ICBESCF – 2008

International Conference on Biodiversity, Environment and Sustainability:

Challenges for Future – Delhi 4-6 September 2008.

CONFERENCE THEME : Biodiversity Hazards & Disaster Mitigation

• Man-made hazards and Disaster Mitigation

Title : DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Christopher Lawson B.Sc (Hons), DIC, M.Eng.Sc, MIE.Aust.

SMEC International Pty.Ltd., Dam Safety Project, Jakarta, Indonesia.

ABSTRACT

Dams represent man-made hazards that, as a result of negligence, error or the failure of a
system, can cause man-made disasters.

The use of recognised standards for design and construction, well managed operation and
maintenance procedures, surveillance and safety review programs will help minimise the
risk of dam failure. However, it is also important to identify conditions that could lead to
dam failure and develop emergency action plans (Dam Safety Emergency Plans- DSEPs)
to manage those situations should they occur.

DSEPs outline the required actions of dam owners and their personnel in response to a
range of possible emergency situations. DSEPs are also provided to emergency services
to assist them in disaster mitigation and the development of their own evacuation plans.
Computer simulated dambreak studies are undertaken by the dam owner to assess the
extent of downstream flooding and identify the population at risk. A variety of dam
failure mechanisms and scenarios (sunny day failure, failure under various flood
conditions) are modelled and the resulting flood inundation maps can be used to develop
emergency evacuation plans.

This paper presents a dam safety management framework that enhances the safety of
existing dams and protects the safety and welfare of the community from dam failures.

(Keywords: Dam Safety, Dam Safety Emergency Plans, Emergency Action Plans)

1.0 INTRODUCTION

There are approximately 45,000 large dams (dams higher than 15 metres) in the world
and more than two thirds of these dams were built in the last fifty years. In developing
countries, dam construction is imperative to economic growth. In India prior to
independence in 1947, there were fewer than 300 large dams. By the year 2000 the
number had grown to over 4000, more than half of these dams built between 1971 and
1989. India ranks third in the world in dam building, behind the US and China. While
some of these dams were built primarily for flood control, water supply, and
hydroelectric power generation, the primary purpose of most Indian dams (96 percent)
remains irrigation. In fact, large dam construction has been the main form of investment
in irrigation undertaken by the Indian government.

Dams are essential elements of a nation’s infrastructure. However, the public risk in case
of failure is great; large and increasing numbers of downstream lives and property are
placed at risk. Although there are many concerned with dam safety; the legal and moral
responsibility for dam safety rests with the dam owner.

Each dam is unique in design and construction. However, the structural performance
cannot be fully tested before the dam is set in operation. Structural problems due to
design shortcomings, construction or material deficiencies or poor site conditions may
not be apparent for many years and can escalate rapidly due to the dynamic nature of
water impounded by the dam.

Dams can fail suddenly, with very little warning. Flooding is the most likely result of a
dam failure. Knowing the risk of dam failure ahead of time and advance planning can
reduce the risk of serious injury or loss of life.

Dams require ongoing surveillance and maintenance to keep them in operational

condition and to maintain their structural integrity and safety.

There are many lessons to be learnt from past dam incidents and failures. The lessons
and incidents from the past are repeated in dam engineering seminars and papers to
explain why dam safety programs are essential to safeguard life and property.

There is a need for legislation to reduce the risk of dam failure:

• St Francis Dam in California failed on the night of 12 March 1928. Flood water
killed 450 people. In 1929, the State of California enacted Dam Safety legislation.
• The failure of Eigiau Dam in Wales on 2 November 1925 killed 16 people. In 1930,
the United Kingdom passed dam safety legislation
• Major disasters at at Malpasset (France – 1959), Vaiont (Italy – 1963) and Baldwin
Hills (United States – 1963) resulted in many countries enacting new or revised laws
for dam safety.

Surveillance programs and vigilant site personnel can provide early warning of disasters
and reduce the loss of life:

• Baldwin Hills Dam, Los Angeles was built in 1951 and failed in 1963. At 11.15am,
the dam caretaker noticed unusually high seepage flows. When the dam failed at
3.38pm, 1,600 people had been evacuated from the downstream area. Five people
died.
• Fountenelle Dam, USA nearly failed on 6 May 1965 due to excessive seepage. Quick
action by operations personnel in draining the reservoir averted a disaster.
A disaster can result if surveillance programs are not effective or are “non existent”:

• Vaiont Dam, Italy, completed in 1961, was overtopped by a wave in 1963 causing a
massive landslide. The surveillance program was found to be inadequate and 2,600
people died. Seven engineers were charged and three received jail terms.
• A mine tailings dam near Starva, Italy failed on 19 July 1985 killing 279 people.
There was no surveillance program. The mine managers received jail terms.

