAUGH:

DISTRIBUTION: /s / Waitus H. Hardin

1-C/S A/ Y/AITUS H. HARDIN
1-AG F ile Major, AGC
2- G3 File A ssistant Adjutant General
1-G4 F ile
12-Div Arty
6-l? th Inf
6-31st Iiif
6- 32nd inf
2“7th Recon Co
9-73d Tk Bn
2 Recon P lat,
 i l IF0 ,1
WS ■ P Ï^ B
Uliliinadii ii ■ V f!
HEADQUARTERS 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 7
TRAINING JOSiORANDUM , 17 March 1951
NUMBER ' 4
UTILIZATION OF TANKS IN INDIRECT FIRE ROLE
1« Ref: L etter Headquarters X Corps, AG470.8, dated 5 March
1951, subject: "U tilization of Tanks in Indirect Fire Role".
2. Operations and Control.
a. When tanks are not engaged in th e ir primary mission,
and the te rra in and ta c tic a l situation permits, tanks w ill be used
to reinforce a rtille ry f ir e .
b. When possible, tank fire w ill be included in the Ar­
tille r y , H&I program.
c. Tank fire w ill, be used only for deep targets when
, indirect f ir e methods are used. Normally th is w ill include only
planned prearranged fire s ,
, d. Normally a rtille ry battalions w ill be reinforced by
tanks from the tank company of the regiments they support.
e. The basic fire unit w ill be the tank platoon.
f. Tanks of the Division Tank Battalion nay be assigned
the mission of reinforcing any of the a r tille r y b attalions.
g. When tanks are used for indirect f i r e , they w ill be
under the operational control of the reinforced a r tille r y bat*
ta lio n . The a r tille r y commander w ill assume responsibility for
the following;
(1 ) Communications.
(2) Survey.
(3) Observation.
(4) Preparation.
(5) Supervision of laying and execution of firin g
commands.
SUBJECT : Training Memorandum Number 4 1? March 1951
h. The infantry commander of the reinforcing tank unit
w ill:

(1) When possible make tank units available fo r in­

direct f ir e ,
(2) Be prepared to f ir e on c a ll, missions received
from the a rtille ry battalio n .
(3) D etail one (1) computer to the a r tille r y FDC.
3. Training.
a. The Commanding General, Division A rtillery is respon­
sible fo r coordination and supervision of th is program.
b. The d irec t support a r tille r y battalion w ill be re­
sponsible for the training of the tank company of th e ir supported
regiment so far as indirect fire is concerned.
c. As soon as the minimum training is completed, tank
platoons w ill be rotated on reinforcing missions so as to receive
training as offered by participating in the a rtille ry H&I program.
d. One (1 ) man from each tank company w ill be detailed
to the FDC of the direct support b attalio n . This man must be ac­
ceptable by the direct support b attalion as the mental quali­
ficatio n s of a computer must be b etter than average.
e . Training program.
(1) Computers.
(a) Fire commands.
(b) Elements of firin g data.
(e) Use of firin g ta b les,
(d) Plotting and use of target grid,
(e) Observer procedure.
(f) Determination of corrections.

53
 1
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Training Memorandum Number 4 17 ’"arch 1951

( 2) Firing Battery.
(a) Laying the battery.
1» Compass*
2, Base an&Le.
(b) Measuring adjusted compass, base angle.
(c) Aiming stake displacement.
(d) Servian of the piece.
(e) D rill.
4 . ^ Reports: A rtillery battalions responsible for training
tank units w ill submit training status reports to Division A rtil­
lery weekly prior to 1200 each Thursday*
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FEHENBAUGH:

HERBERT B. POTELL
Colonel, General sta ff Corps
Chief of S taff
OFFICIAL:
/ s / Waitus H. Hardin
/ t / WAITUS H. HARDIN
Major, iiGC
Assistant Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
"A"
Plus ( 3) copies 8th Arny
(3) copies X Corps
(5) copies G3 7th Div

54
 TABULATED ANSWERS TO INDIRECT FIRE QUESTIONNAIRE

_ r.Tïo follom'insr chart is an analysis of 51 questionnaires returned to th is committee. A

to ta l of 82 questionnaires were sent to officers who had served with tank units in Korea between
Ju ly .1950 and December 1951. Of these 82 questionnaires, 58 were completed and returned to the
committee. Seven of the returned questionnaires contained answers th at were not pertinent to the
subiect* the remaining 51 questionnaires were considered to be pertinent to the study and are
tabulated below. '
Question Yes No Unknown or Unanswered Total
Did your unit in Korea ever use tanks to
fire indirect f ir e , or did you observe any
other tank uni"6s so employed? 39 12 51
In your opinion, was th is indirect f ir e
effective? 21 12 18 51
a. Were the desired resu lts obtained for
which the tanks were employed in th is
indirect f ir e role? 21 5 25 51
b. Did th is indirect fire by tanks a s s is t
friendly forces as much as expected in
the accomplishment of th e ir mission? 14 7 30 51
c. Did th is indirect fire by tanks have the
desired effect on the enemy-? 20 1 30 51
Did your unit have any training; in
indirect f ir e prior to leaving the
United States, or in the combat zone
prior to actual combat? 23 20 8 51
 Question Yes No Unknown or Unanswered Total
If you did have occasion to use tanks
(or observe them) in the indirect fire
missions, in your opinion could they
have been more effectively employed
a t the time in th e ir primary assault
role? 12 23 11 51
a. Should tankers be trained for
indirect fire ? 42 6 3 51
b« If so, should this training be
done before entering the
combat zone? 41 7 3 51

Totals TSS VS TS5 455

 APPENDIX II
Field Manual 17-12 '^Tank Gunneryyy November 1950. Appendix
V, en titled "Tanks or Assault Guns in Defilade," discusses in­
direct f ir e of tanks, the principles of which are applicable to
eith er tanks or a ssa u lt.guns, and is generally sub-divided as
follows:
Section I INTRODUCTION
1. General - Why and when indirect fire is employed, i t s
advantages and disadvantages,
2. Types of Indirect laying - The two types of indirect
laying th a t are employed in tank units are (1 ) single tank in
defilade, and (2) two or more tanks in defilade.
3. Selection and Occupation of a Defiladed Position - The
characteristics of a good defiladed firin g position and the man-
ner in which occupation should be executed.
4. Ifinlmum Elevation —The determination of minimum elevation
for a single and two or more tanks,
5. Angle of Site - The d efin itio n , determination, and ap­
plication of Angle of S ite.
Section II SINGLE TANK OR ASSAULT GUN IN DEFILADE
6. General —The methods used to fire a single tank from a
defiladed position vary l i t t l e from the methods used for direct
fire adjustment of HE,
7. Laying the Single Tank for Direction - The in it ia l di­
rection anu su c^q aen T sh ifts for the gun,
8. Laying the Single Tank fo r Range - The tank commander
estimates the range from the gun to the target and determines
the angle of s ite , relays th is —
reformation to uhe tank gunner in
yards who then, be referring to the firin g chart, converts the
yards readings to mils and applies th is reading to the gunner’s
quadrant.
9. • Adjusting F ire of a Single Tank t The measurement and
subsequent change of direction and range of the round to a ta r ­
get h i t .
 10« Examples of Fire Commands for Single Tank in Defilade.
Section I II TM) OR MORE TANKS BI DEFILADE
H* General —The establishment of'a basis of fire by the
company commander and/or platoon leader, and the laying of a ll
tanks, p a ra lle l.

12. Laying Tanks for Direction - The laying of two or more

tanks for direction is exactly the same as for one tank (see
para 7 above).

13* Laying Tanks for Range - The laying of two or more tanks
for range is exactly the same as for one tank (see para 8 above).
14* Adjusting Fire of Tanks - The converged, closed and open
sheaf and the techniques of adjustment.
15. Examples of Fire Commands for Tanks in Defilade.

j«|I 1n1 %^
gg | M pI if r1lii i*r r1
>, %.
! § 4|| If
mm*
 COMPARISON OF WEAPONS TRAINING» TAliK COMPANY AND ASSAULT GUN COMPANY

ARMY TRAINING PROGRAMS

(Extracts from)

TK BN TK CO MED or TK CO HV ASLT GUN CO

ATP 17 -300 ATP 17-201 ASLT GUN PLT in
MED TK BN
ATP 17 -203

c SUBJECTS HOURS OF TRAININO

0
ATP PHASE D TANK CO ASSAULT GUN CO
OF TRAINING E ATP 17-201 ATP 17-203
111 Turret Famil 3 3
III Diss & Assembly Tk Gun 4 4
I II Opert & Maintenance Tk
Gun 4 4
III Power Traverse 3 3
I II * Gyrostabilizer 3
III Iden & Insp of Ammo 4 4
I II Binocular &^Mil Formula 2 2
1 III Direct Fire*sights 3 3
I II Auxiliary Fire Control
I Instruments 3 3
I II Crew D rill 4 6
III Range Determination 4 3
* Conduct of Fire 7 _.
111
III Crew Non Firing Exercise 6 6
Í 11 I II Gunners Preliminary Exaa 16 16
III ♦ Subcaliber Firing Mani-
I pulation & Shot Adj at
Stationery Targets 8 mm