The following are just some of the hundreds of significant dam failures that have
occurred around the world in the last few decades:

• Kanthale Dam in Sri Lanka - 18 metres high embankment dam originally built in
the 7th Century and restored in 1875, failed in 1986 killing 129 people due to the
failure of an outlet structure.
• Teton Dam in Ohio, USA - 93 metres high. Dam failed during commissioning in
1976 killing 14 people due to piping failure initiated by design and construction
deficiencies.
• Banqiao and Shimantan Dams in China - Banqiao Dam was a 118 metres high
dam built in the early 1950s and failed in 1975, due to design and construction
deficiencies, causing the failure of the Shimantan Dam downstream and the loss
of more than 18,000 lives. Details of the death toll were not released until 2005.
• Gouhou Dam in Qinghai Province, China – 71 metres high concrete-faced
rockfill dam built in 1988 failed in August 1993 due to internal erosion and
piping, killing more than 300 people.

The International Committee of Large Dams (ICOLD) has determined that the three
major categories of dam failure are overtopping by flood, foundation defects and piping.
For earthen dams, the major cause of failure was piping or seepage. For concrete dams,
the major causes of failure were associated with foundations. Overtopping was a
significant cause of dam failure in cases where there was an inadequate spillway.

It is now widely accepted that it simply costs too much to address the effects of
emergencies only after they happen. The traditional approach of emergency response and
restoration of communities must therefore be supported by emergency mitigation.
Promoting a risk management approach for safer sustainable communities, mitigation is
defined as any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and
property from a hazard event.

2.0 HAZARD AND RISK IN DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT

It is convenient to classify dams according to the hazard and risk presented by the dam.
Hazard is the potential for loss of life, property and services. Risk is independent of the
hazard category and is the probability of an adverse event occurring. The hazard
category of the dam can change from low to high during the life of the dam.
The hazard potential of a dam is a qualitative assessment based on experienced
judgement.

Hazard Classification Systems are used to categorise dams according to their degree of
hazard potential and there are various systems adopted by dam authorities around the
world.

The table below is an example of a four level Potential Impact Category System.

Table 14: Potential Impact Categories for Dams in Terms of Failure Consequences.
(After New Zealand Society on Large Dams)

Potential Incremental Consequences of Failure

Potential Impact
Category
Socio-economic,
Life
Financial, &
Environmental
High Fatalities Catastrophic damages
Medium A few fatalities are possible Major damages
Low No fatalities expected Moderate damages

Very Low No fatalities minimal damages beyond

owner’s property

The hazard category determines the dam design criteria and the frequencies associated
with inspection, monitoring, operation and maintenance. Emergency management and
the formulation of emergency action plans are also determined by the hazard category.

A survey of the topography and population downstream of the dam combined with a
computer simulated dam-break analysis is necessary to accurately assess and report the
consequences of dam failure.

3.0 DAM SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

It is the role of government to enact legislation to protect the community. Dam safety
legislation is necessary to establish regulatory authorities with the necessary powers to
ensure that dam owners undertake appropriate dam safety management.

The objective of dam safety management is to protect life, property and the environment.
The objective can be achieved by implementing and maintaining an appropriate dam
safety program. A dam safety management program recognises the causes and possible
impacts of dam failure and sets out a program of several elements that include short term
and long term actions.
A properly prepared Dam Safety Management Program will contain elements and actions
that:

• Ensure that proper industry standards are adopted for the investigation, design,
construction, operation and maintenance of the dam.
• Prepare action plans to manage incidents.
• Provide a surveillance program that monitors the operating status of the dam.
• Undertake regular safety reviews of the dam.
• Outline the responsibilities for dam safety.
• Provide dam safety training to the dam’s management and operators.
• Ensure appropriate funds and resources are available to maintain the program.

Quality management can play an important role in assuring the effectiveness of the dam
safety management program through formalised procedures and documentation.

Many international and national non-government organisations (International Committee

on Large Dams, Australian National Committee on Large Dams and New Zealand
Society on Large Dams) have developed guidelines to assist the preparation of Dam
Safety Management Programs.

The important interrelated elements of a Dam Safety Management Program are:

3.1 Dam Inspections

Regular visual inspections of dams is necessary to identify any adverse conditions that
may affect the normal operation of the dam. Inspections are carried out by trained dam
operators at frequencies related to the hazard category of the dam. Any unusual sightings
are brought to the attention of a qualified dams engineer. Special inspections are carried
out by a dams engineer following unusual events such as earthquakes and floods. All
inspections should have a form of reporting that documents the results of the inspection
and provides conclusions and recommendations for remedial works or further
investigations .