I I II Subcaliber Firing HE
f '1 Miniature Range 6 6
i
III Service Firing with Coaxial
f
7: MG While Tk is Moving 6 6
III ♦ Service Firing HE and Shot
Ì Adjustment 6 •»
rt III * Service Firing at Moving
Targets i 6 _
HI Famil Submachine Gun 4 8
III Famil Machine Gun Cal 50 6 6
1 III ¡Famil P isto l Cal 45 Im p_s 111M H s j mÜ §
** ¡Conduct of Fire HE Adj ji i
1 HI , 4 îi
I II ** 1 Conduct of Fire Moving 1
I Target j • - 1! i j
I II **
é Conduct of Fire AsIt Gun M i*
1 in Defilade j •
i« III ** ! Service Firing HR Adj ; 4
Îi 8 j
** Subcaliber Firing AsIt Gun 1 Í
1 111 a
I in Defilade 1 6
** Service Firing AsIt Gun in
111 Defilade
1 - 6
IV Conduot of Fire Advanced
Gunnery 2 2
IV ♦ Subcaliber Firing Adv
Gunnery 6 -
IV Service Firing Advanced
Gunnery 8 8 .a
IV * Tks in Defilade 1 -
IV ♦ Subcaliber Firing Tks in
Defilade 6 ii
IV ♦ Plat Firing Massed Fire 2 _
IV * Service Firing Plat Firing 6 ” j
IV Firing Gunnery Qualificatioi l
Course 48 48 Ç
IV ** Indirect Fire AsIt Gun - 8
IV ** Plat in Defilade - 6
IV ** Service Firing Plat Firing
(indirect) - 8
TOTAL HOURS PHASE I II & IV
WEAPONS (GUNNERY TRAINING) 193 200
TOTAL HOURS COMMON SUBJECTS 142 149
TOTAL HOURS TRAINING PECULIAR
TO EACH TYPE COMPANY 51 51
.r ... _____ __________________ _________ - ___ ; _ — — — :__ » - ........... ..—'
-------- .— — — — —— —— — —

NOTES

1« * - Denotes subject peculiar to tank company.

2 . ** - Denotes subject peculiar to a ssa u lt gun company.
3. - Subjects not marked by a ste r isk in d icate they are common to both
tank company and a ssa u lt gun company.
4 . Phase I I I Training is b a sic and advanced in d ividu al train in g (14 w eeks).
Indoctrination of in d ividu als without prior m ilita r y service with common
background o f fundamental m ilita ry knowledge. I t w ill c o n sist of
in d iv id u a l, te c h n ic a l, and s p e c ia lis t tra in in g .
5« Phase IV Training i s basic u n it train in g (10 weeks). Basic u n it train in g
provides team tra in in g in which the in d ividu als are welded in to e f fe c t iv e
squads, crews, platoon s, companies, or comparable company - le v e l u n its .
6 . The organization, A ssault Gun Company, discussed in t h is se c tio n , has
been changed to A ssault Gun Platoon per TO&E 17 N S e r ie s. However, the
tra in in g required by t h is platoon i s ex a ctly the same as train in g for
the a ssa u lt gun company*
AG 353.4 AKPSIRI-CA 2d Ind RJW/hd
(20 Nov 52)
SUBJECT: Indirect Fire of Tanks
HEADQUARTERS, THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL, Fort S ill, Oklahoma, 11 Dec 52
TO: Commandant, The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
1. The following infom ation re la tiv e to techniques of em­
ployment of tanks fo r in d irect fire are provided in reply to a
request of Alexander M. Haig, Jr», Captain, Amor, Chairman,
Committee No. 10.
2. GENERAL C0M.CENT. The A rtillery School is of the opinion
th a t a l l weapons (tanks, a n tia irc ra ft, e tc .) have the capability
of indirect f ir e should be exploited to the maximum extent com­
mensurate with th e ir primary mission. Xfoile these weapons pos­
sess ch aracteristics re stric tin g or lim iting th e ir employment to
certain type iir.ss.ion3, they are fundamentally cannon, and as such
have the capability of providing fire support by indirect methods.
I t is considered highly desirable th a t the training of tank units
include employment in an indirect fire role; th is training ap­
proximating th at given to our a n tia irc ra ft units. Further, con­
sisten t with th e ir primary mission, tank units should be organi­
cally capable of performance of as many of the various detailed
functions involved in the indirect f ir e ro le , i,e „ , survey,
computation of data, etc. as their training and the equipment
provided w ill peanut.
3. ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.
a . Does The Artille ry School f eel th a t high velocity
tank weapons can be effectively employed as reinforcing a r t i l -
lery fire s? " ~ T
Yes. Factors considered in arriving at the decision
to employ tanks or a n tia irc ra ft weapons to reinforce a rtille r y
units include:
(1) Requirements fo r weapons to reinforce conventional
a r tille r y .
(2) Rate of fire of weapon.
(3) Range of weapon,
(4) Range and deflection dispersion.

60
 (5) A vailability of ammunition in quantity required.
j ) boas* o f tubes*

(7) Diversion from primary ro le.

Further, there are many examples of effective employment of ten1'
units as reinforcing a r tille r y in both World '• ar T’
conflict in Korea.
b. Can a lig h t or medium a r tille r y battalion provide ac­
curate firin g data to a platoon or company of tanks without de- <
uraciing from the a r tille r y mission?
Yes. Provided with the necessary range tables and
allie d data, ary fie ld a rtille ry b attalion can provide firin g data
to a tank unit for short periods of time without m aterially a f­
fecting i t s primary mission. However, present TO&E’s do not pro­
vide sufficient personnel to absorb th is additional function for
protracted periods of time. Should th is be necessary, there are
two solutions: .
(1) The tank or a n tia irc ra ft unit sends a computer
to function within the fire direction center of the reinforced
a r tille r y unit, or
(2) The fire direction center of the reinforced
a r tille r y unit sends basic data (coordinates and altitu d e of
ta rg e t, amount and type of ammunition, and time of firing) to
the tank or a n tia irc ra ft unit which in turn computes i t s own
firin g data.
c, Does The A rtillery School include in current teaching
methods fo r incorporating tank units into organic a r tille r y f ir e '
direction centers? ' "' 11
Yes. The Department of Gunnery includes four hours
of instruction in the incorporation of tanks, heavy mortars, and
a n tia irc ra ft weapons within a rtille ry f ir e direction techniques.
Instruction and ta c tic a l exercises presented by the Department
of Combined Arms include the considerations and techniques of
employment of a l l available weapons (tank and a n tia irc ra ft) in
support of ground operations.
FOR THE COJOANDANT-

/s / Harry E. Cox
/t/ HARRY E. COX
Capt, Arty
Acting Asst Adj Gen

61
 RESEARCH COMMITTEE HR 10
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION DIVISION
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky
AICBB-E 353.4 20 November 1952
SUBJECT: Indirect Fire of Tanks

TOj Commandant
The A rtillery School
Fort S ill, Oklahoma

1. Student Research Committee Nr 10 of the'Armored Officers

Advanced Class is conducting a study on the efficacy of including
indirect f ir e methods in Armor training. During the World War n
and the Korean co n flic t, tanks have been frequently employed re­
enforcing a r tille r y f ire s . In most cases, data has been supplied
by a r tille r y f ir e direction centers and the actual conduct of fire
supervised by a r tille r y personnel.
2. In order th a t th is study might reflect current thought
at the A rtillery School and result in coordinated recommendations,
i t is desired th at the A rtillery School’s views be included in th is
study.
3. Of specific in terest to th is study are the following
questions:
a. Does the A rtillery School feel th a t high velocity
tank weapons can be effectively employed reenforcing a rtille ry
fire s?

b. Can a lig h t or medium a r tille r y battalion provide

accurate firin g data to a platoon or company of tanks without de­
tractin g from the a r tille r y mission?
c. Does the A rtillery School include in current teaching
methods for incorporating tank units into organic a r tille iy fire
direction centers?

62
aICBB—
E 353*4 20 November 195
SUBJECT: Indirect Fire of Tanks
4. The views of the A rtillery School on the above questions
together with any additional comments w ill provide an essential
contribution to th is study. I t is anticipated th a t th is project
w ill be finalized by 30 December 1952.

/ s / Alexander ¡¿. Haig, J r .

/ t / ALEXANDER M. MIG, JR.
Captain, Armor
Chairman, Committee Nr 10

63
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
F O R T LEAVENWORTH, KS
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