3.2 Dam Monitoring

Dam monitoring uses either instrumentation or physical measurement to compare the

actual performance of a dam with its intended design performance. A variety of
instrumentation such as water level recorders, rain gauges, inclinometers, v-notch weirs,
settlement gauges, piezometers, crack meters, pressure gauges, seismographs etc. can be
used to monitor the performance of a dam.

The frequency of monitoring also relates to the hazard category of the dam. The higher
the hazard category, the more instrumentation and higher frequency of monitoring.

3.3 Operation and Maintenance

The proper and scheduled operation and maintenance of a dam is important to ensure the
ongoing serviceable nature of all the dam’s components and equipment. Operational
preparedness of the dam’s critical equipment can only be achieved with a regular
operation and maintenance program.

The preparation of Operation and Maintenance manuals includes routine and emergency
operating procedures and preventative maintenance schedules to cover routine operation
and exercising of valves and equipment and condition based maintenance to replace worn
components or coatings.

3.4 Safety Reviews

A safety review of a dam’s performance is usually conducted every 10 to 15 years or

when routine inspections raise concerns about the dam’s performance. The safety review
will assess the integrity of the dam against current accepted engineering design standards.
Deficiencies identified by the review will be recommended for remedial action by the
dam owner.

3.5 Dam Manager and Operator Training

Effective competency based dam safety training can be provided on-the-job or in the
classroom for managers, operators and maintenance staff.

3.6 Dam Remedial Works

Regular surveillance, monitoring, operation and maintenance can identify deficiencies in

a dam that may warrant further investigation and a possible safety review. Risk
assessment techniques can be used to assist the selection of appropriate remedial actions.

3.6 Emergency Management Planning

Emergency management planning is the responsibility of the dam owner and such plans
should be put in place for dams that have the potential to put lives at risk in the case of
dam failure. Section 4.0 provides details of the preparation of Dam Safety Emergency
Plans.

3.7 Emergency action plans

When a dam is found to place lives at risk to the downstream community, emergency
action plans are developed by authorities responsible for the evacuation of the
downstream community in the event of a dam failure. The action plans use flood
inundation maps, provided by the dam owner, showing the extent of inundation caused by
dam failure. The maps provide useful information relating to access and egress from the
flood inundation area and enable the authorities to prepare evacuation plans.
4.0 DAM SAFETY EMERGENCY PLANS (DSEP)

GIS and GPS techniques enable the mapping of the area downstream of the dam.
Topographical survey information Computer dam break software, originally produced
by the American National Weather Service, is used to simulate different dam failure
mechanisms and uses flood routing techniques to model the extent of flood inundation
downstream of the failed dam. The flood inundation map enables authorities to identify
the potential lives and property at risk and also verifies the hazard classification for the
dam.

The preparation of the DSEP includes a notification flow chart, as shown in figure 1
below, for the various emergency scenarios and who to be notified in order of priority,
notification timing and method of notification (eg. telephone, mobile phone, fax, radio,
satellite phone etc.).

Dam safety emergency plans should exist for all dams where there is a potential for loss
of life in the event of dam failure. They identify the emergency conditions that could
compromise the safety of the dam. They also describe procedures to be followed by the
dam owner to respond to and mitigate the emergency conditions at the dam and to liaise
with authorities responsible for emergency activities downstream of the dam.

The development of safety emergency plans can cause apprehension with people living in
the vicinity of dams. They may perceive the development of a DSEP to be an indication
that the dam is unsafe. Communication plans and community involvement during the
preparation of DSEPs is important to created awareness of the need for emergency
planning.

REFERENCES

1. Australian National Committee on Large Dams Inc., (2003), Guidelines on Dam Safety
Management.

2. British Columbia Dam Safety Regulation (2000) – B.C. Reg.44/2000.

3. FEMA, US Department of Homeland Security (2004), Federal Guidelines for Dam

Safety, Hazard Potential Classification System for Dams.

4. New Zealand Society on Large Dams, New Zealand Dam Safety Guidelines November
2000 Issue #2
 There is a problem at the dam that may effect the integrity of the dam.
The dam operator must classify the emergency

NO Has the YES

dam
failed?

NO Is dam YES
likely to
fail?

YES Is the NO
problem
stable ?

NON DAM FAILURE EMERGENCY DAM FAILURE EMERGENCY

1. Obtain technical advice from dam 1. Evacuate the area and restrict
safety specialist. unauthorized access. Notify
emergency agencies if the
2. Monitor the situation. failure is likely to cause a
significant discharge of water
3. Correct the problem. that can put the downstream
community at risk.

2. Obtain specialist technical

advice concerning dam status.

3. Commence appropriate
preventive actions.

4. Monitor the situation.

5. Take steps to correct the

problem if possible.

FIGURE 1. DSEP NOTIFICATION FLOW CHART